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Introduction

Ten years have elapsed since the publication of the first edition of *Comparative Education*. As we reviewed the contents of that edition, we were impressed by the rapid pace of change in the interim. On the one hand, it has become nearly a cliché in literature on comparative higher education to note the astonishing transformations in the 21st century. On the other hand, the pace of change in the new century is nothing short of astounding. As a result, comparative research and scholarship have become more central than ever to the understanding of contemporary higher education.

The first edition of the reader showed remarkable foresight in a number of areas: attention was turned in that volume to such key and abiding issues as privatization, the role of the State, institutional autonomy, and the rise of postsecondary education in such emerging contexts as Southeast Asia. At the same time, fundamental theoretical frameworks, models, and analytic perspectives are no less relevant now than at the publication of the first edition. Ideology, hegemony, legitimacy, power, culture, and identity are just some of the concepts that continue to be central to understanding higher education in international and comparative perspectives. Each is addressed in one of the sections of this revised edition.

As was done during the development of the first edition, in this revision we have attempted to be inclusive of various perspectives, regions, and cultures. We understand the irony inherent in publishing a comparative volume in English and selecting readings primarily from books and journals derived from the academic core. We have endeavored to mediate these biases, however, by drawing upon an advisory board that represents scholars from across the academic and international spectrum. The advisory board was extremely helpful in providing suggestions and advice on how best to represent cultures and ideologies both in the core and on the periphery. As editors, we have engaged in several rounds of manuscript suggestions and selections both to update contributions from the first edition and to add new categories and themes to this revision. Nevertheless, we understand the difficulties in being truly inclusive and accept that inevitably there are many perspectives and contexts not sufficiently represented here.

Since the appearance of the first edition a number of themes have become more central to understanding comparative education. Therefore, in this volume we seek to build on the strengths of the first edition while bringing to the fore the finest emerging scholarship in areas of critical international concern: globalization, the political economy, privatization, public accountability, and the growth of higher education and scholarship in the newly industrialized world. At the same time, we are cognizant of the fact that higher education is a terrain of contest. Decisions over policy, allocation of resources, access, and the uses of knowledge are objects of constant practical and analytical dispute. Values, ideologies, choice sets, structures, and processes do not exist only in a theoretical space. Rather, they exist in a broader context of social, political, and economic conflict. Similarly, the process of choosing how best to organize this second education and which readings to select was itself not without contest. The editors engaged in a lively debate at times about how best to bring to the Reader new voices and new perspectives that reach beyond Western hegemony.

We have organized this volume into six sections: one designed to present foundational approaches to thinking about postsecondary content in comparative perspective and five that organize the research presented here into key domains of contest and change in higher education.
Models and Frameworks

The opening section of this volume presents material that offers a mix of contemporary and classic perspectives on comparative higher education. Our intent here is to underscore the importance of deconstructing both what we study in comparative scholarship and how we approach the study of comparative higher education. The articles in this section each present distinctive approaches to the fundamental issues at hand, and in many cases also present critiques of dominant theoretical perspectives in comparative work. These works address key themes essential to models of comparative research: the relationship between power and knowledge; the role of ambivalence in shaping the relationship between knowledge production, policy, and emerging structures of global capitalism. Taken together, the materials in our opening section express the potential of emerging perspectives on comparative higher education. At the same time, the articles presented here point to the need for further development of nontraditional and critical theoretical models and frameworks of analysis.

Faculty, Students, and the Production of Knowledge

A second key terrain of contest, the relationship of faculty and students to the production of knowledge, is introduced in this section. Contemporary research and policy debates often isolate student development and interests from faculty work, while increasingly locating knowledge production at or beyond borders of higher education. The authors here explore essential critical and postmodern approaches to knowledge production as they present new perspectives on faculty work in distinct national contexts, analyze the political economy of student participation, and apply discourse analysis to a study of the changing images of student sin postsecondary research and practice. We have selected articles that stand alone as exemplary works of scholarship and that when taken together shed light on the many interdependent aspects of faculty labor, student life, and emerging paradigms of knowledge production.

Organization and Governance

One of the most visible sites of postsecondary contest at the onset of the 21st century is the arena of organization and governance. Over the past two decades few forces have more powerfully challenged norms of postsecondary activity than the broad neo-liberal restructuring of higher education throughout the world. The reconsideration of public subsidies for postsecondary education, the concurrent debate over the public and private goods produced through higher education, and the imposition of market structures and processes have radically altered traditional understandings of postsecondary organization and governance. The readings in this section address the conflict and ensuing organizational transformation in a wide range of national contexts. The contributions here include a model for understanding the challenges universities face under increasingly complex global calls for adaptation and an analysis of the pressures of transformation generated by local and international demands on postsecondary institutions across the EU. Globalization itself is deconstructed in various aspects of this research through the analysis of curricular changes, the role of global norms of managerial behavior, and the tension between academics and managers under demands for the reform of higher education. Despite the varied contexts and challenges addressed in these articles, they share common threads. The ways in which postsecondary education is organized and governed in a particular setting and historical moment is mediated by negotiated understandings of mission and purpose. The emerging forms of organization apparent in the literature presented here point to the mutability of structures and processes and to the contested nature of legitimate forms of postsecondary organization and governance.

Social Context of Higher Education

The literature brought together to address social context illuminates a number of key theoretical and empirical questions through a shared focus on the social forces that are shaping the terrains of
contemporary higher education. The tension among local, national, and global claims on higher education and the impact of that contest on culture, gender, and identity is a common thread that runs throughout these articles. It is manifest in the analysis of reform in distinctive national settings and through the presentation of common influences shaping higher education across borders, which is reflected in the mix of local, national, and international contests shaping post-secondary development.

The attention to context is essential on several levels. In a time when the concept of globalization is ascendant, it is imperative to understand the “not global,” the forces and factors outside of, or oppositional to, the globalizing project. In that light, the nation state, in its various forms and relationships, becomes a source of contextualization, a site of contest, rather than a subsumed factor in the path of globalization. Furthermore, addressing social context is essential to understanding power and legitimacy in contemporary higher education. Taken together, the works presented in this section suggest that only when such factors as individuals, communities, collectivities, nations, institutions, social movements, governance structures, interests, and demands are placed in context, can we move to an understanding of the role of the State and the global in shaping contemporary higher education.

The State, Markets, and Privatization

Few concepts have more salience in the study of comparative higher education than the State. Driven by neoliberal challenges to the provider State and the pressures of globalizing forces, the role of the State and its linkages to markets and private enterprises have assumed a central place in understanding comparative postsecondary education. The research presented in this section proves a multifaceted approach to understanding the State, markets, and privatization. It moves beyond traditional constructs of the State as a unitary force acting upon higher education, presenting the State as a diverse and complex arena where various interests and movements contend. The university here is seen as both a site of contest within the State and as an instrument in broader social, political, and economic conflicts.

Dominant trends within the field of higher education also highlight the increasing role of markets and privatization in shaping and reshaping higher education at the local and international levels. The articles presented in this section stress the connections between market and State dynamics and point to distinct forms of privatization occurring in different university systems and regional contexts.

These articles turn attention to the problem of conceptualizing “the State” at a time when States and the roles of those States take multiple and disparate forms. They also point to the differences in authority relations between various States and higher education institutions in different national and international contexts, to the need for distinctive approaches to understanding the role of the State in various aspects of higher education, and to the role of the State in nation-building and university development.

Globalization

Our final section brings together research on one of the most oft-cited and contested concepts in contemporary society, globalization. The readings in this section attempt to illuminate the concept of globalization and its effects within and across institutions and systems of higher education. The scholars presented here offer diverse perspectives on globalization and its effects in distinctive contexts and for a variety of institutional types. They take innovative approaches to such key issues as the role of discourse and policy for inculcating globalization into these institutions, the impact of global hegemony in shaping postsecondary activity, the roles of public and private interests in shaping the globalized university, and the complex relationship between internationalization and globalization. Taken together they offer insight into the power of the demands made in the name of globalization as well as the potential for transformation that emerges from resistance.
We acknowledge that no single work, or Reader, can do justice to the depth, breadth, and diversity of the field of comparative education. We also understand that the international environment of higher education is a fluid and dynamic arena of research and scholarship. For this reason, we have attempted to select contributions that, while time-sensitive, represent larger conceptual ideas and case studies that reach beyond the national contexts considered. We encourage readers to use this volume not as an encyclopedia of comparative education but as a compendium of scholarship providing theories, data, perspectives, and contexts to stimulate further reading, research, discussion, and critique. This, in our estimation, is the most valuable contribution of comparative research in higher education.

—Brian Pusser, Ken Kempner, and Imanol Ordorika
July 2008
PART I

MODELS AND FRAMEWORKS
AMBIVALENCE AND THE POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CHANGE IN GERMAN HIGHER EDUCATION*

HANS N. WEILER

Abstract
This article argues (a) that universities are profoundly ambivalent institutions; (b) that this ambivalence explains a great deal about their behavior that would otherwise remain inexplicable; (c) that one of the most striking manifestations of this ambivalence can be found in universities’ attitudes towards change; and (d) that this ambivalence has its roots in a fundamental tension in modern society about the university’s purposes. There is good reason to believe that this set of observations holds true for universities everywhere, albeit to different degrees and in different ways. As a case in point, this article focuses on the process of change (and non-change) in German higher education over the past ten years.

Keywords: Higher education, politics of knowledge ambivalence, change.

Ambivalence

Arguing that universities are profoundly ambivalent institutions does not mean, of course, that there is no ambivalence elsewhere; what it does mean, however, is that the realm of higher education reveals, comparatively speaking, an unusually and quite exceptionally pervasive, persistent and unmistakable quality of ambivalence. This ambivalence, furthermore, is not just something that inheres in the culture of academia, but is in turn a function of societal and political contradictions about the role of knowledge and the purposes of the university. Ambivalence begets ambivalence, as it were.

“Ambivalence” is used here in two different, but related and complementary meanings: contradiction and uncertainty. In the first sense, ambivalence is defined, by no less an authority than Merriam—Webster, as “contradictory . . . attitudes . . . toward a particular person or object and often with one...
attitude inhibiting the expression of another”; Merriam—Webster cites, as an illustration, an observation by the anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn about the Apache Indians’ “ambivalent attitude and behavior toward death”. The second meaning speaks of ambivalence as “uncertainty as to which approach, attitude or treatment to follow”. This article shows how pertinent a description this is of universities; Merriam—Webster uses instead an observation about the English film which, according to film critic John McCarten, “because of a nervous ambivalence toward its subject matter . . . fails to produce the chuckles”. The English film and this paper may, incidentally, have this in common.

However, and once again, nobody says it better and more concisely than venerable old Montaigne: “Mais nous sommes, je ne sais comment, doubles en nous-mêmes, qui fait que ce que nous croyons, nous ne le croyons pas, et ne nous pouvons défaire de ce que nous condamnons.”

The notion of ambivalence has a rich and varied tradition not only in psychology and psychoanalysis (from Eugen Bleuler in 1910 to Sigmund Freud and the work of Joost Meerloo all the way to contemporary scholarship in feminist psychology about “Mothering and Ambivalence”, but in literary scholarship but in the social sciences as well.

In the social sciences, Marx, Durkheim and, indeed, Montaigne, have pioneered the concept of ambivalence, if not the term, but one of the particularly influential contributions to the study of ambivalence remains that of Robert Merton, whose work on the ambivalence of professions is particularly germane to what this article is all about, and will be discussed further below. It has been followed, more or less congenially, by a host of other scholars, including Gary Thorn and Andrew Weigert, but still remains a major milestone.

In this context, the work of Zygmunt Bauman on “modernity and ambivalence” raises a particularly interesting point in the way it casts the struggle of “exterminating ambivalence” as a “typically modern practice, the substance of modern politics, of modern intellect, of modern life”, only to conclude that, in the wake of modernity, we have learned to “be living at peace with ambivalence”. “Once declared to be a mortal danger to all social and political order, ambivalence is not an ‘enemy at the gate’ any more. On the contrary, like everything else, it has been made into one of the stage props in the play called postmodernity”.

Ambivalence and Higher Education

The argument about the ambivalent quality of universities should not be too difficult to substantiate and has a rather decent pedigree in the literature. Universities could almost be defined by their own ambivalences, i.e., by their own “contradictory attitudes” towards a wide variety of objects: towards knowledge, society, change, authority, democracy, and—most consequential of all—towards themselves. From whatever angle one examines universities, there seems to be pervasive evidence of ambivalence—with the one notable exception of a rather unambivalent resistance to outside judgments about the university’s ambivalence.

As one looks at universities in different settings, there is ambivalence

• about the relative priority of teaching and research,
• about the proper relationship between the university and the state, or between the university and business,
• about what and whom to include and to exclude from the pursuits of the university,
• about how centralized or decentralized the structures of decision-making should be,
• about how democratic or how authoritarian a university’s governance should be,
• about the relative importance of the autonomy of the individual scholar and the autonomy of the institution,
• about how national or international an institution the university should be,
• about how regulated or deregulated the life of the university and its members should be,
• about the importance or obsolescence of disciplines,
about the relative virtues of the status quo and of change, or of freedom and order, to mention just a few.

It might be instructive to imagine for a moment a similar degree of ambivalence in any other social institution. Imagine courts of law were similarly ambivalent about what does and does not constitute admissible evidence. Imagine even remotely similar degrees of ambivalence in traffic, in public transportation, in an orchestra, or in space travel—and it becomes clear how exceptionally ambivalent an institution the university is, and how important it is to appreciate this ambivalence if one really wants to understand how and why universities behave as they do.

This article takes a closer look at some of these instances of ambivalence, and uses these examples as stepping stones to the further question of why this might be so. Examples will be drawn primarily from the German system of higher education, partly because this author has looked at German universities particularly closely for some time now, from both the inside and the outside,14 and partly because—from looking at a number of other university systems—there is reason to believe that German higher education is both a reasonably representative and a particularly instructive variant of the general pattern.

It should be emphasized that this piece does not address the question of whether or not, and on what grounds, ambivalence may be good or bad, functional or dysfunctional for institutions of higher education. This disclaimer includes resisting the temptation to suggest that ambivalence about its own goals and purposes could serve as a wonderful mechanism of defense for an institution such as a university that tries to avoid accountability for its results and accomplishments: as long as there is ambivalence about exactly what an institution is supposed to accomplish, it makes little sense to hold it accountable for whether or not it has achieved its goals.

It has already been pointed out that there is a respectable tradition in the social sciences of dealing with ambivalence as a characteristic of social organizations—a tradition that, in Robert Merton’s words, is based on the “premise that the structure of social roles consists of arrangements of norms and counter norms which have evolved to provide the flexibility of normatively acceptable behavior required to deal with changing states of a social relation”.15 Surely not only Merton can think of many situations in higher education that require that kind of flexibility.

In fact, Merton himself is quick to make the connection to academia when he applies this notion of “potentially conflicting pairs of norms” to scientists and scientific institutions, and comes up with a whole series of such conflicting pairs of norms.16

Quite in keeping with Merton’s basic argument, all those who have tried to make sense of the institution of the American university presidency owe a great debt to Michael Cohen and James March for their classic study on “Leadership and Ambiguity: The American College President”.17 Who with some experience in American (and, indeed, German) higher education would not resonate to the following observation: “The college president has more potential for moving the college than most people, probably more potential than any one other person. Nevertheless, presidents discover that they have less power than is believed, that their power to accomplish things depends heavily on what they want to accomplish, that the use of formal authority is limited by other formal authority, that the acceptance of authority is not automatic, that the necessary details of organizational life confuse power (which is somewhat different from diffusing it), and that their colleagues seem to delight in complaining simultaneously about presidential weakness and presidential willfulness.”18

**Ambivalence and the German University**

It would go beyond the scope of this article to provide an extensive introduction to the nature and the peculiarities of German higher education.19 Suffice it to highlight the following points that are particularly germane to this article’s argument:

1. German higher education is much more of a “system” than anybody would ever dream of claiming American higher education to be; it operates under system-wide norms and regulations and features a considerable degree of homogeneity across institutions.

2. It is essentially a public system, with the vast majority of funds being provided straight from
(state) government budgets, and with fairly encompassing control over the use of those funds by the state bureaucracy. There are a few private institutions, all small and most of them highly specialized in business administration, computer science and other easily marketable subjects; their number is growing, but they remain a marginal phenomenon. Also, except for these private institutions, public higher education is entirely tuition free.

3. It’s a federal system where the 15 states have largely exclusive jurisdiction over higher education, with some considerable participation by the federal government through such channels as supporting university investments, research funding, and student support.

4. German reunification, which had seemed to offer a unique opportunity for substantially redesigning key social institutions, such as the university, did in fact, and to the bewilderment of many observers, not produce any major change in German higher education. However, just when that historic opportunity appeared to have been missed, a significant movement towards university reform got underway and has, over the past six or seven years, generated a great deal of change.20

Against this background, this case study focuses on four areas of ambivalence that appear to be particularly pronounced (and instructive) in the German case.

1. ambivalence about autonomy,
2. ambivalence about change,
3. ambivalence about inclusion and exclusion,
4. ambivalence about universities as national or international institutions.

Ambivalence About Autonomy

Universities everywhere have traditionally and persistently been adamant about the importance of their being autonomous, typically meaning the rights of the individual scholar to be free of outside interference in his or her performance of academic duties in teaching and research.

In a remarkable accomplishment of living with contradiction, the university (at least in its prevailing European incarnation) has for an extended part of its history been able to reconcile this firm insistence on autonomy with the persistence of an institutional relationship between the university and the state that was both utterly non-autonomous and characterized by more or less total dependence on both the regulatory and providential tutelage of the state over the university—with the one notable exception, of course, of not directly interfering with the individual professor’s “autonomy”.

This traditional contradiction is very much at the heart of the kind of ambivalence in the contemporary German university that this article is interested in pursuing. For reasons which have been analyzed elsewhere,21 there has been, over the last ten years or so, a significant political move in the direction of a more autonomous relationship between state and university, and in the direction of the conception of a university, by now enshrined in the higher education laws of several German states, that possesses a rather high degree of institutional autonomy and self-determination, in some instances all the way to significant control over budgetary and personnel matters.

One of the main arguments of the advocates for this degree of institutional autonomy22 has been the need for the university to mobilize its own resources more effectively behind a set of institutional goals and priorities that respond more adequately to the society’s need for knowledge and training; the notion of more sharply defined “institutional profiles” has loomed large in these debates.

This kind of strategy is obviously on a collision course with the staunch advocacy of professorial autonomy in the traditional sense. What, under the old regime, the authority of the state had no right to interfere with—namely the rights and privileges of the individual professor—clearly is now at least as much in jeopardy by “the university’s” efforts to marshal synergies and mobilize its own resources by imposing a certain degree of direction and purposiveness on the aggregate of its intellectual resources.23
The ambivalence that results from this development is obvious: “autonomy”, long a unanimous and unambiguous battle cry for professorial rights, has suddenly become a two-sided sword and a highly ambivalent political agenda. Institutional autonomy competes with individual autonomy. Two different outcomes—the independence of the university from the state’s bureaucratic tutelage and the freedom of a professor’s research and teaching—are competing with one another in a political setting in which one is perceived to be inimical to the other: more autonomy from the state is seen (quite correctly) as giving the university’s leadership more of a mandate to marshal the institution’s resources behind the university’s mission and thus to encroach somewhat upon the professors’ unlimited right to his or her own academic agenda. At the same time, the unfettered exercise of the individual faculty member’s autonomy is seen as undermining the very degrees of freedom that the university has gained in the battle for greater autonomy from the state.

The somewhat paradoxical outcome of all of this is a rather ambivalent attitude on the part of the professoriate towards the notion of greater university autonomy from the state, and even a tendency to rather retain the considerable, but more distant and not very activist authority of the state as the lesser evil compared to the rather close and possibly quite enterprising authority of a university president or dean to whom the state has delegated considerable decision-making authority.

Ambivalence About Change

In a slightly different sense, the situation that has just been described can also be cast as a profound ambivalence in the contemporary German university towards change. There is, on the one hand, a diffuse general belief in the intellectual inevitability and, indeed, desirability of change as a result of the ongoing process of inquiry and expanding knowledge. At a considerable level of abstraction, there appears to be a consensus that new knowledge is likely to generate new reality, that discovery, invention and understanding are bound to alter and improve human lives and the conditions under which human beings interact with one another and with their physical and social environment.

At the same time, however, universities are notable for their resistance to change, particularly when their own institutional arrangements and conditions of work are concerned. Some of this resistance has to do with fear of the unknown, some with concern over losing acquired rights and privileges in the process of structural change (a situation for which the German language has coined the inimitable and untranslatable term “Besitzstandswahrung”), but there is more to it than that.

This author’s anecdotal, but patently representative, experience during the 1990s at the helm of a newly established German university is pertinent here, particularly with regard to efforts to move away from some of the hallow traditions in German higher education. The experience is a case in point of precisely the kinds of arguments that have already been mentioned: the concern on the part of the faculty over losing the prerogatives that one had just so arduously acquired, or simply apprehension over entering uncharted territory and departing from time-honored ways in which, for example, lawyers had always been trained, etc. One of the mantras which was heard in the university senate time and again was “but this is the way we have always done it in . . .”—and one would fill in Cologne, Heidelberg, or Berlin.

But there was and is a more serious kind of resistance to change that, on the part of some of its advocates, reflects a genuine ambivalence between the value of change and innovation and the value of professional legitimacy. The argument goes roughly like this: It’s a good idea to innovate and to change an institution, but in doing that, we run the risk of moving our university out of the mainstream of respectable academia, and put not only the reputation of our faculty, but also the chances of our students and graduates in jeopardy.

This is both a serious and a very instructive kind of ambivalence. It is, for those familiar with the history of German higher education in the 1960s and 1970s, forever associated with the fate of the University of Bremen which, as the prize it had to pay for rather boldly moving ahead into new directions of academic training (including the training of lawyers), was ostracized and marginalized in the academic world in ways that have even survived some of the innovations that triggered it.
Without a doubt, this is an awkward choice for a university to make, especially a new and unknown one. Does one seize on the chance of a new beginning, and risk not being taken seriously in the community of established and reputable universities? Does one try to distinguish oneself by being different, or by being particularly faithful to the existing institutional precedents, and what are the institutional and professional costs of either strategy? It is not surprising that, in situations like this, universities tend to “play it safe” and sacrifice change on the altar of academic respectability.

Ambivalence About Inclusion and Exclusion

A third kind of ambivalence in higher education has to with the issue of inclusion and exclusion. This is an issue that tends to be more acutely perceived at American universities, but has begun to haunt the German university as well as it undergoes a process of further and more competition-based differentiation.

There is by now, albeit to a different degree, in both systems of higher education a basic tension between the conflicting goals of openness and selectivity, of giving as many people as possible a chance vs. selecting the ones for whom academic success can most safely be predicted. At least some of the current preoccupation in Germany with the introduction of consecutive degree programs of the BA/MA kind reflects this tension and attempts to solve it, just as at least some of the American debate about affirmative action is rooted in this kind of ambivalence.

That, however, is only the proverbial tip of a much larger iceberg. The real issue was, and continues to be, the much more fundamental question of the legitimacy of different kinds and traditions of knowledge, and of the grounds on which such legitimacy is established and claimed. The future of interdisciplinary programs is as much part of that issue as the debate about the “culturality” of knowledge, the questions raised by feminist epistemology, the growing debate about the “governance of science”, or the notion of a relationship of reciprocal legitimation between knowledge and power. In that more fundamental sense, the debate is far from over and is one of the more fundamental sources for the ambivalence of the contemporary university, in Germany as elsewhere.

Ambivalence About Universities as National or International Institutions

It is remarkable how ardently scholars will profess the internationality and universality of scholarship, and how intensely at the same time universities as institutions are beholden in so many ways to national frames of reference. Here lies another source of ambivalence that makes it difficult for universities to come to terms with what they are, especially at a time when the relevance of national frames of reference is increasingly subject to questions. Here again, German higher education serves as an instructive case in point.

It is, of course, true that knowledge and scholarship transcend national boundaries; but it is equally true that, especially where its teaching and training function is concerned, a university’s mission (and in particular a German university’s mission) is circumscribed in major ways by nationally defined standards, rules and regulations—from the training of lawyers to the training of teachers and from the entrance requirements for civil service positions to the equilibration between certain educational achievements and public salary scales. When it comes to defining desirable or legitimate outcomes of a German university education, the nation state is alive and well, and has developed the recognition of such outcomes in career and income terms into a veritable art form.

The ambivalence regarding national and international frames of reference in higher education is exacerbated, however, by the increasingly transnational quality of the politics of knowledge. This refers not only to the general transnational quality of the production, dissemination, and utilization of knowledge, but more specifically to the growing international traffic of ideas and prescriptions...
about what universities are, and ought to be. There have been historical antecedents for this kind of traffic, as in the role that German university concepts have played in the development of higher education in the US in the 19th century, but nothing compares to the pervasiveness with which models of higher education have started to travel around the world in the last quarter of the 20th century. This latter traffic has been remarkably one-way in that it has essentially promulgated—with more or less success—certain traits of US higher education in other parts of the world: privatizing higher education, achieving more differentiated systems, creating entrepreneurial universities, fostering competition both within and between institutions—all of these and others have served as maxims for the reform discourse in many countries, with an implicit or often explicit reference to the model nature of American higher education.

This development has some paradoxical elements. First, as national systems of higher education go, the US “system”, for all its obvious accomplishments, is probably the most idiosyncratic and least “comparable” system in today’s world; few other systems have an even remotely similar degree of differentiation and selectivity, and the existence of a prestigious private sector in higher education is almost unique in the world. Second, and the constant invocation of American models for higher education reform elsewhere notwithstanding, the US system stands out internationally as being remarkably devoid of any significant system-wide reform in recent times, especially when compared to the rather sweeping winds of change that have transformed, or are in the process of transforming, higher education in such countries as the UK, the Netherlands, Austria, or Germany.

Partly as a result of these paradoxes, and partly as a reflection of a more diffuse distrust of American precepts, the invocation of US models in the higher education reform discourse in such countries as Germany has typically engendered a considerable, and mounting, degree of controversy. It would be worth a separate paper to trace this controversy in the German case, from its fairly innocuous beginnings in meetings of German and American university administrators to more recent indictments of the “infatuation with America” ("Amerikaseligkeit") in the reform discourse—notably well before the onset and the ramifications of the Iraq conflict.

Whence Ambivalence?

These instances have been selected from a much wider range of possible examples in order to illustrate the rather pervasive element of ambivalence that seems to characterize the cultural habitat of academia in general, and in Germany, in particular. There are other examples, such as the ambivalence about the meaning of institutional democracy in higher education, or about whether or not the university should involve itself in social issues, or the ambivalence over centralization and decentralization in academic governance. All of these, taken together, do indeed convey the image of an institution that is profoundly at odds with itself.

The question is: why would this be so?

At least one answer to this question has to do with the last part of the argument that was stated at the outset of this article: the ambivalence of universities is a fairly accurate reflection of the fact that both the state and society tend to have profoundly ambivalent orientations towards higher education. The major dimension of this ambivalence has to do with the kinds of purposes that state and society consider appropriate for the university; this dimension varies—or rather, oscillates—between reaffirming the independence of the university in its pursuit of knowledge and invoking the right of society to have the university contribute to the solution of a society’s problems. This is probably true in the US as well as in Germany and other countries, except that in the US the state, as in everything else, plays much less of a role in articulating norms regarding the purposes of higher education—notable exceptions, such as affirmative action, notwithstanding.

Faced with this contextual ambivalence about its own purposes, the universities themselves see no particular reason to overcome what for them seems to be a natural—or at least very comfortable—tendency towards an academic and cognitive culture that is in its turn profoundly ambivalent about its own identity and purpose. Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the university has developed into the kind of profoundly ambivalent institution that this article has sought to describe.
The ambivalence of society towards its universities is something that figured already in Robert Merton’s concerns. It has to do with the tension between society’s deeply rooted respect for scholarship and scholars, on the one hand, and a similarly deep-seated doubt whether they really deserve the perks, the freedoms and the resources they receive.

There is, however, a more subtle and more recent kind of ambivalence in the society’s perception of its universities, and that has to do with different conceptions of knowledge and its utility. Here there reigns, on the one hand, the time-honored notion of the academy as the place where knowledge is being pursued for its own sake. On the other hand, there prevails—in its crassest form—what has come to be known as the notion of shareholder value. In this kind of ambivalent perspective, scholars are at once seen as independent high priests of knowledge, or as public servants of whom certain outcomes are expected. In Germany in particular, one would find a sizeable accumulation of views on either side of this continuum, even though the scale seems to have recently tipped in favor of the shareholder value side.

As far as the state is concerned, its ambivalence toward universities is even more pronounced and, in some instances, quite bizarre. In the German case and in some other European countries, the state constantly vacillates between regulation and deregulation, between control and autonomy, between the high-risk/high-gain dynamic of reform and the relatively comfortable and safe maintenance of the status quo.

But beyond that, there is a kind of ambivalence that seems to border on downright duplicity. Here I am coming back to the German variant of the issue of autonomy, where I had already pointed out a fairly conspicuous movement in the direction of letting universities handle their own affairs more independently of the state. That, ostensibly, would go for the management of financial resources as well, and there is talk and quite a bit of action about block grant budgets—“Global-haushalte”—in which universities would receive a certain amount of money to do with as they see fit. That sounds, at first sight, like a fairly reasonable implementation of the principle of autonomy. Except for one thing: in every case of globalizing university budgets that I know about, universities lose a sizeable chunk of the money they had before. The question is whether there is really a political concept of greater institutional autonomy at work—or just a skilful minister of finance having found another way of balancing a precariously imbalanced budget? The correct answer is probably, both of the above, and amounts to yet another indication of the profound ambivalence with which the state views universities.

One other thought needs to be added to this reflection on the relationship between the state and universities, hopefully without the risk of becoming an accessory to yet another conspiracy theory. For beyond the question of specific policies like block grant budgets, there is something quite delicate about this relationship between universities and the state. That delicacy has to do with what, in some of my earlier work, I have described as a relationship of reciprocal legitimation between knowledge and power. In this relationship, knowledge and power legitimate each other such that knowledge becomes an important source of legitimacy for a given order of political authority (as in the role of scholarly expertise in establishing the credibility of government policies) while, at the same time, an important part of the legitimacy of certain kinds of knowledge derives from political decisions about qualifications for professional employment, standards of public contracting, and the acceptance of expertise. If this is so, it imposes such a significant burden on the relationship between state and universities that it might well account for at least some of the ambivalence of the relationship: While the state depends on the university at least in part for generating and sustaining the legitimacy of its authority, the university in its turn depends on the state at least in part for the legitimation of its knowledge product.

Thus, for a whole variety of reasons, both society and the state are rather ambivalent in their relationship to, and their conception of the purposes of, the university. Is it at all surprising, then, that universities have developed ambivalence into an art form of their own, and that universities define themselves in ways that maximize the strategic utility of ambivalence for the pursuit of their own goals?

It works very nicely: If universities do not like the troubles and frustrations of social involvement, they insist that their primary task is the disinterested search for truth. If, on the other hand
and under different circumstances, the search for truth seems too ascetic and unrewarding, the
involvement in the social issue du jour may provide a welcome distraction.

If lucrative contracts or grants from outside the university beckon, it is useful to remind every-
body that the state has to leave the university with enough discretion to avail itself of such oppor-
tunities. If, at less opulent times, the effort to raise outside resources under the competitive conditions
of the open funding market appears to be too burdensome, the role of the state as the legitimate
provider of the university’s wherewithal is duly emphasized.

Nor can the universities necessarily be blamed for making use of these degrees of freedom
that their environment so invitingly grants them. They act, in some sense, perfectly rational. If
state and society had similarly ambivalent attitudes about civil aviation or public utilities (and, as
we know, sometimes they have), airlines and utility companies would probably do the same, or at
least try.

Is this a bad situation or a good situation, or does it matter? Is what Stephen Frosh says about
the relationship of fathers to their children—“Certainty is almost always destructive; ambivalence
has many positive attributes.”46—true for universities as well? Is, in a situation where markets
become more important than state patronage, ambivalence no longer “the enemy at the gate”, as
Zygmunt Bauman claims?

The answer, unfortunately, is far from clear.
At its best, ambivalence in academia provides the very space for alternative answers without
which the process of inquiry would remain a rather sterile affair.
At its worst, ambivalence provides a comfortable excuse to avoid asking the hard questions
and finding the hard answers.

There is, alas, ambivalence even in analyzing ambivalence.

Notes

1. Montaigne (1998, p. 461) (“But we are, I know not how, of two minds in ourselves, which is why what we
believe we do not believe, and cannot disengage ourselves from what we condemn”).
2. Cited by Merton (1976, p.3).
5. See, for example, the work of Susan Cole (1985) on rituals of mourning in the literature of different cul-
9. See also, for a particularly illuminating study of ambivalence in the context of the German political cul-
ture, Ralf Dahrendorfs classic on “Society and Democracy in Germany” (1965).
11. ibid., p. 15.
12. ibid., p. 279; see also Smart (1999).
13. See, among many others, Cohen and March (1986). In another realm of educational policy analysis, I
have made use of the notion of ambivalence in connection with the issue of centralization and decentral-
ization (Weiler 1993).
16. Merton (1976, pp. 33–34). Some time ago, this author had occasion to reflect on the experience of six
years as head of an institution of higher education in Germany, and came up with a remarkably similar
list of contradictions (or ambivalences) in the life of a university (see Weiler 2001c).
19. See, for more extensive treatments, Daxner (1999); Enders et al. (2002); Fallon (1980); Mittelsträßer (1994); Rothfuß (1997); Teichler et al. (1998); Weiler (1998a, 2001a).

20. This somewhat peculiar sequence of non-developments and developments deserves, and has received, a more detailed treatment than is possible here: Weiler (2001c); see also Müller-Böing (2000); Stifterverband (2002).


24. What Mittelsträßer calls their “structural inability to change” [“Reformunfähigkeit”], 1994, p. 17.

25. Viadrina European University at Frankfurt (Oder)—a new, post-unification university about 60 miles east of Berlin, right on the Polish-German border and set up with a special mandate for both interdisciplinary and international scholarship, the latter particularly with a view to cooperation with Poland and the rest of Central Europe. As a new university, established at a time of rather momentous social and political change in that part of the world, the Viadrina was meant by its founding parents to be a “reform university”.


27. Other newly founded universities like Konstanz and Bochum featured more moderate degrees of innovation, and were thus, and by being more circumspect in their public posture, spared the fate of Bremen.

28. This author had an instructive experience recently with a bi-national seminar of American and German specialists in higher education, which was to deal with the issue of “democratization in higher education” and had given the participants relatively free reign in how to define that issue for purposes of their own contribution to the seminar. It was interesting that almost all of the American participants denned the issue of democratization in terms of access to higher education, while almost all of the German participants defined it in terms of university governance and structure. There clearly is, at least at this point in history, a considerably greater preoccupation in the US than in Germany with questions of equity, which also reflects, of course, the much more differentiated nature of the US system of higher education. This is likely to change, and there will be probably once again much more concern with access in German higher education as soon as Germany will have, as now seems inevitable, both tuition fees and more university control over student admissions.


34. Harding (1986).


37. Teichler et al. (1998, pp. 79–96); Wächter (1999).

38. Pertinent in this connection is the (true) story of the process of hiring two new faculty members at Frankfurt (Oder)—after all, at a university with a special international mandate. One of the two professors came from the University of Munich and one from the University of Warsaw. For an extended transitional period, German civil service regulations permit newly appointed professors to claim the reimbursement of travel expenses to regularly visit their families as long as they still live in their old location (“Familienheimfahrten” is the official bureaucratic term for it). Thus, the professor from Munich was regularly paid the airfare for going home to Munich over the weekend. For faculty whose families reside abroad, however, the official rules specify that travel can only be reimbursed to the nearest German border station. For our colleague from Warsaw, inasmuch as Frankfurt (Oder) is situated already on the German–Polish border, this meant that his reimbursement was limited to the taxi ride from the university to the railway station in Frankfurt (Oder)—but only, of course, if he could prove that he had unusually heavy books and papers to carry, because otherwise he was only entitled to the cost of public transportation.


40. Clark (1998); Müller (1996); Weiler (2002).

41. Notwithstanding such developments as the groundswell of curricular innovations that Martha Nussbaum (1997) reviews.

42. Müller-Böing et al. (1998).
43. In the words of one of the most prominent (and thoughtful) critics of this kind of infatuation, the former state secretary of higher education for the state of Saxony, Hans Joachim Meyer.

44. Merton (1976, pp. 32ff).


References


EDUCATION POLICY IN THE AGE OF KNOWLEDGE CAPITALISM

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Introduction

Martin Carnoy and Diana Rhoten (2002) have recently argued that “linking economic and social change to changes in how societies transmit knowledge is a relatively new approach to studying education.” Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, historical studies challenged the old view of comparative education that focused on the philosophical and cultural origins of national systems of education by situating educational reform in economic and social change. Carnoy and Rhoten write,

Some of them went further, using approaches based in political economy, world systems theory, and theories of neo-colonialism and underdevelopment to show that economic imperatives on a global scale were a major force in shaping education worldwide.

They recognize how globalization provides both a new empirical challenge and a theoretical framework for comparative education, arguing,

Globalization is a force reorganizing the world’s economy, and the main resources for that economy are increasingly knowledge and information. If knowledge and information, usually transmitted and shaped by national and local institutions, are fundamental to the development of the global economy, and the global economy, in turn, shapes the nature of educational opportunities and institutions, how should we draw the directional arrows in our analysis?

They go on to argue that “if knowledge is fundamental to globalization, globalization should also have a profound impact on the transmission of knowledge,” yet while the decentralization of educational administration and finance has proceeded apace, there has been little apparent change at the level of the classroom. Carnoy and Rhoten also analyze the relationship between the nation-state and the globalized political economy as one that involves, on the one hand, processes that may diminish the power of the state through growth promotion and enhancement of national competitiveness based on attracting multinational capital flows at the expense of domestic education policy, and on the other, processes that may shift and enhance specific powers of the state to control the territorial and temporal spaces for capital investment, especially in the new complexity of layered world and regional governance. Elsewhere, Carnoy (2000) argues that globalization is impacting education in terms of finance (reduction of public spending and the search for other founding sources); the labor market (providing a ready supply of skilled labor as a basis to attract foreign capital); the quality of national educational systems (through international comparison, testing, and standards); and the adoption of information technology (to expand quantity of education at low cost). In this regard, he suggests that “globalized information networks mean transformation of world culture,” which is increasingly contested by new global movements (see also Peters 2002a). Prophetically, he remarks, “This constitutes a new kind of struggle over the meaning and value of knowledge,” yet he acknowledges that these educational changes, while sharing certain characteristics, also vary greatly across regions and nations.
It is clear that accounts of globalization differ considerably. *Globalization* is a contested term, and different forms of globalization (economic, cultural, ecological, technological) can be understood as parallel and differential processes that proceed differently and affect countries in varied ways. Yet what we might call “the neoliberal project of globalization”—an outcome of the Washington consensus and modeled by world policy agencies such as the IMF and the World Bank—has predominated in world policy forums at the expense of alternative accounts of globalization. It is an account that universalizes policies and obscures country and regional differences. It also denies the capacity of local traditions, institutions, and cultural values to mediate, negotiate, reinterpret, and transmute the dominant model of globalization and the emergent form of knowledge capitalism on which it is based. Yet voices of criticism, even from mainstream economists, have been raised against this monolithic and homogenizing model of globalization.

For example, Joseph Stiglitz (2002), as former chief economist of the World Bank, has recently criticized the policy decisions of the IMF as “a curious blend of ideology and bad economics.” In particular, he argues that the IMF’s structural adjustment policies imposed on developing countries have led to hunger and riots in many countries and have precipitated crises that have led to greater poverty and international inequalities. Elsewhere, Stiglitz (1999a) identifies the new global knowledge economy as one that differs from the traditional industrial economy in terms of the scarcity-defying characteristics of ideas. He argues that the reality of the knowledge economy requires a rethinking of economics because knowledge behaves differently from other commodities such that its sharing may add to its value. He maintains that knowledge also shares many of the properties of a global public good, implying the necessity of government intervention in the protection of intellectual property rights in a global economy, especially where the tendency to natural monopolies is even greater than in the industrial economy, marked by a greater potential for monopolies than under industrial capitalism (see also Peters 2001b, 2002b, 2002f, 2002g).

Yet at the heart of Stiglitz’s (2002) analysis of globalization and its discontents is an approach based on the economics of information—in particular, *asymmetries of information*—and its role in challenging standard economic models of the market that assumed perfect information. Information economics provide better foundations for theories of labor and financial markets. His work on the role of information in economics evolved into an analysis of the role of information in political institutions, where he emphasized the necessity for increased transparency, improving the information that citizens have about what these institutions do, allowing those who are affected by the policies to have a greater say in their formulation. (Stiglitz 2002, xii)

The transformation of knowledge production and its legitimation, as both Stiglitz and Carnoy indicate, are central to an understanding of globalization and its effects on education policy. If transformations in knowledge production entail a rethinking of economic fundamentals, the shift to a knowledge economy also requires a profound rethinking of education as emerging forms of knowledge capitalism involving knowledge creation, acquisition, transmission, and organization. This chapter is an essay on the new political economy of knowledge and information. It adopts the concepts of “knowledge capitalism” and “knowledge economy” as overarching and master concepts that denote a sea change in the nature of capitalism, and it seeks to understand this change by reference to economic theories of knowledge and information. Comparativists in education, while alert to the forthcoming struggles of the meaning and value of knowledge, must also come to understand the driving economic theories, in part responsible for influential characterizations of knowledge capitalism and the knowledge economy, as a first stage in sensitizing themselves to regional and cultural differences in the way educational policies are formulated and implemented.

The term *knowledge capitalism* emerged only recently to describe the transition to the so-called knowledge economy, which we characterize in terms of the economics of abundance, the annihilation of distance, the deterritorialization of the state, and investment in human capital (see table 1). As the business development and policy advocate Burton-Jones (1999, vi) puts it, “Knowledge is fast becoming the most important form of global capital—hence ‘knowledge capitalism.’” He views it as a new *generic* form of capitalism as opposed to simply another regional model or variation. For Burton-Jones and analysts of world policy agencies such as the World Bank and OECD, the shift to a knowledge economy involves a fundamental rethinking of the traditional relationships between...
education, learning, and work, focusing on the need for a new coalition between education and industry. Knowledge capitalism and knowledge economy are twin terms that can be traced at the level of public policy to a series of reports that emerged in the late 1990s by the OECD (1996b) and the World Bank (1998) before they were taken up as a policy template by world governments in the late 1990s (see, e.g., Peters 2001b). In terms of these reports, education is reconfigured as a massively undervalued form of knowledge capital that will determine the future of work, the organization of knowledge institutions, and the shape of society in the years to come.

This chapter, then, focuses on the twin notions of “knowledge capitalism” and the “knowledge economy” as a comparative context for formulating education policy. First, it briefly analyzes recent documents of world policy agencies concerning these two concepts, focusing on the OECD’s emphasis on “new growth theory”; second, it examines the World Bank’s Knowledge for Development; and, third, it briefly discusses the notion of knowledge capitalism as it appears in the recent work of Alan Burton-Jones (1999). These examples serve as three accounts of knowledge capitalism, or, better, of contemporary capitalism, that explain its advanced development from the single perspective of the economic importance of knowledge and information. In the concluding note, the chapter raises a series of issues for comparative education and entertains a concept of knowledge socialism as an alternative organizing concept underlying knowledge creation, production, and development.

### The Knowledge Economy: The OECD and New Growth Theory

The OECD report The Knowledge-Based Economy (1996b) begins with the following statement:

OECD analysis is increasingly directed to understanding the dynamics of the knowledge-based economy and its relationship to traditional economics, as reflected in “new growth theory.” The growing codification of knowledge and its transmission through communications and computer networks has led to the emerging “information society.” The need for workers to acquire a range of skills and to continuously adapt these skills underlies the “learning economy.” The importance of knowledge and technology diffusion requires better understanding of knowledge networks and “national innovation systems.”
The report is divided into three sections, focusing on trends and implications of the knowledge-based economy; the role of the science system in the knowledge-based economy; and indicators, essentially a section dealing with the question of measurement (see also OECD 1996a, 1996c, 1997; Foray and Lundvall 1996). In the summary, the OECD report discusses knowledge distribution (as well as knowledge investments) through formal and informal networks as being essential to economic performance and hypothesizes the increasing codification of knowledge in the emerging “information society.” In the knowledge-based economy, “innovation is driven by the interaction of producers and users in the exchange of both codified and tacit knowledge.” The report points to an interactive model of innovation (replacing the old linear model), which consists of knowledge flows and relationships among industry, government, and academia in the development of science and technology. With increasing demand for more highly skilled knowledge workers, the OECD indicates, Governments will need more stress on upgrading human capital through promoting access to a range of skills, and especially the capacity to learn; enhancing the knowledge distribution power of the economy through collaborative networks and the diffusion of technology; and providing the enabling conditions for organisational change at the firm level to maximise the benefits of technology for productivity. (7)

The science system—public research laboratories and institutions of higher education—is seen as one of the key components of the knowledge economy, and the report identifies the major challenge as one of reconciling its traditional functions of knowledge production and the training of scientists with its newer role of collaborating with industry in the transfer of knowledge and technology.

In an analysis of the knowledge-based economy in one of the earliest reports to use the concept, the OECD observes that economies are more strongly dependent on knowledge production, distribution, and use than ever before, and that knowledge-intensive service sectors (especially education, communications, and information) are the fastest growing parts of Western economies, which, in turn, are attracting high levels of public and private investment (spending on research reached an average of 2.3 percent, and education accounts for 12 percent, of GDP in the early 1990s). The report indicates how knowledge and technology have always been considered external influences on production and that now new approaches are being developed so that knowledge can be included more directly. (The report mentions Friedrich List on knowledge infrastructure and institutions; Schumpeter, Galbraith, Goodwin, and Hirschman on innovation; and Romer and Grossman on new growth theory). New growth theory, in particular, demonstrates that investment in knowledge is characterized by increasing rather than decreasing returns, a finding that modifies the neoclassical production function, which argues that returns diminish as more capital is added to the economy. Knowledge also has spillover functions from one industry or firm to another, yet types of knowledge vary; some kinds can be easily reproduced and distributed at low cost, while others cannot be easily transferred from one organization to another or between individuals. Thus, knowledge (as a much broader concept than information) can be considered in terms of “know-what” and “know-why,” broadly what philosophers call propositional knowledge (“knowledge that”), embracing both factual knowledge and scientific knowledge, both of which come closest to being market commodities or economic resources that can be fitted into production functions. Other types of knowledge, what the OECD identifies as “know-how” and “know-who,” are forms of tacit knowledge (after Polanyi 1967; see also Polanyi 1958) that are more difficult to codify and measure. The OECD report indicates that “Tacit knowledge in the form of skills needed to handle codified knowledge is more important than ever in labour markets” (1996b, 13, emphasis in original) and reason that “education will be the centre of the knowledge-based economy, and learning the tool of individual and organisational advancement,” (14), where “learning-by-doing” is paramount.4

The World Bank: Stiglitz’s Knowledge for Development

In 1998 the World Bank released its influential World Development Report: Knowledge for Development (World Bank 1998), which indicated a major shift in the development paradigm away from its status
as a bank that provided infrastructure finance to one that resembles a “knowledge bank,” with a
greater emphasis on the role of knowledge, learning, and innovation in development (see chapter 9). 
Knowledge for Development tends to separate knowledge about technology from knowledge about
attributes, or what is traditionally called human capital formation. The aim is to reduce “knowledge
gaps” and to foster knowledge creation and acquisition. In this changed picture of development,
education takes on a central role in terms not only of basic education but also of lifelong education
(see chapter 9).

Let us briefly note the importance of education to this development recipe. Acquiring knowl-
edge not only involves using and adapting knowledge available elsewhere in the world—best
acquired, so the report argues, through an open trading regime, foreign investment, and licensing
agreements—but also local knowledge creation through research and development and building
upon indigenous knowledge. Absorbing knowledge is the set of national policies that centrally con-
cerns education, including universal basic education (with special emphasis on extending girls’
education and that of other disadvantaged groups); creating opportunities for lifelong learning;
and supporting tertiary education, especially science and engineering. Communicating knowledge
involves taking advantage of new information and communications technology, as the report would
have it, through increased competition, private-sector provision, and appropriate regulation.
Arguably, without delving further into this substantial report, the World Bank maintains its neolib-
eral orientation with an emphasis on open trade and privatization, although it is recast in terms of
the perspective of knowledge.

Stiglitz, perhaps, deviates more from the Washington consensus. In a series of related papers
delivered in his role as chief economist for the World Bank, he (1999c) argues that knowledge is a
public good because it is nonrivalrous—that is, knowledge once discovered and made public
operates expansively to defy the normal “law” of scarcity that governs most commodity markets.5
Knowledge in its immaterial or conceptual forms—ideas, information, concepts, functions, and
abstract objects of thought—is purely nonrivalrous such that there are essentially no marginal costs
to adding more users. Yet once materially embodied or encoded, such as in learning or in applica-
tions or processes, knowledge becomes costly in time and resources. The pure nonrivalrousness of
knowledge can be differentiated from the low cost of its dissemination resulting from improve-
ments in electronic media and technology, although there may be congestion effects and waiting
time (e.g., to reserve a book or download from the Internet). Stiglitz (1999c) delivered his influen-
tial paper “Public Policy for a Knowledge Economy” to the United Kingdom’s Department for Trade
and Industry and Center for Economic Policy Research on the eve of the release of the UK white
paper Our Competitive Future: Building the Knowledge Driven Economy (www.dti.gov.uk/comp/
competitive/main.htm), which subsequently became a template for education policy in England
and Scotland (see Peters 2001b). Stiglitz’s paper also provides a useful guide for understanding
some of the analytics of the knowledge economy (see table 3.2).

While nonrivalrous, knowledge can be excluded (the other property of a pure public good) from
certain users. The private provision of knowledge normally requires some form of legal protec-
tion, because otherwise firms would have no incentive to produce it. Yet knowledge is not an ordi-
nary property right. Typically, basic ideas, such as mathematical theorems, on which other research
depends, are not patentable, and hence a strong intellectual property rights regime might actually
inhibit the pace of innovation. Even though knowledge is not a pure public good, there are exten-
sive externalities (spillovers) associated with innovations. As Stiglitz notes, the full benefits of the
transistor, microchip, and laser did not accrue to those who contributed to those innovations.

While competition is necessary for a successful knowledge economy, Stiglitz maintains that
knowledge gives rise to a form of increasing returns of scale, which may undermine competition,
for with large network externalities, forms of monopoly knowledge capitalism (e.g., Microsoft)
become a possible danger at the international level. New technologies provide greater scope for the
suppression of competition, and, if creativity is essential for the knowledge economy, then small
enterprises may provide a better base for innovation than large bureaucracies. Significantly, Stiglitz
provides some grounds for government funding of universities as competitive knowledge corpo-
rations within the knowledge economy and for government regulation of knowledge or informa-
tion monopolies, especially those multinational companies that provide the so-called information
infrastructure.
On the basis of this analysis, Stiglitz provides a number of pertinent observations on the organizational dimensions of knowledge. He maintains that just as knowledge differs from other commodities, so too do knowledge markets differ from other markets. If each piece of information differs from every other piece, then information cannot satisfy the essential market property of homogeneity. Knowledge market transactions for non-patented knowledge require that we disclose something and thus risk losing property. Thus, in practice, markets for knowledge and information depend critically on reputation, on repeated interactions, and also, significantly, on trust.

On the supply side, knowledge transactions within firms and organizations require trust and reciprocity if knowledge workers are to share knowledge and codify their tacit knowledge. Hoarding creates a vicious circle of knowledge restriction, whereas trust and reciprocity can create a culture based on a virtuous circle of knowledge sharing. On the demand side, learning cultures (my construction) artificially limit demand for knowledge if they denigrate any request for knowledge as an admission of ignorance.

Stiglitz argues that these knowledge principles carry over to knowledge institutions and countries as a whole. If basic intellectual property rights are routinely violated, the supply of knowledge will be diminished. Where trust relationships have been flagrantly violated, learning opportunities will vanish. Experimentation is another type of openness, which cannot take place in closed societies or in institutions hostile to change. Finally, he argues that changes in economic institutions have counterparts in the political sphere, demanding the institutions of an open society, such as a free press, a transparent government, pluralism, checks and balances, toleration, freedom of thought, and open public debate. This political openness is essential for the success of the transformation toward a knowledge economy.

**Knowledge Capitalism: Burton-Jones’s Conception**

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**TABLE 2**

**Analytics of the Knowledge Economy**

It is argued that the knowledge economy is different from the traditional industrial economy because knowledge is fundamentally different from other commodities, and these differences, consequently, have fundamental implications both for public policy and for the mode of organization of a knowledge economy.

The Scarcity-defying characteristics of ideas
1. Nonrivalry
2. Conceptual vs. Material Knowledge

Intellectual property rights
1. Excludability
2. Externalities
3. Competition

Organizational dimensions of knowledge
1. Knowledge markets
2. Knowledge transactions within firms
3. Openness and knowledge transfer
4. Experimentation

The marketplace of ideas
1. Pluralism in project selection
2. Robustness
3. The failure of central planning
4. Decentralization and participation within firms
5. Openness in the political process

Source: Adapted from Joseph Stiglitz (1999c).
Perhaps the most developed model of knowledge capitalism, together with the most worked-out implications for education, comes from a book of that title—Knowledge Capitalism: Business, Work, and Learning in the New Economy by Alan Burton-Jones (1999). Burton-Jones states his thesis in the following way:

The fundamental proposition of the book is that among the various factors currently causing change in the economy, none is more important than the changing role of knowledge. . . . As the title of the book suggests, knowledge is fast becoming the most important form of global capital—hence “knowledge capitalism.” Paradoxically, knowledge is probably the least understood and most undervalued of all economic resources. The central theme of this book is, therefore, the nature and value of knowledge and how it is fundamentally altering the basis of economic activity, thus business, employment, and all of our futures. The central message is that we need to reappraise many of our industrial era notions of business organization, business ownership, work arrangements, business strategy, and the links between education, learning and work.

He argues that the distinctions between managers and workers, between learning and working, are becoming blurred so that we all become owners of our own intellectual capital, or knowledge capitalists—at least in the Western advanced economies. And he goes on to chart the shift to the knowledge economy, new models of knowledge-centered organization, the imperatives of knowledge supply (as opposed to labor supply), the decline in traditional forms of employment, and the knowledge characteristics of work. He argues that “economic demand for an increasingly skilled workforce will necessitate a move to lifelong learning” (vii) based upon the learning imperative, including the use of learning technologies, which will lead to the development of a global learning industry and to profound “changes to the relationships involving learners, educators and firms” (vii). Burton-Jones addresses himself to the question of how governments might assist in the transition to the knowledge economy by focusing on knowledge acquisition (education, learning, and skills formation) and knowledge development (research and innovation) policies, suggesting that while most of the changes have occurred as a spontaneous response to the demands of the market rather than through state intervention, the state has an important role to play. He is less enthusiastic than Stiglitz or Thurow about the proposition that the increasing importance of knowledge in the economy might lead to a reversal of current trends and produce an increasing role for the state.

Knowledge Capitalism or Knowledge Socialism?

Of the three accounts of knowledge capitalism we have briefly presented, Stiglitz’s arguments are perhaps the most important for understanding what we call “knowledge cultures.” As we argued in chapter 1, the distinction between the knowledge economy and the knowledge society is too dualistic. The object of economics of knowledge is knowledge as an economic good and the properties governing its production and reproduction. Insofar as the knowledge economy discourse is seen as a basis for the structural transformation of the economy focusing on the production, distribution, and transfer of knowledge, it cannot base its understanding on the industrial economy or, indeed, employ traditional neo-classical assumptions. Knowledge does not behave in the same way as other commodities as the exchange, use, and sharing of knowledge may not deplete its value but actually enhance it. Knowledge capitalism reifies the economic at that historical point when a shift to the “sign” economy, or the importance of symbolic goods in general, blurs the distinction between economy and culture. The discourse of the knowledge society focuses on the social origin of ideas and their effects on society and the social relations of knowledge including its institutions. It is concerned with new forms of social stratification evident with the production of knowledge and the emerging international knowledge system. It is also concerned with questions of access and distribution, and with associated rights. Our preferred term knowledge cultures encourages a greater interdisciplinary approach based in part on the understanding that we must understand the new logic of cultural consumption where consumers are no longer passive but act as co-producers of knowledge, information, and cultural goods. We use the term knowledge cultures in the plural because there is not one prescription or formula that fits all institutions, societies, or knowledge traditions. In this situation, perhaps, we should
talk of the ways in which knowledge capitalism rests upon conditions of knowledge socialism, at least upon the sharing and exchange of ideas among knowledge workers.

Our speculative hypothesis, not investigated at any length in this chapter, is that knowledge capitalism will exhibit different patterns of production, ownership, and innovation according to five basic regional models of capitalism. These five regional models, based in part on different cultural understandings of knowledge and learning, not only represent cultural differences in the meaning and value of knowledge but also provide a major index for regional differences in education policy.

We can talk of Anglo-American capitalism, European social market capitalism, French state capitalism, and the Japanese model. Clearly, one might also talk of an emergent fifth model based on China’s market socialism. A recent World Bank study, for instance, has suggested that the Chinese government must take on the new role of architect of appropriate institutions and provider of incentives to promote and regulate a new socialist market economy based on knowledge (see Dahlman and Aubert 2001).

Yet the notion of the knowledge economy also represents something of an anomaly. Even in the face of widespread policies of privatization, education in most OECD countries remains overwhelmingly public, that is, state owned and regulated. As we argue more fully in chapter 5, the dominant mode of the organization of knowledge is still largely state owned, even if there has been a steady erosion of traditional state providers at all levels and in all areas of education. Clearly, as firms and other nonstate organizations edge themselves further into the traditional preserve of state education, public ownership and regulation of knowledge will diminish. In addition to an increase in the privatized distribution, delivery, and sources of knowledge, there has already emerged a web of public-private partnerships, particularly in science and engineering fields. There is the continued likelihood that governments will permit greater experimentation in forms of provision, regulation, and funding with the emergence of public-private partnerships, community-owned and/or religiously oriented institutions, and a raft of private enterprises that not only directly substitute for traditional state educational activities—especially with the growth of private business and management schools—but that also interface with the state sector in the area of technical support. There are myriad forms of privatization that parallel each other, from vouchers to outsourcing. This emergence of profit, not-for-profit, community, and state organizations indicates that there will be many struggles—legal and ethical—over knowledge ownership, creation, distribution, access, and archiving. In the age of knowledge capitalism, the problem of knowledge cannot be separated from the problem of the accumulation of capital; these two are increasingly interdependent and inextricably bound up together in ways that imperil “pure” state forms of knowledge production and exchange. The picture is further complicated through the progress of an emerging intellectual property rights regime developed and promulgated, in particular, through the World Trade Organization and negotiations of trade policy, including the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which came into force in 1995. These new trade rules, designed to encourage international competition, include all manner of service activity and describe those services universally considered to be essential to human health and development, such as education and health care. The implications for knowledge institutions, especially higher education and libraries, are enormous and point toward “knowledge wars” between “information-rich” multinationals and small dependent states, and toward future global struggles over the commercialization and commodification of information, knowledge, and associated services.

Notes

1. A version of this paper was given as a keynote address to the World Comparative Education Forum Economic Globalization and Education Reforms, Beijing Normal University, October 14–16, 2002.
2. This observation seems questionable in view of the restructuring of national curricula to focus on basic skills of numeracy and literacy, the standards-based movement, the proliferation of work-based education programs, the introduction of technology studies, the emphasis on science, the reform of teacher training, the registration and new accountability of teachers, and the like, which have accompanied globalization.
3. There is a huge literature criticizing globalization and suggesting alternatives. See, for example, Appadurai (2001), Bello (2001), and Mandle (2003).
4. The emphasis on tacit knowledge is developed out of the work of Polanyi (1958, 1967), which is also strongly developed in terms of the concept of practice in both Heidegger and Wittgenstein. The emphasis on practice, perhaps, is a major distinguishing characteristic of much twentieth-century philosophy, sociology, and cultural analysis (see, e.g., Turner, 1994), with a focus on the practical over the theoretical and the “background practices” against which theoretical knowledge is articulated and/or codified. The concept of practice, mostly unexamined, figures largely in education and pedagogy and in the relatively new concept of “communities of practice” that has been developed in the context of business and organizational learning.

5. This section on Stiglitz draws on the section “Analytics of the Knowledge Economy” from Michael Peters’s recent paper “Universities, Globalisation and the Knowledge Economy” (Peters, 2002f).

6. For a recent article by Burton-Jones, see the inaugural issue of the web-based new start-up journal Policy Futures in Education, edited by Michael Peters and available at Triangle Publications from 2003 (www.triangle.co.uk). The inaugural issue is devoted to “Education and the Knowledge Economy,” with contributions from Paul A. David and Dominique Foray, Gerarde Delanty, Steve Fuller, and many others.

7. Dahlman and Aubert (2001) argue that improving education is perhaps the most critical reform for the medium and long runs.
Abstract

This article argues that public policy formation cannot be understood without a consistent theory of the capitalist state and politics. This is particularly true with respect to educational policies. Expanding capital accumulation and increasing the legitimation of the entire mode of production seem to be the principal roles of the capitalist state, a role that is in perpetual tension. Coming to grips with this tension constitutes a principal challenge for the state. Considering educational policies, programs and practices, to inquire into the reasons for the growth of a given educational level—how programs have been devised historically, by whom, for what purposes, and how they are related to the educational clientele that they are supposed to serve—is to ask for an explanation of the determinants of educational policy formation. In this article a framework for a political sociology of educational policy making and a set of hypotheses on the production rules of public policy are offered.

Determinants of Education Policy Formation

In comparative research in political science and public administration, determinants of public policy have been cataloged from a vast array of contrasting perspectives. Siegel & Weinberg, for instance, have emphasized the following domestic, internal influences in policy making: (a) environmental determinants of public policy (e.g. economic factors, physical environment, and social and demographic factors), and (b) political system determinants of public policy (e.g. political community, political regimes and the authorities). Among external influences in policy making, they have distinguished the following: (a) international development forces (e.g. military and political developments), and (b) international organizational cooperation, assistance and pressures (which certainly have proven to be very relevant for some areas of educational policy making in various countries) (Siegel & Weinberg, 1977). An alternative schema has been substantiated by H. Leichter for use in analyzing public policy. He has distinguished between situational factors (divided into six complementary sets of factors which extend from economic circles to technological change); structural factors (which include the political structure and the economic structure); cultural factors (distinguishing between political culture and general culture); and finally environmental factors (distinguishing between international political environment policy diffusion, international agreements and multinational corporations) (Leichter, 1979).
These are merely a few examples of common trends in the empirical analysis of public policy. Unfortunately, there are very few studies which address themselves to an analysis of educational policy formation in capitalist states which at the same time try to overcome the narrow and technical point of view commonly used in studies of policy making and planning.

Policy making, for instance, has been commonly analyzed as: (1) the production of interaction between political controllers and professional providers of services (Saran, 1973); (2) the focus on timing and feasibility as crucial elements in policy making (David, 1977); (3) research such as Wirt & Kirst (1982) which, by assuming that schools are miniature political systems, falls into the contradiction of accepting a pluralist power structure in the United States, but ends up portraying schools as a world of harmony and consensus; (4) research that deals with local state policy making, and the development of educational policies taxonomies, especially basic control mechanisms available to state-level policy makers, in which the independent (explanatory) variable would be the political culture and educational assumptions of policy makers (Peabody Journal of Education, 1985); or (5) an Eastonian-system analysis perspective that focuses on education units as parapolitical subsystems that include the processing of demands, the generation of support by authorities, regime and the political community, and the feedback response factor (Howell & Brown, 1983). All of these fairly conventional approaches lack an understanding of theory of the state, and a critical conceptualization of issues such as domination, power, rules and political representation in analyzing policy making. But perhaps they are especially faulty in that the methodological individualism of these studies led to an underestimation of the constraints (or restraints) on policymakers’ actions, and particularly their conspicuously naive worldviews. In short, these types of studies lack the theoretical sophistication needed to understand a very complex and rather sophisticated political process of educational decision making in capitalist societies. As Richard Bates has said, “Underlying this onslaught of criticism was a clear impatience with the value neutrality of classical public administration and its tendency to distance itself from complex and controversial issues while focusing on narrow empiricist studies of administrative processes” (Bates, 1985, p. 15).

They also lack a holistic approach to determinants of policy making, i.e. an ability to link what happens in schools and nonformal education settings with what happens in terms of accumulation and legitimation processes in the overall society. Above all, they have a practical-pragmatic bias in which the guiding knowledge interest (borrowing the term from Habermas, 1968) of the research is exclusively empirical-analytical, thus oriented toward potential technical control, rather than, or in addition to, an historical-hermenueitic interest or a critical-emancipatory one.

Hence, prevailing methodological individualism in social theory, and Pragmatist empiricist epistemological assumption in educational administration have defined the study of policy making as a political process “in which constraints and opportunities are a function of the power exercised by decision makers in the light of ideological values” (Child, 1973 cited in Clegg & Dunkerley, 1980, p. 338).

In this article, I shall argue that a critical theory of power and the state is a necessary seconding point to study educational policy making—hence, moving the analysis from the strict realm of individual choice and preference, somehow modeled by organizational behaviour, to a more historical-structural approach where individuals indeed have choices, but they are prescribed or constrained by historical circumstances, conjunctural processes, and the diverse expressions of power and authority (at the micro and macro levels) through concrete rules of policy formation. Also, I will argue that any study of education as public policy should deal with the issues of the organizational context in which power (as an expression of domination) is exercised. The relationships between power, organization and the state should be understood from a combined perspective of the political economy and a political sociology of educational policy making.

I shall argue that policy making should be studied in the context of a theory of politics. Following Clegg (1975), I assume that the concept that articulates political life is domination which has manifold expressions, from economic dominance of one class over others in the material production and reproduction of social life, to patriarchal relations and intersubjective, male to female domination in the household (Morrow & Torres, 1988). Similarly, the distinction between surface/deep structure models of rules, borrowed from structural linguistics, could be very useful as a starting point in understanding power in decision making (Clegg, 1975, p. 70). Chomsky (1968) has distinguished between ‘deep structure’ (a semantic interpretation of sentences) and ‘surface structure’
TABLE 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Objective processes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surface structure</td>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Exchanges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deep structure</td>
<td>Rules</td>
<td>Rationality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form of life</td>
<td>Domination/exploitation</td>
<td>Economie activity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Clegg (1975, p. 78).

(which implies the phonetic interpretation of sentences) where they both constitute in dynamics of language structure as a vehicle of meaning.

The deep structure is composed of a set of restrictive and enabling rules, “those which operate to modify independently existing forms of behaviour and activity” and those which create new forms of behaviour and activity” (Shwayder, in Clegg, 1975, p. 75). At the level of deep structure, a given combination of rules constitute different rationalities as, for instance, in Weber’s three modes of legitimate authority or domination (e.g. traditional, charismatic and bureaucratic). At the level of surface structure, observable exchanges between individuals and institutions would constitute exchanges of power (which in turn, as Marx pointed out in Chap. 23 of Vol. I of The Capital, will inhibit or contribute to the simple and complex reproduction of economic exploitation/domination structures in social life). Clegg has graphically described the articulation of these categorical-analytical relationships (Table 1). In Clegg’s terms: “Power is about the outcomes of issues enabled by the rule of a substantive rationality which is temporally and institutionally located. Underlying this rule is a specific form of domination. The progression is from domination → rules → power” (Clegg, 1975, p. 78).

This approach to rules, power and domination, which are essential stand-points to the study of policy making, has to be complemented with a discussion of a theory of the state in order to understand what I have called, following Claus Offe, the production rules of public policy. The next section attempts, first, to highlight the importance of a theory of the state for the study of educational policy making, and second, to introduce the notion of state authority in capitalist societies. For the sake of clarity, the theoretical, analytical and political differences between the theories and authors that are discussed below, and that inspired our framework (e.g. the state derivationists, Poulantzas, Offe, Therborn, Gramsci, etc.), will not be discussed in great detail. Similarly illustrations and examples that may bring to life this theoretical framework will not be extensively used due to space restrictions.

**Theory of the State and Education**

A common thread that runs through Marxist and Marxist-influenced educational research is the analysis of education as part of the state-administered reproduction of fundamental societal relations (Broady, 1981, p. 143). It has been discussed elsewhere that, in general, the notion of social reproduction (a) presupposes theories of society as a complex totality which develops through contradictions; (b) takes relatively complex societies as the object of inquiry within which formal and specialized educational institutions play a significant role; (c) argues these educational institutions constitute strategic sites for the stability and further development of these societies; (d) studies the relations of mutual interaction between these institutions and the larger society which provides the basis for sociologies of education; (e) suggests that policy formulation within the educational sphere constitutes a crucial context of negotiation and struggle which may have decisive effects on the capacity of society to maintain or transform itself, hence, educational settings are a microscopic representation of the larger macroscopic societal dynamics; and (f) paradoxically considers education to be either a powerful (and somehow a unique) tool for socialization into a given social order or to challenge and resist a hegemonic culture or social practice. In short, theories of social reproduction in education are linked with power, race, gender, class, knowledge and the moral bases of cultural production and acquisition (Morrow & Torres, 1988).
Although the relationship between education and the State is at the core of the definition of education’s reproduction function in capitalist societies, it has rarely been thoroughly analyzed in contemporary social theory. Research questions concerning the capitalist state and its class-based proceedings, state impingements on educational structures, practices, codes, and especially educational planning and policy making, still lack sound theoretical understanding and appropriate methodological procedures for their study.

For instance, the influential book *Schooling in Capitalist America* focused on the notion of capital and its intervention in the educational system, particularly in the preparation of students as future workers at the various levels in the hierarchy of capitalist production (Bowles & Gintis, 1976). Bowles & Gintis have suggested a correspondence principle which explains educational development. In brief, there is a perceived correspondence between the social relations of production and the social relations of education (Bowles & Gintis, 1981, p. 225). Responding to the critics, they have argued that this correspondence principle depicts five main features of capitalist schooling: (a) the surprising lack of importance of the cognitive aspects of schooling in the preparation of good workers and in the intergenerational reproduction of social status; (b) an assessment of the limits of progressive education which is social rather than biological or technological; (c) a focus on the experience of schooling, which provides a consistent analytical framework for understanding the school as an arena of structured social interaction, and the school curricula as an outcome of these interactive processes; (d) a larger framework to integrate the effects of schooling on individuals (e.g. skills, attitudes, scholastic achievement) into a broader process of structural capitalist transformation and reproduction; and finally (e) Bowles & Gintis claim their analysis shows that, in order to understand the structure of schooling, it is not the ownership but the control of the means of production that matters (Bowles & Gintis, 1981, pp. 226, 227).

The emphasis here is on the general, class-based social determination of educational policy and schooling which is expressed in the correspondence principle. In a more recent contribution, Carnoy & Levin (1985) have emphasized that this earlier analysis of education and reproduction lacks a concrete theory of the State. Similarly, although it is important to consider the process of correspondence between education and capital accumulation, it is even more important to focus on the process of state mediation of contradictions. It is argued that the major problem with the type of analyses produced by Bowles & Gintis and Boudelot & Establet is, “...that it does not account for the contradictory trends towards equality and democracy in education... Indeed, Bowles and Gintis argue that the ‘laws of motion’ of correspondence are so dominant that democratic or egalitarian reforms must necessarily fail or be limited in their impact” (Carnoy & Levin, 1985, p. 22).

To understand these complex relationships of correspondence and contradiction in education an explicit theory of the State and politics is necessary. I will argue that to study public policy formation, one must identify concretely the institutional apparatus of the State and who directly controls this apparatus. Similarly, it is of fundamental importance to identify the roles of the capitalist state (and education) in regard to the process of capital accumulation and social legitimation (Curtis, 1984).

Before I turn to discuss the notion of the State and policy making, I would like to assume that the capitalist state has a relative autonomy from the social classes, which seem to be recognized by Marxist and non-Marxist scholars alike (Archer & Vaughan, 1971, pp. 56–60; Offe & Ronge, 1975; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977, p. 199; Alvater, 1979; Skocpol, 1980, pp. 155–201; Fritzel, 1987, pp. 23–35). Indeed, this relative autonomy is structural and is built into the very foundations of the capitalist mode of production (Boron, 1982, p. 47). Similarly, I will assume that state intervention in civil society has become one of the State’s crucial features which takes different forms in different countries, involving such diverse issues as: (a) the articulation and/or independence of the capitalist state and the bloc-in-power, to use the expression developed in Poulantzas’s writings (Poulantzas, 1969a, pp. 237–241), (b) the articulation of the State-subordinate class relationships; (c) the degree of direct and indirect state action in the regulation of capital accumulation (i.e. the State’s role in the economy); (d) the State-Nation relationship in the context of the World System—as a macrocosmic condensation of broader dynamics and strains built into this structural relationship, particularly in the case of peripheral dependent states; and (e) the issue of the crisis of the capitalist states, with its implications in terms of hegemony and legitimation processes.
State Authority and Policy Formation

The concept of the State has become a fashionable term in political science. However, many authors would refer to political authority and policy making as the role of the Government or the public sector, and some may even be inclined to use a more comprehensive notion such as the ‘political system’ rather than the State. This is not the place to argue on behalf of the usefulness of the concept. I shall point out that I share the rationale of Daniel Levy (1986, pp. 12–25) regarding the advantages of using the concept of the State.

I use the notion of the State, first of all as a reaction against liberal-pluralist political approaches that for many decades worked within a ‘stateless’ theoretical framework; and second, in order to highlight particularly, the role of the state as an actor in policy making with purposeful and relatively independent action while at the same time becoming a terrain where public policy is negotiated or fought over.

I propose to consider the State, at the highest level of abstraction, as a pact of domination and as a self-regulating administrative system. Cardoso has suggested that the state should be considered "The basic pact of domination that exists among social classes or factions of dominant classes and the norms which guarantee their dominance over the subordinate strata" (Cardoso, 1979, p. 38).

Similarly, Claus Offe (1972a, b, 1973; 1974, 1975a, 1975b, 1984) conceptualizes state-organized governance as a selective, event-generating system of rules, i.e. as a sorting process (Offe, 1974, p. 37).

Offe views the State as comprising the institutional apparatuses, bureaucratic organizations, and formal and informal norms and codes which constitute and represent the ‘public’ and ‘private’ spheres of social life. The primary focus, then, is neither the interpersonal relations of various elites nor the decision-making of process per se. Therefore, the class character of the state does not reside in the social origin of the policy-makers, state managers, bureaucracy or the ruling class, but in the internal structure of the state apparatus itself due to its necessary selectivity of public policy; a selectivity that is "built into the system of political institutions" (Offe, 1974, p. 37).

In a similar vein, Goran Therborn identifies two main sources of determination of policy formation in the capitalist states. On the one hand, those determinations which originate at the level of state power, that is, the specific historical crystallization of relations of forces condensed into a pact of domination which acquires expression in a set of policies concerning the productive process, and, on the other hand, those determinations which originate in the structure of the state apparatus and the class bias of its organizational form (Clegg & Dunkerley 1980, pp. 433–480; Therborn, 1980, pp. 144–179).

In summary, the emphasis here is on the dual character of the capitalist state and its organizational forms. That is to say, while the state claims to be the official representative of the Nation as a whole, it is at the same time the object, product and determinant of class conflict. Through its policies directed toward the constitution and reproduction of the capitalist system, it is protected from various threats and guides its transformation; yet by acting as a factor of cohesion, the State’s long-term planning synthesizes the goals of economic and social reproduction of capitalism as a system of commodity production, despite the sectoral or factional short-term needs and disputes of individual capitalist or corporative groups (Altivater, 1973; Offe, 1973; Skocpol, 1982, pp. 7–28).

Having outlined in very abstract terms the use of the notion of the State, I turn now to advance a set of working hypotheses on the production rules of public policy.

Production Rules of Public Policy: A Theoretical Assessment and Hypothesis

Is Public Policy Formation Mainly a Response or Anticipation to Social Threats?

At the highest level of generalization, the first hypothesis advanced here will stress that any mode of state intervention is linked to a changing pattern of potential or actual threats, or to structural problems that emerge out of the process of accumulation of capital. Thus, the modes of state activity (which will be identified in the next section) can be seen as responses to these social threats and problems (Offe, 1975b, pp. 137–147; O’Donnell, 1978a, b, 1982; Wright, 1978, p. 277; Curtis, 1984, p. 12).
Obviously, this pattern of perceived social threat and state response should not be taken mechanically. As Goran Therborn has so aptly argued in studying the origins of welfare state policies in Europe and the strengthening of class activism:

What is being argued is, (1) that a threat from the working-class movement, perceived by the political rulers, was a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for welfare-state initiatives; (2) that there is a structural affinity between the first major welfare-state initiatives and the modern labour movement; and (3) that there is a chronological relationship between the emergence of the modern labour movement and the beginning of the welfare state, which makes it probable that there is a causal link between the two, the nature of which remains to be demonstrated. (Therborn, 1984, p. 12)

However, after saying that, Therborn claims that there is always a certain tension between the identified historical processes and the analytical categories used for its study. Arguing that public policy is made out of opposing social-policy perspectives, Therborn cautiously emphasizes that the forms and principles of public social commitments have been politically controversial. These controversies have not been merely conjunctural, and have not only pitted individual politicians or civil servants and political parties and interest groups against each other. They have also developed along class lines, and the various specific issues are to a significant degree intelligible in terms of opposite class perspectives. Classes are not decision-making bodies, which is a fundamental reason why policy making is inherently irreducible to class conflict and class power. Yet a class analysis provides an explanatory framework that can make the study of politics and policy into something more than a modernized *histoire événementielle* of strings and episodes acted out by individual policy-makers. (Therborn, 1984, p. 25)

The extent to which these changing social patterns of threats alter not only public policy formation, but also the very same form of the capitalist state, is not our immediate concern here. However, there seem to be certain affinities between the perceived pattern of threat and the pattern of state response/transformation. For example, recent political sociology argues that the emergence of a highly repressive form of political regime, e.g. the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State in Latin America, is causally related to the internalization of the production in Latin America and the perceived threats from the subordinate social classes. Guillermo O’Donnell argues that the emergence of such regimes is linked to a particular phase or crisis of capital accumulation encountered in the maturation of dependent, industrializing economies. In short, this is the phase in which ‘easy’ import-substitution possibilities have been exhausted and further expansion seems to depend upon new investments in capital intensive, technologically advanced industries. Included with this ‘economic framework’ of the explanation, there is an increased activation of the popular sector and working classes which threatens the political stability of the capitalist regime (what Huntington has termed the “praetorianization” of the masses); finally, there is an increased importance of technocratic roles in the State. The evolution of these two major variables, namely the ‘deepening of industrialization’ and the so-called ‘background variables’, lead the societal situation to an elective affinity between advanced industrialization and bureaucratic authoritarianism (Collier, 1979, pp. 3–26, 380; O’Donnell, 1982).

Why is this issue of social threats so important, and how are they dealt with by advance capitalist states? The so-called ‘German Debate’ (Holloway & Picciotto, 1979, pp.19–31; Jessop, 1982; Carnoy, 1984) will give us some clues. A prominent participant in this debate Eltmar Altvater, pointed out that capital is unable, as a result of its existence as many factionalized and mutually antagonistic capitalists, to produce the social preconditions of its own existence. State interventionism is derived (deduced) as a particular state form working toward shortening and overcoming those deficiencies of private capital by organizing individuals into a viable body (namely a general capitalist interest).

Altvater derives the nature of state interventionism from the four general functions of State which he has envisaged.

There are essentially four areas in which the State is primarily active, namely, 1) the provision of general material conditions of production (‘infrastructure’); 2) establishing and guaranteeing general legal relations, through which the relationships of legal subjects in capitalist society are
performed; 3) the regulation of the conflict between wage labour and capital and, if necessary, the political repression of the working class, not only by means of law but also by the police and the army; 4) safeguarding the existence and expansion of total national capital on the capitalist world market. (Altvater, 1979, p. 42)

Claus Offe not only explicitly recognizes his agreement with Altvater (Offe, 1973a, p. 110) in their mutual criticism of the State Monopoly Capitalism Thesis (STATEMOP Thesis). Offe also adds to Altvater’s formulation that state domination should be understood as a regulating system or as a system of filters with the specific selective mechanisms of: (a) extracting a general class interest from many fractionalized capital units, and (b) oppressing or suppressing any anti-capitalist interest which could arise in any capitalist social formation (Offe, 1975b, pp. 125–144).

Hence, social threats are dealt with by social policies and state institutions as part of this preventive and regulative role of the State. In regard to these state functions, Therborn’s comment on the need to look at the State’s everyday routines would show a fundamental activity that has not been highlighted so far, the Welfare activities which seem to dominate everyday state routine (Therborn, 1984, p. 32). In support of this, Therborn shows that since education is at the core of welfare policies—and since education and also health systems are labour intensive, they employ a sizable majority of the total public servants—school employees in 1970, at the time of the Vietnam War, for the first time since the US turned into an imperial world power, became significantly more numerous than military and civilian defense personnel (Therborn, 1984, p. 35). A similar argument could be developed for a dependent society such as Mexico where slightly more than half of the total increase in federal employment between 1970 and 1976 was allocated to education (Torres, 1984, p. 156).

In societies in social transformation, recent research (Carney & Samoff, 1988) has shown that, on the one hand, a new political regime must respond to mass demands for more schooling, better health care, and the redistribution of agricultural land. On the other hand, a fundamental task of these regimes is to accumulate capital in order to expand the national material base. It seems that while, hypothetically, social demands and the accumulation of capital are complementary since healthier, more educated people will have higher productivity and therefore will increase output, to choose one to the relative exclusion of the other may mean, in the worst case, to risk failure of the political project itself. Carney, Samoff and co-workers have demonstrated how in all of the case studies, which included Cuba, Nicaragua, China, Tanzania and Mozambique, the expansion of public services such as education and health care also have ideological implications, and that the legitimacy of the State in both low- and high-income countries is therefore affected by its capability to deliver such services to the population at large.

Patterns of State Activity: The Pursuit of Abstract Systemic Interests or Single-Class-Based Interests? On Modes and Methods of State Intervention

Claus Offe recognizes four main guiding patterns of state action. First, exclusion: since the State has no authority to order production or to control it, State and accumulation are somehow divorced in such a way that production and accumulation cannot be separated. Second, maintenance: the State does not have the authority but rather has the mandate to create and sustain conditions of accumulation, as well as to avoid, regulate or repress social threats. Threats may come from other accumulating units (e.g. interfirm, interindustry and international competition), from non-capitalist entities (e.g. the working class, social movements), or from criminal or ‘deviant’ behaviour. Third, dependency: the power relationship of the capitalist state and its main decision-making powers depend, like any other relationships in capitalist society, upon the presence and continuity of the accumulation process. A last guiding pattern of state activity is the legitimacy function of the capitalist state. The State can only function as a capitalist state by appealing to symbols and sources of support which conceal its true nature (Offe, 1975b, pp. 126, 127). In a more crude economic analysis of the advanced capitalist societies, Offe has suggested a structural discrepancy between abstract, surplus-value-related forms and concrete, use-value-related forms used in the implementation
of state functions. Thus, this discrepancy can be maintained, if not solved, over time only by a system of legitimacy. Indeed, it is likely that as state power acquires more functions, it also requires an increase in legitimation (Offe, 1973b, p. 74).

Considering the above-mentioned fundamental parameters of state intervention, what remains to be clarified is the analytical distinction between modes of state intervention and methods of state intervention. The former refers to state action vis-à-vis state expected functions under the logic of commodity production, while the latter refers to a somehow abstract analytical distinction which embraces those several state alternatives (methods) to choose from in the process of public policy formation.

The principal modes of state intervention can be divided into allocative modes and productive modes. Offe has proposed the following schematic description of these types of activities:

1. **Allocative**
   - a) allocation of State-owned resources,
   - b) response to demands and laws (“politics”),
   - c) demands which are positive and specific in regard to time, space, group, type, and amount of state resources, and
   - d) decisions reached by politics.

2. **Productive**
   - a) production of inputs of accumulation (organized production process required)
     in response to perceived threats to accumulation;
   - b) conflicting or incompletely articulated demands that cannot be eliminated without threatening the overall process of accumulation;
   - c) decision reached by policies based on State-generated decision rules. (Offe, 1975b, p. 133)

Using allocative activities, the State creates and maintains the conditions of accumulation by means that simply require the allocation of resources which are already under state control (e.g. taxes, repressive forces, land, mass media). The productive mode represents state action which supplies a variable and a constant capital which the units of private capital are unable to produce. Beyond areas of competence or types of policies considered, what really differentiates these two modes is that the allocative mode is usually controlled and thereby reinterpreted by its inputs while the productive mode is generally controlled and thereby evaluated by its outputs (Offe, 1972a, p. 128).

The principal methods of state intervention are the following: (a) *state regulation* through a set of positive and negative sanctions connected with a certain behaviour of social categories (e.g. bureaucracy) or social classes, (b) *infrastructure investment* either as a partial or supplementary method to private capital activity (e.g. building roads, bridges, airports) or as a total method with which to replace private capital activity (e.g. the case of mass public compulsory education in some countries, law enforcement or the administration of justice. In these cases, the participation of private initiative is negligible in terms of the amount of investment and the probability of a high and consistent degree of control of systemic outcomes); (c) *participation* as the co-determination of policy making and policy-operation through consent building in decision-making bodies which incorporate several interest groups or corporative units.

Considering these modes and methods, it is important to propose a second hypothesis regarding the process of policy formation. Thus far, it has been suggested that the State’s motivational force is the pursuit of an abstract systemic interest rather than any particular interest; however, it is equally important to distinguish between short-term, conjunctural processes and long-term, historical or organic processes in policy formation. The Gramscian dictum is in this regard very insightful and clear, and deserves to be quoted at length:

A common error in historical-political analysis consists in an inability to find the correct relation between what is organic and what is conjunctural. This leads to presenting causes as immediately operative which in factor only operate indirectly, or to asserting that the immediate causes are the only effective ones. In the first case, there is an excess of ‘economism’, or doctrinary pedantry, in the second an excess of ‘ideologism’. In the first case there is an overestimation of mechanical causes, in the second an exaggeration of the voluntarist and individual element. The distinction between ‘organic’ movement and facts, and ‘conjunctural’ or occasional ones must be applied to those in which a regressive development or an acute crisis takes place, but also to those in which there is a progressive development or one towards prosperity, or which the productive forces are stagnant. The dialectical nexus between the two categories of movement, and therefore research, is hard to establish precisely. (Gramsci, 1980, p. 178)
Are the ‘Form’ and the ‘Content’ of Policy Making Two Distinct Dimensions?

A third working hypothesis regards the distinction between *form* and *content* in the production rules of public policy, which results from the same analytical distinction between deep/surface structure models of rules. For instance, analyzing welfare state politics, Therborn has argued that: “One important reason for the intricate complexity of welfare-state history is the fact that public social-policy commitments can take a number of different forms, and questions of form have often aroused more controversy and conflict than the principle of public social responsibility *per se*” (Therborn, 1984, p. 16).

First of all, at a lower level of abstraction, it is not to be expected that a situation in which a stated intention of a policy and its actual outcome faithfully coincide could ever be found. Even though at first glance this point seems to be a trivial one, nonetheless it prevents a formal comparison—so common in educational studies—between the State’s alleged goals and the practical results. In general, such comparisons are too formal and generic to be worthwhile. Therefore, there will always be a gap between what is declared, what is implemented, and what is the actual policy outcome.

Second, at a higher level of abstraction, if the rationality behind a policy decision is treated as an analysis of language-in-use, any conversation will have a basic grammar, but the linguistic rules will not have entire control over the quality, intensity and meaning of the message. Similarly, “The organization structure can be conceived in terms of the selectivity rules which can be analytically constructed as an explanation of its social action and practice (its surface detail, what it does). The rules collected together, may be conceived of as a mode of rationality” (Clegg, 1979, p. 122). This mode of rationality, that is expressing selectivity rules, could be of different origins. Clegg has distinguished four types of rules: *technical rules* (know-how to carry out a particular administrative task), *social regulative rules* (any intervention to repair social solidarity in an organization, such as the implementation of human relations), *extra-organizational rules* (e.g. discriminatory practices based in racism, sexism, etc.) and *strategic rules* (social contracts, and wages and income policies).

It should be mentioned in passing that an example of a related type of analysis, although applied to education discourses (which influence and inform educational policies), can be found in Giroux when he compares different views of cultural production, pedagogical analysis and political action in the teacher-student experiences. Giroux distinguishes different pedagogical discourses (or logics-in-use in education), namely the discourse of management and control, the discourse of relevance and integration (progressivism), and the discourse of cultural politics—critical affirmative language; hence, using Giroux’s terminology, a discourse that moves from a language of criticism to a language of possibilities (Giroux, 1985, pp. 22–41).

In short, the distinction between form and content of public policy is similar and related to the distinctions between rationality and social action, and between deep/surface structures. In fact, if we take into account all the possible combinations of different selectivity rules (and the fact that all of them may be co-existent at some point, or conversely, given a particular historical and organizational setting, one may predominate over the rest) with inputs (including rationalities), processes of transformation, and outputs (including social action) of policy, a simple distinction of form and content will vanish in front of our eyes; every policy form may or may not have a particular policy content if we take into account selectivity rules.

Is the State a Problem-solving Agent?

As a result of these theoretical explorations, the fourth hypothesis rejects the notion of the State as simply a *problem-solving agent*, an approach that in general places too much emphasis on the analysis of policy content and on the predominance of ‘technical rules’ among selectivity rules. The main assumptions of this common approach to policy making are the following: (i) the State seems to be analyzing those processes which occur in the political arena, and through a diagnosis of the chief problems, organizes its political agenda for action; (ii) from this standpoint, it is important for researchers to focus mainly upon which interests are involved in the determination of policy making; and (iii) as soon as this identification has been done, the corollary of the analysis will be to check those interests against the material outcomes and the distribution of tangible benefits which
result from policies and implementation (Lindblom, 1968, pp. 12, 13). In general, these shared assumptions are used in the basic approaches to policy planning in education, including such areas as the estimation of social demand, needs analysis, manpower planning, cost-effectiveness analysis or rate-of-return analysis (Russel, 1980, pp. 1–15; Simmons, 1980, pp. 15–33; Weiler, 1980).

**Is Social Control Built into the Selectivity Rules?**

A fifth hypothesis suggests that any organizational structure has controls which are built into the system of political institutions. Following Clegg, an organization-structure is a set of sedimented (i.e. historically laid down and superimposed) selection rules: “The organization-structure can be conceptualized as a structure of sedimented selection rules. Those prescribe the limits within which the organization-structure might vary” (Clegg, 1979, p. 97). Furthermore, those rules of policy formation depend upon the main guiding patterns of state action, the main state resources to carry out its functions, and the principal modes of state intervention.

The central guiding patterns of state activity have been identified as (a) exclusion, (b) maintenance, (c) dependency, and (d) legitimacy. The political puzzle, then, for the capitalist state is how to reconcile these patterns in the production of public policy. I have maintained following Offe, that the motivational and structural force underlying policy making is the attempt to reconcile these four elements. To carry on its functions, the State resorts to four principal means: fiscal policies, administrative rationality, law enforcement and repression (which should not be considered only as a special case of administrative rationality and mass loyalty. In the case of the dependent state, perhaps the most significant feature is that the exercise of coercion and organized repression overlaps (and sometimes will have more prominence than) the other three standard means.

These main resources enable the capitalist state to perform its principal roles of executing preventive crisis management, determining priorities embodied in social needs, social threats and civil society problem-areas (for example in Canada a typical case of a problem-area is the native question), and devising a long-term avoidance strategy for further threats and conflicts. In this regard, contradictions can no longer be plausibly interpreted simply as class antagonism. They must, as Offe insists, at least be regarded as necessary by-products of an integral political system of control (Offe, 1975a, pp. 4, 5). To this extent, the fiscal crisis of the State, which appears to be the inevitable consequence of the structural gap between state expenditure and revenues, is at the same time a lively testimony and expression of systemic constraints.

**Can Functional Interaction and Interdependency Be Differentiated According to Different Political Regimes?**

A last hypothesis will stress that the different forms of functional interaction and interdependency within a bureaucratic organization can be analytically differentiated; and similarly, the form that this interaction assumes will vary according to the type of political regime considered.

For instance, Oscar Oszlak in analyzing political regimes in Latin America has identified three main types: bureaucratic-authoritarian, democratic-liberal and patrimonialist; similarly, Oszlak identifies three main types of bureaucratic interdependency: hierarchical, functional and material or budgetary (Oszlak, 1980).

Before exploring determinants of policy formation, it will be necessary to identify and carefully characterize the type of political regime and capitalist state, and which dominant form of bureaucratic interdependency comes into the discussion.

**Production Rules of Policy Formation: A Summary**

(1) The capitalist state has been defined as an arena, a product and a determinant of class and social conflict. Hence, any mode of state intervention is linked to a changing pattern of threats, potential or actual, or to structural problems that emerge out of the process of capital accumulation and political domination. Particularly in dependent states but also in industrial advanced social
formations, class struggle and the political practice of social movements give shape to the state structure at the same time that an institutionalized set of selectivity rules alter the intensity, degree and level (character) of class and social conflict. Two implications can be drawn. On the one hand, the form and content of state policies give shape to the forms and content of the class and social struggles, while, conversely, class and social struggles are shaping the form and content of state policies (Sardiei-Bierman et al., 1973, pp. 60–69). On the other hand, there is a practical tension between consensus-oriented practices and coercion-oriented practices in the planning and implementation of state policies.

(2) There are modes and methods of state intervention which deal with those patterns and threats raised in the class and social struggles; the former (divided into allocative and productive modes) refers to a wide range of probable activities regarding the use of state resources while the latter (distinguishing between state regulations, infrastructure investment and participation) refers to the range of probable courses of action undertaken by the State. Both, methods and modes of state intervention, gives substance to the process of public policy formation.

(3) At the most abstract level, the main determinant of public policy formation is not the pursuit of any particular interest, but of an abstract systemic interest. Nonetheless, two different kinds of historical processes underpin public policy. On the one hand, there are structural determinants which have a historical-organic origin; on the other hand, there are conjunctural determinants which do represent, at a particular point in time, the short-term crystallization of a peculiar constellation of forces in class and social struggles.

(4) Particularly in liberal-democratic societies, the State always will try to reconcile its contradictory guiding patterns of activity within a concrete corpus of state policies. Then, the process of policy formation will never reach a steady-state situation nor will it be completely coherent; it will always express conflicts, imbalances, contradictions and a fragile stability in policy formation.

(5) In this regard, there always will be a gap between the publicly stated goals and targets of state policies and the actual outcomes, as well as there will be a practical and analytical difference between rationalities (as selectivity rules) and social action. Then, to consider the State (and state policies) as only a problem-solving agent would be grossly misleading. However, this seems to be the dominant approach in educational policy planning. This framework of the State as a problem-solving agent (needless to say, an argument usually advanced by technocratic-minded and not historically-minded scholars and administrators) fails to recognize the internally-produced and the externally-originated determinants of policies—especially those with the most causal weight in non-statistical terms. Secondly, this framework omits the display of the basic regularities, what Offe has termed the basic ‘laws’ of public policy formation.

(6) By combining the modes and methods of state intervention, three main laws of motion of public policy can be suggested here. These are the law of motion of bureaucracy, the purposive-action law of motion, and the participatory-consensus building law of motion. In order to study these policy laws of motion, it would be necessary to consider not only a political framework and a theory of the State, but also an organizational approach to policy making. In this regard, any public policy, in its form and content, is bounded by a system of inputs, processes of transformation, and outputs, all of them related to deep/surface structures (rationales) expressing not only social action but domination and power.

(7) Looking particularly at the dependent state, a decisive landmark is the State’s bureaucratic encapsulation of policy making. In this sense, there are different forms of functional interaction within a bureaucratic organization; those forms of interaction can be analytically differentiated; and the form this interaction assumes will vary according to the type of political regime considered. This point leads us to recognize several common traits in the historical evolution of state apparatuses, for example in Latin America (Oszlak, 1981, pp. 3–32); traits that are of paramount importance in the study of educational policy formation in a corporatist state such as the Mexican State, with the complex interaction between a ruling party in power for more than 40 years, the forceful action of corporative trade unions and capitalist associations, and the ideology of efficiency held by the organic bureaucracy of the state (Pescador & Torres, 1985).

(8) Since capitalism did develop differentially in each country, the configuration of the State will sharply differ across countries. I have assumed here that it is crucial to characterize the type of state, its historical traits and main features as a mode of political control and political organization,
and the balance of power established in the society by the ongoing confrontation between social and political forces, prior to undertaking an empirical analysis of educational policy making. Without such a historical and political background, it would be difficult to understand the particular rationale of resource assignment and the underlying motives for the creation (or elimination) of institutions, services, plans or policies. Finally, turning now to education in greater detail, it is necessary to clarify theoretically education’s particular role in capital accumulation and political domination. By considering a theory of the State and education, it will be possible to assess in detailed fashion the politics of educational policy making, and policy making as politics.

**Conclusion: A Theoretical Approach to Public Policy-Formation in Education**

It has been suggested here that the inquiry about policy formation must be in light of the following dimensions: (1) the main actors of policy formation, including the bureaucracy, administrative agents and social constituencies and clienteles; (2) in terms of organizational studies, there are the main systemic elements which can be found within a given educational setting—I will name them inputs, processes of transformation and outputs; (3) the main institutional phases, stages and/or units of policy formation (the levels of policy planning, policy making, policy operation and even the policy outcome)—these distinctions are useful in analytical terms for undertaking case studies; finally (4), the intellectual, institutional and ideological atmosphere where those decisions are made (the policy framework). Additionally, I shall argue that those dimensions are offset or shaped by the general framework of organization rules, historically embedded within a particular organization. At a second, but nonetheless determinant, level of generalization in the analysis, it may be said that the production rules of public policy identified above would offer a theoretical bridge with which to understand educational relationships between the political society and the civil society at a particular point of time.

Henry Levin (1980) has offered a concise and highly stimulating analytical framework with which to study educational policy planning. Figure 1 constitutes a good synthesis of his model of analysis which needs no further explanation.

Combining Levin’s analytical dimensions, although modified, and the theoretical framework devised in this article, Figure 2 gives a graphic representation of the main analytical dimensions to be taken into account in analyzing educational policy formation.

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**Figure 1. Henry Levin’s Policy-Planning Analytical Framework**

- **External influences (A)**
- **Educational reform and educational planning (B)**
- **Policy (1)**
- **Laws and budgetary resources (2)**
- **Educational resources (3)**
- **Educational process (4)**
- **Educational outcomes (5)**
- **Social outcomes (6)**

- Political
- Economic
- Social
- Cultural
- Religious
- Historical

- Compulsory attendance
- Curriculum requirements
- Funding
- Facilities
- Personnel
- Materials

- Organization
- Curriculum
- Instructional
- Methods

- Skills
- Knowledge
- Values
- Attitude
- Grades
- Certificates

- Income
- Occupation
- Political behavior
- Child-rearing behavior
- Cultural attributes
- Literacy
- Alienation
- Competition
By and large, in an analysis of educational policy making, the following concerns could be highlighted: (1) as regards inputs mechanisms, I will suggest the need to emphasize specially those principles regulating the type of task dealt with by the State, which is related to bureaucratic ideology and the state self-producing values and ideologies; (2) regarding processes of transformation, the emphasis will be placed on modes of decision making rather than on the handling of tasks. In addition, other important analytical dimensions for this study are: patterns of organizational positions and of relations among their incumbents, and the competing models of resource allocation; (3) regarding output mechanisms, those that should be explored and analyzed are as follows: (a) patterning of decisions and practices of the State toward the civil society (especially the educational clientele), and (b) modes of outflow of material and non-material resources from the State, understood as concrete processes of transformation of the social relations addressed generally toward particular social classes (Therborn, 1980, pp. 37–48).

While the study of policy formation should take into account the form and content of rule production and the predominant laws of motion of educational policy formation, any empirical research should confine itself, in its initial stages, to analyze specific levels and modalities in order to avoid simplistic generalizations not based on deep observation and analysis of empirical (quantitative and qualitative) data. Similarly, the production rules of public policy identified should be checked against concrete policy content and policy output in order to substantiate the main hypotheses regarding processes of transformation oriented toward the civil society.

In summary, if the main concern is to study policy formation, a preliminary attempt to do so should offset such distinct analytical dimensions as: (a) the State’s goals and policy targets—the
social history of state apparatus and the ebb and flow of class and social struggle; (b) modes and methods of operation in educational policy formation in dealing with social threats or problems that arise out of capital accumulation problems and/or political legitimation practices, policies and outputs; (c) the extent and type of bureaucratic organization; (d) the educational bureaucracy’s ideologies contained in policy planning—as internal determinants of policy making; (e) material and non-material policy outcomes; perhaps a fundamental issue that ought to be discussed from a post-Marxist perspective is education’s (and welfare activities in general) role in the production and reproduction of productive and unproductive labor, and education’s contribution to production and realization of surplus-values; (f) capitalist and non-capitalist units of policy formation (Clegg & Dunkerley, 1980, pp. 486–492), which brings to light the important distinction between use-value and exchange-value as distinct goals of policy making in education (and other welfare activities and institutions); (g) the role of the educational policy within the overall state public policy, particularly (although not exclusively) at the level of legitimation practices. For instance, Miller (1986, p. 244) classifies within accumulation expenditures for social investment the levels and modalities of higher education and other non-elementary or secondary school education. Elementary and secondary education’s expenditures are classified under accumulation expenditures for social consumptions. Perhaps adult and non-formal education expenditures, always neglected by the analysts, can also be classified, following the original O’Connor’s taxonomy as social expenses; (h) and the struggles by groups and social classes to resist the hegemonic practices of the capitalist state. However, if resistance groups have some visible presence and are somehow inserted within the state apparatus, the task will then be to study how they have tried to consolidate or enlarge their position, and to promote specific policies, in the presence of restricting and enabling rules.

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Notes

1. As a pact of domination and as a corporate actor who assumes the representation of popular sovereignty and as the political authority that enforces the democratic rule, the State becomes also a terrain for struggle of national and socio-political (class) projects. These contradictory functions summarize the contradictory unity and inherent complexity of capitalist states. Also, it highlights a crucial problem for Marxist analysis: the class character of the State—a question addressed by the neo-Marxist analysis which tries to overcome the impasse that resulted from the instrumentalist-structuralist debate and was exemplified in the exchanges between Poulantzas and Miliband almost two decades ago (Poulantzas, 1969a, pp. 237–241,1969b, pp. 67–78; Miliband, 1970a, b).

2. The foremost penetrating pieces of research on state policies, have in one way or another pointed out this essential feature. For instance, Weber views the State as not only instrumental but immanent, that is, the State as the monopoly of force and site for exchange of services and community benefits (Weber, 1969, Vol. 1, pp. 210–215).

3. Eric Olin Wright (1978, p. 15) has suggested a schema of structural causality distinguishing diverse modes of determination and organizing them into several models of determination. Modes of determination are considered to be distinct relationships of determination among the structural categories of Marxist theory and between these categories and the appearances of empirical investigation. Models of causal determination are schematic representations of the complex interconnections of the various modes of determination involved in a given structural process. Wright has outlined six main modes of causal determination: (a) structural limitation, (b) selection, (c) reproduction/non-reproduction, (d) limits of functional compatibility, (e) transformation, and (f) mediation.

4. The STATEMOP thesis advocates that Marx’s political economy was dealing with competitive capitalism. However, the development of productive forces has progressed and large monopolies have thwarted competition in such a way that the State and ‘monopoly capital’ has become intertwined. This new phase of ‘monopoly capitalism’ is seen to invalidate the general laws advanced by Marx, particularly the laws of commodity exchange, capital accumulation and the falling rate of profit. Therefore, as in this theory, the analysis of modern capitalism must build on Lenin’s analysis of the State and imperialism rather than on orthodox applications of Marx’s methodology. The STATEMOP main thesis and critiques are thoroughly discussed in Holloway & Piccioto’s book. A very good piece of criticism is Margaret Wirth’s article (1977).
5. Since the early formulation of dependency theory, there has been a challenge to the notion that international dependency relies on a set of countries which constitute a central core (industrial advanced countries) and a set of countries which constitute a periphery. Certain countries that have been identified as ‘Newly Industrialized Countries’ (NIC) have assumed new functions in the world division of labour by constituting industrial platforms of development through their labour-cost advantages (e.g. India, Singapore, Korea, Hong Kong, Pakistan, Brazil and perhaps Mexico). In spite of these changes, the notion of the ‘dependent state’ could be analytically useful if we assume that it refers to states where (i) the majority or a sizeable proportion of the labour force still remains linked with agriculture production: (ii) in many cases, most of the country’s exports are essentially non-manufactured goods, (iii) there is not a political structure resembling the welfare state; (iv) and this state is subject to important constraints for future autarchic economic and political development due to a raising external debt, a continuous outflow of domestic capital and labour, and a huge ‘underground’ informal, non-taxable, economical exchanges; (v) in this political structure, the role of the Armed Forces is usually prominent in national politics, and it is the ultimate resort for conducting repression activities; (vi), and finally, this state is further constrained by its operation in a given orbit of geopolitical power and the presence of an imperial ruling country—in spite of the global exchangeability of commodities and the international division of labour due to the World System.

6. The first premise of James O’Connor’s analysis of the fiscal crisis of the State is that the State must try to fulfill two main functions: the accumulation and the legitimation functions. Therefore, at the same time that the State involves itself in the process of capital accumulation, it also tries to win the support of the economically exploited and socially oppressed classes for its programs and policies (O’Connor, 1973b, pp. 64–96). What is initially stressed in O’Connor’s claim is that these two functions are mutually contradictory inasmuch as the growth of the state sector and state spending is increasingly the basis for the growth of the monopoly sector of the economy and the total production. Reciprocally, the growth of state spending and state programs is also the result of the growth of the monopoly industries, and “the greater the growth of the monopoly sector, the greater the State’s expenditures on social expenses of production” (O’Connor, 1973b, pp. 13–39, 1973a, pp. 81–82). This, for many years the standard neo-Marxist explanation, is now being critically assessed. As an example of new financial estimates and theoretical developments in radical political economy, see Miller’s extension of O’Connor’s analysis. Miller (1986, pp. 237–260) argues that although it seems clear that the state fulfills an accumulation and legitimation function, they should be better formulated to explain the state’s ability to promote accumulation in the 1970s and 1980s.

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Abstract

This article explores the ways we might use modern and post modern theory to examine problems in comparative higher education. The problems or objects of study on which comparative higher education currently focuses are problematized and interrogated. The implications of several versions of globalization theory for comparative higher education are explored as are the various post-aliities, Mann’s political sociology of social power, Foucauldian theory of knowledge/power regimes, and feminist theory. Finally, the article looks at methods that might be used when drawing on these theories to study comparative higher education.

As we enter the twenty-first century, the social sciences are riven with debate over what problems they should study and what theories and methods should be used to study them (Giddens and Turner 1987; Rosenau 1992; Seidman 1994; Baert 1998). The same debates that enliven the social sciences are beginning to appear in comparative higher education, which draws on the social sciences to formulate problems, theories and methods (Kempner, Mollis and Tierney 1998). A major divide seems to be between modern and postmodern theories (see Tierney 2001, this issue). I am not sure how useful this divide is to the comparative higher education community: in many ways, postmodern versus modernism seems no more than another instance of dichotomous metanarratives that obscure as much as they illuminate. Instead, I argue that postmodern theoretical insights are perhaps most profitably used in conjunction with new developments in modern theories that have profited from the debates initiated by postmodernists.

In this article, I explore how we might use modern and post modern theory to think about the ways that globalization, itself a highly contested concept, is related to shifting power/knowledge regimes in which (comparative) higher education is embedded. In essence, I offer a research program for the field to explore, amend, debate and perhaps execute. First, I very briefly outline what
comparative higher education currently takes as its problems or objects of study, then I try to problematize those using insights from modern and postmodern theory. Second, I present the major theories that presently dominate discourse about comparative higher education, then suggest modern and postmodern theories that might better deal with comparative higher education in a global context. Third, I make the case that the new problems facing higher education and the new theories that frame them call for mixed methods, multiple site case studies, data gathering from micro to macro levels, and a variety of analytical techniques linked to discrete levels and units of analysis.

The “Object” of Study in Comparative Higher Education

Despite the appellation “comparative” higher education, most work in this field of study, as evidenced by the journals *Higher Education* and *Comparative Education*, looks at higher education in a single country, asking the reader “to compare country to country, article by article to draw comparative meanings from the research” (Kempner et al. 1998, p. xv; see also Epstein 1988; Altbach 1993; Kogan 1996). In many of these single country studies, higher education is considered as a system, composed of various types of tertiary or post-secondary institutions, which are usually elaborated in terms of structures and functions. When comparisons among countries are made, they are often between two countries (i.e., Skolnik and Glenn 1992) and are not broadly comparative. Alternatively, when issues within the system are elaborated—for example, the place of women, institutional autonomy, student protest—they are usually presented as to how they play out in terms systems, sectors, institutions and cultures (Tyomby 1996; Mollis 1997). Features that are different from the system/culture of the author are often highlighted, implicitly pointing the reader, usually assumed to be from the same system/culture as the author, toward the comparison to be made (Kempner and Makino 1993; Tierney 1994). When higher education is compared among countries, the primary focus seems to be the system level (Altbach 1998; Tilak 1998), with little attention to institutional differences and to institutional cultures.

The primary task or problem of the majority of these studies is description, very often description of changes or reforms within or among countries. The description of change or reform is usually limited to the higher education system or systems, sectors, institutions or cultures (Altbach 1989; Cerych and Sabatier 1989). When contextual factors (modernization, globalization, ideology) are utilized they are usually presented as external to higher education and invoked as a non-integral frame rather than incorporated as part of the description (Kempner et al. 1998). The features on which descriptive efforts focus usually deal with access, persistence, training, faculty productivity, finance, accountability, quality assurance, organizational efficiency and leadership. In depth treatment of research usually occurs elsewhere, conducted by scholars who write in journals such as: *Issues in Science and Technology; Research Policy; Science, Technology and Human Values* (Slaughter 1998).

In this approach, the “object” of study, to use post modern terminology, is usually not interrogated, let alone deconstructed, and rarely problematized, nor is the author/scholar and her/his relationship to the object of study scrutinized with regard to her/his position in the power/knowledge relationships embodied in comparative higher education. Although the values embedded in these particular objects of study are not usually articulated, expanded access (massification, universalization) is usually taken to be good, as is persistence and degree completion, especially in fields close to the technoscience core of information economies. Faculty productivity with regard to scholarship, and especially teaching undergraduates, is valued, particularly in fields likely to result in jobs that make countries more economically competitive. Descriptions of finance focus on depicting ways to keep costs down while raising quality. Organizational descriptions center on how to organize the system (centralized/decentralized, hierarchical/flat) to move students through efficiently. Accountability and quality assurance usually deal with methods for measuring performance of faculty and students to assure the state that universities are performing efficiently. These objects of study constitute a narrative of modernity in which the greater the efficiency, the more the education, the greater the return to individual and nation.

To deconstruct and problematize the “object” we have to interrogate the object, splintering the metanarrative of modernity, exposing new questions (Somers and Gibson 1994). For example, we
need to interrogate the idea of access, persistence and degree completion. Does increased access, persistence and degree completion equalize opportunity? The answer is undoubtedly no; instead, increased access, so long as the degree does not become universalized as is the case with high school degrees, logically can only increase inequalities of opportunity. Those with college degrees do substantially better, at least economically, than those without, a point that has been empirically verified over and over (Leslie and Brinkman 1988). The new questions raised by interrogation of the idea of access are: what new patterns of stratification, or re-stratification, does increased access or massification create? do opportunities vary by sector of higher education attended (Oxbridge/red brick, ivy league/land grant) or by control (private/public), by field (technoscience/humanities), or do the new fault lines of stratification run a jagged and as yet unmapped course through all these domains? or, is the bar raised, and is graduate education the new terrain of stratification?

If we interrogate ideas about training, job placement and finance, we have to move past the basic subsidy that majority of students receive (the Pell grant, the HECs) and begin by identifying the disciplines in which students receive additional support, the institutions which receive the most state support for students, and the fields/organizations/corporations with which these heavily supported students and disciplines are aligned. Most importantly, we need to go beyond concern with undergraduate student aid and give attention to governmental, corporate and institutional investment, categories on which we do not collect data in terms of how they differentially impact various segments of universities. Investments in research infrastructure (information technology, scientific laboratories), and peripheral entrepreneurial activities (technology transfer offices, institutional advancement) account for more funds than undergraduate student aid in many universities. These fault lines between colleges and fields within universities, between undergraduate and graduate education are often deeper than those among institutional sectors. For example, a U.S. woman with a B.A. (college degree) in English literature often earns less than a woman with an A.A. (community college) in a technical area such as dental hygiene, and less than a male high school graduate (Grubb 1992).

Historically, scholars of comparative higher education have treated undergraduate student financial aid and research (graduate) funding separately, perhaps because the funds very often come from different state administrative agencies. However, we need to understand how these funding streams interact at the system and institutional level and then make cross national comparisons. The increasing flows of private funds for research as well as those from donors also have to be factored into any understanding of higher education finance as does the way institutional patterns of investing these monies—including funds from intellectual property. Only when we begin to understand the complex ways these funding streams interact will we be able to theorize institutional, national and comparative higher education finance.

In pursuit of our understanding of ever more complex funding patterns, we have to give up thinking about the state, corporate and civil society as external to the university. The university does more than respond to or act on domains usually conceived of as “external” or “out there”: segments of universities incorporate those domains, are integral parts of the administrative state and regional trading blocks and global economic circuits of exchange (Slaughter and Rhoades 1996; Rhoades and Slaughter 1997; Baez and Slaughter 2000). We need to begin to ask questions that let us map precisely the points at which segments of the university incorporate various external domains, explore the ever increasing permeability of borders, examine the nodes in which corporation and state set up shop within the university. Only then will we be able to begin to explain and understand the differential financing of student places and fields, and begin to understand how prestige and status in some fields and institutions are preserved in the face of uneven massification.

Faculty productivity and faculty work are two different sets of issues, the first usually approached from (an implicit) labor management perspective, the second often approached from (an implicit) totems of professorial authority stand point. When faculty productivity is treated from (an implicit) labor management perspective, the central question is how to get more labor from faculty so as to reduce institutional costs; subsidiary questions are how to create economies of scale with regard to faculty-student ratios, how to balance work loads among functions (research, teaching, service). If we interrogate “faculty productivity” other questions come to the fore. “Productivity” is a labor economics term that stems from management efforts to maximize profit taking by increasing the amount of
work a laborer does, either through increasing the ratio of equipment to worker (automation), increasing the pace of work (speed-up, Taylorism), or increasing the efficiency of work (re-organization of the work place or work task). When we study “faculty productivity” we study the faculty as worker, or ever more closely managed professional (Rhoades 1998).

In many ways the “faculty productivity” approach, with its intense focus on the individual professor, misses the emergence of “postmodern” faculty work. “Faculty productivity” focuses on the individual professor in a single classroom as the unit of analysis. However, in “postmodern” universities, teaching, research and service can no longer be seen as the purview of individual faculty. Instead, professorial work has been rearranged in complex matrices of instruction, research and service production that varies by field and function. The professor cannot operate without teams that provides support in a variety of ways: information technology, power point production, webmastership, technicians to maintain laboratories, engineers to maintain equipment, to say nothing of graduate students who grade and lead discussion sections. This “interstitial emergence” (Mann 1986) of matrix professorial work fragments the tasks and authority of professors, whether they are performing teaching, research or service, and reorganizes institutions. We have to ask how work and authority within universities and colleges are being reconstituted. If we raise these questions comparatively, our insights will be heightened.

Another widespread approach to faculty work focuses on totems of professional authority: autonomy, merit, peer review, academic freedom and tenure. The totems demarcate faculty work in colleges and universities from work performed by professionals in other public sector organizations. If we deconstruct the totems of autonomy, merit, peer review, academic freedom and tenure —we see that the sacred is also strategic and the totems are tropes for asserting and maintaining professorial power. Among the questions that emerge from deconstruction are: how do the totems function when work becomes part of a matrix organization? who has academic freedom and the right to participate in peer review; the professor, the team, or delegated members of the team, and, if the later, who delegates? What happens to the idea of professional autonomy in matrix organizations? If we study the institutional rather than the individual, what happens to the concept of autonomy when higher education is privatized and the student or her parents bear the largest share of the cost of higher education? Is it possible to even talk about institutional autonomy when education is conceptualized as a consumer (student/parent)-product (education) relationship? What does peer review mean, when corporate scientists are included, as is increasingly the case on NSF panels? What happens to academic freedom and “curiosity driven” research when government agencies set research agendas to maximize economic productivity (Slaughter and Leslie 1997)? Yet another set of questions centers around the increasingly contradictory claims of academic freedom and intellectual property: if academic freedom comes to mean that faculty have claims to intellectual property, then how is the free traffic in ideas possible, since all ideas become alienable, and students as well as other faculty and institutions are charged for their use (Baez and Slaughter 2000; Mothe 2000)?

Historically, “faculty productivity” questions have been part of an administrative agenda aimed at more closely controlling faculty work, while totemic professorial questions have been part of the faculty’s effort to sustain their autonomy. But in the postmodern university, the historic antagonism between faculty and administration becomes more complex. As suggested earlier, the boundaries between higher education, the state and the private sector are becoming increasingly permeable and both faculty and administrators may be subvented members of multiple public and private organizations, which mediate their historic adversarial posture. Again, the questions that need to be asked are: which faculty and administrators, from what sectors, controlled by whom, develop “layered” organizational identities? Where do the new fault lines run?

Concepts such as accountability and quality assurance are usually treated as necessary for legitimacy. They are necessary for justifying public funding, guaranteeing the product, a form of truth in advertising, the price to paid for using state funds and students tuition. The questions usually asked are: how is student learning assessed on array of dimensions ranging from rising junior exams to job placement? how great is the effort in undergraduate education as compared to graduate? how “good” is the faculty, which is measured by everything from reputational ratings to counts in citation indices? Institutions are also ranked and rated as are systems of higher education. More recently, accountability and quality assurance are being tied in with standardization and integration of curricula across trading blocks, as is the case in the European Union. Quality assurance
becomes particularly important when nations within a trading bloc are trying to standardize higher education so professional workers are prepared by higher education to do the same work in diverse locations.

If we deconstruct accountability and quality assurance, these can be, and often are, seen as efforts on the part of the state to rationalize and regulate higher education. However, this interrogation does not go far enough. The question of why states want to regulate higher education is usually not asked; instead, a will to power on the part of a totalizing state is assumed. More profitable questions are: who within the (nonmonolithic) state seeks to regulate higher education and why? We might begin to look at new professionals from multiple fields, ironically, usually certified or trained in colleges and universities, whose professional project is management, not scholarship. The New Public Management in Europe, for example, often pits new professionals within the state against “traditional” professionals inside and outside higher education (Mothe 2000). Has the “professionalization of everyone” created fractures within the professional strata so that professionals with a power base in the administrative state seek to control professionals with claims to autonomy who are linked to the administrative state but seek to distance themselves from it, as do professors in universities?

Another accountability and quality assurance question that deserves increasing attention is how corporate sponsored or university-industry partnerships are factored into assessment. Are these projects presumed to be effective because they serve the market? Are they judged or should they be judged by a different metric than educational programs that are not directly sponsored by the private sector? Do they need closer monitoring or less? Do we think of them as products or as education? Are such dichotomies—product v education—viable any longer?

Organizational efficiency and administrative leadership are usually linked together because studies in higher education, whether comparative or not, most often assume that leadership is necessary to achieve organizational efficiency and effectiveness. These studies then split into two domains—(1) rationalistic quantitative studies that measure various aspects of the organization and, when problems are identified, then call for greater leadership to solve the problem (Massey and Wilgar 1992; Massey and Zemsky 1994), or (2) cultural qualitative studies that look for sagas, stories, symbols and metaphors that leaders can use to better manipulate the organization (Morgan 1986; Clark 1998). The question of organization and efficiency for what is usually answered in terms of organizations missions and markets, and are often ritual, mantras, systemically self-referential (“teaching-research-service”, “service-to-the-state”, “democracies colleges”), ignoring how comparative higher education is embedded in power/knowledge regimes.

Perhaps as important as administrative leadership are studies of faculty and student leaders. Higher education devotes relatively little attention to faculty in unions, professional associations, advisory boards and corporate boards or to faculty who act as boundary spanners between private and public sectors or between various state agencies. Similarly, relatively little attention is paid to students who are not being “developed”, regardless of whether students are in student government, student unions, or social movements. If faculty and students are studied outside their worker/learner or consumer capacity, very often the studies attempt to find ways that allow administrators to get rid of them (unions of faculty or students) or co-opt them (student movements), often by making them part of the corporatist “team” that leads the higher education sector. (For exceptions, see Altbach 1998.) Rather than studying these groups as “objects” of administrative manipulation, we should study faculty and students acting in these extra organizational capacities as essential to organizational functioning and to change and reform. Faculty in collective, independent organizations have developed and defended concepts such as academic freedom and tenure (AAUP 1990). Student movements have changed universities, making them more inclusive and more focused on social justice. These non-hierarchical, indirectly functional, sometimes subversive organizations of faculty and students need to be studied in terms of their leadership capacity and ability to contribute to institutional change and reform.

I have tried to problematize the “object” of comparative education, and suggest new questions to ask. Looking at the “object” of study, from a (somewhat) post-positivist, post-marxist, post-modern perspective, raises questions about the subject or author, and how s/he is situated in power-knowledge relations. How do we, who write about comparative higher education figure in
the story? Narratives that scholars, students, authors of higher education tell about themselves are multiple and overlapping. The most powerful narrative is about making the systems work better. Scholars are now doing for comparative education what they did for the expansion (massification) of national higher education (Slaughter and Silva 1983)—gathering data that makes possible the standardization and integration of higher education across trading blocks (EU, NAFTA, Australasia) and along global circuits of economic exchange. The usual posture of scholars who work in this realm is that their work is technical (non-normative), aimed at solving problems to realize goals on which there is consensus across states. Uninterrogated are the values embodied in technical puzzles set by (neo-liberal/partisan) states—for example, that standardization and integration of cultures and knowledge systems and economies is desirable. Unproblematized are the ways that such work constitutes bureaucratic and scholarly careers, acts as opportunity structures for professionals, and enhances their human capital—for example, for faculty who write about comparative higher education even as they serve as consultants to systems of higher education, augmenting their income and enhancing their scholarship. The interactions of scholarship, career and opportunity structure need to become “objects” of study in higher education.

A negative version of the “making the system work better” story is often told by post-positivist, post-marxist, post-modernists, post-colonialists, feminists (Slaughter 1993; Slaughter and Rhoades 1996). They would have us create inclusive, “pluralistic” higher education systems that validate difference. Although they cast themselves as outsiders, other than the Western “universal” white, male, heterosexual authors of the “making the system work better” narrative rarely deal with their own privilege within higher education nor with the elite nature of higher education, which cannot be shared across multiple communities and classes without comprising its power as well as the authors own opportunity structure. Nor do these “others” reflect on their own (modernist) story of the scholar as critic and how that intersects other scholarly narratives about higher education. Our narratives of “post-ality” (Zavarzadeh et al. 1995) have to be interrogated with as much vigor as any other narratives if we are problematize the “subject” and “author” of higher education.

Theories of Comparative Higher Education

The major theories employed to frame studies of comparative higher education at the international level are modernization theories and world systems/neo-colonial theories. At the level of the nation state, structural/functional, institutional and neo-institutional as well as neo-functional theories, and variants, such as the New Public Management, dominate. For the most part these theories do not consider partisan politics, which I take to involve public struggles over who makes decisions for and about higher education. The modernization/structural-functional/institutional/neo-institutional/neo-functional theorists focus on the administrative state, not the partisan state; when they consider the (benign, non-coercive) economy, it is in terms of what is the proper way for higher education to engage the economy to foster economic growth while preserving (fictive) autonomy for the higher learning. The world systems/neo-colonial theorists (Wallerstein 2000) focus on structural domination, not partisan politics and political domination (Psacharopoulous 1985; Psacharopoulous and Woodhall 1985). These theorists dwell upon the economy, but always as an external, coercive, dominating power that violates the (potentially liberating, emancipatory) character of higher learning (Torres 1998). At the international level most comparative work employing a neo or post-colonial or world systems perspective has been done at the elementary and secondary level, not the tertiary level (Carnoy 1985; Psacharopoulous 1985; Torres 1998). Occasionally, these theories are employed at the level of the institution in postsecondary education and are used to explore various post-alities, identity formation, feminism, and occasionally new social movements. However, the post-alities (Zavarzadeh et al. 1998) often lose track of the organization, almost always lose sight of the system, and rarely look at partisan politics or at an economy that depends on partisan politics to realize economic agendas. In short, scholars of comparative higher education rarely look at political economy, rarely employ political economic theories. (For an exception see Carnoy 1985, and Easton and Klees 1995).

To think about the problems or “objects” of study outlined in the preceding section, we need to look at comparative higher education using theories that draw our attention to phenomenon that
mark the break from the modern, industrial era. A number of theorists are trying to break down old categories (public/private, hierarchy/colllegiality, state/economy, black/white, man/women) and destabilize enduring paradoxes (structure/agency, macro/micro, subjective/objective) to better study organizations, and it is these theories that should be most useful to the study of comparative higher education. For the most part, these theorists are modernists, but have paid close attention to the critique of modernism offered by postmodernists. As yet, these theories do not have a group label, but all of them see organizations, sectors, circuits of power in ways that fracture the modern view of organizations. Among them are political economic globalization theories (Castells 1993; Carnoy 1993) networks of social/political power theories or political sociology (Mann 1986) power/knowledge theories (Foucault 1979), narrativity theories (Somers and Gibson 1994), and feminist theories (Callas and Smerchich 1998).

Political economists who deal with globalization concentrate on explanations for the growth of global institutions: markets, multinational corporations, transnational governing and regulatory bodies, higher education and science and technology. Globalization theories speak to the parameters within which higher education operates. In very rough terms, these theories can be characterized as conservative, neo-liberal or post-Keynesian, and radical or post-marxist, and all purport to explain globalization while at the same time offering normative models for globalization.

The conservative or Chicago school perspective de-emphasizes the polity, instead stressing the role of the market in national economic success. The conservative school sees market forces as impersonal, disembodied and inexorable, as supplanting national economies with a global market. To compete successfully in the new global market, nations have to cut back, reducing social welfare and entitlement programs, freeing capital and corporations from taxation and regulation, allowing them to operate unfettered (Friedman 1981, 1991; Friedman and Leub 1987). In the conservative model, the only acceptable role of the state is as global policeman and judge, patrolling the edges of the playing-field to make sure it remains level, adjudicating trading infractions and transgressions. The private sector is privileged as the engine of competition, and the state no more than a drag on economic growth. In this model, the focus is on the private rates of return to human capital investment in higher education, shifting costs from society to the individual who benefits. The IMF and World bank seemingly rely on this theory of political economy, particularly in “Third World” or “developing” countries. In terms of higher education, this often means curtailing the public sector through reduced funds and introduction of tuition while stimulating private higher education on grounds of merit and quality. However, these political economic policies are applied differentially to various countries and institutional sectors. Comparative study and theorization of conditions tied to lending are much needed, especially at this moment of world criticism of the IMF and World Bank.

Keynesian political economic theories were built at the level of the nation state. Federal control of the money supply was used to stimulate or slow national economies, thereby avoiding depression. As global markets emerged and national controls on international flows of capital were eased to take advantage of expanded opportunities, capital mobility increased. Greater international capital mobility made more difficult manipulation of the economy at the national level. At the same time, the warfare-welfare approach to the political economy characteristic of the United States and the United Kingdom became more difficult to sustain. The end of the Cold War, together with the growing critique of defense R&D as a tool for technology innovation, made stimulation of the economy through military expenditures problematic. Simultaneously, increased global competition made political and economic justification of the social wage or social safety net more difficult (Thurow 1980; Melman 1982). In other words, the growth of a global economy, the increase in capital mobility, the end of the Cold War, and the erosion of the social wage made Keynesianism inadequate in the “information economy.”

Neo-liberals or post-Keynesians have tried to devise industrial policies that enable established industrial nation states to compete more successfully in traditional “smokestack” industries and to stimulate new high-technology industries, largely through increasing research and development (R&D) and productivity (Porter 1990; Reich 1992; Tyson 1992). In this view, the nation state plays a role in stimulating high-technology innovation, in building human capital to exploit high technology in multinational corporations, and in creating a climate favorable to investment at home.
(Carnoy et al. 1993). Although neo-liberal or post-Keynesian political economists emphasize the stimulating and supportive role the state plays with regard to the economy, they simultaneously embrace free trade. Indeed, the neo-liberal state valorizes the market and market values. In the EU, the neo-liberal state, via the New Public Management, works to stimulate higher education’s contributions to economic productivity across a range of activities (Neave 1988; Neave and Vught 1991; Mothe 2000). In contrast, the United States for the most part eschews direct mechanisms for planning, relying instead on “the market” or a bottom-up approach, in which industry takes advantage of government-subsidized opportunities for R&D stimulation—for example, the Advanced Technology Program in the United States—in areas loosely targeted for state support for developing products for the global market (Etzkowitz 1994; Branscomb 1997). At the same time, the neo-liberal state offers support for the productive functions of the economy, it withdraws state support from welfare functions—for example, in higher education, the neo-liberal state withdraws funds for student support (initiation of tuition charges in the EU and Australia, attempts to initiate tuition in Mexico, higher tuition in the United States) and for professors’ “curiosity-driven” research at the same time it increases funds for targeted research and university-industry partnerships (Slaughter and Leslie 1997; Slaughter 1998).

Neo-marxists continue to develop an important critique of global capitalism, even as they recognize that highly centralized state socialism is no longer a viable political economic alternative. Post-marxists see the private sector working through the state apparatuses of the several nation states and various international trade organizations and tribunals to level the playing field so that stateless multinational corporations can dominate the global economy, establishing a new international division of labor. In this new international division of labor, multinational conglomerates move production facilities to those parts of the world that provide the most profitable combination of capital and labor, disproportionately to the lowest wage states that offer the greatest incentives to multinationals (Frobel et al. 1980; Chomsky 1994). Multinational CEOs are able to manage far-flung global production through the information superhighway and telecommunications. In this model, owners and managers of stateless multinationals, as well as owners and managers of the many ancillary businesses that serve them, are winners, and workers, whether high-tech or low, and the unemployed, rooted or trapped in nation states, are losers.

In higher education, this model is exemplified by what Michael Gibbons (1994), who is not a Marxist, post or otherwise, calls “Mode II” science and technology. Mode II science and technology is transdisciplinary, transinstitutional and transnational. There is no longer a gap between discovery and application, between laboratory and market. Science and technology are project specific, not permanently located in units within universities. Scientists and engineers are part of the postmodern economy, members of the flexible labor force, signing on to just-in-time research production teams, ready to move anywhere in the world, as the demands of the project and the market determine. Computer software that might once have been produced in a spin-off company with a symbiotic relation to a U.S. university can now be more cheaply and easily produced in India, using some team members from the United States, but drawing most from India. More important than labor costs in predicting location of Mode II science is the technological level of the industrial sector (Castells 1993; Castells and Tyson 1988). In other words, when multinational, whether large or small, science and technology firms relocate plants they choose industrializing countries with relatively high levels of education and technological development, avoiding the lowest cost, least developed countries, especially in Africa and in parts of South America, which political economic geographers now refer to as the Fourth World (Castells 1993). Transdisciplinary, transinstitutional, transnational science and engineering problems may be set by industry, perhaps in concert with government, rather than by academic disciplines. Universities may no longer be able to claim that they are central site for basic science and engineering research. As scientific labor disperses around the world, university centers may have to compete fiercely and globally for R&D funding.

Political economists who are neither post-Keynesians nor post-marxists, but perhaps fall somewhere in between the two camps, argue for established industrial countries modeling themselves more closely on the Japanese and newly industrializing Asian countries, and for developing state planning capacities as well as mechanisms for capturing and redistributing more equitably the profits from multinational enterprises. They argue that national policies strongly influence competitiveness, especially national policies on labor availability and technological infrastructure, on R&D,
on high technology and management training, and on protection from foreign competition and concessions from foreign multinationals (Bowles 1992; Carnoy et al. 1993; Barnet and Cavanagh 1994; Grieder 1997). Other scholars who position themselves between neo-liberal and neo-Marxist scholars of political economy examine workers migration routes, the technologies that draw them, as well as the creation of Third World enclaves within the First World (Sassen 1991; Thrift 1987). These frameworks could be profitably applied to the movement of scholars, graduate students, undergraduates, graduate students, research funds and projects as well as high technology embedded in universities. The political economists who position themselves between neo-liberalism and Marxism are especially important for discovering patterns of international and transnational higher education because they speak to the intersection of state and economic actors at the point where policy effects tertiary education.

Another theoretical approach that offers many new possibilities for framing some of the problems outlined previously is Mann's (1986) political sociology of social power. (See also Torres 1998 for political sociology of power.) Mann's theory allows us to focus more closely on networks of power between and among states, economies and higher education systems, and various institutions, such as professional associations. Mann's key point is that societies are not bounded. Mann sees societies as “constituted of multiple overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks of power” (p. 1, all italics in the theory section are in original) that draw on four sources of social power, “ideological, economic, military and political” (p. 2). In various historical times, one power source may have greater primacy than others, and all are in play to various degrees. Networks are comprised by individuals in social interaction in organizations, and any one individual belongs to multiple organizations and may belong to more than one network. These networks of power are very often stratified, distributing power from a small number at the top of the network who control the organizations to a larger number at the bottom, although the degree of stratification may vary with the source of social power and within the organizations that comprise the network(s). For example economic organization is comprised of networks or “circuits of production, distribution, exchange and consumption” which Mann calls “circuits of praxis” (p. 25). Groups or organizations “defined in relations to the circuits of praxis are classes. The degree to which they are ‘extensive,’ ‘symmetrical,’ and ‘political’ across the whole circuit of praxis . . . will determine the organizational power of class and class struggle” (p. 25). However, economic organization is not necessarily the form of organization that has primacy nor is it the only form of organization that creates social stratification. “The few at the top” in any sociospatial network of power can keep large numbers “at the bottom compliant provided that their control is institutionalized in the laws and norms of the social group in which both operate” (p. 7).

Institutionalization does not create stasis in terms of either organization or function. Because societies are not bounded or unitary, but confederations or alliances of “multiple overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks of power” (p. 2) that are sometimes tight and sometimes loose, individuals are always “forming new networks, extending old ones, and emerging most clearly into our view with rival configurations of one or more of the principal power networks” (p. 16). Mann is clear that institutions comprising the four major power sources are not tied to specific functions. For example, the state has numerous economic functions, not least of which is the annual redistribution of the proceeds of taxes, while organizations in the economy have political functions, among which are contributing to political campaigns. Mann adds further complexity to his conception of societies as organized networks of power by arguing that organizations do not have fixed functions; instead they continually redefine and expand their functions. They can also generate new organizations. Indeed, Mann sees organizations as promiscuous in terms of both form and function. Shifts within institutions and the organizational building blocks that comprise them often produce “interstitial emergence,” the “outcomes of the translation of human goals into organizational means” (p. 16). These new organizations are sometimes able to realize their goals and other times (or simultaneously) their pursuit of new goals creates unintended consequences that open the way for “rival configurations” of power.

The advantages of Mann’s theory for the study of comparative higher education are several. First, it allows us to talk about discourse and ideology across organizational structures and segments of structures that have differential power. In other words, we can follow networks that cross institutions, nations, systems, studying, for example, the organizational players surrounding an information
technology lodged jointly in a school of engineering and computer sciences, and see how they articulate with corporations, granting agencies, other segments of higher education, similar programs in other countries, examining the way discourse, ideology and relations of power change and transmute, expand or contract along the network.

Second, Mann’s theory lets us look at multiple sources of power and be more precise about power. We are able to move beyond economy versus ideology, structure versus agency, yet do not go so far as seeing power everywhere and nowhere, as do so many of the postmodernists and post structuralists (Foucault 1977, 1979). Because individuals are members of multiple, overlapping organizations and organizations are conceptualized as promiscuous in terms of form and function, organizations (and organizations that emerge interstitially) can be both opportunity structures for individual agents, and constraints upon individual agents. For example, international higher education programs can be studied as cases of interstitial emergence; individuals who are members of professional associations such as ASHE and members of higher education departments in universities, take advantage of consulting opportunities within their trading blocks (i.e., NAFTA), of students from the trading block (Mexico and Canada) being sponsored by their governments to study in U.S. departments of higher education, and State Department-multinational corporation partnership grants to build education/training programs to create a network that supports the emergence of programs of international higher education to aid in the standardization and integration of curriculum and training within trading blocks, better preparing the “block” professional worker.

Third, Mann’s theory spares us lengthy discussion about abstract indicators of class composition, about the relation of one class or class fraction to another, about domination and resistance, and instead lets us focus on concrete networks of power across an array of power sources without abandoning class as an important component of economic organization. In the example just cited, we could focus on the resources the network was able to access, noting how the individual actors were able to draw on state (including time and discretion about tasks that are built into faculty positions) and multinational corporate funds, conjoined with a neo-liberal political agenda to promote trading blocks and competitive advantage, to study emerging forms of tertiary education. By also looking at who is not part of the network of power (local firms, individuals unable to access relatively elite institutions of higher education, individuals who are not in fields close to the market) we begin to see the knowledge/power relations constituted by the network.

Fourth, Mann’s theory lets us look at the multiplicity of state functions, particularly at partisan, ideological and economic functions, most of which are occluded in theories that deal with the administrative state. We are able to look at the overlap among neo-liberal politicians who promote a minimal state whose job is to promote the growth of global circuits of exchange and the private sector economy, multinational corporations, the sectors in the population(s) who benefit from the new wealth flowing from the global projects of the neo-liberal politicians and the leaders of multinational corporations, and locate segments of higher education professionals—the high technology, research and managerial segments close to global markets—that overlap with the network of power created by neo-liberal politicians, leaders of multinational corporations, and a variety of professionals. (Scholars and students of comparative higher education may map their network and find themselves at the outer edge of the inner circle.)

Mann’s theory is uniquely suited to look at change within existing institutions, an approach eminently suited to an era in which we talk about restructuring the economy, reinventing government, right sizing the military and reforming higher education. Mann’s theory lets us begin to think about public higher education as a state organization with ideological and economic functions and private, non-profit higher education as an ideological organization with economic functions and state resources. Both public and private higher education are sites of academic science and technology, which are integral to economic circuits of power that are expanding in the information age.1

Foucault’s conceptions of knowledge/power systems add yet another crucial dimension to consideration of comparative higher education. Foucault makes the point that all knowledge and individuals who create or participate in knowledge production are embedded in knowledge/power systems. This is a more destabilizing concept than “social construction” or the idea that all knowledge is subjective because it forces us look at our connections to broader power systems. The knowledge/power system means that we are always embedded in knowledge/power systems, and can no
longer consider them as external to us. Because power works from below as well as from above, we are always implicated. Interior/exterior, subjective/objective, public/private are social constructions of power relations. When we, as scholars of comparative higher education, take as our “object” of study systems of higher education, or transnational relations among institutions of higher education, we embody simultaneously our own institutions, the institutions we study, and the power networks that link them, creating a narrative that very often enhances our own networks, as well as our power and prestige within our institutions. By choosing to study comparative higher education we become part of the struggle over what higher education will look like, norming, calibrating, celebrating or destabilizing these systems. We are nodes of transnational comparative higher education, simultaneously consulting, contracting, and creating career, or simultaneously critiquing and creating career (Bourdieu 1988).

Using these new theoretical developments in political economy and political sociology theory to study comparatively knowledge/power regimes in higher education allows us to study many new problems facing higher education, but these theories do not deal at length with discourse and narrativity, key elements in understanding higher education. Theorists of narrativity (Somers and Gibson 1994) postulate that social life itself is “strored and that narrative is an ontological condition of social life” (p. 38). They see narrativity as important to social science because of its focus on contextual relationships, causal emplotment, selective appropriation as well as temporality, sequence and place. “Indeed the chief characteristic of narrative is that it renders understanding only by connecting (however unstably) parts to a constructed configuration or a social network (however incoherent or unrealizable) composed of symbolic, institutional, and material practices” (p. 59). In other words, relationality is analytical: for example, “all identities must be analyzed in the context of relational matrices because they do not ‘exist’ outside of those matrices” (p. 65). What this means for the study of comparative higher education is that we have to deconstruct and understand the stories that are being told about the political economy and the Mannian networks of social power, the Foucauldian knowledge/power regimes. These stories may be about professors creating software to encrypt data for global markets, universities copyrighting the product and selling it to finance more research and endowed chairs. Conversely, the story may be about university professors who genetically engineer crops that take over native people’s grain strains, universities patenting and profiting from the new crops, leaving native peoples without their traditional livelihood. Analysis of the story will enable us to contextualize networks in the political economy. For example, we will be able to see if the characters in the story are male or female, whether their identities feature as a part of causal emplotment, what their relationship is to each other in terms of Foucauldian knowledge/power networks, as well as the stories they tell about their social power networks, and the concrete location of those networks in the emerging geography of comparative higher education.

Feminist theory is central to the study of comparative higher education. Feminist theory destabilized that most enduring of modern dichotomies—male/female—and made space in the academy for post-ality. Feminist theory prompts us to think about equal rights, salary equity, comparable worth (Bellas 1994; Glazer Ramo 1999). Feminist organizational theory (Acker 1990; Callas and Smerchich 1992) lets us see gendered organizations. Feminist moral development theory lets us see that there are multiple voices as well as different ways of learning and thinking (Gilligan 1984), which can be understood if we adopt the standpoint of the “other” (Hartsock 1997).

Theories that deal with “tipping” and consequent salary depression (Kanter 1993) suggest that as segments of faculty and the student body become “feminized” these segments may lose value. Although the gender composition of faculty and fields are extremely variable by country and culture, very little comparative work has been done on tertiary education. (For an exception, see Kelly and Slaughter 1991.) Given the rise of the neoliberal state a profitable approach to exploring gender cross-nationally might be in terms of connection of faculty and fields to private or public sectors, the analytical divide that might tell us more than divisions such as applied/basic or life/non-life (Slaughter 1998). The neo-liberal state valorizes the private sector and enables private, profit-taking organizations to indulge their preferences for hiring men. If we look cross nationally, we may find, for example, that medicine is a male field only in countries (the United States) where health care is associated with the private, profit-taking sector, while in countries where health care is heavily socialized, medicine is primarily female.
Methods for Comparative Higher Education

To study the new problems facing higher education and to frame them with new theories calls for mixed methods, multiple site case studies, data gathering from micro to macro levels, and a variety of analytical techniques linked to discrete levels and units of analysis. To be comparative, studies must focus on more than a single institution or even a single nation state. Rather than attempting to study entire systems of higher education or even whole institutions across several countries, we can take a Mannian approach, and focus on a network or networks that capture what we seek to study and explore: for example, we could follow institutional research officers from their home universities to their national professional associations, to their trading block or international associations, paying attention to who funds them and what they measure—are they counting, calibrating, collecting data on interactions between universities and the private sector? what do they measure, dollars and cents or other forms of exchange? how do they decide on standardization of categories and how does that shape the way dialogue occurs within our departments and institutions? Or, conversely, if we follow corporations that invest in higher education research, what are the national systems, institutions and departments in which they invest? is corporate research partnered with government? is it the marked or unmarked category, and if marked, is it as something to be emulated or does it symbolize perils facing higher education? How does corporate investment change curriculum, student socialization, institutional investment, knowledge/power systems within institutions?

To keep subjectivity, people, stories in the treatment of political economic networks we need to draw on narrativity, to examine author and authorial subjectivity, as well as the “object” of study, the relation of author, object and reader, looking particularly at emplotment, which functions as a popular explanation of causality. If narrativity were introduced to the corporate research networks described in the preceding paragraph, we would ask about the gender, social class, institutional location, position in power/knowledge networks of the authors as well as the objects of study, and examine how the story changed as it was told from different perspectives. We might begin to see that corporations were invested in high technology departments close to the market, in which there were few women, and that those women who were part of the network were in “handmaiden” positions—public sector technology transfer officers, patent attorneys—to male professors who received the funds, executed the research and participated in corporate sector decision making. The men in the knowledge/power network might tell a story about “Mode II” science and its contribution to economic growth, with the scientist as hero; the women’s story might be very different, along with their location in the power/knowledge network.

To pursue these new methods, scholars of comparative higher education will increasingly have to work in cross national teams that bring together people with both qualitative and quantitative research skills. In many cases it is unfeasible for a single researcher to be able to follow a network across multiple institutional and national sites, perhaps even to regional or global regulatory bodies. However, working through the Internet and perhaps drawing on national research funding that increasingly promotes international research projects or holding working meetings at professional association conferences, teams could overcome the barriers of geography. (Language, cultural barriers and diverse academic reward structures may well be more difficult to overcome.)

Because the teams would be studying an array of phenomenon, to make meaningful cross-national comparisons, quantitative data would be useful because of its breadth. However, qualitative data would be necessary to destabilize categories, to capture subjectivity, narrativity, and new stories. Great care would have to be exercised in framing team questions, theories, methods and units of analysis, to say nothing of interpretation. For example, macro level questions (how permeable are boundaries between public, non-profit [tertiary education, professional associations] and private for profit [corporations, university-industry-government partnerships! organizations]) may have to be framed with macro political economic theories (Castells 1993; Carnoy 1993) and rely on quantitative analysis of changing institutional investment and expenditure patterns. Related questions at the level of the nation state may take different, but complementary shape: for example, how do university-industry-government partnerships shape knowledge/power regimes that influence decision making about tertiary education. In this case Mann’s (1986) political sociology
might be useful in doing a multi-site case study of university-industry-government partnerships that followed organizational networks of power measured by charting decisions taken and tracing their effect throughout the tertiary system. At the micro level, the questions might center on the stories various members of the university-industry-government partnerships tell. Narrativity theory (Somers and Gibson 1994) might inform this questions, and the researchers would perhaps examine departments at the university that participle in university-industry-partnerships, as well as departments that were unable to become part of such a partnership. The team doing the study would have to specify carefully questions, theory, data and method, and carefully articulate the several levels of analysis. (For an effort at this multi-theoried, multi-sited, varied units of analyses see Slaughter and Leslie 1997).

Problematizing comparative higher education by interrogating the work we currently do raises exciting new questions for research. Postmodern theories used in conjunction with new developments in modern theory push us to reframe our understanding of organizations, and look less at discrete organizations and pre-established analytical categories. Drawing on new questions, modern and postmodern theory, we should be able to better to follow the fault lines that demarcate new knowledge/power regimes that encompass a globally situated higher education. We can operationalize these theoretical perspectives by using mixed methods, multiple site case studies, data gathering from micro to macro levels, using a wide array of analytical techniques linked to discrete levels and units of analysis. The future of comparative higher education is rich with promise.

Note

1. Mann's greatest weakness, which he acknowledges but does not remedy, as his lack of attention to gender.

References


“THE DOOR OPENS AND THE TIGER LEAPS”: THEORIES AND REFLEXIVITIES OF COMPARATIVE EDUCATION FOR A GLOBAL MILLENIUM

SIMON MARGINSON AND MARCELA MOLLIS

One moment does not lead to another. The door opens and the tiger leaps.

—VIRGINIA WOOLF, THE WAVES

The Field of Comparative Education

Employing Bourdieu’s topographical terminology for the social, we can say that the heterogeneous discourses, theories, methods, and techniques of comparative education, together with the networks of governmental and institutional practices with which the disciplinary knowledge is associated, constitute what may be defined as a “field.”¹ Employing Foucault’s notion of discursive practices, we can say that comparative education is an academic subdiscipline implicated in circuits of “power/knowledge.”²

Some researchers assume a separation between education and politics and power. We find that, at the heart of comparative international education research, education intersects with power. Much of the work is large-scale cross-country data collection financed by governments and global agencies: the demands of power shape the practices of knowledge. However, comparative education is not simply “programmed” in the corridors of power. It has an intellectual autonomy, and, from time to time, it produces insights and techniques that open doorways for government and educational management. Even as power constitutes knowledge, so the reciprocal applies: new knowledge augments the capacities of power.

All social sciences are affected by their relationship with governmental power. Perhaps comparative education has been shaped by that relationship more than have other social sciences. Research that is genuinely independent of policy requirements is more the exception than the...
rule. Often there is a transparent cultural affinity between applied research in comparative education and its financing and use. The global templates of education systems used in this kind of comparative study, grounded in implicit social models, are “Western” and English language in content. Frequently, these templates have been closely shaped by the norms of education in the United States. Western European norms are also significant, for example, in comparative work conducted by United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and in some of that performed at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Nevertheless, even in those agencies, particularly at the OECD, the influence of American norms of educational practice is apparent. It is the Americanized and Americanizing World Bank and International Monetary Fund and their influence in economic policies, rather than advice from the more European and Third-World-responsive UNESCO, that is increasingly shaping educational policies throughout the world. This match between power and knowledge reflects the economic/intellectual weight of the leading world powers, the geographical and political location of agencies such as the World Bank, and the biographies of academic faculty and agency personnel. The 1972 remark by B. Barber still applies; it is no coincidence that, in the field of comparative education, “models of development and modernization turn out to bear a remarkable resemblance to the evolution of American industrial capitalism.”

Power and politics do not stand still; no power relations are ever complete in their effects; existing hierarchies never constitute an absolute closure of the social imagination. Like all social sciences, comparative education is capable of functioning as a site of open-ended “basic” academic research not designed to serve government or educational managers per se but to provide explanations, in this case, explanations about educational systems and practices. Further, the relations of power in comparative education are not unitary but are heterogeneous and contested, constituted by a complex mixture of national-global forces. In other words, it is possible for comparative education to be attached to more than one kind of political project.

When we take in the field throughout the world, we find it includes many diverse perspectives determined by financial interest or geopolitical location, by social or cultural agendas, or by intellectual preferences. Faculty in comparative education are not a homogeneous group. Some research is tied to government or international agencies; some is joined to political projects critical of official policies (and sometimes both kinds of research are combined in the work of the same person). Some research is located near the global centers of power; some is located in countries where the role of global agencies is problematic and the world economic, cultural, and educational hegemony exercised by the United States is a serious concern. Often there is a certain plurality of views within the global agencies themselves. More significant is the diversity of national locations. On the geopolitical plane, some nations are leading nations, others are subordinate but advantaged, while others are marginal to the global centers of power. These locations shape the capacity of nations to draw benefits from international comparisons, and they also tend to affect the power of their researchers to shape the main strands of comparative research. At the same time, there are also variations in mode of thought, in theories and methods (in varying balances of quantitative and qualitative and differing uses of cases, surveys, and historical analyses), and in disciplinary foundations. Comparativists draw on sociology, economics and political economy, political science, business and management, and various interdisciplinary sets, intersecting with relations of power in various ways.

In other words, power/knowledge relations in comparative education are diverse, differentiated, and complex; they incorporate multiple and often conflicting interests and ideas; and they position individuals and institutions within a constantly shifting field. In this article we do not attempt an exhaustive literature-based study of the field of comparative education; that would require more than one journal article. Rather we focus primarily on a certain strand of work that, in our judgment, tends to dominate the field of comparative education and its practical applications. We need to emphasize that, in critiquing what we see as the hitherto dominant strand in comparative education, we do not wish to imply that all work in comparative education reflects this perspective (or that all comparativists are puppets manipulated by the World Bank). Significant parts of the field are distanced from this tradition. There have been important strands of work...
critical of global hegemony in comparative education, more so in the past decade: work grounded in political strategies of resistance; work reflecting feminist, indigenous, and other nondominant perspectives; and work using research methods that enable hitherto subordinated agendas to emerge (e.g., ethnographic research). There is a larger body of work that exhibits a plurality of perspectives and approaches, including subaltern elements. Nevertheless, not all work that exhibits the subaltern is necessarily counterhegemonic. We also emphasize that, among comparativists who foreground plurality, the “acid test” is their willingness to critique the hegemonic strand that has long dominated the field, for it is this configuration of power/knowledge that renders the subaltern voices ineffective. Acknowledging subaltern perspectives without clarifying the beneficiaries of domination/subordination merely confirms their subaltern status.

In this article we draw out the theoretical, methodological, and political elements making up the hegemonic strand and consider its limitations amid the growing salience of ‘globalization.’ (This term is discussed further below. We use ‘globalization’ not simply in the sense of a world market but to reflect all relationships—economic, social, cultural, political, and so on—that extend beyond the terrain of the nation-state.) In doing so, we do not propose a new monoculture in comparative education. We call for greater diversity, intellectual sophistication, inclusiveness, and exchange, together with a new awareness of the power/knowledge relations that constitute the field. Comparative education should be able to encompass both hegemonic culture and alternative voices and to move with greater freedom between global and national/local, between macro and micro dimensions, between quantitative and qualitative methods, between theoretical sets, and across the disciplines. Nevertheless, if comparative education opens up to greater diversity, the relations of power within the field also need to alter. Hence, the focus of the second half of the article is not on refining, improving, and thus nurturing and protecting the hitherto dominant strands in the field but on developing elements of one possible alternative approach that foregrounds the subaltern elements.

In order to ground both the critique of the dominant strand of comparative education and the development of alternatives, we begin by reviewing a concept that is at the heart of the logic of comparative education: the dyad of sameness/difference.

Sameness and Difference

Making educational comparisons always involves both “difference” and “sameness.” Difference and sameness are philosophical opposites, but they are not necessarily antagonistic or mutually exclusive, either in logic or in the real world. For example, real education systems exhibit diversity in one respect and sameness in another. The relation between sameness and difference can be complementary rather than antagonistic. Take, for example, school evaluations that use pregiven norms to measure learning and rank schools. The comparison rests on a common template and encourages schools to converge. Yet it also establishes a hierarchy of institutional outcomes, which is a form of difference. Another example is the school culture of Japan. Public schools encourage homogeneity and unity in compulsory schooling, reinforcing values of equality and group consensus. In contrast, the jukus (private educational institutions) offer a highly differentiated, competitive, and individualized curriculum, promoting individual differences while training students for the entry requirements of the most prestigious educational institutions. Japanese scholastic culture is shaped by unity in compulsory public schooling and differentiation in the parallel private institutions, the two coexisting in the same national setting.

Likewise, the logic of comparison incorporates both sameness and difference. First, any act of comparison assumes an a priori notion of difference, whether difference of degree, as in unequal quantities of the same kind of object, or difference of kind, as in the contrasting of objects with varying qualities. Second, comparison involves a search not just for variations between cases but also for resemblance between them. Comparison is only possible on the basis of common criteria, including the identification of units for comparison, the quantitative and qualitative methods used in making comparisons, and the theoretical framework linking the criteria together. Neither sameness nor difference can be
absolute. If sameness were absolute and the world were understood as one homogenous place, there
would be no meaningful variation and, hence, nothing to compare. If difference were understood to
be absolute, there would be no common basis that would permit comparison. In that sense, each term—
sameness and difference—provides the condition of possibility for imagining and observing real world
phenomena that exhibit the other.

At the same time, the relationship between sameness and difference is not fixed but rather vari-
able. Comparativists can vary the emphasis on one element in relation to the other through their selec-
tion of theories and methods, depending on the purposes of the work. Qualitative work is readily
associated with emphasis on difference. Quantitative work lends itself to projects that emphasize
sameness. The fit between the pairings of sameness/ difference and quantity/quality is not exact,
but it is suggestive. When we use qualitative techniques to examine phenomena drawn from a com-
mon set, the closer we look and the more complex the criteria used in observation, the more that
"sameness" becomes turned into difference. In qualitative studies based on complex case work, where
there is always more to investigate than can ever be encompassed, there is a prima facie bias toward
the creation of difference and incommensurability between cases, tending to eliminate the possibil-
ity of comparison itself. But comparison can also be used to turn “different” phenomena into similar
phenomena. For example, in quantitative cross-national comparisons of educational achievement,
though the same numerical data may have different contextual meanings in each national context,
in a cross-country table the different contexts disappear. A “7” from Norway looks the same as a “7”
from Malaysia, regardless of the circumstances in which each “7” was produced. Even in qualitative
studies designed to prepare a content-rich and context-rich description of each national case, there
is a moment of abstraction that occludes at least some elements particular to each nation. Here the process
of comparison contains a prima facie bias toward the creation (discovery) of sameness, and again,
toward the elimination of comparison itself.

**Sameness and Difference in Comparative Education**

Thus, there is a broad range of ways in which sameness and difference might be deployed within
comparative education. When we observe the field as it has evolved in practice, we find a tendency
for the work to push in the direction of one side of the dyad or the other, either towards sameness
(universalism) or difference (ultrarelativism). A universalist method imposes uniform models on
all cases, while ultrarelativist approaches treat each case as completely different. The dominant
strand of comparative education, connecting to the requirements of global agencies and often to
governments, is semi-universalist in character. Here comparative education can become hegemonic
education. There is just enough recognition of local specificity to attach each location to the hege-
monic core. The principal opposition to that dominant strand, as it has evolved so far, tends toward
ultrarelativism. Although the practical consequences of the first position far outweigh the second,
in intellectual terms, both positions are equally problematic.

The semiuniversal approach tends toward absolute sameness (homogeneity) between educa-
tional systems while preserving a limited form of difference, expressed as unequal quantities of
sameness; an example would be comparative league tables of the characteristics and performance
of national systems prepared either by matching national data sets to each other or by cross-boarder
surveys. This eliminates all local features and all forms of difference except for measured differ-
ences in the criteria selected for comparison. The result is a deceptively simple outcome: the trans-
parent “performance” of each national system, though shorn of the contextual data that explain
that performance. But once codified, such truths take on a power of their own. Thus, comparison
is reduced to a two-step method, with the aim to (1) identify similarities between the object of study
and another object and (2) identify a limited form of difference as deficiency by weighing one
education system against another or an ideal type. Difference is expressed not as qualitative dif-
ference but as unequal amounts of a single quality. This approach to comparison excludes the “other”
and the possibility of discovering “otherness” or “alterity,” the state of being other or different. It
excludes what can be called “deep difference.”

The ultrarelativist position takes the opposite extreme, treating different cultures as wholly het-
erogeneous. Ultrarelativism is premised on an abstracted and ahistorical form of “difference.”
Ultrarelativism is a universal generalization about particularity, a position replete with ironies. B. Young comments that “notions of cultural incommensurability appear to rest on the assumption that frameworks are totally closed and unchangeable.” But identities are more fluid than this and, in a global era, have become more multiple, hybrid, cosmopolitan, and changeable, suggesting that the ultra-relativist position—far from being fashionably “postmodern”—is increasingly obsolete. Ultrarelativist forms of “comparative” education obscure what is common to national systems and deny the mutual effects in international relationships. This not only blocks comparison but also handicaps understandings of the dynamics of each system, in which national, international, and global elements are intermeshed. Like homogenization, ultrarelativism ultimately precludes sympathetic engagement with the object of research. It cannot interpret difference.

In summary, we take an agnostic position on the relationship between sameness and difference, rejecting the extremes of both universalism and relativism. In comparative education, neither sameness nor difference can be absolute, and the design of theories and methodologies should reflect this. Against the universalist position, we argue that method in comparative education should be oriented toward the interpretation of differences and the recognition of the “other.” It is necessary to devise techniques that will foreground identified forms of difference and enable unexpected real world differences to surface within the discourse. Against the ultrarelativist position, we argue that comparative education needs to interpret individual differences not simply as terminal but in the context of a wider set of variations, recognizing that there are commonalities structured by the relations between “others” and between “other” and “self.” In making comparisons, we understand sameness and difference as interpenetrated and omnipresent, not as uniform “same-sameness” and “same-difference” but in a myriad of heterogeneous forms. The interactions and tensions between these two poles give the field much of its ambiguity, vibrancy, dynamism, and varied potentials. This suggests that comparative education should avoid privileging either sameness or difference in any lasting sense, using each to interrogate the other, constantly moving between them. It also suggests that the field needs to be more reflexive about the relationship between, on the one hand, the contents of its theories and techniques and, on the other hand, their effects in constructing sameness/difference.

The Dominant Strand of Comparative Education

Early work in comparative education in the “traditional-classical” perspective, underpinned by history and philosophy, elaborated a set of interacting characteristics or variables in the form of a mechanism that was seen to compose each national education system. The objective was to identify the forces or conditions determining educational development. National differences in the variables explained variations in educational systems and outcomes. Implicit in the methodology was an ethnocentric historical narrative in which the evolution of “Western” schooling was standardized and universalized for all nations. As M. A. Eckstein notes, it was imagined that, with all nations sharing a common set, albeit with historically grounded local variations, “selected features of school administration, staffing instructional methods, and curriculum could be imported into another country and grafted onto its developing systems.” There was a tendency for homogenization, accompanied by some interest in the different systems for their own sake.

Later the traditional-classic perspective was supplanted by the “empirical-scientific” perspective, represented in the late 1950s by G. Bereday and A. Anderson. Bereday argued that comparative analysis should be preceded by an abstract schema, a guiding hypothesis for the collection and presentation of proven facts. Bereday and Anderson criticized the classical era studies as macrocosmic, ahistorical, impressionistic, and exclusively limited to national systems of education. They presented their framework as more analytical, microcosmic, and precise, with categories sustained scientifically by empirical proof. Their comparative education set out to establish empirical or statistical relationships among social, political, and economic factors in education.

In the 1960s, the main strand of comparative education, particularly in the United States, was colonized by instrumental positivism. This followed a similar development in other social sciences, including economics and sociology. At this point, the now familiar combination of elements emerged: positivism, the privileging of quantitative methods, the emphasis on homogeneity and universal (global) sets, negative “othering,” and occlusion of the “other.” None of these elements
were necessarily linked. For example, regardless of the potential correspondence between quantity/quality and sameness/difference, it was not inevitable that the exercise of hegemony would incorporate a strong quantitative agenda. Nevertheless, at this time, these different elements were mutually reinforcing. By the mid-1960s, a sociology of comparative education, shaped by structural functionalism and incorporating the older notion of “one true path” for national educational progress, was becoming orthodoxy.19 This was underpinned by a new recognition of the importance of education in the Third World, backed by large-scale funded projects. In the context of the Cold War, under the banner of “international cooperation,” many comparativists (however sincere they were about bringing education to the world) were sustained by American foreign policy and aid programs that provided funds for research in areas (such as Indochina, South Asia, and Latin America) that were seen as geographically strategic in the conflict with Communism.

These funds were distributed by national governments and global agencies subject to American influence.20 Within the field, the weight of international networking and project financing—not to mention the aura of science in an era of the supremacy of science—was irresistible. Although comparative education exhibited some continuing diversity, many of its leading centers were organically linked to American interests and institutions. While Britain and France still exercised something of a global role and the Dutch, Germans, Japanese, and Scandinavians were interested in Third-World development, none of these countries exercised a comparable world influence, either through universities or through global agencies.

Positivism in social science dated from the late nineteenth century.21 With classification a central tenet of its cosmogenesis, it moved from reality as chaos to reality as cosmos, “discovering” regularities paralleling the forms of Newtonian physics. The methodology was modeled on the nineteenth-century natural sciences: foundationalism, objectivity, control and manipulation of variables, experimentalism or quasi-experimentalism, universality, and rationality. This enabled the observation of regularities that were measured and quantified, applied in experimental analyses, used to study correlation and causalities, or manipulated (controlled) in future analyses assuming the status of laws or conventions common to the field.22 It was believed these laws could be summed up in concise, simple phrases, presented mathematically, and used, subject to the falsifiability of the hypothesis, to plan and manipulate the construction of social realities. For positivists, a fundamental order underlying the dynamic of things themselves could be discerned through methodical and rigorous social science. The attachment of positivist economists and sociologists to notions of deep social stability and regularity rendered their disciplines suitable for the tasks of population-managing governments. Likewise, many comparative researchers embraced the instrumental role of education in national development as it was framed in universal theorizations of the relationship between education, economy, and society—such as human capital theory—whereby nation-building strategies in education were reduced to abstract and manipulable financial equations.23

As E. H. Epstein states it, positivism in comparative education meant that “only empirical statements about education are scientific and only scientific statements are meaningful.”24 According to Epstein, this “science” valorized only a limited range of quantitative methods and techniques. It produced knowledge of a technical-instrumental kind. It was characterized by epistemological preferences such as the preoccupation with statistical refinement, surveys as a method of investigation, the progress of science as knowledge accumulated by induction or verification, the presumption of value neutrality in data gathering, and investigations on a massive scale, for example, those by large research teams whose research findings were formulated in laws or generalizations. Theory and investigation were reduced to the rigorous application of methodologies and techniques. Numerical data were separated from the social and cultural conditions from which they were drawn and reembedded in universalistic abstractions. According to R. Feito:

The bourgeois ideology has always tried to eliminate the political character of the state institutions, among them the school. . . the bourgeois individual thinks, in a fetished way, of the separation of politics and economy, conceiving of the state as something independent from civil society. The liberal approach declares that the individual is universal—he/she subscribes to norms of conduct established by culture, occupation, and social position—and at the same time the individual is a separate entity. . . . The school is neutral and the process of selection is presided over by universalistic criteria. The culture transmitted by the school is the universal culture, the only valid culture.25
H. J. Noah provides a revealing insight into positivism. For him, the primary goal of comparative education is to “establish generalized statements about education valid for more than one country”—“lawlike” cross-national statements on relations between education and society and relations between teaching and learning.\textsuperscript{26} Comparative education focuses on “the careful identification, validation, and measurement of variables,” maps relations among the variables in each nation, and synthesizes the national equations into a general equation. “Country names” are brought in “only when the ability to make valid generalizations across countries fails” and “when no amount of within-system (nation) adjustment of either the independent or dependent variables can reduce the across-nation differences in observed relationships.”\textsuperscript{27} Only at this point, national character or historical background appears. Noah contrasts this method favorably with what “used to be” the primary goal of comparative education, “the most complete description possible of other education systems” and “most telling comparison of one system with another.”\textsuperscript{28} His “comparative” education has no intrinsic interest in individual countries or in subjecting its “laws” to tests of local relevance and cross-national transferability. His position is a clear statement of the homogenizing effects of positivism, its deep desire to mirror the natural sciences, and its deliberate occlusion of national specificities and the dynamics of difference.

In the face of complex questions, positivism strives for dualistic “yes” and “no” answers. Yet much social theory suggests that, in contrast to the natural sciences, the social sciences exhibit ambiguity.\textsuperscript{29} Given the open-ended and ultimately idiosyncratic nature of social life, many events do not conform to rules of universality. When such rules are invoked, the notion of universality is invalidated, or, rather, it becomes not a precondition for scientific work but another contested terrain. To account for this in a fashion, the positivist sociology of education now tends to use probabilistic quantitative models grounded in uniform statistical frequencies in place of laws or lawlike explanations.\textsuperscript{30} But the underlying problem remains. Much that is real is suppressed from view. For example, in designing indicators for use in statistical analysis, it is necessary to create deductive generalizations that begin from evidence about the fragmentation of social reality. This method permits a series of traits to be identified, but, by highlighting “common” themes, it can obscure important differences, not to mention the variety and plurality of intervening elements. The method hides the very same diversity that the indicators are meant to reflect.\textsuperscript{31} G. Busino states, “Comparativism has been invariable in the search of identity. But of an ambiguous identity . . . it has only been the search for an illusion, for an ideal: the identity assured by science, the function of identity of a culture that places science in the heart of all its values . . . In a culture that raises reason as eminent value, logic as the supreme procedure with its demonstrative tests, comparison is the means to disguise the verdicts of deduction and induction, to argue what is easy for us to demonstrate.”\textsuperscript{32}

More complicated analyses that seek to understand the historical nuances and interrelations of things using complex multidisciplinary analyses that are problematic, tentative, or uncertain are rejected as unnecessary.\textsuperscript{33} Even if pertinent in theoretical terms, such analyses are seen to lack usefulness for government, which is based on well-defined and immediate problems and motivated not by the search for explanations but by actions that quickly and efficiently resolve those problems.

Instrumental positivism in comparative education is not only intellectually simpler but is also a striking example of the manner in which the social sciences have learned to speak to power in easily digestible terms, regardless of the cost for our deeper understandings and our larger capacities for action. It is also policy functional in another sense. For example, the notion of difference as inequality fulfills certain policy needs. By providing computable data attributable to “performance,” it enables the allocation of deficiency, failure, and blame. It creates data-based hierarchies among national systems, and it normalizes inequalities of status and resources. It encourages all national systems to follow a common blueprint for education reform, a single path to “success.” Of course, when success is measured in a hierarchical table of comparative performance, only a minority of nations can fully succeed. The journey is universalized; the destination is not. De facto global homogenization, rather than universal educational achievement, becomes the horizon of policy.

Notions of difference defined as inequality are sometimes associated with strategies of democratization and improved intrasystemic articulation.\textsuperscript{34} During the long expansion and modernization of national systems, strategies such as the Education for All initiative in the United States, in which equal rights meant providing the same education to all, homogenized education. In the process, such strategies attached a democratic glow to the semi-universalist strand of comparative education. Yet
despite their role in modernization, these strategies are also conservative, narrowing the scope for local self-determination, diversity, and innovation. In specifying common numerical performance measures for comparative purposes, strategies of difference-as-inequality tend to suppress in advance the unexpected, the ambiguous, the complex, the idiosyncratic, and (in global strategies of equalization) the nationally specific. When using singular global comparisons, the potential for national variation in system-level criteria is lost. When national systems focus on performance as measured in the common comparison, a homogenizing logic is installed. Over time, all systems tend to become the same. The same homogenizing logic entered university evaluation and quality assurance around the world in the 1990s.35 The common denominator in these systems is the construction of top-down homogeneous indicators of institutional educational quality, which created categories for classifying academic institutions, often for financial distribution. In this process, the organizational particularity, history, and differential mission of each university and the multiplicity of interests and practices associated with the diversity of disciplinary fields are obscured or ignored.36

‘Globalization’: The Tiger Leaps

To those who believe that history is a process of incremental change modulated by uniform tempo, we argue that it is prone also to sudden changes and breaks. As Virginia Woolf put it in 1931, anticipating the theoretical sensibilities of half a century later, “One moment does not lead to another. The door opens and the tiger leaps.” Contemporar![Image](https://example.com/globalization.png) y ‘globalization’—marked by the sudden salience of global relations—is one such example of a historical break, one such leaping tiger. ‘Globalization’ has had a profound impact on every field of the social sciences, especially those that emerged in the modern nation-building era and those whose chosen terrain is that of international relations. Comparative education lies in both of these categories. In the context of ‘globalization,’ positivism’s commitment to universalistic and linear interpretations; its failure to encompass fragmentation, ambiguity, and contingency; and its inability to move freely across general and particular and quantitative and qualitative are increasingly serious handicaps. At the same time, the epistemological forms taken by the chosen hegemonic project of positivism, forms that have been sustained within the policy horizon of the nation-state, are undermined.

As we see it, ‘globalization’ is not simply an economic transformation. At this level of aggregation, economies cannot plausibly be separated from social and cultural contexts. This makes the task of analysis more complex, but it enables us to recognize that global changes are manifest in transformations in the economic, technological, social, cultural, and political realms. These changes are remaking the power/knowledge relationships at the heart of comparative education, touching all aspects of identity; reshaping the nation-state, which hitherto was the central unit of analysis; and reworking relations between sameness and difference, and between the self and the other. As yet, ‘globalization’ has caught comparative education largely un-prepared. For the most part, it remains isolated from the extraordinary fecundity of contemporary social and cultural theory, continuing to sustain the concepts, methods, and development narratives of the previous era. Comparative education still deploys the nation-state as its basic unit of analysis much as it did in the 1960s. This provides us with an obligation and an opportunity for its reconceptualization. Some scholars have begun to do this, for example, the authors in the collections edited by N. Burbules and C. Torres, Globalization and Education: Critical Perspectives (Social Theory, Education and Cultural Change) and N. Stromquist and K. Monkman, Globalization and Education: Integration and Contestation across Cultures.

First, a comment about the term ‘globalization.’ We do not use ‘globalization’ in the normative neoliberal sense of the formation of a universal world market, nor do we read cultural and educational changes as a function of economic changes—though it is clear that the unprecedented global mobility of capital has been the death-blow to old policies of closed national economic management and that the policy practices associated with neo-liberalism are often highly potent. Nor do we adopt complete boundary dissolution, global convergence, and universal citizenship. To speak of internationalization and the blurring of national frontiers requires a cognitive map providing for the elaboration of comparisons beyond simplistic images of a global village inhabited by the technologically privileged. To distance ourselves from the neoliberal usage, we use ‘globalization’ in single quotation marks (‘ ’). Perhaps a new term is needed.
‘Globalization’ is the process of becoming global. What does this mean? As we see it, ‘global’ and ‘globalization’ are geostrategic terms referring to systems and relationships beyond the scale of the nation and located at continental, regional, and world levels. The question is, What is new about ‘globalization’? ‘International’ trade (inter-national, between nations) has a long history, and cross-continental religions are at least 2,500 years old. Western universities have sustained a worldwide system of codified knowledge, with increasingly universal reach, for more than a century. Nevertheless, in the past 3 decades or so a further change has occurred. Global relations have become more extensive and intensive. This change is marked above all by thickening networks of instantaneous media and communication and the new forms of identity, community, and action they facilitate. Electronic communications and complex data transfer have created round-the-clock world financial markets. There is ever-growing traffic in global products, symbols, and ideas and an expanding global dimension in the popular imagination, fed directly by universal-American themes in media, popular entertainment, and consumption.

‘Globalization’ is also characterized by the mobility of people for the purposes of business and labor, migration, and study, leading to a more complex cultural mix and to cosmopolitan and hybrid identities. In this respect, ‘globalization’ is an extension of earlier trends, but the quantity of movement has greatly increased, and the quality of mixing is new. People changing location use media, communications, and return travel to sustain contact with their previous places, their previous selves. Traveling is less a passage from one absolute place-identity to another, more an absorption of additional strands of identity in a setting in which selves are cosmopolitan, linked to several cultural groups, and simultaneously affected by kin-based, local, national, regional, and global markers. Many international students and faculty assume hybrid identities. While this ‘globalization’ excludes the poorest part of the world’s population who lack access to telecommunications and whose experience of the global is limited to (and by) images of global consumption, it has a broad impact on other social layers. D. Held et al. note that ‘notions of citizenship and national identity are being renegotiated in response to contemporary patterns of global migration and cultural globalization . . . in many cases the trajectory of these negotiations is far from clear.”

Some theorizations of cultural ‘globalization’ conjure up an incessant changeability, flicker, and fleetingness in the ever more rapid turnover of images and systems. Here, as with the ideological notion of a single world market, it is important not to fall into a universalistic ‘globalization’ that loses locality, contingency, and cultural context so that perpetually changing ‘globalized’ cultures become seen as transcendent and constituting the “abortion of history.” To invert the point made earlier, the changes associated with ‘globalization’ are incremental as well as discontinuous. Much of what is claimed as reinvention are the same practices recycled and attached to novel signs. Perpetual reinvention is a marker of the neoliberal ideology of ‘globalization,’ creating continuous obsolescence and ever-new products and markets while relations of power remain unchanged. There is discontinuity but, against the notion of ‘globalization’ (or postmodernism) as a complete break, we emphasize the continued relevance of studies in history, sociology, and political economy for situating educational practice.

It is often noted that ‘globalization’ is associated with two contrary trends: a trend toward worldwide convergence, that is, toward homogeneity, and a trend to difference via more extensive and complex encounters with cultural “others.” Even while differences become more visible, paradoxically, ‘globalization’s’ homogenizing systems, reaching every local corner, render heterogeneous difference more uniform than before. ‘Globalization’ foregrounds differences that appear within the frame of global systems while eliminating the potential for “others” located outside those systems and opaque to them. At the same time, even its generalities are mostly nationally and culturally specific. Thus, certain global universals appear as other, even as alien and hostile, to many people. Global systems in finance and communications, and most world products, are carriers of particular national traditions, those of Anglo-America. For example, until recently, four-fifths of all electronically coded information was in English. Other global universals can be more consistently inclusive, able to contribute to local capacity building everywhere, for example, commitments to human rights, tolerance, ecological sustainability, and the empowerment of the marginalized and oppressed. V. Rust and L. Laumann argue that “the disputation between equilibrium and conflict points of view have been superseded in the 1990s by a wide array of knowledge communities that have come to recognize, tolerate, and even appreciate the existence of multiple theoretical realities
and perspectives. According to A. Giddens, essentially all of these orientations express a firm commitment to democracy.49

At the same time, by no means all global conceptions of democracy are universal in their acknowledgement of rights of difference. N. Stromquist remarks that “to accelerate the process of democratization, international development agencies, both bilateral and multilateral, are working on a new area of development: political development. Their programs usually go under the names of good governance, democracy, and human rights. Bilateral and multilateral agencies, no less than the states they represent, are still male dominated and patriarchal in orientation.”50

Stromquist argues that it is necessary to analyze how democracy is treated by global agencies and what is present/absent in their definitions. One test of the “improved” conceptions of democracy, plurality, and respect of the rights of self-determination is to see how women and gender issues are framed. In this manner, one cross-national universal is interrogated from another subaltern and also often cross-national perspective. “Within feminist perspectives there is increasing clarity of the need to educate women and men in new conceptions of citizenship. Concrete efforts to modify practices and social representations of gender, democracy, and politics are few.”51 In the global era, attempts to expand women’s citizenship face contrary pressures. On the one hand, ‘globalization’ offers the potential for the rapid transmission and expansion of ideas about citizenship that acknowledge individuals as political actors in their own right. This creates space for women. On the other hand, nations now have a diminished potential to expand the basic rights of citizenship because of global processes of economic and technological change and, in some nations, due to the rise of ethnic nationalism. Further, “globalization gives priority to the market over social justice and it is creating new forms of labor processes that for the most part are contributing to reinscribe gender inequalities in new occupational forms.”52

Implications for Comparative Education

‘Globalization’ has immense implications for education. As well as its effects in reconstructing the potentials of national government—which has been the great incubator of modern schooling and higher education systems—‘globalization’ is associated with the growth of international markets in on-site and on-line education, and increased movement of people and communications. The worldwide number of foreign students has grown from 1 to 2 million since 1980. On-line education, crossing national borders, hastens the cultural interpenetration of nations and educational institutions. And international comparisons, once the province of a few specialists, are often now the terrain on which national policy is conceived and formulated. This raises the stakes in comparative education. E. Oyen remarks,

People flow between countries in ways that have never been seen before, at the same rate that international organizations are established nonstop. Politicians go for comparisons to increment their comprehension and control of national events, though they end up accepting intuitive comparisons to justify a great part of their policy preferences. Bureaucrats make extensive use of national and international statistics in their comparisons, and industry and the world of business constantly compare the social context of national and international markets. . . . This tendency to globalization has changed our cognitive map. While some cultural differences tend to vanish, others become more pronounced. Comparative investigation probably has to change, going from emphasizing the search of uniformity in the variety, to studying the preservation of enclaves of unity amid an ever increasing homogeneity and uniformity.53

Despite ‘globalization’s’ dual potential for homogenization and difference, as Oyen suggests, it would not be hard to mount the claim that in education, especially education policy, it is the homogenizing aspects that are uppermost at present. For example, the neoliberal case for school reform by J. Chubb and T. Moe, grounded in evidence and argument about locally controlled U.S. public schools, for a while was required reading around the world, regardless of local circumstances.54 In the Anglo-American countries, courses for international students in business and information technology are forming a global elite who are steeped in American talk and business practices. Web pages, travel, and communications give American universities a more immediate visibility and salience in policy and practice outside the United States. The World Bank model for higher education reform, with
mixed public and private sector provision and funding, corporate-style competing institutions, and the transfer of responsibility for educational quality from government to institutions, is widely adopted and has become a benchmark for comparison. The means of transmitting the World Bank model are global, yet the model has a local First-World, “Northern,” and particularly American identity. Global hegemony in comparative education does not mean the extinction of the national dimension and its replacement by abstract universalism so much as the worldwide elevation of the educational practices of one nation—or rather, an idealized version of those practices. Other nations do not vanish. They are subordinated. The strategic objective is to render their governments the instruments of hegemony.

Among many possible cases, consider the successive World Bank diagnoses and prescriptions for higher education in Argentina (while noting that a similar point can be made about the World Bank’s policy advice in almost every Latin American country). These reports transmit an unambiguously North American vision into the analytical space of the “South.” The World Bank reports draw on a set of proposals, seen as common to all countries, and it promotes these as the only possible solution, while it denies those elements in existing educational practice specific to the cultural and political contexts of each nation. For example, in 1993, advancing its argument for economically driven modernization, the Bank polemicized against the “reformist” tradition in Argentine universities. “Reformism” derived from Argentina’s democratization after World War II. It imagined the student as an intellectual personality that was learning to integrate professional and scientific training with critical thinking and civic commitment. The nation’s future leaders were to be trained in public institutions. The university, imagined as autonomous and critical in relation to the state, and as accessible to all citizens, was to be governed by students, faculty, and alumni. The reformist university was profoundly central to the distinctively Argentine vision of the nation as a pluralistic political community. This tradition influenced universities elsewhere in Latin America and helped to shape the French May Revolution of 1968. But there is scarcely a feature of this vision that the World Bank has not targeted, contrasting it unfavorably with global practice. There is “a generalized lethargy in the performance of academics.” The students “enjoy free education but generally take much more time than is necessary to complete a course of study.” Higher education is highly politicized. “Higher education issticky.” The World Bank advises that additional financing should be accompanied by institutional changes designed to secure greater “discipline,” managerial reforms should be introduced and the democratic element in university governance rolled back, student performance should be monitored, entry to university should be restricted and tuition should be charged, private institutions and market impulses should be encouraged, and so on.

Government-instigated reforms in Argentine higher education, especially the 1995 Law of Higher Education, have gone some way toward meeting these demands. In the process, the traditional citizen-forming mission of the universities and the power of university-defined academic excellence in shaping the universities have been weakened. The effect has been to homogenize Argentine higher education in the terms of the global template, reducing cross-national diversity while also reducing its internal diversity of mission and interest.

Here the power/knowledge effects of instrumental positivism are apparent in the symmetry between its conceptual architecture and its real life global effects. The conceptual-methodological breakdown of national specificity is joined to the policy-practical deconstruction of subaltern national interests. Outside the United States, educators often experience the homogenizing side of ‘globalization’ as a strong Americanization that threatens to overwhelm all forms of identity that are not minor variations on global themes. Nevertheless, we want to resist the notion of ‘globalization’ as an automatic, universal, and unstoppable Americanization. A. Appadurai emphasizes that mobile identities are determined not by hegemonic culture per se but by their subjects. There is also the possibility of plural global systems. A strong version of Americanization constitutes one set of possibilities. More fragmented and diverse kinds of ‘globalization’ constitute others. Likely we will experience a mix of the two, varying by sector, with unitary ‘globalization’ strong in sectors such as finance. Where educational practices will fall is as yet uncertain.

In relation to “the cognitive map” used in comparative education, the implications of ‘globalization’ depend on the theorization of ‘globalization.’ Comparative education has never been innocent of the global: its positivist form contributes to the homogenizing ‘globalization’ of national systems. Yet orthodox comparative education has not developed a reflexivity in relation to its own global effects.
Perhaps there are practical reasons for avoiding the issue, and these have blocked the theorization of the changing global/national relationship. It might suit the positivist comparativist to continue testing national education systems against global templates and to advise national governments on how to converge with ideal global forms. It might seem convenient to leave the nation-state at the center of methodology, protecting agencies such as the World Bank from scrutiny and debate while maximizing the pressure on “sovereign” national governments to conform. But this position is increasingly untenable given the empirical weight of global agencies and supranational regional groupings, not to mention the globalization fever in social science and the plurality of interests and methods within the field of comparative education itself.

From the standpoint of independent scholarship, the key issue posed by ‘globalization’ is its relativization of the nation-state. Governance remains national in form, and nation-states continue to be central players in a globalizing world, but partly as local agents of global forces, for the nation-state now operates within global economic constraints. While it retains the potential for self-determination and global influence, it no longer provides a sealed cultural environment. The implications for comparative education include the need to research the global agencies and all global institutions and relationships, to investigate the new geo-political-educational structures of power in a globalizing world, to study international education including on-line education, and to consider new forms of governance and identity those other than the national. In our view, global changes cannot be grasped using positivist frameworks and static categories. To incorporate these phenomena requires a novel and plural approach. We now turn to possible elements of a reforged comparative education that responds to the sudden changes associated with the tiger of ‘globalization.’

**Comparative Education “After the Tiger”**

We have argued that ‘globalization’ creates both sameness and difference and that the relationship between them is open-ended and contingent: comparative education should not privilege either sameness or difference in a lasting sense. Similarly, comparative education should encompass both hegemonic culture and alternative voices, moving between the macro and the micro and between qualitative and quantitative methods. To exercise this strategic intellectual freedom, it is essential that, to a significant degree, comparative education is beyond the control of government or global agencies. That is, within the field, the strand of independent research needs to be enhanced: there needs to be independent research dedicated to explanations and interpretations, able to reflect on the power/knowledge effects of comparative education itself, strong enough to provide a counterpole to the hitherto dominant instrumental strand in research, and strong enough to affect the content and methods of the latter in the longer term.58

The new cognition required as part of comparative education rests on awareness of the limitations of positivist methods and on skepticism about grand narratives, data collection, and data analysis techniques, without falling into the epistemological nihilism implied by ultrarelativism. Such cognition seriously takes into account the uniqueness of the object of study, the historicity of the life world, and the heterogeneity of social subjects and their evolving identities. It draws at need on a broad range of academic disciplines, and it is theory-driven while taking a flexible approach to theory. It subordinates methods to theories, rather than the other way around. It encompasses both quantitative and qualitative methods, tending to subordinate the former to the latter rather than vice versa. It is reflexive in that it understands the implications of the practical role of comparative education for its theories and methodologies, and vice versa.

We will now comment on five elements of this new cognition: the ethics of sameness/difference and self/other in comparative education, theories and methods in comparative education, a disciplinary framework for (largely) qualitative research, the reflexivity or “self-knowledge” of comparative education, and elements of a research agenda for the global era.

**Ethics for a Global Millennium: Difference, the Self, and the Other**

When modern schooling systems were built, democratic reformers focused on the spread of educational opportunities. They favored universal and homogeneous systems to weaken the old exclusions
and hierarchies. With difference understood as inequality, the objective was to reduce difference.\textsuperscript{59} With cultural diversity a tool of elite power, the goal was a common culture, with the double meaning of “common” as “popular-democratic” and as “universal.” But in a global era, homogenizing systems break down subaltern identities without lifting subaltern status or material position. Here the old democratic agenda needs to be pluralized, and one of its axes reversed. Taking Oyen’s point, the need is not for sameness amid variety; it is to sustain the capacity for difference—the right to cultural self-determination, the universal human right to identity. This raises the question of the conditions under which the right to difference is promoted, and whose right of difference it is. In research in comparative education, it invokes relations between self and other.

We argue that, in independent research in comparative education in the global era, the approach to sameness and difference needs to be grounded in an explicit ethic of relations between self and other (this refers not just to individual self/others but also to cross-national and cross-cultural relations among institutions, national authorities, etc.). The foregoing argument suggests that the methodology in comparative education research should not automatically privilege the self over the other, or vice versa. The methodology should be concerned to recognize the other and to explain difference by understanding its “otherness.” Although the research process privileges the knowledge power of the researcher, cross-national research can be structured so as to cut the transfer of knowledge power into global hegemony. For example, we can use reciprocal methodologies, in which researchers from different nations scrutinize each other’s terrain. While all education systems should be transparent to external scrutiny, we support the right of those systems to self-determining identity, including the cultivation and expression of national or regional differences. We seek to replace the a priori bias toward global models with an a priori bias against claims to hegemony and in favor of cultural diversity. We seek to replace negative “othering” with empathy with the other.

We do not take the ultrarelativist position that all imitation and sameness is “wrong.” For example, cross-national convergence in participation rates, public spending, and aspects of institutional modernization may well be welcome. For us, the issue here is the cultural contents of curricula, pedagogies, and socialization in education. All else being equal, greater cultural diversity among national systems is a sign of more potent self-determination. From this perspective, a key question for comparative education is the pedagogical, cultural, political, and economic preconditions necessary for, say, indigenous identities in education or national policy determination in a globalizing environment.

This approach to comparative education requires a capacity to engage with the identity of the other in a process of deep comparison, without collapsing into ultrarelativism. Deep comparison requires a capacity and willingness to open the self. Understanding of the other is never complete but this is true of all relationships. As noted by Young, “the appropriate remedy for xenophobia and ethnocentrism is not a culturally relativist embrace of all culture . . . but the development of bicultural or hybrid awareness, followed by more pluralistic perspectives.”\textsuperscript{60} The guiding principle is equality of respect. The comparativist who is willing to incorporate part of the object of study into her/his own identity and who is able to make the transformation of subjectivity a fruitful part of the process of comparison can draw more profound lessons from the research. This requires recognition that the self lies “somewhere between, on the one hand, heterogeneity and total plasticity” and, on the other, “the entirely homogenous, harmonized single self of the myth of character.”\textsuperscript{61} The self and the other are both open to change, but they are also both valued and sustained.

Appreciation of the other does not have to rest on deconstructing the other or on dissolving the self. Opening the self can be uncomfortable, even laden with risk. For the positivist, the process of distancing from the other (the object of study) is essentially defensive, the assertion of an unchanging inviolable self. The hegemonic comparativist expects all identities and practices to be open to transformation except his or her own. A fixed self is preserved at the expense of understanding the other, undermining comparison itself. But, when “deep comparison” is used, no system has hegemonic or privileged status. All education systems can be relativized for analytical purposes, without exception. Questions can be raised about the education system from which the comparison is being made, as well as the system or systems with which it is being compared. Questions of relative status and value are left open. As noted, one way to actualize this “deep comparative” perspective is to use reciprocity. Instead of a solo researcher comparing another national system
against her or his own system, two researchers each compare the other system against their own system. They then collaborate on the identification of similarities and differences between the two nations, using a hybrid set of criteria constructed through a process of mutual consultation. Subsequently, in the process of validation, they return to the bilateral and reciprocal. Young states that “an interpretation is verified by the other, in the new mutual intercultural ground that the communicative exploration of meaning creates.”

**Theories and Methods**

To produce a comparative thought, we elaborate a set of linked characteristics within a system. The linking system, the “prism” that aims to “throw light” on the object of research, determines the richness of the outcome. Theories, methodologies, empirical observations, quantitative analyses, and the schema for their integration are all useful inputs to the prism. Any tools that can assist explanation should be available. There is no single path to understanding. Recent perspectives in the sociology of education envision reality as constantly changing, with a number of dimensions or layers that constitute independent spheres but share intertwined dynamics. The acid test is not the internal consistency of the intellectual system per se—and still less the capacity of that system to produce numerical data—but its capacity to generate better explanations. “Better” is defined by the purposes of the inquiry, whether it is to improve education or to improve our understanding of social phenomena. As S. Dow notes, the tools may be heterogeneous but still contribute to an overall research program.

To those who argue that the choice of theory or method is driven not by its purpose but by its alleged “universal” applicability as a privileged source of truth, we would reply that no one approach can produce all relevant “truth,” that different theories and methods are associated with different truth effects and all truths are partial truths, and that we are not so rich in our understandings of comparative education that we can afford to neglect the insights of a range of approaches. This is not to argue that all theories, methods, and disciplines are interchangeable, equivalent, or “equally valid.” On the contrary, it is to argue that they are incommensurable and hence cannot be equally ranked truths.

Hitherto in comparative education, debate about analytical tools has mostly centered on methodology. For the positivist, claims to superior research are underpinned by statements about quantitative rigor, so that the path to knowledge is reduced to the internal logical consistency in research design and to fidelity to the empirical protocols. While theory is never absent, it is mostly implicit, buried deep in various methodological positions. In contrast, we emphasize the primacy of theory over methodology, noting that theory tends to be determining whether or not it is explicit. In a reflexive field, the contents of theory are made explicit. All theories, methods, and research protocols are open to interrogation. A field unable to reflect on its own theoretical preconceptions is doomed to obsolescence.

The distinction between quantitative and qualitative methods is only problematic when the categories are seen as opposing and mutually exclusive. While quantitative tools are indispensable for certain explanations, especially those emphasizing the elements common to different cases, qualitative tools enable those data to be situated in context, foregrounding difference and enabling problems of transfer among cases to be addressed. The two kinds of method can work in conjunction in the same research project. One case in point is the relationship between people movement and identity. Global changes in identity are occurring in conjunction with material changes in the flows of people, goods, capital, and electronic messages. These flows are capable of being captured by empirical measurement. While the complex identities themselves are beyond statistical aggregation and population-to-population comparison, they can be studied using qualitative methods such as intensive interviews and the examination of documents, artifacts, and communications.

However, we do not see qualitative and quantitative methods as “equal” or equivalent to each other. Qualitative methods are able to encompass a wider spectrum of sameness-difference than are quantitative methods, which by definition depend on singular quality, sameness. We will not expand here on methods of qualitative research, where there is an extensive literature. Rather, we will consider a question that is canvassed rather less often: disciplinary frameworks for the theorization of qualitative research.
A Discipline Framework for Qualitative Research: History and Social Science

Given the range of disciplines already used in comparative work, it might be thought that a plurality of foundation disciplines is already accepted. Yet, few researchers use a genuinely multidisciplinary approach. The field largely consists of competing singular approaches: it is multidisciplinary, but not multidisciplinary. Multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches enable a richer set of methods and insights, and hence enable a greater complexity in the research. At the same time, this complexity poses the problem of the conceptual architecture used in integrating the foundation disciplines.

In moving beyond the limits of positivist sociology to an interdisciplinary and primarily qualitative approach to comparative research, we envisage central roles for the history of education as well as sociology and potential contributions from other disciplines such as political economy, cultural anthropology, the history of curriculum, the sociology of science, and epistemology. We refer to the approaches suggested by C. Tilly and I. Wallerstein. M. Pereyra reminds us, drawing from Tilly and Wallerstein, “It seems like the task of today is Unthinking the science that was left to us by the founders of modern social theory like Augusto Comte and his followers, who constructed a positive method starting from historical comparison but which in essence was ahistorical. . . . It may be necessary to Unthink this nineteenth century science that still rules our cultural unconscious and the practice of so many researchers.”

Comte, Spencer, and Durkheim assigned to the historical comparative method the role of “precise laws [and] determined relations of causalities.” That is how the comparative method was constituted, as hegemonic practice within an equally hegemonic social theory. Challenging this intellectual practice, other approaches to comparative methodology were integrated into the hegemonic social theory in a simplified form. Their theoretical relevance has been rediscovered in the classic analyses of M. Bloch and M. Weber and, more recently, that of T. Skocpol. Bloch describes two uses of comparison in history. One approach is characterized by the search for universal phenomena in cultures and societies set apart in time or space. Research following this trend is dedicated to finding similarities and continuities, but it tends to produce somewhat superficial conclusions. The second approach proceeds historically by investigating the nature of each culture, which may lead to the study of neighboring and contemporary societies, for example, those of Europe. In contrast to the first approach, this approach rejects the idea of “going hunting for the resemblance” (chasse aux ressemblances).

Subsequently, the French School of the Annales, including F. Braudel, replaced the traditional dichotomy that positioned sociology as the science of regularities and history as the science of particularities with an interdisciplinary proposal articulating between social sciences and history. Socializing history and historicizing sociology constitute “omnipresent” tendencies in the recent literature. Skocpol positions comparative history as overcoming the gap between theory and history. She explains the utility of historical-comparative analysis:

Historical-comparative analysis allows us to select national historical accounts as units of comparison . . . it offers a valuable anchor for theoretical speculation. It encourages us to clarify the real causal arguments suggested by the great theoretical perspectives, and to combine different arguments, if necessary, to remain faithful to the ultimate objective, which is of course the true enlightenment of the causal regularities that exist throughout historical cases. Whatever the sources of theoretical inspiration, comparative history will only succeed if it does this task in a convincing way. . . . So long as it is not applied mechanically it can stimulate extensions and theoretical reformulation and also new ways of seeing concrete historical cases.

Skocpol’s proposal provides elements linking comparison with a theory of differences and, above all, from the perspective of complementarity with history, even if we do not agree that “the enlightenment of causal regularities” is the ultimate objective.

Thus, against those who presume that ‘globalization’ has abolished national histories, we assert the continued explanatory power of the history of education. At the same time, orthodox histories of schooling grounded in universal explanations about schooling culture should be challenged by alternative histories to the official ones, not accounts asserting another equally totalizing narrative but accounts that draw on different realities. Here cultural anthropology has a contribution to make. For example, M. J. Maynes argues that the “process of schooling” was not uniform,
as proclaimed by those histories of education that celebrate the notion of an hegemonic Eurocentric culture. It was not even homogeneous within different European countries, and it affected in varying ways the popular sectors and their everyday lives. Maynes mentions an Italian peasant who, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, used to find comfort when she went daily to school, in spite of the mnemonic routines and the rigidity of the methods, instead of remaining at home where she was brutally beaten and forced to perform strenuous chores.77 This testimony was found in a personal diary, and it is useful in demystifying the idea of scholarization as always repressive by nature and contrary to the spontaneity of the popular sectors. The history of education tackled from the perspective of the silenced, the anonymous actors constructing history from below, the nonof- official alternative history, the history of the “thick narratives”—such a history can account for the empty spaces, the subaltern spaces, and postcolonial positions. It allows a fuller range of differences and particularities to emerge.

Likewise, in the sociology of education, some recent models reject the notion of scientific work that is separated from theoretical foundations and universally applicable. Debates among paradigms and approaches, ranging from the modernist to postmodernist, and structuralist to post-structuralist, suggest that pretensions to a sense of certainty and analytical precision in a world increasingly unpredictable and imprecise maybe naive.78 In these perspectives in the sociology of education, reality is imagined as a concrete totality with a great degree of variability and volatility. This is a challenge to traditional linear and evolutionary concepts of knowledge, around which deterministic inferences and deductive conclusions are based and empirical foundations are organized. Being a more flexible, even playful notion of science, empirical events, and theoretical analysis, this recent sociology of education downplays the normative distinction between value judgments and empirical judgments. It uses open-ended scientific models, searching less for patterns of regularity and universalizable and reproducible results than for dynamics of transformation of complex totalities that cannot be parcelled out into distinct domains. These perspectives in the sociology of education, despite their reliance on case studies and theory-driven methodologies, are highly interdisciplinary and comparative.

Here there is no need for specialized methods to identify laws or lawlike processes. Certainly, reality displays recurrent patterns and regularities. These can be studied at different levels, including metatheories, middle-range (context-bound) theories, and empirical research including data collection and analysis. None of these levels can be easily differentiated or pursued as totally independent instances. However, they are moments in the division of labor of the research process and can be identified as discrete steps. There is a constant iteration in all these moments, with the empirical moment deconstructing the meta theoretical or theoretical moment and vice versa, in an endless succession of revisions throughout the whole research process. Contrary to the old scientific tendency that emphasizes disciplinary rather than interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary work, these perspectives in the sociology of education tend to be interdisciplinary, transdisciplinary, and comparative in nature.79

This perspective imagines reality in terms of nonlinear events and profound discontinuities in real life phenomena. This questions traditional notions of objectivity. Here, the notion of social objectivity is not a premise of good research but an agonizing process of striving. It involves a dialectical process, engaging both researchers and the so-called research object. Rather than being an invariant starting point for research, objectivity becomes another goal. It is achieved through iteration, multiple checks and balances throughout the research process, multiple intersubjective exchanges among researchers and populations “studied,” and the quality of the intellectual analysis that decodifies the different processes of representation (and, hence, languages, voices, identities) of the people involved in the research.

Broadening the notion of objectivity implies also the critical reconsideration of the notion of subjectivity. Positivist approaches to comparative education attempt to achieve a universal, clearly established, and procedurally bound notion of social objectivity, one easily attained through the implementation of methodological rules, as if a study can be protected from pollution. The subjectivity and singularity of the researcher is ignored. But in social research there are no simple, easy to apply, and universally applicable rules to be implemented hygienically in a laboratory-like, environmentally controlled manner. The attempt to model comparative research this way is merely misleading. By concealing the role of researcher-as-subject, it denies political reflexivity (the
comparativist becomes an unthinking tool of the powers-that-be) and hides from scrutiny the effects of the researcher’s own intellectual perspectives and practical roles. Against this, we argue that in a reflexive field that is explicit about its methods, subjectivity is not a liability but an asset, another input to the inquiry, analysis, and explanation.

**Power and Reflexivity**

We have seen that, in comparative education, various theories and methods are attached to particular policy agendas, with predictable power-knowledge effects. Some theories and methods are generalizing, and their use is associated with sameness and globalism; others gain life from particular sites or contexts, foregrounding locality and difference. Some narrow the range of identifiable difference and produce sameness; others identify and produce diversity. Theories and methods have varying meanings in different contexts. For example, comparison of student test scores has one meaning and effect in a hegemonic nation—perhaps alerting its education professionals to the need to sustain global dominance by improving their efforts—and another meaning and effect in a poor and marginal nation.

The point is that the choice of method (or theory) often determines whether the effect is homogenizing or not and whether it strengthens or weakens national identity or local institutions. Sometimes we may want to encourage sameness—for example, by using homogeneous cross-national comparisons of participation rates to measure the worldwide distribution of citizen rights to education. Sometimes we might want to highlight diversity—for example, tabulating not student literacy scores but variations in languages of instruction. The consequences of these choices need to be made conscious and explicit. In a reflexive field, researchers openly deploy disciplines, theories, and methodologies not only according to the kinds of explanations they produce but also according to the attendant power effects.

**A Research Program: Global Comparative Education**

We will mention five implications of the global for a reforged comparative education. First, ‘globalization’ suggests that nation-to-nation comparisons should be located in a larger analytical framework, noting trends of convergence and other global effects and noting also that global effects are contested and uneven and vary among nations, regions, and institutions. At the same time, in nation-to-global-standard comparisons of participation rates to measure the worldwide distribution of citizen rights to education. Sometimes we might want to highlight diversity—for example, tabulating not student literacy scores but variations in languages of instruction. The consequences of these choices need to be made conscious and explicit. In a reflexive field, researchers openly deploy disciplines, theories, and methodologies not only according to the kinds of explanations they produce but also according to the attendant power effects.

Second, the traditional comparative map of the world, in which all nations are formally similar and ranked according to their level of development on a single scale, is more inadequate than ever. It eliminates global phenomena, it fails to explain power relations among nations, and between national and global, and it hides qualitative national differences. This suggests the need for a new geopolitical cartography that traces the flows of global effects and the patterns of imitation, difference,
domination, and subordination in education policy and practice. Are the categories of “Third World” and “North/South” relevant? Does the “center/periphery” framework provide a useful structure for understanding hegemony in educational policy? Is there more than one hegemonic center of power in world education? For example, does the European Union have a major role to play in global developments, and what is its relationship to Anglo-American hegemony? Given the spread of English-language communications, what is the longer-term scope for an independent global approach in China, Japan, or the Islamic world? What are the prospects for Spanish as a second global European language?

Third, the growth of cross-border international education foregrounds it as an object of research in itself, only partly encompassed by studies of particular national practices. International education sits between global, international, and national systems. It opens a host of inquiries, from hybrid subjectivities among mobile students, to the question of the attributes required for educators, institutions, and systems in a nationally interpenetrated educational world, to comparative policies on language and bilingualism, to the patterns of international research collaboration and competition, to the spread of commercial practices in international education and the resulting tension with pedagogical practices and national cultures, to the mushrooming of on-line education communities and their relationship with national regulation, and so on. Research in international comparative education needs to encompass the cross-national recognition of education qualifications, the emerging pan-national systems of accreditation and quality assurance, and cross-border electronic distance education (which partly evades national regulation altogether).

Fourth, as noted, globalization opens up a new potential for forms of identity other than national identity and the prospect of enhanced recognition of that potential. The singular methodological focus on the nation downplayed supranational cultural and religious identities and obscured intra-national regional variety in educational participation, resourcing, and outcomes, despite some research in this area. This near exclusion of the regional is unsurprising. The modern nation-state is a mechanism for achieving national definition, political reconciliation, and homogeneity; it is a set of tools for overcoming political and cultural diversity. Now, the global relativization of the nation-state allows regional and cultural diversities to resurface. Nevertheless, only where national infrastructure provides protection from the homogenizing effects of ‘globalization’ are diverse identities furthered. For example, certain Western European minority cultures, such as the Welsh culture, are more strongly placed than their equivalents in African countries, where the state lacks the will, the policies, and the resources needed to facilitate indigenous identities.

Finally, a further set of research problems is generated by the impact of the global dimension at the national level. Modern education systems are still organized locally and nationally, subject to national regulation, and powered by a nation-building mission, albeit an often fragile one. The trends to increased mobility and cosmopolitanism have major implications for policies on the preparation of citizens in education. Another set of research is suggested by patterns of global policy borrowing and imitation, which suggests the need for a methodology for studying conditions for successful transfer of educational policies and practices. For example, the 1994 World Bank model of higher education urges systems to move to mixed public and private funding. Not all nations can draw on a domestic capital base sufficient to underpin major private funding: no other nation, with the possible exception of Japan, has the American capacity for tuition financing, corporate research, and donations from alumni and foundations. Comparative education could research the varying capacities of individual nations to meet this and other global policy norms. In turn, this would allow the development of a more nuanced, variable model of public and private financing. A further research agenda triggered by ‘globalization’ is to directly examine education-policy borrowing itself: to map in and between nations the forms and instances of isomorphism and convergence, and their opposites, self-determination and diversity, in education systems and institutions.

The core policy issue is whether, to what extent, and within what limits nationally determined education practices are viable. What conditions can sustain national and local self-determination and difference in the global era? The answer will vary by nation. To take an extreme case, the capacity of American education to sustain a national agenda within a globalizing world is not an issue (though there are issues of Hispanic, Afro-American, and first-nations self-determination within the United States). Indeed, the globalizing world is strongly affected by the American national
agenda. But, in many parts of the world, ‘globalization’ appears in conflict with national identity, and self-determination is a burning issue. The problem of Americanization creates a principal dividing line in the field of comparative education. It is rarely acknowledged by American faculty. There is as yet little internal critical reflexivity in relation to the global effects of national American practices, effects mediated not only by government but by universities also. Nevertheless, this problem is at the heart of the dyad of sameness/difference integral to comparison, and it is fundamental to the power/knowledge effects of comparative education in the global era. As such, Americanization is a principal policy and research agenda for independent-minded scholars inside and outside the United States, with ongoing potential to stimulate dialogue and debate.

Conclusion

Although comparative education is an American-dominated field complicit in the global-as-convergence, its theories and methods can be redeployed to help explain hegemony, difference, and self-determination on a world scale. At the beginning of this article, we argued that, while governmental and global power has been central in the shaping of comparative education, it is possible also for new knowledge to augment the capacities of political power. The building of a democratic, pluralist, nonrigid, and nonethnocentric field of comparative education would enable new kinds of judgments about national and global phenomena. In some countries, comparative education enters into programs for educating teachers, and a democratized field of study could augment the building of political forms of national citizenship and global exchange, taking us beyond the limitations of global markets.

Comparative education could do this more effectively if there was genuinely equal sharing among different traditions in the field, manifest in a multilingual approach. As G. Garrido notes in relation to church Latin in medieval Europe, a common language contributes decisively to unity and universality. Diversity of tongues shapes the multiplicity and variety of phenomena accounted for by comparative education. The fact that linguistic diversity is not the norm is symptomatic of Americanization. Significant communities in comparative education in Spain and Latin America, Europe, and China are undertranslated and underpublished in English. Data from Held at al. show that “it is books originally written in English that are overwhelmingly the object of translation into other languages,” not vice versa. However, in comparisons that cross language barriers, comparative researchers ought to be conversant with the languages and cultures of all of the nations under study, precluding “intellectual tourism.” To the extent that comparative education is focused on difference as well as sameness and on local specificity as well as global standards, we can require more curiosity about what non-Anglo-American voices are saying and greater sensitivity to the rights of the other.

Notes

3. The growing salience of American, and to a lesser extent British, policy norms in the education work of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) can be read from OECD education publications from the mid-1980s onward, and this salience was attested by longstanding OECD official George Papadopoulos during a symposium on the OECD role in national education policies in Brisbane, Australia in 1998. That conference was attended by one of the authors.
5. We understand hegemony as the exercise of primary influence, tending toward control, through a broad range of institutions, practices, and mechanisms: political, economic, and cultural (linguistic, customary,
discursive, etc.). The concept has its roots with A. Gramsci, but we do not share Gramsci’s assumption that political economy and class are necessarily primary in relation to the other aspects of hegemony (A. Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. and trans. Q. Hoare and G. Nowell-Smith [New York: International Publishers, 1971]).


9. Mollis, *Estado nacional y universidad*. The two kinds of education are in tension, yet they share a common division of labor. Their contradictions and commonalities are formative of Japanese social relations.


22. For a revealing account of the positivist method in neoclassical economics, see the famous essay by Milton Friedman, “The Methodology of Positive Economics,” in M. Friedman, *Essays in Positive Economics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 3–43. For Friedman, the more universal are the postulates of economics, the less troubled by locality and difference, the more powerful and desirable they become.


28. Ibid.


31. To refer to a simple example, to say that in Spain public education makes up 60 percent of the elementary and secondary enrollment is ambiguous at best, given that, in certain autonomous communities such as Catalonia, the private sector represents more than 50 percent of enrollments: F. Raventos Santamaría, *Metodología Comparativa y Pedagogía Comparada* (Barcelona: Editorial Boixareu Universitaria, 1990).


35. Mollis and Marginson (n. 1 above).


40. N. Burbules and N. Torres, eds., *Globalization and Education: Critical Perspectives (Social Theory, Education and Cultural Change)* (New York: Routledge, 2000); Stromquist and Monkman (n. 6 above).

41. The problems created by the economistic and homogenizing usage of globalization in Anglo-American neoliberal discourse are discussed in F. Clyne, S. Marginson, and R. Wooc, “International Education in Australian Universities: Concepts and Definitions” (paper presented to the Comparative and International Education Society conference, San Antonio, March 7–12, 2000). See also Marginson (n. 23 above).


46. Held et al., p. 326.

47. Keyman provides a useful account of these combined tendencies.

48. Held et al., p. 346.


57. For more discussion of reforms and counter-reforms in Argentina, see Mollis and Marginson (n. 1 above).

58. In relation to this point about the expansion of space for independent research, an anonymous reviewer asked, “Who is going to fund it?” It has always been possible for some faculty to sustain their own research programs, financed by ongoing university resources as distinct from specific project grants; some grant- ing sources such as foundations encourage independent scholarly work; and those accepting project grants should not consider themselves immune from the responsibility to act independently.


60. Young (n. 15 above), p. 504.


63. The word “prism” refers to the metaphor of the Object-prism from A. Matute of UNESCO, in which “by selecting an Object-prism one is selecting an universe which one expects to enter by means of the critical reading of the former, where each universe has a different quality and any amount of roads to travel” (A. Matute, “El método de acercamiento crítico: Otro punto de vista sobre calidad de la educación,” *Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios Educativos* 21, no. 2 [1991]: 89–108, quote on 102).

64. Here we emphasize the value of the scholarship of class, race, and gender as an integrated set of theories facing the challenge of postmodernism but also moving beyond the political immobility of many postmodernist positions.


72. An analysis of the theoretical-methodological tendencies of the past 30 years can be found in Abramhs.


74. Skocpol, p. 236.


76. Some critics of the hegemonic history of education who argue from the neomarxist or critical theory standpoint themselves use a totalizing, generalizing narrative that searches for uniformity and hegemonic ideology. Examples include those who argue that social class is a simple determinant of school achievement, without space for alternative determinations. J. Schriewer, professor of comparative education of the University of Frankfurt and member of the European Society of Compared Education, is clarifying. He notes that general accounts of change in metascientific discourse have moved from “the methodological normativity to the sociohistorical description.” The diverging types of theories (some scientific, others of
reflection) are related to the functional orientations and the concomitant definition of problems present in the different subsystems of society. He argues that, in accordance with these theoretical styles, the different ways of tackling experiences related to “cultural alterity” end in the “method of comparison” and the “exteriorisation racing world situations respectively” (J. Schriewer, “La dualidad de la educación comparada: Comparación intercultural y exteriorización a escala mundial,” *Perspectivas de la UNESCO* 19 [1989]: 3).


78. Samoff (n. 33 above); Morrow and Torres (n. 19 above).


86. OECD (n. 11 above).


88. One exception is the collection of readings presented by Kempner, Mollis, and Tierney in *Comparative Education* (n. 12 above), but the editors note the difficulty in finding contributions to the literature that reflect subaltern interests.


91. Held et al. (n. 43 above), p. 346.
THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF POSTAPARTHEID HIGHER EDUCATION TRANSFORMATION

ISAAC M. NTSHOE

Introduction

The discourses of neoliberalism and global market competition dominate social and economic agendas at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In particular, global competition and new managerialism have underpinned the recent emphases on accountability and administrative efficiency, and there has been a permeation of contemporary business practices and private sector ideas or values in public sector institutions. Although there is general agreement on the need to reform higher education and training (HET) provision in this context, such reform efforts are often characterized by competing interests, contradictions, and even compromises.

Global Market Economy and HET Transformation in South Africa

Current trends in HET in South Africa and worldwide undoubtedly suggest an increase in the influence of the market and the global neoliberal ethos, with the latter becoming dominant in the discourse of the HET sector and determining its direction. The debate on this subject is diverse and includes the following issues:

First, massification (acceleration and expansion of higher education and increased access to it) has become a popular means to address the problem of elitism. It has created a higher education system that is to accommodate new kinds of students and students from previously underrepresented groups, including women, ethnic minorities, and mature students.

Second, interinstitutional competition has intensified, and this has resulted in university-state relations being recast in contractual terms. The outcome of this is increasing government control over HET.

Third, globalization and marketization have tilted the balance in higher education from “internal,” essentially academic concerns, to “external” issues such as institutional positioning and reconfiguration of missions to ensure financial survival.

Fourth, the competitive environment introduced by globalization and marketization has, necessarily, resulted in the creation of new relations with students and users, reduction in per capita student subsidies and the replacement of students’ block grants by loans and graduate tax. In this
competitive environment, funding councils are increasingly using their authority to introduce mechanisms of accountability and control over teaching and research, by linking funding to outcomes. Fifth, government departments, funding councils, and other agencies have developed strategic policies to reinforce the notions of "market" culture and resource allocation, which change HET into a quasi market. Furthermore, competitive values are currently being espoused and competition between and within institutions encouraged. However, additional government resources for higher education have not accompanied the increasing competition brought about by globalization, marketization, and internationalization.

Policies that are driven by the global market economy and new managerialism have been subjected to intense debate, notably the negative impact of these policies on developing countries. In South Africa, for instance, the government’s 1996 Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, which aims to create jobs by increasing foreign investment, is clearly driven by global competitiveness and complies with World Bank macroeconomic principles. This is a major contradiction of the political agenda embedded in the government’s Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) of 1994. This program was intended to address equity, reconstruction and development, including poverty alleviation. Thus, critics of GEAR argue that the government has turned from promoting a quasisocialist critique of class society to a celebration of the “free market,” in that GEAR is a policy that is supervised by the market.

The shift away from RDP to GEAR tends to compromise, albeit indirectly, equity and redress principles that guided the policy discourse prior to the first democratic elections and during the first 3 years of the postapartheid era. The notion of free market, in particular, has promoted a spirit of competitive individualism that assumes that success is based entirely on individuals’ merit (even among some of the previously disadvantaged groups). Competitive individualism, therefore, seems to provide an explanation of why the previously disadvantaged communities in postapartheid cannot fairly compete with their previously advantaged counterparts. This growing belief in competitive individualism has had the effect of negating the reality that racial and gender inequities (and their effects on the poor African black majority) will be difficult to eradicate because of historical and institutionalized injustices.

Discussions about the impacts of the discourse of globalization and new managerialism on HET in South Africa largely reflect developments in countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand as well as several Asian societies. According to Jan Currie, even though globalization is termed differently in different contexts (“McDonaldization,” “Toyotism,” and “post-Fordism” or “neo-Fordism”) and “each takes a slightly different form, they all emphasize economic efficiency, and there is a tendency towards homogenising practices.” However, Currie warns that it may be too simplistic to reduce globalization to transnational homogenization, because the specific historical, political, cultural, and economic characteristics of each country influence the ways in which globalization has developed and continues to unfold.

As in other countries, the neoliberal economic order (globalization and new managerialism) in South Africa is shaping HET policy in various ways in the postapartheid era. Thus, more than ever before, the HET sector is expected to respond to the increasingly globalized knowledge-intensive world of the twenty-first century. This is expected to pose huge challenges and serious dilemmas for decision makers.

There is a concern, for example, that South African policy documents do not take into consideration sufficiently the impact of the global economy on the national economy. Thus, analysts are skeptical of the insistence that higher learning institutions (HLIs) produce “useful” knowledge for the global economic market without analyzing the implications of this for internal development and the basic needs of the population as a whole. The neoliberal view assumes that HET must satisfy the needs of an export-driven economy by producing technicians skilled in business, science, and technology. The opposing view assumes that HET policy must equalize access of different groups of students, run development programs, and change the composition of the staff of higher education institutions.

Analyses of governance and management styles as well as funding structures that characterize HET transformation after apartheid reflect trends in other countries that adapt to global competition. In South Africa, however, these trends also need to be located within the context of racial inequity that derives from policies in vogue before the democratic election of 1994.
Principles and Goals of Higher Education Transformation in South Africa

The transformation of HET in postapartheid South Africa is underpinned by the following vision, principles, and goals: (1) overcoming social, political, and structural inequalities; (2) establishing a system that contributes to reconstruction and development; (3) creating mechanisms for increasing the participation of a range of constituencies; (4) developing structures for increased collaboration between government, labor, and the business sector in providing funding for higher education; and (5) promoting active participation by South Africa in globalization, marketization, and high technology.

Transformation of HET in South Africa focuses primarily on reform of the structures of the system itself (size, shape, governance, and funding) with a view to developing alternative structures. An issue that arose from debates concerning the HET sector was whether the binary system of universities versus technikons and technical colleges that existed before 1994 should be continued or whether it should be replaced by a unitary structure. This tension was resolved by the adoption of a middle-ground position, that is, a “single coordinated” system retaining some elements of a binary system. The reform would address elitism, as funding would no longer favor universities at the expense of technikons and technical colleges.

A major problem with transformation of the HET sector is the delay in or the lack of sufficient implementation of the broad policy framework of the White Paper of 1997. The higher education system continues to face the following major challenges: (1) declining enrolment, which results in competition among HLIs for students; (2) decreasing public funding for higher education; (3) increasing student debt; (4) low student completion rate and low research output; (5) lack of policies on academic and program development; (6) lack of effective governance and management in some institutions; (7) disruptions of academic programs because of the financial and academic exclusion of some students; and (8) skewed full-time enrollment across study fields and programs.

Although the challenges outlined above affect historically advantaged institutions (HAIs) as well as historically disadvantaged institutions (HDIs), the situation in HDIs is reaching a crisis. For example, declining enrolments, which is purportedly linked to cuts in funding, student debt, and lack of effective governance and management, are endemic in HDIs. Thus, the proposed institutional mergers and incorporations that affect mainly HDIs are defended on the grounds that many of these institutions are nonviable (because of declining enrolments) and lack effective governance and management.

Generally, while the higher education sector expanded rapidly between 1993 and 1999, student enrolment declined after 1999. This suggests that the idea of massifying the higher education sector, which was promoted by the National Commission on Higher Education (NCHE) of 1996, has not materialized. Moreover, table 1 indicates that between 1999 and 2002 Afrikaans HAIs gained in student enrolment and that English HAIs maintained enrolment levels but that historically black universities experienced substantial declines in student enrolment.

Enrolment growth by black male and female students in historically disadvantaged technikons (see table 1) could be attributed to the sociopolitical climate of nonracialism, the demand for equality

### TABLE 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Changes</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Historically white (Afrikaans) universities</td>
<td>+ 14,000</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historically black technikons</td>
<td>+ 9,000</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historically white (English) universities</td>
<td>- 2,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historically white technikons</td>
<td>- 5,000</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance institutions (Unisa, Technikon SA)</td>
<td>- 35,000</td>
<td>-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historically black universities</td>
<td>- 20,000</td>
<td>-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>- 47,000</td>
<td>-8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

of educational provision, and the need to redress racial and gender inequities in the new postapartheid democracy.\textsuperscript{39} This enrollment growth was also precipitated by the demand for higher education and by the new steering higher education policy that requires equal funding for universities and technikons. Factors that seemingly influenced the increase in enrolment of blacks at technikons in the 1990s include (1) the demand for higher education by African students, principally for career-oriented qualifications offered by technikons; (2) the relatively low fees, especially at historically disadvantaged technikons; and (3) the relatively low entrance requirements demanded by technikons, especially in mathematics and science fields.\textsuperscript{40}

The decline of white students during the second half of the 1990s, on the other hand, could be explained as follows: (1) increase competition from private colleges offering postmatriculation courses; (2) increase in African students qualifying for technikons, thus making it difficult for white students, especially those with low matric grades, to gain admission; (3) white students leaving historically advantaged technikons because of racial or negative attitudes toward the changes taking place at these institutions; and (4) possible declining rate of white matriculants and possible declining birth rate.\textsuperscript{41}

The enrolment growth at technikons is also attributed to the redress of gender equity by individual institutions. Thus, there has been an increase of blacks in the 1990s and especially of female students at historically advantaged technikons, previously dominated by white students. The increase of black female students at technikons is also related to their steady enrolment in non-science and technology fields.\textsuperscript{42} While black enrolments have increased at previously white technikons, their enrollment in non-science and technology seems likely to exclude members of this disadvantaged group from participating in the current information and technologically driven economy in postapartheid.

### TABLE 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Changes</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Historically white (Afrikaans)</td>
<td>+120</td>
<td>+9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>universities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historically black technikons</td>
<td>+92</td>
<td>+17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historically white (English)</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>universities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historically white technikons</td>
<td>-54</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance institutions (Unisa, Technikon SA)</td>
<td>-169</td>
<td>-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historically black universities</td>
<td>-346</td>
<td>-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-356</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The implication of this pattern of enrolment change, given that the government subsidizes institutions mainly on the basis of student enrolment and research, is that government funding for HAI$s$, especially former Afrikaans universities, has increased, while government funding for HDI$s$, has declined (see table 2).\textsuperscript{43} Exacerbating the situation is the fact that it is often difficult for small and less reputable universities in poor communities to compete for grants and contracts or to raise money from other sources, such as entrepreneurial ventures, to augment reduced state subsidies as a result of declining enrolments.\textsuperscript{44}

However, although student numbers have declined overall, HAI$s$ have enrolled many more black students since 1994. The exodus of black students from HDI$s$ to HAI$s$ can be attributed to the presence in HAI$s$ (and the absence in HDI$s$) of the following: effective governance and management; proper accounting procedures; completion of programs and qualifications, availability of resources, and prestige in the labor market.\textsuperscript{45} In addition, the decline in enrolment at historically black universities needs to be understood against the background of the general drop in the number of students who qualify to enter tertiary institutions (by passing the matric or obtaining matric exemption) as well as in relation to the growth of the pandemic of HIV/AIDS.\textsuperscript{46}
Student debt in HDIs is seldom discussed, in particular the issues of students who are unable to pay (because they are from poor families) and of students who are unwilling to pay (based on the notion of entitlement, which was successfully used as a resistance strategy before 1994). Research has shown that policies to achieve equity and broaden access to higher education become meaningful if students’ differential capacities to pay form the basis of resource allocation.

The delay in implementing government policy on access to and equity in higher education and associated problems with it are manifestations of the intricacies of postapartheid society. Decision makers in the postapartheid society are faced with the challenge of expanding access and achieving equity, on the one hand, and responding to demands of new managerialism and developing a cost-effective and efficient system of higher education, on the other. The analysis of HAIs and HDIs suggests that the imperatives of equity and redress remain major challenges especially if they are guided by GEAR.

Responses in terms of pace, scope, depth, form, and content of change at institutions varied among the various institutions. Some institutions have taken full advantage of the new environment, developed strong strategic planning and management expertise and have used resources to respond to the demand for higher education by non-traditional students. Others have remained essentially residential and have asserted strong emphasis of excellence, postgraduate teaching and research. Yet others are characterised by stability, a strong leadership core, a shared vision of where the institution is moving, a slowly expanding student body and a relatively stable academic and service workforce. Finally certain institutions have, for various reasons, been unable to reorient themselves as quickly and to the same extent as others. They have experienced sporadic and differing degrees of instability due to conflict among different institutional governance structures and accompanying lack of stable authority.

These different institutional responses need to be understood against the background of managerialism and global forces that impact on higher education. The responses to globalization and managerialism include quasi marketization and privatization, entrepreneurship, increased interinstitutional competition, and a drive for greater efficiency.

It has been asserted that the development of a competitive climate among public higher education institutions results from the absence of a national plan. Negative competition among institutions has been described as follows by the Council on Higher Education: “Lack of institutional focus and mission incoherence, rampant and even destructive competition in which historically advantaged institutions could reinforce their inherited privileges; unwarranted duplication of activities and programmes; exclusive focus of ‘only’ paying programmes; excessive marketisation and commodification with little attention to social and educational goals; and insufficient attention to quality.”

In view of deficiencies in the system, the following recommendations, which affirm the policy framework in the White Paper, were made: (1) achieving the vision and goal of the transformation of higher education institutions; (2) establishing targets for the size and shape of higher education; (3) increasing the participation rate in higher education from 15 percent to 20 percent; (4) shifting the balance in enrolment over the next 5–10 years between the humanities, business and commerce, and science, engineering and technology from the current ratio of 49 percent : 26 percent : 25 percent to 40 percent : 30 percent : 30 percent, respectively; (5) ensuring equity of access for underrepresented groups (blacks and women); (6) changing the staff composition in relation to student composition in order to accommodate black women and blacks; and (7) establishing single dedicated distance education institutions to expand access both locally and to the rest of Africa.

However, after apartheid HLIs, as the public sector more generally, have been driven by the contradictory imperatives of social justice (to improve equity and access) and the requirements of neoliberalism (to serve the economy and markets and the internal demands of their disciplines). Some commentators argue that the primary aims of the university are to generate new knowledge and develop critical thinking, and not primarily to implement government policy, to advance technical knowledge, and to supply higher level skills needed by markets.
Student Enrolment and the Changing Labor Market Demands after Apartheid

The report of the Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology (DACST) describing the nature of the changes in the South African society specifically prioritized the integration of science and technology as well as higher education’s role in this in the postapartheid South Africa. The report specifically emphasized information, communication and technology, biotechnology, and new materials as areas that need urgent attention to make South Africa competitive in the global knowledge-driven society.

The White Paper on Science and Technology: Preparing for the Twenty-First Century (DACST), too, gave priority to setting up a national system of innovation (NSI) as a strategy to enable the country to compete in the increasing knowledge-driven and globalizing economy. The proposed science and technology policy needs to be seen, first, against the background of the demands of the global economy, namely, competitiveness, productivity, increased flow of information across the globe, and the dominance of communication technologies. Second, the DACST proposals need to be understood against the background of demands for South Africa to participate in the current global economy, on the one hand, and the imperatives of equity, on the other hand.

The Human Sciences Research Council’s findings on the investigation of market demands in the postapartheid society suggest that organizations that participated in its study concurred that there were shortages of skilled persons in the area of human development, especially in executive and high administrative positions, and in professional and semiprofessional occupations. The study predicted a growth of demand for IT persons, engineers, engineer technicians, and technologists, with electrical and chemical engineers heading the list. In addition to the general shortage of these persons, the study also showed a general concern in all organizations that participated in the study about the specific problem of recruiting skilled black persons. The Bureau for Market Research reported the most critical shortages in electrical, electronic, software, civil, industrial, and chemical engineering.

The quantitative data collected by the Education Policy Unit of the University of Western Cape suggest that student enrollments in the fields of study in various institutions were skewed. Furthermore, enrolment in science and technology was generally low (11 percent of African full-time undergraduate students); almost half of all African full-time students in 1996 were concentrated in the life and physical sciences, especially in subjects like biology and chemistry; and within science and technology there was a concentration in science teaching and allied subjects rather than in industry-linked fields such as computer science, biochemistry, and hydrology.

These research findings have implications for the HET sector and for the Education Training Development Programme of the Sector Education and Training Authority. The findings revealed noncompliance with national requirements. They also revealed deficiencies in HAIIs as well as HDIs. It was a misconception that HAIIs had a concentration of students in programs that developed the needed high-level skills, whereas HDIs had a concentration of students in the humanities. Although the proportions were less problematic at HAIIs, the situation at HAIIs as well as HDIs lag behind projected goals in the production of people with “needed” high-level skills.

The National Plan for Higher Education is particularly concerned about HET and its Human Resources Development Strategy, and therefore suggests that HET play a pivotal role in developing primarily high-level knowledge/skills in science, technology, engineering, management, and information technology. It is on the basis of the skewed enrolment patterns that the National Plan for Higher Education proposes to shift the balance in enrolments over the next 5–10 years between the humanities; business and commerce; and science, engineering, and technology from the current ratio of 49 percent: 26 percent: 25 percent to a ratio of 40 percent: 30 percent: 30 percent, respectively. However, while these shifts have been proposed, the National Plan for Higher Education also raises concerns about the tendency to neglect knowledge/skill in other fields such as the humanities and languages. This is an important observation because it supports the view that, first, the proposed shifts do not imply that other skills, including those that address equity, development and citizenship, should be abandoned and, second, that HLIs must diversify their missions and therefore the types of scarce knowledge/skills they wish to develop.

Some critics of the current policy argue that whereas during the apartheid years, the HDIs resisted their direct and instrumental role in production for the system while HAIIs disputed the
extent of their collusion, currently all institutions accept that serving social and economic projects is the chief justification for their existence. 71

**Changing HET Curricula and Research in Postapartheid Society**

The National Qualifications Framework was the impetus for change in the higher education curriculum in postapartheid South Africa; it paved the way for the creation of a new higher education policy and facilitated the establishment of the South African Qualifications Authority. 72 The latter was promulgated by way of a parliamentary act to give effect to the National Qualifications Framework and attain quality assurance through the accreditation of programs within the general framework of outcomes-based education. The South African Qualifications Authority is therefore responsible for laying down what is termed critical cross fields (generic) and development outcomes for all (higher education) qualifications in South Africa. 73 Accordingly, all programmes must seek to promote critical cross-field outcomes and specific outcomes before they can be registered on the National Qualifications Framework. The South African Qualifications Authority, through education and training quality assurers, recognizes the need to involve professional bodies, providers, learners, government, labor, and business in the delivery of standard and quality programs. 74

In general, the challenge of maintaining the required balance between generic (core) skills and disciplinary skills should be understood within the context of divergent approaches and perspectives on pressures internal to higher education to serve the needs of disciplines as well as external social, economic, and political demands placed on institutions. 75 The effort to develop in students intellectual and generic/interpersonal skills as well as knowledge about how organizations work is based on two assumptions. 76 First, developing graduates in this manner will improve their performance in the labor market and thus the economic competitiveness of a country. Second, making graduates more attractive to employers will meet some of the latter’s criticism of HLIs and their graduates.

Two approaches often adopted by academic planners are the “stand alone” and the “embedding” approaches. 77 The stand alone approach is underpinned by a discipline-based design and implies the separation of modules in order to provide, in curricula of a university, some or all of the employability skills. The embedding approach, on the other hand, refers to a situation where skills are seamlessly embedded in learning programs and curricula.

As a response to external demands, there has been a general move from disciplinary curriculum and research designs (or mode 1 knowledge production) to interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary curriculum and research designs (or mode 2 knowledge production). 78 In contrast to mode 1, mode 2 knowledge is characterized by problem-solving or strategic as opposed to disciplinary research; that is, problems for problem-solving research arise in a particular context and are seen to be transdisciplinary and transinstitutional problems. 79 Furthermore, mode 2 knowledge production can be seen to facilitate the progressive penetration of market values into HET through academic capitalism, in that HET sector is no longer viewed to be the sole producer of knowledge. 80 This in turn has encouraged the idea of partnerships between public HET institutions and business/industry in the production and distribution of the findings of transdisciplinary research. 81

Two perspectives relating to knowledge production and the emergence of mode 2 in HET prevail in South Africa. The first assumes that the moves toward transdisciplinary (i.e., mode 2) knowledge production provides opportunities for developing an HET sector that is both responsive to the needs of business/industry and those of a previously excluded majority. The second perspective assumes that capitalist demands and the assimilation of HET into a marketized and commodified world inform the current restructuring of HET. 82 Despite the concerns of those adopting the second perspective, curriculum restructuring is driven by the belief that a transdisciplinary program-based design is an innovative response to the pressures of keeping abreast with the global trends of participatory and application-driven research, addressing the nations’ needs, promoting collaboration between knowledge producers and interpreters, as well as between knowledge managers and implementers. 83

However, the relevance and epistemology underpinning mode 2 knowledge production have been questioned by some scholars in the following ways: (1) the justification and explanation of
mode 2 knowledge production are often too simplistic; (2) mode 1 and mode 2 have been and will continue to complement each other; and (3) curriculum and research in higher education need to be characterized by application-driven, transdisciplinary knowledge production, which integrates and mutually enhances teaching, research, and especially community.84

It was largely because of external pressures that interdisciplinary, cross-disciplinary, and transdisciplinary designs were implemented in the development of higher education programs. Supporters of these designs claim that cross-disciplinary and transdisciplinary designs provide opportunities for a university to integrate skills in one program rather than providing the different disciplines separately or in an add-on fashion.85 It is further asserted that transdisciplinary designs are nonlinear and therefore afford students the opportunity to combine, assemble, and reassemble, in line with their own design and purposes, components of learning from various disciplines and transdisciplines, and from local and global sources.86

Becher asserts that cross-disciplinary and transdisciplinary approaches help alleviate the problem of academic tribalism and territorialism that create artificial boundaries between discipline specialists and militate against cooperation and the cross-fertilization of ideas needed to solve problems that appear in an interdisciplinary, transdisciplinary, and cross-disciplinary form in the real world.87 The culture of organizing curriculum content for higher education in terms of disciplines needs to be understood against the long-established predominance of the demands of disciplines.88 Thus, “universities have always offered a provider-led curriculum, and internal procedures governing teaching, research and staffing, have developed accordingly.”89 However, this practice has led to cultural and organizational closure that militates against cross-disciplinary flexibility, transdisciplinary learning, and student choice.90

Furthermore, debates about the changing role of universities in the current context of global competitiveness also have been accompanied by assertions that curricula and programs in higher education should be developed according to an outcomes-based approach in order to make the sector more responsive to changing conditions. It is further argued that the development of relevant outcomes can no longer remain the sole prerogative of HLIs but that they should be products of interaction between stakeholders in the sector. This view further assumes that institutions like business enterprises will logically develop programs that are demanded by the market in order to remain viable.91 Moreover, supporters of outcomes-based planning argue that a shift away from content-based curricula toward skill-based curricula is necessary because outcomes-based curricula provide students with skills they can directly use in employment.92

The proposed interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary designs for program-based planning are informed in South Africa by the National Quality Framework.93 The proposed shift from qualification-based to program-based design has had implications for the way in which curricula, learning programs, and research are benchmarked in institutions, among faculties and departments, and interinstitutionally. The program-based design assumes that all programs have broad areas of specialization and that it is desirable to use wide or narrow descriptions, whichever is required by a specific purpose. Thus, the current policy states that all qualifications in higher education in South Africa should be based on interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary programs that transcend single-discipline designs.94 This approach has been adopted to change curricula and learning programs and to make the sector responsive to the economic and social needs of postapartheid South Africa.95

The call to establish a proper balance between generic and specific disciplinary knowledge has led to increasing professionalization in university education, especially in engineering, medicine, accounting, and law in South Africa. However, the creation of regulatory bodies begs the question as to who dictates the outcomes of higher education and consequently who decides curricular relevance. For example, should providers (institutions themselves), the government (as the major funder), employers, or professional bodies decide the outcomes of higher education curricula?

The HLIs in South Africa have responded differently to the challenges facing the country after apartheid, although there is a gradual movement in universities toward programs that have developed beyond the traditional disciplines.96 Most South African universities have revised their academic programs fundamentally and moved toward program-based learning and teaching.97 Many collapsed rigid divisions between the different faculties offering disciplines in the humanities, closing down certain departments or reducing the number of departments.98 However, terms such as “mission
statements,” “strategic planning,” “equity,” and “excellence,” which characterize the process of reconfiguring the HET landscape in postapartheid South Africa, are seen as a reflection of corporate branding that pervades the transformation of the higher education sector.99

In defense of interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary curricula, Paula Ensor pointed out that the restructuring of academic programs in some institutions in South Africa has involved the development of curricula that are intended to replace the degree structure of the past.100 In the traditional system students were free to choose from a range of offerings, but in accordance with the university statutes. This has been replaced by a system in which curricula are organized into coherent, vertical streams.101 Thus, the traditional selection could be termed collation-type offering and the latter an integrated type.102

Like other HLIs after apartheid, the University of Cape Town had to respond to national demands (particularly from government) and internal pressures (mainly from students) to transform.103 Some of the criteria expounded in its mission statement (and, therefore, guiding the transformation) included the notions of excellence and equity, life-long education, research-based teaching and learning, the necessity for working within the framework of South Africa as an African nation, and the need to transcend the legacy of apartheid.104 In order to give effect to its new mission, program-based learning designs were developed, which provided career direction for students and reduced the 10 faculties to six.105 Another element of curriculum transformation at the University of Cape Town was the move away from discipline-based designs to interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary designs.106 This move resembled the program-based curriculum planning encouraged by the Department of Education and differed from the traditional qualification-based planning.107

In addition, four higher education institutions in the Western Cape were surveyed by Kraak to determine if there were shifts from mode 1 to mode 2 curriculum planning and research to comply with the demands of the increasing knowledge- and information-based society.108 The case studies suggest that although the projects in curriculum planning displayed several of the characteristics of mode 2 research, in general they formed a minority of the total research undertaken.109 Furthermore, many of the projects failed to capture all the inherent properties of mode 2 knowledge production, such as transdisciplinary and transinstitutional partnerships, plural financing, transacademic regulation and management, and transacademic evaluation and quality control.110

Conclusion and Policy Implications

This article has explored policies and processes relating to the transformation of HET in postapartheid South Africa at the time when HET worldwide is being reformed and reconfigured in order to respond to the neoliberal ethos, new managerialism, and global economic competitiveness.111

The argument that, while universities will continue to play a unique role in societies, this sector has had to redefine its traditional role in order to become responsive to communities it serves is a persuasive one in developing sustainable policies and improving practice. Several external demands on the sector include that (1) HLIs accelerate, expand, and increase access in order to address the problem of elitism that existed previously in the sector and to accommodate new kinds of students, especially previously underrepresented groups; (2) HET policy and practice address interinstitutional competition, a change in university-state relations, and gradual government intervention in HET; (3) HLIs be responsive to new management styles, competitive individualism, and global market competition and focus less on internal academic concerns and more on external issues such as meeting the demands of employers; (4) HLIs institutional governance and management structures as well as the public funding and resource allocation mechanisms be reformed to increase accountability and control over teaching and research; and (5) HLIs engage in entrepreneurial-like behaviors in order to raise additional resources.

Debates about transforming the HET sector in the postapartheid society discussed in this article have been located, on the one hand, in the context of the impact of globalization and new managerialism with all their consequences, and, on the other hand, in the imperatives of the social agendas of equity and inclusion. Two contrasting views relating to these two contexts have emerged.
Following South Africa’s acceptance back into the international community, the government imple-
mented the GEAR strategy to raise the country’s competitiveness. This macroeconomic policy seems
to have informed recent policies on HET. However, critics consider GEAR to be a contradiction of
the government’s Reconstruction and Development Programme that was intended to address equity,
reconstruction, and development, including poverty alleviation. An encouraging rejoinder is that
these two contexts and views must guide policy-making processes and practice. Thus, HET policy
and practice should resolve inherent clashes between demands of new managerialism and the expec-
tations of the majority of the South Africa population after apartheid. For example, in view of his-
torical inequities in education in South Africa, it is necessary to address the issue of students who
cannot pay fees and lodging because they come from poor families. In addition, many deserving
students, especially from rural areas, experience problems of accessing the government’s loan
scheme.

A personal view on these issues is that the current changes in HET are unlikely to be reversed.
Therefore, a balance needs to be struck between core values of HET, especially the university, and
increasing influence of new managerialism, which promotes the perception of higher learning insti-
tutions as businesses and of stakeholders in them as customers. A stark reality in the South African
scenario is the influence of business management models on current policies of HET, on funding
and resource allocation, and on institutional mergers and incorporations. However, the business
management model is not necessarily appropriate in HET, especially in a country where, until
recently, resources in general and those in higher education in particular were allocated inequitably
among the different population groups and where HLIs were separated on the basis of race and
ethnicity. However unintended the consequences of the current funding policy and the mergers
and incorporations, they are likely to prejudice HDIs. In addition, a proper balance will have to be
struck between institutional autonomy and the creation of effective governance and management
in the HET sector in post-apartheid South Africa.

Notes

1. Neoliberalism refers to a gradual shift from traditional liberalism, which shaped higher education in many
European countries. See, e.g., Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira, “The New Left Viewed from the South,” in The
Taylor, “The Revival of the Liberal Creed: The IMF, the World Bank, and Inequality in a Globalized

2. Rosemary Deem, “‘New Managerialism’ and Higher Education: The Management of Performance and
Cultures in Universities in the United Kingdom,” International Studies in Sociology of Education 8, no. 1
(1998): 47–70, and “Globalisation, New Managerialism, Academic Capitalism and Entrepreneurialism in
Universities: Is the Local Dimension Still Important?” Comparative Education 37, no. 1 (2001): 7–20; Pollitt,
p. 43.

3. See, e.g., Asghar Adelzadeh “From the RDP to GEAR: The Gradual Embracing of Neo-Liberalism in

4. George Subotzky, “Complementing the Marketisation of Higher Education: New Modes of Knowledge
Production in Community-Higher Education Partnership,” in Changing Models: New Knowledge Production
and Its Implications for Higher Education in South Africa, ed. A. Kraak (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research
in Kraak, ed., pp. 70–87.

5. Massification and its impact on HET are explored by Peter Scott, “Post-Binary Access and Learning,” in
Access and Alternative Functions for Higher Education, ed. G. Parry and C. Wake (London: Hodder and

6. Catherine Bargh, Peter Scott, and David Smith, Governing Universities: Changing the Culture (London: Society

7. Ibid., p. 2; Mary Henkel, “Academic Values and the University as Corporate Enterprise,” Higher Education

9. Bargh et al.


12. See, e.g., Adelzadeh; Harris and Michie; Subotzky, p. 109.


20. See, e.g., Adelzadeh (n. 3 above); Bertelsen, pp. 135–47; Harris and Michie; Subotzky (n. 3 above).

21. Harris and Michie; Nzimande; Orr.


23. Bertelsen (n. 10 above), p. 138; Orr; Subotzky.


29. Ibid., chap. 6.

30. Ibid., pp. 45–50.


33. Historically advantaged institutions were developed for the white population in accordance with the ideology of separate development. Hence, the term “historically white institutions.” Historically disadvantaged institutions were developed for population groups other than whites and were also known as “historically black institutions.” As both of the terms, “historically white institutions” and “historically black institutions,” reflect racist tendencies, they have been replaced with the more neutral terms, “historically advantaged institutions” and “historically disadvantaged institutions.” Two views prevail about the current status of higher education in general and historically disadvantaged institutions in particular: (1) getting the size and structure of the system right will address the major problems and (2) transformation no longer offers hope for historically disadvantaged institutions.

34. For example, allegations have been made regarding a lack of effective governance, inadequate leadership, and mismanagement at the University of Transkei (Unitra), University of the North, and Fort Hare University. See Adam Habib, “The Institutional Crisis of the University of Transkei,” Politikon 28, no. 3 (2001): 1–25; Department of Education, “An Independent Assessor to Investigate the Affairs of the University of Fort Hare in Terms of Chapter 6 of the Higher Education Act, No. 101 of 1997,” Government Gazette, no. 19842, notice 326 (March 12, 1999) (Pretoria: Government Printers, 1999), “Investigation into the Affairs of the University of the North by Independent Assessors Appointed by the Minister of Education in Terms of Chapter 6 of the Higher Education Act 101 of 1997,” Government Gazette 424, no. 21654 (October 16) (Pretoria: Government Printers, 2000), and National Plan, p. 16.


40. Ibid., pp. 75–77, 86.

41. Ibid., p. 88.

42. Ibid.


45. Council on Higher Education, Annual Report, p. 4; Bertelsen (n. 10 above), pp. 139–40; Department of Education, National Plan (n. 20 above), sec. 3. Enrolment at historically black universities has declined in...
the context of changing demands of the labor market and of increasing recognition of technikons and technical colleges as qualified providers of higher education.

46. The impact of HIV/AIDS is both direct (when students get the disease and drop out) and indirect (when students drop out to care for sick family members and relatives); see Jeanne van der Merwe’s article, “Where Have All the Matrics Gone?” *Star* (December 28, 2001); Jeanne van der Merwe and Moshoeshoe Monareng, “Matric Fears as Minority Get Varsity Access,” *Star* (December 28, 2001). Although the government prohibits disclosure of figures relating to the disease, a survey of women attending antenatal clinics suggests that the HIV/AIDS rate is reaching alarming proportions (see Belinda Berensford, “Doubts on Accuracy of Aids Stats,” *Mail and Guardian* [March 23–29, 2001], p. 61.


49. Ibid., p. 4.


51. Bertelsen; Chisholm (n. 10 above); Orr (n. 14 above); Subotzky (n. 4 above).

52. Bertelsen, pp. 140–47; Chisholm, pp. 50–51; Orr, pp. 44–57; Subotzky, pp. 97–99.


54. Ibid., p. 13.


64. Cooper and Subotzky (n. 32 above).

65. Ibid., p. 125.

66. See *ibid*.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.


70. Ibid., p. 31.

71. See Bertelsen (n. 10 above), p. 139; and Wolpe (n. 58 above), pp. 287–91.


74. A similar move to stress employable and transferable skills in the United Kingdom in 1997 impacted on university autonomy in terms of what these institutions offered and was interpreted by some commentators...
as growing state intervention in the higher education sector (see Tapper and Palfreyman [n. 25 above], p. 140). For example, the report recommended that the funding structure for public higher education be changed and paved the way for the creation of the Quality Assurance Agency (see Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals [n. 25 above]).


76. Similarly, Mark Blaug (“Where Are We Now in the Economics of Education?” *Economics of Education Review* 4, no. 1 [1985]: 17–28) analyzed the labor market in the United Kingdom in the 1980s and concluded that, although cognitive knowledge and subject-specific skills are clearly necessary for professions such as medicine, success in these professions, especially in changing conditions, also involves acquiring generic skills such as interpersonal, personal, and motivation skills.

77. Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals (n. 27 above), p. 4.


79. Muller (n. 4 above), p. 77.


81. Ibid., p. 113; Laurillard.


84. Subotzky (n. 4 above); Muller, pp. 78–83. See Muller, p. 79, on the epistemology underpinning mode 1 and mode 2 knowledge production in practice. Mode 1 has evolved and this has led to the development of mode 2 knowledge production. This explains why mode 2 competence depends on mode 1 (see Muller, p. 79). See Subotzky, p. 127, on the complementarity between mode 1 and mode 2 knowledge production.

85. See Ackerman (n. 57 above); and Klein (n. 57 above).


88. Laurillard (n. 78 above), p. 140; Robertson, p. 90.

89. Laurillard, p. 138.

90. Ibid.; Robertson, p. 91.

91. Laurillard, p. 138.

92. See National Committee of Inquiry (n. 25 above); Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals (n. 25 above).


96. See Ensor (n. 57 above); Soudien and Corneilse (n. 82 above), p. 303.

97. Ensor; Soudien and Corneilse.

98. For the rationalization process at the University of Cape Town, see, e.g., Soudien and Corneilse, p. 306.


100. Ensor, pp. 95–96.

101. Ibid., p. 96.

102. Ibid., pp. 95–96.
103. See Soudien and Corneilse, p. 302.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid.
109. Muller (n. 4 above), p. 78.
110. Kraak, p. 137.
111. See, among others, Bertelsen (n. 10 above); Chisholm (n. 10 above); Orr (n. 14 above); Subotzky (n. 4 above).
112. Reservations expressed in this article about the wholesale adoption of new managerialism and quasi marketization are consistent with the views of Laurillard (n. 78 above); Bertelsen; Orr; Wolpe (n. 58 above); and Soudien and Corneilse (n. 82 above).
PART II

Faculty, Students, and the Production of Knowledge
THE UNIVERSITY IN A DEMOCRACY—
DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE UNIVERSITY*

JURGEN HABERMAS

In the vicinity of Sde Boker in the Negev, Israel's large desert, Ben-Gurion wants to found a university town to serve the exploitation of this desert area. The new town is being planned for ten thousand students and the corresponding number of faculty and is to bring Israeli youth into contact with the development of the desert through the acquisition of the necessary knowledge of the natural sciences and technology. It is intended primarily to develop the trained personnel who will be necessary for future industry in the desert. In particular, the development of such industry will involve enterprises that require much scientific knowledge and little raw material.

This news item appeared in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of January 11, 1967. If, without additional knowledge, we read it correctly, a university is to serve as an instrument for the industrial development of an almost inaccessible region. From the very beginning industrial production will be initiated at the level of the most advanced technology. For the future of Israel this is probably a vital project. For us, however, the idea of a university as the starting point for the industrialization of a strip of desert is unusual. Yet the Israeli example is not so out of the way. Our educational institutions also have tasks to fulfill in the system of social labor.

Universities must transmit technically exploitable knowledge. That is, they must meet an industrial society's need for qualified new generations and at the same time be concerned with the expanded reproduction of education itself. In addition, universities must not only transmit technically exploitable knowledge, but also produce it. This includes both information flowing from research into the channels of industrial utilization, armament, and social welfare, and advisory knowledge that enters into strategies of administration, government, and other decision-making powers, such as private enterprises. Thus, through instruction and research the university is immediately connected with functions of the economic process. In addition, however, it assumes at least three further responsibilities.

First, the university has the responsibility of ensuring that its graduates are equipped, no matter how indirectly, with a minimum of qualifications in the area of extra-functional abilities. In this connection extra-functional refers to all those attributes and attitudes relevant to the pursuit of a professional career that are not contained per se in professional knowledge and skills. The classified advertisements provide weekly information about the catalog of leadership characteristics and loyalties supposed to be possessed by employees in managerial positions. Analogously, judges are expected to be capable of an institutionally adequate exercise of official authority, and doctors of quick action in situations of uncertainty. Of course, the university certainly does not produce the

*This essay was originally a lecture given at the Free University of Berlin in January 1967 at the University Conference.
virtues of these unwritten professional standards, but the pattern of its socialization processes must at least be in harmony with them. When this does not happen, conflicts arise. One need only think, for example, of the protests of Protestant congregations against ministers of the younger generation from the Bultmann school. We can be sure that these ministers are not worse exegetes than their predecessors. In short, the problem is not their functional abilities.

Second, it belongs to the tasks of the university to transmit, interpret, and develop the cultural tradition of the society. The influence of interpretations provided by the social sciences and humanities on the self-understanding of the general public can be seen easily. Today the hermeneutic sciences, no matter how positivistically disciplined in their methods, cannot in studying active traditions completely escape the constraint of either continuously reproducing them, or developing them or critically transforming them. We need only recall the recent discussion among German historians about the origins of World War I. Or imagine how future schoolteachers’ picture of German classicism would be altered if for one generation the radical authors published by Suhrkamp Verlag occupied the chairs in modern German literature at the universities.

Third, the university has always fulfilled a task that is not easy to define; today we would say that it forms the political consciousness of its students. For too long, the consciousness that took shape at German universities was apolitical. It was a singular mixture of inwardness, deriving from the culture of humanism, and of loyalty to state authority. This consciousness was less a source of immediate political attitudes, than of a mentality that had significant political consequences. Without planned actions, without the organized study of political science and without political education, without the student body’s political mandate in questions of current politics, without student political organizations—indeed under the aegis of an apparently apolitical institution—generations of students were educated in the disciplines of knowledge and simultaneously were educated in a politically effective manner. This process reproduced the mentality of a university-trained professional stratum for which society still intended a relatively uniform status. Transcending differences of faculty and profession, this mentality assured the homogeneity of the university-trained elite to the extent that in some leadership groups academic training even sufficed to preserve continuity through the German defeat in 1945. Nevertheless, at the universities themselves this tradition has not survived fascism. As we know, the academic stratum, shaped by a uniform mentality, has dissolved in connection with long-term structural changes in society. Does this mean, however, that today’s universities no longer meet the task of providing political education, or, insofar as they take care of this function in another way, no longer need to meet it?

The example of the desert university planned as a center of industrial development suggests the peculiar idea that research and instruction today have to do only with the production and transmission of technologically exploitable knowledge. Can and should the university today restrict itself to what appears to be the only socially necessary function and at best institutionalize what remains of the traditional cultivation of personality as a separate educational subject divorced from the enterprise of knowledge? I should like to argue against this suggestive illusion and advance the thesis that under no circumstances can the universities dispense with the three tasks I have mentioned that go beyond the production and transmission of technologically exploitable knowledge. In every conceivable case, the enterprise of knowledge at the university level influences the action-orienting self-understanding of students and the public. It cannot define itself with regard to society exclusively in relation to technology, that is, to systems of purposive-rational action. It inevitably relates also to practice, that is, it influences communicative action. Nevertheless it is conceivable that a university rationalized as a factory would exert an influence on cultural self-understanding and on the norms of social actors indirectly and without being conscious of its own role in doing so. If the university were exclusively adapted to the needs of industrial society and had eradicated the remains of beneficent but archaic freedoms, then behind the back of its efficient efforts, it could be just as ideologically effective as the traditional university used to be. It could pay for its unreflected relation to practice by stabilizing implicit professional standards, cultural traditions, and forms of political consciousness, whose power expands in an uncontrolled manner precisely when they are not chosen but result instead from the ongoing character of existing institutions.

After 1945 the primary aim of university-education in West Germany was to use the dimension of general education, mediated by neohumanism and strongly anchored in institutions, with the goal of educating the citizens of the university to become reliable citizens of the new democratic
order. The general education programs that appeared everywhere were easily connected with political education. The administrators of culture were not petty in establishing chairs in political science and sociology. Student governments were occupied with current political issues and student political organizations were welcomed and promoted. Whether it was interpreted as a formal commitment to political education or not, the political enlightenment of students seemed desirable, especially in the period of the Cold War. If I may generalize, at that time the university was inserted into democratic society with a certain political extension of its traditional self-understanding, but otherwise just as it was. Unchanged was the university’s crisis-proof foundation of self-governing autonomy. A by-product of the latter, of course, was a certain immobility, for it turned out to be an impediment to self-motivated university reform. That is why today, two decades after the first post-war reform program, a discontented society has presented the cumbersome university corporation with a bill for which it is admittedly not solely responsible.

In this situation those professors who would like to preserve the traditions of the German university are confronted with an alternative. They can read the latest recommendations of the Council on Education and Culture (Wissenschaftsrat, a government council on long-term changes in the educational system) as a technologically conceived strategy for adaptation and adopt it. Then they would be sacrificing sanctified foundations of tradition, putting up with regulation, and, above all, saving their own position in a university run by full professors. Or they can interpret it, after discounting the bureaucratically pressured reduction of the length of the course of study, in accordance with the so-called progressives. Then they can keep the university open to that dimension that we associate since the days of German Idealism with the concept of self-reflection. But this, it seems to me, would require the price of a transformation of internal structures.

The link between our postwar democracy and the traditional university—a link that seems almost attractive—is coming to an end. Two tendencies are competing with each other. Either increasing productivity is the sole basis of a reform that smoothly integrates the depoliticized university into the system of social labor and at the same time inconspicuously cuts its ties to the political, public realm. Or the university asserts itself within the democratic system. Today, however, this seems possible in only one way: although it has misleading implications, it can be called democratization of the university. I should like to substantiate my vote for this second possibility by trying to demonstrate the affinity and inner relation of the enterprise of knowledge on the university level to the democratic form of decision-making.

The argument with which I begin is borrowed from the philosophy of science, since the traditional self-understanding of scientific inquiry that goes back to Hume argues for the existence of a fundamental separation of practice from science and for the coordination of science and technology. Hume demonstrated that normative statements cannot be derived from descriptive statements. Hence it seems advisable not to confuse decisions about the choice of norms, that is, about moral or political problems, with problems of the empirical sciences. From theoretical knowledge we can at best, given specific goals, derive rules for instrumental action. Practical knowledge, on the contrary, is a matter of rules of communicative action and these standards cannot be grounded in a scientifically binding manner. This logical separation thus suggests an institutional separation: Politics does not belong at the university except as the object of a science that itself proceeds according to an unpolitical method.

Now the argument propounded by Hume is not false. But I believe that it does not imply the strategy for which Hume's positivistic successors have invoked it. We do not need to judge scientific inquiry only under the logical conditions of the theories that it generates. For another picture emerges if we examine not the results of the process of inquiry but its movement. Thus methodological discussions are the medium of scientific progress—I mean methodological discussions of the utility of an analytic framework, the expediency of research strategies, the fruitfulness of hypotheses, the choice of methods of investigation, the interpretation of the results of measurement, and the implicit assumptions of operational definitions not to mention discussions of theoretical foundations of the fruitfulness of different methodological approaches.

Interestingly enough, however, from the logical point of view, discussions of this kind do not follow rules different from those of any critical discussion of practical questions. This sort of critical argumentation is distinguished from straight deductions or empirical controls in that it rationalizes attitudes by means of the justification of a choice of standards. True, the relation between
attitudes and statements cannot possibly be one of implication. Yet the approval of a procedure or the acceptance of a norm can be supported or weakened by arguments: it can at least be rationally assessed. And this is precisely the task of critical thought, both for metatheoretical and practical decisions.

Of course it makes a difference whether we are discussing standards that, as in science, establish the framework for descriptive statements or standards that are rules of communicative action. But both are cases of the rationalization of a choice in the medium of unconstrained discussion. In very rare cases I practical questions are decided in this rational form. But there is one form of political decision-making according to which all decisions are supposed to be made equally dependent on a consensus arrived at in discussion free from domination—the democratic form. Here the principle of public discourse is supposed to eliminate all force other than that of the better argument, and majority decisions are held to be only a substitute for the uncompelled consensus that would finally result if discussion did not always have to be broken off owing to the need for a decision. This principle, that—expressed in the Kantian manner—only reason should have force, links the democratic form of political decision-making with the type of discussion to which the sciences owe their progress. For we must not overlook the element of decision-making in scientific progress.

Here we see evidence of a subterranean unity of theoretical and practical reason. Today we can only formally take note of this unity; we have no philosophy that could explicate its content. In relation to the sciences, philosophy today can no longer claim an institutionally secured position of privilege, but philosophizing retains its universal power in the form of the self-reflection of the sciences themselves. In this dimension, occupied by philosophy, the unity of theoretical and practical reason that does not hold for scientific theories themselves is preserved. Philosophy, having become circumscribed as a specific discipline, can legitimately go beyond the area reserved to it by assuming the role of interpreter between one specialized narrow-mindedness and another. Thus, I consider it philosophical enlightenment when sociologists, directed by professional historians, apply some of their general hypotheses to historical material and thereby become aware of the inevitably forced character of their generalizations. They thus learn to reflect on the methodologically suppressed relation of the universal and the individual. I consider it philosophical enlightenment when philosophers learn from recent psycholinguistic investigations of the learning of grammatical rules to comprehend the causal connection of speech and language with external conditions and in this way learn to reflect on the methodological limits to the mere understanding of meaning. These are not examples of interdisciplinary research. Rather, they illustrate a self-reflection of the sciences in which the latter become critically aware of their own presuppositions.

Such immanent philosophizing also confirms its validity with regard to the transposition of scientific results into the life-world. The translation of scientific material into the educational processes of students requires the very form of reflection that once was associated with philosophical consciousness. The developers of new pedagogical methods for curricula in college-oriented schools should go back to the philosophical presuppositions of the different fields of study themselves. Thus, for example, the transmission of basic grammatical structures in a language class at the primary school level, where the bases of several languages are taught simultaneously and comparatively, cannot be meaningfully discussed without confronting the problems of the philosophy of language as they have developed from Humboldt through Saussure to Chomsky. Similarly pedagogical problems of history instruction on the junior high school level lead to the problems connected with the emergence of the historical consciousness that has developed since the end of the seventeenth century with the tradition of the philosophy of history. Equally important is the demand for self-reflection that such pedagogical questions create for the natural sciences and mathematics. It would be easy to show in the cases of other disciplines the crossover points between theory and practice where self-reflection arises: in jurisprudence the practice of -the application of laws leads to problems of hermeneutics, and in the social sciences it is the practical need for aid in decisions and planning which has called forth discussions about basic methodological questions.

All of these examples characterize a dimension in which the sciences practice reflection. In this dimension they critically account to themselves, in forms originally employed by philosophy,
both for the most general implications of their presuppositions for ways of viewing the world and for their relation to practice. This dimension must not be closed off. For only in it is it possible to fulfill in a rational fashion those three functions which the university must in some way deal with over and above the production and transmission of technically exploitable knowledge. Only in this dimension can we promote the replacement of traditional professional ethics by a reflected relation of university graduates to their professional practice. Only in it can we bring to consciousness, through reflection, the relation of living generations to active cultural traditions, which otherwise operate dogmatically. Only in it, finally, can we subject to critical discussion both attitudes of political consequence and motives that form the university as a scientific institution and as a social organization. Students’ participation in research processes essentially includes participation in this self-reflection of the sciences. But if critical discussions of this type occur in the area of comprehensive rationality, in which theoretical and practical reason are not yet separated by methodological prohibitions that are necessary on another level then there is a continuity between these discussion and the critical discussion of practical questions: critical argument serves in the end only to disclose the commingling of basic methodological assumptions and action-orienting self-understanding. If this is so, then matter how much the self-reflection of the sciences and the rational discussion of political decisions differ and must be carefully distinguished, they are still connected by the common form of critical inquiry.

Therefore, so long as we do not want to arbitrarily put a halt to rationalization, we do not need to accept the existence of an opposition between a university aiming at professional specialization and one aiming at external politicization. For the same reason, however, we must not be satisfied with a depoliticized university. Current politics must be able to become part of the internal university community. I say this even though a National Democratic Club (a right-wing group associated with neo-Nazism) has been founded at the University of Frankfurt. And I believe it possible to advocate this thesis because the only principle by which political discussions at the universities can be legitimated is the same principle that defines the democratic form of decision-making, namely: rationalizing decisions in such a way that they can be made dependent on a consensus arrived at through discussion free from domination.

This is, as noted, a principle. It is binding but not real. That is why when considering the process of democratic decision-making we must distinguish, at least for analytical purposes, between (a) the discussion of proposals and justifications and (b) the demonstration of a decision with appeal to the preceding arguments. With regard to matters other than conflicts between parts of the corporation about questions of university politics, the university is not the place for the demonstration of political decisions. But it is, I believe, an ideally suited place for the discussion of political issues, if and to the extent that this discussion is fundamentally governed by the same rules of rationality within which scientific reflection takes place. This structural connection also renders comprehensible that students make extensive use of their civil and political rights in order to demonstrate their will outside the university as well. Inversely, however, it is then just as understandable that members of the university are expected, in their role as citizens, to make clear the connection between demonstrations and the argumentation that preceded them.

This thesis seems to be supported by my attempt to demonstrate an immanent relation between the enterprise of knowledge at the university and the critical enterprise. But this relation can also be defended pragmatically by the need for political self-protection. In a democracy that is not firmly established, we must expect masked states of emergency that are not interpreted and recognized by the authorities as violations of legality. Often in such cases the only thing that works is the mechanism of self-defense, based on solidarity, undertaken by the whole institution under attack. The particular interest then seems to draw strength from beyond its own limits through an acute convergence with the general interest. The Spiegel affair was an example. In rare unity of spirit the entire press took up arms against this violation of the freedom of the press. A violation of wage autonomy would surely set off a no less united protest by the unions. And so, too, if the constitutional norm that guarantees freedom of instruction and research should ever be violated again, the first resistance should come from the universities themselves, with professors and students side by side. An act of self-defense of this sort could no longer be expected from a depoliticized university.

If for this pragmatic reason we not only permit but promote the critical discussion of practical questions at the university, then students naturally have an even greater right to take part in
discussions in which the university itself is a political issue. They have a legitimate role in determining local and national policies about the university and higher education. Now for years an active and logically persuasive minority of students has demanded a democratization of the university. The university run by professors, which simulates a community of teachers and students, would be replaced by a corporation in whose administration all three parties would take part with the opportunity of asserting their own interests: students, junior faculty, and professors. Also, the dualism of academic hierarchy and the administration of institutes would be overcome. Again, students and junior faculty, in accordance with their actual functions, would participate in administering the resources of the institutes. These proposals have been subject to misunderstandings, partly because they are based on false models, for example, workers’ co-determination in industrial enterprises.

I cannot discuss this further here. But I am of the opinion that we as professors have no reason to abstain from such discussion. If, for example, the present conflict at the Free University—whose open character, contrary to the lament of part of the press, cannot hurt the universities standing or freedom—can still lead to a politically meaningful result, then it might be the following: the formation at the universities of Berlin and the Federal Republic of joint commissions in which professors confer unrestrictedly with instructors and students about all demands regarding university policy, including the most aggravating ones. And the public should be immediately informed of the results.
THE RESEARCH/TEACHING RELATION: A VIEW FROM THE ‘EDGE’

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Abstract

The relation between teaching and research is a defining feature of a modern university and of academic identity. Many universities claim a close relation between the two as well as a strong critical orientation. Yet the gap between claims and practice in higher education appears to be widening as government and institutional policies increasingly treat research and teaching as separate entities. Studies of the relation reflect these events. Such studies are not only contradictory but point to an increasing gap between research and teaching.

What is missing in this complex and contradictory literature surrounding the research/teaching relation is an understanding of the relation in its local and historical context—a conceptual archaeology. Using a case study, we trace the development of teaching and research at the University of Canterbury (Christchurch, New Zealand) over time. We explore founding discourses, colonial imperatives, Humboldt’s legacy, the influence of philosopher Karl Popper and more recent events such as national audit and a new tertiary education strategy. We also look briefly at ways in which, as part of the academic heartland, the relation can be strengthened within institutions.

Keywords: case study, community of inquiry, higher education, New Zealand, research/teaching relation, University of Canterbury.

Introduction and Rationale

A strong relation between research and teaching is generally understood to be a defining feature of a modern university and of academic identity (Clark 1997). In the late 1990s a brief review of Hattie and Marsh’s (1996) meta-analysis of studies focusing on the relationship between research and teaching was published in an internal newsletter at the University of Canterbury (in Christchurch, New Zealand). The review reported a zero relationship—teaching and research
were found to be only ‘loosely coupled’. The response from academic staff within the University was immediate, emotional, and varied. Some staff referred to the research as “total twaddle” whilst others indicated that they had “advocated [that position] for years” (Robertson and Bond 2001, p. 8). The incident precipitated a programme of research (Robertson 2003; Robertson and Bond 2001) including this case study. The purpose of the case study is to uncover the ways in which the relation between research and teaching has been understood at the University of Canterbury over time, to explore the contextual discourses that may have formed those understandings, and to look briefly at ways in which the relation might be strengthened within institutions.

The Research/Teaching ‘Nexus’

The contradictions in the academics’ responses described above are reflected in the literature on the relation between research and teaching. There have been numerous quantitative attempts to account for the relation by correlating teaching effectiveness as measured by student evaluations of teaching and research productivity as measured by publication counts (see Feldman 1987; Hattie and Marsh 1996). These studies suggest little or no relationship. Others (e.g., Fox 1992) position research and teaching as competitors for time and resource rather than as complementary aspects of scholarly endeavour. In contrast, qualitative studies focusing on academics’ perceptions and experiences have most often indicated a strong belief in the existence of, and need for, a symbiotic relationship in which involvement in research enhances teaching and, to a lesser extent, involvement in teaching stimulates research (e.g., Jensen 1988; Neumann 1992, 1993; Rowland 1996; Smeby 1998).

Reflecting this complexity, our own research, which focuses on individual academics’ experiences, shows considerable variation along a continuum from no relation to an integrated relation (Robertson 2003; Robertson and Bond 2001).

Research and Teaching—competing Ideologies?

This variation in academics’ views of the research/teaching relation, in the research on the topic, and even in the methodologies underlying the research, is symptomatic of the current global influences that are fragmenting and reshaping higher education. The reality is highlighted in comparative research in higher education (e.g., Altbach 1998; Clark 1995; Geiger 1993; Marginson and Considine 2000; Slaughter and Leslie 1997). Policy in higher education has increasingly become “a subset of economic policy” thus perpetuating an “academic capitalism” (Slaughter 1998, p. 1). The meanings of higher education, of academic work, and of the relation between universities’ internal and external worlds have each been redefined. The liberal university is giving way to the ‘enterprise’ university (Marginson and Considine 2000; Peters and Roberts 1999). Ideologically, the traditional emphasis on the production and transmission of knowledge as a social good has been replaced by the production and transmission of knowledge as a market good (Buchbinder 1993) where knowledge as product, performance and commodity is favoured over knowledge as insight, appreciation and understanding (Codd 1997). Basic research is unable to compete with applied research in attracting external funding. Research and teaching are not only increasingly subject to different and competing imperatives, they have become competing ideologies (Barnett 2003). Research is drifting from the teaching environ towards the marketplace and teaching is losing its link with research as a result of changing priorities and modes of work (Clark 1995; Slaughter and Leslie 1997).

A Focus on Inquiry

Research that argues for the university as a ‘place’ or ‘community’ of inquiry offers a different perspective (e.g., Brew 2003; Clark 1995; Robertson 2003; Rowland 1993, 2000). It reflects contemporary education theory and its emphasis on the social construction of knowledge through communities of practice (Lave and Wenger 1991). It adopts a particular interpretation of inquiry—that together, academics and students constitute a community of practice in which ‘teaching’ encourages learning through the practice of research (Bowden and Marton 1998; Brew 2001, 2003; Mourad 1997). This view is driven by the argument that the current ‘products’ of higher education are unprepared for an age of radical uncertainty and supercomplexity (Barnett 2000). Instead, there is a need for a higher education that allows the integration of research, teaching, scholarship and
learning in a culture of inquiry (Brew 2003). Already there are reports of practical initiatives that are intended to encourage a visibly closer relation at all levels (e.g. Jenkins et al. 2003).

Rationale for the Case

The research outlined above illustrates the complexity of the discourses concerned with the relation between research and teaching. Comparative research provides an extensive empirical basis at a macro level for understanding the causes of separation. Much of this research derives from the "institutional and intellectual center" (Altbach 1998, p. 20) of higher education—large research universities and institutes in the northern hemisphere, and in particular, the USA. It draws on macro-political economic and social theories (e.g.,Marginson and Considine 2000; Slaughter and Leslie 1997), public policy and materials that exemplify significant historical change or important developments (e.g., Geiger 1993; Slaughter and Leslie 1997). Its strength lies in its use of broad ranging cross-national case studies and analyses (e.g., Clark 1995; Slaughter and Leslie 1997) and one of its main contributions is the identification of generic processes and common trends. It tends to take less account of the local or the marginal (McCulloch and Lowe 2003). Yet such knowledge has the power to "structure the possible field of action of others" (Foucault 1982, p. 221).

Barnett (1990) argues that the ‘idea’ of higher education is largely buried in the past. Nevertheless, in positioning current practices, universities not only ignore but are also largely unaware of their own rich and complex heritage (Readings 1996). What is missing from the different areas of research outlined above are in depth studies that provide a greater understanding of the ways in which the meanings attributed to the relation between research and teaching are experienced and acted upon within individual institutions and over time. Using Barnett’s (1990) notion of a ‘conceptual archaeology’, we map and critique the development of research and teaching and their relation at the University of Canterbury, from its founding in 1873 until the present day.

The Case Study

The data for the case study are drawn from archives housed in the Macmillan Brown Library (University of Canterbury), un-catalogued documents stored by the University, and other acknowledged sources. Our analysis draws on Gadamer’s (1989) philosophical and Bakhtin’s critical hermeneutics (Gardiner 1992). We introduce the case with a brief orientation to the University of Canterbury and its founding discourses. Four distinct phases, defined by changes in institutional practices and activities with regard to research, teaching, and their inter-relation were evident in the data. Each phase is described and located more generally in its wider context. Of necessity, given our focus on depth rather than breadth, we emphasise the local and national over the global.

The University of Canterbury—An Orientation

New Zealand is a small country consisting of two main islands with a population of four million people. It is located 1200 miles from Australia, its nearest neighbour, and 13,000 miles from the United Kingdom to which it continues to be affiliated as part of the British Commonwealth. It has eight universities ranging in size from Auckland University with approximately 23,000 students to Lincoln University with 4,500 students. The universities provide a range of undergraduate and graduate programmes including the research doctorate. In 2003 the University of Canterbury is home to approximately 12,000 students and 490 academic staff. It serves the city of Christchurch (population 316,000) and the wider Canterbury province, though its Engineering schools attract students from across the country. Until recently its student population was largely mono-cultural but the University is now a recognised destination for international students.

Founding Discourses

As with others established in British colonies worldwide, universities in New Zealand have emerged from and are participants in the long and complex tradition of Western higher education. They
share, in various measures, the attitudes, values and practices of British, European and American universities (Marginson and Considine 2000). They owe much to the ideas of Cardinal Newman, and the legacy of Humboldt and the German research university.

The founding discourses of the University of Canterbury have their roots in England (Marginson and Considine 2000), and specifically in the formation of the Canterbury Association in 1848. The Association was founded to set up a Church of England settlement in Canterbury, to oversee the selection of colonists and the purchase of land. Led by Edward Gibbon Wakefield, it had strong links with the English ‘establishment’. Of its 53 members, 30 were graduates of Oxford University and 17 of Cambridge University (Gardner et al. 1973). The city of Christchurch was named to commemorate the role of the Oxford men who had contributed to Wakefield’s plan for the settlement. Wakefield’s policies of ‘systematic colonisation’ (Harrop 1939, p. 186) included the setting aside of considerable sums from the proceeds of land sales for church and educational endowment. The Oxford influence is particularly evident in the original collegiate structure of Christ’s College which was part of the plan. It was to be a two tiered institution. The lower tier or secondary school was established. The upper tier or university was delayed due to the economic stresses and workloads in the new settlement (Harrop 1939).

Parallel events overseas should be noted. At the time that Canterbury College was being set up in the Oxford style, the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge were subject to reform (Clark 1995). The new civic ‘redbrick’ universities being established in England adopted the Scottish system of specialisation based on departments and the development of ‘advanced thinkers’. Similarly, universities in the USA were making a revolutionary shift (Clark 1995) in allegiance from the English and Scottish systems to the Humboldtian ‘ideal’ as many of the leaders of American universities had previously visited and studied in Germany (Lucas 1994).

In New Zealand, the Scottish-settled province of Otago was first to establish a University in 1869 and to propose that it become the University of New Zealand. However the notion of a single, monopolising university did not fit well with the then disjointed system of provincial government. Nor was it likely to meet the needs of a scattered, and geographically isolated society. By way of compromise, the University of New Zealand was established as a separate institution in 1870 in Wellington. The University was modelled on the University of London (Harrop 1939) with its affiliated colleges. As laid down in the New Zealand Education Act of 1874, it was to be strictly an examining body, and its funds were to be devoted to the appointment of examiners, the conduct of examinations, the establishment of scholarships, and the conferring of degrees.

In 1871, the newly constituted University of New Zealand invited institutions of higher education to apply for affiliation. The Canterbury Collegiate Union sought affiliation and, in 1873 was transformed into Canterbury College. Unlike the University of Otago, Canterbury College did not seek the title of ‘university’; this occurred only with the demise of the University of New Zealand in 1962. Subsequently university colleges were also established in Auckland (1883) and Wellington (1898).

**The First Phase (1870–1945)—A Focus on Teaching**

A “liberal education” or a nineteenth century performative agenda?

The aim of the newly established Canterbury College was to provide “a liberal and regular course of Education” (Gardner et al. 1973, p. 40). Its main vehicle was the Bachelor of Arts degree—a general qualification emphasising breadth rather than depth (Parton 1979). Students were expected to study the arts and sciences by taking both Latin and mathematics. Given its antecedents, Canterbury College, of necessity, adopted Newman’s idea of the university. Educationally, research was not of interest. Teaching, with a concern for mastering a body of knowledge, was emphasised.

To illustrate the benefits of this liberal education with its emphasis on the unity of knowledge, Gardner et al. point to the breadth and humanity exhibited in the letters of Canterbury graduate and famous nuclear physicist, Earnest Rutherford:

> In them, the ‘two cultures’ flourish happily together. It is not fanciful to suggest that his years at Canterbury College equipped him in non-scientific ways that helped to make him a better scientist (Gardner et al. 1973, p. 169).
John Macmillan Brown, first Professor of classics and English at Canterbury College, provides evidence of the pervasive discourse of the time:

The aim of the university lecturer . . . is to stir into active life the higher faculties, the imagination, the reasoning, the powers of comparison, and most of all the power that grasps a subject in its entirety, systematises and transfers it into a living part of the mind (in Gardner et al. 1973, p. 103).

The introduction of Newman’s idea of a university was tempered by the practical realities of the new settlement and several factors combined to make conditions less than ideal. The 1877 New Zealand Education Act provided for universal elementary education. Subsequently public high schools were established in many parts of the colony, and primary and secondary education flourished. The role of Canterbury College was performative. The Bachelor of Arts qualification was expected to respond to the increased demand for the education of primary and secondary teachers who could turn a hand to almost any subject. These early years of the College were marked by a strong sense of service to the economic and social priorities of the local community. The colony required well educated teachers and the College responded with a BA degree designed to meet the needs of local students. Many of these intending and practising teachers enrolled in the College’s evening classes (Atkinson 1969; Gardner et al. 1973). John Macmillan Brown observed:

Nor must it be forgotten that at first all my students and, later, all but a few, chiefly junior scholars, were engaged in teaching or other work all day. My lectures had to be either early in the morning or after six or seven in the evening, or on Saturday (in Hight and Candy 1927, p. 35).

In the new settlement, “university education in the widest and best sense of the term was regarded as a luxury” (Harrop 1939, p. 193). This perception was reinforced by the composition of the governing body of New Zealand who were “to only a small extent men of university standing” and who “saw little reason why [other members of the community] should be given greater opportunity” (p. 193).

**Governance and Control**

Despite recommendations of the Royal Commission of 1878, that each of the colleges should have ample independence including “the conduct of examinations by persons resident in the colony” (Harrop 1939, p. 192), the University of New Zealand continued to exert control. The College’s liberal arts programme was circumscribed by the examination syllabus set down by the University so there was little freedom to develop curricula. Professors of the colleges had little or no share in their governance. Examinations were external to the constituent colleges and the country, in that, in all but a few cases, the examiners were scholars of repute in Great Britain (Beaglehole 1937). This question of external examinations was to be a contested area for five decades. It was only in 1925 that the Senate of the University of New Zealand agreed that examinations at pass grade be conducted by professors who taught the subject. Nevertheless, advanced and honours degrees in some arts and sciences, engineering and Bachelor of Music continued to be subject to external examination in the UK until the second World War and beyond.

By the early 1900s, academic working conditions and adequate funding at the University of New Zealand became an issue nationally. The relationship between the University and its affiliated colleges was uneasy. In 1910, 13 members of the teaching staff at the Victoria College of Wellington (now Victoria, University of Wellington) presented a petition to Parliament requesting an inquiry into the condition of university administration and education in New Zealand. In 1911, the New Zealand University Reform Association published the petitioners’ arguments in a pamphlet. Reflecting the belief in the centrality of the modern university to national culture and identity, the authors claimed:

Probably no single institution is capable of so far reaching effects on national life as a University. According to modern notions, the duty of a University is not merely to provide a culture which is a luxury for the few, but through the professions and the teachers to mark its impress on the whole mass of the community and to infuse into every department of national life an ever-increasing
sense of the value of scientific ideals and scientific method and training, in their application to every
form of human activity (New Zealand University Reform Association 1911, pp. 5–6).

The authors also argued that the existing degree system did not encourage original work. There
were few scholarships available, the libraries were of poor quality and laboratory facilities were
insufficient or non-existent. In all, the authors considered it “a university atmosphere quite
unsympathetic to investigation” (New Zealand University Reform Association 1911, p. 107)
and held up as a laudable alternative the research/teaching synthesis of Humboldt’s University
of Berlin.

In 1924 the Minister of Education announced the establishment of a second Royal Commission
on University Education in New Zealand and the following year saw the publication of its Report
(Reichel 1925). Included in the scope of the Commission was the requirement to inquire into and
report on the provision that should be made in New Zealand for university teaching and research,
the desirability of the system of affiliation to the University of New Zealand, and the issue of
external examination.

The Commissioners recognised the significance of research in the function of the university.
They considered that “teacher and student in a university should be engaged jointly in a voyage
of discovery in search of truth” and they observed that:

the conditions under which New Zealand was colonised and developed ensured the selection of
a population animated by a love of adventure and of investigation . . . one would therefore expect
that the spirit of inquiry and research would flourish in and would be encouraged among such a
community (Reichel 1925, p. 76).

However their findings revealed a somewhat different state of affairs. Under the evening lecture
system they claimed too many students were engaged in earning a livelihood and interested only
in gaining the final examination. They described the system of external examination with its rigid,
imposed syllabus as iniquitous and as militating against any research ethos. Teachers spent too
much time consumed in lectures, examinations and the correction of essays. Working conditions
were poor, the academic staff low paid and classes large, with the result that there were few oppor-
tunities to conduct research and publish. Amongst other recommendations the report stated that
“the University should be reconstituted as a federal teaching university with constituent colleges
enjoying a large measure of autonomy in regard to curriculum and examinations” and that candi-
dates for professorships should be familiar with methods of research and be able to demonstrate
evidence of research involvement (Reichel 1925, p. 88).

These recommendations were to be curtailed as the University became subject to further
Government control through its finances. Colleges were required to submit annual financial state-
ments to Government. Harrop (1939) reports that the University’s growing scholarship fund, built
up from reserves in the past, was used as an argument to stem “the flow . . . of Government assis-
tance” (p. 198). Thus monies that could have contributed to research were redirected elsewhere.
Moreover, as a result of worldwide depression, Government grants and other sources of revenue
diminished and the colleges including Canterbury were forced to reduce expenditure and cut salaries
(Harrop 1939). Unlike the northern hemisphere, there was little or no private funding available for
research and public funding of higher education was limited and intermittent.

The Second Phase (1945–1946)—Conditions for a Discourse of Inquiry

It was not until 1945 that the concerns outlined above were taken up on a wider scale. Brief as it is,
this second phase constitutes a watershed in the history of the development of research and teaching
at Canterbury College. We draw on three particular sources of evidence. First, a group of teach-
ers in the University of New Zealand published a provocative statement titled Research and the
University (Allan et al. 1945). At the same time, the Chancellor of the University of New Zealand
issued a Questionnaire on research practices (University of Canterbury 1945) to the heads of depart-
ments of all the Colleges, inquiring about departmental and local community research in the period
1933–1945. Topics included: the availability of funding for research; the time available to undertake
research activity; the quality of research facilities in comparison with overseas universities; other
perceived barriers to engaging in research; and, ways in which research might be increased or improved in the department. Respondents at Canterbury College included heads of departments and other staff members in accountancy, biology, botany, chemistry, economics, education, English, geology, history and political science, mathematics, mechanical engineering, modern languages, philosophy and physics. Lastly, the Canterbury University College Students’ Association (CUCSA) published a report entitled *University Reform* (Canterbury University College Students Association 1946). The data from these sources include repeated calls for a different mindset with regard to research, the establishment of a University Press to aid publication, scholarships to enable postgraduate research, a change to the examination system to allow greater control of the syllabus, additional staffing (academic, technical and clerical), improved accommodation, increased funding for equipment and travel, and contact with other researchers in New Zealand and overseas.

**Karl Popper and a (Missing) Culture of Inquiry**

*Research and the University* (Allan et al. 1945) was essentially a manifesto setting out the requirements of the University if it were to become a research institution. Of its six authors, four were from Canterbury College, one from the University of Otago and one from Auckland University College. The initiative was driven by the Viennese philosopher Karl Popper who was a lecturer at Canterbury College for nine years. Coming from the European tradition of academic research Popper was dismayed at the absence of such a tradition in New Zealand. Indeed, after one year he told a friend that he would have to conceal his research activities because his colleague, Sutherland, frowned upon them (Hacohen 2000, p. 339). In modelling and promoting the research function of the University Popper created “an impact on the academic life of the College . . . greater than that of any other person before or since” (Gardner et al. 1973, p. 262).

*Research and the University* opened with a quotation from Flexner’s (1931) *Universities American English German* in which the authors claimed that research and teaching should be “conceived as hovering on the borders of the unknown, conducted, even in the realm of the already ascertained, in the spirit of doubt and enquiry” (from Flexner 1931, p. 242, italics our emphasis). Popper and his colleagues went on to assert: “we regard research and teaching not as separate functions of a University teacher but as complementary parts of a single entity” (Allan et al. 1945, p. 2). The commonly held view that the University is primarily a teaching institution should be abandoned. Rather the University should be looked upon as an institution in which “the spirit of free enquiry is preserved and cultivated” (p. 2).

In order to remedy the situation as it exists in New Zealand a complete change of attitude is required. It must be recognised that a specialist might achieve much greater educational result by teaching his speciality than by spreading his teaching over what is traditionally considered the balanced content of his subject. The view that it is the task of the University to hand to the students a definite body of examinable knowledge must be discarded (Allan et al. 1945, p. 3).

These academics advocated a new unity of research and teaching, following Humboldt. Likewise, the CUCSA report supported the essential complementarity of research and teaching, considered that far too little research was being done in the University and recommended the development of research schools attached to the University. Responses to the questionnaire also indicated the need for the fostering of a different mindset, research tradition or culture in New Zealand. There was a call for research to be “considered as an integral part of department work, enabling better teaching, stimulation of students, freshening of the mind, preservation of self-respect and contact with overseas workers” (Department of Biology).

**Structural Barriers to Inquiry**

*Research and the University* included a direct attack on the examination system as administered by the University of New Zealand. The examination system was also focus of criticism in the data from the questionnaire. Concern was expressed at:

- the hampering effect of the unrealistic bounds of a set syllabus and a uniform national examination system. This is a prime barrier to the development of a research tradition, and indeed of real
university education. It makes for an artificial division between teaching and research. It engenders cram school habits and attitudes instead of a living interest in problems, a training in tackling them and a sense of responsibility on making pronouncements about them (Department of Economics 1945).

In a similar vein, a senior lecturer in English complained that the current syllabus turns the university teacher into “a re-hasher, an animated textbook”, while an acting professor of physics asserted that “we are committed to a tradition of spoon feeding in this country and students expect to be coached for examinations”. The system, conducted by examiners in Britain, was perceived to stifle teaching freedom and encourage coaching and cramming at the expense of understanding and scholarship. The authors of Research and the University concluded that “the educational task of the University must be taken much more seriously than its role in grading students” (Allan et al. 1945, p. 4).

Another concern was the nature of academic workload. The head of the Department of Chemistry reported that practically no research work was carried out by academic staff in the period 1933–1945. This theme was repeated again and again throughout the responses to the questionnaire. Factors constraining research activity were remarkably similar across departments, the major barrier being static staffing levels at a time of rapidly increasing student numbers. For example, “Botany student numbers increased from 51 in 1939 to 156 in 1945. Accommodation, equipment and staff remained practically the same” (Department of Botany). Heavy teaching, examining and administration loads left little time for research. “There is little doubt that, as at present staffed, the Science Departments in the New Zealand University Colleges, have such a heavy burden of teaching, examining and general administration, that no excuse need be made if they did those duties alone” (Department of Physics). A professor of mechanical engineering reported that “my own teaching hours amount to 26 hours per week”. The Department of Economics perceived “a strong tendency in the past to regard the New Zealand Colleges as purely teaching institutions whose main function was to see students through their examinations”.

The absence of funding for research projects was another concern. “Funds have been unobtainable in the past for research projects in this Department within the College” (Department of History and Political Science), Library facilities at Canterbury College were described as “pathetically inadequate” (Department of Economics). These observations were supported by Popper, who commented that the Canterbury College library was about the size of his father’s! (Hacohen 2000). Complaints regarding lack of space were unsurprising. The entire university was still housed at its original (1873) central city site.

The present laboratories are overcrowded and there is no further space either for private rooms for additional staff, or for more than the prewar number of research students. As soon as men return from the services, wishing to do M.Sc. work, the position will be desperately acute (Department of Chemistry).

Isolation both from colleagues in universities overseas and within New Zealand itself was another factor that affected research activity. A professor in the Department of Chemistry pointed out that “the stimulus of contact with other research workers in similar fields is most fruitful and often essential, but owing to our isolation is usually missing”. Travelling by sea from New Zealand was long and often uncomfortable at the best of times and opportunities would have been severely curtailed in wartime. Popper himself observed that “you have no idea how physical distance, something rather abstract, becomes profoundly and terribly concrete here in New Zealand. One lives a sort of pseudolife, outside the world” (Hacohen 2000, p. 342). Even within New Zealand it seems that inter-institutional contact was limited and that academics experienced a similar sense of isolation from ‘kiwi’ colleagues.

Redefining Research

The flurry of activity at this time led to moves to redefine research, culminating with a recommendation in the Canterbury College Council Minutes that:

The University should affirm and pursue the principle . . . that for the developing of research, staffing must be sufficiently liberal, in all departments, to allow teachers the necessary freedom
to engage in it. Research itself must be liberally defined, so that it can be seen as the instrument of all departments of knowledge and teaching (University of Canterbury, Council Minutes 1945–1949).

The nature of research had already been raised in the questionnaire data:

My first difficulty is in the definition of research. Some people regard it as exploration beyond the frontier of existing knowledge, others as the application of existing knowledge and methods to new fields or in new ways, still others as new approaches to or presentation of existing knowledge (Professor of Economics).

The call for a more liberal definition of research was supported by Professor I. A. Gordon. In his column in the New Zealand Listener (a weekly publication commenting on current events) he defined research as:

the application of critical intelligence and independent judgement to any problem that is capable of systematic study. . . . In the humanities, research often produces not so much new facts as a new synthesis, a new interpretation and an original point of view (Gordon 1946, p. 12).

Setting the Scene for the Third Phase

The activities of this second phase bring into sharp relief the discourses of the past four decades and illustrate the interweaving of local and global influences. The flurry of activity at Canterbury in regard to research parallels that in universities in the northern hemisphere. It is easily explained from a macro-perspective. As a result of the second World War, and particularly in the USA, research became integral to national interests and funding sources shifted from the private to public sector particularly in defence, technology and medicine (Geiger 1993; Lucas 1994). Scientific research attracted substantial funding which in turn raised the existing profile of research as an academic enterprise. Research that had been driven primarily by academic interests became federally funded, contractual and programmatic. The privileging of research occurred particularly at the expense of undergraduate teaching (Geiger 1993). These shifts signal the beginnings of the discourse of research as ‘product’, and Clark’s (1995) research ‘drift’ and teaching ‘drift’.

Such compelling external forces certainly played a part in influencing events at Canterbury College. However, unlike universities in the northern hemisphere, Canterbury lacked an existing research base on which to develop the necessary infrastructure. As with other colleges in the University of New Zealand, it had little involvement in wartime research initiatives. Unlike North American universities, it was unable to take advantage of Geiger’s (1993, p. 32) post-war “seller’s market for research”. The data suggest that the increased activity was more likely influenced by the decades of unrest, the inappropriate conditions under which teaching was expected to be conducted, the part played by Karl Popper and his colleagues, and an increase in funding. In the early part of the twentieth century the shift towards a German model of scientific inquiry was reinforced in the USA and elsewhere by refugees fleeing from Europe (Lucas 1994). Karl Popper’s sojourn in Christchurch was part of this flow. In the event, despite the passionate plea for research and teaching to be regarded as a coherent entity, it was instead interpreted by the University as the addition of research to the academic agenda—research was to be encouraged but teaching and research were treated as separate functions.

The Third Phase (1946–1990)—a Change of Culture

The years 1946–1990 mark a change of culture. During this time Canterbury came of age. In 1962 the University of New Zealand was disbanded and Canterbury College became a University in its own right. Departmental Annual Reports from 1956 until their demise in the 1970s (they were re-instituted in 1998) provide a valuable source of data for this period. Departments were required to report on the disposition of work between members of staff in the department, any staff changes and their effects, scholarships or other awards obtained by students, future plans for the department and general comments plus a summary of research and scholarship undertaken during the year. They were not required to report explicitly on the interrelation of research and teaching,
something which is now required in faculty profiling and in applications for promotion. Although
some of the concerns voiced in 1946 remained, especially in relation to lack of space, on the whole
the tenor of the reports was positive and forward-looking.

**Funding, Space and the Growth of Research Activity**

In November 1946 the Research Committee of the University of New Zealand was established. Its
role was to administer £10,000 of which Canterbury’s share was just over a quarter (Gardner et al.
1973). At much the same time, the first discussions about the possibility of a new university site
were taking place. If Canterbury was to become a ‘research’ university, as the lobbying of 1945/1946
proposed, then increased funding and improved and expanded accommodation needed to go hand
in hand. In the event, the School of Engineering was the first to take up residence at the new,
variously more extensive site in Ilam (a suburb of Christchurch) in 1961, followed by the Faculty of
Science in 1966 and the Arts Faculty in the early 1970s.

Research activity gained momentum. Departments commented on the growing number of
research students. Laboratories were established, enabling staff and graduate students to work on
joint projects. A field station, providing accommodation and laboratory space for 24, was built at
Kaikoura (north of Christchurch). Research seminars for staff and students were promoted. In
1967 the Department of English, following a temporary pre-Illam move, concluded that “the improve-
ment in physical surroundings has had a marked effect on the life of the department . . . the imme-
diate growth in research activity in 1967 was . . . one of the most heartening results of the move”.

As well as these developments, the annual reports indicated a much increased incidence of
‘refresher leave’, often at institutions overseas, and a greatly expanded list of publications. In 1974
the Association of University Teachers called for increased research funding:

> All universities in New Zealand operate under Acts which include reference to their duty to
> advance, maintain and disseminate knowledge through teaching and research. University teach-
> ing, through their research, are able to contribute to national development, to keep their teaching
> function fresh, and to extend the boundaries of human knowledge (University of Canterbury 1974,
> pp. 4–5).

Four years later the Chancellor of the University of Canterbury was appealing for continued invest-
ment in university research.

> Why you may ask, why universities? Why not special research institutes, leaving the university
to get on with teaching? But what sort of teaching would it be without the refreshment, excite-
ment, stimulation and inspiration that come from working at the frontiers of knowledge and, from
time to time, crossing them . . . without that study and research university teaching would become
dull and sterile (University of Canterbury 1978, p. 3).

New staff appointments made it possible for lecturers to specialise to a greater extent than
previously and thus to link their teaching more closely to their research. In 1956 the Head of the
Department of Education reported: “As a long term policy I intend to increase the degree of spe-
cialisation in teaching . . . the literature of the subject is now so considerable that acceptance of
increased specialisation is necessary in order to maintain and raise standards of teaching”. Similarly
in 1961, the Department of Classics reported that, with the addition of a new staff member, there
would be “a more pronounced move towards specialisation in teaching”.

**Research Growth ‘in Context’**

By the 1950s research at Canterbury College was an accepted feature of academic practice. Taking
a local perspective, Gardner et al. (1973, p. 398) attribute the “really explosive development of
research activity” starting around 1965 to the changed size and atmosphere of the institution. The
change of culture was accompanied by a realisation of the need for a focus on depth rather than
breadth of knowledge and specialists rather than generalists, the establishment of supporting struc-
tures such as a research committee (and funding), adequate facilities for research, and discourses
that focus on research at department level.
The growth in research activity at Canterbury in the 1960s resembles, on a smaller scale, the expansion of research in universities in the northern hemisphere that began two decades earlier. Yet, in the northern hemisphere post-war assumptions about research differed considerably from those in New Zealand. While the University of Canterbury, and its national counterparts, concentrated on the establishment of the infrastructure and physical resources required for doing research, research universities in the northern hemisphere were developing coalitions with industry and the military, and with industry and medicine, that were driven by government policies (e.g., Bowden 1996; Slaughter 1998). During the Cold War, such coalitions created the conditions for the stabilisation of basic research, yet they were non-existent at the time in New Zealand.

Nevertheless, the ‘idea’ underpinning higher education at Canterbury shows evidence of a shift from Newman’s teaching university with its focus on the liberal arts, towards a modern ‘research’ university. During this phase, the data indicate that the research/teaching relation assumed a unidirectional and hierarchical flow from research to teaching to learning—research was the preserve of the academic and teaching was informed by research. Structurally research and teaching are treated separately—the data suggest that whatever the relation, it is implicit and reflects ‘no relation’ or a ‘weak’ relation in terms of Robertson’s (2003) continuum.

**The Fourth Phase (post 1990)—a ‘Close’ Relation Between Research and Teaching**

By 1990 the research/teaching relation at Canterbury was inextricably embedded legally, economically, and politically in the national context of higher education. Claims of a ‘close’ and/or ‘strong’ relation are made repeatedly. For instance, with reference to the New Zealand Education Act (1989), the University’s Charter (1991, p. 1) states that: “a well recognised characteristic of a university is that its research and teaching are closely interdependent, and most of its teaching is conducted by people who actively advance knowledge”. In the same source, the University undertakes to “observe in recruiting academic staff the principle that teaching is inseparable from research”. This commitment to a close relation between research and teaching is reaffirmed in the outgoing Vice Chancellor’s Report (University of Canterbury 1997) and that of the incoming Vice-Chancellor (University of Canterbury 1998). The nature of the relation was reiterated in response to Audit requirements: “for Canterbury a strong relationship between teaching and research has always been a primary element of its culture” (University of Canterbury 2000, p. 1, italics our emphasis).

**National and International Influences**

In the 1980s the global restructuring of higher education saw some of the greatest changes to the nature of academic work than at any time in the previous century (Marginson and Considine 2000; Slaughter and Leslie 1997). Such changes were slower to reach New Zealand. Until 1990, a university in New Zealand was considered the only institution in which research and teaching were related. It was also the only degree granting institution. However, the nineties marked a decade of radical economic restructuring. Higher education became an increasingly open market in which the polytechnics and colleges of education sought and achieved degree-granting status and began to develop research agendas. Previously unfamiliar issues of quality and accountability took centre stage. The institutional discourses about the research/teaching relation are underpinned more explicitly by the University’s response to legislation, and national and international agendas. The external environment drives the University’s programme and unlike previous phases the context is now highly competitive.

In 1996 the first national academic audit of New Zealand universities was undertaken by the New Zealand Universities Academic Audit Unit (AAU). The AAU report on the University of Canterbury (1997) highlighted the market driven environment to which the university was struggling to adapt. On the relationship between research and teaching the AAU panel:

formed a very positive view of the way in which research informs teaching at Canterbury University. Examples include lecture content changing annually in terms of the lecturer’s research; undergraduates reading review articles; and teaching in research areas quickly moving new ideas down through the undergraduate levels (New Zealand Universities Academic Audit Unit 1997, p. 25).
Despite receiving what was perceived to be such positive feedback on the research/teaching relationship, the University of Canterbury feared for the future of the research/teaching link. Concern was expressed that research monies coming into the university might be separated from teaching monies. If research were to become 'output tagged' it could seriously affect funding for humanities research. From the mid nineties onwards departments were increasingly exhorted to make more visible the links between research and teaching. From the Dean of Arts:

"It is currently more important than it has ever been that university staff are seen to not only be involved in research but regularly to publish the results. Research underpins university teaching and governments must be persuaded of the essential nexus between the two" (University of Canterbury 1998a, p. 15).

And, in the report of a review of the History Department:

"The complex inter-relatedness of teaching and research in universities is obviously important in this debate—we must ensure that at every turn the research input to ALL teaching is highlighted and documented" (University of Canterbury 1998b).

These warnings reflected national events. The publication of the Government’s White Paper on Tertiary Education (New Zealand Ministry of Education 1998) signalled the apparent beginning of a separating out of research and teaching funding with a proportion of research funding to be allocated through a contestable pool. The White Paper was followed in 1999 by a proposal from the Tertiary Education Minister that there should be just two or three well-funded research universities in New Zealand (instead of the then seven) which would focus primarily on research work leaving the others to focus on teaching. All the universities protested vociferously. Somewhat paradoxically, and despite scholarly disagreement about the nature or even the existence of such a link, one of the themes of the second national auditing cycle conducted by the AAU was the ‘Teaching/Research Nexus’. The AAU rationalised its inclusion on the basis that its existence was enshrined in legislation and as such it required auditing. “Institutions must therefore specify the expected effect of the link between teaching and research and the AAU audits the institution’s processes for achieving this link and the effectiveness of these processes” (New Zealand Universities Academic Audit Unit 1999, p. 14).

Such an explicit focus on the relationship between research and teaching provoked a flurry of activity in all the New Zealand universities. A joint working party was formed at Canterbury consisting of representatives from the University’s Research Committee and the newly formed Teaching and Learning Committee. This group was charged with preparing a report on the nature of the research/teaching link at Canterbury and key findings were to be included in Canterbury’s Audit 2000 Portfolio. The report (Spronken-Smith et al. 2000) outlined the university’s obligations and commitments to the integration of research and teaching, discussed mechanisms for monitoring policy, considered current practice as well as factors constraining a close relationship and suggested ways in which the link might be strengthened.

The year 2000 saw another significant change in tertiary education in New Zealand. The new Labour government established the Tertiary Education Advisory Commission (TEAC) to devise a long-term strategic direction for the tertiary education system. Between 1980 and 1999, real funding for universities fell by 36%. There was also a substantial deterioration in the ratio of academic staff to students over the same two decades. “These trends raise serious questions about the capacity of New Zealand’s tertiary system to protect the desired level of quality in relation to teaching and research” (TEAC 2001, p. 12).

In their submission to TEAC on issues set out in the Commission’s terms of reference, the Association of University Staff (AUS) pointed out that “the interaction of scholarship, research and teaching form the ‘signature’ by which university-appropriate activities may be differentiated from other tertiary activities” (Association of University Staff 2000, p. 1). A key objective of TEAC’s strategic direction was the enabling of life-long learning for a knowledge society. Such a society emphasises the knowledge content of goods and services, the centrality of research and learning, the importance of critical reflection and debate about knowledge and its use, and recognition of the role of intellect and research as drivers of economic growth (TEAC 2000). The issue is
highlighted in the following quotation in which the relationship between research and teaching and the provision of postgraduate education is directly addressed.

The provision of postgraduate education requires a significant level of research intensity and that most of those involved in teaching such programmes should be active researchers . . . the requirement for research (particularly the ‘scholarship of discovery’) and teaching to be linked at the undergraduate level is less compelling. While postgraduate study involves in-depth investigation and specialisation, undergraduate education is concerned primarily with transmitting the basic knowledge and general skills that form the foundation of a particular discipline . . . hence, the primary requirement of those responsible for teaching at this level is a comprehensive and current knowledge of the relevant discipline and the skills to communicate this knowledge in an effective manner (Tertiary Education Advisory Commission 2001a, p. 109).

The Commission recommended that the Education Act 1989 should be amended to require that undergraduate degrees be taught by people with a comprehensive and current knowledge of their discipline and the skills to communicate this knowledge. The Government rejected this recommendation. In the meantime, however, the introduction of Performance-Based Research Funding, which allocates resources according to the quality of the research produced in each institution rather than on the basis of student enrolments, looks set to aggravate rather than ameliorate the tension between research and teaching.

Reflecting on the Past—Looking to the Future

As with every university, the case study provides a picture of an institution that has a unique identity embedded in its local geography, its history, and its people (Clark 1998; Lucas 1994). The hermeneutic task is to learn from the events but at the same time respect their historical autonomy. Our focus on the local illustrates the social construction of institutional knowledge and the process and power of institutional myth making. The case study has explanatory power in that it provides some understanding of the influences that framed research and teaching at Canterbury; that favoured certain constructions and excluded others. Furthermore, despite the evidence of significant change it is also possible to identify recurring themes.

Barnett (2003) notes that the Oxbridge tradition was largely a teaching tradition. Unsurprisingly it was the conditions for teaching that were of greatest concern in the early years at the University of Canterbury. However the teaching ideal was constrained by multiple layers of governance, lack of finance, and the pressures inherent in needs of the local community. Academics were marginalised by the separation of key aspects of their work. They were also situated quite literally at the ‘edge’ in terms of distance from the academic ‘heartland’ in the northern hemisphere (see Altbach 1998). Evidence suggests that these conditions supported and reinforced a form of instruction that militated against the development of reason, the use of imagination, and inquiry. As conditions changed and research became established, research and teaching were acknowledged as co-dependent—teaching was informed by research—research as knowledge was transmitted. Access to the ‘heartland’ was made easier through the use of technology and accessible air travel. By the last phase, research at Canterbury had become—“the dominant project of university life” (Barnett 2003, p. 147). This morphing of research and teaching and their relation reflects international social, political, and economic changes in higher education (e.g., Geiger 1993; Lucas 1994). Yet, particularly in the early years, the local conditions controlled the temporal aspects of change. As Canterbury shifts metaphorically from the periphery towards the centre global ideologies become more evident.

The effect of the relation between governance and academic aspects of teaching and research is also of significance. The governance ‘at a distance’ in the early years constituted a form of academic imperialism that fragmented and disabled academic work. Although the mechanism differs, fragmentation between Government, university, and academics continues to be evident. Drawing on cases studies of Australian universities, Marginson and Considine (2000) observe that change strategies focus on organization and finance rather than teaching, learning and research. Management works around academic cultures rather than through them. They argue that despite an institution’s success and the strength of its academic culture “the tension between academic
and managerial perspectives is endemic”. Such tension “absorbs energy, reduces the scope for organisational coherence” (p. 238) and reduces the possibilities for change.

In separate studies, Clark (1998), and Marginson and Considine (2000), identify several ‘elements’ common to universities that have achieved significant change. One of the elements is a “stimulated academic heartland” (Marginson and Considine 2000, p. 239). At its core is a strengthened relation between research and teaching—an institutional focus on learning as inquiry. In this climate, academic cultures are respected, their diversity is acknowledged (Barnett 2003; Marginson and Considine 2000) and change occurs by working with them rather than around them.

This notion of a university as an institution of learning (Bowden and Marton 1998; Brew 2001) is not new. Yet how might it be achieved in practice? We drew attention previously to the increasing separation of research and teaching and the ways in which these discourses comprise competing ideologies. Quoting the Pro Vice Chancellor at the University of Sydney, Jenkins et al. (2003) suggest that the ‘nexus’ must be re-engineered or purposefully constructed. They offer multiple, specific strategies for bringing research and teaching into closer alignment at the level of the curriculum, the department, the institution and with regard to the national and international administration of research and teaching. They point out that, in particular, policy making at institutional level has the power to ‘shape’ research/teaching relations.

Our case study illustrates the importance for Canterbury of academic autonomy. The idea of independence and autonomy can also be applied to departments and centres within universities. Increasingly, commentators are pointing to the importance of valuing and encouraging the diversity of academic cultures within institutions thus heralding a move from a focus on the universal to the specific (e.g., Barnett 2003; Marginson and Considine 2000). Taking this tack, the task for universities is not simply a strengthening the link between research and teaching but recognising the need for different strategies for different situations. The words independence, autonomy, diversity have a familiar ring. They have been part of the student learning literature for several decades.

Our research (Robertson and Bond 2001), which focuses on individual academics’ experience at Canterbury, indicates three ways in which the relationship between research and teaching is currently enacted—through the transmission of research findings, through the modelling of a research approach to learning and by engaging students as active participants in the inquiry process. All three approaches are important and all are necessary. Presently, and particularly in the sciences, it would seem that undergraduate teaching relies heavily on transmission. Students are treated as peripheral participants (Lave and Wenger 1991) for much of their undergraduate experience. However modelling plays an important transitional role between ‘telling about’ and having students ‘participate in’. It offers students a glimpse of the research culture of the community prior to their own engagement in disciplinary inquiry. In terms of legitimate peripheral participation, it provides students with an “observational lookout post” (Lave and Wenger 1991, p. 95). These modelling processes need to be made more explicit for students within the curriculum, and for staff within the culture of the institution.

A growing body of literature indicates that students’ understandings of research in particular and academic work in general, even at postgraduate level, may be poor (Jenkins et al. 1998; Willis and Harper 1999; Zamorski 2002). If the research/teaching relationship is to constitute one of the core values of higher education then we must all seek to understand and communicate its special nature. Students need to understand explicitly what it is to learn in a research environment. They need to be exposed early in their university careers to the ‘other’ (research) side of university activity so that it ceases to be other. For example, at University College, London, all year one students complete a first term assignment in which they interview a member of the academic staff about his/her research (Jenkins et al. 2003).

Mourad (1997) proposes post-disciplinary research programmes as places of instruction as well as research: programmes in which teaching at all levels occurs through and in the course of research where the distinction between the two is blurred; and curricula, that instead of being based on codified knowledge, are determined largely by the direction of the inquiry. In such programmes, research, teaching and learning form a dynamic, flexible and integrated whole. Similarly, Clark (1995, 1997) advocates an inquiry model of education in which the dichotomisation of research and teaching is rejected in favour of research-based teaching and learning. Given the reality of massification, Mourad (1997) and Clark’s (1997) proposals could point to a greater separation of undergraduate and
postgraduate teaching, along the lines of the North American model. However, Mourad explicitly includes undergraduate education as part of his proposal. Likewise the Boyer Commission (1999) calls for radical reconstruction (rather than cosmetic surgery) that includes turning the prevailing undergraduate culture of receivers into a culture of inquirers.

Ultimately, the scholarship and excitement of higher education can only be understood by active participation in the inquiry process. Students at all levels can and should be legitimate participants in inquiry. Specifically, they should be encouraged to become familiar and work with the disciplinary tools of knowledge creation; to adopt a critical stance apropos knowledge and to observe and participate in the processes of knowledge creation through discussion, problem-based learning approaches, laboratory work, field work and individual and group research projects.

These ideas are not new. They were advocated by Humbolt in the nineteenth century, and Popper and his colleagues in 1945. Yet our case suggests we cannot hope to advocate for inquiry in the absence of a supporting culture of inquiry and critical reflection. Even more fundamentally, if the process of inquiry itself is narrowly or poorly understood then fostering inquiry becomes a dubious undertaking. For change to occur, universities urgently need to examine the way in which their discourses support the status quo—the ways in which their views of knowledge influence their practices. As academics we need to challenge these dominant discourses which, in their emphasis on accountability and performativity are further fragmenting research, teaching and learning. We need to engage as critical beings, embracing both critical reflection and action (Barnett 1997). As part of this process we must stop merely asserting a close relation between research and teaching and start exploring carefully the nature of the relation as it exists and as it might exist in universities of the future. Only in this way can the advantages of working and studying in an institution that celebrates “the spirit of doubt and enquiry” (Allan et al. 1945) be clearly demonstrated and defended.

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Feminist Education: Rebellion within McUniversity

Jane A. Rinehart

It is not hard to locate significant points of disagreement between the principles of McDonaldization applied to universities and the ideals of feminist education. Ritzer’s characterization of the continuing emergence of McUniversity (1998) highlights the ascendance of the student consumer and the business model. According to Ritzer, student consumers seek ease of access, low costs, and “quality” products (Ritzer 1998: 152). All of these goals have the potential of conflict with the aims of feminist educators. One way to increase access is to promote distance education, thereby limiting the possibility for building a classroom community through conversation and focusing on one-sided input from the instructor that contradicts the feminist emphasis upon mutual learning through dialogue. Lowering costs may translate into increased reliance upon adjunct instructors (Ritzer 1998: 158) and higher student-teacher ratios; both of these work against feminist aspirations for strong bonds among faculty and between faculty and students and threaten the academic freedom of teachers. While Ritzer does not give “quality products” a specific meaning in relation to higher education, his general treatment of McDonaldization (Ritzer 2000) suggests that quality is redefined in terms of efficiency, predictability, calculability, and control. If these are what student consumers seek—course credits that are delivered in the same fashion as fast-food burgers—then descriptions of feminist pedagogy as creative, spontaneous, attuned to local classroom dynamics and needs, and facilitative rather than managerial in style point toward the likelihood of conflict.

As a business, the university must attract/please customers (increase revenue) and minimize expenses. The former fosters grade inflation and reduced requirements, and the latter leads to increased reliance on temporary faculty and technology. In contrast, feminist educators strive to challenge students rather than to please them, making them dependent upon the protections of tenure and academic freedom. They are also committed to teaching methods that depend upon face-to-face classroom relationships, meaning that they are less amenable to construction as online or video courses. The differences indicate that feminist educators have entered the university at a particularly inopportune moment. If Ritzer is correct that the forces associated with McDonaldization will increasingly shape higher education, this forecasts considerable trouble for instructors committed to feminist scholarship and pedagogy. But it is also possible that these teachers may create trouble for McUniversity.

Trouble is also widely documented in writings by college teachers who do not explicitly identify with feminist pedagogy (Delucchi & Smith 1997a; Eisenberg 1997), so it would be incorrect to identify feminist educators as the only faculty members struggling with the terms of McUniversity. These general problems center on the tensions between the university’s commitment to cultivating the student consumer’s satisfaction and the view of many teachers that treating education as a product and teachers as sales clerks corrupts (or even destroys) the mission of a university. However, it is not only that students increasingly regard themselves as consumers of what the university is selling that creates difficulties, but also the gap between what the student customers want and what the faculty believes they ought to want. This is seen most clearly in writings by
teachers who complain that students demand easier courses (less reading, rigor, and depth), seem uninterested in academic goals other than “good grades,” and punish teachers who disappoint them (Trout 1997). While feminist educators may share this view that student consumers are often hostile to such academic values, there are also additional points of conflict with student consumers generated by feminist commitments to developing a critical consciousness toward society and culture, engaging in collaborative classroom learning, and linking knowledge to political praxis.2

Developing Critical Consciousness and Positionality

Critical consciousness is based on achieving distance from received knowledge and developing the capacity to question dominant ideas, images, and values—the cultural stories that preserve the status quo. These are the model stories present in a culture: its representations of certain kinds of lives as exemplary, its version of how the society has changed, and its cautionary tales about what to avoid. Cultural stories express the normative order, the understandings about how things work and how they are supposed to work (Richardson 1995: 211–212). Ritzer’s theory is such a cultural story because he presents McDonaldization as normative, necessary, and inevitable, albeit also undesirable in some respects. University education assimilated to the rules of McDonaldization brings universities into a dominating cultural narrative in which success is tied to conformity to the consumer society. Collective stories contest cultural stories by voicing the experiences and perspectives of “those who are silenced or marginalized in the cultural narrative” (Richardson 1995: 212). In the collective story, the focus is on the social category to which an individual belongs and on the capacity to transform the conditions of its exclusion. Collective stories are critical of the status quo.

Feminism is such a collective story, and feminist teachers have written numerous descriptions of their work as a type of critical or liberatory pedagogy (Hoffman & Stake 1998), although not without challenging some of the assumptions, aspirations, and methods associated with this position and refashioning it for feminist goals (hooks 1994; Luke & Gore 1992). “Positional pedagogies” represents one such reformulation, based on the insight that subject positions and understandings are more multiple and contradictory than critical pedagogy’s division between the oppressed and the oppressor, liberating truth and distortion (Ellsworth 1992). This insight entails a commitment to a continuing practice of reflexivity. In teaching that foregrounds positionality, students and teachers work to understand how their ideas and those expressed in the course texts are influenced by their locations—historical, social, cultural, and political—and are therefore partial, relational, and oppositional (Luke & Gore 1992; Maher & Tetrault 1994). In Haraway’s (1988) term, all of us are “situated knowers,” but awareness of such grounding is often blocked by universalizing ideologies, insistence upon objective truth, and constant pressure to regard the world we are in as given and unquestionable rather than socially constructed.

Ritzer’s theory of McDonaldization both describes a dominating aspect of our historical situation and denies our capacity to oppose it effectively, thereby limiting opportunities for genuine critique.3 Positional pedagogies, on the other hand, strive to expand awareness and resistance while also recognizing that academic courses, although they can become political communities, are not the same as social movements. Positional pedagogies disturb the cultural story’s dominance by constructing messier and unstable knowledges that emerge within continuing conversations. Positional pedagogies create opportunities for collective stories to develop that connect members who inhabit different social situations, acknowledging both differences and commonalities that can bridge these. Feminist teachers who practice these classroom strategies acknowledge that discovering ways to link these classroom stories to political movements for social change is a pressing challenge to feminist educators. Feminist pedagogues do not claim the ability to undo McDonaldization, but their work is an example of resistance to its effects within universities.

The negative images associated with feminism in popular consciousness indicate its ability to elicit defenses from those who are comfortable within the cultural story—a category that includes many, perhaps most, of the students enrolled in universities. Feminist education, then, is one of the ways that many students encounter a disruption in their consumer role.4 In challenging cultural narratives that leave women out or avoid consideration of the effects of
gender/class/race/sexuality, feminist teachers attempt to shift students away from acceptance of these exclusions to critical reflection on their consequences. This kind of shift is unsettling because it entails movement off the “paths of least resistance” (Johnson 1997) that allow for ease of passage into accepted social roles and the comforts these provide. The acceptance of consumerism as the paradigmatic mode of public participation for most Americans means that social critique, the presentation of collective stories that contest the hegemony of the existing social arrangements, is risky. Blistering attacks on women’s studies (Denfeld 1995; D’souza 1991; Lehrman 1993; Patai & Koertge 1994; Sommers 1994), the prime university location for feminist scholarship and teaching, provide ammunition for student customers who want to avoid the anger and confusion that accompany changing one’s mind; such attacks are frequently reinforced in mass media portrayals of all feminists as man-hating extremists (Beck 1998; McDermott 1995; Rhode 1995). In McDonaldized America and McUniversity, anger, confusion, and extremism are problems to be managed and preferably eliminated.

Most students have been trained to be cool consumers of various products, and this consumption requires a lot of looking and making individual choices based on personal preferences. Edmundson has written a description of his students as “nearly across the board, very, very self-contained. On good days they display a light, appealing glow; on bad days, shuffling disgruntlement. But there’s little fire, little passion to be found” (1997:41). This can be attributed to pervasive cultural messages “from consumer culture in general and from the tube in particular” (1997:41). These messages communicate that the best way to be in our society is to be self-interested, laid-back, tuned into irony, and turned off by big causes. The laid-back quality and the belief that choices are manifestations of personal opinions that cannot be challenged means that many students find intense discussions of their views worthless. They just do not see the point.5 When these cool customers are buying a university education, the same habits operate and are often reinforced by universities sensitive to marketing and retention. Teaching that is critical of coolness, consumerism, and individualism can prompt a negative reaction. Students may rate more highly teachers who demonstrate the “customer-service traits” they expect, such as friendliness, concern, sensitivity, understanding, and support (Baker & Copp 1997). Customers do not expect store clerks to be subversive of their ideas, to expose them to challenges and unsettle them.

If professors are categorized as sales clerks, this creates problems for teachers who refuse to be helpful assistants to student shoppers, who, instead, raise discomfiting questions about equating social participation with cruising the mall. There are important differences between learning and enjoying, between learning and feeling safe, and between learning and liking the teacher: “I began to see that courses that work to shift paradigms, to change consciousness, cannot necessarily be experienced immediately as fun or positive or safe and this was not a worthwhile criteria [sic] to use in evaluation” (hooks 1988:53). McUniversity does not offer either resources or a rationale for contesting consumer choices; instead, it is a place designed to offer students “positive” experiences. While Ritzer offers grade inflation, increased emphasis upon student retention, and fewer curriculum requirements as examples of how universities seek to become “positive” environments (1998:156), it is also plausible that this list of measures to eliminate negativity might include avoiding teaching perspectives that evoke student complaints. This is the context in which feminist educators meet their students.

Ritzer states that he expects universities to maintain many of their traditional components and not become exactly like fast-food restaurants and malls (1998:161). However, it is not clear how he believes universities can reconcile their adherence to academic values with their adoption of the principles of McDonaldization—in other words, at what point does a McUniversity cease to be a university—a place where the dominant cultural story can be analyzed and contested and students are invited to become critical and reflexive thinkers (Delucchi & Smith 1997b:337)? Feminist education is necessarily committed to this understanding of the university because feminist scholarship and action are subversive of established knowledge and structures. Such subversion does not mean the imposition of a different set of authoritative “truths,” but the practices of continuous critique and exploration (Lather 1991). Although feminists within the academy have often been accused of undermining its commitment to rigorous inquiry, the ideals of feminist education—if not always the practices—express a firm belief in careful scholarship and open-minded dialogue in the midst of differences (Nussbaum 1997:202–215).6
Collaborative Learning

Labels for different views (such as conservative/traditionalist versus radical/feminist), whether given to us or assumed by us, mask the complicated mixture of ideas and feelings that each of us brings to our conversations. The labels are more likely to stand, even to become more fixed and rigid, when the teacher presents an argument for one position to student listeners. This structure invites simplification and polarization. Distributing responsibility for talking and working to identify points of agreement and disagreement does a much better job of waking everyone up from the hypnotic spell of the status quo. That spell depends upon most of us being either out of the game as spectators on the sidelines, or in the game as advocates for one side of a dichotomy in a debate that only one side can win. The focus on winning demands domination, and domination depends on forgetfulness of our hesitations, blind spots, inconsistencies, and questions. Winning also means that we have to pretend not to be connected with our opponents, reinforcing denial of our interdependence.

Collaboration is a different design. Collaborative learning is not about a feminist teacher lecturing to students who are for, against, or undecided and moving some of those in the latter two categories into the former. It is not about changing conservatives into liberals or progressives. It is a continuing practice of subversion through questioning and experimenting with various strategies for understanding in the context of a learning community: “feminist education holds out the potential to reinforce understandings that all knowledge, including that which is inspired by emancipatory fervor, must be questioned” (Bauer & Rhoades 1996: 107). In this kind of classroom, truth is not the possession of the teacher, but a shared accomplishment that acknowledges its partiality and incompleteness. Subversive teaching is “not the transmission of ready-made knowledge, but the creation of a new condition of knowledge” (Felman 1982:31).

Collaborative learning constitutes students as citizens, rather than as consumers. These are highly contrasting social positions and roles. Consumers expect to express preferences and whims, to be courted, even coddled. Consumers make demands, so that parking and purchasing on credit become necessities instead of amenities. There are also responsibilities attached to consuming, such as paying (eventually) for one’s purchases and performing various kinds of self-service in McDonaldized settings, but these are not highlighted in the social construction of the consumer’s role. Advertising promotes consumption as easy and fun, not as a set of duties, and retailers have adopted various strategies to maximize these aspects, such as “Happy Meals” with toys and playgrounds as part of fast-food outlets and shopping malls. Ritzer points out that the same emphases on comfort and pleasure penetrate university campuses: “Many student unions are already being transformed into minimealls with the inclusion of ATMs, video games, and fast-food outlets. The future of the university may be found, at least in part, in its current student unions” (Ritzer 1998: 155). When students move from such settings into collaborative learning classrooms, consumer expectations and demands are contested by rules about a different form of social participation: citizenship.

In the United States, citizenship is anemic because individualism is so highly prized, and individual well-being is defined in terms of rights rather than obligations: “If the entire social world is made up of individuals, each endowed with the right to be free of others’ demands, it becomes hard to forge bonds of attachment to, or cooperation with, other people, since such bonds would imply obligations that necessarily impinge on one’s freedom” (Bellah et al. 1985:23). Furthermore, the agendas of individuals are increasingly identified with the pursuit of occupational success and consumer satisfactions, framed by a refusal to question the economic and political systems in which “individual” wins and losses take place. That refusal to question is connected with the absence of opportunities to question: “We live in self-imposed exile from communal conversation and action” (Borgmann 1992: 3). A university might be expected to be an exception, but often it is not. Students are constructed as private individual consumers, rather than as participants in shaping a common life based in sustained conversations about ideas and their consequences.

Ritzer emphasizes McUniversity’s individualizing qualities, especially in relation to technologies of instruction that offer students maximum efficiency and control by sacrificing symbolic exchange. The interactions between teachers and students that have traditionally defined learning will increasingly be replaced, Ritzer predicts, by interactions between individual students and televised or computerized images (Ritzer 1998: 160). These kinds of learning situations are pre-
sented as desirable because of the “freedom” they offer to students, such as the freedom from required classroom attendance that ties them to specific times and places. Throughout his discussion of McUniversity, Ritzer assumes that students will demand such options and be tough judges of their quality in terms of “production values” familiar to them from CNN and MTV (Ritzer 1998: 160). Thus, Ritzer claims that most universities (with the exception of the highly prestigious) are, and will continue to be, pressured into adopting formats for learning that meet their customers’ expectations; these expectations are formed by broader cultural options for being informed and entertained by technologically mediated communication.

Feminist educators are in a difficult spot. The view from the trenches of women’s studies, for example, highlights struggles with limited resources (of budget, faculty, autonomy) and unsupportive administrators (Clark et al. 1996; Martin 2000; Mayberry and Rose 1999). For the most part, women’s studies, as well as other disciplines (humanities, social sciences, education) where feminist teachers are likely to be located, are not in a position to refuse participation in the university’s efforts to attract and retain students—for example, with technologically enhanced instruction. At the same time, feminist teachers are also likely to be invested in teaching that highlights face-to-face social interactions between teachers and students and among students. They are likely to favor collaborative learning strategies. These methods actively promote the development of the classroom as a learning community that practices shared inquiry and constructs knowledge together—in contrast to a “banking model” (Freire 1970: 58), in which knowledge is passed from the expert teacher to the ignorant student.

The difficulties in combining such a collaborative model with technologically framed instruction are revealed in Rose’s discussion of her initial experience offering a feminist theory course within the compressed video/distance learning format (1998). Nevertheless, Rose believes that “distance education is one way in which those offering women’s studies programs can collaborate to pool resources and serve our students better” (1998: 127). Avoiding an all-or-nothing stance, she recommends some strategies for reducing the distance of students at the remote site and advocates teacher resistance to some features of distance education (1998: 128–129). Hopkins offers a more emphatic endorsement, based on five years of teaching a live cablecast women’s studies course (Hopkins 1999). While she concedes that such teaching departs from feminist principles in its reliance on the lecture format and the absence of direct interactions with students in the classroom, Hopkins asserts that both of these challenges can be managed. Instead of being coopted by McUniversity’s reliance upon technologically assisted forms of education, both Rose and Hopkins model an alternative response in which the technological means does not eliminate feminist ends. They show that there is considerable space within a McDonaldized setting for feminist ingenuity. This is both similar to and different from Ritzer’s discussion of skunk works—non-rationalized niches within McDonaldized systems in which people are encouraged to innovate and create (2000:225). McUniversities might regard women’s studies programs as sources of positive nonconformity that enliven the organization. Feminist educators take a different view, considering their work not as a niche that serves the organization by being different, but as a space that nurtures resistance to its expectations and demands.

Their hopefulness may be well founded, if Bauer and Rhoades are correct in describing students as “longing for some sort of cooperative or collaborative structure within which to work, a framework which inevitably contradicts their insistence on individualist values.” At the same time, however, this longing may be the basis for student criticism and resistance as “students are disappointed that feminism has not yet changed the world” (1996:103). The meanings of changing the world are various, but the commitment of feminist teachers to connecting theory and praxis, the classroom and the world beyond it, is integral to their conception of teaching and learning as political acts.

Politics as Knowing and Acting

Feminist teaching is grounded in a mission of social justice, although the definitions of this are multiple (Ropers-Huilman 1998: 150–153). Within this multiplicity of perspectives on what constitutes social justice and how to foster it in classrooms and beyond, feminist teachers share a dedication to eliminating gender inequalities that involves engaging students in critical thinking about existing
social arrangements and envisioning other possibilities. Women’s studies owes its existence to the
women’s movement, so it is rooted in efforts to bring about social and political change in soci-
eties. Referring to feminist “working papers” produced during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the
editors of an anthology of memoirs by feminist activists state: “In fact, women’s studies began here,
with the scrutiny of gender institutions and practices” (DuPlessis & Snitow 1998:13). The forms of
this scrutiny varied, and not all feminists, then or now, have extended their critique to the prob-
lems posed by Ritzer. Still, feminists share a desire to question what exists and pose alternatives.
This contrasts with McUniversity’s acceptance of prevailing business practices as necessary in order
to compete successfully for student (or parent) dollars. Often this acceptance entails the view that
the practices and principles of McDonaldization are not political choices but economic realities; as
such, they are regarded as objective facts. The sheen of objectivity, then, leads to a presumption in
favor of neutrality in which universities can claim to be adjusting to the way things are rather
than deciding to take a political (evaluative) position. Feminist teachers are more likely to present
all positions as expressing politics—values and interests—and to question the possibility and desir-
ability of neutrality.

Ritzer’s stance on this in relation to McUniversity is ambiguous. He identifies his basic premises
this way: “the university is a means of educational consumption . . . and students are adopting a
consumerist orientation to it” (1998: 153). He writes, “Educators are being compelled to recognize
this new reality,” preceding a quote about how the expectations of student customers will change
how the faculty teach (1998: 152). These, and similar assertions, suggest that he has adopted a
neutral descriptive posture regarding the shift to McUniversity. However, he also presents a chapter
on ways of dealing with the new means of consumption, including educational consumption,
that assumes their negative qualities. Ritzer’s general analysis of McDonaldization relies upon a
Weberian perspective that “calls attention to the dehumanizing and irrational sides of
McDonaldization and forces us to articulate a standpoint of critique and to think of forms of resis-
tance and alternatives” (Kellner 2000). Still, Ritzer indicates that a modern response to
McDonaldization is accompanied by the “sense that many of these problems are irresolvable and
that they must persist,” and “ultimately this perspective tends to lead to a feeling of resignation”
(1998: 163–164). He believes that postmodern perspectives, drawn especially from Baudrillard, offer
alternatives to resignation by asserting the fragility of McDonaldized systems.

Ritzer bases his view of McUniversity’s fragility on the one-sided exchange that it fosters
between students and those who work to please them. Student silence and inertia will reveal the
impossibility of McUniversity’s terms. If it seeks to “please” the student consumer, the McUniversity
will be impossible to sustain because all responsibilities for teaching and learning will be placed
on the faculty and staff; it will self-destruct (Ritzer 1998: 169–170). Ritzer uses a surprising metaphor
to convey the power of students’ nullification of meaning, their fatal silence: “In their mindless,
limless increase the student masses will destroy the educational system in the same way that
cancer cells destroy the physical body . . . . McUniversity will not be destroyed with a bang, but in
a series of whimpers” (1998: 171). While this imagery is shocking, its practical import is not clear
in the sense of offering a detailed prognosis of specific actions and their impact. Ritzer seems to be
arguing that McUniversity’s characteristics—its lean organization, emphasis upon fun and excite-
ment, lowered standards, reliance on technological means of instruction, proliferation of satellites,
and efficient means of handling student consumption—will transform the customer into a relent-
less, deadly enemy. As students adapt more fully to their role as consumers of education, their facil-
ity in playing this part will overwhelm the capacity of their “host”—McUniversity—to satisfy them.

Even though Ritzer presents a variety of micro-forms of resistance that might be deployed in
fast-food restaurants, he puts McUniversity students into the same category as credit card users.
Neither resists; rather, both accept every new enticement to consume. Their lack of resistance lures
“the system into riskier and more desperate forays . . . the system grows so reckless and overex-
tended that the slightest disruption would cause it to collapse” (Ritzer 1998: 172). Meanwhile, intel-
lectuals (faculty) are advised to expose the contradictions in the new means of consumption and
develop maps that will help us to find alternatives. None of this is helpful, even in the limited
way of Ritzer’s final chapter in The McDonaldization of Society (2000), where he presents some indi-
vidual and collective forms of resistance. Ritzer concedes that “the postmodern perspective does
not lead us to a clear and coherent set of procedures,” providing, instead, “theoretically informed
hints” (2000: 173) and a sense that change in the new means of consumption will be created not by self-conscious agents but by consumers who bring about its collapse by their conformity. He ends the chapter on dealing with the new means of consumption with the suggestion that “a modernist” might want to search for ideas that would mobilize “agents against the excesses of the new means of consumption” (Ritzer 1998: 173). It is curious that he identifies such a desire only with modernists, because he acknowledges that the postmodernists Derrida and Foucault suggest strategies for everyday forms of innovation and resistance (Ritzer 1998: 170–171).

The argument of this chapter is that such agents are already mobilized, many under the sign of postmodernist ideas about knowledge and power. Feminist educators are one example of this mobilized resistance to McDonaldization. Their curriculum materials and teaching methods are both critical and transformative. Feminist education is a political practice of active resistance that aims to foster a sense of agency—the capacity to act—and some research suggests that it succeeds (Lovejoy 1998; Musil 1992). One of the reasons that students may fear feminist education is reluctance to gain critical insights that will lead to feelings of hopelessness (Bauer & Rhoades 1996: 105) and isolation (hooks 1994: 117). These fears reveal the power of “the world as it is” to seem “the world as it must be”—a translation that Ritzer’s work on McDonaldization may strengthen. Although his new edition of The McDonaldization of Society includes a more extensive discussion of how people can work together to create non- or less-McDonaldized alternatives (Ritzer 2000: 202–222) and presents reasons why such struggles are worthwhile (2000: 232), Ritzer still asserts that “no matter how intense the opposition, the future will bring with it more rather than less McDonaldization” (2000: 232). Feminist education, and the larger effort of feminist activism in which it participates, become, in Ritzer’s analysis, small havens of escape (niches) and ennobling but futile struggles.

These terms of existence are unacceptable. Why put forth the strenuous effort entailed, by critical consciousness and collaborative learning if not for the belief in the potential of such work to undermine pessimism and to nurture hopes? Practicing freedom from McDonaldization within McUniversity is not the same as creating a non-McDonaldized society, but it is one of the steps toward building the social movements that might accomplish this. Kellner suggests that “Ritzer’s critical analysis . . . of McDonaldization . . . forces us to articulate a standpoint of critique and to think of forms of resistance and alternatives . . . to consider precisely what form of society, values, and practices we desire” (1998). A different reading suggests that Ritzer’s work might have the opposite effect, instilling resignation to an irreversible social trend (Rinehart 1998). Feminist education is one means for challenging such passivity: “The classroom, with all its limitations, remains a location of possibility” (hooks 1994: 207). These words of a women’s studies student are one example of the possibilities: “Women’s studies has opened up whole new areas to question myself about. Questions like: ‘Well, how is this useful for activism? How is this going to change the world? . . . . Am I working hard enough to change the world?’” (Lovejoy 1998: 129).

Notes

1. For the purposes of this chapter, “feminist education” refers principally to the pedagogies and content of women’s studies courses, but it may also include courses not listed under this program but taught by professors who identify their aims as feminist. This follows the practice of Hoffman and Stake, who investigated feminist pedagogy practiced within both women’s studies courses and courses taught by the same teachers under other disciplinary headings (1998).

2. My formulation of the distinctive characteristics of feminist education differs only slightly from the definition of feminist pedagogy used by Hoffman and Stake: participatory learning, validation of personal experience, encouragement of social understanding and activism, and development of critical thinking and opennessmindedness (1998).

3. For examples of such criticisms of Ritzer’s theory of McDonaldization, see Alfino, Caputo, and Wynyard (1998).

4. Women’s studies is sometimes dismissed by parents of students as a “nonmarketable” subject (Martin 2000: 112), suggesting that these courses are also regarded as detrimental to preparation for work in the McDonaldized economy.

5. This is one professor’s explanation for students’ failure to see the point: “They are, after all, the products of a culture committed to entertaining them 24 hours a day, and of a high school system committed to
providing a ‘comfortable,’ stress-free academic environment, one largely stripped of academic pressures and demands (little or no homework, no flunks) and marked by therapeutic praise and inflated grades” (Trout 1997: 30). The relationship between this assessment and McDonaldization is obvious.

6. One feminist educator, while conceding that “criticisms of some women’s studies work are not without basis,” also points out that many of those who criticize women’s studies as intolerant rely on anecdotes and small samples and fail to acknowledge that “problems of shoddy scholarship and intolerant classrooms cut across all disciplines” (Rhode 1997: 226).

References


JOB SATISFACTION OF UNIVERSITY ACADEMICS: PERSPECTIVES FROM UGANDA

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Graduate School of Education, University of Bristol

Abstract

Although several studies in the affluent world have examined the job satisfaction and dissatisfaction of lecturers in higher education, little is known about academic job satisfaction in the low-resource countries. This study probes those factors contributing to academic satisfaction and dissatisfaction in higher education in the developing world. Using a sample of 182 respondents drawn from two universities in Uganda, this analysis reports that the factors most prevalent in the prediction of dons’ satisfaction relate to co-worker behaviour, supervision and intrinsic facets of teaching. Analogously, the stimuli that create academic dissatisfaction are largely extrinsic (contextual) factors with respect to facets of remuneration, governance, research, promotion, and working environment. This article discusses these findings in the light of Herzberg’s dichotomy and concludes that any given factor be it intrinsic or extrinsic can either evoke academic satisfaction or induce dissatisfaction. The present analysis finds that while age, rank, and tenure significantly predict academic job satisfaction, no evidence is adduced to support a gender influence on dons’ job satisfaction. Implications for Ugandan academics’ job satisfaction are formulated, recommendations made, and a further research agenda proposed.

Keywords: developing nations, job satisfaction.

Introduction

The Global Trend: An Endangered Profession?

At a time when the geographic lines that divided the world of scholarship are becoming blurred (Boyer et al. 1994), higher education systems in both the affluent and the developing world find themselves amidst a difficult process of change that will obviously impact significantly on their principal workers. Indeed, public debate and academic reflection on the academic profession is not always characterised by contentment and serenity (Enders 1999), and with a plethora of what are called structural reforms, the skills of being an academic are increasingly becoming isolated and fragmented (Smyth and Hattam 2000) and relationships, particularly power associations, are changing. For instance, some argue that with the growth of privately sponsored research, the interests of
commercial firms have become dominant on campus, and consequently, academics have become ‘corporatised’ (Altbach 2001). Quite clearly the work of academics is affected by major global trends evident in universities notably accountability, massification, managerial controls, and deteriorating financial support (Altbach and Chait 2001). It would seem, therefore, that not only is the academic workplace changing rapidly worldwide, but also the academic profession is finding it increasingly difficult to manage the tensions within which it has to operate. This is particularly noticeable in the developing world, and one has to ask, in that context, is the academic profession endangered?

The Ugandan Context: Doing More with Less

In Uganda there is increasing demand by universities on academics to perform more effectively and efficiently, while at the same time they are expected to operate under adverse and declining circumstances (Kajubi 1992; Saint 1992). As a consequence of increased enrolments and the need for more staff, there is reduced rigour in staff recruitment and promotional criteria (Ocitti 1993). But, despite such moves, 48 percent of posts were unfilled at Makerere University Kampala (MUK) (Sanyal 1995). Coupled to, and exacerbating, these issues is the reduction in funding for the Higher Education sector. For example, out of US $710m earmarked for Uganda’s Education Strategic Investment Plan (ESIP)-1998–2003, only 9% of the total figure is for higher education (The New Vision 1999). When looked at within the overall educational project and its competing needs, these developments can be regarded as reasonable. Garrett (1999) has seen this reduced investment in Higher Education as typical of the Sector Investment Programmes currently being undertaken by many developing countries, and to be understandable within the context of their crucially important drive towards Universal Primary Education (UPE). As Urwick (2002) has recognised, the need for public funding on primary education has taken precedence.

This having been said however, the Higher Education sub-sector still has an important role to play in the overall drive towards improved standards, and it still requires adequate and sustained investment. Evidence suggests that staff pay for university lecturers is insufficient, housing facilities very poor, and the housing allowance paid in lieu is not enough to facilitate obtaining suitable accommodation available on the open market. Nevertheless, the volumes of work for academics and resource implications have increased with enlarged student enrolment (Ssesanga 2001). For example, the chair to student ratio at MUK main library is 1:19 (The New Vision 2001). Indeed, the spiralling numbers of students at MUK are straining and stressing academic staff (MUASA 1996, p. 13). Arguably, MUK is in a space crisis. Table 1 illustrates this situation.

What is even more disturbing however, is the suggestion from Ocitti (1993), that this quantitative expansion is likely to have a major impact on the maintenance of quality. The current reality in Uganda, as in most Sub-Saharan Africa universities, is one of congestion in lecture theatres and laboratories, and overall limited facilities and equipment with which to provide an adequate teaching/learning environment (Saint 1992). As a consequence, Ugandan dons have to teach increasingly more from a shrinking resource base, while faced with an explosion of new knowledge and skills to be acquired. What is likely to be the effect of such rapidly declining conditions on the ability and willingness of lecturers to continue to deliver an effective education?

As Garrett (1999) has noted, the social context of teachers, their attitudes, and their working conditions, are intimately related in a very complex manner and we need to understand them better. Not unexpectedly, such changes, as suggested by Oshagbemi (1997), are likely to affect the job satisfaction of university teachers. In the circumstances, it would seem to be common sense to suggest that the magnitude, and ramifications of the impact of these forces on Ugandan academics working life are as diverse as they are numerous.

As noted earlier, therefore, this study identifies and discusses factors, considerations or aspects of university teachers’ jobs, which contribute most to their satisfaction and dissatisfaction. In this way, it is hoped, one can summarise the elements which lecturers themselves claim to be contributing to their job satisfaction and dissatisfaction, as well as providing some more general insights into the academic profession in Uganda. This paper reports the factors that are most prevalent in the prediction of Ugandan academics’ job satisfaction and dissatisfaction, and adapts them in the
context of the Herzberg et al. (1959) Two-factor theory. Additionally, this study examines the impact of age, gender, rank, and tenure on Ugandan academics’ job satisfaction.

Relevant Literature

Since the late 1950s a number of researchers have theorised about the nature of job satisfaction and developed models, which attempt to explain differences in job satisfaction as detected in empirical studies. One of the better-known theories was developed by Herzberg et al. (1959). In this theory it was proposed that job satisfaction is not a unidimensional concept. Rather that intrinsic variables related to personal growth and development (satisfiers) and which contribute to job satisfaction, are separate and distinct from those extrinsic factors, associated with the security of the work environment (hygiene factors) and which account for job dissatisfaction or its reduction. These latter are not therefore directly related to increasing job satisfaction; rather they can contribute towards decreasing dissatisfaction. There is however, no agreed definition of what job satisfaction is (Evans 1997; Fairman 1973; Mumford 1972), and it has become an elusive and even a mythical concept (Lacy and Sheehan 1997). As a result, this lack of an agreement as to the nature of the concept has led to considerable disparity among the numerous studies that have been undertaken (Garrett 1999), and it has become a multi-dimensional phenomenon with many concepts vying for inclusion (Volkwein and Parmley 2000).

Despite some evidence that contradicts details within the Herzberg theory, it has not however, been disproved. It is employed in this present study since it is widely used and therefore facilitates comparisons between investigations. Furthermore, there is need for it to be tested in different contexts, such that it may eventually be refined and further articulated. We were particularly interested in exploring the applicability of the theory in a developing world context.

A number of studies, mostly in the industrialised world, have sought to examine aspects of academics’ satisfaction with their job across nations. Boyer et al. (1994) conducted an international study that explored among other factors, sources of satisfaction and frustration among professors in 14 countries (Australia, Brazil, Chile, USA, UK, Germany, Israel, Hong Kong, The

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>4876</td>
<td>8396</td>
<td>- 3520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>2774</td>
<td>5048</td>
<td>- 2274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>- 1253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>1081</td>
<td>- 611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicine</td>
<td>12565</td>
<td>14710</td>
<td>- 2145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>9493</td>
<td>11613</td>
<td>- 2120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/Sciences</td>
<td>1267</td>
<td>9368</td>
<td>- 8101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>3710</td>
<td>10587</td>
<td>- 6877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vet. Medicine</td>
<td>6589</td>
<td>5010</td>
<td>+ 1579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>6413</td>
<td>18414</td>
<td>- 12001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fine Art</td>
<td>1489</td>
<td>2301</td>
<td>- 812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Librarianship</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>886</td>
<td>- 388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stat. &amp;A/Econ.</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>1407</td>
<td>- 787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cont. Education</td>
<td>1402</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>- 557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>52846</td>
<td>92371</td>
<td>- 39867</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Netherlands, Korea, Japan, Russia, Sweden and Mexico). The results of this research showed, perhaps not surprisingly, that professors reported a high sense of satisfaction with their intellectual lives and the courses they taught as well as their relationships with colleagues. Contrary to Herzberg’s theory, this finding showed that both intrinsic and extrinsic factors can contribute to job satisfaction. Most faculty members, however, felt that they were not well paid. Only in Hong Kong and the Netherlands did more than 50% of faculty rate their own salary as ‘good’ or ‘excellent’. For instance, only 46% of surveyed professors in the USA rated their salaries favourably. In nearly half the responding countries more than 40% of the surveyed professors reported their job was a source of considerable strain with Japanese, Russian, and Korean faculty reporting the most pressure.

Similarly, Lacy and Sheehan (1997), using a sample of 12,599 respondents, examined aspects of academics’ satisfaction with their job across eight developed nations (Australia, USA, Germany, Canada, Mexico, Israel, Sweden and UK). Again, contrary to Herzberg’s theory, the results showed that both (content-related and context-related) aspects of the job could lead to both job satisfaction and dissatisfaction. On the whole, academics across the sampled nations were generally satisfied particularly with four facets of their jobs: relationships with colleagues; the opportunity to pursue their own ideas; job security and their general situation. A sizeable proportion of respondents (44.1%), however, was dissatisfied with prospects for promotion, compared with (27.6%) who indicated satisfaction. Additionally, respondents from Mexico, USA and Israel were most satisfied with promotion prospects. In comparison with other countries, German respondents expressed the lowest levels of satisfaction with their prospects for promotion, followed by academics in Sweden and the UK. With regard to overall satisfaction, around 60% of academics in Sweden and USA were satisfied, compared with their counterparts in Mexico, Germany, UK and Australia, where less than 50% of the responding academics were satisfied with their jobs. It would seem that the above findings tend to show that in the affluent world, (where extrinsic factors meet a basic level) intrinsic job aspects tend to influence the extent to which University academics are satisfied, or not, with their jobs.

**Contextual Background: Job Satisfaction Studies in Uganda’s HE**

Very few studies have been conducted in the area of job satisfaction in Uganda’s higher education sector. The data that do exist from the few studies that have been carried out however, indicate low levels of satisfaction among academic staff.

Opolot (1991) found that (ITEK) academic staff were dissatisfied with their pay. He concluded that if job satisfaction was to prevail in an institution, there should be fair remuneration of staff based on output, experience and level of education. This finding would seem to support Garrett’s (1999) observation that in a situation where lower-order needs are not met, extrinsic rewards tend to shape the level of satisfaction of workers.

In a study conducted to evaluate the Staff Development Programme (SDP) at MUK, Etoori (1989) found low job satisfaction among staff. Furthermore, the findings suggest that an institution which has a low job satisfaction rating among its staff, will have a high attrition rate, with employees seeking positions in institutions where they perceive prospects to be better.

Kyamanywa (1996) investigated job satisfaction in Uganda’s tertiary institutions. The results showed that four factors affected job satisfaction: Incentives, pay packages, leadership styles and the obtaining conditions at the workplace. The results would seem to show again that in an environment of scarcity where lower-order needs are not being met, hygiene factors tend to shape the job satisfaction of workers.

Bameka (1996) exploring factors affecting academic staff productivity at MUK, came to three major conclusions:

- The level of academic staff qualifications has a significant effect on academic staff productivity in respect of research but has no significant effect on productivity in respect to teaching and provision of community service.
• The financial resource base at MUK, weak as it may be, has no significant effect on staff productivity.
• The level of motivation of the academic staff has a significant effect on the productivity of academic staff at MUK.

Bameka’s (1996) results indicate that, unlike financial rewards, personal factors such as one’s drive to work, and qualifications, have a significant relationship with academic staff productivity at MUK. The results however, show that, where lower order needs such as salary, are not catered for, then teaching and community service tend to be affected.

Mulindwa (1998) assessed job satisfaction among academic and administrative staff at Polytechnic College, Kyambogo. Analysis of qualitative evidence revealed that levels of remuneration were the greatest contributor to job satisfaction among staff, followed by government policy on higher education and institutional policy. This finding may contradict Herzberg’s theory, which assumes that extrinsic rewards such as salary contribute towards reducing dissatisfaction but of themselves do not increase job satisfaction. The results, however, seem to support Garrett’s (1999) observation that, where lower order, extrinsic factors such as salary are not met to some critical, basic level, then intrinsic satisfiers will have little impact.

Tizikara (1998) examined correlates of academic staff satisfaction in MUK and the Islamic University in Uganda (IUU). Her findings revealed that there was a significant difference in satisfaction between academic staff in MUK and IUU in respect to pay and incentives. Furthermore, the results showed that academic staff were dissatisfied with the general situation obtaining at their universities, particularly in the areas of inadequate instructional materials, teaching space and the number of students in class. It was concluded that academic job satisfaction at both universities, at the time of the research, was affected by social, political and financial correlates though in varying degrees.

In the light of the foregoing discussion, it is possible to hypothesise that Uganda’s higher education seems not to provide the kind of pay that is professionally rewarding to its staff. Additionally, the kind of physical environment that obtains seems not to encourage professional development or high quality academic work. From the available evidence, therefore, it would seem that the Ugandan teaching community tends to be in turmoil and many frustrations and contradictions lie under the surface.

Method of Data Collection
To investigate the factors contributing to Ugandan academic job satisfaction and dissatisfaction, the following research method was employed.

Sample
The population was comprised of teachers from two universities in Uganda. It was felt that these two universities provided a large enough sample to be representative of all Ugandan universities, and to make available an adequate representation of the range and diversity of academics and their environments found in institutions of higher learning in Uganda. Data on job satisfaction were obtained by a questionnaire survey. Of the 250 questionnaires administered to potential subjects selected from the two participating universities, 182 usable questionnaires were returned yielding a response rate of 73%. A breakdown of responding academics by age, gender, tenure and rank is summarised in Table 2.

It is notable from Table 2 that the demographic data of responding academics was wide ranging. However, the majority of the respondents (50%) were lecturers, male (80.5%) and less than 45 years old (69.8%), which tend to agree with Boyer et al. (1994) findings that the majority of dons world-wide are middle aged and male. The relatively few respondents of the rank of professor and associate professors reflects their restricted numbers in the academic population.

Questionnaire and Interview Schedule
To better understand those factors contributing to Ugandan dons’ job satisfaction and dissatisfaction, a questionnaire comprising eight job aspects was constructed. The questionnaire was designed to collect data in the following areas:
• Demographic and background characteristics to provide the needed information to describe the sample such as university, and faculty, together with sex, age, academic rank, tenure, and marital status of the respondent.

• Job Aspects: the job satisfaction of academics was measured on nine general elements of their work comprising of:

**TABLE 2**
Demographic Data of the Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>% of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age (years)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 35</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35–44</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45–54</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 +</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>80.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tenure in present university (years)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0–5</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6–10</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11–20</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21–30</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 +</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Academic rank</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professors</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/Professors</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Lecturers</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lecturers</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Teaching
- Research
- Governance
- Remuneration
- Opportunities for promotion
- Supervision
- Co-worker’s behaviour
- Working environment
- Job in General (JIG)

These various elements themselves might be thought of as intrinsic or extrinsic to the university lecturers’ job. However, they are too broad to be of much use when analysing a person’s satisfaction or otherwise with their work. Consequently, they have been deconstructed into their various components, each of which were judged by a group of independent experts as to whether they
constituted an intrinsic or extrinsic feature of the general job element. Respondents were asked to indicate the level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, which they derived from the various components of each of the nine aspects of their jobs.

- In order to further identify and classify elements, which are relevant to job satisfaction and dissatisfaction, respondents were additionally asked to list five factors or considerations of their job which evoked their satisfaction and separately, to list five leading factors or considerations of their job, which induced their dissatisfaction.

Pilot tests of the questionnaire and the interview schedule were conducted using four academics from each institution that participated in the survey thus representing the target population as closely as possible.

**Analysis**

A 5-point Likert-type scale was employed. The scale ranged from 1–5 representing 1 – ‘Extremely Dissatisfied’, 2 – ‘Dissatisfied’, 3 – ‘Indifferent’, 4 – ‘Satisfied’, 5 – ‘Extremely Satisfied’. The essence of a 5-point scale was to encourage respondents to use full width of opinion and avoid errors of central tendency. For purposes of analysis, however, the two extreme categories of 1 – ‘Extremely Dissatisfied’ and 5 – ‘Extremely Satisfied’ were collapsed into one and scored as 2 = Dissatisfied; 3 = Indifferent; and 4 = Satisfied.

To identify if there were any differences in the level of job satisfaction of respondents on each aspect, the SPSS package was utilised and a principal component analysis was performed and factors were rotated using varimax procedures by which factors with significant loadings were extracted. A t-test was applied to compute if there were any significant differences in respondents’ level of job satisfaction on each aspect based on institution, age, gender, academic rank, and tenure. The level of significance was set at 0.05.

The analysis of free response data, and field notes from the interview were triangulated with the quantitative findings to identify vital explanatory factors in light of the literature review and issues emerging from the documentary survey. These data were analysed inductively against the conceptual framework of the study, and the literature review which, permitted the researcher to articulate against an informed background, factors that evoked Ugandan academics job satisfaction and dissatisfaction.

**Results and Discussion**

**Factors Contributing to Academic Satisfaction**

Relative to teaching,academics rated highly the satisfaction derived from intrinsic factors of teaching like interest shown by students in courses taught, and autonomy of content taught. For instance, Table 3 reveals the satisfaction of responding dons with courses taught. It can be seen that almost 92% were satisfied, with only 5% indicating dissatisfaction while 3% indicated indifference. With a mean of almost 4, Ugandan academics showed that they are satisfied with the courses taught in relation to professional training.

Based on both questionnaire and interview data, a summary of the factors contributing to Ugandan academic’s satisfaction can be viewed in Table 4.

The most frequently mentioned factors related to teaching were autonomy in content taught, as with relationship and respect by students. The next most common factors related to co-worker behaviour. This implies that Ugandan academics are sociable beings and value their collegial interactions.

Relative to supervision, freedom on the job and relationship with their immediate boss were cited as sources of academic satisfaction. Location of the university contributed most to academic satisfaction with respect to working environment. The freedom to research and publish was the only factor mentioned as contributory to Ugandan academics satisfaction with research.
TABLE 3
Frequency and Percentage Distribution Showing Academic Satisfaction with Course(s) Taught (n = 182)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 = Dissatisfied</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 = Indifferent</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 = Satisfied</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>91.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 4
Distribution of Satisfaction Responses based on job Aspect and Percentage of Academics Mentioning Factor (n = 138)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect of job</th>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Academics mentioning factor % of 138</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co-workers</td>
<td>Relationship with others</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support from co-workers</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching</td>
<td>Autonomy in content taught</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sharing knowledge with students</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recognition of efforts by students</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P/Conditions</td>
<td>Location of university</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervision</td>
<td>Freedom on the job</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Working relationship with boss</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>Freedom to research and publish</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Factors Contributing to Academic Dissatisfaction

A summary of the dissatisfaction responses based on quantitative evidence and percentage of 159 respondents can be viewed in Table 5.

With regard to remuneration, the most frequently mentioned factors were inadequate and irregular salary. These data tend to reflect a pattern of academic discontent with salary. Relative to research, sources of disillusionment were largely extrinsic such as lack of research grants and library facilities. Instructional materials and large classes were frequently mentioned as factors contributing to academic dissatisfaction with teaching.

Computing and relaxation facilities were cited frequently as contributory to respondents anguish with working facilities. The majority of respondents felt that undervaluing of teaching excellence in the reward system accounted for their misgivings with promotion.

To give greater support to any conclusions that may be made, the data from the free-response format were compared with information already collected in the Likert-type scales.

There were notable areas of convergence relative to Ugandan academics sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction as illustrated in Table 6.

A Model of Ugandan Academics Job Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction

Based on the evidence coming from the survey, interview and free-response data, a model of respondents’ satisfaction and dissatisfaction with primary and other duties was developed. Given that the universities in the study are teaching-intensive institutions, teaching is the main activity and perhaps the primary interest of most of the responding academics. Congruent with the Herzberg et al. (1959) dichotomy, the findings of this study indicated that intrinsic factors of teaching were most prevalent in the prediction of job satisfaction of Ugandan academics. Indeed, 92% were satisfied with courses taught, the most common reason given for this being the exercise of control, which the
### TABLE 5
Distribution of Dissatisfaction Responses based on Job Aspect and Percentage of Academics Mentioning Factor (n =159)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect of Job</th>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Academics mentioning factor % of 159</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Remuneration</td>
<td>Inadequate salary</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Irregular salary</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>Lack of research funds</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Library facilities for research</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin. and Mgt.</td>
<td>Relationship with university admin.</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy formulation procedures</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching</td>
<td>Instructional materials</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Class size</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W/ Facilities</td>
<td>Access to computer</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Facilities for relaxation</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion</td>
<td>Teaching skills in promotion</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 6
Areas of Convergence between Quantitative and Free-response Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect of Job</th>
<th>Quantitative (Likert scale)</th>
<th>Free-response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teaching</td>
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<td>Working Facilities</td>
<td>Geographical location of university(s)</td>
<td>Location of university(s)</td>
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(s) Satisfaction; (d) Dissatisfaction.
Figure 1. Model of Ugandan Academics Job Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction with Primary Duties

individual had over the content of his/her course. Figure 1 represents a possible model of Ugandan academics' satisfaction and dissatisfaction with their core obligations. Consequently, the current notion in the literature that academics enter university teaching because of intellectual pleasure (Altbach and Lewis 1996) or the enjoyment they receive (McKeachie 1982; Serow 2000) was sustained.

It is interesting, however, to note that these data are at variance with the contention that where lower order needs (extrinsic) factors are not met, higher order needs (intrinsic) are not likely to come into play as sources of satisfaction (Evans 1997; Maslow 1954), and particularly in the context of low-resource countries (Garrett 1999). Based on these findings, it is concluded that, despite the arduous working conditions (Mujaju 1996), and the mismatch between instructional and student numbers (Tizikara 1998), Ugandan dons seem satisfied with intrinsic facets of their job, particularly teaching and research, and, unsurprisingly, dissatisfied with extrinsic features of their academic role.

Indeed, some intrinsic factors contributed to Ugandan academics' satisfaction with teaching. These data, however, chime well with the contention that academics have control over content elements of their job (Enders and Teichler 1997; Moses 1986; Pearson and Seiler 1983; Serow 1997). Additionally, concurrent with Herzberg's two-factor theory, extrinsic factors contributed to Ugandan academics' job dissatisfaction as evidenced in Figure 1.

Pertinent findings arising from sources of academic satisfaction and discontent with the six other job aspects investigated in this study are summarised in Figure 2. Not unexpectedly, given the plight of Ugandan dons (Kajubi 1992; Mujaju 1996) respondents were dissatisfied with remuneration which, lends credence to Herzberg's (1959) contention that pay being an extrinsic aspect does not lead to true gratification, merely a reduction in dissatisfaction. Consequently, a good many Ugandan dons have been forced to take other jobs, thereby dividing their loyalty to their employer, and reducing their commitment to their university obligations.

As the results indicate (Figure 2), Ugandan lecturers were dissatisfied with promotion. Several key observations emerge: First, given that promotion would lead to an increase in pay (Oshaghbemi 1996), it is plausible to deduce that Ugandan dons' dissatisfaction with promotion is in part, explained by inadequate and erratic pay. Second, respondents dissatisfaction with promotion arose inter alia from their being unappreciated and unrecognised for achievements made, where 58% of the sample felt unhappy. Contrary to Herzberg's theory, therefore, we see recognition, an intrinsic factor, inducing job dissatisfaction.

Strikingly, whilst these data in Figure 2 show obvious areas of dissatisfaction like remuneration, aspects of research and working facilities, the overall picture of the job in general (JIG) is not as gloomy. Over 80% of respondents reported deriving satisfaction from academic work as
What emerges from the findings is that while being asked by administrators and policy makers to do more with fewer resources, Ugandan dons are being told, at least from the sample of this study, that they should not expect to be facilitated or rewarded financially for meeting ever increasing demands. Yet, while obviously frustrated by poor working conditions and emoluments, when asked about their JIG, most respond that it is satisfactory.

Looking ahead, it seems safe to predict that the high degree of control academics have over intrinsic elements of their work (Moses 1986; Pearson and Seiler 1983) and the intellectual pleasure derived (Altbach and Lewis 1996), or the degree of autonomy enjoyed by academics (Enders and Teichler 1997; Serow 2000) all contribute to overall satisfaction. This scenario would seem to be a fruitful avenue of future investigation.

In addition to identifying sources of academic satisfaction and dissatisfaction, this study addressed the influence of age, gender, rank and tenure on academic job satisfaction with respect to each of the eight aspects of the job.

**The Influence of Age on Job Satisfaction**

Relative to age-teaching satisfaction, while younger respondents were more likely to derive satisfaction from extrinsic factors, their older counterparts evoked satisfaction from intrinsic facets of an occupation.
teaching. Consistent with prior research (Oshagbemi 1997; Rosen 1978; Siassi et al. 1975), age has a significant influence on teaching satisfaction. While there were considerable misgivings with research, it is useful to note that older Ugandan academics were more likely to derive satisfaction from both intrinsic and extrinsic factors within the general area of research. Consequently, age showed a predictive effect on research satisfaction. In agreement with the literature, all age groups felt unhappy with institutional governance. Age, however, showed no overwhelming effect on academic satisfaction with institutional governance.

Though older dons were more likely to express satisfaction with their position on the pay scale, it is useful to note that no overriding age differences in academic satisfaction with remuneration were observed. By contrast, age showed a predictive influence on academic satisfaction with promotion. While younger lecturers rated favourably the support and guidance received from supervisors, it is useful to highlight that there was compelling evidence to show that age influences academic supervision satisfaction.

Gender and Job Satisfaction

Results from the Uganda study suggest a picture of academics with much in common but with some significant differences between different groups. Although both male and female respondents felt relatively happy with teaching, there is some evidence to suggest that men were more likely to signal satisfaction with extrinsic factors. Consequently, the pattern recurring in the literature (Olsen et al. 1995; Poole et al. 1997), that women appear to be more positively oriented towards teaching, does not seem to hold for Ugandan academics. Both men and women overlapped broadly in expressing their disenchantment with research, and there was no compelling evidence to suggest a gender difference relative to research satisfaction. Consistent with the research literature, (Boyer et al. 1994) academic discontent with institutional governance was pervasive. The study, however, produced no evidence to show a gender difference with respect to academic governance.

Whilst male respondents rated their satisfaction with the pay scale higher than comparable females, no difference in remuneration satisfaction was explained by differences in gender. Relative to gender-promotion satisfaction, Ugandan women dons more than men, were highly disenchanted with promotion criteria. Though the findings tend to sustain the current thinking in the literature that women academics are promoted at a slower pace, (Caplan 1994; Toren 1993 cited in Poole et al. 1997) it must be said that no evidence was revealed to show any gender difference with academic promotion satisfaction. While more women than men, felt happier with work time autonomy, this study produced no evidence indicating any gender influence on supervision satisfaction. Though both men and women expressed high satisfaction with co-worker behaviour, men more than women were significantly satisfied with collegial participation and integration. Overall, while there were no major discrepancies perceived between Ugandan men and women dons with respect to working conditions, some contrasts were apparent. In conformity with evidence-informed data, (Poole and Langan-Fox 1996), women had a more positive attitude to their working conditions relative to the enjoyment of the job.

Rank and Job Satisfaction

Relative to rank-teaching satisfaction, while respondents derived satisfaction from intrinsic factors, the findings revealed that senior academics were more likely to signal satisfaction with both intrinsic and extrinsic facets. No compelling evidence, however, was apparent to show that academic rank has a predictive influence on teaching satisfaction. With respect to research, while professorial staff, felt happy with content elements, middle and junior respondents were more likely to signal satisfaction with context factors. Based on this study’s findings, therefore, there was overwhelming evidence to support the notion that rank has a predictive influence on research satisfaction. While professorial staff signalled satisfaction with departmental administration, mid level and junior dons rated institutional governance more favourably. The data reported that differences in academic rank significantly influenced governance satisfaction.

With regard to remuneration, whereas professorial staff were delighted with their pay scale, mid and junior academics showed less discontent with benefits and compensation. There was no
overriding evidence, however, to suggest that differences in academic rank impact on remuneration satisfaction. In contrast to Herzberg’s dichotomy, promotion; classified as an *intrinsic* aspect of academic work; contributed to respondents’ dissatisfaction. There were striking and persistent differences between senior and junior dons, however, to suggest that promotion satisfaction among Ugandan academics was dependent on rank. Strikingly, respondents were pleased with supervision, an *extrinsic* aspect of academic work. The data revealed that supervision satisfaction among Ugandan academics rose proportionately with rank. Contrary to Herzberg’s conceptualisation, respondents felt happy with co-worker behaviour, an *extrinsic* aspect of academic work. No evidence was adduced, however, to suggest that differences in academic rank consistently predicted differences in co-worker satisfaction. Interestingly, *extrinsic* factors contributed to Ugandan academics satisfaction and dissatisfaction. While rank offered no consistent indication of contentment on the job, the general trend indicated that differences in academic rank significantly influenced working environment satisfaction.

**The Influence of Tenure on Academic Satisfaction**

Relative to teaching, while new entrants were likely to show less discontent with *extrinsic* factors, long serving respondents felt happier with *intrinsic* facets. No consistent evidence, however, was found to show that tenure influenced respondents’ satisfaction with teaching. In contrast to Herzberg’s theory, *intrinsic* aspects of research contributed to respondents’ dissatisfaction. Differences in tenure, however, consistently predicted Ugandan academics overall dissatisfaction with research. Governance contributed to dons’ dissatisfaction rather than their satisfaction. The results of the present analysis produced no evidence to lend support to the contention that tenure consistently influenced Ugandan academics governance satisfaction.

Not unexpectedly, and consistent with the research literature, Ugandan academics were disenchanted with remuneration. Data showed that differences in tenure did not influence differences in remuneration satisfaction. Relative to promotion, the data evidenced more contrasts than similarities. There was compelling evidence to suggest that academic tenure showed a predictive effect on Ugandan academics promotion satisfaction. The data produced clear evidence to show that supervision satisfaction tended to increase with tenure among Ugandan dons. In contrast to Herzberg’s theory, respondents expressed satisfaction with co-worker behaviour, an *extrinsic* aspect of academic work. The results of this study showed that differences in academic tenure significantly influenced differences in co-worker satisfaction of Ugandan academics. Contrary to Herzberg’s theory, it was of interest to note that *extrinsic* factors contributed to respondents’ satisfaction and dissatisfaction with working facilities. Tenure, however, showed a predictive influence on Ugandan academics satisfaction with their working environment.

**Conclusions, Implications and Recommendations**

The current investigation has established that while Ugandan academics are relatively satisfied with co-worker behaviour, supervision and *intrinsic* facets of teaching, their potential sources of dissatisfaction are remuneration, governance, promotion and physical facilities. Although the *intrinsic* elements that contribute towards both teaching and research are likely sources of satisfaction, and *extrinsic* facets of these two areas more likely to predict Ugandan academics’ dissatisfaction, the findings do not wholly support Herzberg’s contention that these are mutually exclusive. It is concluded, therefore, that any given factor could either evoke satisfaction, or indeed induce dissatisfaction, which reflects situational variables in the working environment (Quarstein et al. 1992 cited in Oshagbemi 1997). While age, rank, and tenure significantly predicted academic job satisfaction, the present research provides no evidence to support a gender influence on respondents’ job satisfaction.

This study’s findings have practical implications for university management and governing bodies, as with academics, and higher education policy makers in Uganda. A delicate question is whether the power should be concentrated at the top of an institution. From the perspective of the individual academic, such concentration of power is often interpreted as bureaucratisation. If, as
this research has indicated, academics feel distanced from top administrators at their institutions, then those at the helm of university leadership and management in Uganda should build senior management teams around themselves, or form advisory groups with a predominance of academics. Consequently, with increased communication, it is more likely that university leaders will be viewed as collegial co-ordinators, thereby fostering mutual trust and respect between academics and university administrators.

Designers of higher education policies in Uganda should assess afresh the role, service and relationship of universities and society. Increasingly, for Ugandan universities to be able to serve the best interests of the nation, essential interests of the very universities themselves must be defended so that they can remain of utmost value to the society they serve. The challenge, as conceptualised by Ajayi et al. (1996) is for higher education policy in Africa to move beyond the search for relevance and identity to the creation of virile academic communities. Indeed, attracting and retaining competent staff has now become the biggest current problem in African universities (Amonoo-Neizer 1998). The immediate priority, therefore, is the need to re-examine Ugandan universities system of incentives and rewards and for systems to be put in place that recognise the need for job satisfaction to be maintained and constantly reviewed.

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Abstract

The article pertains to how one might employ postmodern assumptions in the study and analysis of comparative higher education. The text first critiques the idea of modernism by way of a discussion about postmodernism. The author then analyzes the implications of postmodernism for comparative higher education research. In doing so, the author outlines five tenets of postmodernism that revolve around alternative ways of thinking about knowledge production and identity construction. The premise of the text is that postmodernism offers a different interpretation from modernism about the twin ideas of knowledge and identity. The author concludes by offering suggestions about how postmodernism might reorient the work of comparative higher education research. Accordingly, the goal of the text is to delineate competing conceptions of reality with regard to knowledge production, identity, and the role of the university.

The project of modernism and the social role of the university have gone hand in hand throughout the 20th century. Broadly stated, proponents of modernism have assumed that rational, objective knowledge discovered by scientific inquiry ultimately will set humanity free, or at the least improve the lives of men and women. Universities have existed to enable scientists and philosophers to study particular phenomena so that they might advance understanding and inculcate cultural truths into the young. In these respects universities have been seen as central organizations of the modern idea of the nation-state and a central tool for nation-building. To be sure, at different points in time and with a handful of institutions, universities have fought against the assumed role of state agent; but I shall suggest that more often than not, they have perpetuated and furthered national interests and aspirations rather than acted as critical agents of them.

In this text I have twin objectives that pertain to the role of the university and the project of modernism. First, I elaborate on and critique the idea of the modern university by way of a discussion about postmodernism. Second, I offer an analysis of the implications of postmodernism for
the study of comparative higher education. I will argue that rather than knowledge production being autonomous and free-floating, it heretofore has been constrained by the ideological apparatus of the nation-state. Concomitantly, I drop the notion of a singular, cohesive identity that acts as an autonomous agent; instead I develop the idea of a fractured subject that is shaped by, and helps shape, the culture in which identity exists. As I shall discuss, the assumption that guides the text is that how one theorizes the subject and constructs the idea of knowledge impacts on what one studies and how one interprets the academic world.

In order to develop the argument three caveats about the text are germane. First, I focus exclusively on public and/or private research universities that might be considered national institutions. To be sure, over the last generation in particular, there has been a dramatic rise in private institutions, two year vocational colleges, and proprietary organizations that cater to a particular clientele, but I save the analysis of those organizational types for a later paper. At this point, I intend to discuss those institutions with histories that have been embedded and intertwined with the nations where they exist.

Second, for the purpose of discussion I have created ideal types with regard to the delineation of modernism and postmodernism. Whenever theoretical constructs are discussed there are intellectuals who subscribe to a particular idea but have different interpretations of what they mean. Certainly not every individual who subscribes to modernism, for example, interprets ideas such as power and knowledge in similar fashion; the same may be said, if not more so, with regard to postmodernism. Indeed, as I shall elaborate, because postmodernism is a relatively new theoretical framework there are bound to be widely divergent strands and interpretations such that any attempt at defining a “pan-postmodernism” would be seriously misguided. And finally, the idea and enactment of modernism and postmodernism varies from country to country. Although there are theoretical constants that I will outline, it would be fallacious to suggest that all universities everywhere operate from similar theoretical vantage points when they conceive of ideas such as knowledge, or try to enact particular research agendas.

The goal of this text, then, is to delineate competing conceptions of reality with regard to universities and knowledge production. Obviously, my purpose is not to prove that one view is worthless and another supreme; rather, I shall suggest that the study of comparative higher education might be informed by an understanding of competing theoretical frameworks with which one works and the ideological notions of those who undertake research.

The University and the Production of Knowledge

Modernist Premises

Although one might argue that knowledge has been produced in multiple arenas throughout this century, one central locale has been the university. The discovery of knowledge also has been a sine qua non of the mission of the research university. How faculty roles have developed, what role the university should play in national development arenas, and how one judges the success of an academic organization is also partly defined by way of its ability to generate new knowledge. Obviously, different nations have had different capabilities with regard to enabling universities the facilities and infrastructure to develop a research agenda, but the vast majority of institutions in one way or another have seen their role as partly defined by their ability to do research. If institutions are not able to undertake research today, then their aspiration is that they will do so tomorrow.

The assumption that individuals who work in universities are able to discover knowledge derives from a variety of premises that underscore how the theoretical framework of modernism orient how a university’s participants think about, conduct, and define inquiry. A modernist stance on knowledge production proceeds from the belief that objective scientists from particular disciplines undertake neutral investigations. The domain of inquiry in which scientists reside frames their locus and outlook. Parochial views based on institutional or national interest are irrelevant in the area of science. As Philip Altbach has observed, “Knowledge is international” (1997, p. xiii).
International differences on a grand scale, or institutional idiosyncracies on a more microscopic level are neither of interest nor relevance to the scientist. “It is the discipline mode of organization,” says Burton Clark, “that has rendered higher education over time and space, basically meta-national and international” (1983, p. 29).

Such a view holds two core beliefs. The first assumption is that the knowledge produced by a discipline’s actors reflects neutral categories that have occurred in linear fashion. The second related assumption is that the production of knowledge is additive. The community of scientists within a specific field work in concert with one another so that one person learns one fact and another builds on that fact by discovering another, and so on. The ability of scientists to communicate and learn from one another irrespective of nation or institution enables the development of generalizations and objective forms of knowledge.

Such beliefs enable higher education researchers to ask, “if an omniscient social engineer were to devise a comprehensive national knowledge policy, what would be the optimal role for university research?” (Geiger 1985, p. 54). From this perspective, a similar response irrespective of the national origin or of the institution is a possibility insofar as the role of universities in advancing knowledge ought to be, or is, similar from nation to nation, from university to university. Again, obviously, there are differences between the research capability and infrastructure of the United States and a third world country. However, the goal, presumably, is similar.

University research, from a modernist perspective, ought not be dependent on national imperative; conversely, all nations follow the same path to modernize. As Arnove and his colleagues have pointed out modernism’s assumption is “that all societies follow the same path to development and the countries at different stages of development represent different points on the same continuum or trajectory” (1982, p. 5). Thus, Kempner has pointed out how modernization in developing countries “is accomplished by emulating the social and economic circumstance of the core, industrial countries such as the United States” (1998, p. 3). The underlying assumption, of course, is that the development of knowledge is ideologically-free. The role of the university from the vantage point of much comparative work is to engage in objective debates about one scientific matter or another. Since universities are removed from political and sociological arenas they are thus neither instruments of the state nor beholden to any particular political viewpoint. Further, if knowledge production is impartial and shared within a disciplinary community of scholars, then the physical locale of where one conducts knowledge is relatively unimportant. Indeed, the case might be made that a scientist’s geographic locale has become even less important with the advent of electronic technologies that hook researchers up with one another regardless of whether they are next door in a laboratory or 4,000 miles away.

Such a line of thought permits a variety of actions to follow about universities. Authors such as Alfonso Borrero Cabal, for example, feel comfortable making suggestions about university structures and functions regardless of the national origin of the institution (Borrero Cabal 1993). In his text he links universities of the middle ages to those of today and of tomorrow. Universities always have changed, he posits, but from the modernist framework, there has been a relatively clear trajectory. As he states, “The university arose from agreement and consensus between teachers and students, who were united for the corporate management of universal knowledge” (1993, p. 22). Universal knowledge is a hallmark of the academy, then, and the work of faculty regardless of their national origin is the search for Truth. He argues that autonomy is one of the fundamental cores of the academy. The scientist is an individual who functions with dispassionate interest as he or she tries to discover discrete facts en route to the creation of grand theory. Many will translate the idea of autonomy into the modernist framework of academic freedom. The professor is free to study what he or she wants without interference. Thus, while there may be different types of universities with a variety of functions, the essence of what one thinks of a university is to be the same in the 21st century as what it was in the Renaissance.

The growth of an area of inquiry occurs when scientists within a discipline learn from one another and expand upon ideas. Paradigm shifts and revolutionary breakthroughs occur when an individual develops a unique way of seeing particular phenomena. Even Thomas Kuhn’s descriptions of paradigm revolutions still take place from a modernist version of science where individuals work on particular projects from a non-ideological, pan-national perspective. A “revolution”
occurs not because one ideological line of inquiry subsumes another, but because a scientist is able
to convince other like-minded individuals that there is a different, more compelling way to describe
a specific aspect of the scientific world.

The implications of a modernist view of knowledge production has a logical relationship for
the structure of the academic enterprise. If knowledge occurs within disciplines and the best crit-
cics of a scientist’s work are other scientists, then the building block of the university will be the
department, school, or faculty unit. The work of the faculty, and relatedly, the reward structure, will
be geared inward toward the development of research. Who, after all, other than like-minded col-
leagues will be able to judge the merit of one’s ideas? The relationship between the university and
external agents is tenuous. Governmental agencies, funding authorities or corporations might
suggest areas for study, but it is the faculty who determine the framework of investigation, the
design of the study, and its evaluation.

One of the chief functions of the university thus becomes the ability to become arbiters of and
trainers for scientific and cultural quality. If only scientists can critique scientific studies, then the
university must train younger scientists for successive generations. Although social science and
the humanities may not be precisely similar to the natural sciences, the modernist of the 20th cen-
tury has struggled to develop parallels of scientific rigor so that one might be as confident about
cultural or sociological findings as one is about scientific findings. Thus, the challenge for the
university of the 20th century has been to create a climate for itself so that the knowledge work-
ers—the professorate—are able to perform their work without the intrusion of ideological and
political matters; scientific findings may unfold in as merito-cratic a manner as possible. As
Roger Geiger has commented, “The inherent strengths of university research are in theory related
to the intersection of discipline and institution. Scientists in their research roles are oriented more
toward their peers in the scientific community, rather than their bureaucratic superiors in their
institution” (1985, p. 67). Of consequence, argue Geiger and others, the objective nature of research
impacts academic life so that the work of the faculty is merito-cratic and objective, rather than
personal and political.

The view of academic life and knowledge production proposed from this perspective is one
where laws and generalizations are possible and desirable. Objectivity is the coin of the academic
realm; to insert one’s personal beliefs into the research project is to poison the academic well. The
discipline drives the work of the faculty. The department is the intellectual home of the professo-
rate and the building block for the structure of the 20th century university.

Best and Kellner (1997) suggest that the modernist paradigm came into being in the 15th cen-
tury and lasted well into the 19th. To summarize: deterministic logic, critical reasoning, indi-

dividualism, humanistic ideals, a search for universal truths, overarching theories about knowledge,
and belief in progress, are hallmarks of modernism. The university was a central organization for
modernism and the professorate were key figures in advancing modernist premises. Although
various strands of modernism obviously exist—Marxism and human capital, for example—the
premise here is that the underlying assumptions are more similar than different from one another.
The existing comparative higher education literature (e.g. Kogan 1998; Teichler 1996; Clark 1996)
in general works from modernist premises that seek generalization across categories and which
aim to place countries on a comparative continuum, or in a comparative matrix. However help-
ful such work has been, I now turn to an alternative way to think about comparative higher
education research.

Postmodern Premises

Those who subscribe to postmodernism argue that changes in society have presaged different ways
of interpreting the world, and hence, the manner in which academic work is interpreted and defined.
As Smith and Webster note:

Postmodern thinking suggests that the academic community is a kind of fiction and that differ-
ence is the hallmark within and between institutions which bear the title. The growth of special-
ization has become so complete that colleagues even within a faculty often cannot discuss their
areas of expertise without misunderstanding. . . . It has become impossible to defend any parti-
cular hierarchy of subjects in the modern university today, let alone any notion of authoritative
knowledge (1997, p. 5).

Hierarchical social structures, singular notions of identity, linear lines of production, and
the idea of the nation-state all have come under renewed questioning and reformulation. Indeed,
at times, it almost might seem that the entire epistemological world is “up for grabs.” Such inde-
terminacy is unsettling. In a text about the new production of knowledge, Michael Gibbons and
his colleagues, for example, ask how postmodernism’s self-contradictory extremes can be rec-
cepted: “If all is incoherent and unconnected, playful shadows, how is reflexivity possible” (1994,
p. 103). What I intend to outline here is not so much a simple answer to their question, but a
way to think about it which enables comparative higher education research to take on different
premises.

As I noted at the outset, there are different strands of postmodernism in large part depending
upon the departure point of the author. In the arts ludic postmodernism has been more concerned
with irony, tropes and playfulness. Critical, or “oppositional” postmodernism—which I will dis-
cuss here—derives from recent social movements and seeks new forms of critique and opposition.
Critical postmodernism is related to modernism—hence, the “post”—with its concerns for critique,
struggle and change. But there are also significant differences. While it would be impossible to delin-
ate the entire scaffolding of postmodernism within the confines of this text, five attributes help
define distinctions between modernist versions of the world that are useful in considering with
regard to academic life:

1. **Knowledge and social construction.** The postmodernist assumes that knowledge is not “discov-
ered” as if it already exists; as opposed to the modernist, the job of the scientist is not to find
“knowledge” either by unearthing preexisting data or by combining different facts in cre-
ative ways that lead to scientific breakthroughs. Instead, individuals and groups, based on
social, cultural and ideological positions create knowledge. Critics of social constructionism
often have misconstrued the idea and argued that if postmodernists assume that reality does
not exist then how does one explain “natural laws” such as gravity or relativity? The point,
of course, is not to deny the existence of an objective world, but to consider how “natural laws”
are constructs that are subject to change, reformulation and creation. Social constructionists
do not argue that science is myth or fantasy, but rather that the creation of knowledge is de-
pendent upon cultural constructs. Knowledge production is a creation made by people working
in groups. From this perspective, institutions and nations play a role in the creation of
knowledge. As Best and Kellner nicely summarize:

Denying that laws of nature are social constructs presupposes a fixed, immutable, absolute truth. . . .
Against an objectivist conception of scientific law, the social constructionist argues that our sci-
cientic laws and explanations are constantly changing in accord with discoveries in science, shifts
in intellectual fashions, and mutating paradigms of knowledge and inquiry, and thus that there
is no objectivity, knowledge or truth independent of our conceptual schemes, that all discourse is
socially constructed and subject to change and modification (1997, p. 226).

Thus, those who are interested in how knowledge gets produced study where it happens, by
whom, and in what social contexts. It is not mere happenstance that science has been conducted
by men and that issues of concern to women often have been overlooked or interpreted in a par-
ticularly patriarchal manner. Similarly, that history books are only now being populated with the
lives of people of color, or that homosexuality was defined one way a century ago and another
way today underscores to postmodernists the arbitrary nature of knowledge. Knowledge is a social
product with political roots (Tierney 1996, p. 15). Knowledge policy has political consequences
that shape the way individuals think about and act in the world. The challenge becomes not sim-
ply to explain a linear story about how objective scientists discovered scientific laws or how one
might develop a cohesive knowledge policy irrespective of government or nation. Instead one
considers how knowledge gets constructed and employed in different contexts and situations.
Accordingly, one investigates local contexts rather than work from a meta-national framework.
Knowledge is neither neutral nor additive. Specific interests of the researcher in particular and society at large help define how one thinks about knowledge and these interests are investigated not by disinterested observers but by subjective participants. The university is seen as a site where contested versions of “truth” take place with the endpoint not being that one version of truth reigns supreme as one piece of data is put together with another piece until a coherent framework exists. Instead, the postmodernist concern is to struggle continually in decoding how particular interests are supported, denied, overlooked, or occluded. Knowledge production is a dynamic process that helps define and is defined by the worlds in which it is situated. And it is situated in multiple worlds—that of the discipline, the nation, the institution, to name but three prominent examples. The postmodernist thus investigates the university in a very different light from the modernist who assumes that disinterested observers pursue their work. Knowledge becomes an ideological construct that organizes beliefs, actions, and expectations.

I hasten to add that I am not saying that those who have subscribed to the modernist perspective have purposefully sought to fool anyone by way of political machinations or that the individual who thought of him or her self as an objective scientist is in some way manipulating data or theorems in a mystical or unethical manner. Postmodernists do not claim that science is latter-day numerology, or that all scientists purposefully seek to push a particular perspective. Indeed, modernism came about in large part in response to romantic notions about the world that brought forth colonialism and imperialism. Science, if it were to be objective, was inevitably tied to liberal humanist notions about meritocracy. Rather than work from one’s biases, science was intended to enable society to develop fair, equitable ways to study different phenomena. And yet, however laudable such a notion might have been, the postmodern critique is that knowledge and science, and hence universities, are just as inevitably tied to regimes of power, and to this I turn.

2. Power/persuasion. As opposed to modernism’s faith in science and the scientist, the postmodernist seeks to analyze assumptions and frameworks that appear as objective and explore how they are actually the results of specific power relations. If scientific thought is framed by social constructions, then of consequence, how one vantage point or discourse assumes primacy over another is in part a result of relations of power. Change does not simply occur by happenstance, but rather by differing regimes of power working for primacy.

Cooper and Burrell discuss the conflicting epistemological positions of modernism and postmodernism: “Modernism with its belief in the essential capacity of humanity to perfect itself through the power of rational thought,” is contrasted to postmodernism “with its critical questioning, and often outright rejection, of the ethnocentric rationalism championed by modernism” (1988, p. 92). Multiple voices vie for the legitimation of their own social reality. Instead of overarching narratives that are the result of received wisdom, postmodernists analyze subject-centered pluralist discourses. Such investigations bring forth an understanding of why some voices have been silenced or marginalized, and why others have been more prominent.

Power is seen not as something that individuals and groups enact but as a force in and of itself. Power, like culture, exists before anyone tries to use it or wield it. Situations, events, organizations are framed by the parameters of power so that all individuals—regardless whether they are citizens, faculty or politicians—are ensnared in it. The scientist in the laboratory is not exempt from being ensnared in relations of power. Power is not something that one chooses to use or eschews, but rather it defines the ideology within which cultures operate. There is no purified vantage point where one may act objectively or conduct research as if what one does is possible in an ideological, power-free vacuum. And yet, power is not totalizing. Individuals and groups are able to resist specific relations of power, or comply. The first step in acknowledging this viewpoint is to accept that knowledge is not autonomous and discovered by unique patterns that disinterested scientists put together within encapsulated scientific communities. Instead, one constantly focuses on the inherent structures in which scientists undertake their work.

One of those structures is the university. Obviously, the postmodern portrait of the university is vastly different from the monastic ivory tower that has pervaded romantic and modern thought. Indeed, if knowledge production is a central point that is necessary to come to terms with in postmodernism, then the university becomes a key site to analyze and deconstruct. The postmodern
challenge turns on how one might locate the knowledge constructions of different phenomena as ideological and hence as a strategic site for intervention and change. From this perspective, the role of the intellectual takes on a particular meaning.

3. Identity and the intellectual. If modernism’s scientist was that of the faceless researcher working without either national or personal identity, then postmodernism’s is the opposite. Postmodernists work from a sense of identity that is fractured and splintered rather than cohesive and unitary. What is meant by identity and how to think of it with regard to research and university life goes to the core of modernity. “Identity,” notes Stephen Seidman, “is a site of on-going social regulation and contestation rather than a quasi-natural substance or an accomplished social fact” (1993, p. 134). Instead of assuming that identities are fixed and determinate, postmodernists work from the belief that identity is most often up for grabs and developed in relation to the socio-historical forces at work.

The fractured nature of the postmodern identity has implications for how to think about those who do research as well as the nature of research itself. Comparative research becomes essential rather than complementary. One can not understand phenomena in isolation if a singular identity is non-existent. Instead, the researcher comes to terms with the multiple ways that cultures, societies, groups and organizations construct identity not to identify one as supreme and others as lacking, but rather to develop as full an understanding as possible. Perhaps the most obvious example of the need for comparative data is the rapid growth of interdisciplinary work. Researchers have found that the premises of a single discipline are no longer sufficient for investigating different aspects of modern life. Similarly, the university no longer is a site that seeks to develop a unified theory but rather it is a conduit for diverse conversations about the nature of a particular phenomena. The university becomes more a facilitator for dialogue than a repository of truth.

The role of the intellectual, accordingly, takes on a different role and is seen in a different light. The disinterested intellectual of a modernist persuasion eschewed any interest in the rough and tumble of political life or of active involvement with society. Indeed, if anything, the partisanship that existed in society was what scientists tried to avoid and overcome. Instead, in the rarefied atmosphere of the academy one found objective science divorced from the real world undertaken by men and women who saw the intellectual as one who found Truth. Thus, the function of the modern intellectual was that of cultural reproduction and the pursuit of pure research, whereas postmodernism assumes that the intellectual’s role is to redefine and reshape those structures that reproduce dominant powers, rather than mirror them. As Foucault notes:

The real political task in a society such as ours is to criticize the working of institutions which appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticize them in such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight them (1974, p. 171).

The intellectual rejects the idea of “pure” research and struggles to decode the implicit power of the state and how “free” one is to perform his or her academic work. To be sure, not every research project in every country will be redefined by such an awareness, but the overall learning experiences get framed in a fundamentally different way from what currently exists in the academy. Further, the intellectual who speaks on behalf of others is given up in favor of the individual who advises, communicates and creates the conditions for change. The intellectual from this perspective assumes a much more modest role than that of the modernist hero or revolutionary (Best and Kellner 1991). One might expect, for example, that the postmodern academic would act in local and international arenas on much more concrete levels than the disengaged theorist propounding ideas about societal change or transformation.

4. Acceleration and discontinuity. If modernism’s projects were framed by underlying notions of linearity and rational progress, then postmodernism’s attempts are of the opposite persuasion. The work of postmodernism is as much a cultural analysis as an economic one so that researchers investigate various phenomena with an eye toward understanding the exponential growth of goods, services, data, information, images, and the like. As opposed to the assumption that the underlying ideas of a text or research project has the potential for permanency, postmodernists assume that nothing lasts very long. Lyotard, for example, has written of “the temporary contract supplanting permanent institutions”—in politics, culture, the economy, intellectual
life, social affairs, even the most intimate personal relationships” (1984). Not surprisingly, such an assumption is one of the issues with which the campus battles of the 80s centered on as academics argued over “core” texts. The postmodernist assumes that change is a constant, that cultural texts will change, and indeed, that they should. For those who hold onto a linear view of progress, however, one needs cultural relationships to the past in order to learn about the future. Time is a unity for the modernist that works chronologically, whereas it ruptures, fragments, and moves in fits and starts for the postmodernist. Thus, as Peter Scott has observed:

universities in the new mass age are less able to guarantee students access to a privileged body of knowledge, because such a body of knowledge no longer exists, or to socialize them into ‘expert’ niches within a carefully differentiated division of professional labour, because that division of labour has been eroded from ‘within’ by epistemological insecurity and from ‘without’ by the reconfiguration of the labour market (1997, p. 42).

One looks for understanding and makes sense of life not merely in what has come to be thought of as sacred texts, common wisdom, or scientific thought, but also through a wide array of cultural artifacts. Rather than conformity and rationalization, the postmodernist seeks to foment diversity and change. The idea of culture itself is analyzed and debated; what society has come to think of as cultural institutions—universities, museums, national archives—are deconstructed not only for what exists in them, but what does not. How such organizations have been organized, by whom, and for what purposes, becomes a key point of investigation. Areas and people that have previously been ignored become sites for analysis.

In part, these changes have come about, or have been accelerated by, the massive technological changes that are taking place in the world. Relationships with peers in other countries have become, as many as with those individuals with whom someone shares an office. How one configures the overwhelming amounts of data and information that is now available to the intellectual and to the common citizen has opened up an explosion of the way to think about what we think, how we think, and with whom we think. No longer can the academic claim to be in isolated spheres or pockets of knowledge domains.

5. The death of the nation-state

Bill Readings argued that “the University...is no longer linked to the destiny of the nation-state by virtue of its role as producer, protector and inculcator of an idea of national culture. The process of economic globalization brings with it the relative decline of the nation-state as the prime instance of the reproduction of capital around the world” (1996, p. 3). I cannot stress enough that as with modernism, such comments will always have exceptions and contradictions, but I argue here that the broad statement holds. Institutions are situated in a variety of forces and alignments that constrain some and enable others so that no organizational type functions in global synchronicity such that all universities act in a particular manner. Nevertheless, universities are becoming transnational and more bureaucratic rather than national arbiters of good taste or interests.

In this light, those who have argued for cultural canons and criticized the commodification of knowledge are reacting not only against the surface changes that are taking place in university life, but also the underlying structural changes that we are ascribing here. As noted above, if a canon of knowledge exists then a university faculty is capable of transmitting it. The discussion about the canon is more than arguing about whether author “a” should be replaced by author “b”; rather, one must acknowledge that knowledge is not autonomous and that there is no longer a subject that might incarnate the principle. Such an assumption goes to the heart of the role of the university. As Kumar asks, “If universities were only about the communication of knowledge or the transmission of imperishable values, then it is difficult to see how they could defend themselves against the charge of being expensive anachronisms” (1997, p. 28). As I discuss in the next section, one must take such concerns seriously as universities move into the next century.

Nationalism, of course, still exists. The postmodernist, however, views conflicts such as Bosnia as the dying gasps of the ethnic state rather than its resurgence. Globalization does not suggest that the state will wither away, but that it becomes more managerial. Of consequence, the university responds in fashion so that struggles over technology transfer, the rights and roles of faculty, the nature of teaching and learning become key areas for redefinition. The meaning of culture,
what counts for knowledge, and who is to be involved in the debate over such meanings is transferred from universities to a wide variety of settings; the role of the intellectual, again, is not in setting the definitions but in helping to expand the dialogues.

Implications for Comparative Higher Education

By no means do I intend to suggest that the above thumbnail sketch is a full and complete delineation of postmodernism. I have discussed post-modernism’s impact on various facets of academe elsewhere (Tierney 1993, 1997), and there are many useful texts that go into detail about the postmodern project (e.g. Best and Kellner 1991, 1997; Smith and Webster 1997). However, the points that I have raised have been done with the expectation that they might enable those of us who do comparative higher education to rethink modes of analysis and investigation that heretofore have been wedded to modernist frameworks.

Scholars such as Kelly, Altbach and Arnove, for example, have observed that “the major theoretical framework informing research in Comparative Education during the 1960s and early 1970s was that of modernization” (1982, p. 515). Reviews of comparative higher education have pointed out that the work often “provides a traditional functionalist [modernist] view of issues” (Brandi 1994; p. 159). In much of the helpful work by Rolland Paulston (Paulston 1992; Paulston and Liebman 1994) he has argued for the need to deconstruct metanarratives; he also has suggested that postmodern perspectives “definitely constitute an idea whose time has come. Their attractiveness follows in large part from the fact that they provide what long-dominant, but now fading structuralist representations leave out” (1992, p. 193). In his presidential address to the Comparative and International Education Society Val Rust observed, “Postmodernism was one of the most debated issues in the academic world during the 1980s. Yet, the discussion almost bypassed the comparative education community. I argue that postmodernism should be a central concept in our comparative education discourse” (1991, p. 610).

One might think that the various critiques and calls to action of this kind seek to discredit the work that already has been done. I wish to reiterate that the challenge I have outlined is not to seek the theoretical dominance of postmodernism, but to suggest that envisioning comparative higher education from the vantage point argued for here might enable new ways of seeing, and hence acting, in the academic world. Indeed, theoretical preeminence of any singular view of the world is antithetical to the lineaments of postmodernism I have just discussed, and is far too doctrinaire and rigid for a theoretical movement that is in its infancy and still undergoing thought, reflection, and change.

At times some suggestions that derive from postmodernism will also find agreement from those who subscribe to modernism. “Post” modernism suggests that a relationship exists between the two models. The text by Gibbons and his colleagues (1994), for example, on the new production of knowledge works from modernist premises but on occasion the authors offer suggestions (such as transdisciplinarity) which also fit the postmodern project. Indeed, Gibbons et al. make use of postmodernism in their work, but ultimately reject it because of what they see as extreme reflexivity. I am convinced, however, that postmodernism provides researchers with different issues and ways of thinking about comparative higher education. The challenge is not to drop a promising but ill-defined concept because of its lack of clarity, but rather to struggle to provide greater understanding. In what follows, I offer three of the most prominent issues that might aid in greater understanding.

1. Heterogeneity. What one means by the “university” needs a more heterogenous definition than what currently exists. Rather than investigate Western notions of knowledge and research and assume that all universities must aspire to a similar, singular goal of excellence, a postmodern framework explores multiple ways that universities might change and evolve. In part, I am suggesting that localized and regional interpretations of different facets of knowledge, rather than supra-national definitions, become organizing frameworks for comparative higher education.

Further, Zygmunt Bauman has argued that in a global marketplace universities are becoming more and more akin to businesses. In such an environment, universities, he suggests, “are obliged
to cede the right to set the norms, and perhaps most seminally the ethical norms, to its newly embraced prototype and spiritual inspiration” (1997, p. 20). Some might assume that the movement toward singular definitions of excellence based on global capital might be in keeping with postmodernism’s assertion about the decline of the nation-state. However, the critical form of postmodernism that I have discussed here calls for resisting the ever-increasing embrace of the global-state. If education is contested and up for grabs then the professorate writ large need to seek ways to provide spaces so that localized identities and cultures are enabled voice.

From this perspective, universities move toward self-definitions of what constitutes identity and away from universal frameworks (Camargo 1991). Olmedo Garcia, for example, pointed out that foreign intervention in the affairs of the University of Panama did not move intellectual activity toward culturally specific actions in concert with Panamanian ideals but instead it moved the University in the opposite direction—toward the homogenization of teaching, research and service. Garcia labels loans from the World Bank or agreements on technical assistance as examples of “sociological espionage” (1989, p. 20) insofar as such activities provide massive ideological influences on the nature of activity at the University. Obviously, neither all loans nor all offers of technical assistance are examples of conscious attempts at “espionage.” But the postmodern challenge is to study ways that difference might be encouraged and increased rather than assume that all institutions must work from universal definitions of excellence so that “one size fits all.”

In this light I support Rust’s call to “reject any claim that one way of knowing is the only legitimate way” (1991, p. 616). Instead, the postmodern challenge is to decide which approach to knowing is appropriate to specific interests and needs. Such a suggestion assumes that organizational forms will differ. Governmental regulations and calls for accountability need to allow for a variety of types and frames, rather than impose universal definitions of standardized curricula and the like. Such a premise enables analyses of why there has been a movement toward centralized regulating bodies, universal curricula standards, and evaluative measures of the professorate and higher education.

2. Engagement with the other. If universal ideas about objectivity and truth are abandoned in favor of intertextuality, relativism and hermeneutics, then feminist standpoint theory, identity politics, and multicultural frameworks are logical outgrowths. That is, postmodernists will struggle to investigate the multiple identities at work in, around, outside of, and against, the university. The postmodern world is made up of “hybrid identities and communities” to use Gomez-Pena’s term (1996) where individuals are members of multiple communities. The challenge for comparative higher education research is to understand how universities might enable their constituents to become expert in border crossing. Hybridity and the ability to cross borders—intellectual, geographic, social, cultural—is central to the postmodern debate surrounding contested notions of identity.

One might argue that these points are at cross-purposes. On the one hand I suggest that localized definitions are necessary, and on the other I imply that one needs to develop hybridity. However, I am not suggesting an assimilationist stance by encouraging standpoint theories or multiculturalism. Rather, I am pointing out the necessity in a postmodern world to deal with issues of identity and knowledge from multiple vantage points. In essence, we need to become multilingual. If knowledge is not autonomous and the singular subject has exploded into multiple identities, one might worry that the academic world becomes a Babel where no one is able to communicate with one another across difference. However, as noted above, in a world marked by accelerated technological and cultural change, one area ripe for investigation is coming to terms with the new roles demanded of universities and academics. As communication and translation become key to action in a postmodern world, the university’s ability to teach and act in hybrid manners only will increase.

3. Method and knowing. Schwartzman has observed that, “The value assumptions taken for granted in Western culture concerning the nature of education, research and organizational behavior are only a very limited subset of a much larger array of possibilities” (1985, p. 102). One way to come to terms with other subsets and possibilities is to broaden one’s methodological horizons. If realist assumptions have been shattered, then greater work and analysis must be attempted at understanding the contingent nature of all truth claims. Obviously, given the premises of postmodernism, no text, no method, is theoretically free. The method one chooses and how one undertakes research are equally value-laden choices. One does not simply “do”
research as if questions await for someone to ask them, tabula rasa. Questions have particular agendas behind them and the hand of the researcher is always present.

If I offer a specific suggestion about the doing of research, again, it is not to argue for one or another methodology. Instead, I see the need for a more robust approach to the study of comparative higher education. The choice is not whether one does quantitative research or qualitative research, but instead researchers need to tie research designs to theoretical notions about particular areas of investigation and to use the full array of research tools at one’s disposal. In general, the research methodology of comparative higher education has been more restricted than in other domains. There have been case studies, but few life histories. There have been interviews, but virtually no ethnographies. There have been armchair analyses, but no testimonios.

I also do not see a range of interviews or case studies. Rectors and faculty are interviewed, but students and non-college goers are often forgotten. State policy analysts have a voice; the poor do not. Researchers from the United States and Europe have a more powerful voice than those from the third world. If what I have suggested is to hold sway, then these kinds of imbalances will of necessity change and be reconfigured.

**Conclusion**

Bill Readings suggested that the university is a ruined institution. He wrote:

> Those ruins must not be the object of a romantic nostalgia for a lost wholeness but the site of an attempt to trans-value the fact that the University no longer inhabits a continuous history of progress, of the progressive revelation of a unifying idea. Dwelling in the ruins of the University thus means giving serious attention to the present complexity of its space, undertaking an endless work of detournement of the spaces willed to us by a history whose temporality we no longer inhabit (1996, p. 129).

One response of such an observation would be to reject it, but such a rejection would be mistaken if the premises I have outlined are correct. The changes that are upon society are taking place with such rapidity and are of such a magnitude that to assume that universities will be able to survive without considering those changes will doom academe to becoming organizational anachronisms. A second response might be to struggle to recreate what once existed. Such a reaction is how I interpret much of the conservative debates over the last generation by the likes of Allan Bloom and Dinesh D’Souza. The last gasp of modernism is the attempt to reassert authority by once again trying to define generalized notions of Truth. Again, the postmodernist will argue that such an attempt moves the professorate in a mistaken direction.

A cynical interpretation of Readings comment is simply to agree with him that the university is indeed “ruined.” Some will suggest that the reach of the global-state is so pervasive, so far-reaching, that any attempt to struggle against the powers of global capital is useless. From this perspective universities can be little more than the bureaucratic arm of a unipolar capitalist system.

However, from the oppositional form of postmodernism outlined here, I suggest that struggle is possible and that those of us in universities are able to reinvent the academy in ways that meet the challenges ahead. An understanding of the complex and culturally marked spaces that universities inhabit is a first step toward stimulating the imagination and activating change. Such a belief may not move academics forward—as if we are trying to reconstitute a linear view of progress—but it will enable colleges and universities to develop more creative ways to come to terms with the multiple definitions of knowledge and identity that heretofore have privileged some and silenced others.

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References


THE STUDENT STRIKE AT THE NATIONAL AUTONOMOUS UNIVERSITY OF MEXICO: A POLITICAL ANALYSIS

ROBERT A. RHoadS AND LILIANA MINA

In this article we explore the political tensions surfaced through the student strike at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México [UNAM]). The lengthy strike was a response to proposed tuition fees by the administration and lack of student participation in the decision-making process. Although some of the tensions described in this article have long existed at UNAM, recent efforts by the Mexican government to link higher education more closely to the nation’s economic development interests has heightened conflict between what may be described as social justice versus market-driven political and economic sentiments. By social justice sentiments, we refer to long-standing efforts to remedy economic inequities by promoting highly accessible and egalitarian forms of higher education. In terms of market-driven views, we refer to Mexico’s efforts to advance a global economy by promoting more selective and competitive forms of higher education. In seeking to make sense of these tensions, we call upon the work of Antonio Gramsci and of Karl Mannheim, whose writing we find useful in framing and analyzing oppositional discourses. We are also heavily indebted to Imanol Ordorika’s previous analyses of UNAM, as we seek to further arguments deriving from his work.

The issues at UNAM are complicated, and rarely are the groups or dividing lines clearly drawn. The biggest challenge we face in writing this article is simplifying matters sufficiently in order to present a coherent explanation of the dynamics and tensions; yet at the same time we must capture the incredible complexity of UNAM’s political environment. This indeed is quite the challenge. And to top it off, we are outsiders looking in, seeking desperately to avoid the colonial gaze. In our defense, in a political wilderness as complex and multifaceted as UNAM, perhaps observing “the forest” from a distance has its advantages.

The growing impetus for Mexico to open its markets and become a significant player in the global economy has added to the political tension that has long undergirded its national politics. The rebellion by the Zapatistas in Chiapas is but one example of the conflict between local economic and sovereignty concerns versus more market-driven, corporate efforts to globalize Mexico’s economy. To groups such as the Zapatistas, Mexico’s step into the global marketplace, most evident by its participation in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), has produced little or no return for the vast majority of citizens who continue to be decimated by poverty. Additionally, powerful international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), along with corporations based primarily in the United States, have increasingly come to influence national policy in Mexico as “Amerization” takes a deeper hold on the country’s economy. While many of these Western-based organizations influence national economic policies in developing countries such as Mexico, accountability is minimal if existent at all. For example, the IMF has long demanded that the Mexican government reduce subsidies to public universities such as UNAM. These economic and political forces have major implications for public higher education in Mexico, as the case of UNAM reveals.
A central aspect of the complex political and economic dynamics at UNAM is rooted in debates about Mexico’s strategic initiatives relative to globalization. This is true for the political economies of other Latin American universities as well. The trend throughout the region is toward the privatization of higher education, evidenced by decreased state funding and increased rhetoric and policy changes linked to market-driven views. Correspondingly, the following strategies are being implemented to varying degrees: more restrictive and competitive admission standards organized around formalized evaluation; new or increased tuition payments; the reduction or elimination of marginal programs, especially those less likely to serve the needs of business and industry; and procedures to ensure expedient student progress. All or a combination of these strategies are seen as necessary to boost the university’s role in promoting economic transnationalism.

Mexico’s commitment to globalization and market-driven economics reflects the dominant political discourse and was a central policy of the ruling party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), led by Mexico’s former president, Ernesto Zedillo, and the Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN), which through the leadership of Vicente Fox ousted the PRI in the summer of 2000. But the discourse of globalization has generated much resistance. Antiglobalization and proautonomy rhetoric characterized the student strikers at UNAM during the 1999–2000 academic year as they cited Mexico’s Constitution and held to a belief in its historic commitment to education as a social institution.

Our knowledge of UNAM derives from four primary sources. First, during the 1999–2000 academic year we participated in a listserv centered in Mexico City and created specifically to discuss issues surrounding the strike. Second, through our participation in the strike listserv we were able to administer a short, open-ended survey that was completed by 77 respondents. A third source of data derives from a site visit conducted in January 2000. Finally, a fourth data source is represented by a variety of documents and publications, including letters and opinion pieces written by UNAM faculty and students, newspaper and periodical coverage, and official proclamations released by the UNAM administration.

La Máxima Casa de Estudios

The National Autonomous University of Mexico has over 250,000 students and is the largest university in North America. It is a multiuniversity in the truest sense, with satellite campuses throughout Mexico. Estimates suggest that as much as 30 percent of all university research is conducted at UNAM. The university receives roughly 90 percent of its budget from the government and is generally regarded as Mexico’s preeminent university, as well as la máxima casa de estudios (the nation’s university). An important development that contributed to the strike is that for the fiscal year 1999 the university was forced to cut its budget by 30 percent. The budget cuts reflected a decrease in support from the federal government said to be caused by falling oil prices. The administration saw budgetary constraints as a legitimate rationale for charging tuition, although student strikers tended to see such issues as excuses for implementing a market-driven concept of tuition in which low-income students would effectively be blocked from participation in higher education.

As it exists today, UNAM was established in 1910 through the initiative of Justo Sierra, minister of public education. At the heart of the institution’s structure was the principle of university autonomy. As Ordorika notes in his extended political analysis of UNAM, “With historical variations, the government granted UNAM an autonomous statute; the legal rights to administer its resources, make academic decisions, and appoint university authorities.” Sierra believed that while the university should be funded by the government, at the same time it must be self-governing and independent of the government. Sierra’s vision was not implemented until 1929, when the university charter was passed by the government, granting UNAM partial autonomy. This autonomy was strengthened in 1945 with the passage of the Charter of the National University, which recognized the public and national responsibilities of the university and established the government’s formal role in funding it. Finally, in 1980 an amendment was added to Article 3 of Mexico’s Constitution guaranteeing university autonomy, which was seen to include self-governance, academic freedom, and free examination and discussion of ideas.
Another facet of UNAM’s institutional identity relates to the fact that free education is seen as a fundamental gain of the Mexican revolution. In fact, the revised Constitution restricts the institution of fees and tuition charges for public education. While much debate exists as to whether the free education doctrine is to include higher education, UNAM has embraced for years a policy that charges virtually no fee for enrollment (the equivalent of a 2-cent charge has been in place for years). To many students, free education at UNAM is fundamental to its identity as la máxima casa de estudios. Attempts at UNAM in 1986 and 1992 to adopt tuition fees met steep student resistance, and in each case the administration failed.9

Historically, UNAM has played a central role in the larger landscape that is Mexican society and culture. This fact cannot be understated in analyzing issues surrounding the strike and the importance student strikers placed on preserving access to UNAM. Related to its role as a source of cultural and historical significance is the broad curriculum available to students at UNAM. As one student explained, “The University is the major center of professional preparation, of research, of education, and of culture for the country.” And a second student added, “The University is the cradle of culture for the country, and the largest university in Latin America, and because it is la máxima casa de estudios everything is related to national issues.”

Students expressed the belief that UNAM offers critical economic and cultural opportunities for the masses, the vast majority of whom cannot afford tuition payments. Thus, at the heart of the conflict at UNAM were issues related to access and contested views regarding the role of la máxima casa de estudios. The student strikers supported the position that UNAM should be tuition free and accessible to students from the lowest income groups throughout Mexican society. Their position is based on Article 3 of the Mexican Constitution. One student elaborated on this position: “All the conditions of the strikers, the defense of autonomy, the defense of democratic education, conform to Article 3 of the Mexican Constitution.” A second student stated, “We fight so that the government will not charge for schooling. We have participated in all the movements that call for payment in any public schools. It is unconstitutional to charge.” A third student supported similar views and in the process pointed a finger at the media for its negative portrayal of the student strikers: “The media obviously omits a lot of things. They make the students look like villains for ‘kidnapping’ the University, but let’s not forget how our ‘intelligent’ government from the very beginning began to cut back funding for the public universities so that they could pay the bankers. There is no doubt that this is a national issue, and that the students have to pay a price to sustain accessible schools. The fact is that this is a country where the majority of the people are poor and cannot pay.”

Over the years, debates over the principle of autonomy and definitions of access have been at the heart of major clashes between students and university and governmental officials. However, the most significant protest in UNAM’s history concerned governmental policies and took place prior to the 1968 Olympics hosted in Mexico City.10 The protests of 1968 revolved around student concerns about oppressive political practices at the national and city level. Demonstrations at la Plaza de Tres Culturas in the Tlatelolco section of Mexico City culminated with military and police units firing on a crowd of roughly 5,000 protesters. Although the government never released an accurate count of the killings of October 2, most estimates suggest that 300–400 protesters were shot and killed.11

With complex historical antecedents, the demonstrations during the academic years 1998–99 and 1999–2000 reflect the latest in a series of major student protests over tuition charges, access, and student participation in university governance. For example, in 1987 students at UNAM fought administrative efforts to implement entrance exams. As part of a market-driven philosophy, the administration wanted to replace a highly accessible admissions process with a more selective, competitive process. But the administration underestimated student commitment to UNAM’s egalitarian mission and were surprised by massive demonstrations that effectively overturned their efforts (a decade later the administration moved again to implement more formalized admission procedures, including standardized tests).

The most recent student strike was launched in the spring of 1999 and came as a consequence of efforts by the administration to implement tuition fees.12 The strike grew long and complicated, with charges and counter-charges coming from the many groups engaged in deliberations. It is impossible for us to describe all the key events, subplots, and diverse constituents involved in one.
form or another. Instead, we offer a brief summary of some key events in order to offer a general sense of the strike.

La Huelga Sin Fin

On April 20, 1999, students and their supporters took over many of the faculties and schools constituting the large and complex university system that is UNAM. The takeover came after the administration, led by UNAM’s rector, Francisco Barnés de Castro, announced the General Regulation of Payment in which tuition would be required of all students. The tuition payment amounted to roughly U.S. $90 per semester and came on the heels of the government’s announcement that UNAM’s budget would be cut by U.S. $30 million. Students also were angry that the final decision announced by the university council had been made at an off-campus meeting to which student representatives did not have access. As one student explained, “The strike started because the administration acted anti-democratically. In short, they did not consult with the university community. Barnés did not care if we were in agreement with the increase. Many times it was requested of him to meet so that a dialogue could take place or alternatives or propositions could be offered to UNAM.”

The students organized a governing body to lead the strike—the General Council of the Strike (Consejo General de Huelga, or CGH). Two political groups dominated CGH: moderates and leftists (termed “ultras” by the media). The moderates or moderados (also considered “progressives”) tended to be aligned with the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) and other progressive political organizations such as the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN). Many of these students identified as part of el cardenismo, a movement supporting social and economic reform and the PRD presidential candidate Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (the PRD, along with the conservative Partido de Acción Nacional [PAN], were the leading opposition parties to the long-standing and ruling PRI at the time of the strike). The Leftists tended to be removed from mainstream electoral politics, and students were affiliated with a variety of groups, including Unión Revolucionario Emiliano Zapata, Frente Popular Francisco Villa, Movimiento Proletario Independiente, and the Trotskyist Juventud Socialista.

Along with various political organizations represented on the CGH, a variety of structural divisions within the complex UNAM system were also represented. For example, different colleges had their own student groups, including the Colleges of Veterinary Medicine and Zootechnology, Engineering, Medicine, and Sciences and Humanities, not to mention a large delegation of representatives from external colleges and institutions affiliated with UNAM known as extrauniversitarios, including the National Institute of Cardiology. Representation of the various schools alone accounted for 120 student delegates (delegados de escuelas) on the CGH.

In addition to groups having formal representation on CGH, there also were a number of loosely organized student and nonstudent groups based on informal designations, such as the “women in white,” a group of faculty women from the College of Sciences and Humanities, and the “eight emeriti” (los ocho eméritos), composed of eight retired faculty held in high regard by the university community. These groups to varying degrees found ways to influence the complex debates at UNAM. For example, los ocho eméritos specifically are noteworthy for the strong proposal put forth midway through the strike. Their proposal basically consisted of suspending the regulation of payment until university-wide forums could look into fundamental problems at UNAM. The university-wide forums also would include a review of UNAM’s 1997 reforms concerning formal entrance examinations and the university’s relationship with CENEVAL, the National Center for Evaluation. Despite the support of a large body of UNAM faculty, not to mention distinguished writers such as Carlos Fuentes, the proposal was rejected by the far left of the student movement for failing to meet their demands.

The original demands of the student movement were released by the CGH shortly after the takeover of the university and are contained in the following six points: (1) revocation of the General Regulation of Payment and annulment of all types of costs for registration, paperwork, services, equipment, and materials; (2) revocation of all the 1997 reforms on registration and exams (this included the elimination of standardized exams to be used for admission purposes), with corresponding reestablishment of automatic acceptance from preparatory schools to the university and
annulment of time limits on academic continuation; (3) implementation of a democratic and resolute congress, in agreement with the lifting of the strike, and a vote by the delegates that will guarantee that the decisions of the congress will be a mandate for the university community and will be respected by the authorities; (4) dismantlement of the political apparatus of repression and political espionage and elimination of all types of acts and university sanctions by external agencies affiliated with the university, the return of the retained checks of professors who have supported the strike and refused to give classes off-campus, and annulment and discontinuance of all penal action, especially in the case of 73 student detainees; (5) adjustment of the academic calendar based on the number of days of the strike, excluding the courses held off-campus; (6) abolition of the bonds between UNAM and the National Center for Evaluations.

Student support for the strike was relatively strong at first, but in late April counterstrikers appeared on the main UNAM campus, and a small scuffle ensued. The appearance of the counterstrikers though was soon overcome by a May 12 rally to support the strike in which 100,000 protesters representing students, faculty, staff, and labor unions marched to the historic Zócalo in downtown Mexico City. In early June, Rector Barnés backed off the initial demand for tuition payments from all students and stated that only those who could afford to do so would be required to pay (it was not made clear who would make such determinations, and so student leaders balked at the offer). A few weeks later, Barnés followed his earlier decree with another stating that tuition payments would be voluntary, that strikers would be immune from university sanctions, and that the spring semester would be extended so students could complete classes.

In July, the spring semester officially ended and the administration offered to discuss demands, but only if the occupation were to end. The students rejected the administration’s offer in large part because of deep mistrust. Strike leaders, dominated more and more by the far left of the movement, stated that students had bargained before with the administration and had been betrayed. They would not make that mistake again. It was during June and July that tensions between the left and moderate wings of the student movement came to a head. The result was the eventual exclusion of los moderados from the movement. This was an important event in that any hope of a significant vanguard movement was likely lost. The growing dominance of the left in the student movement also led to the rejection of the late summer proposal from los éxitos míteros.

In September, marches in which participants demanded a settlement grew in size and number as the start of the fall semester was delayed. On November 12, Rector Barnés de Castro resigned as the strike moved into its seventh month. Soon thereafter, Xavier Cortes Rocha was named interim rector, and he vowed to continue the dialogue. A few weeks later, Juan Ramón de la Fuente was named the new rector of UNAM. Under de la Fuente’s direction, a strong proposal was put on the table in the form of a university-wide referendum. Even though 90 percent of the workers, students, and faculty voted in support of the proposal in late January, the left wing of the student movement refused to end the strike. Finally, on February 6, more than 9 months after the strike began, 2,400 federal police raided the main campus and detained more than 400 striking students (mostly from the left), putting an end to the long ordeal.

Political affiliations in many ways defined the conflicted terrain of the strike. In fact, a significant concern addressed by many students at UNAM reflected a belief that the strike and the administration’s reaction to it was more about electoral politics than deeply felt ideological principles. In the midst of the strike, one student expressed fear that the student movement was “more about politics . . . and less utopian” than he had hoped it would be. A second student, also commenting during the strike, echoed the preceding perspective: “Don’t be surprised if the conflict continues until the presidential elections, and that a whole generation is lost because of poor management at the hands of politicians. Just because a certain level of politics exists, it does not signify that it is acceptable. UNAM needs to get away from the direct influence of the government.”

Paradoxically, conservative students tended to see the university as a neutral entity and blamed moderate and left-leaning student strikers for politicizing UNAM. As one student explained, “The leftist parties entangle national problems with the university.” Some also blamed political leaders and authorities for not acting decisively: “The strike should have never started. But once it did start what was lacking was a heavy hand by authorities. Mexico’s authority is in crisis. There are no leaders. Everything is political ambition. Those in power are afraid to exercise it for fear of losing power.” And another student stated, “The important issue is the manipulation of the CGH by way of the
leftist radicals who have been cysts to the university for over thirty years. And the failure of the government at all levels to make a decision to apply the law against the strikers.”

While conservative students charged the left with politicizing the university, countercharges aimed at UNAM’s administration and the PRI came from left-, liberal-, and progressive-minded students. One student suggested complicity of Mexico’s president (at the time), Ernesto Zedillo: “The President uses the strike as a weapon to devalue the left, but he knows that a lengthy conflict can also revert back and harm the official political party.” This student alluded to the possibility that Mexico’s dominant party, the PRI, which essentially was in power from 1929 to 2000, contributed mightily to the farcical quality of Mexico’s political process over the years and could suffer damage due to its inability to end the strike. On the other hand, supporters of the PRD, a primary political challenger to the PRI since the 1988 presidential election, feared that a long, drawn-out strike might push support away from progressive PRD candidates led by Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. Indeed, Cárdenas and the PRD received modest support in the July 2000 elections, finishing a distant third in the presidential race behind the PAN and the PRI. An advisor to Cárdenas pointed out that while the PRD supported the strike at the beginning, their party’s position was that the students should have accepted the university’s proposal of late summer, when a governing congress with significant student representation was offered. In the later stages of the strike, the PRD sought to distance itself from the far-left students, who, in the end, seized control of the strike, pushed moderate and progressive students aside, and showed little interest in a negotiated conclusion. Their basic position was that they would not negotiate with a government that cannot be trusted, and therefore, they wanted a student-dominated university congress implemented immediately.

For the PRD, the problem may have been one of guilt by association, with many casual observers and political operatives likely associating the radical left wing of the student movement (the “ultras”) with progressive-minded PRDs (the cardenistas). Thus, when the far-left students refused to negotiate over what many observers considered a reasonable proposal, sentiment shifted even more from the students and the PRD to conservatives associated with PRI. This led to more than a few observers questioning the motivation of the student leaders, possibly giving the PRD a black eye in the process.

In addition to the importance of party politics, political concerns linked to the nature and importance of institutional and national autonomy defined major elements of the strike. This is especially relevant to how the strike was ended, when students were forcibly removed by los federales. This, as a former rector, Barrios Sierra, argued back in 1968, may violate the autonomy of UNAM. As one student explained, “What a terrible habit of the Mexican people, a nation without a historical memory. One that forgets the declaration of its politicians.... Dr. Zedillo’s promises always declared that he would never use force. He has forgotten.”

Issues of institutional and national autonomy surfaced in a variety of contexts. For example, there existed a compelling fear among left and progressive students that the country’s commitment to globalization posed a challenge to UNAM’s autonomy and accessibility. For example, a vital concern of the strikers was the increasing commitment of Mexico to market-driven forces that are pulling the country and institutions such as UNAM toward privatization. As one student explained: “Everyone thinks that this is a problem between the authorities and the students, but it is not like that. This is not only a national problem but an international problem. The imperialist politics that have been planted in Mexico and abroad have driven privatization not only in education but in all public sectors. For the most part, and in the near future, all that is the common people or nation will no longer be. We will be in foreign hands, the hands of the United States.” The preceding student’s sentiments are captured in a political cartoon published in a special strike issue of the Mexican political magazine Proceso. The cartoon depicts Uncle Sam as a puppeteering devil standing over UNAM’s former rector, Francisco Barnés, controlling his behavior to suit the interests of the United States.

Perhaps the biggest challenge in framing this article is capturing the incredible political diversity within the student body at UNAM. Not only were the strikers torn over a wide range of complex and deeply rooted political and ideological positions (the most notable being the tension between the far left and the moderates), but students in general revealed deeply divided views on the strike. Additionally, the length of the strike brought about an ebb and flow of emotions and attitudes toward the strikers and their issues. A number of students expressed deep confusion and
bitterness as the strike lingered on indefinitely. For example, the following student addressed some of these feelings during the latter days of the strike: “I don’t know what to think anymore. So much time has been lost. The strike was due to the student fees which don’t exist now. All that the strikers wanted has been given to them, and to the detriment of UNAM.” Another student also commented near the end of the strike: “The strike is affecting my life plans, because it does not permit me to continue my studies. And it affects me because I love UNAM, and to see the conditions that UNAM is currently under hurts very much.”

Clearly, conservative students and even some moderates tended to resent the strikers for sidetracking their educational careers. Many of these students did not see the movement’s concerns as legitimate issues for shaping UNAM’s future. As one student explained, “The University is a public institution, financed by the country and for that reason it must respond to the necessities of the country and not particularly to the students.” Student strikers, however, were quick to point out that they “represent” the country as much as if not more than other constituencies within the broader society. Their goal was not to tear down the university, but to build a stronger, more democratic institution in which students have a significant voice in determining policy. Although arguably unsuccessful, the student strikers sought to institutionalize their movement by gaining voice and influence at UNAM. One student in particular spoke to the issues raised here: “We are students, not delinquents. We also want to study. No one wanted the strike. But understand that this has been a recourse to pressure the authorities. We want a university for everyone, for the people, not just for a certain sector of the population.” In this respect, the student movement sought to hegemonize a more democratic vision of UNAM.

Considering the Work of Gramsci and Mannheim

The conflict at UNAM may be examined through a Gramscian lens in which the success of the students was contingent upon their effort to build an alternative hegemonic movement around a social justice vision of higher education. Here it is important to understand Gramsci’s notion of hegemony as having both cultural and political components and involving both political and civil institutions in the promotion and enforcement of social and cultural norms. Hegemony is not simply the deployment of political organizations to gain dominance in a particular society. Hegemony also rests on social and cultural institutions—civil society—adding to the weight of political force by advancing cultural domination. Thus, building a counter-hegemonic movement—an alternative hegemony—involves advancing a cultural and ideological struggle that challenges the informal and institutionalized forms of oppression exercised by dominant groups.

From Gramscian perspective, a key to an alternative hegemonic movement is intellectual and moral leadership concerned with cultural transformation. Cultural change, then, is seen as a necessary step in building a movement capable of overturning dominant ideologies and groups. And although domination of some form is inescapable, in an alternative hegemonic movement subordinate and subaltern sectors are included in such a way that individuals participating in these sectors know that they are integral to the general project. The key here is that there must be important features of a project that subaltern groups share. For example, the belief that everybody who gets an education and works hard can share in the wealth of a society is a commonly held notion by dominant and subaltern groups. As it is shared by the vast majority, subaltern groups are willing to accept a degree of domination, because, in a sense, they are part of the dominating project.

In Gramscian terms, the student strikers may be understood as a subaltern group. Their struggle was in opposition to the domination presented by UNAM’s administration, which clearly was an extension of Mexico’s national governance structure led by the PRI and reflective of the state’s use of education to promote its political agenda. A Gramscian analysis suggests that the student movement have as its goal the creation of a unified opposition capable of challenging the domination of UNAM. Only through the successful emergence of an alternative hegemonic movement would the students be able to break their domination at the hands of the administration and the PRI. As Gramsci wrote, “Subaltern groups are always subject to the activity of ruling groups, even when they rebel and rise: only permanent victory breaks their subordination, and that not immediately.” Clearly, from a Gramscian perspective, understanding the relationship between the student strikers and domination associated with the administration and government is key.
It is important to note that in defining the student strikers as a subaltern group we not only argue from a strict economic, class-based, Gramscian analysis of oppositional movements, but also incorporate understandings of their marginality as students. Although certainly many of the student strikers derive from lower and working classes within Mexican society and are likely to embrace such identities as part of their participation in the movement, just as certainly many others are the children of the privileged. Consequently, our definition of the student strikers as a subaltern group combines their class status with their marginalized status as students. We base such a judgment on long-standing social science evidence supporting an analysis of college and university students as marginalized members of larger academic communities. For example, an extensive body of research on student movements in the United States during the 1960s as well as more recent research on student activism in the 1990s offers much support for such an argument.

To understand the nature of domination faced by the student strikers at UNAM, we find it necessary to explore the relationship between university reform and the Mexican state. Let us begin with a discussion of Carlos Ornelas and David Post’s differentiation of “populism” and “modernism.” According to Ornelas and Post, modernist reforms seek “to rationalize universities, making their allocation of graduates in the labor force more efficient. A university that is sensitive to the economy’s need for particular skills signals those needs by passing on the relative costs of different academic programs to students.” They go on to argue that modernist reforms “aim to decrease student subsidies in public universities, or at least to concentrate subsidies in socially more productive fields such as engineering and medicine.” The modernist assumption is that “social benefits from the university are maximized when its resources are competitively allocated to individuals based on their particular merit and capability.”

A populist ideology, which Ornelas and Post argue is rooted in liberal individualist ideals, seeks broader social change through university reform and sees social stratification as a key concern. They claim that “the primary goal of students and professors who embrace populist reform is to gain political power. As intermediate objectives, populist reformers attempt to win the lowest possible tuition for students, as well as the most open possible admissions to the institution for part-time as well as full-time students.” Populist reformers tend to see the university as the center of Mexican culture, situating Mexican elites as the gatekeepers of culture and power because of their role in controlling the universities. Opening up the universities to the masses is seen as a way of sharing power and providing service to the broader society.

Although Ornelas and Post shed light on the complexities of higher education reform in Mexico, the philosophical stance of populism fails to capture the dramatic challenge and ideological position of UNAM’s student strikers, especially those centering the strike—the moderates. To be more clear, many of the leaders in the student movement were aligned ideologically with progressive and left views of society and social structure. They represented a rejection of liberal and neoliberal views of university reform, although they agreed with the populist sentiment of expanding educational opportunity and increasing social mobility for the poor. Their calls to action and demands for democratic restructuring of the university bear little resemblance to liberal appeals to hone the system by working through existing institutional structures. Indeed, the student movement reflected radical sentiment that may be understood as a social justice position, challenging the liberal individualism of populism and seeking to build a counter-hegemonic project capable of reversing market-driven initiatives of the ruling powers.

Ornelas and Post, in their discussion of the “modernist” position, provide insight into the market-driven accountability of the current government. This movement has been described by Levy as the “new accountability.” It reflects Mexico’s growing interest in global markets and addresses the market-driven project pursued most vigorously following the 1988 election of PRI presidential candidate Carlos Salinas de Gortari: “Salinas has pressed for a new political-development model, including less national government involvement in the economy and higher education. He has repeatedly made the point that Mexico has to improve its education at all levels and in particular reform its traditional policies for public higher education.” The higher education reforms that Levy notes include fixing the following problems: easy entry to the universities, soft studies with few examinations, free tuition, and excessive public employment for faculty (most faculty teach as adjuncts and work at other jobs). Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon (Salinas’s successor, elected in 1994) continued to follow the path laid by Salinas, using his position as part of a campaign to solidify the
PRI, which only in recent elections faced the possibility of losing power, finally being ousted in the summer of 2000 by the PAN and Vicente Fox. A comment from Gramsci seems particularly insightful here: “The more the immediate economic life of a nation is subordinated to international relations, the more a particular party will come to represent this situation and to exploit it, with the aim of preventing rival parties gaining the upper hand.” This certainly appears to be the case in Mexico, where the struggle between the administration and the student strikers also signified a struggle between rival political parties, the powerful PRI versus the emergent PRD (ironically, in the end the student strike may have cost both parties’ votes to the PAN).

University reform efforts led by student progressives affiliated with the PRD as well as far-left groups represent something more complex than the “liberal individualist ideals” designed to “gain political power,” as described by Ornelas and Post in their discussion of populism. Certainly, power is important in the case of the student strike. But, power in their case seems to be a means to an end. It is the end—social justice through democratic decision-making bodies and educational opportunity for the poor—that defines the alternative hegemonic project at the center of the student movement. The failure of the students to achieve political and cultural transformation reflects not so much an assault on Gramscian thought as it does the shortcomings of the student coalition, most specifically, the major fracture between the left and moderate wings.

The social justice position is most evident in the strikers’ defense of Article 3 of the Mexican Constitution addressing free public education. The beginning text of Article 3 reads as follows: “Every individual has the right to receive education. The State—Federation, States, and Municipalities—will provide preschool, primary, and secondary education. Primary and secondary are compulsory.” And later, under Article 3, Section IV, the Constitution reads: “All education that the State provides will be free of charge.” And then in Section V, still under Article 3, it reads: “Besides providing preschool, primary, and secondary education, the State will promote and assist in all types and means of education, including higher education necessary for the development of the Nation.” Interestingly, Article 3 of the Constitution also calls for education to be democratic. Furthermore: It [education] shall be democratic, considering democracy not only a judicial structure and a political regimen, but also a system of life based on the constant economic, social, and cultural betterment of the people.” A commitment to the Constitution’s defense of free public education, largely the result of the Mexican Revolution, is poignantly captured in one of the protestor’s slogans, claiming that “Zapata fought so we could study,” a reference to the insurgent efforts of Emiliano Zapata to forge a new Mexican Revolution, is poignantly captured in one of the protestor’s slogans, claiming that “Zapata fought so we could study,” a reference to the insurgent efforts of Emiliano Zapata to forge a new Mexico during the revolutionary struggles of 1910–20.

In many ways, social justice versus market-driven mentalities reflect underlying sentiments linked to democratic versus instrumental decision-making processes. In their discussion of schooling and the democratic state, Martin Carnoy and Henry Levin note that issues linked to equality (democratic issues) are often pitted against concerns for increased efficiency (instrumental issues). Although democratic views openly acknowledge a particular political position—a democratic one—strategies rooted in instrumentalism tend to deny political realities and situate organizational and social problems as informational problems. From such a perspective, if the proper amount of information or the correct ordering of facts can be achieved, then a clear decision will derive from the analysis. Thus, problems of ideology and politics get ignored as antidemocratic processes involving powerful organizational decision makers guide an instrumentally evaluated and bureaucratically delivered decision, masked as apolitical and ideologically neutral. But, of course, the decision is rooted in bureaucratic conservatism, where ideology often exists beneath the surface. As Mannheim argued, “The fundamental tendency of all bureaucratic thought is to turn all problems of politics into problems of administration.” This is the primary form that domination takes in the case of the relationship between the administration and the student strikers at UNAM.

For Mannheim, the very nature of ideology is rooted in politics and must be understood in terms of the sociohistoric forces at work in a given society at a particular time. “We must realize once and for all that the meanings which make up our world are simply an historically determined and continuously developing structure in which man develops, and are in no sense absolute.” Along these lines, Gramsci argues that “everyone is a philosopher” and asks whether it is “better to ‘think’, without having a critical awareness, in a disjointed and episodic way? . . . Or, on the other hand, is it better to work out consciously and critically one’s own conception of the world . . . choose one’s sphere of activity, take an active part in the creation of the history of the world.” In either case,
Gramsci adds, we are all products of “some conformism or other, always man-in-the-mass or collective man. The question is this: of what historical type is the conformism, the mass humanity to which one belongs?” In the case of UNAM, the strikers, in part, were trying to bring Mexico into historical focus by challenging the underlying ideology of the Zedillo administration, namely, its views of economic expansion and the role of accessible higher education.

A central theoretical concern of this project was to make sense of the strategies student strikers employed as a means to advance a cultural and political project centered on issues of social justice, and how, as part of their project, they incorporated subordinate sectors of the student movement. And, of course, a central point of our analysis must contend with whether the student movement came up short, or whether indeed Gramsci’s notion of oppositional movements is theoretically lacking.

Although the university administration and the PRI were unable to forge a successful hegemonic movement around a market-driven view of higher education, as evidenced by the strike and its support among students, by the same token, the student movement failed as well. The UNAM student strikers saw the educational policies of Mexico as a product still in the making. Their strike was an effort to fundamentally shape such processes through whatever political and cultural opposition they could create as part of a resistance strategy. They clearly had an ideological position—this they did not deny. But they also recognized that the forces against which they struggled were also ideologically rooted. For them, globalization is given meaning in Mexico through an ideology firmly grounded in a market-driven mentality largely driven by the wealthiest Western countries and Japan.

Despite their strong ideological commitments, the student strikers failed to account for subaltern groups on the margins of their own movement. In the power struggle played out between the left and more moderate student forces, the possibility of forging an alternative hegemonic movement was severely hurt. The inability of the strikers to build a powerful and cohesive movement was reflected in the division and discontent within both the student movement and the general student body. In the end, the left’s lack of trust of the university administration, the PRI, and their fellow moderate strikers was too much to overcome as their ideologically based resistance became more uncompromising. Potential seemed to exist in the beginning, but as the strike dragged on and as sentiment shifted, any chance of forging a movement capable of successfully challenging the administration was lost.

Leadership was lacking at key levels within the student movement. Exclusionary decisions by far-left students that in the end chased moderate and progressive allies out of the movement revealed either a case of political naiveté, nihilism, or both. One explanation offered for the leadership vacuum was the fact that many experienced student leaders did not play key roles in the strike simply because they were involved in the political campaign for presidential candidate Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. The loss of veteran student leaders to the Cárdenas campaign is as good of an explanation as any for the weak decision making that led to the defeat at the hands of the administration.

From the perspective of the student strikers, it was somewhat disheartening that so little was accomplished when so much seemed possible. In the end, a movement with the potential to be a vanguard for democratic reform in higher education fizzled beneath the weight of in-fighting, immaturity, and inexperience. For the administration, the opportunity to claim victory, however temporary, fell at their feet as public sentiment, with the aid of massive media support, shifted to their favor. And so as left and progressive students lost a chance to forge a possible hegemonic movement, they may have done significant damage to the PRD in the process, a notion borne out by the subsequent election of PAN leader Vicente Fox and only moderate to weak support for Cárdenas. With the ability of the administration and the PRI to reclaim UNAM in the spirit of bureaucratic control and a market-driven mentality, democracy and social justice in Mexico may have taken a hit in the process.

**Conclusion**

Underlying social justice and market-driven perspectives are fundamental convictions about the nature and role of UNAM. On the one hand, student strikers believed that UNAM ought to serve the poorest of the society by offering accessible education and opportunities for social mobility. In
arguing from a social justice position, they tended to point to massive economic inequities throughout the larger society. This group saw the government’s reduction of UNAM’s 1999 budget and the administration’s subsequent decision to raise tuition as abandoning the responsibility of the state to provide free and accessible higher education. On the other hand, government and administrative officials, as well as a significant block of students, saw the university faced with economic exigencies that demanded greater accountability and a shift toward increased privatization. Funding cuts from the government were seen as unavoidable and necessary, the result of Mexico seeking to expand its competitive role in the world economy. For this group, a move toward privatization of higher education encourages the kind of entrepreneurial spirit needed to compete in a global economy.

The actions of students at UNAM may be understood as an attempt to forge a specific vision of Mexico and its policies toward higher education. The students saw the issues at a critical juncture in the political and cultural trajectory of Mexico as a state. They viewed the forces of globalization and the growing influence of market-driven decision making as bureaucratic threats to democratization, which, in their minds, is expressed through open access to higher education and opportunities for social mobility. In this regard, the goal of the strikers was to create a movement in which social justice issues took precedence over bureaucratic instrumentality.

The administration reflected the global commitments of former President Zedillo and the PRI (and the PAN as well). They saw reliance on market forces as part of the expansion of Mexico’s commitment to global capitalism. While neoconservatives tend to view capitalism itself as a democratic form, the realities of UNAM may situate the university as a fading open-access organization in a global Darwinian play whereby the most financially solvent institutions survive (usually those with governmental support, i.e., banks and corporations). The rest drop by the wayside, much like the dinosaurs of the prehistoric period. Such thinking reflects the “Soberonian saga” Ordorika describes in his analysis of UNAM, when he detailed the role former rector Guillermo Soberon (1973–80) played in strengthening a conservative administrative stronghold by investing more money in particular structures and departments at UNAM. As Ordorika explains, “This discourse served the conservative groups perfectly. The new formation argued that politics had no place in an academic institution. Politics were condemned as a negative and anti-university practice.” Such an ideology took root despite the fact that the vast majority of key administrative appointments went to members of the PRI and were clearly political.

Adding to the ideological tension is the historic mission of UNAM, rooted in a social justice view of higher education. To impose a market-driven schema on such a long-standing and widely embraced philosophy is to refashion its historic identity. If such a decision is to be considered, then it ought to be confirmed or rejected democratically through open political debate and not simply accomplished through executive fiat, which, as the strike suggested, is unlikely to work. In the process of acting unilaterally, it is hardly surprising that subaltern groups rejected the domination of the PRI and what they saw as its autocratic administrative arm embodied by the official leaders of UNAM. Clearly, the present administration has failed to build a hegemonic movement around a market-driven philosophy.

In many ways, the problems at UNAM offer a microview of the larger landscape of Mexican higher education and its changing economy. The work of Rollin Kent is most helpful here in that he has identified two key stances influencing Mexico’s efforts to modernize: “uncritical adoption of a modernistic educational discourse sometimes linked to technological messianism [and] currents of resistance that express fear of the destruction of historically ingrained popular forms of sociability by intense modernization.” Kent suggests that reconciling these tensions is one of Mexico’s biggest challenges: “Higher education institutions are enveloped by tensions among various cultural forms which need to find a means to express and resolve themselves. The dispute over educational values will surely continue, as educators are faced with the double goal of providing a good basic education for everyone and simultaneously developing a sophisticated system of higher education that is needed to support international economic competitiveness and cultural integration.” Given Kent’s advice, and our own finding that the tension between market-driven philosophies versus social justice perspectives is so much a part of Mexico’s cultural landscape, organizations such as the IMF and World Bank would be wise to include such points in analyses of economic options for Mexico. It seems fairly self-evident that in a country where over one-fourth of the
population lives under conditions of severe poverty, denying access to higher education is more likely to lead to destabilization at the cost of dollars saved toward education. As Attilio Boron and Carlos Torres argue in their analysis of education in Latin America, high poverty rates confound neoliberal restructuring, because citizens are denied “access to the minimal levels of social welfare that are in some cases . . . constitutionally guaranteed both in the spirit and in the letter of the law.” 40 This is certainly the case at UNAM where the spirit of open access prevails among so many low-income students.

Notes
3. Ordorika, “Reform at Mexico’s National Autonomous University,” and “Power, Politics, and Change in Higher Education.”
8. Ibid.
9. Ordorika, “Reform at Mexico’s National Autonomous University.”
13. We borrow the title for this section (“The Strike without End”) from a special issue of the Mexican political magazine Proceso.
19. We are deeply indebted to the theoretical analysis of UNAM put forth by Imanol Ordorika in his dissertation “Power, Politics, and Change in Higher Education” (n. 1 above). Additionally, we are grateful to have had the benefit of personal and professional conversations with Ordorika through which we gained insight into the application of Gramsci’s work to the political struggle at UNAM.


24. Ibid., p. 279.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.


29. Ibid., p. 28.


33. Ibid., p. 85.

34. Gramsci (n. 2 above), p. 323.

35. Ibid., p. 324.

36. Ordorika, “Reform at Mexico’s National Autonomous University” (n. 1 above).

37. Ibid., p. 414.


39. Ibid.

TALKING OF STUDENTS: TENSIONS AND CONTRADICTIONS FOR THE MANAGER-ACADEMIC AND THE UNIVERSITY IN CONTEMPORARY HIGHER EDUCATION

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Abstract

The paper examines data on references to students made by manager-academics in 16 UK universities whilst giving accounts of their careers and practices, and reflecting on aspects of the current roles and priorities of higher education institutions. The issues raised are of wider interest than the UK, since the contradictory pressures of teaching and research and learning versus seeking new sources of funding are common to higher education in many countries. The focus and methodology of the Economic and Social Research Council funded project on which the paper is based are outlined, before discussing how the theoretical interests of the project relate to the student, the ways in which the student is a significant aspect of current higher education policies, and the contested status and identity of the student in higher education discourse and research. The changing nature of the student population, the relationship between manager-academics’ concerns with the student and their institutional context, their major preoccupations in their roles, and how these preoccupations relate to level of seniority in management are also considered. We conclude that whilst current UK higher education policy emphasises the student, responses at institutional and individual levels focus on organisational, resource and time implications of the student body, rather than the student him/herself. Furthermore, it is noted that senior manager-academics roles tend to remove their incumbents from contact with students. It is suggested that manager-academics need both more contact with students and more understanding of their situation and concerns.

Keywords: higher education policy, higher education research, institutional change, the student experience of higher education, university management, university students, widening participation.
Introduction

The paper examines data on references to students made by manager-academics in sixteen UK pre and post-1992 universities, whilst giving accounts of their careers and practices, and reflecting on aspects of the contemporary purposes and priorities of higher education institutions. The data illuminate some of the competing pressures facing academic institutions in the twenty-first century and show the dilemmas faced by academics in management roles in universities with different kinds of missions, some focused mainly on research and others more teaching-centred. Though the data are drawn from UK higher education, issues about the purposes of contemporary universities and their managers, the search for new sources of funding to replace shrinking state support, and the diversification of academic work into entrepreneurial activities as aspects of research and teaching, are common to higher education in a number of different countries (Slaughter and Leslie 1997; Clark 1998; Marginson and Considine 2000; Brooks and Mackinnon 2001). Students, teaching, learning and assessment remain core elements of most university systems and academic work. Nevertheless, shifts from elite to mass higher education, international markets for students, the establishment of external and internal quality assurance systems, the development of new technologies for distance as well as face-to-face teaching and intensified competition between universities and other knowledge-intensive organisations in the knowledge economy, are affecting the work done by academics as well as the management and cultures of their organisations (Altbach 1996; Fulton 1998; Shah and Brennan 2000; Smith 2000; Enders 2001b).

In the early sections of the paper we outline the focus and methodology of the project on which the paper is based and also examine its theoretical framework and how this might relate to the ways in which the manager-academics interviewed talk about students. Then we examine the changing nature of the student population, the relationship between manager-academics’ concerns with the student and their institutional context (noting that different types of university may attach differential importance to students, learning and teaching), their major preoccupations in their roles, and how these preoccupations relate to level of seniority in management. We return then to models of new managerialism and discuss how these relate to or are distant from serious consideration of the student. Finally, we conclude that whilst UK higher education policy now heavily emphasises the student, our data, both at institutional and individual level, and especially that from respondents in the pre-1992 research-led universities, focus on the organisational, resources and time implications of the student body, rather than the student him/herself. This tendency was somewhat less marked in the post-1992 former polytechnics that tend to see their mission as being more teaching and student-focused. The analysis highlights the centrality of management to the organisation of UK universities, suggests that management is mediated by complex processes and contexts of universities as organisations, and notes that senior manager-academics roles tend to remove them from daily contact with students. The analysis supports a continued need for research into the lives and experiences of students in contemporary higher education institutions, so that both researchers and manager-academics are better informed and also suggests that senior manager-academics need to spend more time with and listening to students.

The ‘New Managerialism and UK Universities’ Research Project

The data in this paper are drawn from an Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) funded study (grant no. R000237661) carried out between 1998 and 2000 by researchers based at Lancaster University. The project examined the extent to which ‘new managerialism’ had permeated the management of UK universities. ‘New managerialism’ refers to a set of reforms in the management and organisation of publicly funded services instigated by many western governments over the past two decades (Clarke, Cochrane et al. 1994a; Ferlie et al. 1996; Clarke and Newman 1997a; Exworthy and Halford 1999a). Theorists have noted that there are several manifestations of its existence that may become apparent in organisations; these are discussed in the next section of this paper.

The research was conducted in three phases. Phase one used twelve focus-group discussions with academics, manager-academics and senior administrators from a range of professional associations or learned societies to explore changes, directions and conditions in the management of UK universities. In phase two, we conducted semi-structured interviews with Heads of Department,
Deans, Pro-Vice Chancellors, senior administrators and the Vice Chancellor at twelve universities. The sampling strategy focused on the size, type (pre or post-92 institution), location, number of campuses and teaching/research emphases of each university, and on the subject disciplines and gender balance represented across participants. The interviews covered: background careers; selection mechanisms for management posts; training and support; work life and home life; management practices and routines; views about change; work anxieties and pleasures; attitudes towards institutional management and organisation. We also probed thoughts on issues related to gender processes within management. In phase three, four institutions were chosen for detailed case studies. These comprised a further set of interviews with manager-academics and senior administrators; analysis of documentation such as mission statements, operating statements, corporate plans and Quality Assurance Agency reports; observations of different locations and some meetings; and interviews with groups of university staff, from secretaries to librarians, estates personnel, trades unionists and technicians.

It should be noted that exploration of manager-academics’ experiences of and accounts about students was not an explicit focus of the project and this must be borne in mind when examining what was said. Nevertheless, undergraduate and postgraduate students, and their teaching, learning, assessment, organisation and support, are familiar concerns and important purposes for both the participants in our project, and their institutions. However, what is important to stress at the outset is that we do not use our data to examine individual participants’ attitudes to students. Rather, we consider that references to students are useful means of exploring current developments within higher education and the dilemmas facing academics who hold management responsibilities.

The Student, New Managerialism and the Context of UK Higher Education Policy

Governments and policy analysts claim that ‘new managerialism’ is a means to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of publicly funded services of all kinds, although research on ‘new managerialism’ has revealed that this is not necessarily so (Clarke et al. 1994a; Ferlie et al. 1996; Clarke and Newman 1997a; Exworthy and Halford 1999a) and has also suggested that new management approaches build on the old approaches. New managerialist ideologies and practices go alongside the development of new quasi-markets (Le Grand and Bartlett 1993) in which service providers compete, emphasise ‘value for money’, and use techniques and structures of management typical of organisations in the for-profit sector. The impact of greater competition between UK universities for students might be expected to result in more attention being paid to the needs of students by increasingly efficient and consumer-aware institutions and manager-academics. However, the four general variants of new managerialism identified in research on the UK health service (Ferlie et al. 1996) position the service recipient, and view their influence, in different ways.

The first model, the ‘efficiency drive’ emerged during reforms to the National Health Service in the late 1980s. Here the main emphasis is financial control and value for money—or efficiency gains—brought about by enlarged and empowered management, performance monitoring, audit and target setting, and short-term staff contracts. It is a feature of this model that management and organisational structures and mechanisms that trigger provider responsiveness to consumers by reducing professionals’ powers of self-regulation, and stimulating more entrepreneurial mindsets within tight structures of accountability to management for the achievement of set targets within cost controls. The second, the ‘downsizing and decentralisation’ model, came to prominence in the early 1990s, and questions some elements of the ‘efficiency drive’ model with an emphasis on organisational flexibility and sensitivity to the quasi-market, rather than to management plans. Decentralisation, achieved through the splitting of organisation into smaller autonomous units with devolved financial responsibility, accompanied flatter management structures, contracting, outsourcing and resource allocation as means of control. Here, responsive service provision is enabled by financial sensitivity combined with organisational capacity, in order to achieve rapid shifts in provision, with the emphasis on streamlined services.

The third or ‘excellence’ model represents the application of the human relations school of management theory to the public services (Deal and Kennedy 1981; Peters and Waterman 1982), albeit some time after it had already proved problematic within the for-profit sector. In this model, organisational cultures, values, rituals and symbols are a focus for both processes and forms of service
provision. There are two main variants: a top-down and a bottom-up approach to managing organisational development. In the former, charismatic leadership and projection of an organisational ‘vision’ accompany mission statements and communications policies in an organisation. In the bottom-up variant, senior management has no privileged role, with decentralisation, meritocracy, recognition of performance by results and a learning culture emphasised. The customer or consumer forms a major focus within both variants, as symbolic and cultural ‘glue’.

The fourth, ‘public service orientation’ model, is largely a theoretical one (Ranson and Stewart 1994). It represents attempts to combine concepts of public service mission with management techniques and ideals from the for-profit sector, such as total quality management. The consumer is understood as service-user, and is viewed on a collective, rather than individual basis. User participation and accountability are raised as legitimate concerns with emphasis on productive value for money—i.e. community development—rather than individual satisfaction. Management power is intended as a democratic process. If found in a university, the student would be an important priority, and possess rights of access to, and influence within, decision-making forums. Although students are represented on many HE committees, especially in the pre-1992 universities, this does not always equate to impact on decisions. Furthermore, as has been shown in studies of Australian universities, there is evidence from our study and elsewhere of increasing use of unaccountable and informal groups like senior management teams for streamlined decision-making. These groups are not committees and hence, have no student representation or formal accountability (Marginson and Considine 2000).

Ferlie et al. (1996) stress that any one organisation is likely to display elements characteristic of more than one of these models. As evidenced in sectors other than higher education, each model of ‘new managerialism’ represents organisations’ varied and historical management responses to changes to the economic, political and social environment across the public sector. As such, all models represent stages in the development of ‘new managerialist’ ideas, and each incorporates pre-existing management ideas. Higher education institutions in the UK enjoyed the perceived status of autonomy from the state under the conditions of a corporatist compromise and complex network of influence on the policy process; in the last 25 years, it is claimed that these have collapsed (Kogan 1988). This collapse highlights existing patterns of institutional dependency on the state, as public provider of the funds needed for their operation and results in decreased institutional influence within the policy process (Henkel 2000a).

Systems that effect greater direct control on institutions utilise the individual student, the nature of the student body, teaching and learning, course drop-out rates, students’ achievements and employment destinations as levers of control. Universities’ structures and activities are placed under scrutiny by external accountability exercises, for example via the Quality Assurance Agency’s (QAA) system of subject review for teaching quality. Quality assurance inspection outcomes have only indirect financial impact on institutions (except in Scotland) but they can affect perceived reputation and hence market value, which may in turn affect recruitment. At the same time, institutions are encouraged to diversify the student body, with special allocations of money available for recruitment from new specific, disadvantaged socio-economic sectors of the potential student population. This has already happened to an extent, with the post-1992 universities specialising more in teaching and the pre-1992 institutions having a greater focus on research, although it is arguable that the UK Research Assessment Exercise, because of its links to funding based on research quality gradings, has caused almost all universities to pay attention to research (McNay 1997; Harley and Lowe 1998; Mace 2000; Lucas 2001).

The introduction of tuition fees for UK undergraduates in the late 1990s (though subsequently Wales and Scotland have abolished these), and a rise in the number of self-funding international and part-time students has generated a dynamic within which the student becomes an individualised consumer or customer, and seeks value for money alongside powers of redress. Yet unlike organisations in the for-profit sector, universities also have a responsibility to care for their student-customers’ pastoral needs, and must allow students rights of participation in decision-making (Higher Education Quality Council 1996) as users of the service provided, rather than as temporary members of the academic community. Greater attention is now paid to students’ progression, academic success and economic achievement, but also the academic standard of provision. Whilst increased and diversified access changes the nature of those whom the academic has to teach, and
makes drop-out or failure more likely if students are not well-supported, courses and teaching must maintain levels of integrity and difficulty, despite the supposed counter-pressure of potential litigation (Middlemiss 2000) in cases of failure or drop-out.

At the same time, all emphases on the student, their teaching, learning and achievements stand in tension with simultaneous emphases on research activity and income through the Research Assessment Exercise, creating tensions which may force academics to focus on research rather than teaching (Harley and Lowe 1998; Mace 2000; Lucas 2001; Lucas 2002) or downgrade the status of those who choose to concentrate on the latter. Whereas creativity in research is rewarded, innovation in teaching is often less highly regarded and rewarded (Hannan and Silver 2000; Hannan et al. 2000), even in some of the post-1992 institutions with a higher orientation towards teaching. As the following section shows, whom the student is, the nature of the student body and the actual experiences of the student, are relatively little understood, either in research terms or by manager-academics in UK higher education. It is suggested that this may be a phenomenon characteristic of other higher education systems too.

Many studies of the changing nature of higher education have focused on policy processes and on the university relations, especially ideological and organisational factors (Bleiklie 2000). However, individual actors are also important in bringing about change, as acknowledged by studies of academic identities (Henkel 2000b) and university chief executives (Bargh et al. 2000). We suggest that organisational, management and individual responses to this complex of forces are all important and likely to be complicated, contentious and contradictory. Yet these responses are also a key to understanding the permeation of ‘new managerialist’ ideologies and their impact on both management structures, practices and techniques, and the relative status and position of the student.

The ‘Student’

Silver and Silver reviewed the quality and focus of research concerning higher education students in the US and UK in the last half of the twentieth century (Silver and Silver 1997). They note “significant silences” (p. 9) in research foci, and explain how these silences are a result of the impact on research interests of the concerns of policy makers or institutional leaders. Research attention shifts from the lives and experiences of students themselves, and research themes mirror various shifts in policy and their implications for institutions, and the new ways in which students impact on teaching or academics’ lives and work. Silver and Silver note the critique that “neglect of students as alive human beings is a venerable academic tradition” (Rudolph 1966, p. 56 quoted in Silver and Silver 1997, p. 12). They suggest that this critique is still valid today, with “little interest in the meaning and implications—rather than the assertion—of changing definitions of students, ranging from ward, apprentice or junior partner, to customer, client and consumer” (ibid. 1997, p. 9).

There are indeed many competing discourses and images of the student in higher education discourse, research and theory. Silver and Silver understand the rise of the ‘student-customer’ as a product of the discourses and imperatives contained in the Charter for Higher Education (Department for Education 1993). These discourses assert the student as ‘customer’, and are part of a politics of representation (Clarke and Newman 1997, pp. 107–122) that concerns political, management and professional interests. Clarke and Newman argue that whilst at a political level, the Citizens’ Charter movement “opened up state organisations to greater scrutiny and control, and enabled . . . the power to enforce priorities though the operation of performance targets and league tables” (p. 110), any particular Charter also serves specific management interests. At both political and management levels, attempts to represent the service-user as ‘customer’ necessitate articulation of the customer’s needs. The concept ‘customer’ is constructed, defined, and asserted by reference to these needs.

In theory, the customer has the right to both ‘voice’ and ‘choice’; these rights enable the customer to effect forces for change (Du Gay and Salaman 1992; Pollit 1993). But conceptual confusion is widespread. In conclusion to a debate entitled The Role of Students in Quality Assurance, Harold Silver noted:

that throughout the proceedings the vocabulary used by speakers and delegates to describe students and their role in quality assurance had varied between customers and consumers through to participants and partners (Quality Standards Council 1995, p. 6).
Partington et al. define the student as “stake-holder”, whose role in quality assurance is “raised”, and “now significantly more influential” (Partington 1993, p. 8). This view, they suggest “is particularly true if education is conceived as a service and the student as the consumer” (ibid., p. 84). It is from this perspective that:

the previously untouchable, elitist, ivory towers of learning have been transformed into ‘trading estates’, ... the stakeholders in the trade they ply have become all important arbiters of their effectiveness and efficiency. In short, it is now widely acknowledged that students, as consumers and stake-holders, have a powerful and significant new role to play (ibid., p. 1).

However the essential questions of whether students see themselves as ‘customers’ or feel enabled to exercise their right to ‘voice’ and ‘choice’ remain largely unexamined areas of policy and institutional practice (Johnson 2000b).

Redefinitions of students as consumers with self-asserted (or management asserted) ‘needs’ presents a challenge to professions and professionals, despite the idea that professionals have always been ‘client’ centred. Non-professional definitions of need call into question the professional’s right to “define the problem” (Clarke and Newman 1997, pp. 110, 116) and devise appropriate service provision. Such powers of jurisdiction are central to professional authority, and underpin the exercise of professional judgement (Macdonald 1995). The idea of the ‘student customer’ generates and legitimates new, external specifications and directions for professionals’ work, yet the student identity, students’ rights and status in relation to the professional, and definitions of students’ needs become subject of contest between professionals and managers.

For the public and the media, students are “almost by definition politically and in every other way radical, are promiscuous, riotous, alcoholic layabouts” and such images “are almost always obsolete [and] rarely reflect the dominant experience and roles of students in their learning and other environments” (Silver and Silver 1997, p. 14). Indeed the student as former prostitute is more seductive for media values than fundamental issues of students as debtors (Times Higher Education Supplement 2001; Times Higher Education Supplement 2001 a) or as mature students. Yet the student role and identity is defined and regulated by the structures and cultures of the University in the UK (Pilkington and Cawkwell 1994). Pilkington and Cawkwell (1994) argue that the University has “quasi-judicial powers” over students; these powers have historical, cultural and legal foundations. The derivation and object of these powers is the stability of traditional ethics, ethos, and discipline; authority is manifest in symbols, and is effected through the University’s procedures for ‘policing, disciplining and punishing their students’. A student has multiple ‘contractual relations’ within the University. These can be material—with service providers—or implicit to various temporal or cultural features of life in the University, and expressed as a set of memberships, rights, duties, expectations and obligations (ibid., pp. 820–883). The various contractual relations inform the student of their different roles, identities and status in each respect. Thus from the inside, ‘the academy not only defines what knowledge is, but also defines and regulates what a student is’ (Morley 1997, p. 237), emphasis in the original.

We adhere to the venerable academic tradition suggested by Silver and Silver (1997), by concerning ourselves with the nature of manager-academics’ interests in students, rather than students’ lives and experiences. This interest stems from an understanding that discourses of the student are significant aspect of both the higher education policy process, and significant to understanding the lives and experiences of those who work with the implications of policy. Within our data, students appear in various guises, often simultaneously, as, for example, numbers, the demand side of markets, units of resource, or sources of administrative workload. Yet, rather than concentrating on the images themselves, we are interested in the tensions and contradictions present within the variety of ways in which the student might be understood (by the managers of the academy), for the work and experiences of those manager-academics.

Manager-Academics and the Student Population

For many respondents, expansion and diversification of the student population typified the important changes they had experienced in their time in higher education:
Expansion of student numbers...and wider access to a wider variety of students...I think that’s the biggest change on the teaching side I think that we notice (HOD, Social Science, pre-1992).

For some, the changing student population explained the centrality and strengthening of management within universities:

In the [few] years I’ve been here [the university] has expanded, it’s doubled, or more than doubled, the student numbers. If you have that rate of growth and you have enormous complexity of types of degrees, a lot of mature students, part-time students, students coming in for day release, afternoon release, evenings, weekends,...the institution is running an inherently far more complex set of processes than ever before. Sorry, but you can’t do that without management (VC, post-92).

Others interpreted pressures to diversify, and their consequences, as a leitmotif and purpose for their role as managers and the role of the institution:

As a Dean of School...what I’m currently doing,...its rootedness must be in the quality of the educational experience of students who come to us....I see the role as manager as...[also] a responsibility to try and make sure that...more people from the kind of class background I came from, feel that higher education is for them as well....It’s the access, widening participation, that provides the centre-piece of our mission statement, our strategy (Dean, Humanities and Social Science, post-1992).

Some respondents explained how the changed student population provided a new context for their work, and a new set of challenges for academic staff:

The worst is being beaten up by the press for being the institution we are and for not being Oxford. That makes me so angry because it’s the brilliant staff all doing those extra hours, coming in Saturdays for Open Days, who are being vilified and the students are being vilified by ignorant journalists whose agenda is they don’t believe in mass higher education, they don’t believe in access....Our students on the whole don’t have good A level results, but they have good degree results—they have a very strong value added (VC, post-92).

Although a few participants expressed disgruntlement with the difficulties of working with students with lower entry qualifications, or with the supposed threat to academic standards, this was mostly in the pre-1992 universities, many of whose students tend to come from higher social class backgrounds. However, the majority did not contest the political, social or economic rationales for widening and diversifying the student population. Some suggested that the demographic make-up of the institutional student population provided useful measures of institutional or personal performance. Others experienced an imperative to secure, via the student population from local communities, the relationship between higher education and up-skilling in the economy, a view of higher education policy that has been contested by others as failing to grasp how the contemporary labour market works (Brown and Scase 1994; Brown 1995; Brown and Scase 1997):

we’ve become regarded as important players in the [city] economy and particularly in the regeneration of [this part of it]....A subset of that is...the continuing work with the local population, in particular the [ethnic] community. I think it’s a great achievement really,...that [that] community now seem to think of us, and refer to us, as their university. And we have multiplied, hundreds of times actually, the number of [those] students in the university (VC, post-1992).

The range of student identities contained in the above extracts indicates the range of ways in which the student is perceived by manager-academics, and reflects the different ways in which the student appears in higher education policies as an object. References to students also varied in nature according to the particular institution in which we conducted our research; this indicates greater diversity, as opposed to isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Clarke and Newman 1997a) in institutional responses to policy imperatives (Johnson 2001). Nevertheless, there were considerable differences between views of respondents in pre-1992 universities as compared to those from the post-1992 former polytechnics. It is to this institutional context that we turn next.
Students, Manager-Academics and University Priorities

Historically, those universities once run by local authorities, the former polytechnics, have emphasised their teaching activities and the vocational relevance of their higher education courses. However, since incorporation in 1992 (Pratt 1997), these former polytechnics have retained a focus on teaching but also attempted expansion of research, not without some difficulties:

We have a lot of mature students and non-standard entrants, they take a lot of hands-on teaching, they have a lot of value added ... there is a contradiction and it’s represented right across every department within the School and I find that very difficult ... because ... I’m dying to say, “Yes, we must do this high quality teaching, but we must also improve our research” (Dean, Social Science, post-1992).

It is misleading to suggest that variation in institutional response to recent higher education policy can be explained only in terms of a broad distinction within the sector. The particular histories of each of the 16 institutions we visited also account for some variation in mission and culture. Nevertheless, post-1992 universities have larger undergraduate student populations and higher staff-student ratios than pre-1992 institutions and it might be expected that students are a more dominant issue for manager-academics in the former than the latter. The following pre-1992 VC is unusual in seeing students as vital to his work; some of his pre-1992 peers made scant reference to students in their interviews.

I do spend a fair bit of time actually talking to students through ... the students’ representatives and I’m very keen to involve students in the running of the university, because it’s really run for them, and not involving them seems to me to be the supreme irony in university management. ... In general it does not involve students except in a token way (VC, pre-1992).

Yet even his views contrast sharply with some of the responses from VCs in post-1992 institutions. The latter give the impression that student recruitment, well-being and resourcing have higher priority and are engaging concerns for their own work and institution:

Very first thing I ever said ... was, “Students come first” and ... a member of staff said to me, “Well we know that’s true but it’s very tactless of you to rub our noses in it”, which I thought was hilarious. And I would say 80% of the organisation breathed a sigh of relief, and that very much includes colleagues who are caretakers, who are cleaners, ... and also the majority of the academic staff. ... And the people quoted it at me, when I asked them to do something else, they said, “I can’t, students come first”, [laugh] ... “Come to a meeting? I can’t, my students come first”, and that’s right. That’s absolutely right (VC, post-1992).

This pattern of response is not the same for Deputy or Pro Vice-Chancellors (PVCs/DVCs), nearly all of whom discussed students at least in relation to recruitment or widening participation. Matters relating to research equated in importance to the quality of students for most respondents in the pre-1992 sector:

[This institution has] already done a lot of climbing but the competition is getting tougher the whole time and there’s an absolute disparity at the moment between its research standing and its national standing in terms of students. A place that has half its departments at five and five star level should be asking two A’s and a B to get in at undergraduate level. ... There’s many reasons for that; its location, its name, all that sort of stuff, it’s a very bad recognition factor, its branding is bad (PVC, pre-1992).

Yet increasing student numbers was not on the agenda for some PVCs in the pre-1992 sector, primarily because the institution identified with, and felt more prepared for, research activity:

We are, in a literal sense, research-led: 25–27% of our income would be research, [and] we define ourselves by the research that we do ... I go [to the council of lay members] with a strategic option that all my colleagues down the corridor have worked out, that we have put through academic board and everywhere else, which is: actually we don’t want to grow as an institution and add student numbers. It’s not something we’d be good at (PVC, pre-1992).

PVCs with specific portfolio for students or teaching and learning were able to provide more detailed accounts of the major preoccupations within student-related issues. Those in the pre-
1992 sector described teaching in terms of a conflict between teaching and research. Those in the post-1992 sector tended to describe teaching in terms of its own, internal set of interconnected, institution-wide and cultural problems/solutions:

The purpose of my role is to make sure that the learning environment is high quality, that...money's best deployed, that the staff are well supported through personnel policies so that they can, in turn, give good service to students. ...It's a slow process... because of snooty, academic attitudes to support staff because they don't take seriously the Director of Estates as a partner in the delivery of a service to the students, they think he's there as a slightly elevated servant to the academic community [laugh]. And actually engaging the support staff and drawing on their understanding of these things is terribly important So for example, our Director of Learning Facilities...is somebody who teaches. ... So not only does he manage this empire of physical things, but he stands up in front of a class, so he understands what it's like when a bulb blows in the OHP (DVC resources, post-1992).

Deans and HoDs had generally higher levels of concern with students as individuals as well as groups, than those in more senior positions. Yet these concerns differed in respect of institutional priorities. Thus the same issue might be experienced in contrasting ways. The following two extracts focus on staff recruitment and deployment. In the post-1992 sector, interests in teaching are viewed as a complementary attribute to a research profile, whereas in the pre-1992 sector, interests and activity in teaching or students are a means of hierarchical segmentation of staff and of little value relative to the overall institutional mission:

I will be looking, when I appoint staff, not just for people [with] research and scholarship, although I'll certainly be looking for that. I also will be looking for people who... seem to me to have the potential to develop as committed, good tutors who will care about students and who will actually deliver the sorts of experiences to help develop students. That I would want to see (Dean, Business, post-1992).

Until fairly recently you had staff who were very research-active and got on with research, and you had other staff who were less research-active, actually love doing teaching...looked after students, did the administration....Now you have a situation where because of the RAE...the stated mission of [the university] is that all members of staff will be grade 4 or above. Now if everybody's a super star, firing at that level, doing research...is the quality of teaching going to be maintained into the future when you've got lots of chiefs and no Indians? (Dean, Arts/Humanities, pre-1992).

Manager-academics’ references to students are directly related to the daily concerns and tasks they experience and these differ as a consequence of the varied institutional frameworks within which they undertake this work and also by the level (e.g., department, university) at which they work (Deem and Johnson 2000). These different experiences accounted for variation in perspectives on, and opinions about, the communities within the university with whom (or on behalf of whom) they worked. Manager-academics’ references to students also display this same pattern, suggesting that these references to students are useful means of unpicking the priorities and preoccupations of manager-academics at different levels of seniority. We turn to this issue next.

The Student and the Preoccupations of Manager-Academics at Different Levels of Seniority

Vice-chancellors expressed a sense of accountability to the people in their institutions. Most used the idea of accountability to staff and students to explain a felt duty and direction in their work. Here, students are a present, if abstract concern:

I feel accountable to my students and I have a duty and a responsibility to make sure that they get the best quality student experience that they can get (VC, post-1992).

PVCs and DVCs generally have the task of implementing the work consequent on institutional mission, and often have a defined remit. Yet even when this remit is not directly connected to student affairs, the student sometimes appears in discourse as a priority of purpose:
At any level within academic life the first thing you are looking at is the well-being of the student in the most general sense. And if there’s a tussle between doing the paperwork and seeing to the well-being of the student my immediate inclination is the well-being of the student. I do see a conflict there as we become more and more proceduralised (PVC external relations, post-92).

Manager-academics at all levels described the phenomenon of ‘proceduralisation’ as vast increases in bureaucratic, administrative and paper-based work resulting from external and internal quality assurance. Procedural activities were often closely related to, and intertwined within accounts of, student-affairs. Irritation with the former often coloured responses to the latter, leading to a situation where the student appeared as source of irritation. Nevertheless, many felt that both the student, and strategy and activity in respect of teaching or research, often lost out as a result of the manager-academics’ preoccupation with paper:

The volume of paper that you have to process is actually too much to deal with effectively...you are never certain you have enough time to do full justice to all those issues....If I get a letter in from a student who is appealing about an examining board decision then...it’s got to be dealt with urgently. But it does mean that some of the other things that you might wish to do have to get pushed to the bottom of the pile (DVC, post-1992).

Deans grappled with both implementation and operational issues within the defined area of their School or Faculty. Their concerns with the student often focused on problems with generic support services provided at a university level, and the extent to which management at university level was coherent with, and allowed the Dean to meet their needs:

The university centre does need to support us with IT. It needs to support us with estate management, it needs to support us with things like students’ satisfaction, all the counselling, all the student services as well (Dean, Arts, post-1992).

References to students were often made within accounts relating to finance, income generation and resource allocation. Here, students were synonymous with ideas and descriptions of markets, actual and potential sums of money, statistics and ‘balancing-books’

You get your money for teaching based upon the number of bodies you teach....Now with inflation staff salaries have gone up by 3.5%...so the amount of money we’ve got per student has gone down in real terms compared to last year by quite a significant amount (Dean, Science, post-1992).

The student, and their needs and expectations also connected with accounts of the dilemmas involved in judging viable academic development and provision. Here, however, financial considerations were a key consideration, with secondary criteria for provision based on perceptions of student demand and external values, rather than academic interests:

The mantra which I have been chanting at staff is that they have to have academic credibility allied with financial viability in everything they do in terms of the academic work. There is absolutely no point in the world in having the most beautiful, pure, academic, theoretically-sound course that nobody wants to attend. We can’t afford it. On the other hand there is no point either in having courses which pile up the money which have no credence in the professional world or with students (Dean, Social Science, post-1992).

Financial and academic viability were linked and predominant concerns for both Deans and HoDs, who were acutely aware of the need to sustain their units in financial, as well as academic terms. Whilst research income and publication provide for both forms of credibility, the judgements applied here are drawn against internal criteria for what constitutes, and generates viability in research because proposals and outputs are scrutinised by peers. The student becomes a significant criterion in developing academic provision, and yet the viability of an academic programme is judged against ideas of the student’s wider role as applicant and graduate. Who students are, their support needs and motivations are crucial questions for the manager-academic to address, and generate a need for detailed understanding, not just of student markets and demand for courses, but of the holistic nature and conditions of the student’s experience:
The danger is always if we lose sight of students and we lose sight of the world of work and where our students go and who are students are, where they come from, how we recruit them, how we do all these different things, if we lose sight of that for one minute we are dead (HOD, Social Science, post-1992).

Our data suggest that the search for appropriate and accurate indicators for judging the adequacy of university strategy, and degrees of performance were both key preoccupation, and substantial dilemma for all manager-academics. PVCs’ and VCs’ accounts gave interesting insight into the range of potential indicators available. The nature, source and implications of each indicator proved a subject of contest and controversy:

- We are trying to develop non-HEFCE funding as is virtually every university. But when you start to [rent space] ... then there’s bound to be a feeling that we’re becoming too ‘commercial’ here, ‘why is it that our own students are being thrown out of their classroom in order to get this money?’ (PVC, pre-1992).
- One or two of our programmes next year will be exclusively 30 point at A Level. Now, you can look at that from an elitist point of view and that’s very good, it’s a high quality institution. Bullshit. What it means is you’ve got higher good quality applications (VC, pre-1992).

The pressures of the range of conflicts and dilemmas presented in this paper combine with the evident workload increases consequent on expansion and diversity of the student population, and increased (and related) proceduralisation. The struggle to determine a way through, and to choose appropriate criteria for provision or indicators of effectiveness and performance, is difficult and constant. Yet if the manager-academic’s work and workload removes them from the interface with students, there are implications for their quality of understanding of students, as individuals with sets of relationships and needs in respect of teaching. The VC, perhaps the person at greatest remove, requires people and information s/he can trust:

- Somebody asked me, “Do you meet individual students?” I said, “No, if an individual student comes to see me one of us is in trouble” . . . I don’t try and run this place as if it’s my personal responsibility. You have a lot of people round . . . and when you trust them . . . and when they think there’s something you ought to know, they tell you (VC, post-1992).

Deans and HoDs who deal with academic staff on a direct basis need ongoing experience in teaching and research, in order to sustain understanding of, and credibility with, their colleagues:

- You’ve got to make judgements over academic issues connected with teaching or research or student matters. I think you have to have experience working yourself in those areas to be able to understand the decisions . . . and above all to have credibility with your colleagues, if you can say that you’ve been through this (Dean, Science, pre-1992).

Although students are viewed in some respects as burdens, these burdens relate to the external policy concerns with accountability, and the paperwork implications of students who, when viewed as customers, are encouraged to turn to litigation or appeals processes. This contrasts with manager-academics’ objections to loss of contact with students in the classroom or laboratory, and the educational purposes that had, in part, brought them into higher education:

- I really enjoyed the contact with students and I enjoyed lecturing, so sometimes I miss that . . . I do sometimes have regrets in some respects. I mean this job has actually turned out to be much more challenging I think, than I thought it would be (Dean, Applied Science, post-1992).

If climbing the management ladder reduces contact with students, this is, however, also reflected in some of the assumptions of at least two models of new approaches to managing public services, as we shall see.

**Students and Models of New Managerialism**

As we have seen, our manager-academic respondents presented a range of views about and of students, as consumers, learners, members of academic communities and units of resource. Of course, we have to be a little cautious in how we interpret these data, since perceptions of students
were not explicitly sought from respondents. However, in general we noted that views expressed by those above HoD level indicated relatively little contact with students and a managerial rather than teacher-orientation towards students in general. But for those working in post-1992 universities, even amongst more senior manager-academics, concern about issues like student pastoral care, student rights and the importance of widening participation strategies was generally more in evidence and more positive in tone than in the statements made by those working in pre-1992 universities. How much does this reflect individual and institutional views about the centrality of students to different approaches to university, faculty and departmental management? Our data from all three phases of the project showed somewhat mixed views on how much managerialism had permeated universities. Learned society focus group discussions and ordinary staff in the four case-study institutions were the most likely to argue for the strong presence of managerialism, with manager-academics downplaying it much more. However, the latter may reflect the degree of hybridisation which has occurred in UK universities as new approaches to management have blended with older approaches.

Of the four models of new management introduced earlier and taken from a previous study of the UK National Health Service (Ferlie et al. 1996), the public service orientation model, which if applied to higher education would mean that students would be a key element in shaping what happened as part of a new agenda of involving citizens in decisions over what services are offered, how and why, did not appear to have permeated universities significantly. Elements of the top-down variant of model three, the excellence model of organisations, were evident in our sample institutions, in respect of claims to be introducing cultural changes, and the increasingly high profile of mission statements and communications policies in some institutions, all of which mentioned students and learning somewhere. However, interestingly, few respondents described their institutions as learning organisations for staff (which of course has indirect implications for students). In the phase three case studies, non-academic and junior academic staff suggested little access to training or effective developmental support and manager-academics experienced an equal lack of preparation and support for their management roles (Johnson 2000a; Deem and Johnson 2001). Although there had been some attempt at resource devolution to department, school or faculty units (as in the decentralising model two), this was often muted because departments only had limited freedom to spend non-staff budgets. Often power to make new staff appointments was controlled by senior management. Nor was learning innovation for students in evidence in every institution we visited. Attempts to offer less standardised, more flexible educational provision to students sometimes appeared minimal, obstructed by traditional structures, and absence of money:

Actually we should take over the [city] casino, we’d make more money running ‘The Casino for Higher Education’. We could say it was work experience for our maths and statistics students because they could work out the rules of probability of the odds that are going round. I’m not saying entrepreneurial means you’ve got to go into crazy ventures, I’m just saying to deliver your mission you have to be much more flexible in what you do, how you do it, where you do it, who does it, and so on. And that isn’t deliverable in the existing structures (VC, post-1992).

Model one, the ‘efficiency drive’ appeared the closest fit with most of respondents’ observations on changes to the organisation and conduct of academic work and management. Indeed some respondents from all three noted an alleged deleterious effect on both staff and students of annual ‘efficiency savings’ in the per-student unit of resource. Phase one focus groups revealed a belief that the power and extent of senior and administrative management had strengthened in recent years over both teaching and research, supported by outside pressures in relation to audit. This was supported in phase two by manager-academics’ reported experience of more explicit and stringent financial targets (Johnson 2001), and an accompanying pressure to both monitor and encourage the performance of their staff (though the latter referred more to external measures such as RAE and quality assurance inspection than to internal concerns about quality of offerings to students). Finance and internal and external accountability /audit were a significant preoccupation at all levels of management. These were major factors contributing to both the increased pace of work experienced by all our respondents and to a situation which, when coupled with the implications of the expansion of the student population, many felt left them indeed doing more for less:
Academics are asked to perform in resource terms. Research, you could say, is actually now a resource input into the institution. They’ve got to do that, they’ve got to teach students, more students than ever before, so that’s a resource issue, and they’ve got to do more administration than ever before by virtue of the auditing and accountability criteria which are imposed from outside. So, you could say that academics are being asked to do more and more for the same amount of money. . . . and the money now comes with far more strings to it than previously (PVC, pre-1992).

The mixed and limited permeation of ‘new managerialism’ into higher education was perceived by our manager-academic respondents to have had greater impact on staff than on students. Nevertheless the small number of interviews conducted in phase three case-study institutions with Student Union sabbatical officers suggested that there was perceived to be considerable impact on students, whether evidenced in increased reluctance of senior managers to genuinely debate major issues with students or in the extent to which managerial responsibilities took staff away from student contact. To the extent that manager-academics thought students had been negatively affected by managerialism, it was mainly in relation to the higher education policy environment. Negative impacts mentioned included: reduced per-student units of resource and academic time; perceptions of falling academic standards; the stress experienced by non-traditional students within a higher education system that was struggling to respond to their needs, and the cultural, structural and financial challenges this environment presented:

You can’t imagine how difficult it would be to say to an Admissions Tutor, “You will take students with lower A levels or whatever”, but that’s not what we intend at all . . . In no sense are we dumbing our admissions. Rather, we’ve got to find ways of attracting people who wouldn’t even think of coming to [this university] and think [it] isn’t for them (PVC, pre-1992).

We are widening access to students, which actually means we are taking on a much broader range of students, some of whom are far less well equipped to deal with the rigors of higher education than the others that we’ve been used to getting, so somehow or other you’ve got to provide more support (PVC, post-1992).

The greater emphasis on management alleged by many respondents implies that there might be greater investment of effort into managing student affairs. Yet managing the student body is far from easy because student demand for higher education is unpredictable and volatile, and because students are not homogeneous and cannot easily be subjected to batch-process means of management. Though proponents of new models of management for public services imply that the service consumer or customer is taken fully into account, we have seen that those models considered by our respondents as having achieved the most permeation into UK universities (the ‘efficiency drive’ and ‘decentralisation’ models) are those which pay least attention to involvement of service users, customers or consumers and also place the least emphasis on learning.

Conclusion

We have suggested that whilst both higher education policy and the ideological nature of that policy emphasise the role and status of the student, responses from our interviewees at institutional and individual level show concerns with the management, resource and time implications of the student body, rather than with the individual student him/herself. In our data, discourses about students appeared within discussion of the pressures manager-academics face in respect of recruitment, finance, administration, staff-allocation, course provision and teaching. The introduction of tuition fees, and increasing numbers of self-funded mature, part-time, professional and Masters students, shifts the concept of ‘the student’ from novice-scholar or temporary member of the academic community, to that of consumer who gains individualised status, rights and identity. Institutions’ legal obligations to the student (Middlemiss 2000) are emphasised but did not appear to have significantly altered manager-academic practices. Although references to the student as customer or consumer, were made by our respondents, the implications were often resisted and contrasted with manager-academics’ felt professional obligation to transform the student in academic terms and support their needs within this process. It is not that the manager-academics interviewed had no concern for the student. Rather it is, as our foregoing analysis shows, that these preoccupations
are predominantly driven by financial and resource issues, rather than by students’ actual demands or needs. The idea of the student-consumer is largely resisted. Furthermore, although there was evident a rhetoric of ‘the student comes first’ in some of the post-1992 institutions studied, the missions inspired by that focus tend to position the student as service-user, with needs and views, rather than customers or consumers with demands to be satisfied. Similarly, institutional flexibility and speed of response to the higher-profile student (as customer or service-user) are mediated by existing structures and traditions, and operate in the context of severe financial pressures, as well as being in constant competition with the demands of research.

The resource environment and increasingly global competition for students and research income encourages the appointment of more VCs from non-academic backgrounds (Times Higher Education Supplement 2001b). Indeed not-for-profit organisational experience increases the likelihood of the incumbent holding attitudes, forms of thinking, and contacts that will foster negotiations and strategic alliances with industry and commercial science.

Previously, the academic discipline and academic record of candidates for the post of Vice Chancellor played a greater part in selection (Sretzer 1968; Farnham and Jones 1998; Bargh et al. 2000). This has not yet disappeared but there are signs that such criteria may be of declining importance in appointing academic heads of universities. Yet the degree to which VCs or even PVCS from non-academic background can be appointed depends on their ability to understand, and the degree of respect and credibility they achieve with, both the academics who conduct teaching, research, administration and management at other levels in the institution, and students.

Our data suggest that many of the more senior manager-academics interviewed experienced decreased involvement with students as both regret and problem. Manager-academics’ understandings of successful management in higher education draw, to a large extent on their previous experiences of teaching students and conducting research, and incremental involvement with strategic, operational and organisational issues. The rich subtleties of this experience contribute to manager-academics’ ability to form, implement and assess effectiveness of both policy and performance. Learning to manage is a continual process, because contexts and problems change, and this results in continual solution formation. Thus the manager-academic has a continuing need for contact with all those at the coal-face of higher education teaching and research, including students. Finally, if the work of manager-academics or general managers is to remain well informed, they need access to studies (and the time to read them) of ‘who’ the students are, and the holistic nature of their experiences and expectations, and also more contact with actual students, who remain the bedrock of most academic institutions.

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References


PART III

ORGANIZATION AND GOVERNANCE
THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSITY TRANSFORMATION

BURTON R. CLARK

We have seen five European universities in action, each transforming itself over a period of ten to 15 years by vigorous effort that can be characterized as entrepreneurial. Each university’s development is itself a complex institutional story, one best told when embedded in contextual peculiarities and unique features of organizational character. When thus portrayed, the universities offer different histories, settings, and profiles. We then know Warwick in the English Midlands as a major research university only three decades old that faced down hard times in the 1980s and positioned itself to compete with the best universities in its own country and the world. We know Joensuu in rural Finland as a minor comprehensive university formed out of humble beginnings in the late 1960s that had to take risks and push hard 15 years later simply to achieve a sustainable niche in its own national system. As a completely technological university located on the west coast of Sweden we see Chalmers as a place that has retained a specialized form even as it asserts innovative strength across a spectrum of fields in engineering and applied science and assumes a special status in the Swedish university system. Twente, hard by the German border in The Netherlands, stands as a technological university of somewhat broader character, with a growing second focus in applied social science and its own set of distinctive campus features. Glasgow’s Strathclyde, defined in the British system as Scotland’s historic technological university, has taken on an even more semicomprehensive form where three of its five faculties (business, education, and the arts) are concentrated in research, teaching, and service outside science and technology. Five universities, five distinct places, conditioned by national and local contexts, different origins and developmental trajectories, and the commitment and effort of particular individuals.

But we have also seen that the institutional stories can be framed in a common conceptual structure. Formed largely from research observations, five identified elements become generalized pathways of a type of university transformation which builds upon inquiry and moves an institution aggressively into increasingly competitive orbits of science and learning. The abstracted pathways serve analytically as middle-range categories. They rise up from the realities of particular institutions to highlight features shared across a set of universities, but at the same time they still allow for local variation. Operating at only a first level of generality, the elements avoid the mists of vagueness encountered in the rarified atmosphere of unanalyzed academic abstractions and commencement-day rhetorics that clog academic and public images of how universities operate and change. My conceptual framework also shuns sweeping expressions of leadership and mission, reengineering and empowerment, strategy and stakeholding, the bromides and platitudes of the dominant management literature of the 1980s and 1990s. (Micklethwait and Woolridge, 1996) I have stayed close to the special features of academic organization and have sought concreteness in the organized tools of this particular sector of society. Four elements are highly structural: we observe them in tangible offices, budgets, outreach centers, and departments. Only the more ephemeral element of institutional idea, floating in the intangible realm of intention, belief, and culture, is hard to pin down. Emphasizing manifest structures helps greatly in explaining the development of organized
social systems. Without doubt, organizational change is sustained when it acquires specific carrying vehicles. Significant change in universities has definite organizational footing.

With the five-element framework in hand, pinpointing developmental pathways, we can confront a prior question: is there a generalizable need to transform lurking in these five cases that may also be deepening in other universities? Ambition to do more than currently could be done certainly played a major role in the examined institutions. Thoughtful administrators and faculty saw that their institution could not become all that it could be if it remained in its 1970s form; a revised posture less hobbled by imbedded constraints was required. In sensing that significant transformation was compelling, the five universities chosen for study were surely not alone. A few other institutions in Europe have similarly embarked on a transforming journey; still others around the world have had cause to contemplate major change. Confidence in the traditional ways of organizing and operating academia has been eroding.

In this concluding chapter I want to explore the reasons why other universities will find themselves treading the entrepreneurial path, or will ignore the need to undergo significant transformation at considerable peril. I argue that widespread features of a rapidly changing university world pressure individual institutions in many nations to become more enterprising. If multitudes of universities need to engage in the hard work of entrepreneurially led change, then the interrelated elements brought forward in our five-case analysis may be seen as answers to a global problem of growing university insufficiency.

Modern universities develop a disturbing imbalance with their environments. They face an overload of demands; they are equipped with an undersupply of response capabilities. In a demand-response equation of environment-university relationships they may be seen as falling so badly out of balance that if they remain in traditional form they move into a nearly permanent stage of disequilibrium. A tolerable balance requires a better alignment. Transforming pathways are then a means of controlling demand and enhancing response capability. To orchestrate the elements, institutional focus takes center stage.

The concept of the focused university, on which I conclude, points to a type of organizational character that growing classes of universities will need for sustainable development. In evermore turbulent settings, universities can become robust as they develop problem-solving capabilities built around a flexible focus. But to do so they must become uncommonly mindful of their characterological development. Facing complexity and uncertainty, they will have to assert themselves in new ways at the environment-university interface. But they will still have to be universities, dominated as ever by educational values rooted in the activities of research, teaching, and study.

The Demand-Response Imbalance

I remarked in the introduction to this study that national systems of higher education can neither count on returning to any earlier steady state nor of achieving a new stage of equilibrium. As principal actors within those systems, public and private universities have entered an age of turmoil for which there is no end in sight. Disjunction is rooted in a simple fact: demands on universities outstrip their capacity to respond. From all sides inescapable broad streams of demands rain upon the higher education system and derivatively upon specific universities within it.

- More students, and more different types of students, seek and obtain access. Ever more accessible higher education means endless “clientele” entitled to various types of education in their lifetimes. The general trend of elite to mass to universal higher education is well-known. But its effects in creating endless demands have not been well understood. This channel of demand in itself, if left unanswered—as in the case of open-door universities on the European continent—badly overloads the response capabilities of individual institutions. And as an “environmental” demand, the clamor for inclusion is organizationally penetrating; it flows into, through, and out of universities as applicants become participants for two, four, six or eight years, and more, only to again negotiate passage as adult students in continuing education.
- More segments of the labor force demand university graduates trained for highly specialized occupations. At different degree levels, graduating students expect qualification in diverse specialties. Graduates also need retraining throughout their professional careers. Thus the
training requirements for the labor force also become virtually endless. This channel of demand in itself can badly overload universities when answers have not been found to control demand and bolster response capabilities. Again, a seemingly “environmental” demand does not merely knock at the door. Rather, future careers are expressed in a vast array of training tracks and specialized student careers within the academy. “Output” boundaries are increasingly permeable.

- Patrons old and new expect more of higher education. Those in government expect more to be done at lower unit cost. It has become a virtual iron law internationally that national and regional governments will not support mass higher education at the same unit-cost level as they did for prior elite arrangements. As other patrons, particularly industry, invest in universities, their diverse expectations become pressing. Patronage shades off into a growing chorus of interest groups repeatedly expressing their voices. “Accountability” extends in many directions. This stream of demand also becomes virtually endless. And the viewpoints of the many patrons also readily cross old university boundaries as group representatives take “their” allotted places on university boards, committees, and advisory groups.

- Most important of all, knowledge outruns resources. No university, and no national system of universities, can control knowledge growth. With expanding knowledge in mind, science experts have long spoken of “endless frontiers.” Flowing from the research imperative built into modern disciplines and interdisciplinary fields of study, knowledge expansion, and specialization are self-propelling phenomena.

The unbelievable scale and scope of just the contemporary knowledge base can be readily illustrated. As of the early-to-mid 1990s, the field of chemistry produced worldwide a million research articles in less than two years. Mathematics generated more than a hundred thousand new theorems a year. The biological sciences fragmented and recombined as well as produced new knowledge at a rate that required curricular revision of teaching materials every two to three years. Economists have turned their logics to every sector of society, rapidly creating subfields that concentrate on such topics as the economics of the family, crime, and social welfare. Psychology has become 20 and more specialties, some so large that they break away in national and international associations of their own. Historians recently produced more literature in two decades than they did in all previous periods: by proliferating such specialties as the history of science in nineteenth-century Japan, they endlessly divide attention by societal activity, historical time, and country. Throughout the humanities new points of view that contest traditional understandings have emerged in a confusing jumble, causing some humanists to see the university as an institution that has lost its soul. And the knowledge produced and circulated in universities is now greatly extended by the growing array of knowledge producers located in other sectors of society. Business schools in universities are only partly responsible for the vast outpouring of books about business management which had risen in the mid-1990s to over 2,000 a year, more than five a day.

The point is inescapable: internationally, no one controls the production, reformulation, and distribution of knowledge. Fields of knowledge are the ultimate uncontrollable force that can readily leave universities running a losing race. Just by itself, the faculty of a university department expresses an inexhaustible appetite for expansion in funding, personnel, students, and space. Rampaging knowledge is a particularly penetrating demand, rooted in the building blocks of the system: it shapes basic-unit orientation, organization, and practice. Since it has no stopping place, it never ceases. As one field of knowledge after another stretches across national boundaries and brings more parts of universities into a truly international world of science and education, growth in knowledge specialties also becomes the ultimate internationalizing force for the higher education sector of society.

These four broad streams of endless demand converge to create enormous demand overload. Universities are caught in a cross-fire of expectations. And all the channels of demand exhibit a high rate of change.

In the face of the increasing overload, universities find themselves limited in response capability. Traditional funding sources limit their provision of university finance: governments indicate they can pay only a decreasing share of present and future costs. “Underfunding” becomes a constant. Traditional university infrastructure becomes even more of a constraint on the possibilities of response. If left in customary form, central direction ranges between soft and soggy. Elaborated
collegial authority leads to sluggish decision-making: 50 to 100 and more central committees have the power to study, delay, and veto. The senate becomes more of a bottleneck than the administration. Evermore complex and specialized, elaborated basic units—faculties, schools, and departments—tend to become separate entities with individual privileges, shaping the university into a federation in which major and minor parts barely relate to one another. Even when new departments can be added to underpin substantive growth and program changes, the extreme difficulty of terminating established academic tribes or recombining their territories insures that rigidity will dominate. Resources go to maintenance rather than to the inducement and support of change.

As demands race on, and response capability lags, institutional insufficiency results. A deprivation of capability develops to the point where timely and continuous reform becomes exceedingly difficult. Systemic crisis sets in.

How are universities near the end of the twentieth century sometimes made sufficient unto their changing environments? How are demand and response brought into reasonable balance? Adaptive responses that ease the strain take place at both system and institutional levels. System solutions set the broad context for university pathways of adaptive action.

The Search for System Solutions

National and provincial systems of higher education primarily cope with the growing demand-response imbalance by differentiation. Through both planned schemes and unplanned adjustments, systems sort out gross bundles of tasks to different types of universities, colleges, and research establishments. (Clark, 1983; Teichler, 1988; Neave, 1996; Meek et al, 1996) Formal sectors are built: in Europe, universities and polytechnics have often been set apart; in the United States, universities, four-and-five-year colleges, and two-year community colleges are commonly separated into a tripartite division of labor. Additionally, where private institutions exist, they develop individual niches in the overall national system. Access is thereby differentiated; labor market relations segmented, and different patrons provide different types and levels of support and expect different results. Beyond such broad sector separation further differentiation often occurs among universities: specialized and comprehensive universities are common in European systems.

But formal differentiation is often strongly opposed. Recently in European countries, a political tug-of-war has taken place between political parties and interest groups who want to maintain or construct an integrated, even homogeneous, single national system and those who stress the advantages of a formal division of labor. A combination of nominal integration and operational differentiation has become a useful compromise. While such institutions as polytechnics and teacher training colleges are blessed with the university title and brought into an all-embracing single system, the differentiation of institutions, programs, and degree levels continues. The university label is stretched to give it multiple meanings and usages.

The American system offers an extreme case of the creation of different types of universities. Private institutions quite freely anoint themselves as universities; public colleges, state by state, lobby themselves into the university title. The growing aggregation of 400 or more places called universities has stretched into a half-dozen major categories: some grant many doctorates and do much research; some grant a few doctorates and do a little research; and some neither grant doctorates nor do hardly any research. (Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 1994) Crossover types readily appear; e.g., some universities and colleges that are not permitted by state authorities to award doctorates proceed on their own to develop a research culture, secure more research funds than some institutions that do doctoral work, and link up with other institutions to give a joint doctorate. In Britain, after the government collapsed the old binary line and allowed polytechnics to become known as universities, the stretch in meaning of the term became much greater. A differentiation in resources and teaching and research commitments that previously took place between two main types of institutions became greater differentiation within a single formal type.

A “democratization” of titles does not bring full operational convergence: institutions become known more by what they do rather than by what they are called. Hence in national systems and on the worldwide stage we find some universities heavily concentrated on research and some that hardly do any at all; those that give many advanced degrees and others that concentrate almost
completely on the first major degree; those oriented to knowledge for its own sake and those centered on useful knowledge; some that take up national roles and others situated as regional places; and on and on.

Internationally, in the 1980s and 1990s, differential effective access to sources of income rapidly became the favorite way to differentiate university systems. We have seen this national tool operate in Britain, Holland, Sweden, and Finland. Governmental mainline support with its standardizing effects is deliberately reduced or allowed to fall as a share of university costs. The system overall must turn to what we have categorized as second and third streams of support; each has largely differentiating effects. In research-grant competition, standardization gives way to winners and losers; research niches occupied by different universities offer comparative advantage. In exploiting numerous third-stream sources, universities have different possibilities set by location and historic capacity. Then as they individually maneuver, struggling to gain more resources, they widen the differences in specific configurations of external linkages. System evolution toward diversified income promotes a dynamic of institutional diversity and competition. Universities are potentially more individualized. Patrons are then all the more inclined to think they should treat unequal things unequally.

In overcoming response inadequacies, national systems of higher education can go beyond the broadbrush of the differentiation response; they can explore the utility of reforms by engaging in deliberate institutional experimentation. In Finnish higher education the process is known as “learning by experimenting.” (Välimaa, 1994) There, recent experiments included the block-grant budgetary arrangement at Joensuu, the flexible workload scheme piloted at Jyväskylä, and several changes explored in other institutions in quality assessment and in the development of a new polytechnic sector. The Finns have learned that pilot experimentation is relatively easy to initiate: everyone can readily agree to have an experiment get underway “because it is meant to be only a trial and it might fail.” The critical moment of “learning by experimenting,” for the system at large, comes “when the supporters of the experiment want to expand it system-wide.” (p. 153) Then others can coalesce in opposition around their doubts and in support of interests that might be weakened: academic labor unions have resisted in Finland when they anticipated a reduction in bargaining power and less equity in staff rewards.

One large advantage of experimentation in the search for solutions is that small-scale efforts at the outset avoid the large mistakes made when central officials mandate reforms across the entire system without preliminary testing. Since there is no way by means of prior reasoning that central planners can know enough about all local contexts and constraints, the Large Plan (or Big Bang) approach maximizes the scale and scope of unanticipated and undesired consequences. Centralized governments are biased in favor of this road to failure.

Systems of higher education are blunt instruments for reform. (For case studies that reveal bluntness in system efforts to “restructure” higher education in five American states, see Mac Taggart and Associates, 1996) Using the differentiation response, systems can indeed establish broad divisions of labor, implicitly if not explicitly, that serve somewhat to limit demands made upon particular universities and colleges. Ministries and coordinating bodies can point institutions toward different combinations of programs and degrees; they can encourage different segments to adopt different doctrines supporting particular tasks. But systems acting from above have great difficulty in activating local initiatives. In western Europe the reverse has happened: system organization traditionally has worked to induce institutional passivity and weak local leadership. The national or state ministry provided administrative services and lumped together the staff of the university sector in systemwide categories of rank and salary; in effect, it created membership in a national civil service. Within the universities senior professors had commanding authority in their separate departments and institutes. This “continental mode” of state bureaucracy and faculty guild left a weak middle—the elected short-term rector assisted by only a small central staff and surrounded by congregations of powerful professors. (Clark, 1983, pp. 125–129) The “British mode” of authority structure was just a half-step away, with only modest authority located in vice-chancellorships (compared to that of American university presidents) and a web of faculty committees in and around an academic senate very involved in the consideration of change. Weak institutional steering became the norm. With some strengthening of rectorial authority and the enlarging and professionalizing of central staff, this pattern changed somewhat in many European universities in the 1970s, 1980s,
and early 1990s, but not enough to constitute a sturdy response capability with which to face mounting and fast-moving demands. The weak center has severely limited the university capacity to change. Thus, the bluntness of system initiatives amidst the growing scale and complexity of the university sector has coexisted with a structured lack of initiative at the institutional level.

Weak capacity to balance demand and response, we should note, varies somewhat between one-faculty and multifaculty universities. Although they do not escape the problem of deepening imbalance, specialized universities are better positioned than the comprehensive institutions to control demand around their subject specialization and, with a more integrated character, to pursue an entrepreneurial response. Their subject concentration helps measurably to solve the growing problem of institutional focus. It is no mystery why in Europe or America, or elsewhere, specialized universities can more readily move toward entrepreneurial postures than comprehensive ones, particularly if their specialty is technology or business. When I sought nominations of universities for this study, it was no accident that the institutions named by knowledgeable European colleagues, including ones not chosen for study, turned out often to be specialized places, for example, the technologically oriented University of Compiègne in France, the business-administration oriented University of St. Gallen in Switzerland.

In contrast, the imbalance thesis applies strongly to comprehensive public universities. Organized around a wide array of subjects that stretches from classics to medicine, these institutions virtually promise higher officials, legislators, and the general public they will be all things for all demands. Martin Trow (1970, pp. 184–185) noted a quarter-century ago in an analysis of “elite” and “popular” functions of modern higher education that responding to external needs and demands was even then fast becoming an endless task:

If one popular function is the provision of mass higher education to nearly everybody who applies for it, the second is the provision of useful knowledge and service to nearly every group and institution that wants it...the demand on the universities for such service is increasing all the time. This in part reflects the growth of the knowledge-base created by the scientific explosion of the past few decades. Not only is much of this new knowledge of potential applied value to industry, agriculture, the military, the health professions, etc., but also new areas of national life are coming to be seen as users of knowledge created in the university.

The implicit commitment of universities to embrace all of the expanding knowledge core of modern society deepened the commitment both to extend access and to service the interests of outside groups with diverse bundles of relevant knowledge and useful training. System management has been unable to control this explosion in commitments: overloaded universities have simply become more overloaded.

Other observers have also taken early note of the increasing imbalance. Based on a study of 17 universities and colleges then under stress, David Riesman warned in the 1970s against the danger of institutions overextending their resources in order to be all things to all people. (Riesman, 1973, p. 445) Two decades later, in the 1990s, the tendency to overextend resources has become more marked and the results more painful. Based on site visits and interviews in the mid-1990s at 13 colleges and universities in the American system, Leslie and Fretwell found there “was broad recognition that missions had become too loose, that too many different programs were being offered, and that scarce resources were being spread too thin across too many activities.” (Leslie and Fretwell, 1996, p. xiv) Administrators and faculty “reported (and lamented) that they had made too few hard decisions” during the previous two decades. Their lament “was frequently punctuated with one phrase: ‘we have tried too hard to be all things to all people,’ with the unspoken trailer [that] ‘we have become too diffuse to use our scarce resources well’.” (p. 22) These American observers concluded that “a theme...ran throughout our site visits: being distinctive and purposeful is better than being all things to all people.” (p. 16) And institutional strain this time, in the 1990s, was seen by participants as systemically different from periods of stress in the past: “It is a common refrain among those with whom we have consulted to suggest that things are not going to be the same this time, or ever again.” (p. xii)

The differentiation response, it seems, finally comes down to the individual university. Each university has always had unique features that stem from geographic location, genetic imprints, student backgrounds, idiosyncratic historical developments, faculty strengths and weaknesses, and the
play of particular personalities. Now, particularly as knowledge outruns resources, a university’s
basic departments are under ever greater pressure to commit to specialties that differentiate them
from their peer-discipline departments at other universities, whether in physics or psychology or
history. And what happens among departments and faculties radiates upward to intensify the need
for entire universities to differentiate themselves in niches of knowledge, clientele, and labor mar-
et linkage. Such differentiation can be left to drift, and hence to occur slowly; but with accelerat-
ing change, the costs of drift and delay rise—the demand-response imbalance only deepens.
Institutional action then has to be set in motion.

System organizers can help to clear the way by reducing state mandates and manipulating
broad incentives, but only universities themselves can take the essential actions. The point was
made in striking fashion by Clark Kerr in 1993 (p. 33, emphasis added) when he stressed that

For the first time, a really international world of learning, highly competitive, is emerging. If you
want to get into that orbit, you have to do so on merit. You cannot rely on politics or anything else.
You have to give a good deal of autonomy to institutions for them to be dynamic and to move
fast in international competition. You have to develop entrepreneurial leadership to go along with insti-
tutional autonomy.

Enter the growing necessity of what we can now call “the entrepreneurial response.”

The Entrepreneurial Response

If the state and other external patrons cannot exercise the required initiative, how can universities
shift from a passive to an active mode? As historically constituted, their internal faculties and depart-
ments cannot separately do the job. Oversight of their particular fields and protection of their own
material interests has been their customary mandate. Only an overall organizational realignment,
constructed in a first approximation by the elements captured in this study, can set into motion a
new highly active mode. The five cases and certain relevant studies can help to place those elements
in the broader framework of the imbalance thesis.

The Strengthened Steering Core

Warwick, Twente, Strathclyde, Chalmers, Joensuu—all exhibited in 1995 a greater systematic capac-
ity to steer themselves than they had possessed 15 years earlier. That ability did not take any one
form. It could be relatively centralized or decentralized, generally appearing in practice as a locally
unique combination of the two—a “centralized decentralization.” (Henkel, 1997, p. 137) At a given
time this evolving steering capability appeared in different institutions at different stages of devel-
opment and in degree. It could have been initiated by strong-minded change agents, figures drawn
to leadership positions from within or without who wished to break the cake of custom. But in
the sustained work of implementation such personal leadership commonly gave way to collegial
groups. Stronger line authority also appeared: rector’s office to dean to department head, or, in
flat structures that bypass deans, from center to department head. Individuals and groups were
held accountable.

Most important, the administrative backbone fused new managerial values with traditional
academic ones. Management points of view, including the notion of entrepreneurship, were car-
ried from center to academic heartland, while faculty values infiltrated the managerial space. The
blending of perspectives worked best when academics who were trusted by peers served in cen-
tral councils and took up responsibility for the entire institution. Since the underlying traditional
academic culture cannot be ignored, cannot be pushed aside, it must be put to work and thereby
adapted. Central faculty involvement became a crucial step in avoiding what the academic staff
would otherwise see as hard managerialism, too much top-down command. In the hard work of
transformation in these cases and elsewhere, much depends on how well managerial and faculty
values become intertwined and then expressed in daily operating procedures.

Whatever its shape, the strengthened managerial core consists of agents who work to find
resources for the institution as a whole. They seek other patrons instead of waiting passively for
the government to return to full funding. They work to diversify income and thereby enlarge the
pool of discretionary money. They seek out new infrastructure units that reach across old university boundaries to link up more readily than traditional departments with outside establishments, especially industrial firms. The core gives the institution a greater collective ability to make hard choices among fields of knowledge, backing some to the disadvantage of others; this in turn shapes access possibilities and job-market connections. The strengthened steering mechanism is necessary for the task of cross-subsidizing among the university’s many fields and degree levels, taxing rich programs to aid less-fortunate ones that otherwise would be relegated to the corner or even dropped from the enterprise because they cannot pay their way. Agents of the core thereby not only seek to subsidize new activities but also try to enhance old valuable programs in the academic heartland. As much maneuvering among contradictory demands becomes necessary, the agents of the constructed core become institutionally responsible for doing so.

A strengthened administrative core, then, is a mandatory feature of a heightened capability to confront the root imbalance of modern universities.

The Enhanced Development Periphery

The new peripheries that enterprising universities construct also take quite different specific forms. They variously consist of outreach administrative units that promote contract research, contract education, and consultancy. They include a varied array of research centers that are generally, but not always, multi- or transdisciplinary. The new units and centers may be closely or loosely linked to the steering core and the heartland departments. Like science parks that become autonomous, some peripheral units may have the name and sponsorship of the university but then operate much like mediating institutions situated between the university and outside organizations. Again, there is no one way, no one model to emulate.

But the developmental peripheries we have observed have a valuable common outcome: they move a university toward a dual structure of basic units in which traditional departments are supplemented by centers linked to the outside world. The matrix-like structure becomes a tool for handling the inevitable growth of the service role of universities. Department-based “specialist groups” are complemented by “project groups” that admit external definitions of research problems and needed training. The new groups cross old lines of authority; they promote environmental linkages in their daily practice. We noted at Chalmers that they can even effect reciprocal knowledge transfer; the university learns from outside firms as the companies learn from the university. The matrix structure allows for more temporary units, thereby introducing flexibility amidst stability. With tenured staff mainly based in the departments and nontenured and part-time staff often predominating in the outreach centers, the more temporary units of the periphery are more readily disbanded.

Since units of a developmental periphery extend, cross, and blur boundaries, they can decisively shape the long-run character of a university. They can develop new competencies close to useful problem solving. They can generate income that helps to diversify funding. They answer the call for interdisciplinary efforts. But if not judged by academic values as well as managerial and budgetary interests for their appropriateness in a university, they can move an institution toward the character of a shopping mall. A connected and somewhat focused construction of the periphery requires a collective institutional capacity to make choices based on educational values. New outward-looking units can make the problem of overall institutional focus all the more difficult: research centers contend with old departments, transdisciplinary perspectives with disciplinary orientations, the useful with the basic, the outward-looking with the inward-oriented. But when carefully monitored, the periphery becomes a second virtually essential element with which to lessen the imbalance between environmental demands and response capacity. Traditional departments alone cannot effect all the needed linkages: in themselves, they cannot add up to an effective focus. The new periphery is necessary, even if it adds to the organized complexity of the university.

As a halfway house to the outside world, the developmental periphery becomes an organized location within a university for the entry and absorption of whole new modes of thinking. In ideal typical terms formulated by an international study group in the mid-1990s, their designated “Mode 1” refers to the traditional way of handling knowledge in disciplinary frameworks. A
newly emerging “Mode 2,” transdisciplinary and problem-oriented, was seen by the study group as located largely outside universities in a host of knowledge-centered enterprises that stretch from major industrial laboratories to policy think tanks to management consultancies to new small and medium-sized enterprises. (Gibbons et al, 1994; see also Ziman, 1994) Between the ideal types there lies a lengthy continuum of different practical combinations. The peripheries of universities we observed in this study incorporate much Mode 2. Their units are established precisely to go beyond disciplinary definitions; they extend university boundaries to bring in the perspectives of outside problem-solving groups; they are prepared to take their leads from the outside and to work close to application. They are often strongly committed to the straight-on production of useful knowledge.

An enhanced developmental periphery plays many roles in enterprising universities, not the least in bringing new modes of thinking and problem solving within newly stretched boundaries. Organizationally, in Peter Scott’s terms, it helps to stretch the “core” university into the “distributed” university, where knowledge, the primary commodity, is more “applications-generated.” (Scott, 1997, pp. 11–14)

The Discretionary Funding Base

Demand overload hits hard at the core support of universities. Student growth and knowledge growth together increase enormously the costs of systems of higher education and individual universities. Higher costs then change the relationship of universities to their principal patrons, especially funding ministries. If higher education in earlier days had been a minor charge in governmental budgets, it now becomes a major expenditure. As a big-ticket item, university support moves up the agenda of governmental concerns and is thrown into direct competition with other major interests. Politicians pay attention. They put universities on their personal and party agendas. The sheer happenstance of where university support is decided in the state bureaucratic and legislative structure can even become critical, variously contending with the major sums sought by schools, welfare agencies, health departments, prisons, agricultural interests, and the military. Even in good times of rising state income and outlay, governments then seek to control higher education costs. In bad times of general retrenchment they insist on major cuts. They issue dire warnings in statements that echo internationally that the future will bring even more constraint. Government becomes an uneven patron, often acting like a sometime purchaser of university services; it can hardly be depended on in the long term. Its own changing agenda will at times give overwhelming priority to coping with depression, national debt, and international entanglements.

Traditional universities come to a fork in the financial road. They can passively fall in line and undergo parallel financial increases and decreases—as the government goes, so they go—with the governmental stimulus determining university response; or they can actively intervene by deciding to develop additional lines of income from pursued patrons. University ambition encourages the second choice, competition virtually demands it. Such budgetary activity is a crucial step in university entrepreneurship. Active cost containment is also then given a high priority by the institution itself, from central staff to the many departments and units in the academic heartland and the developmental periphery.

To build a diversified funding base in a university is to construct a portfolio of patrons to share rising costs. As new patrons contribute, their expectations of what they should get in return readily intrude to become new constraints. Universities then need greater self-consciousness on where they draw the line between what they are willing to do and not do to meet those demands. The collective will, located in the steering core, then comes into play to define new limits around greatly expanded boundaries; heartland departments also have to test their own edges of legitimacy.

But whatever the relations with specific patrons, a diversified funding base enhances university discretion. The enlarged portfolio of income streams increases total resources. It allows a university to “roll with the punches”; a loss here is replaced by a gain there. It allows a university to build reserves (and to borrow monies) and then to take innovative steps, as Warwick did when it used accumulated surpluses from its earned income to fund a new, striking research fellowship scheme. Diversity in financing, it now appears, “can be regarded as a prerequisite for adaptability.”
The multistream financial base enhances the evermore important capacity to cross-subsidize internally: top-slicing and redistribution of funds by central committees tap the monies brought in by some fields and activities to aid others judged to be necessary and needy. Cross-subsidy becomes the financial heart of university integration. (Massy, 1994; Williams, 1995)

The internal disposition of funds raised through diversified sources is always contentious and never permanently solved. Professors and departments active in bringing in money do not like to see some of it passed off to others who are not, especially if the other departments appear to be lost in mists of conceptual ambiguity, even bogged down in self-imposed disarray. The greater the internal dispersion of fields and interests, the greater the need to have the haves help the have-nots. And the more contentious the issue of internal redistribution becomes. Comprehensive universities have great difficulty in moving money across the gulf between, for example, physics and classics as specific fields or more broadly between engineering and the humanities. Cross-subsidization may flow from teaching to research, or in some cases in the reverse direction. It may flow across levels of education, from undergraduate to graduate, or the other way around. Certainly a primary issue in diversified funding, it is central to the making of choices leading to better focused universities.

The Stimulated Heartland

Since universities consist of widely divergent fields in their traditional departments, enterprising action typically spreads unevenly in the old heartland. Science and technology departments commonly become entrepreneurial first and most fully. Social science departments, aside from economics and business, find the shift more difficult and commonly lag behind. Humanities departments have good reason to be resisting laggards: new money does not readily flow their way from either governmental or nongovernmental patrons. Deliberate effort on their part to go out and raise funds by offering new services may seem particularly out of place, even demeaning. Since departmental adoption of an entrepreneurial attitude will normally vary, a university that has partially transformed itself to be more enterprising might largely exist in a schizophrenic state, entrepreneurial on one side and traditional on the other. Administrators and faculty at the five universities studied rejected this option. Schizophrenic character did not appeal to them: it suggested a split that would mean endless, bitter contention. If that were to be the outcome, then the move into entrepreneurial action might well be more trouble than it was worth: doubters in other universities would be right.

Overall scale and scope are perhaps decisive here. Small to middle size universities—6,000 to approximately 13,000 in our five cases—are still positioned to seek a unified character, even if they stretch from microbiology to folklore. An integrated identity has much to offer: perceivable gains outweigh apparent losses. But large universities of 20,000, 30,000, 50,000 and more, particularly when organized in large stand-alone faculties or schools—the dominant form in Europe and in much of the world—might well find that entrepreneurial habits do not spread well across their major parts. They might then be forced to operate with an entrepreneurial/traditional split in character, with minimal interaction and little or no cross-subsidy across major components. The entrepreneurial side could depend on diversified income and look to new forms of outreach and knowledge production. The traditional side could depend on mainline allocation based on student enrollment and degree output as the foundation for the future.

Impressive in the universities studied was the extent to which the heartland departments had brought into entrepreneurial change. Their changeover has not been easy, not even in the specialized institutions most fully based on science and technology. Even in science departments professors may be committed to knowledge for its own sake in a way that excludes applied interests. But the distinction between basic and applied has steadily blurred and science departments can typically find foci that combine the two. In the social sciences and humanities, as we have seen, departments also find new ways to be educationally useful as they relate to new demands with, for example, policy analysis and multimedia explorations. One traditional department after another finds educational as well as economic value in becoming a more enterprising basic unit.

Stimulated academic departments must find ways to fuse their new administrative capability and outreach mentality with traditional outlooks in their fields. Academic norms operate close to
the surface: they define whether changes are “up-market” or “down-market.” Departmental entrepreneurship that leads to shoddy goods, as defined by other academics, can readily set in motion a vicious circle of declining reputation and less selective recruitment of staff and students. Departments have to make clear that they are not willing to respond to all demands that swirl around them in their respective fields of activities - from potential students, young and old, industrial firms and professional associations, local, regional, national, and international governmental departments. They have to select and thereby to focus. When carried out effectively, a widespread embodiment of entrepreneurship in a university strengthens selective substantive growth in its basic units.

The Entrepreneurial Belief

The most difficult part of this study’s analysis was to grasp organizational ideas and beliefs and relate them to structures that support processes of change. A long-standing popular misconception places a Great Person with a Large Idea at the front end of change. A modern derivative of this view depicts a chief executive officer or management team formulating at the outset a global strategic plan. Idea becomes purpose, a mission statement soon follows, and all else becomes means to a prechosen end. But the reality of change in complex organizations, especially in universities, is different. New, institutionally defining ideas are typically tender and problematic at the outset of an important change. They must be tested, worked out, and reformulated. If they turn out to be utopian, they are soon seen as counterproductive wishful thinking. If found to be excessively opportunistic, they provide no guidance: any adjustment will do. Ideas become realistic and capable of some steering as they reflect organizational capability and tested environmental possibilities. New organizational ideas are but symbolic experiments in the art of the possible.

An institutional idea that makes headway in a university has to spread among many participants and link up with other ideas. As the related ideas become expressed in numerous structures and processes, and thereby endure, we may see them as institutional beliefs that stress distinctive ways. Successful entrepreneurial beliefs, stressing a will to change, can in time spread to embrace much and even all of an institution, becoming a new culture. What may have started out as a simple or naive idea becomes a self-asserting shared view of the world offering a unifying identity. A transformed culture that contains a sense of historical struggle can in time even become a saga, an embellished story of successful accomplishment. Our five universities have moved along this ideational road.

Such cultural transformation at Warwick started out in the early 1980s with the tender idea that it would “earn” its way. With growing success, the earned income approach became a sturdy belief that here was an unusual British university aggressively developing new sources of income, new patterns of organization, and new productive relationships with the outside world. True believers dominated the steering core and became more numerous in a campuswide culture. Outsiders took special note. By its twenty-fifth year, the university was uncommonly well-equipped symbolically to celebrate itself with an enriched story of “the Warwick way.” An organizational saga was emerging.

Twente started its move in the early 1980s with an almost defiant assertion that it was “the entrepreneurial university,” hardly knowing what that would mean in practice. It turned out to mean that Twente would develop a strengthened managerial core and a newly devised developmental periphery and the other operational elements this study has identified. Spreading out in the academic heartland, the initial simply stated idea became an embedded belief, then a widespread culture. By the mid-1990s this small place claimed a rugged identity formed around a recent history of largely successful struggle: a saga was on its way. Twente came to believe in itself to the point of making vigorous efforts to spread its particular attitudes and special operational forms to others: it took up leadership in an emerging small circle of European self-defined “innovative universities.”

The leading idea at Strathclyde in the early 1980s was not sharply formulated. A new vice-chancellor felt strongly that the place had to become more managerial, more businesslike, more able to stand on its own feet. If it were to prosper it had to be run differently. In time, the initial managerial idea, expressed in a distinctive central steering group, a productive periphery, and an
entrepreneurial “spirit” in some heartland departments became folded into a generalized belief system of “useful learning.” This doctrine embraced two hundred years of development while it asserted a will to work with industry and government to solve current problems. The Strathclyde doctrine of useful learning only needed to be slightly embellished and romanticized, as exemplified in the bicentennial celebration I described, in order to become an organizational saga.

Chalmers self-consciously began to assert in the early 1980s a commitment to “innovation.” As the idea and related practices were worked out, a sense of difference grew. A long-standing Chalmers “spirit” was intensified to become an embracing culture that helped predispose the institution to take up in 1994 the highly unusual status of a foundation university, an institutional definition that nearly all other Swedish universities were unable or unwilling to consider. The sense of distinctiveness was thereby further extended, intensifying overall identity. In this ideational part of the quest, deeply rooted cultural features have become parts of a Chalmers saga in which past developments, current intentions, and future character are depicted as closely linked. Chalmers enthusiasts could readily say in the mid-1990s that their place was something different in the state of Sweden. They also had confident reason to believe that a similar entrepreneurial culture will increasingly appear in other Swedish universities.

Joensuu in the mid-1980s took to an idea of becoming a pilot institution that would experiment with an important basic change for the entire Finnish national system of universities. In its national setting the idea of doubtless decentralizing budget-based control all the way down to the department level was a radical one. Joensuu effected the idea to the point of departmental dominance. Early acceptance of a second idea, piloted at another university, that of flexible workloads, helped to make the institution significantly different from those operating in traditional Finnish style. As the “piloting” ideas worked their way into the fabric of the institution, Joensuu has grown up symbolically as well as physically, strengthening its sense of self and its place in the world.

We have noted repeatedly throughout this study that the five elements of transformation become just that by means of their interaction. Each by itself can hardly make a significant difference. Those who see universities from the top-down might readily assume that the strengthened steering core is the leading element. But a newly constituted management group, for example, is soon without teeth if discretionary funds are not available, new units in the periphery cannot be constructed, heartland departments fall into opposition, and the group’s idea of a transformed institution gains no footing. The interaction of transforming elements also largely takes place incrementally over a number of years. Our results accord strongly with an incrementalist view of organizational change. (Lindblom, 1959, 1979; Redner, ed., 1993) Particularly for universities, we stress interactive instrumentalism. Transformation requires a structured change capability and development of an overall internal climate receptive to change. As we have seen by reviewing development over ten to 15 year periods, the building of structural capability and cultural climate takes time and is incrementally fashioned.

Action taken at the center requires faculty involvement and approval. Change in new and old units in the periphery and in the heartland is piecemeal, experimental, and adaptive. The operational units, departments and research centers, remain the sites where research, teaching, and service are performed: what they do and do not do becomes finally central. As put sharply by David W. Leslie (1996, p. 110) in arguing against linear-rational views of strategic planning: “change in colleges and universities comes when it happens in the trenches; what faculty and students do is what the institution becomes. It does not happen because a committee or a president asserts a new idea.

Even in the business world, we may note, careful analysts who trace organizational change over many years observe that successful firms essentially engage in “cumulative incrementalism”: they inch forward by making rapid partial changes. Firms choose to “spread and minimize risks by initiating many different projects,” rather than try to engage in large-scale strategic change. (Stopford and Baden-Fuller, 1994, p. 52) They engage in “concentric entrepreneurialism.” Even in business, leadership is depicted as a diffused phenomenon: “Leadership is acutely context sensitive. . . The need may be for more than one leader over time if performance is to be maintained. Equally important may be the creation of collective leadership at a senior level. . . which may then be supported by the development of a sense of complementary leadership at lower levels. Leading change involves action by people at every level of the business.” (Pettigrew & Whipp, 1991, pp. 280-281) And from a third careful business analyst: “Capabilities grow through the actions of the members of the firm—through the behaviors of employees at all organizational levels.” (Leonard-Barton, 1995, p. 28)
Such findings from sustained analysis of business firms over years of development concur with developmental studies of universities: leadership can be an attribute of groups; entrepreneurship is a phenomenon of total organizations and their many collective parts. “The entrepreneurial response” on which we have concentrated is an all-university capability.

The Focused University

The entrepreneurial response to the growing imbalance in the environment-university relationship gives universities a better chance to control their own destinies. The response may be seen as a way to recover the autonomy lost, particularly in public universities, when mounting demands began to dominate the capacity of universities to respond. The new autonomy is different from the old. In an earlier day autonomous public universities could be given full state support and largely left alone to educate a few students, engage in limited basic research, and prepare professionals for several fields of work. When only one young person in 20 sought university training, most people most of the time did not think about what the university was doing and what it could do for them. Fields of research were simpler, knowledge growth, while moving at a striking pace, could still be grasped. As the end of the twentieth century approaches, however, the demand side of the environment-university relationship has spun out of control and institutional response has become increasingly insufficient. Now when virtually everyone can demand some involvement or relationship, loosely coupled universities have offered ad hoc, diffuse responses.

Universities are caught up in grand contradictions: with less money, do more and more; maintain as always the expanding cultural heritage, the best of the past, but quickly and flexibly develop new fields of study and modes of thought; relate to everyone’s demand because all are “stakeholders.” An American university president crisply formulated in the mid-1990s that the modern research university (public and private) has become “overextended, underfocused; overstressed, underfunded.” (Vest, 1995) Alert rectors and vice-chancellors in Europe could readily agree, recognizing that not only can the condition of underfunded lead to a sense of being overstressed, but that “underfocused” and “overextended” may be virtually two sides of the same institutional posture.

The entrepreneurial response offers a formula for institutional development that puts autonomy on a self-defined basis: diversity income to increase financial resources, provide discretionary money, and reduce governmental dependency; develop new units outside traditional departments to introduce new environmental relationships and new modes of thought and training; convince heartland departments that they too can look out for themselves, raise money, actively choose among specialties, and otherwise take on an entrepreneurial outlook; evolve a set of overarching beliefs that guide and rationalize the structural changes that provide a stronger response capability; and build a central steering capacity to make large choices that help focus the institution. The entrepreneurial response in all its fullness gives universities better means for redefining their reach—to include more useful knowledge, to move more flexibly over time from one program emphasis to another, and finally to build an organizational identity and focus. Warwick, Twente, Strathclyde, Chalmers, and Joensuu have all in somewhat different specific ways shown us how to focus university reach.

Universities need foci that help them solve the problem of severe imbalance and to define anew their societal usefulness. They need to find sustainable niches in the ecology of a knowledge industry that becomes more international and more dispersed among institutions outside formal higher education. The difficulties are huge. Comprehensive universities, those of wide scope, in Europe, America, and elsewhere will remain under great popular and governmental pressure to cover the broadest possible range of subjects and interests. Scattering their promises, and in many cases unable to cap their size, they will continue to tend to spread in a virtually uncontrolled fashion. They take on even more tasks and expectations, undercutting the possibilities of building a critical mass of resources, faculty, and students in different basic units. To contain unbridled comprehensiveness, choices have to be made about the relative magnitude of beginning and advanced levels of study, different services to clienteles and occupations, and especially about fields of knowledge to highlight and downplay. And within every field choices have to be made to pursue certain specialties while ignoring others. If such choices are not made, then all units and subunits simply receive fair
shares on the downslope of limited resources and hardened structures. Steering is left to the mercy of sunk costs.

As active university postures come to the fore, we find they can have positive effects on university character that are not anticipated in traditional thought. The entrepreneurial pathways tend to build coherence. A university becomes more willing to assert to the outside world that it is different, even distinctive. The whole institution can legitimately claim that it has its act together and is thereby better prepared to cope with the confusing complexity and rising uncertainty characteristic of modern higher education. A reputation of coherent competence provides a symbolic bridge to the environment for a favorable gathering of money, staff, and students.

As entrepreneurial responses multiply, universities become more individualized. To make the point in striking fashion, that higher education is not one thing and it has no one future, the Carnegie Council of the 1970s entitled their last report on the U.S. system Three Thousand Futures. (Carnegie Council, 1980) Actively forming their own character in different specific contexts, and developing different specific strengths and weaknesses, entrepreneurial universities, anywhere in the world, similarly develop their own distinctive futures. Rather than praising homogeneity, they put their trust in diversified capability—a posture appropriate for an evermore complex and competitive domain.

An entrepreneurial achievement of distinctiveness serves internally to unify an identity and thereby, ironically, to rebuild a sense of community. “Entrepreneur” may continue to be a negative term in the minds of traditional academics, all the more so after they have seen hard managerialism in action. They may go on thinking of entrepreneurship as raw individualistic striving that is socially divisive. They may continue to fear that a traditional academic community, assumed to exist, will be fragmented if entrepreneurial behavior takes over. However, diffuse in structure and fragmented in intent, traditional European universities, and many others around the world, have had little or no common symbolic and material integration. What integration they have had is steadily eroded by increasing scale and scope. Collective entrepreneurship overcomes their scattered character, leading toward a more integrated self. When entire departments and faculties are assertive, and especially when a whole university takes on an entrepreneurial character, the old understandings are turned upside down. Academic groups, small and large, then see themselves in common situations with common problems, common allies, and common enemies, and in need of common action. A common culture grows, an identity is shared.

Collegiality is then put to work in a different way. Bernard J. Shapiro (President, McGill University) and Harold T. Shapiro (President, Princeton University) have cogently argued that collegiality is normally “biased in favor of the status quo—not to mention the status quo ante.” The challenge is “to redefine our understandings and commitment so that, in empirical terms, collegiality and difficult choices are not mutually exclusive.” (1995, p. 10) The collective forms of entrepreneurship captured in this study change the equation. They put collegiality to work in the service of hard choices. Collegiality then looks to the future. It becomes biased in favor of change.

Self-defining, self-regulating universities have much to offer. Not least is their capacity in difficult circumstances to recreate an academic community. Toward such universities, the entrepreneurial response leads the way.

References


THE INTERVENTIONARY STATE IN CHINA 
AND PROGRAMS AND CURRICULA AT A 
CHINESE VOCATIONAL UNIVERSITY

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Abstract

Through case study methods, we examine a vocational university in China to ascertain if and the extent to which industrial modernization, the global economy and economic market forces, and state planning have altered this institution. We focus specifically upon a vocational university in China, as these institutions comprise the newest higher education sector in that nation and those most logically connected to work in the new global economy.

Keywords: curricula, economic globalization, institutional change, localization, modernization, programs, vocational universities, vocationalization.

The scholarly discussions of the global economy, the new economy, and higher education have addressed universities, particularly research universities, and particularly those institutions in North America (more specifically the U.S., and Canada), Europe, and Australia (Slaughter and Leslie 1997; Clark 1998; Currie and Newson 1998; Deem 1998; Marginson and Considine 2000; Bok 2003; Slaughter and Rhoades 2004). These examinations have focused primarily upon English speaking countries—countries in Western democracies—with some attention to non-English speaking Europe. The now customary view is that universities in the West have been affected significantly by a global economy, by the knowledge economy, by commercialization, and by neo-liberal ideologies, especially new or “fast capitalism” (Gee et al. 1996), particularly in their work processes, their curricular focus, and their pursuit of new revenue streams. For example, Slaughter and Rhoades’ work (2004) reminds us that while public research universities behave very much like businesses, they are not private enterprises and are heavily supported by government and the public. Yet, as we learn from others (Slaughter and Leslie 1997; Marginson and Considine 2000), stemming from a decline in the proportion of government funding, and arguably a reliance upon the private sector or competitive government grants, public institutions have taken on decidedly private business-like characteristics, from increasing their connection to the private sector to adopting private sector behaviors such as marketing and charging fees for services, as well as restructuring for competitive advantage. The discourse in the West about the new economy and higher education

*Anning Ding, the first author and principal investigator, is a native of China, and English is his second language. The first author used interview data in a larger study and we plan to use these data again for another publication.
characterizes the role of the state as limited, particularly the “interventionary state” (Goedegebure et al. 1993) in directing institutions and in the change process of organizations. Although the state intervenes, and indeed in some Western nations plays a significant role in university behaviors, the state does not dominate these behaviors nor determine institutional action.

In this literature, concepts, such as entrepreneurialism, one of the noted outcomes of the political economy on higher education, have strong cultural-historical meanings. Economic globalization, modernization, and new capitalism in the West have different meanings and no doubt different outcomes than in other non-Western nations. In the West, for example, private property is a given—owned by individuals—but not so in all nations. In China, in the Western sense of ownership, for example, the state owns the land of the nation based on the constitution. Ownership of public, private, corporate or individual properties in China is not defined adequately in legal terms (Oi and Walder 1999). Thus, to speak of privatization in China, one is prudent to exercise caution.

With little attention given to nations and their higher education institutions (HEIs) outside the West, we turn to the world’s most populated country—China—to ascertain if and the extent to which HEIs have experienced structural change during the state-guided intervention over the past 20 years. Our assumptions based upon higher education literature (Slaughter and Leslie 1997; Clark 1998; Currie and Newson 1998; Marginson and Considine 2000; Levin 2001; Bok 2003) are that industrial modernization, the global economy, new capitalism, and commercialization have altered higher education in Western and English-speaking nations, and such an alteration may be applicable internationally. While we do not give sufficient attention in this article to theories and concepts, we refer readers to other higher education treatments of the concepts of globalization (Slaughter and Leslie 1997; Levin 2001), marketization and market mechanisms (Leslie and Slaughter 1997), commercialization (Bok 2003; Slaughter and Rhoades 2004), and entrepreneurialism (Clark 1998; Marginson and Considine 2000). We recognize that processes such as globalization are complex (Robertson 1992) and that different countries encounter and respond to global pressures in highly differentiated ways (Guillén 2001). Similarly, with state-directed and controlled markets, we are cognizant of national differences. Nonetheless, we investigate from the perspective of Western higher education discourse on globalization and localization, on academic capitalism, and on resource dependency as well as networks in higher education (Slaughter and Leslie 1997; Currie and Newson 1998; Levin 2001; Slaughter and Rhoades 2004). We look at Chinese higher education in its recent developments through a limited framework similar to what Carnoy (2000) has called “the new economy.” In this investigation, we focus specifically upon vocational universities (VUs) in China, as these comprise the newest higher education sector in that nation and those most logically connected to work in the new global economy.

The Rise of the Vocational University in China

In 1980, a new type of HEI, “vocational universities (VUs),” appeared in China, with vocationalism and localism as dual indicators of their specific features and identities (Dai 1991; Fang 1991; Topical Research Group 1991; Zhang 1991; Zhang and Liang 1991). These characteristics were reflected in their program structure and curricular system and in their practices. Programs at the VUs were vocational in nature in applied fields of study at the pre-baccalaureate level and they served a broad spectrum of professional and occupational needs at intermediate and lower levels of the local job market. Localization which includes the characteristics of flexibility and adjustability was reflected in the entire range of curricula and programs (Fang 1991). Theoretical foundations for program structure and curricula at the VUs were reduced to the required minimum while practical skill training and hands-on learning were maximized as made evident by job position requirements (Zhang and Liang 1991). The VUs were locally administered and financed at the city level. Institutional policies and development plans were constructed in conjunction with local social and economic needs. Students were recruited locally and they worked in the surrounding geographical areas after graduation. Their jobs were intermediate and lower-level managerial and included the categories of skilled technicians and operators in various fields. Both vocationalism and localism worked in concert to support the development of an institution new to China. Supply
and demand were met by vocationalizing the programs and curricula and by localizing institutional operations for the specific needs of the region.

Our research addresses one major question on higher education in China. What changes to institutional policies and practices respond to and accommodate external influences, including the influence of the global economy, governments, and the Chinese modernization movement? This investigation examines VUs in China over their past 25 year development with specific attention given to the recent 4-year expansion, from 1999 to 2003.

Since the late 1990s, Chinese higher education has been undergoing a transformation and an expansion from elitism to mass higher education (Ministry of Education, MOE 1998; Communist Party of China, CPC 1999). Such expansion of this magnitude has led to consequences of enlarged institutional size, emergence of new HEIs, and has arguably intensified marketization and competition among HEIs, with differentiation as an outcome. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, China increased its participation in the global economy and its achievements were widely observed internationally. Local economic and business changes facilitated by the VUs supported global integration, as VUs featured vocationalism and localism.

**Theoretical Perspective: Institutional Change in China**

Wang (1998), in his study of China’s history of modernity, proposed a conceptual framework of institutional change in China to analyze China’s domestic organizational structure. Wang contends that contemporary China’s modernization campaign was initiated and processed on the basis of a “state-led” model. Using its ultimate power, the strong state initiated a change in the domestic structure by introducing or creating a market economy. Economic growth and the development of technology, education, and social welfare flourished through this market mechanism. “The market is the engine, but it is the state, not the invisible hand of the market, that directs the engine. The price is the often seen political distortion of the market” (Wang 1998, p. 38). Wang (1998) observes that political factors of the state government contribute to the modernization initiative, both its progress and success. The state regulates institutional change and alters domestic organizational structures to fit the needs and interests of the state. Higher education in China since the end of the 1970s has undergone several reforms in order to match the demand for national economic development.

We supplement this theoretical orientation with literature on globalization, particularly economic globalization (Waters 1996), to understand influences of global economic forces upon national and local economies. We note that the global and local are interconnected (Robertson 1992).

In the globalization process, an increasing number of developing countries from all regions participate actively in the globalization of production and markets (Dunning and Hamdani 1997). Their priorities are directed at the acquisition of human competencies and capital necessary to benefit from this process and in order to compete economically with other nations and regions.

Globalization is viewed not only through the emergence of world systems on a large scale, but also in the transformation of the everyday life in local communities. Fischman and Stromquist (2000) indicate that most countries, in response to social and economic problems or in meeting the challenge of social change associated with globalization, utilize their comparative advantage at the national level and within countries at the organizational level. Education is recognized by more countries as an essential instrument to cope with globalization forces and to assist regions or countries in developing their niches (Fang 1991; Chapman and Austin 2002). Institutions of higher learning, within the global context, are caught up in and affected by globalization, including new vocational and occupational demands and standards of training advocated by business and industry (Levin 2001).

**A Case Study of Nantong Vocational College (NTVC)**

This research adopted a case study method for an in-depth investigation and interpretation of an educational phenomena—the transformation of curricula and the modernization of higher education in a locally oriented institution (Merriam 1988, p. 2). Yin (1994) indicates that limiting a study
to a single case is “eminently justifiable...where the case serves a revelatory purpose” (p. 21). As China’s higher education system is highly centralized, a case may well explain a general phenomenon that is reflective of a national system. Through a process of personal contact, and a promise of full access to the institution, NTVC—one of approximately 100 VUs in China—was selected as the case institution (Ding 2004). Because of the homogenous character of Chinese higher educational institutions, including standardization of faculty qualifications, management of academic programs, and admissions standards by institutional type, the similarities among vocational colleges are more evident than their differences (Epstein 1991; MOE 2000). NTVC is typical of numerous VUs in Jiangsu province, China, primarily because operational procedures and facility requirements are regularized and unified under the MOE and provincial educational authorities (MOE 2000).

Nantong is located on the lower reaches of the Yangtze River near the East China Sea. The city is close to Shanghai, an internationally known metropolis. Nantong was one of the earliest coastal cities designated in 1984 by China’s central government as open to foreign investment, tourism, and trade (Newman 1992). Similar to other cities in Jiangsu, as well in China, Nantong has a local economic structure that has undergone significant change since the modernization campaign started. As well as economic development, social development has altered traditional patterns of life in Nantong.

To reveal the alterations in postsecondary education, we undertook a qualitative research investigation in the early part of the 2000s. Qualitative methods, particularly document analysis supplemented with interviews conducted in 2003, are the principal data collection methods. These methods, both for data collection and data analysis, relied upon advice from qualitative scholars to ensure a systematic research approach, as well as trustworthiness and credibility (Burgess 1984; Scott 1990; Le Compte and Pressie 1993; Miles and Huberman 1994; Berg 1995; Mason 1996; Marshall and Rossman 1999). Documents collected included public documents of governments at three levels: national, provincial, and city. Documents from the case institution were also collected. Government documents included guidelines, regulations, policies, and mandatory instructions for the VUs to follow regarding the structure of program and curricular arrangements. At the institutional level, collected documents included annual reports, mission statements, institutional policies, catalogues, admission brochures, and institutional correspondence with city and provincial educational authorities.

Those interviewed included senior institutional administrators (president, vice presidents for academic affairs and student affairs, deans of instruction and student affairs), departmental heads, and members of committees on curricula and programs. A total of 16 participants were involved. On average, each interview lasted about 45 min. These were transcribed and translated into English resulting in a 36 page, single-spaced manuscript. Interviews were designed and conducted to generate data on the behaviors of institutional administrators, department heads, and program committee members as well as their perceptions of vocationalization and localization of programs and curricula. Additionally, interviews solicited reasons for their perceptions. At the core, the questions related to program and curricular change following alteration of the local economic structure and labor market.

In addition to interviews and document analysis, and before on-site data collection commenced, we designed a survey questionnaire and sent copies to the institution requesting general information about institutional history, departments, programs, faculty, students, job placements, and local economic structure. Responses to this survey helped us acquire a comprehensive understanding and description of the institution and its community.

Analytical categories for both document and interview data were developed from themes associated with modernization (Giddens 1990) and institutional change to capture the characteristics and conditions of programs and curricula at the case institution. Essentially, these categories were thematic representations of patterns of meaning contained within the data. External demands on the institution, such as global forces and the local economy, as well as governmental policy and internal responses of the institution, such as mechanisms to construct programs and curricula, were examined and analyzed through this interpretative approach. In this article, we rely principally upon document data for our analysis. We followed Miles and Huberman’s advice (1994) on pattern coding and organized data around concepts that included “marketization,” “restructuring,” and “science and technology.”
As well as analysis of documents and interviews, we developed a case history of both Nantong and NTVC. Data from this case history were drawn from Nantong city documents and from NTVC documents and interviews.

**Nantong City’s Economic Performance, 1978–2001**

The city of Nantong includes four county-level cities, two counties, two urban districts, one economic and technology development district, and one tourist resort district. Nantong occupies a land mass of 8001 square kilometers. In 2001, Nantong had a population of 7.82 million. Change of the population division in agriculture and non-agriculture sectors shows a decrease of population in the rural area and an increase of population in the urban area. In 1980, Nantong’s population in the rural area and in the urban area was on a ratio of 11 to 1. More than 91% of the total population were scattered in the countryside. By 1997, this ratio changed to 2.22 to 1. The percentage of the population in the rural area dropped to 68.82%. A large proportion of the population in the rural area discontinued farming and converted to various kinds of non-farming occupations. As a result, urbanization expanded. An urban labor market arose to accommodate population expansion and to serve the needs of industrialization.

Based upon “Nantong City Economic Yearbook” (Nantong Bureau of Statistics 2002), the total value of the GDP in 2001 reached CNY80.93 billion, or US $9.75 billion (Yang et al. 2005). Almost half was derived from secondary manufacturing industries and about one third from tertiary industries. Economic achievements through international business activities were remarkable. In 2001, the total value of imports and exports reached US $3.233 billion, an increase of 2.4% over the previous year. In 2001, agreements for 223 new projects of foreign investments were signed with a total value of US $0.422 billion, an increase of 19.5% over the previous year. The number of foreign owned and joint owned companies grew to 1103. Export of labor for overseas projects also increased, mostly in building and construction projects. About 16,109 Nantong workers were stationed in 41 countries and regions.

According to the “Twenty years of reform and opening of Nantong: A report on social and economic development, 1978–1998” (Nantong Statistical Bureau 1999), a dramatic change had taken place in Nantong: diversification of the economic structure and the growth of the GDP. In 1978, the value of the Nantong GDP was CNY2.939 billion, or US $1.86 billion (Yang et al. 2005). By 1998, it rose to CNY57.747 billion, or US $6.96 billion (Yang et al. 2005). On a comparable price basis, it grew by 6.5 times with an average annual growth of 11%, higher than the national and provincial rate of growth. The GDP per capita per annum had also increased from CNY 408.00, or US $258.00 (Yang et al. 2005) in 1978 to CNY 7,349.00, or US $885.00 (Yang et al. 2005) in 1998.

Before 1978, only state-owned industries existed in urban areas with the people’s communes as collective entities found in rural areas across China. The policy of economic reform started in 1978 shook off the iron control of the national central planning system over production. As a result,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of entities (,000)</th>
<th>No. of employees (.000)</th>
<th>GDP (CNY million) [CONVERT TO $US]</th>
<th>Tax generated (CNY million) [CONVERT TO $US]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>761</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>1,728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times of that in 1997 over 1990</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the economic structure began to diversify to include collective businesses, private companies, personal entities, joint ventures, and foreign investment companies. The expansion of non-state entities contributed greatly to the process of structural diversification (See Table 1).

Change in labor and industrial structure followed the diversification of the economic structure. The rise of secondary and tertiary industries contributed considerably to the value growth of the GDP in Nantong in the 20 years as shown in Table 2.

Introduction of foreign economic activities in Nantong broke the traditional and closed pattern of local economic performance and business activities. These included international trade (import and export), foreign investment (including technology and equipment), foreign economic cooperation, and international tourist business. This economic achievement was significant and evidence of transformation from a closed, agricultural-based human settlement into a more open, industrializing, and dynamic urban zone featuring global characteristics.

**NTVC: Early Development**

NTVC was established in May of 1983 with only six programs and fewer than 400 students. By 1985, another six programs were added, including Chinese secretarial, industrial accounting, business English, mould making, enterprise management, and electrical motor making. By 1987, an internal reorganization led to the establishment of four departments: Mechanical Technology, Electronic Technology, Chemical Technology, and Construction Technology (NTVC 1991, 1990; NTVC Party Committee & NTVC President Office 1993).

The rise of rural industries, such as small manufacturing and service businesses, started and owned by farmers or their families (Byrd and Gelb 1991) changed the local economic structure and generated new and urgent demands for college graduates with specialized skills and techniques. NTVC, in its early efforts, developed a contract training program for those rural enterprises. A tri-partnership (college, enterprises, and students) was formed and enlarged the size of the college enrollment and solved, in part, the shortage of funding. About half of college funding was generated from contract enrolment (NTVC 1991).

Institutional efforts were made to maintain stability and flexibility of the programs and curricula for adaptation to local needs. In the process of teaching and learning, hands-on experience and laboratory work were stressed to promote students’ application of skills and their capability in managing practical emergencies.

**NTVC: Transformation From 1999–2002**

By 2002, NTVC had nine departments: Mechanical Technology, Electronic Technology, Chemical Technology, Construction Technology, Textile Technology, Applied Liberal Arts, Foreign Languages, Economic Management, and Applied Arts which was established in September of 2002 (NTVC 2002). The department contained 62 programs, including 25 four-year double-major programs. The college enrollment increased to 5650, from 2155 in 1998 and 394 in 1983. The number of faculty had

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**TABLE 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GDP</th>
<th>Share of three industries</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[Primary] industry</td>
<td>[Secondary] industry</td>
<td>[Tertiary] industry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>2.939</td>
<td>1.228</td>
<td>1.098</td>
<td>0.612</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>57.747</td>
<td>12.213</td>
<td>26.945</td>
<td>18.59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

grown to 340, from 156 in 1998 and 69 in 1983. Sharp expansion was observed in recent years as revealed in Table 3.

In institutional growth, there is evidence of a two-stage developmental process of increase in enrolment and programs at NTVC: before 1999 and after 1999. Before 1999, the management of Chinese HEIs was manipulated strenuously through central government planning. There was little engagement of HEIs in the market and expansion of higher education was reported as slow and difficult. With further reforms since 1999 on the conversion of a state-controlled economic system to a market-like economy, market forces increased and began to exert more powerful influences on both institutional enrolments and local employment (Story 2003). Following enrolment growth, significant alterations took place in program structure, curriculum, and the expressed purposes of training. For NTVC, this meant rapid development beginning in the period after 1999. Enrolment tripled in 3 years. The number of programs including sub-programs and double-major programs also tripled. Institutional expansion had a three fold outcome: college survival, competitive participation with other institutions, and planning for greater development.

Following the expansion, institutional competition for students became acute. Under the centralized admission’s mechanism, VUs were required to enroll new students last of all post secondary institutions—those students who had the lowest test scores. The capabilities of new students were less than those of students before the expansion. The program head of the construction technology program noted that “we soon found that the students were not prepared and could not adapt.” Yet, this same program head described the dilemma for the institution: “the local labor market changed significantly due to the change of the local demographics and the economic structure.”

The NTVC administration decided that institutional purpose would be revised to focus upon the training of technological personnel, skilled technicians, and skilled operators on the production line. Hence, programs and curricula were restructured and adjusted. New programs were derived from old programs. Extension of core programs to establish sub-programs was found mostly in economic management programs and electrical technology programs. Computer-related programs and English were the two stem programs institution-wide constituting new double major programs with other programs. Moreover, three applied liberal arts programs were set up using this method. The head of applied liberal arts programs indicated that “employers raised the requirements in hiring new graduates. There was a trend towards higher credential requirements and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Entrants (graduates)</th>
<th>Departments</th>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>Double-major programs</th>
<th>Faculty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>394 (127)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1083 (274)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2155 (535)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2223 (722)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2622 (832)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>4076 (601)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>5650 (720)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>6530 (948)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

higher consumption of educated personnel that resulted in a heated competition in the labor market.” The development of entirely new programs was a new practice based upon departmental determination of local needs.

In order to adapt to institutional change, including expansion, NTVC reorganized its management structure. First was the establishment of the NTVC Program Construction and Supervision Committee in 2000 (NTVC 2000). External members from local government and business were invited to report changes in their industries and the labor market and to make comments on changes of the program structure and curricular content. The second adjustment was the extension of departmental duties to include managerial and operational affairs. The third adjustment was the construction of new business-like relationships, including roles and responsibilities between institutional administration and departmental administration, made evident by implementation of the “Contract of Appointment of Departmental Administrators at NTVC” (NTVC 2001b). According to several of those interviewed, all departments, from heads to faculty and staff, experienced higher supervisory pressure over them and heavier performance obligations.

According to the director for instructional services, the new curricular system was segmented into a number of modules that were composed of one or more techniques or skills, a curriculum that supported vocational requirements and a job competency structure. New courses and syllabi were planned and designed for training students with the skills and techniques included in the competency system. Implementation would be made through course delivery in the classroom and through practical work on sites such as labs, workshops, or enterprises. Again, theoretical components were minimized while practical learning was emphasized and enlarged.

**NTVC Under China’s Governments**

Governments and their educational agencies in China play critical roles in shaping higher education institutional behaviors. In this study, a total of 48 documents were collected and examined, including 15 national documents (4 from the CPC committee and central government, 11 from the MOE), 13 provincial documents, all from the Jiangsu Department of Education (JDOE), two city documents from the Nan-tong City CPC Committee and the City Government, and 18 institutional documents from NTVC. Documents covered the period from 1991 to 2002, which corresponded with the second drive of China’s modernization campaign (Vohra 2000).

National documents can be characterized as policy announcements and instructions calling on nation-wide constituents to raise their understanding and awareness of the nation in the progress of globalization and modernization, including the importance of achieving and maintaining strong nation-state status to compete with other nations. The national government and the national educational administration were forceful and up-beat in their views of both economic globalization and the active participation of the nation in the globalization process. Three of the four documents reflected the national view on the urgency of reform of higher education for the post World Trade Organization (WTO) competition in the world market (CPC & the State Council 2002). The role of science and technology progress, the knowledge economy, and economic globalization were emphasized (CPC & the State Council 1999). Illustrative of policy change is the special directive from the central government for developing vocational higher education in China.

[All] the junior colleges and adult colleges should be converted to vocational and technical colleges. Enterprises and business entities are asked to provide part time teachers, and training opportunities for vocational colleges. Advisory committees on the programs and curricula must be established with memberships from occupational associations and enterprises. Vocational schools and colleges must be focused on the training of qualified and specialized technicians, production line operators, and skilled workers who would devote their life to practical work, and who would possess the spirit of creativity. The vocational and technical programs and curricula at colleges must be adjusted and readjusted in adaptation to economic structure, technological changes and labor market requirements. Practical training should be strengthened. Teaching and learning must be combined with productive practices. Teachers at vocational institutions must be trained at enterprises for skill competencies and trained at higher institutions for theoretical knowledge (CPC & the State Council 2002).
The MOE was authorized to implement national policy for education to achieve the modernization goal and to further national ends for global competition. MOE placed its priorities primarily on areas of expansion, quality and efficiency, restructuring, and regulation. Eight out of eleven documents proposed the expansion and the reform of higher education structure for national economic development. The Chinese non-university sector, referred to as higher vocational and technical educational institutions, was given priority during this expansion (MOE, 1998, 2001). In order to achieve an increase in student enrolment, these institutions had authority to compete for students, and thus students could be considered as commodities for these institutions.

Provincial education administrations followed central government instructions in managing the educational systems of their provinces. Thirteen documents collected for this investigation were all from the Jiangsu educational authority, JDOE. Although NTVC, our case institution, is a city college, many of its operational plans and activities including the establishment of new programs had to obtain provincial permission and support prior to enrolling students and operating programs. An analysis of the 13 documents showed that, in addition to following the instructions and policies from the central government, in the past 10 years, the JDOE altered education to serve provincial social and economic development and to prepare qualified graduates for local economic demands and the labor market, particularly for those of VUs (JDOE 1998). Priority was given to those programs related to the “third development opportunity,” or the stages of provincial economic development since 1978, and “for the sustainable development” of the province (JDOE 1998). The reform process was initiated and expected to be carried out in instructional content and in the structure of the curriculum in order to train personnel with applied skills for industry and business.

Only two post secondary education documents were found and collected from the CPC Nantong committee and the city government. These explained the exclusion of the city government from management of college programs and curricula. Although vocational colleges are funded by local governments, the control of program expansion and academic affairs within the institution are outside the control of the city government. Instead, authority is vested in a provincial government agency.

Eighteen institutional documents were examined from the institutional level and they were categorized in two parts. Ten documents were those sent out to the JDOE requesting approval for new programs and for adjustment of current programs: most of the documents originated prior to 2000 when the provincial education administration held authority in controlling program development. The remainder were those distributed internally to departments and program units within the institution: these addressed restructuring, regularization, external competition, marketization, and quality and efficiency.

The frequent requests for approval of new programs to the provincial education administration by NTVC suggest not only the institutional intention in following instructions from the central, provincial, and city governments to serve local demands, but also an opportunity to develop the college itself. Approval and disapproval often caused confusion and inefficiency for NTVC in its planning and implementation of enrolment and instructional arrangements (see JDOE 1994; NTVC 1997). The structure of administrative authority in the NTVC case indicates that the provincial government had the power to control program development at individual institutions. Yet, the lack of knowledge of local economic conditions as well as local labor market needs on the part of the provincial agency led to some dysfunctionality in the relationship between that agency and the individual institution. In 1999, the institution’s administration initiated a comprehensive plan for the reform of program structure and teaching (NTVC 1999). The necessity for such reform was in line with the MOE’s instructions for the reform of teaching at HEIs, and consistent with the provincial educational authority’s guidance to reform teaching and learning at VUs. As well, at NTVC, in a college-wide arrangement, performance benchmarks were established, with each of the departments and the program units required to design and implement their own teaching reforms.

Findings from the document analysis indicate that the national institutional and bureaucratic structures in China reflected and perhaps created a unique social environment in which change in program structure and curricular system took place at the case institution. National policy change and the related implemented procedures played a decisive and crucial role in China’s path toward
modernization and adaptation to a global economy. The managed process by levels of governments ensured that educational institutions were kept on the acceptable track and in the approved direction to facilitate modernization and globalization.

**Modernization, Nantong City, and NTVC**

China’s modernization campaign engaged the nation in the globalization process. Over the last two decades, the city of Nantong was globalized, in the economic domain in particular. In the process of interaction between the local and the global, a market, including the local labor market, emerged and expanded rapidly. Education became a commodity. Prior to this period, and under the former central planning system, education in China was never considered a commodity. Educational institutions were arranged as government agencies and were tightly controlled in a formal and closed structure by the national, provincial, and local governments and their educational authorities. When economic reform started in the late 1970s, and went deeper in the 1980s and 1990s, education in China was not altered substantially to match the economic sector. Since the late 1990s, however, the race to marketization in the economic sectors accelerated. The reform of China’s educational administration began to be oriented to the market and marketization (Hayhoe 1992; Cheng 1995; White et al. 1996). At NTVC, the diminution of funding from the local government, the growing enrolments under the contract scheme, and the recent expansion of enrolments and programs were institutional strategies to adapt to competition and the pressures of market forces. Planning shifted from centralized and national to decentralized and local. The reorganization of institutional management, restructuring to create new programs including both sub-programs and double major programs, and the reconfiguration of the curricular system towards vocationalism and localism exemplified market behaviors in line with economic globalization. In the main, these behaviors at NTVC were intended to increase institutional capacity to compete for students with other similar institutions. For NTVC, the salient outcome was alteration to programs and curricula in line with both local and global markets.

**Vocationalization and Localism Under Modernization at NTVC**

Education within the pattern of vocationalism and localism at NTVC was directed to career development and to training for market purposes. This pattern was inseparable from a globalization process, and resulted in an educational institution being ‘economized’—that is, where decisions are based upon economic rationales (Levin 2001). The academic orientation was no longer the core of the case institution. Academic learning and knowledge dissemination as traditional functions of HEIs gave way to training for workforce skills and job competencies. The Vice President of NTVC expresses this succinctly: “the college programs were now dominated by the demands of the market.”

This case study suggests that the modernization process heavily influenced and shaped the localization of economic structural change, the rise of the market and marketization, and institutional responses. External forces generated from the global economy influenced college arrangements for program structure and the curricular system. Eventually, teaching and learning functions were altered to vocational training.

**Modernization and Entrée to the Global Economy**

For the city of Nantong, international activities, including international investment, international trade, overseas contract business, and international tourism, are prominent features of local involvement in the global economy. Consequently, a market grew that was extended from the local to the global. The local economy, impacted by global forces, was reorganized and restructured in order to gain a place in the global market. Integration of the local into the global is evident: the local and the global became increasingly interdependent, consistent with Robertson’s (1992) “interpenetration” of a local society with other societies or a global culture, and vice versa. The 20-year change
examined in this case indicates that the city of Nantong was re-mapped to globalism. An agriculturally concentrated, closed, and semi-industrialized city is becoming a growing, dynamic, open, and modernizing area. This transformation signified changing demands and local market needs. For NTVC, local requests rose rapidly and changed frequently, challenging the institution to respond and ultimately to change.

The initiation of vocationalism and localism of Chinese VUs occurred with the Chinese modernization program, complimenting and aiding China’s path to the international community and to the global economy. The change and adjustment of program structure and the curricular system are not sudden actions at the institutional level. Instead, an interactive process of change occurred between and among NTVC, the local market, and the local economy. With the participation of external constituents in program and curricular reconstruction, an open operation of education and training was established to link teaching and learning with workplace needs on a rationally defined basis. Program structures and curricular content bear obvious features of instrumentalism and pragmatism in an attempt to raise the vocational skills and techniques of students, and to serve local economic requirements. Although global forces did not impact the institution directly, the effects of localization of global forces affected NTVC organizational patterns at both institutional and departmental levels, and also affected program structure and the curricular system. Consequently, education became training in order to maximize the human talent potential for economic purposes. The academic disciplinary based program structure and curricular system were changed to those based on market requirements and job competencies. For example, fewer hours were spent in academic learning while more hours were devoted to lab work and practice; course content was updated, emphasizing practical skills, based upon the recommendations from external curriculum committee members, who were local employers. This is consistent with national patterns where programs and curricula, traditionally regarded as the core of the academic institution, became industry and commercially oriented. Knowledge and skills were viewed as commodities for trading. The service of VUs for local economic development was also a service to the internationalization and globalization of the local environment, a service, in short, to the global market.

The case of NTVC indicates that the modernization process, including economic globalization and the concept of a global economy, has salience in non-Western countries for HEIs. What is revealed here are the alterations at the institutional level—of management structures, programs, and curricula, as well as student populations. Surprisingly, while the college and its local business and industry are merging both in desirable student outcomes and curricular focus, the local jurisdiction—city government—has no connection with institutional governance. This condition seems irrational. Yet, if we consider governance in U.S. community colleges—as an appropriate comparative institution—local jurisdictions have no formal role in governance outside those districts where board members are elected by the local population, and then only individuals not local governments have decision-making authority in community colleges.

The state led model (Wang 1998) that introduced a market economy is clearly the force behind the alteration of the vocational university. In using the local market and a local institutional for workforce training, the state has connected the local economy to the global. Unlike the accounts of economic globalization and Western universities, this case demonstrates the role of a central government—through its policies and directives—in shaping profound educational reform and in leading a country and its institutions toward a market economy. The case of NTVC is reflective of a nation’s alterations in the face of economic globalization at the end of the 20th century and at the beginning of the new millennium.

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POSITIONING HIGHER EDUCATION FOR THE KNOWLEDGE BASED ECONOMY
ELIZABETH ST. GEORGE

Abstract
This article questions the assumption that increasing competition among higher education institutions is the best method of achieving a strong higher education sector in developing countries. It notes that there has been increasing emphasis on the importance of higher education institutions for sustainable development, particularly because of their importance to the global knowledge economy. For the same reason, the appropriate management of the relationship between the state and higher education institutions is vital to a strong and dynamic future for these institutions. This paper proposes a menu of options for higher education governance, grouped around ‘state-centric’ and ‘neo-liberal’ models of development. The ‘state-centric’ model proposed is based on a variety of examples of high performing Asian economies, in particular, while the ‘neo-liberal’ model is based on emerging trends in higher education management in countries such as Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom. The paper suggests that despite pressure across the globe to encourage a market among universities, this may not always be the most efficient use of resources, or the best way to integrate universities in a country’s drive for economic growth.

Keywords: Asia, development, governance, higher education, knowledge-based economy, management, state, Vietnam.

Introduction
This paper grew out of research into the higher education system in Vietnam, and the concern that the country was being pushed into accepting a neo-liberal model of higher education management, without adequate consideration being given to alternatives that might be more suited to the Vietnamese context.

The aim of this paper is not to propose a particular model of state-higher education relations for developing countries, but rather to look more closely at the different questions needing to be addressed by the management of universities and the range of options available to address those questions so that developing countries are better able to choose the option or set of options that suits their own development context and aspirations. Understanding this framework is particularly important in a world where universities are increasingly vital to ensuring a country’s socio-economic development.
This paper begins with an outline of what constitutes a knowledge-based economy, and why the increasing importance of knowledge has important implications for universities. It then proposes two possible models of university—state relations, the ‘state-centric model’ and the ‘neo-liberal model’, based on the models adopted by the countries with the strongest economic growth of the last decades, and argues that they offer different possibilities for countries to consider in reforming their higher education sector for a knowledge-based economy. Finally, the paper presents a case study of the Vietnamese experience to suggest wider considerations that need to be taken into account in pursuing a particular model of state-higher education relations, particularly in developing countries.

Knowledge-Based Economies

The most important economic development of our lifetime has been the rise of a new system for creating wealth, based no longer on muscle but on mind (Toffler 1990, p. 9).

The last decade of the 20th century saw greater emphasis than ever before placed on higher education. In both developed and developing nations, higher education was believed to be the key to the continuing growth of national economies. Alvin Toffler was writing in 1990, when the knowledge economy was only a concept and before statistics had been developed to quantify the contribution of knowledge to an economy. However, even in 1990, the effects of globalisation could no longer be ignored. Toffler was prescient in noting the now well-recognised international trend in employment from blue-collar low-skilled jobs, to white-collar highly-skilled employment, and the importance of widely diffused and ever expanding knowledge that contributes significantly to current economic growth.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines a country with a knowledge-based economy as one where ‘the production, diffusion and use of technology and information are key to economic activity and sustainable growth.’ (OECD 1999, p. 7). Investment in knowledge refers to investment in areas that generate knowledge, such as research and development, software, education and basic science. It also refers to ‘innovation’ and the machinery, equipment and infrastructure to support it. While the relationship between increasing levels of knowledge and economic growth is not yet clear,1 what is clear, is that most industrialised countries have been investing heavily in new knowledge, its creation, dissemination and adaptation to production, on a par with their investment in machinery and equipment (8%), particularly since the mid-1990s (OECD 1999, pp. 9, 13, 21). The OECD report produced in 1999 was undertaken at the request of its member governments who felt they had insufficient data from which to plan for a knowledge-based economy or assess the contribution that higher education institutions could make to such an economy. The implications are particularly important for higher education institutions, which perform around 20% of all research and development activities for the OECD as a whole (OECD 1999, p. 31).

Education has become an important subject of discussion in international economic fora. The Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), classified education as a service and sought to ensure the gradual reduction of restrictions on educational services such as technology transfer, consultancy, distance education and so on. The eventual aim was to create an international marketplace in education (Kelsey 1998, pp. 55–56). The demands placed on education by the knowledge-based economy are best encapsulated by the educational theorist, Abby Riddell:

Changing trade patterns influence the productive possibilities of the economy and thereby the demand for education, the uses put to education, and the demands made on education for tailoring the workforce to those demands (Riddell 1996, p. 1363).

The implications of such an emphasis though, may be that developing countries get left behind in a global marketplace, if adequate attention is not paid to developing countries’ ‘knowledge economy’.

Like Alvin Toffler, governments have recognised the shift from factory based production to hi-tech and knowledge intensive industries and are now looking at ways in which to encourage
organisations to move into these areas, creating new opportunities and tensions between the state and higher education. In the words of a report from the Branch for Knowledge-Based Economies, then part of the Australian Government’s Department of Industry, Science and Resources

... new growth theories and other new analytical frameworks have attempted to incorporate knowledge into economic production functions. From a policy point of view, since knowledge differs from other economic goods because of its ‘public good’ characteristics, its growing importance raises new challenges for public policy (Department of Industry Science and Resources (Australian Government) 2000).

In the first half of the 1990s, however, the major international development agencies were insisting that developing countries should be concentrating on strengthening their primary and lower secondary education, while higher education was largely considered a luxury of the elite.

After strongly emphasising the expansion of primary and secondary education, as the areas most appropriate to the stage of economic development of these countries in the 1990s (World Bank 1994), in 2000, the World Bank revisited its policy framework for higher education, noting that Tertiary education institutions support knowledge-driven economic growth strategies and poverty reduction by (a) training a qualified and adaptable labour force [...]; (b) generating new knowledge; and (c) building the capacity to access existing stores of global knowledge and to adapt that knowledge to local use. Tertiary education institutions are unique in their ability to integrate and create synergy among these three dimensions ...

The norms, values, attitudes, ethics, and knowledge that tertiary institutions can impart to students constitute the social capital necessary to construct healthy civil societies and socially cohesive cultures. (World Bank 2002).

In a knowledge-based global economy the emphasis must be not only on the structure of educational institutions, but also on their content. Riddell argues that for the future, the most important skill that education can supply is flexibility. Fordist style industry was characterised by narrowly specialised tasks on the factory floor and the fragmentation of skills and knowledge. It relied on strict adherence to time schedules and respect of authority. Industries of the future will rely primarily on individuals who are able to adapt to rapidly changing situations, who are creative, independent and who have broadly based skills that can be used as a basis for specific job skills training. Consequently education should provide individuals with the flexibility to adapt to changing situations. The ‘post-Fordist’ education should emphasise not so much new knowledge as new behaviour, including problem solving and participatory decision-making. The curriculum should include multi-disciplinary studies and a variety of approaches to teaching from a variety of alternative ‘teachers’ (Riddell 1996, pp. 1359–1361). This is particularly important in a global economy, she argues, because the effect of globalisation has been to create patterns of employment, expectations, and demands for skills and products which cannot be met solely within national boundaries, not solely through national policies’ (Riddell 1996, p. 1358).

In recognition of the changing dynamics of the global marketplace, the Uruguay Round of trade talks gained a new focus—ensuring the reduction of barriers to the internationalisation of both education and the recruitment of highly qualified, highly skilled employees able to work in an international environment. It is higher education institutions that are already in the best position to benefit from, and contribute to, the increasing exchange of knowledge and the economic development of their country, as recognised by the World Bank.

Against the now wide acceptance that higher education has a vital role to play in a country’s development and participation in the international economy, the important question remains of how best to manage universities so that they are able to fulfil this function. What are the options for a government wishing to position its higher education system to be at the forefront a knowledge-based economy? A starting point is to examine the strategies of the highest performing economies over the last several decades.

The Asian Model of Education for Development

East and Southeast Asia have the highest performing economies of the last several decades. Public investment in education in Asia between 1965 and 1990 also grew faster than in any other region
in the world, both as a percentage of total expenditure and on a per capita basis (Tilak 1994, p. 59). This expansion occurred just as human capital arguments were beginning to make an impact on economic planners but also coincided with other local influences. In many countries, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, education has been seen as a means of uniting different ethnic and linguistic groups within countries with diverse populations, as well as a means of countering perceived colonial hegemony in a post-colonial world (Nguyen The Anh 1996, p. 524). A substantial education system was a hallmark of a modern society and offered newly established governments a highly visible way of meeting demands for social equality (Huq 1975, p. 56).

During the economic recession of the 1970s, however, high levels of unemployment and particularly of educated unemployed, called into question the value of investment in education. Increasing costs of education due to the enrolment expansion at all levels placed a heavy burden on shrinking government budgets (Fagerlind and Saha 1983, pp. 50–53). Despite these considerations, commitment to educational expansion in most Asian countries continued to grow.

The idea of an ‘Asian model’ of education as separate in its own right stemmed from a series of educational conferences sponsored by UNESCO, often referred to as the ‘Karachi Plan.’ The first conference was held in Karachi in 1959/60 and was followed by two more, in Tokyo (1962) and Bangkok (1965). These conferences aimed to take a more regional look at educational needs, in particular the likely demand for education by individuals, and the demand for educated people by organisations within the region. They were inspired by the success of Japan in gaining an economic parity with the West. The initial plan signed in Karachi focused on primary education and advocated that it be made compulsory. It also suggested that the countries within the region should establish an education plan within the overall framework of national development plans and reserve finance specifically for education. At the follow-up Tokyo meeting, higher levels of education were also considered and the decision was taken to elaborate overall strategies for educational development, on the basis of the concept of ‘balanced development.’ ‘Balanced development’ of education referred to the need to balance educational expansion with economic and population expansion, and with national development plans and available finance. At the Bangkok conference enrolment targets were set at 90%, 33% and 5% in primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment respectively, to be introduced by the year 1980. Japan was held up as the model and inspiration for other countries to follow (Watson 1980, pp. 57–59; Tilak 1994, p. 49).

Based on the ‘Asian model’, many countries in the region massively expanded their primary and secondary education, not to mention teacher training. The ambitious goals of the Karachi Plan were not universally achieved within Asian countries, but the results were nonetheless impressive. Between 1960 and 1990 primary education in Asia expanded faster than any other region in the world (5%) and equaled Africa for the overall growth in school enrolment (5.5%), although not on a per capita basis (Tilak 1994, pp. 40–42).

If the ‘Asian model’ was originally put forward as a distinctive educational model in the 1960s, it has become of increasing interest over recent years because of the economic performance of Asian, and particularly East Asian economies.

Japan was the first Asian country to reach a technological parity with Western nations, not to mention sustained economic growth. As such it led the way for Asian countries in the post-Second World War era who feared Western dominance and sought to develop a distinctively Asian education system (Baker and Holsinger 1996, p. 161). Japan’s educational policies, particularly following the Second World War, focused on high quality universal education and rapid expansion in higher education to ‘catch up’ with the West (Baker and Holsinger 1996, p. 161). Mohammed Shamsul Huq, based on Theodore Schultz’s methodology, undertook a study of returns to schooling for Japan between 1930 and 1955. He found that education contributed around 25% of the total increases in national income during that period. He does stress, however, that ‘the far-reaching educational measures taken in the early Meiji era were not directly linked to the economic growth but laid the foundation on which the country’s economic system was built.’ (Huq 1975, p. 79).

Of more recent impact is the example of the High Performing Asian Economies (HPAEs), and in particular South Korea and Taiwan. Within this model the ‘principal concern is with the role of human resource development, in particular with investment in different levels and types of education as a generator of growth.’ (Singh 1991, p. 386). These countries first sought to achieve universal primary education, and then went on to expand high quality secondary education in line
with the increasing industrialisation of their economies. Now, the focus appears to be on tertiary level education, which will support the knowledge-based, hi-tech economy and help to increase their production of internationally competitive goods and services (Tilak 1994, p. 55). Education has been used as a tool by these countries to short-circuit the process of industrialisation, unlike Western countries, where the universalisation of primary education was not achieved until well after industrialisation, in the 1960s (Fagerlind and Saha 1983, p. 236).

One hallmark of the Asian model is the use of deliberate government strategies and funding to steer education in a direction considered desirable for development. Such strategies are particularly evident in higher education. Jasbir Sarjit Singh (1991) examines the development of higher education in Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, and notes several significant trends common to all these countries since 1970. The first is that they have all been pursuing structural adjustment policies to move their economies away from a significant agriculture sector and towards the manufacturing and service sectors. At the same time they have been steadily increasing the proportion of students enrolled in higher education in comparison with other levels of schooling. Finally the governments of these countries have been using deliberate systems of regulations and incentives to expand the higher education sector and to produce graduates in perceived areas of need: science, technology, and more recently, engineering and scientific research linked to development, and to the needs of local industries. In short the higher education systems have been developed in tandem with their industrialisation policies demonstrating many of the characteristics of planned economies, with fixed growth targets and manpower forecasting aligned to intended growth patterns.’ (Singh 1991, p. 398). A finding that was reinforced by a study ten years later for Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan that ‘identified a set of government strategies and associated institutional structures in the field of education and training in these economies which [. . .] played a crucial role in ensuring that economic growth could proceed without employers experiencing severe skills shortages.’ (Ashton et al. 2002, p. 5). The authors argue that a similar path is being followed by Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia, albeit for different reasons and from a different background (Ashton et al. 2002, pp. 11–12).

But the Asian model may go beyond the issue of balancing development with appropriate years of education and sectoral expansion. Nguyen The Anh argues that an Asian model of education should also consider the Confucian heritage of Japan and the ‘Four Dragons’, which is characterised by ‘government leadership, competitive education, elitist meritocracy, social interaction, a disciplined workforce, principles of equality and self-reliance, and self-cultivation’ (Nguyen The Anh 1996, p. 527–528). The implication is that educational institutions should be concentrating on cultivating these values to achieve higher levels of development, an argument reminiscent of Weber’s explanation for industrialisation based on the ‘Protestant ethic’ in England.

The Asian model of education for development, in short, is underpinned by belief in the importance of education as a driver of economic growth. It demonstrates particular views on the desirable level of funding for different levels of education and for different branches of study, as well as the values and ethics that should underpin what is taught. In general, the Asian model shows the conception of a desirable society to be the achievement of the level of growth and industrialisation shown by Western countries and Japan (although perhaps not the social values). Through education, they seek to bring about this change through a planned process of significant government intervention and focused government funding.

The existence of an ‘Asian model’ of education has a great attraction for countries that wish to emulate the success of the HPAEs, but despite the similarities among the education for growth strategies analysed by Singh,

. . . the four ‘HPAEs’ in Southeast Asia, and Vietnam, the largest of the ASEAN transitional economies, have all followed different education policies over the decades of rapid growth since the 1960s. These reflect in part their different colonial legacies, and in part the different attitudes of their governments to the role of education in the growth process. Although both the Taiwanese and South Korean experiences have been influential in Southeast Asia, as in other parts of the world, there is little evidence that the educational development in Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore has followed either the Taiwanese or the South Korean path [. . .] Certainly neither Thailand nor Singapore educated ‘ahead of demand’ in the way that South Korea and Taiwan did (Booth 2000, pp. 14–15).
The differences between the model adopted in each country notwithstanding, ‘the Asian model’ as a concept continues to be attractive in Southeast Asia, and offer support for strong state intervention and direction to ensure that higher education institutions are working in a direction supportive of economic growth. For many Asian countries, the direction to follow to achieve economic growth has been clear. It is the path of industrialisation already trodden by the West and Japan, with some local variation. For these countries, state direction helped them to short-cut the uncertainties and inefficiencies of market economy and underpin rapid advances in economic growth. At the same time, the need for flexibility and innovation as key features of the knowledge-based economy, give rise to significant questions about the suitability of this model for achieving continued growth, particularly when the appropriate direction to achieve on-going, post-industrial, growth remains unclear.

The Neo-Liberal Model of Development

The Asian model outlined above is characterized in part by strategic government investment and policies to direct the expansion of higher education institutions, as well as the direction of higher levels of science, technology, and eventually, research capacity, ensuring that they are closely linked to emerging industries. The neo-liberal model, by contrast, concentrates on reducing the role of government in higher education and creating a market for individual institutions to compete against each other. In a concisely worded statement, a joint ECLAC-UNESCO document on shifting education and knowledge patterns for production, summarises the concerns of neo-liberal education strategists:

The educational function of the future cannot be carried out through a routine, hierarchical structure, with teachers who think like civil servants and a society which is indifferent to the education system’s financial needs. Autonomy, administrative responsibility, experimentation and close links with the community should be the features of all places where the education process is carried out (Quoted in Riddell 1996, p. 1361).

While such comments could be invoked equally for any level of education, the neo-liberal model for education is most frequently advocated for higher education institutions. In order to meet the criticisms and ideals presented in the ECLAC-UNESCO report, the neo-liberal model calls for higher levels of competition among educational institutions, less government intervention, increased non-government sources of funding (particularly for higher education), decentralisation of management away from the state and in favour of individual institutions, and the introduction of performance indicators to analyse the production of institutions. It aims to produce more cost-effective, flexible institutions that are better able to supply the needs of the labour market.

The World Bank, from a neo-liberal perspective, stresses three key factors to support knowledge-driven development, while ensuring quality, efficiency and equity in tertiary education:

• a coherent policy framework;

• an enabling regulatory environment; and

• appropriate financial incentives (World Bank 2002, p. 83).

These factors are indicative of what Braun and Merrien describe as a ‘new managerialism’ approach to public administration, and to managing higher education in particular. This approach consists of ‘The package of reforms put forward and promoted by the core of the OECD countries enrolled under the banner of the new model of public management whose order of the day was “steering at a distance”.’ (Braun and Merrien 1999, p. 14). Some of the key aspects of new managerialism include decentralisation, deregulation, accountability and quality control through the monitoring of medium and long term plans that specify clearly defined objectives (Braun and Merrien 1999, pp. 14–15).

The World Bank proposes that the appropriate state mechanisms to ‘steer’ higher education for a knowledge society comprise policy, regulatory and financial steering mechanisms, which can be used from a distance in order to strengthen the diversity of the higher education system and enable it to respond more quickly to market forces.

Tertiary education institutions, and entire tertiary systems must become increasingly agile in responding to changes in the labour market. A diverse system that includes a strong set of private
providers and autonomous public providers of tertiary education affords the necessary flexibility (World Bank 2002, p. 86).

It further states that funding should be linked to university outputs, whether defined by graduate satisfaction, level of funding from outside sources or the benchmarking of universities against each other (World Bank 2002, pp. 92–93). The World Bank’s particular emphasis on ‘responding to changes in the labour market’ is based on the assumption that the direction of socio-economic change is unknowable, and that the market is the most reliable indicator of skills shortages. The limitations of the market are well-known, however, and if the higher education sector is simply ‘responding’ to the market, this is already likely to mean significant delays and dislocations in the availability of appropriately qualified workers. The World Bank approach and assumptions contrast significantly with those of the Asian model, where governments have often successfully directed education in advance of market forces, and thereby short-cut bottle-necks to economic growth caused by a delay in the supply of skilled labour.

The reference to the need for a ‘diverse system’ of higher education refers to the World Bank’s continuing drive to encourage a market in higher education, in which universities competing against each other for government and private funding, one of the key hallmarks of the neo-liberal model. The aim of introducing competition among higher education institutions is to increase the efficiency of education, and achieve higher rates of return on education investment. Neo-liberal proponents have argued that as long as the government provides such a high level of subsidies to higher education institutions they will not respond to the real needs of the market, and individuals and governments will continue making inappropriate and inefficient educational decisions (Gillis 1992, p. 238).

The introduction of a market in education under the neo-liberal model of education for development necessarily requires the devolution of considerable administrative responsibility to institutions so that they can have more control over their product. At the same time, it requires states to remain accountable for funding spent on higher education. These dual requirements have led to an evolving form of management from a distance, characteristic of the neo-liberal model.

Increasingly, authors are noting that the neo-liberal model is being adopted by countries around the world in places as far apart as Latin America and China, but the model that is most common, and most commonly advocated, may not always be the one most suited to the particular situation in an individual country.

The Two Models Compared

The two models of higher education management are presented in Table 1. The state-centric model is based not only on characteristics of countries which have adopted the Asian model of economic development (in particular the examples of Vietnam, Singapore, China and Korea), discussed above, but also draws on wide-ranging analysis of European models of higher education and is particularly relevant to many countries of the former Soviet Union. The neo-liberal model is based on the writing of theorists from the World Bank, as well as the practical examples of the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. As such, neither model is based on the experience of a single country and the degree to which these countries are ‘state-centric’ or ‘neo-liberal’ varies considerably. The table presents some of the fundamental political theory principles espoused on each side of the fence, which are associated with the range of options adopted by the different countries in areas related to university finance, administration and curriculum, along a continuum between state direction, and market competition. As discussed above, many countries are moving along the continuum from state-centric to neo-liberal, on a variety of different issues.

Table 1 takes three significant issues facing all higher education institutions today, namely finance, administration and curriculum, and one that is becoming increasingly important in the knowledge economy, that of translating research and innovations into viable commercial products. It then sets out two broad ends of the spectrum against which higher education responsibilities can be divided—ranging from state-centric (more state directed) to neo-liberal (more openly competitive and less direct state intervention). It begins by defining individual issues surrounding the management of higher education (such as: who decides on the curriculum? who should decide how much funding to allocate?), and laying out different ways in which these questions
have been answered. The table emphasises how the division of responsibility for activities relating to higher education can be correlated with particular beliefs as to how a country’s development takes place, although it does not imply direct causality from one set of beliefs about development to a particular approach to higher education management.

The aim of this table is not to suggest that any higher education governance system will fall squarely within one of these categories. Within one country, fully state-funded universities often exist side by side with private universities. Simultaneously, administrative arrangements could include the state appointment of teachers (state-centric), while degrees may be awarded by the university under the auspices of an independent accreditation committee (neo-liberal). In theory, any country could potentially display an infinite combination of options presented in the table in its system of governance, depending on the way in which it chooses to answer key management questions. In practice, however, higher education systems tend to display options from one end of the spectrum or the other, so that they can be described as ‘more neoliberal’ or ‘more state-centric’.

Other authors have attempted to develop a taxonomy of higher education systems (Clarke 1983; Neave and Van Vught 1994; McDaniel 1996; Braun and Merrien 1999), with more or less complexity, but frequently run into difficulties when a particular higher education system displays a characteristic which does not sit squarely within the framework adopted. At the same time, they tend to begin with overarching conceptions about power relations or management theories and attempt to fit the governance systems of individual countries within this framework. The present table begins with solutions found for individual issues of governance facing the higher education system, which it lays out as a different series of possibilities for countries to choose from.

The table acknowledges that there are a number of actors that have an important role to play in shaping higher education and that the actual form that higher education eventually takes will be strongly dependent on the day to day battles that take place between students, teachers, senior faculty members, politicians, state administrators and the market. To this extent it overlaps with previous attempts to characterise power relations at work in higher education governance systems. The aim of this table is not to analyse the relative strengths and outcomes of these actors, however, but to present management arrangements that have been adopted by different countries, and to show how these can be associated with a particular view of the role of the university and its place in the economy.

The Case of Vietnam—Sounding a Note of Caution

If the most developed economies in the world are increasingly tending towards the neo-liberal model, and many aspiring giants are following them, and if this model does indeed offer the flexibility needed to best harness the potential of universities for a knowledge-based economy, as argued by the World Bank, should there be any hesitation for all countries to move in this direction?

In 1994, Neave and Van Vught noted the now well-established trend towards more hands-off oversight of universities by the state across three continents. At the same time, they noted that an exception to this trend related to African countries, where the ‘state supervisory model’ had been less successfully adopted. African countries often suffer from a general poverty of resources, and higher education may be concentrated in a single institution. Expanding the number of higher education institutions would be likely to disperse human and infrastructure resources leading to institutions of mediocre quality, undermining their ability to be at the forefront of knowledge production.

In 1998, the World Bank signed an agreement with the Government of Vietnam to provide a US$83.3 million loan to finance the upgrading of the Vietnamese higher education system. The agreement took six years to negotiate, and in its final form, reflected the World Bank’s concern to promote competition among Vietnamese universities, over and above the Vietnamese government’s plan to create centres of excellence in the north and the south of the country. The problems facing African universities are closely related to the conflict between the Government of Vietnam and the World Bank.

As early as 1992, the Council of Ministers instructed the Ministry of Education and Training in Vietnam to establish both a strong university system and a strong research system in Vietnam, able to contribute to the economic growth and social welfare of the country (Socialist Republic of Vietnam 1992, p. 2). One of the central pillars of this plan was the amalgamation of highly dispersed existing
TABLE 1

Governance Systems for Higher Education for Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>State-centric Model</th>
<th>Neo-liberal Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beliefs about change</td>
<td>— Assumes direction of change is knowable and can be state driven; or that higher</td>
<td>— Assumes direction of change is unknowable, and best anticipated through a variety</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>education can be achieved independently from societal change.</td>
<td>of educational structures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>— State direction is most efficient means of achieving desired outcome.</td>
<td>— Free market competition will produce the most efficient use of educational</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>— Principally state funded or state directed funding.</td>
<td>— Competitive bidding among universities for finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>— Funding allocated according to state development priorities or based on historical</td>
<td>— Use of performance output indicators to allocate finance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>levels.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>— State with important or deciding role in areas such as:</td>
<td>— Large number of private institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• appointing teachers</td>
<td>— Significant proportion of non-state finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• deciding curriculum</td>
<td>— High level of decentralisation of responsibilities to individual universities or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• awarding degrees</td>
<td>even teachers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• enrolment</td>
<td>— Use of performance indicators as a management tool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>— Existence of ‘peak’ universities that offer guidance to others.</td>
<td>— Creation of extra-state bodies to supervise particular issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curriculum and Teaching</td>
<td>— State with high level of influence on curriculum.</td>
<td>— Interactive teaching and problem solving.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>— Curriculum changed with difficulty, requiring higher levels of approval.</td>
<td>— Emphasises competition in class.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>— State (or peak university) control of entrance examinations</td>
<td>— Use of credit system / student choice in the curriculum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>— Emphasis on quantity of knowledge and memorisation.</td>
<td>— Curriculum decided at lower levels of higher education structure, perhaps even</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>by teacher.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>— Curriculum emphasises respect of authority and status quo.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marketing Innovation</td>
<td>— State-directed research programmes in areas of perceived need.</td>
<td>— State provision of competitive funding for research in priority areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>— State directs application of research and innovation in economy.</td>
<td>— State provision of competitive funding to facilitate linkages between industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>and tertiary institutions.</td>
</tr>
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Institutions, the establishment of two national scientific research centres, and two national ‘pivotal’ universities undertaking both research and teaching (Council of Ministers Resolution 324/CT, 22/9/1992). The idea was to build cross-disciplinary centres of excellence that could lead the nation, concentrate the country’s top expertise and train the leaders of the next generation.
In order to achieve this goal, the Government of Vietnam had acquired land on the outskirts of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City and approached the World Bank for funding to build the new national university campuses. Six years later, and three proposals later, the World Bank and the Vietnamese government finally signed an agreement, which contained the explicit proviso that the money was not to be used for construction purposes.8

In commenting on the process, the World Bank argued.

It became increasingly clear this [proposed government] strategy would not improve the responsiveness of the entire system to the country’s rapidly changing needs, and that there was no guarantee that the two higher education institutions targeted to receive funds were in any better position than other institutions to take maximum advantage of project funds (World Bank 1998, p. 6).

The loans finally agreed to, termed ‘Quality Improvement Grants’, were issued to individual universities in successive tranches on the basis of competitive tendering. Universities first needed to show, however, their commitment to strategic planning and improved information management systems to inform university decision-making. This approach was specifically designed to enhance accountability, and also to establish a competitive market in university education and the dispersal of funds among a variety of competing institutions, despite Vietnam starting from a critically low base.

Vietnam introduced postgraduate level study only in 1975. In the twenty years to 1995, Vietnam had produced a total of 2669 postgraduates of all levels, or an average of 133 postgraduates a year, mostly in the sciences, to work for the state, research institutes as well as universities (St. George 2003, p. 124, pp. 320–321). While the human resource situation was eased somewhat through students travelling overseas to study for higher degrees, it nonetheless meant that infrastructure to support teachers and researchers in the country was minimal and that existing expertise was concentrated in Vietnam’s two main cities (Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City). In such a situation, targeted assistance to strengthen training of rural academics in key institutions may well be a more efficient way to build overall higher education in the country than the World Bank funded model of competitive bidding, which favours those universities that can already demonstrate their capabilities through the preparation of successful submissions for funding. In terms of developing the knowledge expertise for Vietnam to compete on the international stage, a concentration of funding is also more likely to have an impact than its wide dispersal.

A second note of caution is related to the first. The knowledge based economy itself and the efforts to reduce barriers to the transfer of knowledge, have arisen out of the collaboration between institutions and individuals around the world. In many countries, particularly in those transitioning from a command economy, some of the biggest hurdles facing universities continue to be the insularity of their higher education institutions and the lack of willingness of their academics to share their knowledge. In this situation, unless the introduction of competitive funding is very carefully managed, it runs the risk of increasing the insularity of universities and undermining the objectives for which it is being introduced.

Again, Vietnam offers an important example. Since 2004, Vietnam has been preparing to introduce UNESCO sponsored ‘Education for All (EFA)’ planning tools to assist provincial officials in planning for the development of early childhood, primary education, lower secondary, and non-formal education. These tools were developed with the assistance of several officials from a key educational research institute. In order to train provincial officials in the new planning methodology, the World Bank proposed to run a competitive tender process for the training. This would have seen the research institute in an incomparable position to succeed in the tender, as the only institution in the country with expertise in the EFA planning methodology. While drawing on the expertise of the institute would undoubtedly have been the most cost efficient and the fastest method of delivering the training across the country, ultimately it would have further concentrated expertise in a single silo, with the potential to eventually undermine the sustainability of the planning methodology itself. In the event, a combination of carefully selected institutions and individuals were chosen to deliver the training, thus promoting cooperation across provinces and higher education institutions.

Finally, the introduction of innovations, such as the devolution of management or curriculum responsibility to the level of teachers, presupposes that they have the knowledge, expertise and
willingness to take on these extra responsibilities. In the case of Vietnam, mirroring the experience of some European countries over the last decade, strong attempts to devolve many management issues (such as curriculum, examinations and budgets) to the level of faculties or teachers, faltered because the increased responsibilities were not accompanied with increased resources, in terms of time, personnel, funding, support or knowledge to take on these tasks (St. George 2003, p. 200). In Phu Yen district, the attempt to create a self-sufficient community college with its own responsibility for developing a curriculum to meet local needs faltered because the district, with an annual per capita income of US$162 (in 1991), could not afford to meet the costs of establishing the college. A different, but nonetheless debilitating hindrance to the decentralisation of management responsibility in Vietnam has been the interference of government, and more the inexperience of regional university staff in areas such as linking more closely with the local labour market (St. George 2003, pp. 181–182), setting their own examinations (St. George 2003, p. 185), or introducing new teaching methodologies (St. George 2003, pp. 327–328). Any devolution of responsibilities must ensure that those taking on the new responsibilities have the skills, knowledge and resources to do so successfully.

At the heart of these issues, however, for countries without a strong higher education infrastructure, remains the question of whether the extra resources required to compete with each other under a neo-liberal framework, would not be better spent on collaboration and increasing the capacity of the country as a whole across particular disciplines of enquiry. In such a situation, there is a strong argument to be made for greater state intervention and direction in higher education.

Conclusion

The G8 leaders meeting in Gleneagles in July 2005 were presented with a joint statement signed by the premier science academies of each of their respective countries and co-signed by the Network of African Science Academies. The statement called on the G8 to:

Recognise that investment in a country’s own science capabilities, along with development of merit-based processes and institutions, are essential to the successful use of science, technology and innovation in Africa, and are fundamental to sound policy-making, good governance and industrial development.

Science, technology and innovation, the cornerstones of the knowledge-based economy, are now clearly on the agenda of both developed and developing countries, as fundamental to achieving sustainable development across the globe. The central question for governments in both developing and developed countries, then, remains how best to harness the potential of higher education for the growth of the economy, while not undermining the multiple other roles that universities play in society. For organisations seeking to assist in this process, there may be room to consider strengthening the ability of the state to direct funding to priority areas, rather than dispersing scarce funding among a variety of competing institutions.

Notes

1. According to OECD statistics Denmark and Finland showed the highest investment in knowledge among OECD countries between 1985 and 1995, yet they showed only middle to low annual growth rates between 1989 and 1998 compared to other OECD countries (OECD 1999, pp. 5, 9). Other measurements of development are not given for comparison. See also Godin (2004) for further details of early studies on the impact of research and development on growth.

2. The term ‘neo-liberal’ is taken from Christopher Colclough (1996) who uses it to refer exclusively to financial policies of education. The basic characteristics I ascribe to this model have also been called ‘neo-Fordist’ (Brown and Lauder 1996), ‘new order’ (Riddell 1996), or less accurately, ‘marketisation’ (Qiping and White 1994) and ‘privatisation’ (Kelsey 1998) by those who highlight the economic aspects of the model.

4. While levelling systematic criticism at governments of countries that impede the establishment of private institutions or the privatisation of existing institutions, the World Bank does note that too great a level of competition among universities can increase disparities in quality between richer and poorer institutions, and lead to greater inequality (World Bank 2002, Chapter 4, pp. 73–74).

5. A practical example of the neo-liberal model is the changes to higher education in Australia over the last decade. In 1988 the Australian government introduced a form of student loan scheme, the Higher Education Contribution Scheme, whereby students are charged a percentage of the cost of their full course, which they begin to pay back through the taxation system once their incomes have reached a certain threshold. The production and productivity of the university is assessed through annual reports in which academics report the number of articles or books they have published and are awarded points based on the scope of the work or the international recognition granted the publishing journal. Points are also awarded for other activities such as teaching or organisation of conferences. Funding for the universities is then awarded on a combination of historical factors (what they have been awarded in the past), productivity, as measured by the number of points they have been awarded for their outputs, and increasingly on the ability of universities to bid competitively for non-government funding.


7. Distinguishing characteristics of the administrative systems of the two models are extrapolated from Guy Neave and Frans Van Vught’s analysis of higher education administration across ten different countries (Neave and Van Vught 1994b).


References


NEW MANAGERIALISM, PROFESSIONAL POWER AND ORGANISATIONAL GOVERNANCE IN UK UNIVERSITIES: A REVIEW AND ASSESMENT

MICHAEL I. REED

“Governing is about Managing the Gap between Expectations and Reality.”

Introduction

The impact of the ideas and practices associated with ‘new managerialism’ or ‘new public management’ on the organisation, management and delivery of public sector services in Anglo-American and European welfare states has been extensively researched, discussed and evaluated in recent years (Ferlie et al., 1996; Exworthy and Halford 1999; Politt and Bouckaert 2000). However, higher education has been, and remains, a relatively neglected institutional sector (Trawler 2001) in which the trajectories of institutional and organisational restructuring typical of new managerialism/new public management continue to be poorly understood. This chapter synoptically reports on and interprets a recently conducted research project on the extent to which the ideological, institutional and organisational reforms associated with the latter have impacted on UK universities. The project was undertaken with particular regard to the selection, roles and practices of manager-academics and their implications for the longer-term position of professional academics.

This multi-disciplinary project, entitled, ‘New Managerialism and the Management of UK Universities’ was conducted by a team of researchers based at Lancaster University between October 1998 and November 2000. The study was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (grant no R000237661). The remit of the project was to examine the extent to which New Managerialism/New Public Management, a set of reforms of the management of publicly-funded services popular with many western governments during the 1990’s, was seen to have permeated the management and governance of UK universities. The study also explored the roles, practices, selection, learning and support of manager/manager-academics such as heads of departments, deans, pro-vice-chancellors and vice-chancellors. The first phase of the study comprised focus group discussions with learned societies from several disciplines where respondents considered what was
changing to the activities and management of their disciplinary specialisms within UK universities. The second phase involved interviews with 135 manager-academics (from Head of Department to Vice-Chancellor) and 29 senior administrators in 12 pre-1992 and post-universities. The interviews explored the backgrounds, current management practices and perceptions of respondents. In phase 3, in-depth case studies of the cultures and management of 4 universities enabled comparisons of the views of manager-academics with those of academics and support staff.

The strategic intellectual objective of the research project was to identify and explore the diverse range of ‘narratives of change’ that emerged from the focus groups, interviews and case studies and to link these to wider movements within the political economy and institutional domains of UK universities. The chapter opens with a theoretical discussion of the concept of new managerialism/new public management and its broader implications for the institutional and organisational restructuring of UK higher education as a component part of the UK ‘public sector’. Subsequently, it moves on to consider the impact of the changes associated with the former on the autonomy and power/control of the academic profession within the UK. It attempts this in relation to broader theoretical interpretations of new forms of professional work and organisation within Anglo-American political economies (Freidson 2001; Leicht and Fennel 2001). Finally, the chapter reflects on the intensifying tensions and contradictions that continue to characterise UK higher education and their longer-term implications for the distribution and ordering of resources, routines and relations within British universities.

The conception of ‘university governance’ employed in this chapter is relatively broad and inclusive. It is taken to refer to the general organisational technologies and practices through which higher education institutions attempt to regulate and control what happens within their, increasingly porous and contested, boundaries. In this respect, this chapter focuses on university governance as referring to a range of organisational forms, modes of control and regulatory practices through which individual and collective behaviour is routinely monitored, evaluated and modified. This is a significantly wider, even ‘looser’, conception of university governance than that conventionally adopted in studies and analyses primarily concerned with formal institutional machinery and structures. Nevertheless, it has the distinct advantage of focusing upon the actual ‘coal-face’ organisational programmes and managerial practices through which recent UK university reform has been attempted, within the wider institutional context set by changing government policy on HE and the global political economy in which it is embedded. In this sense, it is in keeping with contemporary research concerned with the longer-term impact of new managerialist discourses and practices on the changing forms of academic life and identity typical of UK universities at the present time (Trawler 1998, 2001; Taylor 1999; Henkel 2000; Prichard 2000).

**New Managerialism as a Theory of Institutional and Organisational Change**

The conception of ‘new managerialism’ that has informed our research project can be defined in relation to three loosely coupled or overlapping structural elements. First, as a generic narrative of strategic change which is constructed and promulgated in order “to persuade others towards certain understandings and actions” (Barry and Elmes 1997: 433) in relation to the established governance and management of universities. Second, as an emergent but distinctive organisational form that provides the administrative mechanisms and managerial processes through which this theory of change will be realised. Third, as a practical control technology through which strategic policies and their organisational instrumentation can be potentially transformed into viable practices, techniques and devices that challenge, or at the very least substantially modify, established systems of ‘bureaucratic professionalism’ (Clarke and Newman 1997: 68–70). Taken as a package of cultural, organisational and managerial interventions, ‘new managerialism’ constitutes an alternative model of governmental and institutional order for higher education within the UK to that which has existed under the traditional compromise between corporate bureaucracy and professional association from the mid-1940’s onwards (Jary and Parker 1998; Smith and Webster 1997). The latter shaped the post-Second World War development of British higher education to the extent that it facilitated a viable trade-off between managerial control and professional autonomy as exemplified in the organisational
logic and practice of ‘professional bureaucracy’ (Mintzberg 1979). ‘New managerialism’, however, radically questions, indeed undermines, the terms on which that political trade-off and organisational compromise was originally struck and subsequently maintained. This is so to the extent that it is grounded in an ideological, cultural and political critique of existing institutional structures and organisational forms within higher education that articulates their endemic lack of external accountability, internal managerial discipline and routine operational efficiency (Ackroyd, Hughes and Soothill 1989). In turn, this critique, and the alternative logic of organising and managing that it generates, draws on a large body of organisational and managerial theorising in order to sustain and legitimate the narrative of institutional transformation that it promulgates.

As a generic narrative or theory of macro-level change in institutional forms and their underlyng cultural rationale, ‘new managerialism’ draws on an eclectic body of literature that legitimates the, largely untrammelled, exercise of managerial prerogative within the modern private and public sector corporation (Child 1969; Anthony 1986; Enteman 1993). The justification for this unqualified assertion of managerial authority within modern society and organisations is based on a potpourri of ideological claims relating to the universal specialist expertise assumed to reside in ‘management’ as a general capacity overriding specific (e.g. ‘craft’ and/or ‘professional’) knowledge and skill (Locke 1989, 1996; Glover and Tracey 1997). However, ‘new managerialism’ rests on a more inclusive, not to say totalising, ideological foundation. It locates itself within a mythology of ‘market populism’ that can explain and legitimate any social and organisational change in terms of the presumed infallibility of ‘the’ market mechanism as a universal solution to all social problems—irrespective of their historical and institutional provenance (Frank 2001). Thus, ‘new managerialism’—as a meta-narrative of social and organisational transformation—can be contextualised within an ideology of market-based managerialism that would be mobilised right across the public sector as an institutional logic that would simultaneously break the power of professional ‘producer cartels’ (Ackroyd et al. 1989; Exworthy and Halford 1999) and the ingrained organisational inertia characteristic of corporate bureaucracy (Pollitt 1993; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000). The introduction of the market mechanism into the delivery and management of a wide-range of social and public services, the advocates of ‘new managerialism’ contended, would provide that imperative drive towards operational efficiency and strategic effectiveness so conspicuously lacking in the sclerotic professional monopolies and corporate bureaucracies that continued to dominate public life (Osborne and Gaebler 1992; DuGay 1994, 2000; Maddock and Morgan 1998). In local government (Farnham and Horton 1993; Walsh 1995; Keen and Sase 1998), health and social care (Pettigrew, Ferlie and McKee 1992; Ferlie, Ashburner, Fitzgerald and Pettigrew 1996; Deaf, O’Neill and Bagley 1999; Mark and Dospox 1999; Flynn 1992, 1999; Maddock and Morgan 1998; Ham 1999) and education (Rustin 1994; Cowen 1996; Dearlove 1997, 1998 a and b; Henkel 1997) the legitimacy of the discourse driving organisational restructuring identified the introduction of market, or at least quasi-market, mechanisms as the solvent to bureaucratic rigidity and professional intransigence. By imposing market competition through political dictate and administrative fiat, the ideology of ‘new managerialism’ attempted to destroy, or at least weaken, the regulatory structures that had protected unaccountable professional elites and their monopolistic labour market and work practices across the full range of public sector service provision throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s.

At the middle-range level of organisational forms and practices, ‘new managerialism’ entailed a number of interrelated changes in structural design and operating systems. These seemed to clear the ground for a more tightly integrated regime of managerial discipline and control which departed radically from the untidy but stabilising compromises of bureau-professionalism (Harrison and Pollitt 1994; Clarke and Newman 1997; Hood 1995; Webb 1999). At the same time, this programme of intra-organisational reforms dovetailed with changes to the regulatory environment in which public sector agencies and professionals operated. The latter were to become subjected to a much more rigorous regime of external accountability in which continuous monitoring and audit would be the dominant realities (Kirkpatrick and Lucio 1995; Power 1997; Morgan and Engwall 1999). In relation to organisational structure, the major initiative that ‘new managerialism’ facilitated was the deconstruction of integrated bureaucratic hierarchies into dispersed networks of ‘purchasers’ and ‘providers’. Within the latter, services were bought and sold on a contractual basis where regulated market exchange was the prevailing norm (Tilley 1993; Walsh 1995; Kitchener 1999). However, a strategic infrastructure of indicative planning and control was retained at the centre so that it
continued to set the overall resource and policy constraints within which service providers must operate. Eventually, this would be combined with an extremely detailed framework of devolved performance criteria against which operational efficiency and effectiveness at the unit level would be monitored and assessed. Considered in these terms, this, simultaneously strategically centralised and operationally devolved, new surveillance and control regime provided some of the organisational scaffolding on which the ‘entrepreneurial’ (Clark 1998) or ‘postmodern’ (Scott 1999) university could possibly be constructed.

Consequently, the most significant change to internal operating systems lay in the increasing emphasis given to performance target-setting and management against predetermined operational efficiency norms and strategic effectiveness outcomes (Smith 1993). Within the context of much more intrusive and pervasive performance management, a consistent emphasis on the detailed monitoring and evaluation of ‘quality’ standards in service delivery and outcomes emerged as the overriding priority. This was embedded within a public sector management ideology and practice remodelled on private sector commercial enterprise and its putative obsession with ‘total quality management’ (Kirkpatrick and Lucio 1995). The programme of structural and operational reforms entailed in the ideology of ‘new managerialism’ were intended to coerce public sector managers and professional service providers into a more meaningful and direct engagement with their relative competitive position within an increasingly fragmented and uncertain market environment. Here, the needs and demands of the ‘customer’, rather than the ‘provider’, were to be regarded as paramount (DuGay and Salaman 1992; DuGay 1996; Whittington, McNulty and Whipp 1994). In turn, there was a clear expectation that this would encourage, if not force, public sector managers and professionals into a more realistic appreciation of the austere political and financial constraints that their organisations now faced and their stark implications for budget control and management. The halcyon days of the public sector ‘free lunch’ were over. A new age of financial rectitude and draconian resource management would necessarily flow from the dismantling of professional bureaucracy in all its profligate and monopolistic ways. The operational autonomy and political power of unaccountable professional interest groups would be severely restricted and eventually broken by restructured organisational forms and performance review systems that had traditionally protected them within the labour market and the workplace. Neo-liberalism or market populism provided the wider ideological legitimation for this programme of organisational reform; the latter initially fabricated and then maintained the instrumentation through which this programme would be achieved.

The programme of organisational reforms with which ‘new managerialism’ is associated also facilitated the development of a micro-level political technology through which strategic policy objectives and structural redesigns would have a realistic chance of being implemented. The ideology of market-based, technocratic managerialism and the programme of organisational reform that it legitimates and instigates both require a practical configuration of techniques, devices and tools if they are to be operationalised ‘on the ground’ (Mitchell 1999; Rose 1999). If one is to reform individual and institutional conduct in a direction that makes it more competitive, entrepreneurial and efficient, then one needs a technology of discipline and control through which that ‘enterprising culture’ can be practically accomplished (Keat and Abercrombie 1991). Recalcitrant public sector professionals and managers do not become innovative, market-driven and self-motivated entrepreneurs overnight! Their occupational ideologies and organisational identities have to be captured or ‘colonised’ by new discourses and practices that attempt to enrol them within a transformed understanding of their innate entrepreneurial potentialities and ‘powers’ that remain repressed by the dead weight of professional mendacity and bureaucratic mediocrity. In this respect, the new technology of micro-level surveillance, discipline and control that ‘new managerialism’ generates has radical implications for established regimes of professional ethics and organisational conduct. The ‘cultural revolution’ that ‘new managerialism’ sets in motion requires a technology of workplace control, within a restructured governance and management structure, in order to make it a viable as a coherent strategy and programme of change. To have any chance of realising its ideological aspirations and transformative intent, ‘new managerialism’ must foster the design and implementation of an operational control technology that will penetrate the patina of producer-driven regulatory protections in which public sector professionals and managers have been indulgently cocooned.
This micro-level control technology is grounded in a set of practices and devices that are focussed upon the highly complex and inherently risky task of re-engineering the labour process within and through which public sector professionals and managers do their work (Reed 1995, 1999). It also strives to transform the organisational culture within which this, appropriately re-engineered, professional/managerial labour process is embedded. Re-engineering the professional labour process is attempted through a number of relatively mundane, and also rather more sophisticated, devices such as financial monitoring, quality audit, performance measurement and work rationalisation. Overall, these incremental re-engineering changes can be seen to be driven by the need to make the professional labour process more visible, transparent, measurable and hence accountable—to both external and internal managerial hierarchies now relocated in more streamlined strategic control centres (Deem 1998).

Cultural re-engineering is pursued through the construction and dissemination, often in very indirect and subtle ways, of a new matrix of symbols and values and a new lexicon of terminology. In the fullness of time, it is anticipated that these mechanisms of cultural re-identification and transmission will provide the means through which innovative institutional procedures and linguistic practices can become accepted as ‘the norm’ (Shore and Roberts 1995; Shore and Wright 1998). Professional and managerial personnel are encouraged, indeed expected, to internalise and accept these new value systems and languages as an explicit recognition and indication of their duly reconstructed occupational and organisational identities. New bodies of expert knowledge and skill linked to ‘quality’, ‘development’ and ‘empowerment’ are developed and transmitted to professionals and managers who can no longer afford to define themselves through tried and trusted cultural stereotypes of ‘professionalism’ (Gane and Johnson 1993). They must now both work with the new tools and instrumentation that their redesigned work tasks demand, as well as internalising the new values and languages that their contemporary work relationships embody. Obsolete cultural stereotypes associated with professional ‘craft skills’, individual judgement and collegiality are to be superseded by a culture of self-managing teams, project groups and technical experts. The latter would now exercise continuous surveillance and policing over each other within a never-ending competitive struggle to survive (Parker and Jary 1994; Ozga 1995; Piachaud and Willmott 1997).

In this way, the programme of organisational reform that ‘new managerialism’ advocated drew on forms of management theory and technique that seemed to provide a justification for the move towards more streamlined and decentralised organisation structures and ‘empowering’ organisation cultures. The literatures on ‘business process re-engineering’ (Hamer and Champy 1993; Knights and Willmott 2000) and on ‘total quality management’ (Wilkinson and Willmott 1995; Keleman, Forrester and Hassard 2000) provided recipes for ‘root and branch’ organisational restructuring that seemed to eradicate the confusion, waste and redundancy characteristic of professional bureaucracy. ‘New managerialism’ also drew on a growing body of literature focussed on cultural rather than structural, re-engineering in which the motivational and social preconditions deemed necessary for the radical transformation of established occupational and organisational identities could be realised. In this context, contemporary management theories of ‘transformational leadership’ (Hechtsher, Eisenstal and Rice 1994; Sjostrand 1997), ‘self-managing teams’ (Tjosvold 1991; Jenkins 1994) and ‘high trust work cultures’ (Fox 1974; Misztal 1996; Lane and Bachmann 1998), putatively facilitating both individual and collective empowerment, were very prominent. In turn, the strategies of structural and cultural re-engineering promoted by ‘new managerialism’ were brought together in theories of the ‘post-bureaucratic’ or ‘network’ organisation (Hechtsher and Donnellon 1994). The latter predicted that the endemic failings of professional bureaucracy were to be overcome by a complex conjuncture of technological, structural and cultural changes that would inevitably entail the demise of hierarchical authority, functional specialisation and rule-based control. In their place, the theorists of the ‘network’ or ‘virtual’ organisation (Castells 1996; Van Dijk 1999) anticipate a future in which management will be forced to re-organise their conventional strategic forms and operational practices in a highly radical and often dislocating manner.

This process of radical reform, advocates of ‘new managerialism’ insist, will be necessarily framed within a new logic of competition in which entrepreneurial dynamism and collaborative innovation emerge as the dominant features (Best 1990). These new realities can only become institutionalised in the form of the ‘entrepreneurial firm’ once the structural and cultural restraints embedded in Fordist/Taylorist bureaucracy have been swept away by the global competitive pressures and
cultural demands generated by the inexorable movement towards the ‘new economy’. Thus, a putative ‘paradigm shift’ in the international economy, corporate structures and organisational cultures (Korten 1995; Clarke and Clegg 1998; Clegg, Ibarra-Colado and Bueno-Rodriguez 1999) provides the wider context in which the reforms associated with ‘new managerialism’ can be located. Professional bureaucracy cannot be saved; its irreparably damaged by its inherent limitation and its inability to move with the times. ‘New managerialism’ is its nemesis. It’s also the genesis of a new moral and organisational order in which traditional conceptions of professional specialisation and demarcation are superseded by new corporate cultures and structures. Within the latter, a revitalised corporate paternalism and collectiveism promotes unitary notions of ‘family’ and ‘team’ rather than the fragmentary and often conflictual identities associated with occupationally and functionally-based professionalism (Casey 1995).

As previous discussion has indicated, ‘new managerialism’ aspires to define and integrate a meta-narrative of strategic change, a programme of organisational reform and a political technology of workplace control. Insofar as it succeeds in this quest, then it can be seen to provide the foundations for the development of core strategies and structures associated with ‘centralised decentralisation’ or ‘regulated autonomy’ (Hoggett 1991, 1996) and the new form of Innovating organisation that it sustains (Pettigrew and Fenton 2000). However, a great deal of the recent research on the implementation of the change strategy, programme of organisational restructuring and control technology redesign associated with ‘new managerialism’ suggests that, to date, practical outcomes are rather more ambiguous and contradictory than its emergent theory of change anticipated or indeed promised (Reed and Deem, forthcoming). As such, the research literature on implementation indicates that the emerging leitmotiv is ‘hybridisation’—of institutional structures, organisational forms, control technologies and occupational cultures and work identities and relations (Ferlie et al., 1996; Kean and Scase 1998; Exworthy and Halford 1999; Brock, Powell and Hinings 1999; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000). It is the combination and recombination of the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ within what we might call ‘soft bureaucracy’ that seems to define the contemporary trajectory of institutional and organisational restructuring within the public sector (Reed 1999; Flynn 1999, 2000; Courpasson 2000). In part, this might be interpreted as the, necessarily, piecemeal and long-term nature of public sector change. In might also be viewed as the outcome of an inevitable confrontation between the ideology of ‘new managerialism’ and the reality of its operational translation into organisational and professional practice. This confrontation unavoidably produces all sorts of endemic contradictions and tensions—between intensified market competition and institutional stability, between more detailed and intrusive managerial control and effective professional practice, etc.—that have to be coped with in some way or another on a localised, everyday basis. While public sector institutions and organisations have always been hybridised combinations of ‘markets’, ‘bureaucracies’ and ‘networks’, the dissemination and implementation of the package of reforms associated with ‘new managerialism’ has drastically exacerbated the endemic contradictions and tensions that they contained. This has generated an organisational response in which new managerial cultures and control technologies have been selectively ‘grafted on’, in an adaptive and piecemeal fashion, to preexisting structures and cultures of bureaucratic and professional power. As a result, the latter are being incrementally diluted, dispersed and displaced by the ideological, institutional and organisational reforms that ‘new managerialism’ has initiated.

Yet, the longer-term impact of this process of ‘dilution, dispersal and displacement’ on occupational identities, organisational cultures and work behaviour should not be underestimated. Public sector professionals and managers are finding themselves increasingly caught within a revitalised and refurbished matrix of controls that are significantly changing the institutional fields and organisational settings in which they function. This is also changing the ways in which they see themselves, as they are viewed through the ideological, organisational and political prisms through which occupational identities and work behaviour are inevitably refracted. Many of these changes are still subject to complex negotiation and mediation (Kitchener 2000; Kitchener, Kirpatrick and Whipp 2000). But the cumulative weight of evidence indicates that a substantial restructuring of power and control is underway in which established professional groups are struggling to maintain their positions (Brooks 1999).

By deftly combining decentralised functional responsibilities with the recentralisation of strategic control, and overlaying both with a quasi-entrepreneurial culture, ‘soft bureaucracy’ is a peculiar
hybrid of governmental rationalities and organisational practices. It will ensure that ‘new managerialism’ leaves a distinctive and durable imprint on the public sector for many years to come. As Webb (1999: 757) has recently argued, ‘new managerialism’ has let loose a series of interconnected strategies and practices for restructuring public services focussed on work intensification, service commodification and ‘remote control’ or ‘control at a distance’. In theory, this puts the state, if not its subordinate agencies, in an ideal position of selectively choosing when, where and how it might intervene in relation to a particular policy field or issue, while absolving itself of any responsibility should things go wrong. However, this is also likely to lead to “the emergence of schisms within the public service class between ‘old-style’ professionals who use the language of welfare and care and ‘new style’ senior managers and professionals who use the language of markets and efficiency” (Webb 1999: 757). In these terms, Webb is developing a more specific articulation of Sennett’s (1998: 59) overarching evaluation that in “the revolt against routine, the appearance of a new freedom is deceptive. Time in institutions and for individuals has been unchained from the iron cage of the past, but subjected to new, top-down controls and surveillance. The time of flexibility is the time of a new power. Flexibility begets disorder but not freedom from restraint”.

New Managerialism and Manager-Academics in UK Universities

Within a UK university context, the potential impact of new managerialist philosophies and practices on HE might be characterised in relation to four major changes from the position that prevailed for much of the 1945 to early 1980’s period:

1. the, relatively aggressive, assertion of managerial prerogative as a necessary precondition for the implementation of market/private-sector discipline as a generalised solution to the resource problems of HE and a new regulative mode within which all types and grades of staff, but particularly academic staff, have to operate;

2. the direct and indirect regulation of the professional academic labour process and practice through the design, implementation and monitoring of various control mechanisms geared to the detailed and relatively intrusive auditing and continuing evaluation of professional academic work in relation to various, externally-determined, performance measures;

3. the redefinition and legitimating of higher education as a commodity providing service in which educational needs and priorities are reduced to codifiable and measurable performance outcomes and indicators that become institutionalised benchmarks against which individual institutional operations and outcomes can be assessed and continually re-assessed;

4. the re-engineering and re-organisation of the institutional forms, disciplinary matrices and occupational cultures on which UK higher education has conventionally been founded to ensure, as far as is possible, that they will be revitalised to release and redirect the innate creative, innovative and entrepreneurial talents and capacities of academic staff from the stultifying and suffocating embrace of corporate bureaucracy and academic collegiality.

Broadly speaking, our research project set out to describe and assess the impact of this, loosely-coupled, package of strategic discursive change and the associated redesign of supporting institutional structures, organisational mechanisms and implementation technologies on the thinking and practices of manager academics and academic staff. If manager-academics were to be the ‘shock-troops’ of the ‘managerial revolution’ in higher education that new managerialism demanded, were they anywhere near ready, able and willing to fulfil their historic destiny of transforming HE from a moribund, inward-looking and provider-dominated service into a dynamo of technological and economic transformation? What kind of stories would our manager-academics tell us about the past achievements, current predicaments and dilemmas, and future prospects of their disciplines, profession and institutions? What would this tell us about the putative shift from professional bureaucracy or ‘bureau professionalism’ (Clarke and Newman 1997) to ‘entrepreneurial governance’ (Osborne and Gaebler 1992) or ‘the neo-entrepreneurial workplace’ (Leicht and Fennell 2001) heralded by new managerialism and its supporting cast of organisational reformers and reforms? How would these changes be seen and interpreted by our informants as they struggled, as manager-academics operating in a diverse range of institutional contexts, organisational locales and
disciplinary communities, to cope with the tensions, conflicts and contradictions that new managerialist ideology and practice inevitably generated?

What was supposed to be ‘new’ about new managerialism is that it seemed to signal and represent a radical break with older managerialist ideologies and control strategies that had been primarily focused on the restructuring of organisational forms and practices through bureaucratic rationalisation. Thus, the ‘corporatist managerialism’ of the 1960’s and 1970’s was largely geared, in cultural and organisational terms, to the implementation of neo-Taylorist/Fordist control systems and managerial structures in which cost-reductions, work rationalisation and operational integration were the dominant themes. In general terms, these reforms did not threaten professional or producer power and autonomy in any direct way, but they did indicate a shift towards much tighter regulative regimes in which the financial, political and organisational constraints within which professional academic practice was embedded became more transparent, limiting and presssing. The new managerialism of the 1980’s and 1990’s, however, did, potentially at least, entail a much more direct ideological and political attack on institutional and professional autonomy that could not be smoothed over by emollient political rhetoric or ritual genuflection in the direction of academic collegiality. Dominant political elites seemed to be turning away from the rather ‘cosy’ collaborative networks of the UGC and quinquennial reviews towards a much harsher and competitive regime of direct centralised management and control (Halsey 1992; Trow 1974). The latter rejected the informal, tacit agreements and understandings on which a negotiated balance of power and influence between state agencies, institutional actors and professional/provider interest groups had historically and politically depended. It also entailed the legitimation and implementation of much more intrusive and intensive modes of governance and regulation in which market mechanisms, performance measurement and consumer-led, rather than producer-led, strategies of organisational restructuring were to become the dominant themes. Thus, the dead-hand of bureaucratic regulation and producer-dominated service monopolies, in which professional ‘restrictive practices’ were assumed to be rife, were to be swept away by the invigorating ideological force of neoliberalism and the micro-level control technologies through which the latter was to be implemented (Barry, Osborne and Rose 1996).

How would our manager-academics manage to cope in this ‘brave new world’ of new managerialism? How would they see the radically-changed contemporary sectoral conditions, institutional contexts and organisational worlds in which they were located and how would they respond to the challenges that the changes associated with new managerialist ideology and technology presented? Did the notion of the ‘entrepreneurial university’ (Clark 1998) mean anything to them as they struggled to come to terms with the much more competitive, differentiated and fragmented HE environment that the former reflected and reinforced (Trolwer 1998)?

As one might have expected, our research findings suggest that the implementation of the reforms associated with new managerialism have been rather more ambiguous, contested and contradictory than the latter’s advocates or theorists anticipated. Nevertheless, they also indicate that some very significant changes may have occurred ‘on the organisational ground’ within British universities and in relation to the wider institutional and ideological contexts within which the academic labour process and the professional ‘jurisdictional domains’ (Abbott 1988) that it generates and supports are embedded.

Overall, our research data indicated a generalised perception of increasing managerial and bureaucratic control with declining levels of trust in and discretion afforded to professional academic mores and practices. While this generalised perception of ‘advancing managerialism’ was expressed more strongly by non-managerial academic staff, even amongst our manager-academics there was a very clear view that new managerialism—as a theory of practice’—had deeply and extensively permeated UK universities’ organisational cultures and practices over the last decade or so. The picture revealed by our research data is, in many respects, quite complex and often contradictory. The narrative accounts of change articulated through our focus group interviews, institutional-based interviews and more intensive organisational case studies articulate a recurring theme of the combination and recombination of traditional forms of university management with newer elements (e.g. performance measurement technologies) in which new managerialist theory and practice is more evident. Certain crucial components of traditional self-governmentality and management, such as academic peer review in selection and promotion...
procedures, were seen as retaining a significant and continuing role in university management and the organisation of the academic labour process. But these were seen to be increasingly overlain and undermined by new managerial control structures and practices—such as target-setting, performance monitoring, direct supervision, work rationalisation and employment casualisation—that, cumulatively, were substantially eroding what was left of academic self-government and management.

One widely-held perception that emerged in both focus group sessions and individual interviews was that the continuous pressures for greatly enhanced visibility, transparency and accountability in the use of scarce and vital resources within the academic labour process had led to a much greater emphasis on academic and institutional team-working. However, this was interpreted—both by manager academics and non-managerial academic staff/students—as very much a ‘double-edged sword’. Positive elements of improved collaboration, support and understanding were seen to be combined with negative features of self-imposed discipline, closure and control that ran directly counter to more traditional forms of academic collegiality—no matter how attenuated these may have become in practice. Indeed, these new and more encompassing forms of academic team-working were often seen to be dominated by competitive, defensive and/or exclusionary political interests and tactics typical of an organisational regime and technology of ‘concertive control’ (Barker 1993, 1999; Reed 1999). Within the latter, academics collaborate to develop the collective means of their own self-discipline, surveillance and control rather than having the latter externally imposed upon them. As one of our focus group respondents (a head of department) argued:

managerialism is very much control without the admission by the centre that it’s actually doing any controlling, with the protestations of democracy, grass roots. Mid the need to exercise flexibility. But you make one flexible decision that lies outside the set of guidelines that have already been set, then you are called up to the Dean and asked to explain it... What I worry about with new managerialism is a lack of critical debate, of critical scrutiny of the very policies and practices of management... there are deep problems there, deep problems in terms of democratic accountability and actually being able to speak... I can’t really speak like this in my own imitation because one is fingered.

Thus, the shift from a traditional academic ideology and organisation, consisting of cultural and structural elements of both collegiality and hierarchy that often sit rather uneasily with each other, to one supposedly based on a more egalitarian, meritocratic and technocratic value-system/organisational structure may not be as straightforward as many suppose. Indeed, our research data suggests that both manager and non-manager academics across the universities included in our study collectively perceive the institutional reforms and organisational changes pushing towards a more transparent academic labour process as potentially threatening to their established professional identity, status, and authority. The ideology and technology of ‘transparency’ is conventionally legitimated in terms of enhanced openness, participation, accountability and trust. But our informants’ interpretations of these developments resonate much more strongly with a complex mixture of resigned fatalistic acceptance of the inevitability of ‘creeping managerialism’ and a much more positive perception of improved institutional governance and organisational management. However, this is often paralleled by a relatively hostile resistance to the radical encroachment on professional autonomy and power that internalised norms of work performance and technologies of evaluation, consequent upon the shift towards more ‘transparent’ forms of self-management and governance, necessarily entail. As one head of department articulated this paradox:

I think this whole more intrusive culture means that people aren’t left to just get on with it in the way that they were... certainly in the past there wasn’t enough accountability. But I now feel that we have now perhaps swung too far in the other direction... perhaps there is too much monitoring and too much written reporting and so that is a bit of a dilemma, being asked to implement that on the one hand whilst having misgivings about it.

Our manager-academics, by-in-large, are very ‘reluctant managers’ who seem rather unwilling to fulfil the historical destiny that the ideology and practice of new managerialism has scripted for them. Rather than constituting the ‘storm troopers’ of a managerial revolution that will sweep away outmoded and inefficient organisational practices and recalcitrant professional producer-monopolies,
they find themselves in the somewhat unenviable position of trying to hold together fundamentally incompatible imperatives of an ‘ancient regime’ that is badly damaged but will not die and a modernising ideology that is still only half-formed.

Thus, the dominant theme in the implementation of new managerialist discourse and strategy within UK universities, as of the UK public sector as a whole, is one of ‘hybridisation’—of institutional structures, organisational forms, occupational cultures and control technologies. But the, often indiscriminate, mixing and matching of seemingly contradictory principles and practices of institutional governance, organisational management and professional forms—in which selected core elements of the ‘market’, ‘organisation’ and ‘profession’ have somehow to be linked together in a viable modus vivendi—within HE has been significantly different from, say, the NHS (Ferlie et al., 1996), local government (Kean and Scase 1998) and social services (Jones 1999). Unlike within the NHS, where early reforms introduced radical cultural and structural surgery alongside a new cadre of general managers from outside the health service (Reed and Anthony 1993), new managerialism within the university sector has developed within existing institutional structures and without significant ‘managerial entryism’ from sectors outside HE. Again, unlike other sectors, the control strategies and mechanisms deployed by HE manager-academics to try to secure required levels of individual and organisational performance, seem, in relative terms at least, rather muted and less crudely coercive than elsewhere within the public sector system as a whole. But the longer-term impact and significance of these, more incremental, subtle and supposedly continuity-facilitating reforms should not be underestimated. The inherent contradictions, tensions and stresses remain; in many respects they seem to be intensifying. As usual, much depends on where you stand within a public sector system in a permanent state of flux and uncertainty where today’s ‘change masters’ are tomorrow’s ‘change-casualties or victims’.

**New Managerialism and Manager Academics in UK Universities**

As previous discussion has already indicated, our manager-academics relied on a broad range of techniques and mechanisms to try and ‘manage’, at all institutional levels, within an increasingly complex and unstable HE environment. This included enhanced reliance on methods of self-regulation of research and teaching quality (in relation to more explicit, internally and externally generated, financial and performance criteria), more intrusive work performance and allocation systems that require staff to self-assess individual action and outputs across a range of measures, and more formalised peer-review scrutiny of individual and collective performance. The generalised perception of increasingly finance-driven, or at least finance-led, institutional decision-making and managerial control was widespread throughout all types of research data generated by our project. A ‘long hours or ‘presentist’ work culture was also identified by a large number of our informants, so that a 50 to 60 hour working week was seen to be fast becoming ‘the norm’ amongst manager and non-manager academics alike. Academic autonomy was still seen as a significant feature and attraction of professional work culture and patterns within UK universities. But it was also perceived to be under increasing and direct pressure, indeed threat, from both externally-imposed and self-imposed systems of surveillance and discipline that incrementally erode the jurisdictional ‘task domains’ on which academic professionalism was operationally based and culturally legitimated. The implementation and legitimation of the organisational practices associated with new managerialism within UK universities was seen (especially in pre-1992 universities) to require a considerable degree of compromise with and retention of some long established cultural and structural elements. But, as Deem (1998:8, italics added) has argued, “the extent to which visible performativity is now significant in the management of academic labour in universities” should not be underestimated.

Consequently, our research project reinforces the findings of other studies (Parker and Jary 1994; Rustin 1994; Willmott 1995; Prichard and Willmott 1997; Edwards 1998) that identify a trajectory of intensified managerialist focus on visibility, transparency and measurability within the academic labour process. These have become the structural and operational prerequisites for the achievement of continuous internal and external monitoring of and accountability for professional academic performance and the resources it consumes. In Smith and Webster’s (1997: 100, italics added) terms,
these and other changes have placed enormous pressures on the university system. They have cer-
tainly suited in a noticeable shift in the ‘feel’ of university life. For many academics this has been
experienced as an appreciable loss of control over what they do, initiatives coming from the central
management teams that drive the organisation and from politicians from without the university.
A result is that Institutions are experienced more as places of ‘work’ than the community of scholars
that motivated many academics to choose their vocation.

If the concept of the ‘postmodern university’ (Scott 1997) has any empirical validity, then its
operationalisation seems to rely on highly modernist organisational control strategies and practices.
These unavoidably increase organisational uncertainty and job insecurity for the majority of aca-
demic staff by exposing them much more to the vagaries of external market pressures—however
much these may be mediated and moderated in practice—and direct managerial regulation of
professional task performance. Yet, at the same time, the effective realisation of the latter is fraught,
for manager academics and non-academics alike, with all sorts of complexities and contradictions.
This requires an in-built institutional capacity to cope with relatively high levels of paradox and
ambiguity that are likely to stretch material and cultural resources close to breaking point (Dearlove
1998a, 1998b; Cowen 1996). This is particularly the case when we take into account that a form of
‘double surveillance’ (Edwards 1998) is evident within HE. Both internal and external regulatory/accountability mechanisms have to be simultaneously placated, in some way or another, before
the operation and outcomes of the academic labour process can hope to achieve any kind of, often
grudging, recognition from powerful managerial/political hierarchies within and without the ac-
demy. However, they often push and pull in opposing directions; external pressures towards a much
stronger sense and practice of corporate integration, while intensified internal surveillance and
control generates enhanced intra-organisational competition and fragmentation. As Henkel (1998:
179) has suggested, this may be interpreted as the organisational articulation of “a deep contra-
diction at the heart of new public management between the drive towards powerful vertical and
bounded systems of accountability and that towards the more diffuse, horizontal influences of
multiple markets”.

Contested Academic Futures

The analysis offered above raises some pertinent, and potentially vital, questions about the longer-
term position and influence of the academic profession within UK higher education at a time
when the latter is still undergoing some profound changes in its institutional form and intellectual
rationale.

Much of the previous discussion and analysis suggests that a radical transformation is occur-
rning in the HE environment in which UK manager academics and academics are located. A series
of cumulatively intersecting environmental shifts have occurred that push in the direction of mas-
sification, rationalisation, commodification and managerialisation. As already indicated, these macro-
level shifts or trends inevitably become diluted or attenuated at the micro-level of individual
institutions and their complex internal operational dynamics. Yet, they have major strategic or ‘gen-
erative’ implications for changes to the governance, organisation, management and delivery of higher
education in the UK and beyond (Slaughter and Leslie 1997; Jary and Parker 1998; Trowler 1998;
Calas and Smircich 2001). In particular, they raise fundamental questions about the characteristic
occupational culture, identity and form of the academic profession as it struggles to come to terms
with the ‘brave new world’ of globalisation, flexibilisation, intensification and casualisation. No
longer seen as the disinterested guardians of esoteric disciplinary knowledge guaranteeing expert
status as recognised ‘professionals’ but as ‘knowledge producers or workers’ routinely engaged in
generating and communicating socially relevant and economically useful skills or techniques, aca-
demics seem adrift on a ‘sea of utilitarian pragmatism’. For many researchers/commentators, “they
[academics] will have to adjust from being adept producers of (mainly disciplinary knowledge) to
being creative reconfigurers of knowledge in solving increasingly complex problems” (Muller and
Subotzky 2001: 168–169). This does not, necessarily, imply an inexorable process of academic deskilling
or depersonalisation or, even worse, proletarianisation (Reed 2000), But it does indicate that a
continuing commitment to core disciplinary values and identity may be overlain by a set of structural
and cultural changes, encapsulated in the theory and practice of new managerialism, that further fragments and polarises the academic profession (Fulton 2001).

This scenario is consistent with Freidson’s (1994: 2001) recent work and prognostications on the contemporary condition of and future prospects for professionalism in general and academic professionalism in particular. Freidson argues that professionalism is the ‘third logic’ of occupational and work organisation that parallels the market and bureaucracy as the dominant ideal types of institutional regulation and management in modern industrial society. It is based on a set of axiomatic assumptions and principles that differentiate it from the other two ideal types. This is so to the extent that it depends on an organisational mode of delivering and controlling specialised work performance based on accredited and legitimated expertise—that is, formalised expert knowledge—which is accorded the privileged status of monopoly supplier and evaluator of the services that it provides. This right of expert autonomy and discretion “implies being trusted, being committed, even being morally involved in one’s work” (Freidson 2001: 34).

Freidson argues that this institutionalised right to monopoly supply, accreditation and evaluation of expert services and the specialised knowledge/skill base on which it rests has been, and will continue to be, under attack from various directions (Reed 2000). One of the, if not the, most important of these threats is that posed by managerialism. This is the case insofar as it entails an incremental, but pervasive, assault on the technical effectiveness and ethical legitimacy of a mode of occupational organisation and control that has outlived its social relevance and usefulness in a modern, globalised economy. Managerialism poses a serious threat to professionalism in that it maintains that not only have contemporary, and foreseeable, socio-economic trends made monopoly organisation and control of expert services redundant but also that the ethically retrograde implications of the latter are now so strong as to make it morally obsolete. Economic efficiency and moral rectitude come together in a managerialist critique of the ‘professional state’ that berates its inherent wastefulness and corruption.

This critique is reinforced by material developments at the workplace level where ongoing technological, organisational and cultural change generates a ‘neo-entrepreneurial’ organisation of professional and managerial work in which the latter literally ‘change places’ with the former (Leicht and Fennell 2001). This thesis suggests that managers and professionals are changing structural and ideological places in an increasingly unified elite division of expert labour that virtually excludes the middle and lower tiers of managerial/professional workers from effective participation in strategic corporate decision-making. A melding of elite managerial and professional work worlds produces a situation in which “elite managers are becoming the ‘new professionals’, while professionals are being captured by organisational stakeholders that consume and pay for professional services” (Leicht and Fennell 2001: 2). The typical professional is reduced to the status of a subcontractor at the mercy of elite groups of financial and managerial stakeholders that are driven by short-term pressures and demands inimical to the archetypal professional focus on long-term service objectives and priorities uncontaminated by considerations of costs and profitability. Freidson’s (2001: 210–212) prognosis for the future of academic professionalism is worth quoting at some length in this context:

Employing organisations are likely to intensify efforts to standardise the work of rank-and-file professionals in order to reduce their cost and better control and supervise them. Standardisation of work in universities, for example, can occur by mandating standard syllabi and examinations for courses taught by part-time instructors, or in health care organisations by establishing standard protocols for primary care examination, treatment and referral . . . I have no doubt that the faculty will remain composed primarily of credentialled professionals, but the curriculums they cite and administer will have to respond more than previously to the demand for practical training, equipping students to perform (he particular tasks required by employers after matriculation . . . . Some of the humanistic disciplines which have no clear vocational value may not survive at all, and those that do will be pressed by students to be entertaining. Neither “pure” nor “disinterested” research and scholarship which follows out the logic of abstract questions raised by theory nor idle curiosity will be forbidden in principle, but in the scientific disciplines their prominence is likely to be discouraged by shrinking support and respect . . . The educational climate created by strong practical service to profitable private investment or the state or on relevance to mass popular culture will probably make universities and professional schools less hospitable to faculty members who devote themselves to clarifying and extending the traditional
intellectual problems of their disciplines, and to debating moral and intellectual goals... [academic] professionals will indeed become merely technical experts in the service of the political and cultural economy.

Freidson's bleak prognosis clearly suggests that academic professionalism is almost certain to be considerably weakened in its occupational legitimacy, organisational power and cognitive coherence by the combined effects of the interacting set of changes outlined in this chapter and encapsulated in the theory and practice of new managerialism. Our research data indicates that the current trend towards further standardisation, regulation and control of academic work, from a variety of external and internal sources, is unlikely to moderate. It also implies that a further dilution and weakening of academic professionalism consequent upon fragmentation, rationalisation and casualisation is a distinct possibility. However, as earlier sections of this paper have argued, the overall trajectory of change and its longer-term consequences are not easy to predict. Hybridisation of organisational forms and occupational cultures within UK universities is likely to have all sorts of unforeseen and unintended consequences that are likely to generate more complex and diverse outcomes than those envisaged in a mono-causal or linear 'de-professionialisation' thesis. More specifically, our research suggests that the package of organisational reforms engendered by new managerialism does present a very substantial threat to the concept and practice of an integrated academic profession unified around core occupational values and routines that continue to reflect and reinforce a culture of 'academic collegiality'. In addition, it also signals the reality of manager academics being increasingly drawn further into pro-active performance management, and hence control, of academic staff through a variety of organisational mechanisms. But most of our informants, including the majority of manager academics, also continued to exhibit strong personal commitment to traditional academic values and saw themselves as trying to defend, if not expand, the practical significance and impact of those values within their institutions and beyond to the wider HE system. This also led them into situations where new monitoring and control mechanisms were 'adapted' to purposes for which they were not originally intended. They were 'turned' to defend and expand localised domains of academic autonomy and discretion by appropriating new performance measurement and management systems in such a way that centralised organisational surveillance and control become more, rather than less, problematic. Nevertheless, this type of behaviour could also have the perverse effect of reinforcing the powerful competitive drive and fragmenting dynamic set in motion by the ideological and operational momentum inherent in new managerialist philosophies and practices.

Conclusion

The quotation which heads this paper maintains that the core of governing is a highly sophisticated form of political cum impression management that closes the gap, if not chasm, between public expectations and actual outcomes. The argument developed within the paper suggests that new managerialism within UK universities is a discourse of strategic change and a cluster of related organisational reforms that attempt to redefine the reality of higher education for all of those who participate in its design, delivery and consumption. New managerialism strives to close the inevitable 'reality gap' between expectations and delivery by denying its existence or relevance. However, the grounded experience of the changes associated with new managerialism, for its creators, agents and consumers, has been much more ambiguous, not to say tendentious, for all concerned. In the very act of its organisational consummation, new managerialism seems to create even bigger gaps or fissures within the institutional order and moral foundations of higher education that then have to be bridged or repaired in some way or another.

Of course, one needs to retain a proper historical perspective in any assessment of new managerialism's longer-term impact on UK universities in general and academic professionalism and management in particular. It can be persuasively argued that the orthodox model of academic professionalism and university governance/administration began to unravel from the late 1960's onwards. The political compromises and organisational trade-offs between corporate bureaucracy and professional power that had dominated university governance up until this time began to look increasingly tarnished and unattractive as values and movements associated with democratic
participation and managerial effectiveness gathered momentum. In turn, these developments began to erode the cultural and moral foundations of an elitist system of higher education. The latter had clothed itself in the ideological garb of collegiality, community and exclusivity but was relatively powerless in the face of a radicalising, egalitarian critique that anticipated the meritocracy and technocracy of the 1980’s and 1990’s. Thus, the virulent hybridising dynamic of the 1980’s and 1990’s can be seen to have its political and organisational roots in a cultural critique of university elitism and hierarchy that became increasingly influential in the 1960’s. In this respect, the new managerialism of the 1990’s may be seen as an ideological and organisational offspring of a much earlier phase of critical scrutiny and evaluation that simply could not anticipate the triumph of a managerialist discourse and practice thirty years later. 

However, this leaves ‘our’ contemporary middle-level manager-academics in a key position and role as mediators of the unavoidable tensions and conflicts that hybridisation has unleashed. It is they who have to find ways of coping with the uncertainties and instabilities generated by the deep contradictions discovered in the heart of new managerialism (Henkel 1998). If the core contradiction between vertical command and control and horizontal autonomy and self-regulation defines the ideological and structural essence of new managerialism, then it is the manager-academics who have to deal with the, incredibly messy, political ‘fallout’ that the former releases. They have to find the words, actions and relationships that mediate between the imposition of more intrusive, detailed, even ‘alien’, managerial controls and the continued demand, indeed practical need, for localised professional academic discretion and diversity. Of course, this mediating process and practice is necessarily partial, incomplete and contested. Universities are always “a mix of organising practices, which are historically resilient to being wholeheartedly overthrown by the ‘new managers’” (Prichard and Willmott 1997: 289). The sedimentation and layering of new discourses, practices and structures in universities, as in other organisations, is a highly complex process characterised by overlapping circuits of regulation and control that incrementally change dominant forms and patterns. Elements of conflict, discontinuity, displacement and replacement co-exist with elements of collaboration, continuity and stability (Taylor 1999). Nevertheless, the general structural features and political effects of new managerialism are, by now, somewhat clearer. This is so to the extent that the latter has generated a series of ‘power re-distributions and re-allocations’ between constituent ‘power blocks’ and interest groups which has left professional academics in a much weaker position relative to manager-academics and administrators.

Yet, ‘our’ manager-academics remain in a position and place where the tensions and conflict released, or at least exacerbated, by new managerialism remain as real and, seemingly, intractable as ever. As one of them—a head of department—remarked in an interview, 

you have to trust your colleagues to deliver what they are supposed to deliver. There is a considerable amount of autonomy, however much managerialism you try to inject into the system. 

Pan of the managerial role involves a considerable amount of trust in managing academic staff. 

You can’t actually make them do it. 

But the extent to which the control ideology and practice that defines new managerialism as a strategic discourse and programme for transforming university life can facilitate, indeed permit, the necessary levels of trust-based autonomy for ‘delivering the goods’ may be the underlying conundrum that our manager-academics remain fated to confront?

Note


References


THE EU AND BOLOGNA: ARE SUPRA- AND INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES THREATENING DOMESTIC AGENDAS?*

JEROEN HUISMAN & MARIJK VAN DER WENDE

Introduction

In a number of policy fields, regulation at the level of the EU (ranging from general non-binding agreements to legislation) has evolved more or less naturally. It was obvious that it would benefit all Member States and would not harm the national governments’ sovereignty. There are, however, policy fields where this was less obvious, (higher) education being one of them.

This had already become clear in the 1970s. In 1976, the education ministers of the then EC set up an information network as a basis for a better understanding of national policies and system structures. That same year, the Action Programme in the Field of Education was launched (De Wit & Verhoeven, 2001) in which the implementation resided with the individual Member States (Neave, 2003). The Joint Study Programme—the predecessor of Erasmus—was also set up. Other more far-reaching proposals were discussed, but most governments were hesitant to accept moves towards the harmonisation of higher education systems (Teichler, 1998). Although the interest in educational cooperation increased in the 1980s, partly due to supranational programmes such as Erasmus, Delta and Lingua, national structures were not in question. The subsidiarity principle and the sovereignty of Member States formed both the legitimation and the limitation of EC action in higher education (Van der Wende & Huisman, 2004). Articles 126 and 127 of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty codified the subsidiarity principle: the EC will encourage cooperation between Member States and will only support and complement policy action at the national level, while further respecting their responsibility for the content of education, the structure of education systems, and their cultural and linguistic diversity (Brouwer, 1996; Verbruggen, 2002).

How different this seems from the present situation where 80% of the Bologna countries either have the legal possibility to offer two-tier structures or are introducing these. Hence, 90% of the higher education institutions have or will have implemented this structure. Key actors acknowledge that enhancing the quality of education and graduates’ employability is the most important driver behind the Bologna process (Reichert & Tauch, 2003). In less than 10 years, harmonisation (although preferably called ‘convergence’) of higher education structures changed from an unde-

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sirable objective to a highly advisable aim. How can this rather sudden change in attitude be explained?

The main thrust of this article is that we, looking back at the developments in the past decade or so, can detect a complex and interrelated set of factors that has paved the way towards the acceptance of the convergence of higher education systems.

**Behind the Words of the Treaty . . .**

Although the 1992 Maastricht Treaty was very clear on the modest role of the EC in (higher) education, it must be stressed that, almost parallel to the official regulations, a gradual change was visible regarding the role of higher education, at least and at first from the perspective of the EC. Whereas higher education was previously accredited a national and cultural role, the economic rationale became more and more important. The 1991 Memorandum on Higher Education showed that it had become part of the Community’s broader agenda of economic and social coherence. Although at that time many national and institutional representatives criticised this rationale, soon afterwards, national governments started to stress the economic role of higher education. This could be seen in the tendency of governments to step back and grant higher education institutions more autonomy. The general argument was that autonomous higher education institutions would be able to better cope with and adjust to the requirements of international, national and regional environments (Neave & VanVught, 1991). Whereas the latter concerned the general government’s steering philosophy, it also became clear in the particular policies on internationalisation. The economic rationale became more important than the political, educational and cultural rationales (Kälvermark & Van der Wende, 1997). The national views on the role of higher education gradually grew closer—not necessarily intentionally—to the EC’s perspective. The economic rationale became even more dominant in the context of globalisation where the market for transnational supply was estimated to have an annual value of 30 billion US dollars in 1999 and expected to be a growth market (Van der Wende & Huisman, 2004, p. 22). Together with the high expectations on the role of information and communication technologies, this trend spurred international competition and thus the economic rationale.

**Increasing Mobility**

Despite the fact that the EC was more or less forced to concentrate on mobility (and some related measures such as recognition, joint curricula, etc.), the mobility programmes were a great success. In the first year, some 3,200 students participated in the Erasmus programme. At the turn of the century, over a million students had studied abroad under its auspices (EC, 2002). Various studies have indicated that the mobility programme also had considerable impact at the institutional level (Barblan et al., 1998; 2000). The original focus on only EC members has broadened through time to encompass other States in Europe, including countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The success of the programme as such, with considerable European-level financial support (despite criticism about the level of the grants and/or the amount of bureaucracy involved), has probably removed some of the suspicions of national governments regarding EC intrusion in domestic affairs or, seen from the perspective of sceptical Member States, it has not harmed the legitimate role of the nation states. In addition, most of the successes were achieved in the area of student and staff mobility, an area that was much less threatening to sovereignty than cooperation at the level of curricula. National barriers (system characteristics) proved to hinder e.g. the acceptance of new degrees (Klemperer & Van der Wende, 2002).

An even more important effect than the EC’s success in the area of mobility was that the mobility programme pointed at a number of problems that higher education institutions and national governments should solve. The growth of mobility made clear that the higher education systems were extremely diverse. Or as Neave (2003, p. 151) put it: ‘Mass mobility laid bare a very shocking diversity—which would have disturbed the student of comparative education not one iota but which now posed real and practical problems to the builders of a European higher education area’. Hence, national governments—either spurred by indications of universities, colleges or their...
buffer organisations or by their own observations—became aware that the deemed neutrality of mobility across the Member States raised a number of domestic issues relating to the quality of the provisions, the transfer of credits, the language of instruction and even the structural features of the national system. Whereas these issues were relatively unimportant in times of low mobility, they became central to the internationalisation policy agenda when mobility increased to levels catching the eyes of those involved in national policy-making. In addition to mobility triggering attention to these issues, internationalisation policies became more and more integrated into mainstream higher education policy-making, indicating that it was becoming a main feature of higher education policy (Kälvermark & Van der Wende, 1997).

The Invisible Hand of the EC and other Supranational Agencies

An element that is closely linked to the discrepancy between the legal codification in the Maastricht Treaty and the developments in the Member States is the fact that many of the Member States and non-Member States—despite their reliance on the subsidiarity principle—often had an open eye for what was happening in the higher education systems of neighbouring countries or in Europe in general. Fuelled both by the general expectations of the European Commission pleading for a European dimension in higher education, and maybe even more by the OECD education policy reviews, national governments realised (albeit subjectively) whether their national higher education system was still sufficiently in line with a certain (European) model, even if this ideal model might never be attained nor exist in practice. The setting up of a higher professional education sector in parallel to the university sector in Finland and Austria can be seen as clear examples of national policies that are in line with mainstream European higher education systems. The policy documents that announce the emergence of the non-university sectors explicitly refer to ‘Europe’ as an argument to change the domestic structure (Huisman & Kaiser, 2001). Reference to Europe as a model, or the impact of OECD reviews, however, do not seem sufficient to explain domestic policies. The role of other supranational non-governmental organisations dealing with specific policy elements, such as the CRE (later European Universities’ Association, EUA), ACA and agencies dealing with international quality assurance (INQAAHE (International Network for Quality Assurance Agencies in Higher Education) and ENQA (European Network for Quality Assurance in Higher Education)) must not be underestimated, nor should the role of international consortia of higher education institutions (European Consortium of Innovative Universities; Coimbra Group) (Van der Wende & Westerheijden, 2001). Either informally or formally (through policy documents, CRE, 1999; EUA, 2003), national policy agendas can be assumed to have been driven by domestic problems and issues, as well as by the international discussions taking place at the level of non-national organisations. As such, the invisible hands of supranational organisations have an impact on the change from greater introspection of governments (focusing on solving domestic problems) towards a more inter- and cross-national perspective on domestic problem solving. It has certainly increased the awareness of ‘foreign’ or even European solutions to certain policy problems and in a number of instances has led to policy borrowing and imitation.

Policy Elements of EU Actions and Bologna

Looking at the instruments to support staff and student mobility, national governments could not be but positive: international mobility increased, part of the necessary resources were supplied by the EU, and the implementation was in the hands of the higher education institutions (with some coordination activities at the national level, being carried out sometimes by the ministries of higher education, most often by (quasi) non-governmental organisations (see also Caillé et al., 2002)). As such, the EC could not be blamed for intruding in domestic affairs, on the contrary: through financial support for mobility it was able to build some trust. Large amounts of financial support were given for research and development projects (particularly the framework programmes, see Van der Wende & Huisman, 2004). A critical comment could be that the supranational support was negligible compared to the national support for research. However, at the level of individual higher education institutions, EC support is often quite substantial and we estimate that, at the
national level, governments have often calculated whether or not the national contribution to the EU funds for research were earned back. In sum, in terms of policy instruments, the supranational level used strong financial incentives to achieve its objective, with hardly any strings attached.

Turning to a policy analysis of the Bologna Declaration and process, here too the positive elements prevail. First of all, the declaration does not bind the signatory countries. This gives the national government considerable leeway either to deviate from the declaration or—possibly—to achieve the objectives later than promised. Put rather boldly: if European countries like France and Germany are able to resist the binding agreements of the Stability Pact, deviating from a non-binding agreement—whose objectives should be fulfilled by 2010—cannot be considered an alarming violation of rules. At this stage, it is also interesting to compare the non-binding Bologna process with the Lisbon strategy1, which is introducing more direct interference in national policy. Here, the ‘method of open coordination’ is used to achieve greater convergence in national educational policies (in principle, all levels). The leading role of the European Commission in this process is not based on any change in the legal configuration (the subsidiarity principle), but rather on a political mandate. In the field of higher education, the Bologna process and the Lisbon strategy are obviously converging into one policy framework (Van der Wende & Huisman, 2004, pp. 34–35). Second, some commentators have already pointed at the vagueness of certain elements of the declaration. Indeed, the passages on easily readable and comparable degrees, the promotion of European cooperation in quality assurance and of the necessary European dimension are general objectives that allow for different interpretations. Admittedly, greater clarity has been achieved in some respects since the Bologna Declaration. The idea of an undergraduate-graduate structure is accepted by all signatory countries, but it must be stressed that signing the declaration did not put the national governments in a straitjacket. The specific solution to the issue of the length of the two tiers (Reichcrt & Tauch, 2003) is a good example of how governments have been able to preserve many of the pre-Bologna structures (or were simply unable to implement far-reaching changes). From a policy and juridical perspective, the Bologna Declaration should be seen as a general policy agenda, the outcomes of which are largely driven by the powers of the national governments and other stakeholders. Third, the relative vagueness gives the national governments considerable latitude to experiment with certain policy changes in domestic systems, using the Bologna Declaration as the legitimation for such action. Moreover, if a national government has been successful in implementing a change—fitting the Bologna objectives—it may use this to strengthen its position vis-à-vis other national governments that have not (yet) achieved it. The national reports on the progress made regarding the Bologna objectives (prepared for the Berlin meeting of ministers responsible for higher education, September 2003) seem to confirm this expectation: governments often claim that they have been able to achieve an objective (adjusting the regulations to the undergraduate-graduate structure, implementing ECTS, regulating the Diploma Supplement) as the first or one of the first signatory countries. The point is not to show the rhetoric elements of policy development as such, but that the Bologna policy agenda is used to strengthen national power positions in the European ‘scene of battle’.

Caveats

The picture of a smooth process towards the acceptance of supra- or international interference in domestic affairs should not make us blind. There are some areas of national concern that lead governments to ‘put on the brakes’. Three are worth mentioning in the context of this article. The first is related to the cultural rationale for internationalisation. Particularly in countries with a minority language, the debates on the preservation of the national language are heated. These fundamental discussions question the pressure2 to use a majority language (in most cases English) as the language of instruction in higher education. Second, a lack of balance between incoming and outgoing international students is preoccupying national policy-makers. Not only is the popularity (and status) of the national higher education system at stake, but also, and much more, the effects the disequilibrium has on the economic position of the country (brain drain). This brings us to the third issue: the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Whereas at present this seems to
be a slumbering issue in many countries (Luijten-Lub et al., 2004), the underlying rationale and debate on the tradeability of higher education—and the broader discussion on the assumed pernicious impact of globalisation—are points of debate which we expect will dominate the policy agenda more and more.

**Domestic Responses**

Here, we shall summarise the responses in the UK, the Netherlands, Greece, Germany, Austria, Portugal and Norway to the challenges of international and supranational pressure, illustrating the arguments and considerations in the first part of the article. We shall focus on the following elements: restructuring higher education, the shift towards a more economic rationale for higher education, development cooperation, and language of instruction.

Not surprisingly, in most countries a trend towards restructuring the educational structure (towards the Bachelor and Master structure) can be observed. In a number of countries (e.g., Austria, the Netherlands, Greece and Germany) this has led to a change in legislation. There are, however, considerable differences between the countries. In Germany, for instance, the new structure exists in parallel to the ‘traditional’ degree programmes. There are also considerable differences in the level of implementation: in the Netherlands almost all programmes are adjusted to the new structure, whereas in Greece the higher education institutions still have to implement the necessary changes. In other countries, the issue of restructuring is either not high on the political agenda (UK, despite acknowledging that there are anomalies in the degree structure) or is still being debated. It is realised, for instance, that the two-year foundation degrees do not easily fit in the two-cycle structure. In Portugal, no consensus has been reached on the duration of the first cycle. An important element in the debate is the level of support for changes from the academics and students. The Netherlands are an example of a country where the legislation was lagging behind the actual changes in the higher education system; most higher education institutions were already taking measures to implement changes in the light of the Bologna Declaration before a national policy was formulated. But in Greece there is widespread opposition (guided by the university academic staff trade union association) to the implementation of a new degree structure, since the academics fear that internationalisation and globalisation pressures will eventually lead to the degradation of the public university. In addition to the changes in the degree system, most countries have taken measures to implement ECTS and the Diploma Supplement (Reichert & Tauch, 2003).

In a number of the countries, we see a more open approach to international competition. Whereas the UK already was a good example of a country aiming at the export and marketisation of its higher education through the British Council, for example, we now see similar developments in the Netherlands, Norway and Germany. These countries try to find clients for their higher education system in areas which so far have been neglected as target areas, e.g., South East Asia. This international competitive stance not only relates to the export of higher education, but also to issues of quality. For instance, the Austrian government has established an accreditation mechanism that may be interpreted as a shift towards international competition (instead of cooperation).

The change towards competitiveness of higher education does not necessarily imply that cooperation is neglected. Particularly in the domain of (development) cooperation, national governments are still supporting such activities. The particular historical position of the countries, of course, plays a dominant role. The UK’s efforts, for example through the Commonwealth, are clearly affected by its relations with the former colonies. In a similar vein, Portugal has strong links with countries (Cape Verde, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Brazil) that still have Portuguese as the national language. In the same way, the Netherlands have a particular relation with Indonesia, Surinam, the Antilles, Aruba and South Africa.

There are also clear differences regarding the language policy of the countries. Whereas in the Netherlands the change to English is the *lingua franca* (particularly at the Master’s level) does not give rise to much discussion, the situation is different in some of the other countries. In Germany, for instance, teaching in English is a more largely debated topic. Critics fear a loss of cultural heritage and demand an expansion of courses in German as a foreign language. In Greece, the promotion
of the Greek language and culture is an explicit part of the broader internationalisation policy. The government subsidises a number of departments outside Greece that offer modern Greek language courses. Being a country of the lingua franca does not imply that such a position is without problems. The issue in the UK seems to be that the number of outgoing students is relatively low because of language problems. This situation is being investigated.

**Conclusion**

We have maintained that the presumed lack of national governments’ acceptance of inter—or supra-national interference in higher education is not as deep as was expected. Much of the fear of national governments for intervention in domestic affairs has been erased by positive experiences and developments, of which the integration of internationalisation into mainstream higher education policy, the increasing student and staff mobility, the supportive approach—in terms of financial assistance—of the European Commission, and the considerable political leeway for governments in the Bologna process are the most important. The (short) overview of developments in some European countries (Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Greece, UK and Norway) show that governments have developed policies that fit the European agenda towards converging systems of higher education. It has also shown that there are clear differences between the countries in terms of process approach and outcomes. It also has indicated that there are some problematic issues (e.g. relating to the language of instruction and national responses to globalisation), but overall the picture of gradually and rather smoothly adjusting to the broader supra- and international agenda is confirmed. This provides a good basis for the further development of the Lisbon strategy, although the experience with international cooperation and policy coordination may be less advanced at other (non higher) educational levels. Moreover, issues such as language and national focus play an even stronger role at the level of compulsory education.

But a conclusion regarding the fulfilment of the Bologna process in 2010 is not easy to formulate. Let us not forget that the national governments are still in the preparatory path towards the objectives. Many hurdles have been overcome, but many remain. Ministers of education acknowledged this at their meeting in Berlin (September 2003) and decided to speed up the process with respect to various elements, notably in the area of qualification frameworks and quality assurance (including accreditation) (Berlin Communiqué, 2003). The changes in national regulation towards the undergraduate-graduate structure conceal the still existing variety in degree structures in national systems of higher education. In addition, adjusting legal structures is one thing, implementing policies is another. Moreover, so far, most of the changes had a rather neutral objective. We expect more political turmoil when it comes to discussing the adjustments to and implementation of quality assurance mechanisms throughout Europe. Given the agreement to have achieved certain objectives regarding quality assurance procedures (e.g. accreditation) by 2005, developments this year will put the Bologna process to the test.

**Notes**

1. The Lisbon strategy is the follow-up to the declaration made by the heads of state and government in March 2000 in Lisbon, stating that by 2010 Europe should be the most dynamic knowledge economy in the world. The process is built on an extensive programme of objectives and indicators for the performance of educational systems in the EU Member States. http://europa.eu.int/comm/education/policies/2010/et_2010_en.html.

2. We stress that this pressure does not stem from particular supranational organisations. There is simply a demand for a lingua franca.

**References**


THE POLICY CYCLE AND VERNACULAR GLOBALIZATION: A CASE STUDY OF THE CREATION OF VIETNAM NATIONAL UNIVERSITY—HOCHIMINH CITY

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This article examines the policy cycle and vernacular globalization in the context of higher education reform in Vietnam. Through an analysis of the development of the Vietnam National University—Hochiminh City as part of the post-1986 reconstruction of Vietnamese higher education, the article considers the complex interrelationship between globalized policy discourses, national interests and history in Vietnam, and the specific politics of policy implementation within one institution. Vietnam National University—Hochiminh City was created through an amalgamation of a number of smaller universities, and against the backdrop of social and economic restructuring aimed at promoting industrialization and a market orientation within socialist governance. The article reveals the dynamic tension between these local and global influences on higher education policy and practice, and more specifically, the dilemmas associated with top-down policy implementation when a new organization consists of older organizations with powerful provenance and reputations. In so doing the article demonstrates the necessity to globalize policy theory.

Introduction

This article takes as its focus the reform of higher education in Vietnam over the past two decades. This reform has taken place within a period of major social and economic reconstruction begun in Vietnam in 1986. Central to the reconstruction has been a shift from a subsidized and centralized economy to market socialism and increased participation in global economies. Within this context two multidisciplinary national universities, sitting at the peak of a differentiated higher education system, have been created. The article discusses in detail policies and practices associated with the

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development and restructuring of one of these national universities, Vietnam National University—Hochiminh City (VNU-HCM).

The analysis of the higher education reforms in Vietnam draws in particular on the concept of ‘vernacular globalization’ (Appadurai, 1996) to consider ways in which developments within the university sector, and VNU in particular, were mediated by both globalized discourses of higher education reform and local histories and culture. In drawing attention to the micro-politics of implementation, the article shows how local factors such as size, intra-organizational relations, commitment, capacity and institutional complexity mould responses to educational policy and mediate the flow of Western ideas pertaining to higher education. By so doing, it argues that since policy is ‘ongoing and dynamic’ (Taylor et al., 1997, p. 24), the production and implementation of policies of higher education reform, especially in a developing country like Vietnam, should not only aim to serve the challenges of globalization and the accomplishments of particular national interests, but also take into consideration the local micro-contexts in order to achieve desired outcomes.

The article has three parts. The first part examines current education policy literature, particularly pertaining to the political and economic context of globalization and its impact on higher education policy, and the micro-politics of the policy cycle. This discussion of the literature provides a conceptual framework for the second and third parts of the article, which examine the context for higher education reform in Vietnam and the specific developments and restructuring of VNU-HCM.

**Approaches to Policy Discourses, the Policy Cycle and the Politics of Policy Implementation**

**Globalized Policy Context**

Policy discourses today are conceptualized in an emergent globalized political context. Appadurai (1996) argues that we are entering a ‘postnational’ era, in which there are serious disjunctions between economy, culture and politics as they are affected by, and implicated in, globalization. One might dispute the extent of such postnationalism, and argue that nation states have been reconstituted under pressures from globalization rather than bypassed. However, in parallel with an emergent postnationalism, it is certainly the case that there is a new, almost global, policy space emerging in education, including an almost deterritorialized diaspora of policy ideas (Ball, 1998; Lingard, 2000; Henry et al., 2001; Lawn & Lingard, 2002). This means that considerations of policy text production, and underpinning policy ideas, have to be stretched beyond the nation to acknowledge the effects of supranational bodies (e.g. the European Union) and international organizations (e.g. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank), as well as effects associated with the global flows of particular cosmopolitan people (e.g. some policy-makers, politicians and policy entrepreneurs) and policy ideas.

At the current moment it is necessary then that policy and the politics of policy implementation are considered in light of the diverse effects of globalization, in this case, in educational, specifically higher education, contexts. Increasingly, the rapid global flows of ideas and technological advancement contribute to the diaspora of key policy terms and concepts (e.g. knowledge economy, human capital development, social capital development), which are recontextualized in different national and local contexts. This complex interplay of global and local is usually manifest in what Appadurai (1996) calls ‘vernacular globalization’, a concept that Lingard (2000) has applied to the globalized policy cycle in education.

Globalized policy discourses in education attempt to reconstitute education as an element of economic policy for the production of the requisite human capital in the so-called knowledge economy and learning society. Higher education policy thus becomes an element of economic policy framed by a micro-economically focused and rearticulated version of human capital theory linked to the changing structure of economies and labor markets (Taylor et al., 1997; Jarvis, 2000; Peters, 2004; Walker & Nixon, 2004). Ball (1998) refers to this globalized policy discourse in education as big policies in a small world. Following the transition from education simply linked to a ‘bounded’ economic nationalism to education conceived in relation to globalizing national...
economies, higher education is constituted as one important element of economic policy, and deemed to be vital to the competitive economic advantage of nations, a central element of the emergent, globalized knowledge economy (Peters, 2004) and learning society (Jarvis, 2000). At the same time, ever-changing technological advancement continuously requires governments to take action in their higher education policies if nations, especially non-industrialized ones, are to ‘keep up’ with technological and economic developments.

**The Policy Cycle**

In analyzing and theorizing ‘the policy and process and the processes of policy’, Bowe et al. (1992, p. 19) introduce the notion of a ‘continuous policy cycle’ in which policy is more than the policy text, rather it involves several complicated processes, and is worked and reworked throughout a cycle comprising three interrelated and interacting policy contexts, each of which involves struggle, compromise as well as ‘ad hocery’. Approaching the notion from the policy-making point of view, the authors present the policy cycle starting from the *context of influence*, where policy is normally initiated, where discourses are constructed and interested parties struggle to influence the definition and social purposes of the policy. Moving along the trajectory, the second context is the *context of policy text production*, which has a ‘symbiotic but none the less uneasy’ (Bowe et al., 1992, p. 20) relation to the context of influence. While influence is often embedded in the articulation of powerful interests and dominant ideologies, policy texts are normally articulated in the language of the general public good, while interests today can be located beyond the nation. The third context is the *context of practice*, where the ‘real consequences’ of the responses to the material constraints and possibilities of the discursive and textual interventions are experienced (Bowe et al., 1992, p. 21). The key point of this context is that policy is not simply received and implemented by practitioners; policy issues are subject to various interpretations. In a subsequent study, to make the policy cycle model theoretically comprehensive, Ball (1994) argues for two further contexts: the *context of outcomes* considered in terms of policy practice set against policy goals and of social justice, and the *context of political strategy* referring to the evaluations of the former two sets of outcomes and their implications for change.

While the policy cycle argument has been subject to critique because of its neglect in some senses of centralized state power (Lingard, 1993; Gewirtz, 2002), it is clear that the global context of the present requires that the concept be amplified to take account of global effects (Lingard, 2000). Just as the nation has not evaporated in the face of globally derived postnational pressures, so too the state has been reconstituted rather than weakened in a policy sense, while the three contexts of the policy cycle, namely, those of influence, production and practice, have all been affected by globalization. Think, for example, of the stretching of influences upon policy influences from beyond the nation to international and supranational policy bodies and to the pressures from globalized capitalism; think of policy rationales in terms of competitiveness of putative national economies in a global market context; think of policy discourses; think of the emergent (cosmopolitan) academic habitus as affected by and as an expression of globalization, read in policy and political terms as simply neo-liberalism. However, and as this case study demonstrates, ‘global facts take local forms’ (Appadurai, 1996, p. 126). The complexity of these emergent local/national/global plays also has significance for the topics and intellectual resources of comparative education, suggesting a need to move beyond comparisons between nations to considerations of new globalized policy spaces (cf. Arnowe & Torres, 1999; Jarvis, 2000).

In this article, the policy cycle is used to examine the relationships between policy production and policy practice, with special focus on the case study of VNU-HCM. The intention is to highlight the modifications which result from the interplay of the contexts of practice and influence, and which then intermingle with the contexts of outcomes and political strategy. As such, the context of influence here is understood as policy revisited, rather than policy initiated; and the interest groups may differ substantially from those responsible for the development of policy, because they enter the process at the stage of implementation (Rein, 1983). As argued by Gewirtz and Ozga (1990), policy is never simply imposed on ‘duped’ actors, rather it is typically, and sometimes successfully, resisted. These complexities will in turn constitute a context of influence in which factors like power relations and implementation outcomes are significant in causing the state, within specific political contexts, to adjust its policies.
The Micro-Politics of Implementation

Ranson (1995) argues that the formal power of the state is strongly circumscribed by the struggles to influence interpretation and action at each stage of the policy cycle. This is a conception of policy as palimpsest, being rewritten, as it were, as it flows across the policy cycle. One of McLaughlin’s lessons from experience of policy implementation is that ‘change ultimately is a problem of the smallest unit’ (1987, p. 171). Indeed, Datnow et al. (2002) assert, whether initiated by the government, higher levels of the university system, university faculty or local practitioners, educational reforms have changed to adapt to educational institutions more often than institutions have adapted to accommodate educational reforms. According to Fitz et al. (1994), there is a variety of forces that have an impact on the transformation of policy into practice, such as legitimate authority structures within a system, micro-politics, organizational features, management styles, and views of the public. If the implementation of educational reform, or educational change, is to be faithful, it is vital to ‘integrate[] the macro world of policymakers with the micro world of individual implementors’ (Datnow et al., 2002, p. 39).

Altbach’s (1998) examination of the context of change and development within universities provides a useful illustration of the micro-politics of implementation. He argues that the work of the academic profession is central to contemporary universities and that reform within universities is impossible without the commitment of academic staff. He points out that the structures and practices within universities do not lend themselves to unified values and commitments amongst academics: academics within universities are typically divided by discipline and disciplinary sub-cultures; there are high levels of academic autonomy over course content and pedagogy; and within universities there are ‘cumbersome’ governance structures. These factors can make for slow change (Altbach, 1998) and render universities relatively conservative organizations (Currie et al., 2003) with academics demanding a fair degree of autonomy in their work.

McLaughlin’s (1987) contention that the best outcomes of the most promising policy initiatives depend finally on what happens as individuals throughout the policy system interpret and act on them, raises questions pertinent to this study, particularly in relation to the ‘capacity’ and ‘will’ (McLaughlin, 1987) of the individuals within the reform context to effect change, and of the forms of alignment between those responsible for implementation and the objectives of reform policy.

The Case-Study Context

Globalization and Higher Education Policy

It is essential to note that the impact of the globalization discourses and economic forces on education has become strongly emphasized, especially in the literature of higher education policy and the politics of educational change during the late 1980s and early 1990s (Scott, 1998; Currie et al., 2003). The deliberate selection of a more market-oriented approach and increased internationalization of economic activities by many industrialized countries from the early 1980s has been followed in the early 1990s by some previously socialist countries also taking a ‘market socialist’ approach. This has taken place in the context of the end of the Cold War and apparent global dominance of American capitalism and accompanying neo-liberal ideology (Pyle & Forrant, 2003). As Berkhout and Wielomans (1999) point out, against the background of a new global awareness and international competitiveness, arguments for a ‘free’ economy and the interplay of market forces have come to be viewed as a major force influencing education, especially higher education policy development. The universalizing convergence in higher education reform policies has increasingly been acknowledged as the tendency of educational policy ‘borrowing’, ‘modeling’, ‘transfer’, ‘diffusion’, ‘appropriation’ and ‘copying’ which occur across boundaries of nation states (Halpin, 1994; Phillips & Ochs, 2003). This convergence is perhaps even more than policy borrowing as a global policy community emerges across international organizations. Policy ideas are conceptualized within the space of the globe rather than the nation, reflecting the phenomenological world and the habits of this cosmopolitan policy community. What we are seeing then in the context of globalization is more than the migration of policy ideas between nations. A new global policy space has emerged resulting in not only the convergence of big policy ideas for higher education, but also their vernacular manifestation in local contexts, histories and cultures.
Market forces and market approaches are shaping higher education policy in multiple ways as noted by Marginson and Considine (2000) and Walker and Nixon (2004). Nonetheless, it is also obvious that education is more than a mere epiphenomenon of globalized market forces; it is also highly responsive to ideological and cultural matters, particularly those linked to the issues of national development, national identity and international prestige (Berkhout & Wielemans, 1999). In the context of higher education in Asia, for example, Altbach (1998) argues that while the university is ‘a Western institution wherever it exists’ (p. 205), its structure, organization and curriculum development are always ‘filtered’ within the specifics of Asian contexts through varying processes of change, adaptation and accommodation. Altbach thus contends that ‘Asian universities are as much Asian as they are Western’ (p. 53), as the relationship between universities and political and cultural practices within Asian states mediates, and at times challenges, Western academic traditions. At the same time, and as Altbach notes, this ‘filtering’ of the university concept in many Asian societies, including Vietnam, took place within a context of colonialism and its attendant power relations. Thus the university in Hanoi, for example, was modeled after a French provincial university. This colonial context has significantly shaped university structures and curricula in many countries, and as well, often served to reinforce colonial rule (Altbach, 1998).

Past and present discussions of international relations provide a reminder that within the current context of higher education policy production, it is important to pay sufficient and serious attention to the issue of how global and national contexts are integratively constructed within educational policy texts as a rationale for particular policy imperatives (Lingard, 1996). Policy documents in this respect construct the ‘problems’ to which they respond (Yeatman, 1990, p. 158). In the policy context, unlike within the cognate social sciences literature, globalization is most often simply equated with neo-liberalism.

Reform Policies in Vietnamese Higher Education Since 1986

1986 marked the beginning of a period of major social and economic reconstruction in Vietnam in which policies were put in place for the transition from a subsidized, centralized economy to a multi-sectored economy that included a market orientation with state control and socialist governance. This was in preparation for the nation’s industrialization and modernization (Ministry of Education and Training, 1997). Reform in all sectors of education has been seen as central to the process of reconstruction (Duggan, 2001). In the 150 years preceding this period of reformation and reconstruction, Vietnam experienced considerable turmoil and conflict associated with French colonial rule, the Vietnam War, division between north and south, and diplomatic isolation. The post-1986 reconstruction of the economy has included the development of diplomatic, trade and investment relations with a range of countries, international groupings (e.g. Association of South East Asian Nations and European Union) and multilateral investors (e.g. World Bank and Asian Development Bank). This has enabled a new flow of people, goods, ideas and capital into and out of Vietnam. Within this context, the higher education system in Vietnam has been targeted as a key site enabling national economic development.

In accordance with this significant socioeconomic transition, national higher education reform policies have been carried out, of which the greatest and most remarkable feature has been the transformation of the whole higher education system. The transformation of the higher education system was an important part of the transformation from the old to the new style economy, and for the creation of an education system that was responsive to the new and diverse demands of the society (Lam, 1992; Ministry of Education and Training, 1997). More than ever, educational undertakings were geared towards the needs of the national socioeconomic development, in the broader context of increasing globalization and internationalization. On the one hand, the radical transformation of Vietnamese higher education was required by trends within modern scientific and technological developments, as well as global and regional higher education development. On the other hand, though a pure ‘market economy’ was not explicitly addressed in the official documentation during the early period of this reform, the ‘market-oriented approach’ and its principles were implied in the new multi-sectored economy. In this sense, market ideology and responding to new economic imperatives entered Vietnamese higher education policy. Reform policies were formulated which aimed to achieve an economic mission for higher education; namely, to satisfy the increasingly
diverse demands of various sectors of the new economy, and to prepare competent human resources for the nation’s industrialization, modernization and global integration. Here we can see the vernacular playing out of a globalized policy discourse.

The Government Decree 90/CP laid down a policy for restructuring and rearranging the system of universities, colleges, research institutes and other higher education institutions in the whole country (Government, 1993). The objective of this reform was to remove the ‘irrationalities’ which existed in the higher education system. The origin of the ‘irrationalities’ was seen to be the mono-disciplinary universities with highly local and self-contained training activities, and the dispersion and duplication in the training missions of some universities. The key objective was to form strong, comprehensive, multidisciplinary universities in the key economic, cultural and political cities and other important provinces throughout the country, and to develop high national and regional recognition. As part of the diversification of higher education, another objective was to reinforce some specialized universities and community colleges, and to develop semi-public universities, and private institutions. The most remarkable and also most controversial result of the reform policy was the establishment of the two National Universities in the two key cities: the Vietnam National University—Hanoi and the Vietnam National University—Hochiminh.

The Case Study: Vietnam National University—Hochiminh

The Establishment of VNU-HCM

The Vietnam National University—Hochiminh City (VNU-HCM) was established under the Government Decree 16/CP dated 27 January 1995 by merging nine existing universities located in the city. Initially, the rationale for establishing VNU-HCM included the following: to create interconnectedness in the organization; to develop an efficient use of common resources and equipment to serve teaching, learning and research activities; and to entitle VNU-HCM to more autonomy and authority, so as to enable it to develop into one of the two leading universities providing the nation with competent human resources (Phan, 2001; Nong, 2002; Tran, 2002) and sitting at the peak of a differentiated system of institutions. As a new establishment, VNU-HCM initially consisted of 10 member colleges (the College of General Education, the College of Technology, the College of Natural Sciences, the College of Social Sciences, the College of Economics, the College of Education, the College of Law, the College of Architecture, the College of Agriculture and Forestry, and the College of Technical Teachers’ Training), one special High School for the Gifted, two research institutes, and other training and research centres (VNU-HCM, 1997).

VNU-HCM operates with three administrative levels (VNU-HCM level, member institution level and faculty/department/school level), and under the direct authority of the government. In contrast, the other regional universities are under the authority of the Ministry of Education and Training. Moreover, the president of VNU-HCM is appointed by and responsible to the Prime Minister. As one of the two national universities, VNU-HCM is entitled to considerable priority in terms of financial, personnel, infrastructure and equipment investment in order to continually improve the quality and efficiency of training, research and technological application (Government, 2001b). As such, rather than any artificial equalization of institutional roles that might be brought about by systematic educational reforms, this new establishment was intended to promote greater diversity in the higher education system. Different levels of investment in each institution were part of the national development strategy, resulting in a differentiated system.

However, after some years of operation, the establishment of VNU-HCM began to show some problematic signs (VNU-HCM, 2001). Such a large organization, with all constituent member institutions once strong in their own disciplines and with well-established reputations, experienced great difficulty in terms of organizational administration. For instance, the establishment of the College of General Education within VNU-HCM, and the division of the two training stages with a transition exam, appeared not only to interrupt the training/educational process, but also to create inefficiencies in the use of common resources. While a broad general education, and a more focused specialization, were recognized as important for students to acquire, the following problems were acknowledged:

The rigid stipulation of the two stages of training together with the establishment of the College of General Education within a university, and the implementation of the transition exam as a
national exam have actually resulted in irrationalities in training as well as difficulties in administration activities. (Government, 1998a)

Regulations concerning the first stage of learning and especially the transition exam as a national exam were not only complicated and burdensome for students, but also time and resource inefficient for administrators.

Further, prior to the reform all the member colleges were independent public universities with long histories of development and well-established reputations in their own unique disciplines. When these universities were merged to create VNU-HCM, it was a great challenge for VNU-HCM’s leadership to create and sustain a new and harmonious organizational structure and organizational culture. These implementation outcomes, in turn, served to influence policy adjustments. The adjustments included: the disestablishment of the College of General Education (Government, 1998b); the detachment of the College of Education from VNU-HCM (Government, 1999); the de-amalgamation of the other VNU-HCM member colleges (Economics, Agriculture and Forestry, Architecture, Law, Technical Teachers’ Training) (Ministry of Political Affairs, 2000); and finally the reorganization of the VNU-HCM (Government, 2001c). The Government Decree on the Vietnam National Universities and the decision of the Prime Minister to promulgate a VNU-HCM organizational and operational statute, which came into effect in February 2001 (Government, 2001 a, b), have contributed to stopping ‘the prolonging situation of model, structural and organizational crisis’, and of establishing policies that seek to stabilize and sustain the new university practices (VNU-HCM, 2001, p. 3).

As far as policy and the politics of policy implementation are concerned, it is particularly important to acknowledge that ‘policy intentions may (always) contain ambiguities, contradictions and omissions that provide particular opportunities for parties to the “implementation” process’ (Bowe et al., 1992, pp. 13–14). In the sense that policy discourse becomes refrained at local sites in ways that might mitigate and also reconcile its objectives (Berkhout & Wielemans, 1999), the reality of policy in practice always depends on compromises and accommodations. Lessons from this experience have shown that every implementation action simultaneously changes policy problems, policy resources and policy objectives; and therefore new issues, new requirements and new considerations emerge as the process unfolds (McLaughlin, 1987). The possibility of successfully implementing large-scale restructuring, as Berkhout and Wielemans (1999) argue, is dimmed in the absence of the micro-details needed for proper reflection and adjustment. To obtain a detailed understanding of why there were so many upheavals during the early establishment of VNU-HCM and to consider how these might be overcome to achieve stable development, it is essential to study the micro-politics of policy implementation in this particular case.

Institutional Culture and Re-Culturing

Researchers have pointed out a number of reasons why sustainability of large-scale reforms, such as the establishment of VNU-HCM in this case, is so problematic. One of the explanations suggests that reforms fail because they have not really changed the everyday practices and standard operating procedures of the institution—‘how we do things here’ (Schein, 1992; Datnow et al., 2002). In other words, they have not really touched or challenged the core values and beliefs—the culture of the institution (McLaughlin, 1987). Concerning the reform of schools and educational systems, Fullan (2001) makes a distinction between the concepts of ‘re-culturing’ and ‘restructuring’: reculturing is the process whereby the institution’s members question and change their beliefs and practices, whereas restructuring typically means altering roles, policies, procedures, programs and other formal elements of an institution’s organization. Fullan argues that restructuring an educational institution without reculturing will accomplish very little in changing relationships among people in the institution, ones that are mediated by deeply held cultural assumptions. Thus, an implication for implementing change in education, across the sectors, is that any reform effort often has to challenge the most fundamental beliefs about education and in ways that enable educators and administrators to wrestle with age-old cultural beliefs about institutional purpose. As such, reframing thinking about educational reform has less to do with structural change and more to do with the beliefs and basic assumptions of the individuals within the institution who are expected to implement the reform (McLaughlin, 1987).
As for VNU-HCM, such a great structural change resulted in several significant rearrangements within the member institutions as well as within each group, namely top-level administrators (at VNU-HCM level), middle-level administrators (at member institutions’ level), lower-level administrators (at faculty/department/school level) and the teaching and research staff. For example, the former University of Finance and Accounting (UFA) was merged into the University of Economics, which then became one of the members of VNU-HCM, resulting in the merger of the two teaching bodies. The former Rector of UFA was promoted to be the Director of VNU-HCM (administrative) Department of Finance and Planning. The Rector of the former University of Technical Education became the President of VNU-HCM. As individuals in each group changed their institutional location, they carried with them their ‘culture’ and brought it into the new group. As such, those formerly shared norms, beliefs and values became a chaotic mix; the new sub-cultures that emerged contained internal contradictions and conflicts. While the merger created new groups within the new organization, new relationships were also forged and new leadership was assigned. This turnover seriously challenged existing shared assumptions as well as power relations. As conflicts occurred both within new groups of teaching staff who came from formerly different faculties or different universities and among groups within the university, it was therefore crucial for the university to have a certain period of time to rebuild its history of shared assumptions so that some degree of culture formation could take place, and so that there could be some harmony between the ‘restructuring’ and ‘reculturing’ within the institution.

Legitimate Authority Structures

The legitimate authority structures in Vietnamese higher education, at both systemic and institutional levels, can be considered as hierarchically organized. These structures have been traditionally built into the deeply rooted Confucian society, which has its links to thousands of years of Chinese feudalism, as well as the more recent colonial and post-colonial models of state governance. The translation of the national higher education reform policies into practice has been underpinned by hierarchical assumptions in which actors operate according to the expressed intention of the policy, and in which the structured power of the state is reflected (see Hatcher & Troyna, 1994). Bowe et al. (1992) argue that in such a state control model the language of ‘implementation’ strongly implies that within policy there is an unequivocal governmental position that filters down through the quasi-state bodies and into the institutions. According to these authors, such a model ‘distorts the policy process’, because ‘the conception of distinct and disconnected sets of policy makers and policy implementors actually serves the powerful ideological purpose of reinforcing a linear conception of policy in which theory and practice are separate and the former is privileged’ (Bowe et al., 1992, p. 10). However, if the structured legitimate power is understood as providing pressure rather than support to the policy implementation process, then Bowe et al.’s argument can be challenged, in McLaughlin’s (1987) argument, pressure from policy can be important even in settings that subscribe voluntarily to reform objectives, simply because most institutions and individuals are ‘allergic’ to change. In settings where there is uneven consensus about the merit of the policy, for instance, the case of the establishment of VNU-HCM, where the comprehensive multidisciplinary university model adopted from overseas systems was completely new to the Vietnamese higher education context, pressure could presumably provide the necessary legitimacy for program officials to translate policy into practice.

Nonetheless, Bowe et al.’s argument proves to have merit in light of the market ideology in the new market economy, which, at its core, emphasizes the ultimate power of the individual. Rein (1983) argues that when the economic ideology transforms, other social and organizational ideologies alter accordingly. In Vietnam, when there was transformation from the centralized, planned economy to the multi-sectored economy operating under the market mechanism, educational ideology also experienced a transition. This was from education linked to a bounded economic nationalism, to education conceived in relation to internationalizing and globalizing national economies, of which the market-driven ideology was the most remarkable feature. In this context, the traditional approach which once applied in the hierarchically organized institution, based on leaders’ directives and the compliance of subordinates’ activities, was being challenged. The new market economy was producing a new type of individualistic, self-governing self, one less responsive to command approaches;
a new habitus was emerging. There was thus a tension in the case study between the more traditional top-down approach to change and the culture which such change was supposed to cultivate. As Rein (1983) also suggests, one can discern the obverse question here of how to get leaders to comply with what their members wish, rather than how to get subordinates to comply with the rules their leaders set.

**The Power Conflict**

‘Policies typically posit a restructuring, redistribution and disruption of power relations, so that different people can and cannot do different things’, and as such, ‘policy texts enter rather than simply change power relations’ (Ball, 1994, p. 20, original italics). This is particularly apposite in the context of VNU-HCM. Among the wide range of factors in the context of influence, competing centers of authority are the ones which might most profoundly influence the implementation process and its outcomes. In this sense, Ball (1994) argues that practice and the effects of policy cannot be simply read off from texts and are the outcome of conflict and struggle between contending ‘interests’ in the given context.

According to Ranson (1995, p. 429), writing in the English context, power is diffused between the three partners in educational policy development: central government, local government and the institutions, so as to form a ‘triangle of tension’. Considered in the VNU-HCM context, this triangle can be roughly compared to the tension between the Ministry of Education and Training (MOET) (as old central administration), VNU-HCM (as new local administration) and the member institutions. In developing the theoretical model of exchange and power which conceives the relations between levels of government as forming a complex network of organizations, agencies and interest groups, Ranson suggests that the operation of the network is shaped by the pattern of resource ownership and the structure of dependencies. Resources here are broadly defined as finance, authority and/or information. Within this pattern, the powerful actor can win more resources and so ensure the delivery of its services, as well as protect and extend the boundaries of its influence and domination. On the one hand, because VNU-HCM was established by merging nine existing universities which formerly ‘belonged’ to the MOET, and because VNU-HCM operated under the direct authority of the Prime Minister and the government and was entitled to a national priority of resource allocation, it obviously became a powerful actor in the contending relations with the MOET. On the other hand, as a new local administration, VNU-HCM was understandably considered a local, middle-administrative ‘constraint’ by its member institutions, who clung to their firmly built relationships with the MOET. Even more, inside the new organization of VNU-HCM itself, new leadership positions and new administrative structures also unintentionally induced new power tensions with continuous compromises and struggles for influence. And so, altogether, the triangle of tension intermingled with the internal conflicts to create a greater complexity in which there was hardly room for a real emphasis of ‘the value and spirit of partnership’ (Ranson 1995, p. 429).

In that connection, it is useful to employ Rein’s (1983) analysis in arguing that, if we consider the politics of program administration (the VNU-HCM establishment and operation) as a continuation of the legislative-political bargaining process, rather than an altogether different and apolitical process, then we will be able to understand better the conflicting imperatives in the politics of administration and how they can be managed. In this bargaining process, as Rein argues, implementation becomes an attempt to reconcile the three potentially conflicting imperatives: what is legally required; what is rationally defensible in the minds of the administrators; and what is politically feasible in striving for agreement among the contending parties. As Rein (1983, p. 117) notes:

> When many key groups and individuals are excluded from the arena in which policy is formulated, it is typical that the implementation phase of the political process is where policies can be modified to suit individual or group interest.

An interesting illustration of such modification can be found in the politics around new language in the case of VNU-HCM, where the use of some nominal equivalence in foreign languages appeared to be very problematic. The new university model required some necessary nominal change to address the new structural order: under VNU-HCM, the former ‘universities’ changed
to become ‘colleges’ (as in the American multidisciplinary university model, or faculties as in the Australian and UK models)—thus the former University of Economics became the College of Economics. In practice, no consensus from the member universities was achieved, since the change challenged their traditional perception of value in which there was a clear hierarchical differentiation between the nomenclature of ‘university’ and ‘college’, and to accept this change would accordingly mean an institutional ‘devaluation’. Similarly, it was hard to find a perfect equivalent title in Vietnamese to address the ‘president’ of the university. The rough translation of giam doc, which might in turn be understood as equivalent to ‘director’, seemed to take a long time to get the public (even the university staff and students) to accept, simply because it conveyed an executive meaning which was still somewhat strange to the Vietnamese academic context.

Ranson (1995, p. 440) asserts that ‘agreement about change and values is not a given; they are likely to be “essentially contested” within organizations as much as the polity as a whole’. Externally induced practices which are inconsistent or irrational to local routines, traditions or resources are likely to be rejected in time, despite early apparent compliance (McLaughlin, 1987). Linked to Rein’s (1983) conflicting imperatives referred to earlier and the above illustrations, because there was conflict between what was ‘rationally defensible’ and what was ‘legally required’, those responsible for implementing change were confronted with a dilemma. Ultimately they ignored the ‘legal’ imperative and designed new regulations that would minimize the opposition of the two interest groups. And for this reason, the consequence was, in the VNU-HCM 2001 brochure, the member institutions no longer appeared as ‘colleges’ as they did in the 1997 prospectus, but as ‘universities’.

McLaughlin (1987) argues that because the implementation process itself creates new realities and changes the system, normally unanticipated outcomes or even counter-cyclical consequences emerge. Implementation is a process of learning about feasibility because it is always going to uncover new and unanticipated problems. In the case of VNU-HCM, where the policy imperatives were not properly articulated, and the time for passing them was relatively short, and where there was little practical experience or cognitive understanding about how best to achieve the goals of policy, implementation outcomes provided a new context for seeking further clarification, or in other words, served as influences for policy modification and adjustment.

Conclusion

The dynamic, yet incomplete and contested, interrelationships between policy and practice are clearly illustrated in this case study of Vietnam National University—Hochiminh City. Because policies project images of an ideal (Ball, 1990), they are oriented to change and action, providing public intent of transforming practice according to ideal values and therefore systematically challenging the taken-for-granted assumptions and practices in organizations. Albeit many upheavals during the first five years of implementation, the policy for establishing and developing the multidisciplinary national universities, and more specifically the Vietnam National University—Hochiminh City, was reaffirmed by the Vietnamese Prime Minister to be a ‘sound and right policy’ as it had been aimed and had initially proved to meet the national demands of the new time—the period of promoting the country’s industrialization and modernization (Phan, 2001). In the Conclusion of the Sixth Plenum, the Ninth Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party emphasized the imperative of continuing the national education system’s restructuring and development, promoting the process of building and investing in the two national universities (VCP, 2002) to become ‘high-quality comprehensive multidisciplinary centers for undergraduate and graduate training, scientific research and technology application which serve as the core of the national higher education system in responding to the requirements of socioeconomic development’ (Government, 2001b). However, the case study has shown that it is naive for central policy-makers to believe that top-down policy will be faithfully implemented at local sites, but this is especially so when the new organization consists of older organizations with powerful provenance and reputations, as was the case with the multiple member institutions of the Vietnam National University—Hochiminh City.

Because policies are always transformed and adapted to the conditions of the implementing units, local manifestations of central policies will consequently differ in fundamental respects and ‘effective implementation’ appears to have different meanings in different settings. This is absolutely
the case in the university policy context. The imperatives of the policy are redefined during the interaction of the contexts of policy cycle to take account of the problems faced in practice. In order to meet the requirements of the new socioeconomic environment and to achieve best expected outcomes, the production and implementation of higher education reform policies in Vietnam should not only aim to serve the challenges of globalization and the accomplishments of particular national interests, but also take into consideration the local micro-contexts. At the macro-policy production level, however, what we see are the effects of a globalized policy discourse concerning higher education reform, its specific Vietnamese historical, cultural and political mediation, and its vernacular manifestation within one specific site, the National University of Vietnam, Hochiminh. This is vernacular globalization at work in the policy practice phase of the policy cycle, demonstrating the always-contested and specific (national and local) nature of policy implementation, despite the globalized uniformity of university reform policy discourses. Of course, a fuller analysis of this case study would also require attention to the ways in which all phases of the non-linear policy cycle have also been affected by globalization, both discursively and materially.

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Abstract

The increasing pace and scope of global structural change has left Japanese flagship universities at a crossroads. Reflecting upon historical trends, current policy changes and respective institutional strategies for global marketing among Japanese top research universities, the author discusses possible future directions for these institutions and how key decisions may be influenced by selected national policies. By taking a more active role in building flagship universities and making use of higher education for social and economic development, the Japanese government has already taken concrete measures to keep pace with higher education policies of neighboring Asian countries. However, in the author’s view, whether or not Japan can truly develop and maintain world-class universities ultimately depends on an overall improvement in the status of East Asian higher education.

Keywords Asia, Flagship universities, Globalization, International, competitiveness, Japan, Research universities.

Driven by the global structural changes in the academic world, Japanese flagship universities and other major research institutions find themselves at a crossroads. In part because of language barriers and the distance separating Japan from North America and Europe, Japanese universities have never occupied a central position in the global academic world. However, the consistent and ongoing development of Japan’s higher education system through strong national policy initiatives since the late 19th century eventually enabled the country’s leading universities to rank among the top ones in the Asia Pacific region. For example, Japanese universities dominated the top echelons in Asia Week’s annual “Asian University Ranking” until the magazine ceased publication in 2000—even though the University of Tokyo, the top national university of Japan, once declined to participate in that ranking (Yonezawa, Natatsui, & Kobayashi, 2002). In 2004, the world rankings by the Institute of Higher Education of Shanghai Jiao Tong University (2004) and the Times Higher Education Supplement (THES) (2004) listed Tokyo University as the top university outside North America and Europe (“Rest of the World,” in the THES ranking).

However, a number of developments have had a great impact on the position of leading Japanese universities: the sharp rise in cross-border academic exchange following the end of the cold war, the development of information technology around 1990, and the changing nature of university activities in the knowledge economy. The rapid growth of academic and science and technology
exchange among Asian countries poses a potential threat to top Japanese institutions in maintaining their current prominent position. In 2005, Peking University already replaced the University of Tokyo as the highest-ranking Asia Pacific university, according to the THES (2005) World University Rankings. On the other hand, the improvement in the global status of Asian higher education may actually have positive repercussions on the status of Japanese higher education. The direction of future trends—that is, whether or not Japan can earn a reputation for lasting “world-class” higher education institutions—depends on the objectives and strategies chosen by the Japanese government and higher education institutions.

**Historical Background**

**National Initiatives**

The Japanese higher education system is a by-product of the birth of a modern government, known as the Meiji Restoration of 1868 (Kaneko, 2004). Before this era, Japan had instituted a federal system under which the Bakufu (the central Shogun government), local state owners, and private leaders established small higher education institutions. By amalgamating a number of such institutions operating in Tokyo, the University of Tokyo was established in 1877 as the first and the only university in the nation at that time. It took 20 years for Kyoto University, the second university in Japan, to be established in 1897. After that, the national government established one imperial university almost every 10 years—Tohoku (1907), Kyushu (1910), Hokkaido (1918), Osaka (1931), and Nagoya (1939). In addition, several polytechnics in Tokyo with prestigious reputations became universities and colleges, such as the Tokyo Institute of Technology (Tokyo Tech) (1929) and Hitotsubashi University (1920).

In 1879, a total of 78 foreign teachers had been hired by the Japanese government. However, although the initial design of Japanese universities was highly influenced by European and American academia, the development of Japanese higher education largely drew upon domestic human resources. The Japanese government also sent students to European and American universities in hopes that these prospective academics would eventually replace the foreign teachers at Japanese universities. Initially, the number of foreign teachers declined somewhat but increased again by the end of the 19th century (Ministry of Education, 1975).

The Japanese government concentrated its higher education investment on the imperial universities, which had maintained an elevated status distinct from the other universities and higher education institutions. Private higher education in Japan shares a long history with the public domain. Yukichi Fukuzawa established Keio Gijuku as a Dutch-language school in 1858, and Keio called itself a daigaku (university) in 1890. Shigenobu Okuma established a private Tokyo senmon gakko (polytechnic) in 1882, and it became Waseda University in 1902. In 1920, the Japanese government officially recognized these private universities (Nakayama, 1989). Currently, around ten private universities—Keio, Waseda, Meiji, Rikkyo, Hosei, Sophia, Chuo, Ritsumeikan, Doshisha, Kansai, and Kansei-Gakuin—are frequently referred to as top comprehensive private universities. Keio and Waseda have always occupied leading positions among these prestigious private universities.

While private universities were financially independent from the government, they were able to attract a large number of students. Their affiliated primary and secondary schools subsidized the universities’ programs (Amano, 1986). The prestigious private universities recruited staff who were either their alumni or had been educated overseas or at Japanese national universities. This kind of “nepotism” was practiced by many national and private leading universities. However, the number of universities that could produce researchers has been limited until today.

**Post-WWII Structural Differentiation**

In 1949, just after World War II, Japan introduced a new university system, transforming the older European-type university and polytechnic system into one based on the American university system, which consists of four-year undergraduate and graduate education. Following the idea of
developing a system influenced by the American state university system, the Japanese government under the American military occupation started at least one public comprehensive university in each of the 46 prefectures,2 while the national government continued to operate these public universities as “national” universities. Local governments (prefectures and cities) also established local public universities, but these universities assumed minor or peripheral positions, in which they largely remain.

The government officially gave the status of “university” to all national, local public, and private universities under the new system. The former imperial universities lost their special official status. Despite this change in designation, however, the government has continued treating the former imperial universities distinctly from others.

First, the former imperial universities have retained the chair system as a basic feature of their organizational structure, while others took on the departmental system. The chair system gave centralized control over research and teaching to the chairholders. Further, the traditional budgeting arrangements were based on government funding of the chairs—a system in place since the establishment of the imperial universities in the 19th century. In contrast, the departmental system, introduced into much of the rest of the higher education system, was more democratic in that it decentralized academic and budgetary control.

Second, the government tried to limit the number of universities with doctoral programs. Again, the former imperial universities were given a priority for the allocation of those programs. Tokyo Tech was given a special status among the nonimperial universities. Because the core of Japanese industry is manufacturing, Tokyo Tech has always been an important focus for the Japanese national higher education sector. Proposals pertaining to the official categorization of different types of higher education institutions have frequently appeared in government reports, such as the 1971 report of the Central Council for Education (Central Council for Education, 1971). However, these government ideas have not been carried out to this day.

In the 1990s, the national government reorganized the top national universities. All of the former imperial universities and some other top universities, including Tokyo Tech, moved their faculty staff members to the graduate schools (Ogawa, 2002). This trend functioned again as a signal differentiating research-oriented universities from others. Again, the seven former imperial universities were given priority throughout this reorganization.

In 2004, all national universities in Japan were incorporated. This action means that the government is giving more management autonomy to the presidents of national universities and that funding will be based on each institution’s publicized six-year goals and plans and the achievement of these goals (Study Team, 2002).

In the current higher education administration system, 87 national, 86 local public, and 553 (in 2005) private universities are treated as having equal legal status, although both the national and private sectors have steep, hierarchically diversified structures from top research universities to the lower, relatively open-entry local colleges. All seven former imperial universities awarded more than 500 doctoral degrees in 2003 and Keio and Waseda Universities more than 200. Approximately 40 other universities, including these flagship universities, issue more than 50 doctoral degrees each, annually.

**Prestige and Ranking**

There is no well-established system for assessing the quality of education and research at Japanese higher education institutions. In fact, the highly complex structures of prospective universities, particularly of comprehensive ones including the humanities and life sciences have made it almost impossible to implement objective performance assessment. However, at least within the national university sector, the market competition mechanism has not effectively worked in either instruction or research activities. The strong alumni network of prestigious universities in both the academic and industrial sectors has strengthened a kind of “Matthew effect”: a more prestigious university attracts higher-caliber students, who after graduating obtain better positions in the labor market based on their accumulated reputations.

In the Japanese public budgeting system, incrementalism (decisions based on the amount of budgetary allocation for the previous year) has been a core principle of financial allocation. In
light of this, it is unlikely that the existing hierarchy among national universities will experience dramatic change. The only exception to this might have been the establishment of Tsukuba University in 1973, a national project for developing a new comprehensive competitive research university. This relatively young institution is currently ranked under the seven former imperial universities.

The National Institution for Academic Degrees and University Evaluation (NIAD-UE) will implement the initial assessment process regarding education and research activities, around 2009, the concrete plans of which are still under discussion. Whether or not NIAD-UE will introduce an evaluation scheme for research activities that is similar to the United Kingdom’s Research Assessment Exercise remains to be seen. However, the assessment results of research performance will certainly change the current, incrementally based financial allocation mechanism and will have a significant impact on the future of flagship universities in Japan.

In the private domain, older universities (including Waseda and Keio) formed the Japan Association of Private Colleges and Universities in 1951—distinguishing them from the remaining private universities, which belong to the Association of Private Universities of Japan. Waseda and Keio have kept their leading status mainly through market competitiveness, attracting outstanding students who wish to study in Tokyo. Long, prestigious histories and a large number of alumni who wish to teach at their alma mater have enabled these institutions to develop research-active faculties. However, the research performance of these private universities—as indicated by the number of publications, research facilities and other indicators—ranks lower than that of the top national universities. Private universities can also only receive a relatively small number and amount of public research grants. For example, in terms of government-funded grants, Keio University receives only about 10% of the amount awarded to Tokyo University, although Keio has more students than Tokyo University (Takeuchi, 2005).

The ongoing hierarchical structure in both the public and private sector has resulted in consistent rankings from undergraduate enrollments up to research activities. The University of Tokyo has always been considered at the top in almost every field throughout its history. The university has attracted the best students, its graduates have secured the most desirable and prestigious jobs, its faculty reputed as being the most accomplished academics, and its research grants and activities have been the most significant in most fields. As a rule, a country’s oldest university, especially a national one, has a greater chance of maintaining its elevated status. Rivals are always “newcomers,” and it is efficient for the government to continue to invest in older, well-established institutions. The government has tried to promote the emergence of rivals to Tokyo University, such as Kyoto University and Tokyo Tech (Ushiogi, 1984). However, Tokyo University has been regarded as a prototype of the Japanese university (Nakayama, 1989) and can only find peer competition from among world-class universities outside Japan. The relatively stable government funding of higher education in Japan has offered Japanese academics some protection from any radical pressure to realign the existing academic hierarchy. Instead, the question of how to help top domestic universities become world-class institutions has been left to the government and universities rather than to other groups or constituencies. One concern held by government and universities is to keep existing research institutions from being adversely affected by the massification of higher education.

The market involving the enrollment of excellent students has served to maintain a competitive environment among the top national and private research universities. For example, the rapid increase of tuition fees at national universities and the popularity of studying in Tokyo and other large cities improved the prestige of top private universities since the mid-1970s. As a result, the consistency of institutional ranking has been very strong in Japan, compared with frequent changes in ranking orders in both the United States and the United Kingdom.

A fundamental area of concern involves the budgeting practices within the national university system, based on incrementalism without necessary information on university performance. As previously mentioned, the Japanese government has a tendency to allocate budgets based on existing rankings; virtually everyone involved in academia is familiar with this system and thus prefers to belong to an institution known for better funding and ranking. In 2004, the government introduced a six-year-cycle performance assessment among the national universities, with initial results to be published in around 2010. However, it remains to be determined whether or not such an assessment approach will influence the ranking order.
Facing Challenges

The Knowledge Economy and Globalization

The long-established, stable status of Japanese flagship universities can no longer be considered a permanent phenomenon. In fact, the recent and almost exponentially increasing impact of the knowledge economy and globalization now presents a significant challenge to the Japanese university system as a whole and especially to the flagship universities.

The development of graduate education has been slow, especially in the humanities and social sciences. The main obstacle is a unique labor custom that relies mainly on in-house, on-the-job training under long-term employment traditions in Japanese enterprises (Yonezawa & Kosugi, 2006). In the fields of engineering and the natural sciences, master’s degrees are becoming almost mandatory among graduates of flagship universities, and doctoral courses are also better organized. However, professional programs in the social sciences are facing difficulty in successfully connecting with job markets on behalf of their graduates. Japanese firms are trying to recruit core workers just after the completion of their undergraduate studies and to train and promote them within the companies. MBA holders do not gain an advantage regarding recruitment and promotion in this system; therefore, professional programs in general have not attracted business workers, at least until quite recently. Another obstacle is the poorly organized graduate education programs that emphasize tutorials and laboratory work. Japanese universities award a doctoral degree called a “Dissertation PhD” to students who write complete dissertations, without requiring coursework. This system is mainly aimed at awarding degrees to researchers working at research and development divisions of private enterprises. Many university researchers have also been affected by this system and have been unable to complete their doctoral degrees in a timely manner. However, graduate students are now more frequently pursuing their PhDs before seeking their first academic or research jobs. The proportion of students who pursue a dissertation PhD declined from 67% in 1991 to 30% in 2002 in the social sciences and from 53% to 24% in engineering during the same period (Central Council for Education, 2005).

Because of language barriers and the country’s location, Japanese graduate education at flagship universities is facing difficulty in attracting top-level international students and academic staff. The Japanese language largely dominates daily academic and social life in every field. Whereas publication in English is on the rise in fields such as engineering and the natural sciences, manuscripts in the social sciences (except for economics) continue to be largely published in Japanese. It is quite unusual for a faculty meeting to be held in English or even bilingually. A large majority of international students are from Chinese—and Korean-speaking countries, partly because of their advantage in comprehending and learning Japanese. In 2004, 93.4% of international students in Japan were of Asian backgrounds: 66.3% from China, 13.2% from South Korea, and 3.5% from Taiwan. The number of students from South Korea and Taiwan actually decreased slightly from 2003 to 2004, while the number of students from China continued to increase (showing a 9.7% increase from 2003 to 2004), in keeping with the global trend of rising numbers of Chinese overseas students. However, it is clear that Japan is less attractive than English-speaking countries, even for Chinese and Korean students. Adding to this, the academic standards of Korean and Chinese flagship universities are improving significantly, further intensifying the competition among top Asian universities to attract high-achieving students from abroad.

The international viability of Japanese higher education is under question. To be a flagship university in Japan means only that the institution is one of the most prestigious within Japanese society. This label does not necessarily indicate that the competencies of the university’s graduates or even staff are internationally viable, especially in the English-speaking world. While, most flagship universities in Japan now offer some degree programs that are taught in English but not any major portion of their course offerings or programs.

The strong orientation toward research activities on the part of Japanese academic staff, especially at the top research universities, has long impeded the improvement of teaching and learning (Arimoto, 1996). To some extent, at the undergraduate level, seminar-style classes, laboratory work, and graduate research projects are able to provide intimate and holistic learning environments at most of the top Japanese universities. However, standards and criteria for graduation have not
been strictly controlled in bachelor’s and master’s degree programs, and efforts to foster a student-oriented approach toward curriculum development and teaching have been generally ineffective.

Loss of Predominance in East Asia

For several years, Japanese flagship universities have maintained predominant positions in terms of the number of academic publications, at least in the Asia Pacific region. However, the recent rapid development of scientific research activities throughout East Asia has served to reduce Japan’s standing. As determined by Honda and Keii (2005), the publication data in the field of chemistry suggest that Japanese flagship universities are now in close competition with East Asian flagship universities such as Seoul National University, the University of Hong Kong, Tsing Hua University (among others in the region), as well as several North American and European universities. SCI scores in the Shanghai Jiao Tong University Ranking also indicate the same tendency. These data not only suggest that Japanese universities are facing more intense competition than before but also that they should seriously explore the potential benefits of developing stronger academic networks with universities in neighboring Asian countries.

Functional Differences: Public vs. Private

Since the early 1980s, some prestigious private universities located in Japan’s largest urban areas (such as Tokyo and Kansai) have achieved a degree of success in attracting competitive students, partly due to the inadequate number of public universities in these areas, relative to their potential student populations. Waseda, Keio, and other top private universities compete almost equally in the student market with the top national universities, especially for social science majors. Research activities are also becoming more competitive at the leading private universities in some areas, although the hard sciences are still dominated by the national sector because of the costs of purchasing and maintaining heavy laboratory equipment. The increasing research capacity and education quality of the top private universities are raising a fundamental question: why is the lion’s share of public resources invested in national universities rather than the top private institutions? The leaders of top private universities, such as Yuichiro Anzai, president of Keio University, are arguing for more “equal” treatment of public and private institutions in terms of public subsidies (Asahi Shimbun, 2005).

Policy Change

Rising competition, especially with Asian flagship universities and increasing pressure to meet the demands of the knowledge economy have forced Japanese higher education policies to become more strategic. Again, the Japanese government, at least officially, has treated universities equally, while they have sought to protect top research universities against the massification of higher education. The idea of flagship universities was officially abolished in 1949, and official classification and differentiation among universities, especially among national institutions, had for some decades been somewhat of a taboo until almost the end of the 20th century.

However, flagship university policies in East Asian countries, especially China and South Korea, are now having a significant impact on Japanese higher education policies. The national government is now taking a distinct role in actively fostering a limited number of world-class universities through the concentration of financial allocation. Universities are also trying to strengthen their management structures and institutional strategies for cross-border competition among world-class research universities.

The emergence of the knowledge economy has placed greater emphasis on higher education and science policies as priority areas of government policy for Japan’s economic revival. Intervention in higher education is gaining increasing acceptance, and the allocation of resources is more concentrated on a limited number of top universities.

The 21st-Century COE Program

In 2001, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology published its plan to foster around 30 world-class research universities and also revealed its idea to introduce equal
comparative competition for research-incentive funds among national, local public, and private universities (Currie, 2002). This caused considerable political debate throughout the academic world as to whether or not Japan should develop a special category for world-class research universities. Ultimately, the ministry revealed the Center of Excellence in the 21st Century (COE21) program, which specified world-class research units rather than institutions. The basic idea of COE21 is similar to Korea’s Brain Korea 21 program (Lee, 2000; Moon & Kim, 2001) and China’s 211 and 985 programs (Mohrman, 2005), all of which are schemes to foster key research units for world-class research. Japanese higher education experts and policymakers had been quite aware of these policy trends in China and South Korea. Japan is now clearly starting to focus on East Asian higher education policy trends in addition to those of America and Europe. COE21 research units are selected based on performance and research potential, regardless of whether an institution is imperial, national, local public, or private.

The introduction of the COE21 project signifies a historical change in post-World War II policy regarding Japanese flagship universities. Namely, invisible differentiation is becoming more difficult, and justification through visible evidence of performance is becoming more influential. However, as of 2005, the results of the COE21 program surprisingly follow traditional university rankings, headed namely by the seven former imperial universities and by Tokyo Tech, Waseda, and Keio Universities (Yonezawa, 2003).

### Science and Industrial Policies

In Japan, a major part of science and technology research has always been implemented in the industrial sector, and increased financial opportunity for project-based funding has been distributed through open competition among national, local public, and private universities (Asonuma, 2002). In response to the incorporation of national universities and management reform at the top private universities, at the leading universities attitudes are changing regarding the traditional university-industry relationship. All top universities are strengthening the organizational setting for enhancing university-industry linkages, which may lead to increased social and industrial recognition of the university sector over the long run. However, it is too early to judge whether or not these efforts to forge new linkages with industry will translate into direct financial benefits for the universities.

The science policy of Japan itself has also been strengthened since the mid-1990s. The Science-Technology Basic Law was enacted in 1994, and the Council for Science and Technology Policy was established as a national-level council directly chaired by the prime minister. However, this does not mean that the flagship universities have been given a priority position within national policy. Indeed, the policy of the council, given that it is directly under the cabinet, is not consistent with the university and higher education policy led by the Ministry of Education. One of the new trials of cabinet-led science policy is to develop a new research university in the Okinawa area—under the leadership of the cabinet and not that of the ministry (Altbach, 2002).

The flagship universities are faced with the need to strengthen their strategic management system to attract research funds and to increase opportunities for university-industry linkages. A particular weakness of the Japanese flagship universities is that they rely too heavily on domestic research funding. Even at the flagship universities, most research funding comes from public and private research grants and from industry. At this moment, Japanese universities in general lack a system to support writing research proposals in English—which is very difficult to attract international and foreign research grants. It is also frequently argued that Japanese universities fail to obtain research and development funds even from Japanese companies (Lewis, 2001), while multinational-oriented Japanese enterprises contribute to many American, European, and Asian universities.

### Globalization and Marketization Strategies

As mentioned earlier, the incorporation of national universities means that the plans and goals of all national universities are officially developed and publicized. Although these mission statements are still somewhat tentative, they provide some idea on the future vision of respective institutions and their policies for attaining (or maintaining) the status of world-class university. Private universities are also publishing their visions on their official websites. Adding to this, the changing global and regional higher education market is now having a significant influence on the international
strategies of Japanese flagship universities. The following outlines the current policies and strategies of current Japanese flagship universities.

The University of Tokyo

The University of Tokyo, established in 1877, is the oldest and largest national university in Japan, with 10 faculties, 15 graduate schools, and 32 research institutes and centers. The number of non-Japanese full-time faculty is only 52 out of 4,165 full-time academic staff and the total number of non-Japanese researchers is 1,023. The number of non-Japanese regular students is 1,712 out of 27,412. Asian students comprise 83.8% of the student body, 36.8% are from China (including Hong Kong) and Taiwan, and 22.1% come from South Korea.

The University of Tokyo recognizes its position as being the best in Japan, and among the top ten in the world, with current president Hiroshi Komiyama aiming to achieve an even better global reputation (University of Tokyo, 2005; Monbu Kagaku Kyoiku Tsushin, 2005). In its University Charter, set up in 2003, the University of Tokyo outlines among its goals the maintenance and development of the highest level of education and research in the world and serving the public interest of the world, adding: “Being constantly aware of its status as a Japanese university located in Asia, this university, by taking advantage of the expertise accumulated in Japan, will strive to strengthen its links with Asia.”

In order to strengthen linkages within Asia, the University of Tokyo set up a liaison office in Beijing and is planning to add such liaison offices in other East Asian countries, Europe, and the United States in the future. In “The University of Tokyo Action Plan 2005–2008,” the university revealed its strategic plan to attract excellent students from Asia and provide scholarships for them. The Beijing office is not only involved in recruiting students but also in developing linkages with Chinese industry. The university intends to reinforce its system for sending students abroad and in 2005 implemented a short-term academic student exchange program for 44 first—and second-year students. The university is also seeking to increase academic exchanges with foreign institutions, develop facilities for visiting scholars, and create a new, “international” campus.

The strategic development of international networks is also referred to in the action plan. In the research field, the University of Tokyo, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in 1994 founded the Alliance for Global Sustainability, which Chalmers University of Technology in Sweden also joined in 2001. The alliance is aimed at interdisciplinary research collaboration for global sustainability. The University of Tokyo also participates, as a founding member in the Association of East Asian Research Universities (AERU). Established in 1996, the AERU comprises 17 member-universities from China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. In addition to the Association of Pacific Rim Universities (APRU), which was established in 1997 with 36 members, the University of Tokyo is planning to join yet another global alliance of top research universities (the University of Tokyo, ETH, National University of Singapore, Peking University, Australian National University, the University of California (Berkeley), Yale University, Copenhagen University, and the University of Oxford), aiming for closer exchange in research and education.

As for its relationship with industry, the University of Tokyo is rapidly setting up collaborative units with multinational companies such as Sun-Micro Systems and Oracle. The university started to strengthen its international strategies and the division for international affairs at the institutional level. However, the strategic approach at the institutional level for attaining an international reputation as a world-class research university is still in an initial stage.

Other Former Imperial Universities

Other former imperial universities are also aiming to become world-class universities, while their objectives and the approaches for fulfilling them vary (Table 1).

Kyoto University

This university pursues a goal of global excellence in teaching and research, to enable it to participate in a harmonized global society. Kyoto University seeks to foster the development of human
resources with an international outlook and communications skills, within an educational environment that meets international standards. It also intends to be a center of internationally excellent and open research activities. Adding to its existing Tokyo Liaison Office, Kyoto University has established overseas offices and centers in Shanghai, Jakarta, Bangkok, and Hanoi. To date, however, this initiative has been limited to expansion within the East Asian region. There are 49 full-time, non-Japanese faculty, out of 2,911, and 665 non-Japanese researchers. The number of non-Japanese full-time students is 981 out of 22,402 full-time students, with 85.6% from Asia, 47.8% from China and Taiwan, and 15.8% from Korea.

Tohoku University

This university’s main priority is research activities—attracting talented and motivated students and researchers with high competence and performance potential, regardless of nationality, race, gender, or religion. In undergraduate education, Tohoku University intends to develop human resources that will generate international interaction; in graduate education, it tries to attract researchers who understand international research standards and have the potential for contributing new knowledge. In research activities, the university will seek to produce outputs that meet global standards. It also tries to strengthen the relationship with local society.

Kyushu University

This university regards itself as a flagship or key university in Japan and aspires to become a center for world-class education and research. In the domain of international exchange, it focuses upon developing linkages within Asia—especially with Asian developing countries.

Hokkaido University

This university regards itself as a flagship or key university concentrating on graduate education in Japan. It seeks to nurture a “frontier” spirit, internationality, holistic human development, and practically oriented academic activities. It will also work to foster international linkages and interaction and to conduct research that meets global standards.

Osaka University

This university set forth its principle educational policy as “aiming to live locally and grow globally.” It hopes to become a globally first-class university, establish a reputation for itself as a benchmark for global standards in education and research activities, and contribute to the local community as well as various countries.

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**TABLE 1**

Top Ten Universities in Japan, 2002–2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>University</th>
<th>Centers of Excellence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kyoto</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Osaka</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Nagoya</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Tohoku</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Hokkaido</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Keio</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Tokyo Tech</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Waseda</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Kyushu</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: This ranking is based on the number of Centers of Excellence 21 units.

Note: The underlined names are those of the former imperial universities; the italicized are the private universities.
**Nagoya University**
This university also regards itself as a flagship or key comprehensive university. It is committed to offering internationally viable education and conducting world-class research. It also intends to improve the international presence of Nagoya University through international exchange and linkages, especially targeting the Asian region.

**Tokyo Institute of Technology (Tokyo Tech)**
The Tokyo Institute of Technology started its history as Tokyo Vocational School, a national polytechnic for professional engineers in 1881, and received university status in 1929. Currently, Tokyo Tech has six graduate schools, three faculties and four research institutes in the fields of engineering and natural sciences. Tokyo Tech has 851 international students (557 graduate students) out of 10,061 students (5,054 graduate students). Asian students comprise 89.2% of the student body, 45.8% from China and Taiwan and 13.5% from South Korea.

As a comprehensive university, Tokyo Tech aims to become a world leader in science and technology. Recognizing its position as being only 51st in the 2004 Times Higher Education Supplement ranking, the institution is committed to attaining higher levels of performance and therefore recognition at a global level. To achieve this long-term goal, it aims to foster human resources with creativity and global leadership, become leading innovators in research, and contribute to the society through increased levels of industrial and academic collaboration. In 2003, Tokyo Tech published a policy paper for internationalization that outlines a concrete strategy to pursue “internationalization as a global top university,” the main tenets of which are as follows: (1) almost every student must gain the capacity to communicate relatively fluently in English, and a significant share of courses must be taught in English; (2) the number of overseas studies and international students should be high enough so as to make their presence common, with campus life reflecting a multicultural student body and atmosphere; (3) first-class researchers should be attracted to Tokyo Tech, hold their own classes, and enjoy relative freedom to conduct their research activities; (4) suitable facilities and a comfortable environment must be provided; and (5) everyone must come to perceive Tokyo Tech as a leading university on the international stage (Tokyo Institute of Technology, 2003).

To achieve these absolute goals, Tokyo Tech enhanced its offices for strategic management, international affairs, and evaluation. This university has been offering full-degree international graduate courses taught in English for those who do not have Japanese-language skills. A Bangkok office was set up in 2002, to develop stronger linkage with academics in Thailand, as well as an office in the Philippines in 2005 (Monbukagaku Kyokai Tsushin, 2005). In 2004, Tokyo Tech started a joint graduate course program with Tsing Hua University, in Beijing, in the fields of nanotechnology and biotechnology. In this program, students take classes on campus at both universities in Japanese and Chinese after receiving intensive language instruction; if necessary, English is also used as the medium of instruction. Tokyo Tech also runs doctoral programs as a part of a scientific exchange agreement between France and Japan, whereby students are obliged to study one year in each partner country under both French and Japanese program advisers (Tokyo Institute of Technology, 2004a, 2004b).

**Waseda University**
Waseda is the second-largest university in Japan after Nihon University (private), having 53,775 full-time students (8,043 at the graduate level) and 1,996 full-time academic staff in 2005. The total number of international students is 1,949, of which 1,476 are full-time students, the second-largest number after the University of Tokyo. Chinese and Taiwanese comprise 45.5% of international students, with 23.1% being from South Korea and 7.6% from the United States.

Waseda University, a private university with a long history, had official goals when it was founded—including academic independence and serving the public good. Capitalizing upon its large number of students and faculty, Waseda hopes to attract the largest number of international students among Japanese universities. Currently, only the University of Tokyo enrolls a greater number of foreign students than does Waseda.
The key elements of Waseda University’s internationalization policy include exchanges with different cultures in daily student life, the establishment of an international liberal arts college, the development of overseas education programs, joint activities in education and research with foreign partners, hosting international students and sending their own Japanese students abroad, and hosting non-Japanese researchers.

Waseda University has initiated several educational programs taught in English. The Graduate School of Asia Pacific Studies, established in 1998, offers programs of area studies and international relations in both the English and Japanese languages. The School of International Liberal Studies, established in 2004, offers undergraduate liberal arts programs in English for both Japanese and international students, intensive English-language instruction for Japanese students, and Japanese-language instruction for international students. Waseda is also preparing to join the World Class University Program begun by the Singaporean government and is setting up a joint Management of Technology program with the Nanyan Institute of Technology from 2006. Adding to these, Waseda has an affiliated secondary school in Singapore, a joint doctoral program with Peking University (since 2002), a double-degree program with Peking University and Fudan University (from 2005), and a Japanese-language school in Thailand.

Other Top Private Universities

Keio University
Given its origin as an institution with instruction in Dutch and English, this university’s core objectives include the achievement of internationalization and the provision of two graduate degree programs (business and engineering) in English. Although Keio and Waseda are regarded as top private universities, their international standing as indicated by world rankings is significantly low compared with competing national universities. Keio University set up the Organization for Global Initiatives for developing international strategy and networking in 2005.

Ritsumeikan University
A top comprehensive private university established in 1869 as a private school, Ritsumeikan is recognized as an entrepreneurial university in Japan. The university’s good performance levels have succeeded in attracting project funds such as COE21. The university has established liaison offices and summer language schools, such as one that is attached to the University of British Columbia in Canada. In 2000, Ritsumeikan founded a branch university, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University (APU) in Oita Prefecture, in the western part of Japan. Around 50% of academic staff and students at APU are non-Japanese, and all of the courses are taught in both English and Japanese. Utilizing scholarship systems supported by Japanese enterprises, APU is considered highly successful in attracting excellent international students, a significant number of whom find employment in Japanese companies after graduation.

Conclusion: Can Japanese Flagship Universities Succeed?

This article examined the increasing autonomy in institutional management and the pressure of global competition, which have led to the diversification and modification of the international strategies of Japan’s flagship universities. Only Tokyo, Kyoto, and Tokyo Tech are setting their sights on their ranking among the world’s best universities. Other national flagship universities are setting more modest goals: to become a top university in the Asian region, providing education or research that meet the global standards, or stressing linkages with the local, as well as international, academic community.

In general, the research output of Japanese flagship universities is high, and some of these institutions are actually on an equal footing with other world-class universities in this respect. However, despite their relative high reputation, as shown in various rankings and league tables, Japanese flagship universities face challenges in maintaining or improving their international status. In
practice, even the University of Tokyo and Tokyo Tech are focusing more on international links within the Asian region than on the network of North American and West European institutions. No evidence exists that Japanese flagship universities can transform themselves from top regional Asian universities into leading global universities—unless Asian higher education in general gains worldwide prestige in the future. In addition, global competition is placing the top private universities under greater pressure than their rivals in the national sector. While national government policy supports high-performing higher education institutions, whether in the public or private sector, public funding for the prestigious national institutions far exceeds the public funding for the private sector.

Drastic change is needed if Japan seriously wishes to foster the development of world-class universities. The COE21 program had a great impact on the reinforcement of domestic rankings, but whether or not world-class research centers will ultimately result from this initiative is as yet unclear. The first approach for enhancing the international status of Japanese flagship universities would be to institute the official conferment of the distinguished category of flagship university. In a sense this approach would draw upon some elements of the California “master plan” or the pre-World War II Japanese imperial university system. However, it is highly unlikely that this approach will occur, because invisible ranking has existed in Japan for a long time. The second approach would be to let flagship universities clarify their mission and attempt to compete strategically in the global academic market. The national government would then take action to support and enhance such innovative and effective approaches. This latter option would require high investment and support. It should be recalled that even the current two top universities, Tokyo and Kyoto, have yet to articulate their visions for achieving recognition as world-class universities.

From a comparative point of view, potential policy tools available to the Japanese government lie more in the “periphery” of the world’s higher education system. Thus, the Japanese government is directing attention to the successes and failures of policy initiatives in Asian and European countries, in addition to considering the results of American policy. The innovation of the flagship university policy in Asia will certainly reinvigorate a relatively mature country like Japan. To be successful, a wider policy vision needs to be shared and fostered among institutional leaders as well as policymakers and administrators, based on the recognition of current global trends.

Whether Japan can develop and maintain world-class institutions depends largely on the extent to which East Asian higher education improves its status in the global academic community. It is clear that the rapid development of Chinese and Korean flagship universities will threaten the position of Japanese flagship universities within the Asia Pacific region. On the other hand, Japan has already started to learn lessons from those neighboring Asian countries concerning higher education policy, and Japanese universities have also started to establish more active collaborative relationships with other Asian universities. If Asian higher education can improve its status on the global stage, then Japanese higher education will likely eventually earn recognition as world class, given that Japan will be seen as one of the most prominent Asian countries. In this context, the Japanese government understands it needs to take a more active role in building flagship universities and making use of higher education for social and economic development.

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**Notes**

1. “Flagship universities” in Japan are defined as select, top national, and private research universities—namely, the seven former imperial universities (Tokyo, Kyoto, Hokkaido, Tohoku, Nagoya, Osaka, and
Kyushu); the Tokyo Institute of Technology (the top national university in engineering); and three leading private universities (Keio, Waseda, and Ritsumeikan).

2. Okinawa Prefecture was returned to Japan in 1972.

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PART IV

SOCIAL CONTEXT OF HIGHER EDUCATION
This article introduces a relatively recent development, the inclusion of education as a tradable service under the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS). I focus on two Trade in Education Services forums—one in Washington, DC (USA), and one in Sydney (Australia)—to investigate the discursive strategies used to promote trade in education in the multilateral context. I identify the truth regimes that are concretized and the strategies used by both state and nonstate actors to define, codify, and delimit the discourse on trade in education. I argue that these strategies help create the conditions for a broader “epistemic lock in,” where various authorities associated with education are steered toward legitimizing a “new developmentalism,” namely, the reconfiguration of trade liberalization as a developmental tool. By framing the liberalization of trade in education in moral terms, as the means to alleviate global poverty and bridge the development divide, the implications of a GATS-sanctioned commercial agenda are rendered invisible. Using governmentality as a theoretical and methodological framework, I begin the inquiry into the discursive reconstruction of transnational education with the question of how ideas about trade liberalization are globalized. If globalization is imagined as flows, then what exactly is flowing across transnational education spaces? What kinds of ideas and practices are being transnationalized, and what are their “biopolitical” and geopolitical effects?

There are five interconnecting sections in this article. Section 1 introduces governmentality, the tool used to investigate the multileveled scales of governance that have created the conditions for trade liberalization’s status as a “regime of truth.” Briefly, “regimes of truth” refer to a series of historically specific, power-inflected rules and mechanisms for determining what is true and what is false (Dean 1999, 23; O’Farrell 2005, 70). Section 2 first describes how governmentality may be used in the critical analysis of discourses of globalization (Larner and Walters 2004a, 2004b). Next, it introduces the conceptual construct of transnational/global governmentality, which is used to interrogate educational developments in the multilateral context (Larner and Walters 2004b). Section 3 describes the politics of global trade and canvasses the implications of GATS for education. Section 4 moves on to examine existing discourses about trade in education, taking two Trade in Education Services forums as sites for knowledge production. An analysis is undertaken of the kinds of techniques used to shift debates from the explicitly commercial and trade-centered focus of the first forum to a refocused and reworked development agenda. These discursive strategies have been pivotal in securing greater acceptance for the liberalization of trade in education among developing countries. Section 5 revisits some of the key themes sketched out in the article. It reexamines...
the regimes of truth associated with the trade-in-education platform and questions the emancipatory promises of the broader trade-liberalization agenda.

Governmentality

Governmentality Defined

Simply put, governmentality is a framework first developed by the French historian Michel Foucault for understanding how authority and power are exercised through the applications of knowledges, communities of experts, forms of calculation, and all manner of techniques, strategies, and activities (Foucault 1994, 201–22). A central premise in governmentality is a recognition of the productivity of power—its capacity to shape choices and aspirations, form knowledges, induce pleasures, and create things (Foucault 1980). Mitchell Dean (1999, 11), following Foucault, summarizes government as “the more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques, forms of knowledge that seek to shape conduct by working through our desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes” (emphasis added).

Governmentality provided the basis for Foucault to reconceptualize the relations among the liberal state, its population, and individual citizen-subjects. Here, the term “liberal” is used to refer to the philosophy of political liberalism. The liberal state’s primary concern—population, territory, security—was premised on security for its populations as a basis for creating the conditions for the improvement of their health, wealth, and longevity. Foucault coined the term “biopower” to explain the management and regulation of populations by the modern state in ways that ensure that maximum benefit could be derived or extracted from human resources (Foucault 1994). At the same time, the liberal state was also concerned with encouraging individuals to self-manage and self-regulate their thoughts and behaviors, so that the interests of the subject became aligned with that of the state (Foucault 1994). Governmentality, then, provides a way of understanding how “top-down” technologies of domination are connected to “bottom-up” technologies of the self to govern. The latest variant of liberal governmentality identified by Foucault is neoliberal governmentality, or advanced liberal government, where government is premised on using the market as an organizing principle for all types of social organization.

Governmentality offers a more nuanced and reflexive set of tools than grand-narrative approaches, such as classical political economy frameworks, for understanding the complex rubric of forces and processes and authorities and agents that shape the power/knowledge relations governing education. This article does not use governmentality as an alternative grand narrative to political economy but rather seeks to provide a more nuanced picture of the political and economic relations that are shaping education across, and within, states and borders. It uses “midrange concepts,” such as the discourses arising from trade-in-education seminars, to show how rationalities and practices articulate in differently contingent ways to give rise to the configurations of power that shape the regulation and disciplining of education (Larner and Walters 2004a).

Applying an “Analytics of Government”

Pinning down a formal step-by-step method that applies the governmentality framework is not without problems, given Foucault’s general apprehension about inculcating a “methodological
fundamentalism.” To qualify as a Foucauldian-inspired methodology, “it is imperative to examine the relationship between knowledge and the factors that produce and constrain it” (O’Farrell 2005, 52–53). Drawing on this, Dean (1999, 22–23) has developed a four-dimensional grid to investigate the multifacetedness of governance:

- **Forms of visibilities.**—The picturing and constituting of objects that are to be governed, ways of seeing and perceiving “the problem” at hand;
- **Techne of government.**—The means, tactics, technologies, and strategies through which authority is constituted and rule legitimized;
- **Episteme of government.**—The forms of thought, knowledge, expertise, and calculation that arise from and inform the activity of governing;
- **Forms of identification.**—The actors, subjects, identities, and agents that presuppose the practices of government.

This article will apply Dean’s grid to analyze the discourses used to govern transnational education. Because of space limitations, it will focus mainly on visibilities and episteme (knowledge), although it is acknowledged that each dimension “presupposes the other without being reducible to them” (Dean 1999, 23).

**Globalization as a “Governing Mentality”**

Despite the use of innovative theoretical approaches in its study, globalization is most commonly conceptualized as a series of radical and unprecedented transformations brought about by flows of people, capital, images, technologies, and ideas across space and time (Larner and Walters 2004b, 495). The use of governmentality as an analytic unsettles this conventional story. Globalization is taken “not as a prediscursive phenomenon and objective reality with particular causes and consequences but as a discursive event which emerged at a particular historical moment” (Larner and Walters 2004a, 5). Treating globalization as a collection of discourses—ways of knowing—that are deployed toward “convenient” ends by their various subjects reduces the hold of the logic of inevitability and teleological reasoning (Hay and Smith 2005, 125). Put another way, “dedramatizing” globalization frees the imagination and creates a discursive space for social action. With this in mind, Wendy Larner and Richard Le Heron make the case for researchers to shift their analytical focus from flows to the imaginaries that inform flows (Larner and Le Heron 2002, 753–55).

The question of how notions such as global flows have traveled across time and space and how they have come to be stabilized discursively and materially has been the source of much recent research. Feminist and post-structuralist researchers have pointed to the “globalization of ideas” by communities of experts or epistemic communities.3 Given that the rationales and logics for trade in education have relied heavily on discourses of globalization, an awareness of the performative aspects of commentary on globalization is thus insightful.

In their attempts to bring together both globalization and governmentality, researchers have proposed the conceptual construct of transnational or global governmentality, which is described as a dispersed, largely contingent form of governance that embraces connections, relations, and processes across different scales (Larner and Walters 2004a, 2004b). For James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta (2002, 991) transnational governmentality refers to “new modes of government that are being set at the global scale. These include not only the new strategies of discipline and regulation, exemplified by programs such as those endorsed by the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and the World Bank, but also the numerous coalitions and alliances that constitute transnational social movements.” Importantly, the framework of global governmentality does not privilege the supranational above other scales, nor is globalism—the global order of things—reified. Instead, global governmentality interrogates the discursive and historical dimensions of globalism, including earlier global orders such as imperialism, internationalism, and cosmopolitanism (Larner and Walters 2004b, 2).

The emergence of new forms of global governance is generally accepted, although theorists and researchers differ in their approaches and analysis of the forms they take. Stephen Gill (2003, 131–35) suggests that the transnational governmentality that is authored by the WTO is animated by “disciplinary neoliberalism,” a reciprocal process that involves the production and organization of knowledge, policies, and practices according to neoliberal principles, and the use of such neoliberal knowledge and instrumentalities to regulate, shape, and steer the behavior of individuals in
the social body. For Gill, institutions such as the WTO and multilateral regulatory regimes such as GATS, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and the European Union’s Maastricht regimes create the conditions for a “new constitutionalism,” sets of regulations, laws, policies, and practices animated by neoliberal ideas and values. Where traditional notions of constitutionalism are associated with political rights, obligations, and freedoms, the new constitutionalism, according to Gill, confers privileged rights of citizenship to various forms of corporate capital. New constitutionalist principles emphasize market efficiency, the disciplining of public institutions, and limitations to democratic decision making.

A parallel concept to new constitutionalism, but one operating at the national scale, is graduated sovereignty, described by Aihwa Ong (2000, 57) as “flexible experimentations with sovereignty by nation-states in response to differently articulated power formations arising from, and in response to, the broader global context.” The global is thus used to legitimate particular domestic policies. Graduated sovereignty manifests in differential modes of governing internal populations according to how they relate to the global economy, as well as the use of various state instruments, laws, and policies to create market-friendly environments for investors.

Hindess’s analysis of governance in the contemporary world of advanced liberal societies and the “peripheries” in the “global south” also provides a useful context for understanding the implications for national and global governance by instruments such as GATS. In the colonial past, governance was shaped and informed by a civilizational grid—dividing populations according to the level of advancement of their civilization. By contrast, in the contemporary world of “sovereign” nations peopled by citizens, a more palatable and politically congenial set of governing discourses is deployed, namely, aid and trade. These discursive practices are premised on self-reliance and improvement and captured in policy goals of “capacity building” and “good governance.” Although their underlying rationalities rest on claims of political neutrality and scientific legitimacy, their political-epistemic foundations are informed by neoliberal notions of market value and neocolonial ideas about difference, progress, and development (Hindess 2004; Phillips and Ilcan 2004; Ilcan and Lacey 2006). While a great deal has been made of the need to include the third world nation-state in partnership to facilitate ownership of good governance and capacity-building agendas, force and coercion remain a part of advanced liberalism (Jawara and Kwa 2003; Hindess 2004). Uncovering these power relations requires paying close attention to the multifarious instruments, knowledges, and calculations used to operationalize participation and empowerment. It also involves investigating the attributes and qualities depicted by empowered, participating subjects.

Politics of Global Governance

The World Trade Organization

The WTO was developed in 1995 following the Uruguay round of GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs). It is made up of 146 member countries, four-fifths of which are from the group termed “developing.” Because the WTO is able to impose sanctions in order to enforce its agreements, it can ensure that market rationalities take precedence over other international treaties and conventions, including those concerned with human rights or environmental protection (Robertson 2003). The WTO’s objective is to promote the liberalization of trade using the following rules: Most Favored Nation (identical treatment for all foreign providers based on the best treatment accorded to any one foreign provider), Transparency, National Treatment (similar treatment of domestic and foreign producers), and Market Access (WTO 2005).

The WTO regime has been proclaimed by its supporters to be democratic, transparent, accountable, and development friendly. It is democratic in principle because every nation has a single vote. However, in practice, some countries exercise significantly more power than other countries in setting trade agendas (Jawara and Kwa 2003; Wallach and Woodhall 2004). In response to accusations of secretiveness, the WTO has made efforts to construct a more “cosmopolitical” public face (Charnovitz 2004). In remodeling itself as a more open institutional subjectivity, it has developed a more consultative Web site through which a range of Web-based documents are made available, including an online community forum (depicted in cartoon form).
Although the WTO is founded on the premises of a transparent, rules-based, disciplinary, and regulatory regime, it does not operate in an open “free” space but is linked to domestic and international power asymmetries. In this context, the grip of neoclassical economics is reasserted through circuits of geopolitical power and knowledge. Thus, the flexibilities and concessions provided by the WTO to developing countries (“special and differential treatment”) are effectively blunted by bilateral means, allowing more powerful economies to persuade weaker countries to adopt particular trade agendas that are less development friendly. Regional bilateral agreements promise increased market access but demand further concessions for foreign investment and impose rules for intellectual-property protection, thus reducing policy autonomy for national development and opportunity for upward mobility (Glasmeier and Conroy 2003; Shadlen 2005). Having already been subjected to liberalization imposed by IMF and World Bank-driven structural adjustment packages, the bargaining power of some developing countries is severely curtailed in both WTO negotiations and bilateral treaty negotiations (Pritchard 2005; Shadlen 2006). Also, because the IMF and the World Bank continue to adhere to neoclassical economic principles, they are noted for exerting pressure on developing countries to drop any WTO-initiated protections in order to be eligible for loans. Further, as Bill Pritchard demonstrates through a fine-grained analysis of the procedural workings of the WTO’s dispute-settlement body (WTO-DSB), it functions first and foremost as a political mechanism to further trade liberalization. Thus, the rule of market rules the law, and countries’ treaty-based rights under international trade law are more often than not subordinated to the greater goal of liberalization (Pritchard 2005).

Governance within and by the WTO is not just a matter of blocs of strong states bent on promoting their national interests against homogenous cohorts of developing countries. Blocs and nations are not univocal; they are made up of competing and conflicting interests (Ford 2003). But more important, trade liberalization’s appeal also rests on its status as a positive project of government, offering the promise of increased market access for developing-country commodities and opportunities for creating new productive capacities (however limited). Compared to the opportunities for development arising from regional and bilateral agreements, which are heavily imbri cated in “competitive liberalization,” a multilateral system of rules and collective bargaining does appear to offer the better option for equitable trade outcomes for developing countries.

At the same time, there are a host of reputable empirical studies pointing to the exercise of illiberal governmentalities in the realm of international trade. Whether because of the cultural legacies of colonialism (Makki 2004; Halliday 2005), the policies of the Washington consensus, or both, the welfare benefits of trade liberalization have not been realized for many (least) developing countries (Dillon 1995; Shadlen 2005). The Doha development round of trade talks that began in 2001 was initiated to rectify imbalances from earlier trade negotiations, which disadvantaged the poorest countries, but Doha remains deadlocked over the issues of agricultural subsidies and protections and nonagricultural market access.

While the existence of realpolitik forces cannot be disputed, the position of this article is that the power/knowledge effects from seemingly more benign, unremarkable strategies merit closer attention. For example, how the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative conceptualizes a service is instructive: “[Services are] all around us . . . consisting of things that cannot be packaged or built or held . . . ideas and efforts expressed in electrons, on paper, film or the actions of people” (Zoellick 2003). Naming is a productive act; it confers status and legitimacy. Marking out services in thought and epistemology to include the tangible and intangible invests services with an all-encompassing character and, more important, reconfigures every service as property to be governed in ways that secure competitive advantage. Bolstered by a legal doctrine aimed at “governing the intangible,” trade treaties such as the GATS thus have the potential to introduce an administrative, intellectual, and bureaucratic machinery that successfully globalizes property relations.

**GATS and Education**

The GATS is the first multilateral (global) trade agreement to establish rules governing trade and investment in the service sector. In response to developing-country concerns that efficiency and profit goals would subordinate equity, national development objectives, and governmental autonomy, it was decided that the principles of nondiscrimination or equal treatment for all member
states (Most Favored Nation) and transparent regulation would be incorporated as general rules, while National Treatment and Market Access would be optional. These principles would be binding only if countries chose to commit to particular sectors, for example, financial services or educational services.

According to GATS, there are four modes through which a service can be supplied: mode 1 (cross-border supply, e.g., distance education), mode 2 (consumption abroad, e.g., movement of students to study overseas), mode 3 (commercial presence, e.g., overseas campuses), and mode 4 (movement of natural persons, i.e., movement of people to deliver the service). Higher-education services are largely traded as mode 2—consumption abroad—and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, in particular the Anglo-Saxon countries, enjoy competitive advantage, attracting some 85 percent of students (Larsen et al. 2004, 3).

In their discussion of GATS and the rescaling of educational governance, Susan Robertson et al. (2002) offer a detailed analysis of the potential implications for social cohesion and linguistic and cultural diversity by the commercially driven imperatives of the WTO. This and other research highlight the risks associated with GATS (Cohen 2000; Knight 2003; Ziguras et al. 2003). Briefly, the issues of contention at present are the extent to which GATS will interfere with the function of governments to regulate and fund higher education. Although article 1.3 of GATS states that public services (“services provided in the exercise of governmental authority”) are exempted from GATS, most higher-education systems draw their funding from both public and private (including individual) sources, leading to confusion as to whether such hybrid models are noncommercial. Also unclear is how much of private or public involvement makes a provider private in one geographical setting and public in another. Article 6 presents particularly difficult negotiation challenges, given the tensions between the regulatory responsibilities of nations and the issue of what constitutes “unnecessary barriers” for trade and investment (see Chand 2002; Barrow 2003; Scherrer 2005). Unresolved too is the concern that the protections offered by GATS for education could be subverted by “trade offs and package solutions,” as Christoph Scherrer warns: “Much of liberalization in education comes as overspill from other sectors’ free trade or protectionist interest and from the neoliberal constitutionalist agenda espoused most forcefully by international organizations such as the World Bank and the OECD” (2005, 79). Finally, concerns remain that, through its ethos of progressive liberalization, GATS will steer education toward ends that are unanticipated and unforeseen (Kelsey 2003). Given that commitments made cannot be easily reversed (without compensation), this raises the likelihood that poor policy choices will be fixed over time. The next section examines the discourses, rationalities, and practices in the first and the third Trade in Education Services forums, held in Washington, DC (2002), and Sydney, Australia (2004), respectively.

Trade Discourses in Education

The 2002 Washington Forum

The first Trade in Education Services forum was held in Washington in 2002, with the OECD designated as a “broker” to bring together all the stakeholders. A brief synopsis of the forum is now provided to illustrate how problematizations were steered in particular ways so as to arrive at liberalization of trade in education as the solution to a perceived crisis in education. Through all of this, certain truths about the knowledge economy, the effectiveness of public education, and the benefits of trade in education were defined, codified, and delimited.

An important participant at the forum, the World Bank, echoed the thematic priorities in its 1998 world development report, Knowledge for Development, arguing that developing countries were stymied in their development because of “knowledge gaps” and “information problems.” The Bank took the position that an open trading regime—and foreign investment—would enable countries to acquire the necessary knowledge to develop. By adopting this position, the Bank helped to insert Hayekian economic ideas into the episteme of development (Olssen and Peters 2005). Ignored were the issues of “trade justice,” including how existing geopolitical and geoeconomic relations might impinge on developing countries’ capacity to remake themselves into “new knowledge economies.”
Similar in tenor was the OECD’s view that the “arrival” of the knowledge economy was the result of globalization. Globalization and the knowledge economy were thus held responsible for producing a “thirst” for overseas higher-education credentials (Chen 2002). The urgency of responding to this “new” era of the knowledge economy—an era as transformational as the Industrial Revolution—was accentuated by coupling it with a discourse of crisis (see also Robertson 2005). It was implied that the unrequited ambitions of masses of frustrated youth denied education spelled apocalyptic possibilities. The solution? Liberalization—opening up opportunities for foreign non-state provision.

By steering problematizations in particular ways, by invoking a crisis around escalating and unmet demand for postsecondary education and the arrival of a new mode of production—the knowledge economy—an epistemological reality was thus created, featuring trade and liberalization as governing rationalities. The liberalization of trade in education was read against the normalizing narrative that trade in education already existed, evident in the large numbers of students who traveled overseas to further their education. Formalizing the governance of this commercialized transnational education space through GATS was presented as the next logical outcome, one that would ensure accountability and quality assurance. This position took the Anglo-Saxon education export industry as a reference point, while ignoring the fact that relatively few countries in the world have education export industries, even if international students are permitted to study in their education institutions (Scherrer 2005). These discursive maneuverings are also instructive in understanding how space-time reconfigurations work as a political technology. A linear teleology premised on a Euro-American development trajectory was used to promote the desirability and inevitability of trade in education. To progress, nations, cultures, and societies everywhere should aspire to become knowledge economies. Less thought was given to “power geometries”—the insight that individuals, social groups, places, and regions are placed differently in the flows and interconnections termed “globalization” (Massey 1999).

At the Washington forum, supporters of GATS such as the NCITE (National Committee for International Trade in Education), an interest group of for-profit American education service providers, argued that education’s worth was better regarded in terms of how it might contribute more straightforward goals, including the creation of a world trading environment in which foreign companies and educational institutions are not denied access to markets (NCITE 2002, 2–3). The NCITE expressed its concerns in a rights-based discourse that constructed a homogenized American education sector whose members were victims of the vicissitudes of opaque, unfair foreign procedures. They called for “the right to establish commercial operations and the right to full majority ownership, the right to be treated on equal terms with local providers” (NCITE 2002, 1; emphasis added). A more complex and nuanced picture of the U.S. higher-education field was subsequently obscured, including concerns by the American Council of Education (ACE) that GATS could erode the autonomy of American institutions, while doing little to protect developing countries from the worst excesses of America’s marketized system such as the diploma mills.

The papers and presentations at the Washington forum also illustrate the discursive tactics used to devalue the optics and rationales of GATS critics. The concerns of public-sector education unions, in particular, were relegated to the realm of irrationality, their reservations reported in emotional language (“extreme view,” “strident,” “lack of trust,” “fanciful,” “false,” “inflammatory,” “misleading,” and “fallacies”; see Sauvé 2002, 12). Little or no attempt was made to engage with their intellectually robust, careful empirical work, which raised concerns about the impact of trade liberalization on the public good.

A salient and much-used discursive ploy, which runs through much of the WTO-authored discourse including presentations at the first forum, is to portray instruments such as GATS to be flexible, highly accommodating, and animated by the principles of voluntarism and national sovereignty: “Over 140 governments have chosen through membership of the WTO to participate in a package of multilateral agreement because they recognise the overall net economic and social benefits that accrue from a rules-based trading system” (Sauvé 2002, 16).

Statements like this function as “technologies of agency” by their construal of countries’ participation in the GATS as a bottom-up, voluntary process. Less powerful countries (e.g., least developed countries), therefore, are constituted as active participants. For these countries, the identity of “willing participant” establishes the basis for their being responsible for the future.
participants in the WTO and GATS, they are subsequently responsible for their end condition, whatever the outcomes might be, from the liberalization of education. The language of participation creates an impression of agency; however, as Suzan Ilcan and Anita Lacey (2006, 212) observe, “it is agency that is not acquired but bestowed or granted” by the more powerful members of the WTO in accordance to political expediency.

To summarize, certain truths were legitimated and codified by the first Trade in Education Services forum using a variety of strategies and calling upon particular knowledges and authoritative sources. The first truth regime was that an epochal transformation in world politics had created a fairer multilateralism with GATS delivering mutual benefits to all parties. A second truth regime rested on the view that open markets would bridge the knowledge gap by making it easier to acquire technology, capital, and ideas, which by extension would generate educational progress and economic and social well-being for all (Sauvé 2002; see also World Bank 1998).

The scope of this article does not extend to a genealogy of liberalization, but it is certainly worth considering the question of how liberalization as a category of thought acquired such amplitude. How has this rubric come to be invested with so much power and authority and to be seen as the solution to the problem of providing for the well-being of so many people and so many countries? How has liberalization come to be rearticulated with a fairer and more just globalism, where previously it might have been associated with other forms of “global rule” such as imperialism and mercantilism?

Briefly, what is evident from an overview of the literature on trade liberalization is the extent to which proof of its “success” is pinned on examples drawn from selective geographies—the newly industrialized countries, or Asian Tigers (see Little 1981; World Bank 1993). “New trade theorists,” however, have noted that the “Asian Miracle” was sustained by government intervention antithetical to the “market-friendly” policies of open trade and financial liberalization (Krugman 1986; Berger 2004). Further, as the Nobel laureate and liberal economist Amartya Sen has noted, international trade and competition were not the sole factors behind the success of the Tigers. The “Miracle” was enabled by policies aimed at “broad based participation in economic expansion such as good education policies to secure high levels of literacy and numeracy, the provision of good health care, widespread land reforms, the removal of barriers to economic mobility and state efforts to foster gender equity” (Sen 1997).

Simply put, the neoclassical position derives its discursive legitimacy from erasing the specificities of place and time: it does not convey the strategic geopolitical importance of the Asian Tigers during the cold war era, and it renders invisible those geographies where trade-liberalization policies have failed spectacularly to sustain economic growth and address social inequalities (Beeson and Islam 2005). Indonesia (once declared by the IMF to be a model pupil), Zambia, Argentina—indeed, much of the Latin American continent—provide a wealth of examples. In this vein, Daniel Schugurensky and Adam Davidson-Harden (2003, 323) point to the “two decades of neoliberal experiments [that] have already negatively impacted upon the capability of Latin America’s societies to pursue equitable social and economic development.” Also rendered invisible in the discourse of liberalization are the social and ethical consequences of the “cruel, intellectually bankrupt certainties of neoliberalism” (Halliday 2005), which informed structural adjustment programs. These have severely disadvantaged some of the most vulnerable citizens in the world—poor children in developing countries. For instance, providing compelling evidence of irreversible deterioration in the health status of children, John Peabody (1996, 823) highlights the ethical lapses that arise when the temporalities of biological development are staggered to fit with budgetary management programs: “Unique biologic events such as neural development cannot be postponed even for a short period.”

The next section provides an analysis of the third Trade in Education Services forum. At one level, its focus on capacity building pointed to a welcome departure from the aggressively commercial focus of the first forum. However, a closer reading suggests that the softer discourse of new developmentalism signals the emergence of an “inclusive” configuration of what is an essentially neoliberal governmentality, which continues to promote trade liberalization as the means of reducing global inequality. I select extracts from speeches and panel discussions by the forum’s presenters to illustrate the shifting and polyvalent discourses that make up the “new” trade-in-education agenda.
The 2004 Sydney Forum

Publicized as having an “Asia Pacific flavour,” the Sydney forum’s theme, “building capacity and bridging the divide,” appeared to mirror the WTO’s “new” commitment to development. Publicly, the trade agenda was promoted as the means toward achieving cosmopolitan sensibilities and humanitarian outcomes. Privately, the rules of marketing discourse celebrated “hard” marketing over “softer” rationales. Dismissing as utopian sentimentality the “I want to change the world” mentality, one marketing executive emphasized his interest in “hard marketing” not the “soft stuff” (personal communication, October 11, 2004). Notably, the rules that accord status and authority to marketing authorities also play an important part in instilling an instrumentalization of education. As this statement from a senior marketing executive shows, employability is increasingly constructed as driving institutional reputation: “We have to go out there and do research about what employers want. What do the top banks in Shanghai want from their graduates? What do big multinational firms want?” (personal communication, October 11, 2004). Selling the liberalization agenda to its skeptics requires a modicum of diplomacy and humility that emphasizes reciprocal benefits and win-win scenarios. This involves the reformation of particular relations between key operant concepts and a reworking of space-time relations (Foucault 1971). At the third Trade in Education Services forum, key authorities linked education markets to the myriad benefits arising from long-standing, nonmarket intercultural educational encounters. Thus, in his opening speech, the head (secretary) of Australia’s education bureaucracy, Jeff Harmer (2004, 2), observed: “The benefits of trade in education go well beyond monetary value. . . . We have been enriched by international students; we have contact with other cultures, histories and societies in ways previously unimaginable. . . . [We are] strengthening relationships. . . . Citizens in the global labour market are more tolerant and understanding of other cultures. . . . Collaboration of scientists and researchers is important for the economy of our countries. . . . Outside provision challenges countries to think about their national system.”

A set of new identities was created in discourse—citizens in the global market—anticipated to be endowed with tolerance and understanding. A coherent discursive formation, the global labor market, was anticipated to create the conditions to support citizenship. In the context of a liberal trading environment, trade terminology now deems “protectionism” to be a “bad” principle. Those skeptical about trade in education were accordingly conferred with a new identity—protectionist. Thus, the secretary, who was introduced to the forum’s participants as “the CEO,” lamented that “there are people who are protective of education systems. . . . Education is not sufficiently liberalized. . . . Controversies remain” (Harmer 2004, 3).

Governmentality theorists have noted that the persuasive powers of political rationalities are best realized when they are embedded in characteristically moral forms, for example, through references to notions such as freedom, equality, justice, fairness, and economic efficiency (Rose and Miller 1992). At the third forum, the moral and social values of trade were reasserted through the discourse of capacity building. Trade’s neoliberal character was reworked and inserted into a developmental discourse of “doing good” for the peripheries. The ethical reconfiguration of the trade agenda was partly achieved by establishing a discursive common ground between the countries of the North and South. Thus, Norway’s education minister, Kristin Clement (2004, 2), declared that “Norway is an importer of education. . . . We share this similarity with the countries of the South.” Given that Norway is one of the wealthiest nations in the world, with a gross domestic product per capita of $40,000, the relations of similarity are at best tenuous. Additionally, New Zealand’s minister for education, Trevor Mallard (2004), noted that New Zealand was “a poor country and therefore could not provide much by way of educational aid, although it was able to contribute to capacity building by opening its doors to fee-paying international students. Like many of the presentations at the forum, both of these ministerial speeches mirrored a “new” trend found within developmentalist discourse—the reconstruction of trade liberalization as a development tool.

Acknowledging that “there was mistrust” at the Washington forum, Norway’s minister of education was keen for the global order of things to continue, implying that “thinking global” is a natural human tendency that has been stymied at various periods by nation-states: “History offers many stories of countries that kept their people out of global education exchange” (Clement 2004, 3). Staying
on the global course—making sure that (economic) globalization continued—was the best way forward to achieve the goals of bridging the divide between rich and poor countries.

The issues of mobility, migration, and trade in education were salient in several presentations. Having observed that demand for cross-border education was partly migration related, the OECD presenter provided a slew of statistics to illustrate student mobilities: 96 percent of Chinese doctoral graduates and 86 percent of doctoral graduates from India settle in the United States after completing their study, rather than returning home (Vincent-Lancrin 2004, 32). This might once have been considered “brain drain,” but the high status accorded to mobility means that new truths are being normalized—“brain circulation” is now the preferred term. International students “do not transfer completely but retain active links with their country of origin by reinvesting, sending remittances and migrating back” (Vincent-Lancrin 2004, 32). New Zealand’s education minister was similarly enthusiastic about the transnationality of his country’s citizens, noting that “20% of the population of New Zealand lives offshore. . . . This is not brain drain; They are ambassadors. . . . There are tremendous advantages to a country that relies heavily on trade” (Mallard 2004).

Somewhat surprising was the limited exploration within these brain-mobility narratives of the changing proprietary regimes accompanying the knowledge trade. As demonstrated by the TRIPS (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) agreement, intellectual-property regimes impose particular burdens on developing countries, which face paying significant royalties for the outputs of some of their brightest nationals who may have completed most of their education and training in their home country. What is clear is that the development of knowledge is viewed as a highly individualized endeavor (May 2004). Its public benefits are realized by the rewarding of private rights, with no acknowledgment of contributions made by the creator’s country of origin, even though individuals may have completed most of their education in their home country.

As with the first forum, considerable effort was invested by various presenters to highlight the “sovereignty clause” within GATS. A particularly convincing performance was provided by the director of the WTO’s Trade in Services Division, Hamid Mamdouh, whose presentation sought to give trade liberalization a democratic face, a patina of equal opportunity, and a level playing field: “Liberalization means two things: market access to suppliers, and you treat them as you treat your own providers.” In carefully enunciated words, he observes: “GATS doesn’t interfere with government ownership. . . . Government ownership of particular entities will never be challenged by the GATS” (Mamdouh 2004). Left unstated was the continuing ambiguity as to just what constitutes government ownership particularly in the education sphere where hybrid funding models exist. Later, in response to a question from the floor, he agreed that the relationship between trade liberalization and capacity building is insufficiently clarified.

In the context of a post-Washington consensus, Mamdouh (2004) argued that it is necessary to entertain a more active role for the regulatory state: “Under GATS, liberalization does not mean deregulation or privatization. Regulation is important. . . . The aim of liberalization is not just economic objectives; we look at more than the bottom line . . . social cultural, environmental objectives, [and] respect for national policy objectives.”

This argument left unexplored the unresolved tensions arising from the WTO’s ethos of progressive liberalization, wherein the rule of the market overrides treaty-based rights of nations to regulate and to respond to political, economic, and social conditions. The vexing issues of power and geopolitical asymmetries also have to be airbrushed. In a bid to “keep geopolitics out of sight and out of mind,” Mamdouh (2004) declared: “WTO alliances are quite different from the UN. They are not constructed along North/South lines but along mutual interests. . . . Political divisions don’t play much of a role. . . . The trading weight of nation-states is not a decisive factor in determining their effectiveness in negotiating rules in WTO negotiations” (emphasis added).

Such claims that the WTO is a level playing field on which neither geopolitical alliances nor trading weights are decisive influences in negotiations have been robustly refuted by development and international trade scholars and activists. Also contestable was Mamdouh’s assessment that the risk to education posed by for-profit, transnational education companies remains minimal since “education is not considered low hanging fruit” (trade parlance for a priority sector offering strong commercial returns). Again, it is debatable whether this reasoning, along with the reassurance that “the WTO is aware of education’s social responsibilities” (Mamdouh 2004) is sufficient to ensure that GATS does not delimit education’s public-good functions.
In settings such as this, publicizing the WTO’s credentials as a responsible global citizen is paramount: “We are trying to obtain a reconciliation between trade and development” (Mamdouh 2004). The role of activist, transnational social movements in pushing the WTO toward greater engagement with social issues, however, appears to be less welcome: “[The] WTO has a high political profile and people who participate don’t have the expertise but go because they are important enough. [The] WTO has a more complex legal framework. . . . So, you have more complexity and less expertise. You need more specialization, not more participation” (Mamdouh 2004; emphasis added).

Given the strong presence at the forum of senior education bureaucrats, education marketing personnel, and university executive managers, it was not surprising to find little resistance to the trade narratives in public discussions. However, on the last day of the forum an irate delegate from Argentina attempted to steer the discussions away from the realm of the technical and technological toward the political with a sharp criticism of the implied neutrality of transnational education: “What are you educating people for? This has not been discussed at all. . . . We need to build citizenship and enhance our own development in a sustainable way” (discussion, “Building Capacity in Open and Distance Learning,” presentation; Daniel 2004). The panel delegate Sir John Daniel, representing the Commonwealth Association of Universities, offered a response premised on the self-governing, autonomous, choice-exercising individual: “That is an enormous question and I don’t know where to start. You are referring to values. . . . I agree there is no neutrality. [However, our] courses are not just off the shelf. So the business program in [the] UK is very different compared to Australia. What are our values? I don’t know how to answer that in a short answer. Our values are that students will be able to look at the evidence and make informed decisions. . . . Hopefully, they will be the right ones” (emphasis added).

The success of mobilizing transnational resistance to trade in education will continue to present significant challenges, given that the notion of public good has shallow transnational roots and especially given the endurance of cultural and national polarities. Trade in education represents a positive project for many international students who are unable to secure an education in their country of origin. For its opponents, such as education unions, trade increases the commodification of education, weakens certain disciplines, and inculcates privatized, market-like subjectivities in individuals and institutions to the detriment of the public good (CAUT 2005; Scherrer 2005; EI 2006).

The themes of quality control and consumer protection in the education-export industry were particularly salient, with several overseas delegates expressing concern about the aggressively commercial partnerships between Australian education bodies and dubious local operators and the quality of pastoral care provided to students. Reassurances from Australian officials were expressed through the language of audit—the government audits overseas partnerships and offshore campuses. However, because audits take place on a 5-year cycle, they cannot be depended upon to address immediate, pressing problems of quality. A detailed discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of quality assurance regimes and their allied techniques exceeds the scope of this article (see Vidovich and Currie 1998; Ball 2000; Hodson and Thomas 2001). However, three questions are worth raising in the context of the brief exploration below on quality assurance in education: How has education quality come to be visualized in technical and managerial discourse? How has quality assurance assumed an “objective” power-neutral status, despite numerous studies that implicate it as a governmental technology (Shore and Wright 2000; Charlton 2002)? And how do quality assurance frameworks fix the identities and actions of their subjects?

Audits of transnational education programs have consistently raised concerns that without exposure to research and staff development opportunities, casual teaching staff will be stymied in facilitating the higher order critical thinking skills associated with university-level study. British, Australian, and American studies of quality assurance programs have noted that audits are poor custodians of quality (Hodson and Thomas 2001; Charlton 2002; Vidovich 2004). Furthermore, the significant ambiguity surrounding the concept of quality across disciplines, institutional contexts, and social actors makes quality assurance an elusive goal (Polster and Newson 1998; Hodson and Thomas 2001; Marginson 2006). None of these concerns were raised in the forum, aside from a few mild comments by some British panelists on the issue of resources required to implement quality assurance frameworks.

Technologies of performance such as quality assurance audits “present themselves as techniques of restoring trust (accountability, transparency) [but] presuppose and subsequently contribute to a
culture of mistrust including the transformation of professionals into ‘calculating individuals’ subject to calculative regimes” (Dean 1999, 169). Also, rationalities—forms of thought—become governmental only when they are made technical. Governing education is ultimately only possible with the institutionalization of quality assurance mechanisms that make the “incommensurable commensurable” (Larner and Le Heron 2002, 9; Shore and Wright 2000). Informed by managerial rationalities and moralities, quality assurance regimes contribute toward creating self-managing, anxious individuals, while reinventing educational institutions into neo-Taylorist institutions (Strathern 2000). Quality assurance frameworks, then, exemplify global “flows” (Larner and Le Heron 2002). Made up of technical devices, such as software, charts, statistics, reports, and training manuals, all of which can be disseminated across time and space, these flows link people and places in specific ways. As disembodied technical artifacts they are primarily concerned with optimizing performance.

Conclusion

By using governmentality as a conceptual tool, this article has produced new insights into how particular understandings of “becoming global” are constructed, legitimized, and used to govern education. Taking as a focal point two Trade in Education Services forums, the article identified the discursive strategies that define and delimit the discourse on trade in education to show how trade liberalization, which has been a mechanism for global government since the 1980s, is now being embraced in education. These discursive strategies play a critical role in creating the conditions for an “epistemic lock in,” wherein a range of state and nonstate authorities from both developed and developing countries are socialized and acculturated to engage with the trade-liberalization agenda in education.

The first Trade in Education Services forum in Washington, DC, was concerned largely with enabling market access through the reduction of barriers, in particular, mode 3 (commercial presence) and mode 4 (the movement of natural persons). However, the rhetorical focus of the third forum shifted to how trade in education could contribute to capacity building and development. Liberalization was linked to capacity building to make it a more inclusive and congenial discourse. The net effect of both forums was to create the conditions for knowledge of a particular kind, from which various truths could be used to govern. What were these truths?

First, trade liberalization is an important developmental tool; it will help to reconstitute countries that are presently importers of education into sophisticated knowledge economies. Allied to trade as a positive project of governance was its depiction as the means toward supplementing and strengthening public education systems by creating the conditions for quality education services. However, quality regimes function as disciplinary instruments that have the potential to subject educators and educational institutions to specific ways of conducting themselves, namely, optimizing performance ahead of other conduct. Furthermore, research has shown that quality frameworks have a poor record in ensuring good educational experiences for students (Charlton 2002; Marginson 2006).

A second regime of truth was concerned with upholding the sanctity of national sovereignty. Nation-states and their governments were constructed in discourse as willing participants in all facets of liberalization. The principle of voluntarism implied in the GATS discourse on trade in education also creates the conditions for making all nations participating responsible for the outcomes and effects of trade liberalization. As willing partners in capacity building and liberalization, countries cannot claim oppression or exploitation if liberalization in education services subsequently fails to deliver knowledge-economy dividends.

In conclusion, the salience of the capacity-building thematic in the third forum appeared to be indicative of the emergence of a softer, more inclusive and humanitarian discourse. However, on closer analysis, the rationalities and practices, knowledges, and institutional frameworks that constitute capacity building can be seen to derive inspiration and impetus from norms and codes that are inherently neoliberal. These norms rest on the notion of trade liberalization as the means to advancement and betterment for all. It can be argued then, that the legitimacy and sustainability of neoliberal governance derives from a host of discursive reinventions that call on new strategies and knowledges, using new configurations of humanitarianism, freedom, empowerment, and choice.
Why is trade in education regarded now as the means toward successful capacity building of education institutions in the majority (developing) world, where previously international aid and nation building were seen as the solution to building institutional capacity? The answer to this question is complex. While the arena of international trade is not immune to exercises of illiberal governmentality, top-down applications of power are only part of the answer toward understanding the spatial reach of trade liberalization. It is also important to understand the productive possibilities offered by new articulations of neoliberal governance, including the extent to which neoliberal discourses are embodied by individual policy makers, educators, and higher-education administrators. Understanding how the bureaucratic and professional classes in both the North and South have embraced, and simultaneously been steered toward, the belief that trade liberalization is a legitimate, effective, and Humanitarian developmental tool—with a chance to alleviate global inequality—requires further investigation.

Some of the most highly cited works on the implications of GATS for higher education are academic papers arising from consultancy reports funded by bodies such as the OECD and undertaken by various private consultants and researchers to construct a “knowledge economy of capacity building” (see Phillips and Ilcan 2004). One area that merits further study is how epistemic communities have themselves been the target of governmental strategies, subject to the grant and tender economy and the workings of the “enterprise university” (see Marginson and Considine 2000; Slaughter and Rhoades 2004; Washburn 2005), with the consequence of producing particular kinds of knowledge about trade and education. Despite claims by some consultants that they have adopted an “education-centered, international approach” that attends to the implications of GATS for both developing and developed countries (see Knight 2003), as a general observation, research and discussion papers and reports are often based on depoliticized and ahistorical analyses of the processes and outcomes likely to flow from the new multilateralisms being flagged by GATS. As Nederveen Pieterse (2004, 76) observes, “most research and policy accounts . . . tend to be ahistorical and apolitical; in view of their reliance on neoclassical economics they are atheoretical as well. Their matter-of-factness is impression management only; under the surface are many conflicts about measurements and their implications.”

Despite optimistic claims by some media commentators that “the world is flattening out” to become a series of level playing fields (Friedman 2005; see also Wolf 2005), there are many other signs that what is in place is a positional hierarchy of nation-states, regions, institutions, and individuals ordered by the grids of economic success and integration into the global economy. The current brand of transnational neoliberalism, which is sponsored by governing elites and informed by principles of trade liberalization and comparative advantage, is bolstered by global knowledge practices, expertise, and calculative mechanisms such as quality assurance frameworks. Introducing a humanitarian discourse, such as capacity building with its attendant notions of inclusion and partnership, helps to establish new ways of governing populations and geographies. At first blush, these discursive practices suggest a welcome relief from the harsh neoliberalisms that have characterized structural adjustment programs. However, their reconfigured neoliberal underpinnings have similar biopolitical and geopolitical effects, namely, recalibrating the moral worth of individuals, groups, and countries according to whether they have the right attributes, dispositions, and knowledge bases for a particular definition of economic success.

The implications of these new articulations of neoliberalism for higher education are potentially immense. There are signs that trade imperatives will further reduce higher education’s capacity and commitment to attain the “right” balance between service and critique, resulting in power/knowledge practices that are complicit with and contribute toward graduated sovereignties and illiberal governmentality. These developments will do little to further global justice.

Notes

1. The term “biopolitical” is derived from Foucault’s notion of biopower, a technology that emerged in the late eighteenth century for managing populations. “Biopolitics” refers to the politics underpinning the management of populations.

2. The use of “liberal” to refer to a political philosophy is not the same as contemporary uses to indicate left-leaning political sensibilities.

References


NATIONALISATION, LOCALISATION AND GLOBALISATION IN FINNISH HIGHER EDUCATION

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Abstract

This article analyses and discusses the interplay between the social processes of nationalisation, localisation and globalisation in a single European nation state. The view of nationalisation put forward draws on a national case study based on historical and sociological research findings. The second part of the article presents a case study of the nature of globalisation and localisation in an average Finnish university. The article shows that nationalisation of Finnish higher education has created a cultural understanding of higher education institutions important for competition with other nations. As for localisation, on the one hand higher education institutions support their local communities and provinces to gain social and economic benefits. On the other hand, local communities and provinces support their higher education institutions in the hope of benefiting from them. The case studies also suggest that economic globalisation creates new dynamics within higher education institutions both through strategic alliances between higher education and commercial enterprises and through the emergence of alternative new funding sources for research.

Keywords: Finnish higher education, globalisation, production of knowledge.

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to analyse and discuss the interplay between the social processes of nationalisation, localisation and globalisation in a European nation state. It will first look at globalisation as a concept and a social phenomenon. The view of nationalisation put forward here draws on a national case study based on historical and sociological research findings (see Välimaa 2001b). The second part of the article presents a case study of the nature of globalisation and localisation in an average Finnish university. The article’s main focus is an exploration of the interplay between economic globalisation and higher education institutions rather than on an examination of the processes involved in the globalisation of educational markets. As regards theory, the study is rooted in the discussions on globalisation (see Beck 1999; Castells 1996, 1997, 1998; Held et al. 1999) and the need
to situate the Finnish case in an historical framework as a starting point for considering what globalisation means and how it works in the practices of higher education in one particular nation state.

**On the Dimensions of Globalisation**

Globalisation is a complex concept in the social sciences and also in the context of higher education. There is reason to explore its many meanings more precisely. The idea of a conceptual triangle will be used to consider globalisation first as a word, then as a means of referring to certain ideas (social phenomena), and finally to reflect on its various connotations and interpretations (on the conceptual triangle see Kakkuri-Knuuttila 1998).

**Word and Idea**

The *Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary* (1995) does not recognise ‘globalisation’. However, the word ‘global’ originates in Latin (*globus*) and means something which is ‘covering or affecting the whole world’. Globalisation as a social phenomenon refers to the changes in the forms of industrial production and societal patterns. In this way globalisation also may challenge the lives of individuals. It also refers to the changes in the role of nation states challenged by global, international or regional authorities.

**On the Meanings of the Concept**

The difficulty with defining globalisation lies not only in the different ways of understanding the nature of the relevant social changes and trends, but also the different ways of defining, understanding and using the content covered by globalisation as a concept. To illustrate the variety of ways in which globalisation is understood one needs only to point to demonstrations against globalisation during meetings of world leaders discussing world trade. To argue negatively, one could say that it would be hard to use the word globalisation without making any reference to its economic aspect: the organisation of global markets. It also seems probable that globalisation tends to be linked with the dominant role of the United States. In this context, globalisation becomes identified with ‘Americanisation’ through the diffusion of American business, technology, language and culture.

The problems continue when we try to use the word globalisation systematically to examine a social phenomenon ‘covering or affecting the whole world’. As a concept globalisation has been used in a variety of books and articles. It has been said to refer to at least four processes: the emergence of supranational institutions, the appearance of new global cultural forms, the rise of neoliberalism, and the impacts of global economic processes (see Burbules and Torres 2000).

**Globalisation as a Social Phenomenon**

For these reasons, I shall begin my analysis by reviewing some recent interpretations of globalisation as a social phenomenon. Here David Held and his colleagues (1999) are helpful in sorting out different schools of globalisation. In the introductory chapter of *Global Transformations*, Held et al. (1999) distinguish between three different schools of thought regarding globalisation, called by them hyperglobalisers, sceptics and transformationalists. Each represents a ‘distinctive account of globalisation’ or an attempt to understand the social phenomenon of globalisation. Among the authors’ aims is demonstrating that globalisation is contested both as a concept and as a social phenomenon. They maintain that ‘for the hyperglobalizers contemporary globalization defines a new era in which peoples everywhere are increasingly subject to the disciplines of the global marketplace.’ The opposite perspective is presented by the sceptics, who maintain that globalisation is essentially a myth, one which conceals the reality of an international economy increasingly segmented into three major regional blocs within which national governments remain very powerful. As for the transformationalists, they see contemporary globalisation as historically unprecedented. According to them, states and societies across the globe are ‘experiencing a process of profound change as they try to adapt to a more interconnected but highly uncertain world’.
The main difference between these three interpretations of globalisation is their perception of the role of the nation state. The hyperglobalisation thesis maintains that globalisation is primarily an economic phenomenon. As a result, the institutions of global and regional governance take on a bigger role while the sovereignty and autonomy of the state erodes. In short, the hyperglobalisers suggest that economic power and political power are becoming more effectively denationalised and diffused, predicting a fundamental reconfiguration of the framework of human action (Held et al. 1999). The sceptical thesis, again, maintains that instead of globalisation we should be speaking about internationalisation, the implication being that global interactions are predominantly taking place between national economies. The sceptics wish to criticise what they see as the popular myth that the power of national governments or state sovereignty is being undermined by economic internationalisation or global governance. For most sceptics, the current evidence shows that what is taking place is a significant degree of regionalisation and that the world economy is evolving in the direction of three major financial and trading blocs, Europe, Asia-Pacific and North America. Further, the sceptics consider globalisation and regionalisation as contradictory tendencies. It is therefore quite natural that they should predict we will see in the future the world fragmenting into civilisational blocs and cultural and ethnic enclaves, as has been suggested by Samuel Huntington (1996). Those viewing the situation from sceptical perspectives also hold that globalisation and economic internationalisation are primarily Western projects.

The authors of Global Transformations seem to consider the transformationalist thesis the most fruitful one of the three. They define the transformationalists as representing a point of view whose aim is to understand globalisation as a process which is historically unprecedented. The authors argue that among the transformationalists, globalization is conceived as a powerful transformative force which is responsible for a massive shake-out of societies, economies, institutions of governance and new world order (Held et al. 1999, p. 7). However, the direction of the developments triggered by this ‘shake-out’ remains uncertain. The transformationalists see globalisation as a long-term historical process shaped by contextual factors. They believe that contemporary globalisation is reconstituting the power, functions and authority of national governments. In the words of Held and his coauthors, ‘the nation state as a self-governing autonomous unit appears to be a more normative claim than a descriptive statement’ (Held et al. 1999, p. 7). Accordingly, nation states are no longer the sole centres or the principal formats of governance or authority in the world because authority has become increasingly diffused among public and private agencies at local, national, regional and global levels (Held et al. 1999).

According to the authors, we should distinguish between globalisation and processes that are spatially more limited. These processes are defined as localisation, nationalisation, regionalisation and internationalisation. Globalisation is, however, not contradictory to such spatially restricted processes. Instead, they relate to each other in complex and dynamic ways. One might even say that localisation, nationalisation, regionalisation and internationalisation are dimensions of globalisation.

Held and his coauthors are both convincing and most helpful in their analysis of the different schools of thought on globalisation. It is clear that globalisation is a contentious issue both as a concept and as a social phenomenon. What makes these various approaches to globalisation problematic is that the social phenomenon, the changes in industrial production patterns and the development of societies, is easily lost in the academic debates on the meaning of the concept.

And what about global processes and their relationship with higher education? As Burbules and Torres (2000, p. 15) have pointed out, the topic of globalisation ‘calls for a more nuanced historical analysis of the state-education relationship’. To elaborate my view of globalisation as an interplay between local, national and global processes I need to flesh out my argument with the help of a concrete case, the evolution of Finnish higher education.

The First Case Study: Finnish Higher Education in a Historical Perspective

I assume that there are common historical trends which are typical of higher education in Europe in general, not only of higher education in Finland. As a method, a historical case study may both
open broader perspectives on different national experiences and situate the contemporary debate in an historical framework.

**University civilising a people: the establishment of the University of Turku**

The history of Finnish higher education begins with the establishment of the University of Turku, then called the Royal Academy of Åbo, in 1640. At that time Finland was a part of the Kingdom of Sweden, a protestant superpower which in practice controlled the traffic on the Baltic Sea. Wishing to bolster the intellectual capacity of the kingdom and train civil servants for the King, the Swedes strengthened existing universities and established new ones in Sweden, Estonia and Finland. The practical aim of the Royal Academy was to prepare civil servants to administer the kingdom and clergymen to serve the Lutheran Church. The Royal Academy had four faculties: theology, philosophy, law and medicine. (Valimaä 2001a.)

From a political perspective it can be said that the foundation of the university was one aspect of an internal policy whose aim was to unify newly acquired territories of the Kingdom of Sweden under Swedish rule. Other important religious and political objectives involved the defence of a dogmatic Lutheran version of Christianity against Roman Catholics and other Protestant churches (Klinge 1987). In the founding statutes of the university, one of aims of the new institution were defined as follows: ‘WE CHRISTINA, Queen of Sweden . . . desire to promote the better cultivation of the liberal arts in order to increase the fame and beauty of the Finnish Grand Duchy . . . (free translation J.V. after Klinge 1987, pp. 82–84). These statutes also reflect the change that had taken place in the status of universities. During the Middle Ages universities were universal institutions serving chiefly the universal institution above all, the Catholic Church. Modern universities, by contrast, became national establishments satisfying national needs, often defined by national rulers (see Neave 2001; Scott 1995). ‘National institution’ should, however, be understood in the historical context. In the 17th century Finnish national institutions were institutions of the Kingdom of Sweden. It should also be noted that during Swedish rule, Finland was more of a geographical than a political entity. Culturally important was, however, that in the 18th century young Finnish scholars began to study Finnish history and folklore, thus laying the foundations for an emerging Finnish nationalism. Therefore, in cultural terms it may be said that under Swedish rule the Royal Academy provided a cultural basis for combining feelings generated by Finnish local patriotism with cultural nationalism.

**A university in the Making of a Nation State: The Imperial Alexander University**

Sweden lost Finland to Russia during the Napoleonic wars fought in 1809–12. Alexander I, the Emperor of Russia, granted Finland the status of a Grand Duchy in 1809. Finland was given autonomy in internal administration, including financial and religious matters. The Finns were allowed to keep their Lutheran Church and religion. Continuing the Swedish traditions, education remained a religious matter because the Church took over basic education in rural areas while the clergy were educated in the Royal Academy.

**From the Royal Academy to the Imperial Alexander University**

The University of Turku (or the Royal Academy of Åbo) was among the first Finnish institutions to show its loyalty to the new ruler. In return, the university was strengthened in 1811 both institutionally (it was granted an independent status) and practically. This involved the establishment of six new chairs which meant that the university’s resources increased by almost a third (the number of professors grew from 14 to 20) (Klinge 1989, 1997).

There was a new conception of university influenced by German humanism (known later as Humboldtian ideas) that emphasised the importance of academic freedom and students’ moral growth during their studies. It was important for the future development of the university that the model of higher education adopted in Finland was not based on the French idea of a higher education system...
with specialised and vocationally oriented higher education institutions in addition to traditional universities. The role of the Imperial Academy of Åbo also began to change in the early 19th century because, especially since 1817 after the establishment of a new civil service examination, the Imperial University now trained all state officials. The civil service reform was related to the fact that Finnish administration had been enlarged and developed during the autonomy, but there was also a cultural and moral aspect. It was repeatedly stressed that civil servants should provide the common people a moral example: they should be honest and well-mannered citizens (Klinge 1989, 1997). Further, the Russians needed to be sure that this new bureaucratic elite would be loyal to the Emperor. Student opinion was closely monitored because, during a period when there were no independent newspapers and no meetings of the Diet, the students represented the ‘Finnish people’ or at least ‘a Finnish public opinion’ of a kind. In this context, the university had special importance. Finnish university students, like students in other European countries, represented a potential political threat.

The destruction of Turku by the Great Fire of 1827 led to changes in the political status of the Royal Academy of Turku. Using the damages of the fire as an excuse, the Emperor moved the university to Helsinki, the new capital of Finland, and renamed it the Imperial Alexander University (later known as the University of Helsinki) (Klinge 1989). The university’s resources were increased, which helped to secure the loyalty of the professors. A major reform of the university statutes was implemented, however, in the historical context of the European revolutions of 1848–49, when students and professors (and universities) tended to be seen as potentially revolutionary groups (and institutions). The university reform of 1852 had two objectives. Imperial statutes first reorganised the structure of student associations, turning loose student nations into student faculties more strictly controlled by their professors. The second main objective was to improve the standard of teaching and scholarship at the university. This goal was reached by separating the humanities and the science curricula. The university became more of a Finnish and national institution with its own statutes, separate from the Russian higher education system. The reform also ended the persistent demands by Russians that Russian should be introduced as a teaching language at the university (see Välimaa 2001b).

**On the Political and Social Significance of the University Institution**

It has been argued that it was the development of a national economic structure during industrialisation that laid the basis for an independent Finnish nation state (established in 1917) because it was during the 19th century that Finland emerged as an economic unit with a territorial division of labour and an autonomous economic core (Alapuro 1988). In addition to these economic processes, however, the political birth of the Republic of Finland was also made possible by the rise of interwoven cultural and political movements. On a conceptual level these movements were at the heart of the cultural nation-building and the political state-making processes (Alapuro 1988). In Finland these two processes were intertwined in the national university. That is, the spokesman of the Finnish nationalist movement, J.V. Snellman, Professor of Philosophy at the Imperial Alexander University and later a senator in the national government, formulated the ideological aims of the national cultural movement in the spirit of the Hegelian tradition, developing the ‘spirit of history’ into the concept of a ‘national spirit’. According to Snellman, the development of a nation is fulfilled through the state. In his philosophy, the state is a sphere where individuals foster their moral character and promote the common good (Alapuro 1988). Finnish nationalism was thus initiated as a cultural movement by the professors and students of the national university, after which it expanded into a political movement supported by the estate of the burgesses and that of the clergy (Klinge 1997). Politically the Finnish nationalists were known as Fennomans.

It was important to Finnish higher education that many of the leading figures of the Fennoman movement worked at the Imperial Alexander University. The university was thus providing a social forum where different views could be debated and different people could interact with each other. In 19th century Finland it was practically the only place where such interplay was possible, and it was also the place where the social elite was educated. From a political perspective, it is obvious that the student associations served as models for political parties, as has been argued by Klinge (1992). Furthermore, from the perspective of civil society it has been held that ‘it was in the academic setting that the idea of civic activity outside the bureaucratic system, i.e., in associations, the
free press, and parliamentary politics, finally emerged and developed’ (Klinge 1992, p. 37). Thus, university professors and students not only published books and later a newspaper to promote the enlightenment of the common people, but also learned Finnish themselves.

The Fennomans considered it important to establish Finnish-speaking grammar schools; creating a Finnish-speaking university would be possible only when students spoke Finnish as their mother tongue. Changes began during the 1870s, when an improved school system (more Finnish-speaking grammar and elementary schools), a new national infrastructure (especially the new railroad system from the 1860s onwards) and economic development enabled new social groups to send their sons and daughters to university. Gradually the number of students from the previously dominant groups (the clergy, state officials, military officers) fell while the number of those from new social groups (teachers, lower civil servants, merchants, craftsmen) began to grow, with also the sons of peasants and workers enrolling in increasing numbers (Strömberg 1989).

University was the main channel of social rise in Finland’s estates-based society, especially when we look at this phenomenon from the perspective of the upper classes where people from the lower estates entered their ranks through university studies. Seen from the perspective of the lower classes the picture is less clear because of the difference in size between these social groups (Allardt 1967). However, in the social reality of the first half of the 19th century, the upper estates were unwilling to allow university to become a channel of upward social mobility. It was even suggested that the right to enter university should be strictly controlled and that only the sons of the upper classes should be granted the right to study there. The proposal was dropped but the question of who should have the right to go to university remained an important one both ideologically and politically (Välimaa 2001b).

The national university was politically and culturally an important locus in the making of Finnish national identity. It is therefore probable that this social role of university has strengthened the high social status that universities in particular and higher education degrees in general enjoy in Finnish society. At the same time, this nation-building process was supported by a rising group of Finnish-speaking academics, thus emphasizing the importance of university in a definition of the nation based on nationalist ideas of a civil society. This definition of the Finnish nation was reflected also in the Finnish definition of university. It has been suggested that the Hegelian tradition to which the Fennomans adhered created an understanding of university as a cultural entity representing mainly Geisteswissenschaft rather than the more practically oriented empirical sciences. This led to the foundation of special institutions providing higher technical and commercial education (see Ahola 1995).

Higher Education in the Republic of Finland: The Logic of Expansion

The period when Finland was an autonomous Grand Duchy was also important to the development of the Finnish idea of university. It may be no historical exaggeration to say that it was an essential facet of this Finnish idea of university to see it as a national institution. Second, university and higher education were considered important aspects of the development of the nation and the nation state. Third, there was also a realization that access to education, including higher education, is an issue to be decided by politicians, not by the academics themselves. These interpretations of the idea of university remained alive into the 20th century; the issues that they involve have been addressed at different points in time on the basis of a variety of political decisions.

The history of Finnish higher education is the history of its expansion during the 20th century. There has been an increase in the number of higher education institutions, students and academic staff (see Välimaa 2001b). By the end of the 20th century the number of higher education institutions had grown from one university to 20 universities and 32 polytechnics. The number of students exploded from 2300 in 1900 to 248,900 (151,900 university students and 96,500 polytechnic students) by 1999. Measured by student enrolments, Finnish higher education massified during the 1970s when more than 15% of the age cohort entered. In 1999, Finnish universities admitted 19,373 students and the polytechnics 25,804 students, which meant that 69% of the cohort was offered a starting place in higher education (Välimaa 2001b).
While these developments in Finland represent a typical rather than a unique story in the Western cultural sphere, the explanatory factors are linked with historical contexts that are specifically Finnish. The expansion of higher education not only has led to more institutions but to a range of institutions located all over the country and responding to a variety of social, economic and cultural expectations and needs. To explain this development it is useful to consider the subject from sociological perspectives. There are five socio-political processes which have, interacting in various combinations, contributed to the expansion of Finnish higher education in the 20th century. These contributing social forces are (1) political struggles between speakers of Finnish and speakers of Swedish; (2) industrialisation and the needs of the labour market; (3) academic drift, (4) the regional policy principle; and (5) the making of the welfare state.

Historically, one is a combination of the first and the second social forces. By the end of the 19th century, industrialisation began to exert pressures to develop technical and commercial education to train professionals for the growing industrial and commercial enterprises. Technical education was initiated in the 1870s at Helsinki Polytechnic School. This institution gradually developed into a college of technology (in 1908) and finally reached the status of Helsinki University of Technology in the 1960s. Commerce followed the same developmental logic: first there appeared an institution offering two-year programmes, which was then developed into an institution providing three-year training in commerce and business administration that achieved university status in the 1970s. However, together with these developments there were ongoing political struggles between Finnish-speakers and Swedish-speakers in Finnish society. In the context of the cultural and political struggle it made sense to establish, around 1910, separate business schools to serve the Swedish-speakers (Svenska Handelshögskolan, Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration) and the Finnish-speakers (Helsinki School of Economics and Business Administration). The same social dynamics contributed to the establishment in the early 1920s, in a single town, of one university for the Swedish-speakers (Åbo Akademi University) and another for the Finnish-speakers (University of Turku). At the University of Helsinki, the largest higher education institution in the country, this language struggle led to a situation where there are separate chairs for Swedish- and Finnish-speaking professors. It should also be kept in mind that Finnish citizens have the constitutional right to be taught in their mother tongue, whether Swedish or Finnish. However, the social dynamics generated by the language struggles began to wane during the 1930s after the foundation of these two universities and after political compromises in the University of Helsinki. Between the two World Wars, the only additions to these higher education establishments were the College of Veterinary Medicine and the College of Social Sciences.

Between the two World Wars Finnish higher education was an elite system. Studying was possible mainly for the more prosperous social classes, and the number of students in higher education remained low. Social exclusion from higher education took place in the then school system where upper secondary school was a fee-paying institution. The lack of public financial aid for students increased the exclusionary effect (Nevala 1999). Furthermore, university professors belonged to the highest stratum of Finnish society, and from the 1920s to the 1940s many served as ministers (Klinge 1992).

**Higher Education and the Welfare-State Project**

The expansion of Finnish higher education towards a mass higher education system began in the late 1950s. The process was closely related to and at the same time one of the results of a welfare-state agenda supported by the major political parties. Creating equal educational opportunities – including equal access to higher education – became one of the most important objectives on this agenda, implemented over a period extending from the 1960s to the 1990s. The expansion of higher education was supported by a regional policy principle, which opened the way for political lobbying organised through regional pressure groups (including members of Parliament representing their regions, representatives of regional communities, and industrial and business enterprises) to establish a university in their region. The founding of a university was seen not only symbolically but also culturally and economically important to the development of the given region. All major provinces were allowed to establish a university of their own in the 1960s, the 1970s, or the 1980s.
Simultaneously with these societal, ‘external’ factors, higher education institutions have been affected also by an internal process which may be called ‘academic drift’ (Clark 1983; Kivinen and Rinne 1996).

Following the logic of this social dynamics, higher education institutions, their staff and students, seek to enhance the social status of the institution so as to gain more resources. In Finland, academic drift surfaced as a social force mainly after the Second World War. During the most rapid period of the expansion of higher education in the 1960s and the 1970s, some former teacher training colleges succeeded in raising their social status by becoming universities (the University of Jyväskylä, and the University of Joensuu to some extent), while the College of Social Sciences became the University of Tampere. (Välimaa 2001b). During the most rapid period of growth, the logic of expansion was supported by internal academic interests, industrial and commercial needs, and by political processes involved in the making of the welfare state. It was during this period of expansion that conscious higher education policies, expressed through legislation (beginning with the Higher Education Development Act in 1967), emerged in Finland.

Towards a Crisis of Welfare-State Policies

The rapid expansion of the educational system in the 1960s and the 1970s highlighted the need to reform traditional university practices. It is typical of Finland that as a rule, the reforms were and are still being initiated by the Ministry of Education. In the name of national uniformity, these reforms were carried out without considering the size, disciplines represented in or location of the affected institutions. These reforms had the clear aim of bringing about, in the words of Kivinen and Rinne (1996, p. 101) ‘a systemic convergence onto a consistent, standardized model for higher education throughout the country’. Or to put it in other words, the Finnish nation state displayed its territorial power by creating a homogenous system of higher education to serve national needs. This trend peaked, however, by the end of the 1980s after which national higher education policy placed more emphasis on institutional autonomy and academic leadership in order to make higher education institutions more efficient (Higher Education Policy 1991). This shift brought the goals of Finnish higher education policy into line with those defined by the OECD in the 1980s.

The expansion of the higher education system was accompanied by an increase in the basic resources of universities from the 1960s to the 1980s. Towards the end of the 1980s this was an exceptional trend in Western Europe, where higher education budgets were being reduced. The growth in resources was, however, suddenly interrupted by a major economic recession at the turn of the 1990s. In 1991 the expansion of the higher education budget started to slow, and in 1992 the budget was frozen at the 1991 level. In 1993 budget cuts led to the repealing of the Higher Education Development Act. The proportion of public funding provided by the Ministry of Education fell by 19% between 1990 and 1999 (from 84% to 65%), while external funding from both private and public sources grew fivefold (from €102 to €521 million) (Välimaa 2001b).

The above is not only a description of economic problems but also of a crisis in traditional welfare-state policy, which had been based on steadily increasing resources. As a result, for the first time in about 30 years there was no law to regulate the development of the national higher education system. In the Finnish context this interregnum, which lasted two years (1993–95), was exceptional. It also meant the end of expansion in the traditional higher education system: universities. The recession had also begun to change the social dynamics of the expansion process. The regional policy principle was redefined, and no new universities were established after the 1980s. The crisis in traditional policymaking was related to several reforms and changes in the practices involved in the formulation of higher education policies in Finland. The most important structural reform was the establishment of the higher vocational education sector, which began in 1991 as an experiment and developed within ten years into a binary higher education system (see OECD 2002). A second important change was a reform of Finnish doctoral education, one of its important aims being to make universities a more efficient component of the national innovation strategy (Aittola and Määttä 1998). Thirdly, the 1990s saw also the gradual introduction into Finnish higher education of the evaluation of higher education institutions. The establishment of the Finnish Higher Education Evaluation Council in 1995 made evaluation a more professional activity within institutions providing tertiary education.
education (Välimaa 2003). Finally, during the 1990s the national system of steering higher education was developed in the direction of practices which increase competition between and within institutions.

**New Public Management and Academic Capitalism in Finnish Higher Education**

When analysing recent changes in Finnish higher education, it is useful to refer to the concept of New Public Management (Pollit 1995). As a part of the public sector, Finnish higher education has seen an extensive devolution of decision-making powers. This policy principle is evident in the new Universities Act (1997) which gives universities internal autonomy in all important matters. This also means the introduction of new steering instruments based on target or performance negotiations between universities and the Ministry of Education. The official arguments also emphasise the fact that universities have procedural autonomy when deciding how to reach the targets (the number of completed academic degrees) set by the Ministry of Education. The second main trend has been the introduction of market- or quasi-market type mechanisms. The marketisation of higher education has led to competition among and within higher education institutions. Competition is also one of the national steering instruments used by the Ministry of Education in negotiations with each university (see Välimaa and Jalkanen 2001). The third major trend has been the requirement that university staff work to performance targets and output objectives. This trend is closely related to the shift in the basis of public employment from permanency and standard national pay and conditions towards fixed-term contracts and performance-related pay. In universities, this has led to increasing numbers of ‘project researchers’, academics who have been engaged only for a certain fixed period to carry through a specific research project (see Välimaa 2001a). These trends in Finnish higher education echo in significant ways the social dynamics of academic capitalism as described by Slaughter and Leslie (1997).

It seems that the globalised social dynamics of higher education have found their way into Finnish higher education policymaking in three steps. First, attention was paid to issues of efficiency and institutional management, then came a focus on evaluation practices and finally there emerged an emphasis on the financial steering of higher education using instruments often seen as belonging to the neoliberal tool box (Poropudas and Volanen 2003; Välimaa 1997).

**On Nationalisation and Localisation**

Above, I have tried to show that universities and other higher education establishments have always been understood and defined in Finland as national institutions, even though perceptions of what is ‘national’ have changed over time. In fact, the Finnish definition of higher education may also be articulated as a sense of loyalty, defined by of who or what it is that academe is serving and who or what has its loyalty. When Finland was a part of the Kingdom of Sweden, the Finns were loyal to the King of Sweden and, to some extent the region, especially in the 18th century. The situation did not change much at the beginning of Russian rule because Finnish academics swore an oath of allegiance to the Emperor Alexander I. However, in the course of the 19th century Finns’ sense of loyalty began to shift, reflecting an emerging nationalism. Thus, it may be said that gradually university came to be seen as a national institution of the Finns themselves. In the 20th century universities have been understood as institutions important to the nation state.

The high social status of education, and especially of higher education, has been and is also today a social fact in Finland. In the Finnish context, it is only natural that all present-day Finnish political parties share the conviction that higher education is important to the well-being of the country. It also seems that a nationalist tradition of higher education remains alive even though it has taken different forms in different periods of history. During the 19th and the 20th century universities were an important factor in the making of Finnish national identity. Today, official national rhetoric sees higher education institutions as a part of the national innovation strategy. While this indicates a shift in conceptions of higher education, in this new sense higher education does continue to be seen as an important aspect to the construction of a Finnish national identity and a Finnish nation state (Välimaa 2001b).
According to Scott (1998), universities have been national institutions for centuries even though academics have tended to emphasise the international elements of science and scholarship, possibly precisely because of this national dependence, as Scott suggests. From this perspective, the Finnish case, instead of being unique in the Western cultural sphere, it is in line with developments in other countries. However, it is an interesting Finnish phenomenon that the expansion of Finnish higher education between the 1950s and the 1990s meant establishing higher education institutions all over the country. As a result, the expansion of higher education not only led to the massification but also to the ‘provincialisation’ or ‘localisation’ of higher education. The foundation of polytechnics has been an extension of this national policy. Thus, the localisation of higher education not only has reinforced the national importance, furthered a process of ‘nationalisation’ of higher education institutions but has also promoted regional development in Finnish provinces. Today higher education institutions, irrespective of whether they are universities or polytechnics, are defined as ‘engines’ of development in their regions. This expression may be interpreted as indicating a new sense of loyalty towards regions with higher education institutions. In addition, the localisation of higher education opens new perspectives on the globalisation of this sector of education. Now when nation states are challenged by global agents, new localised higher education institutions may find it easier to discover new funding sources and partners if they have both a local and a global orientation.

This argument concerning the relationship between the localisation of national institutions and the globalised context where it takes place requires empirical support. Therefore, the second case study looks at the interaction between a global agent and a provincial university, examining in more detail how these various tensions and national policy expectations are translated into actions within higher education institutions.

The Second Case Study: The Provincial University and Nokia

The second case study focuses on two simultaneous and interrelated processes within a Provincial University (pseudonym) in Finland at the turn of the millennium. The first process involves the foundation of a new faculty of information technology, the second one attempts to solve space problems caused by the expansion of the university. These processes take place in a context where the university is establishing cooperation with a major global IT enterprise, called here Nokia.

Institutional Contexts

The Provincial University is a rather typical medium-sized higher education institution in Finland. At the beginning of the 21st century there are about 15,000 students in seven faculties while the annual budget is about €138 million (64% coming from the Ministry of Education and 36% from external sources). In the 1990s, the problems for which the Provincial University was searching a solution included a lack of room caused mainly by the expansion of the university, where the student enrolment grew by 62.5% during the 1990s (from 8,000 to 13,000 students). In addition, new disciplines were introduced and the number of university staff increased by 35% (from 955 to 1275 people) between 1990 and 1998. Throughout the 1990s, the university was trying but failing to obtain from the Ministry of Education money and permission to build new university buildings on an empty piece of ground close to the existing campus.

The Establishment of the Faculty of Information Technology

Preparing the Ground for a New IT Faculty

Information technology became a teaching and research subject at Provincial University in the 1970s. However, the departments associated with information technology (those of Mathematical Information Technology and of Computer Science and Information Systems and parts of the Department of Statistics) were assigned to two different faculties, causing operational problems. It
was felt that the departments involved in information technology had little visibility outside Provincial University. The situation came to a head in 1994 when information technology applied for but failed to gain the status of a center of excellence. ‘Centers of excellence’ are a national policy tool for the allocation of resources to productive and high-quality research units (Higher Education Policy 1998). After their failure the spokesmen of the idea initiated a project to establish a new Department of Information Technology, predicting that the economic and social importance of IT would increase. They also suggested that the university should be an active partner in these developments. When the spokesmen gained more powerful positions within the university, a committee was set up in the spring term 1996 to discuss the problem and propose various solutions for consideration in the University Senate. At this point the university central administration (the Rector and the Administration Office) began to support the project. When national higher education legislation was revised in 1997, it became possible for universities to establish new faculties on their own initiative instead of asking permission from the Parliament. As a result, it was decided that instead of trying to institute a new department the university would seek to establish a Faculty of Information Technology.

Among the projects that contributed to the founding of IT faculty was a training scheme funded by the European Union, the Ministry of Education, local enterprises and Provincial University. The aim of this European Masters project was to train, between 1995 and 2000, 400 MAs in economics, the natural sciences, information technology and the human sciences. The main idea was to provide the students with more practical training in local business enterprises. According to the plans the students would either come from local enterprises or be already enrolled at Provincial University. It was assumed that graduates from the relevant programmes would be engaged mainly by local enterprises, a goal that was also reached because by 2000 about 50% of the students were working in local enterprises. The European Masters project played a part in the establishment of the IT faculty by promoting cooperation between different departments. It also successfully experimented with the concept of practical cooperation between industry and trade on the one hand and the academic world on the other.

The Decision-Making Processes

Following a normal Finnish decision-making procedure, the university rector nominated a number of committees to make ready for the foundation of the Faculty of Information Technology. In November 1996, after a first committee (MIT committee 1996) had completed its preparatory work, a second committee came to the conclusion that establishing a faculty of information technology would promote the future development of computer science and information technology in the university.

There was a shift in the discourse in favour of the new faculty, however, when the University Senate began to discuss its establishment. There emerged two ‘parties’, the ‘reformers’ and the ‘opponents’. The reformers supported setting up a new IT faculty, emphasising the ‘golden opportunity’ to cooperate with Nokia which the university should not lose. They also maintained that the university would benefit both intellectually and financially from such a powerful ally. Further, they asserted that the new faculty would create new job markets for the students. A still further argument was that outside funding for research projects would help to balance the university budget (given that only 60% of the costs were being covered by the Ministry of Education). Opponents were worried about the impact of the new faculty on the balance of power within the University Senate: the deans of the old faculties in particular were far from eager to increase the number of faculties. The opponents were also thinking about the funding structure of the university: some of them were afraid of losing money to the new faculty. The position of the students in the new faculty was a further issue because the plans for the curricula presented to the Senate were not very detailed.

On the one hand, this discursive shift and the emergence of two parties in the University Senate stemmed from changes in the economic and societal situation during the decision-making process (between 1996 and 1998). The expansion of information technology led to a lack of IT specialists in Finland. The Ministry of Education therefore defined the training of qualified IT specialist as a national goal. Furthermore, a global IT company, called Nokia, had decided to establish a new
research and development unit in the vicinity of the university (actually just 200 m off the campus). The local community was more than willing to take care of all practical arrangements to make the move as smooth as possible. This enthusiasm can be explained by the high local unemployment rate and the opportunity to gain many well-salaried taxpayers. On the other hand, the new argumentation reflected the fact that the University Senate is a political decision-making body, whereas committees are more technical in their orientation.

In this situation, the reformers tried to treat the establishment of the new faculty as a largely technical issue related to the Universities ordinance which was being prepared at the same time in the university. The opponents insisted on a discussion on all aspects of the decision. Consequently, the University Senate debated the proposal to establish a new IT faculty three times. In the Finnish context this meant that resistance to the decision was quite strong. The proposal was first introduced in May 1998. The second debate took place in June 1998, with the decision to set up the new IT faculty finally taken in August 1998. The new faculty, consisting of the Departments of Computer Science and Information Systems and of Mathematical Information Technology, started to operate on 1st September 1998. (Jyväskylän yliopiston hallitukset pöytäkirjat 13/98, 16/98, 19/98).

The resolution concerning the Faculty of Information Technology was an important strategic decision which had the potential to change the orientation of a university traditionally rooted in education, the humanities and the social sciences. Before the establishment of the IT faculty the Provincial University had neither a faculty of technology nor even any substantial volume of teaching provision in the field of technology.

**The Construction of the Agora Building**

The departments of the new IT faculty moved to a new building, given the name Agora. The construction of this building provides another example on the inner dynamics of a university in a globalised environment.

The Agora building accommodates private enterprises, university departments and research centres under the same roof. According to the official web pages, ‘In the Agora building research, education and enterprises are integrated into a functional whole. Agora is a cooperative network and a multi-disciplinary research center.’ (See http://www.jyu.fi/agora/ENGfind.htm). It is both striking and revealing that Nowotny et al. (2001) have chosen the concept *Agora* to describe a social locus where not only does society or industry speak to science but science speaks back to the public. Agora is an interesting concept in my case because it describes a social need felt within Provincial University to create meeting places where scientific and commercial interests may come together for their mutual benefit.

However, the concept of a building which provides room for several university departments and various research teams was first suggested by a professor of psychology a few years before the establishment of the IT faculty. In this proposal the building was called a ‘psychocenter’, and the main aim was to provide more room for psychologists, who were working in cramped conditions. The situation changed, however, when a building was needed for the emerging IT faculty in 1998. The erection of Nokia’s new R&D premises in the vicinity of the University focussed attention to the possibility of cooperation, which had been found rewarding during the European Masters project. Under these circumstances the Ministry of Education finally gave permission to start the construction of a new university building, put up on an open site between the Nokia premises and the university. There was no debate about the building in the University Senate because it had been an issue in the negotiations with the Ministry of Education for many years. The lack of room was also an undisputed fact.

The way in which the construction of Agora was funded reveals another interesting trend in the history of Finnish higher education. That is, the building was financed by a German bank, no longer by the national Ministry of Education. In fact, this is the first university building in Finland funded by a foreign commercial bank. The bank also owns the building and rents it to the university through a real-estate agency, even though the Finnish state has an option to buy it from the bank within a few years. The university, in turn, rents floor space to a number of private enterprises.
The bidding for the constructor and the funding body followed rules laid down by the European Union, yet another global agent.

**On the Nature of Knowledge Transfer**

A critical analysis is also needed of the idea underlying the concept of Agora. The core vision of the free flow of ideas and information is not easy to make work in practice. The Agora building has locks in the doors separating private enterprises from the university, and while business enterprises have free access to the university side of the building, academics do not have access to the private enterprises. Why is that? Teichler (2003) has pointed out that while within academe knowledge is disseminated freely, in business enterprises transfer of knowledge is a commercial activity. It is reasonable to have locks to prevent the flow of students and the flow of communication and to control interaction between science and industry because there is a fundamental difference between universities and enterprises. Universities and academics produce free and public knowledge as they pursue the truth or personal reputation or both, whereas private enterprises use knowledge to produce goods and generate profit.

**Globalisation in the Provincial University?**

An analysis of these recent developments in this average Finnish university suggests that Provincial University is tied to the global market economy in two main areas: the funding of research and the university’s rental costs.

*Research funding* is a relevant issue here because applied research projects in the IT faculty depend mainly on external funding from private enterprises. According to the statistics of the Provincial University, in 2001 as much as 60% of the IT faculty’s funds came from various projects (financed mainly by private enterprises). This was about 20% above the average in Provincial University, where external funding covered 44% of the total resources in 2002. Most of the outside funding in Provincial University came from the Academy of Finland (6%), the European Union (7%), contracted research (8%) and other external sources (10%). The salaries of the teaching staff come mainly from the Ministry of Education (91%). It is an important fact that the majority of research personnel (as many as 59%) are funded from external sources (Annual Report 2003). This indicates that external funding exerts influence especially on the research function of Provincial University even though it is difficult to specify how this funding structure affects the contents of the research. *Rental costs* represent a second fiscal matter related to global money markets. The total rent of the Agora building is about €2 million. According to plans, 25% will be covered by rents from the private enterprises, 50% the Ministry of Education, while the remaining 25% will be paid from project funding (provided mainly by global agents). European interest rates affect Agora’s rental costs more directly than those of any previous university building in Finland. The rents represent 13% of the annual budget of the Provincial University in 2002 (Annual Report 2003). The university is also dependent on the economic success of its tenants.

These circumstances have the potential to influence the operations of the university in three areas: knowledge production, student intake and the funding of the university’s activities. First, knowledge production. In the new social contexts, the contents of research are more shaped by external challenges because new research projects must be related to topics supported by private enterprises and global agents such as the European Union. Second, student intake. Like knowledge production, enrolment is more dependent on the global market economy than before because higher education establishments must increase the number of IT students to serve local and national needs. In fact, the Faculty of Information Technology has rapidly grown into the fourth largest among the seven faculties in the university (with 1900 students in 2003). Third, funding the university’s activities. Links with the European money markets, the need to find funding for research projects and dependence on rents paid by private enterprises have tied the university budget more closely to the global market economy. Finding the money to pay for the basic functions of teaching and research depends more on global agents also because the proportion of public funding in total university funding is shrinking (see Välimaa 2001a).
What Globalisation?

From the perspective of globalisation, it seems essential to point out here that neither the reformers nor the opponents discussed the possibility that global market economies could change the way in which their university operates. The opponents were more concerned about their own political supporters, interests groups and traditional academic values and identities than with arguing against the possible dangers of globalisation. As for the reformers, they saw a golden opportunity which should not be lost. Therefore, globalisation was not a theme in the debates in favour of or against the establishment of the new faculty. This is quite natural also because in Finland in the late 1990s, globalisation had not yet emerged as a slogan or an academic concept. At the same time, the debate over the new faculty analysed above presents an opportunity to test the transformationalist thesis: how is this process related to globalisation? Is there something that makes it an example of globalisation? Or should it be understood as an instance of Europeanisation, or is it perhaps merely an example of commercialisation in a university?

It seems that the case study of Provincial University represents all of these to some extent. It is globalisation in the sense that the Provincial University will be tied more closely to the operations of global market economies in the field of information technology. It is globalisation also in the sense that the university will be a part of the Nokia network and is potentially more closely bound to the R&D activities of a global enterprise. This was also one of the arguments presented by the reformers. It is also Europeanisation in the sense that the European Union’s regulations set new rules for the public construction work involved. Funding from European sources also has an impact on the contents of research. In these ways, criteria defined by regional authorities overrode the traditional power of the national government. The funding is European (even though it is not actually possible to know where the money comes from) at least in the sense that it is lent by a European bank. Therefore, what is important is that the money came through a German bank, not from the budget of the Finnish Ministry of Education, which has been the only traditional source of funding for public buildings. This has implications for the functioning of the university. One may say that it has social implications in this provincial town because the rental costs of the new building are now bound up with the European investment markets more closely than before the 1990s. This is a development related to the globalised information society.

And of course, the process may be explained also in terms of the ‘commercialisation’ of Provincial University. It is not difficult to argue that this is normal in European universities today. One may add that the only possibly exceptional aspect of the situation is the fact that Nokia is not a regional or national but global enterprise. However, that may be, I can hear my critics saying, is this really important? The important thing is that universities are willing to establish close contacts with private enterprises irrespective of whether these are local, national or global agents. Therefore, a ‘commercialisation thesis’ of this kind might lead to the conclusion that what happened at the Provincial University is an example on the commercialisation of a university.

The problem with this argument is that Nokia is not a regional company. The university was interested in carrying through a massive reorganisation of its social and academic structures only because it was cooperating with a global enterprise. The process would have been totally different with smaller enterprises. Therefore, the global element is very strong in this case study; the networks created through and with Nokia were seen as important for the operations and activities of the university. They were considered important enough to persuade the university to remodel its social structure, despite the internal problems this would create, to meet the requirements of a global agent.

The aim of this concluding discussion is to show that the processes related to globalisation have many dimensions. Moreover, these processes look different from different perspectives. What is essential, however, both in the debates on globalisation and in this case study, is the shift in social dynamics caused by and linked with the rapidity of global flows of information. The speed at which changes in the global markets are felt in the resources of a provincial university is increasing all the time.

Therefore, as I see it there are mechanisms that give the global economy a great potential to change social dynamics inside higher education institutions. I also support the glonacal approach suggested by Rhoades and Marginson (2002). It appears that there is a need to analyse global,
national and local agents, contexts and processes together. Why? Because nationalisation, localisation and globalisation are interlinked processes, as I have tried to show in this article. In Finland, nationalisation of higher education has created a cultural understanding of higher education institutions as important factors in the competition with other nations. As for localisation, it refers to processes where, on the one hand, higher education institutions support their local communities and provinces to gain social and economic benefits and, on the other hand, local communities and provinces support their higher education institutions in the hope of benefiting from the scientific capital held and generated by these. This was also one of the motives behind the case described above. Finally, economic globalisation creates new dynamics within higher education institutions not only through strategic alliances between higher education and commercial enterprises but also through the emergence of alternative new funding sources in this area at a time when the public funding of national higher education systems is steadily ebbing away.

Notes

1. As early as in 1999, Ulrich Beck’s discussion of globalisation (first printed in 1997, reprinted in 1999) contained more than 40 references to books on the subject.

2. The case study is based on interviews with university staff who participated in the decision-making processes (three people in favour of the reform, two people who opposed the decision and one person who represents an intermediate view) and official documents of the University.

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THE IMPACT OF RACE, GENDER, AND CULTURE IN SOUTH AFRICAN HIGHER EDUCATION

REITUMETSE OBAKENG MABOKELA AND KALUKE FELICITY NTWANANO MAWILA

Introduction

South Africa’s government initiatives, such as the Commission on Gender Equality, the National Gender Forum, and the Office on the Status of Women, support efforts by its institutions of higher education to become more inclusive and equitable. Nevertheless, there remain fundamental obstacles to the full participation of South African women in the management structures of academe. This article examines the obstacles of race, gender, and culture to the professional advancement of Black female scholars and administrators in South African institutions of higher education. Given the documented historical and continuing underrepresentation of South African women in this sector, it is important to understand their experiences in order to facilitate the establishment of institutional environments that will be supportive to their professional endeavors.

Prior to 1994, the law did not protect Black South Africans. Those who were not White lived in a country that persecuted, segregated, and discriminated against them on the basis of their racial classification. Apartheid included denying job and educational opportunities and limiting access to housing, health services, transportation, and economic opportunities on the basis of gender and race. As Sisonke Msimang asserts, racism under apartheid was both informal (i.e., an everyday practice) and formal (e.g., laws designating areas where Blacks could live, banning interracial mixing, and barring employment of Blacks for certain positions). Apartheid was also used to curb the participation of women, in particular Black women, in various aspects of life, and it effectively relegated them to second-class citizenship status. Msimang argues that this condition of living had profound effects on the private lives of women both in their home and in public, with the state’s encouragement of violence and the conservative patriarchal nature of the society worsening these effects.

It is within this historical context that we demystify the status of Black women in the South African higher education sector. The study on which this article is based was spurred in part by the report of the National Commission of Higher Education that confirmed that in 1993 women occupied 32 percent of the total research and teaching positions. The report further noted that the majority of these women were employed in the lowest academic ranks of junior lecturer or lecturer. Mabokela’s research indicated that at some historically White South African universities, women comprised 100 percent of the positions below junior lecturer rank, 89 percent of the junior lecturers, and 45 percent of the lecturers. Within the higher ranks, women comprised less than 3 percent of professors and about 8 percent of associate professors. What emerged from these early studies was evidence of the persistent absence of Black faculty and, more critically, the chronic underrepresentation of female scholars. Naturally, this situation led to calls for the “elimination of occupational
segregation,” especially by the promotion to and equal participation of women in highly skilled jobs and senior management positions.

Theoretical Framework

This research is theoretically informed by two bodies of research. First, we consider the work highlighting the global marginalization of women scholars in the academy. Second, we draw upon research examining the gendered organizational cultures of universities. When considering the status of women in South Africa, David Johnson’s research distinctly emphasizes “gender rather than women,” based on the argument that women cannot be understood by looking at their condition only in biological terms. Johnson contends that a full understanding of the integral relationship between men and women in South African society is needed. In particular, he stresses the understanding of intersections of gender inequality, race, and class. It is important to recognize that race, class, age, geographic location, disability, and sexual orientation interact to produce inequalities between groups of women. Acknowledging the existence of differences between women in South Africa can shed light on the programs that promote and support the advancement of Black women in higher education.

In examining the status of women in higher education institutions in Kenya, P. Achola and E. Aseka argue that gender-based roles, though irrelevant to workplace performance, are carried into and maintained in the workplace. These authors affirm that women are indeed absent from higher education management. They state that in order to restore women’s central role in development in Kenya and other third world countries, there is an urgent need to overcome the barriers women face. Similarly, research on the South African academy suggests that women scholars continue to have both positive and negative experiences as a result of several confounding factors, including their continued sense of isolation, the ambiguity of their standing, the complexity within their institutions, their marginalization, and the exclusionary tactics that exist within South African institutions. The impact of institutional culture on socialization processes and support for women within the institutions seems to be an area not sufficiently addressed by current research.

When tracing the evolution of professionalism 20 years ago, Magali Larson questioned the ability of professions to reform themselves when “knowledge is acquired and produced within educational and occupational hierarchies which are, by their structure, inegalitarian, antidemocratic and alienating.” Twenty years later, Judith Glazer-Raymo argues that the issue of male dominance and female subordination cannot be easily separated from issues of race and class in feminized professions such as education, nursing, social work, and librarianship, where women form the majority of the practitioners but few of the executives. Gender equity research in professions such as those in academic disciplines falsely assumes that increasing the proportion of women will make these problems vanish. Glazer-Raymo asserts that this is a simplistic notion that camouflages the barriers to women’s advancement and the pervasive impact of discriminatory practices on their progress. Therefore, to understand the gender dynamics of organizations we need to develop theory out of women’s actual organizational experiences. Views that forefront diversity can allow us to explore ambiguities and tensions in women’s roles and identities within a gendered cultural arrangement. For example, a Black woman may define herself as a professional or scholar, but on experiencing racial harassment she might see her identity as “Black person,” while at another moment, when she refers to her lack of access to day care, the same woman might identify herself as “parent.”

Adding another focal layer, C. E. Hackney and D. Runnerstrand demonstrate that methodologies of understanding women’s experiences within organizations need to recognize that women’s lives and social identities are constructed by the social, cultural, and material conditions around them. When women are appointed to leadership positions, they enter existing social groups with established norms, beliefs, and assumptions that guide their interactions and relationships. Embedded in the process of entry is the expectation that women in academic and administrative positions must take charge and become functioning, integrated group members as well as try to understand and accommodate the unwritten rules of the new group. This process is complex for all newly appointed leaders and particularly difficult for individuals who are different in ethnicity, race, or gender from traditional incumbents in leadership roles.
Jon S. Davies and William Foster, as well as Spencer Marxyc, add that traditional leadership in higher education has been based on "hierarchical thinking and prescriptive skill" that has promoted the status quo. Jasbir K. Singh holds that the correlation between women's leadership styles and characteristics and those of organizations needs to be developed in order to improve women's positions in universities. She finds the neglect of women's contributions and their insufficient integration into university management structures to be the main hindrances to the advancement of women in academe. Hannelore Faulstich-Wieland reports that in Germany the question of care of the family was explicitly used as an assessment criterion for management positions for women but not for men. Thus, the gender-specific roles, the rigor, and level of commitment of certain senior positions form a barricade to women aspiring for ascension.

Helen Astin and Carole Leland's research led them to conclude that the U.S. educational workplace should be more a community than an organization. Some authors argue, on the other hand, that when educational workplaces resemble a typical American business organization, many women struggle to lead in a more authentic, socially responsible manner. Some show, however, that women are keen to create an enlivened educational culture grounded in democratic principles rather than through force. Following this latter argument, Astin and Leland assert that female leaders do not have to exercise power over others. Research has documented that women's experiences are closely connected to those of others. Gender influences the nature of transactional relationships among women and others, thus making it challenging at a personal level for women who are in leadership positions.

Other people's perceptions of what it means to be a male or female leader affect women, since these perceptions ultimately affect how women understand their own leadership roles. Barbara Curry demonstrates how women who ascend into higher leadership levels must often contend with culturally engrained views of self-assurance and confidence as unacceptable female qualities. Therefore, as a woman evolves in her leadership position, she is juxtaposed against her own personal development, cultural expectations, and biases as she tries to justify her position to her supporters. Different scholars have suggested that women must develop their "leadership personae." So far, our discussion has shown parallels among the issues that face women leaders in higher education sectors in Germany, United States of America, Kenya, and England. This study is informed by a second body of work that is grounded in the understanding of organizational culture, specifically the "gendered culture" of the academy and its influence on the professional behavior and response of particular groups within the organization. Organizational culture is the social or normative glue that holds an organization together. It expresses the values or social ideals and beliefs that organizational members come to share. These values or patterns of belief are manifested by symbolic devices, rituals, myths and specialized language. Thus, culture influences how people perceive and behave in their environment. It "induces purpose, commitment and order; provides meaning and social cohesion and clarifies and explains behavioral expectations. Through the people within it, culture influences the organization." William Tierney and Robert Rhoads assert that organizations exist as social constructions that revolve around shared meanings. Following this train of thought, it is critical to examine the culture of South African institutions of higher education in order to develop an understanding of its impacts on the professional lives and identities of its women scholars.

To effect this examination, this study draws from Janet Newman and Fiona Williams's framework that analyzes the relationship between race, class, and gender in Britain's social welfare system. This analytical frame helps us understand the social divisions and identities of women in organizations. Newman and Williams contend that race, gender, and class are separate but interconnected and contain innumerable forms of identity, difference, and inequality whose significance changes over time. Their vigorous interpretation of their three-dimensional polyhedron reflects various and changing experiences and suggests that social divisions affect people either singly or in groups and in various ways, at different times and in different situations. They also emphasize that different forms of power and oppression are interrelated. To this end, race, class, and gender have a compounding effect on the experiences and life changes of Black, working-class women in Britain. Emerging from this theoretical position, we seek to understand how the race and gender of South African Black women affect the type of support they receive as they strive to move up the management ladder. We ask, What lessons can we draw from Newman and Williams's work
to shed light on the experiences of the women in our study? What challenges do these women face as they seek to move beyond the marginal positions they hold in academe? In drawing attention to the experiences of the South African woman, the findings we present in this article highlight the intricate relationship between race, gender, and culture.

Methods and Procedures

The findings in this article are based on intensive open-ended interviews with 20 Black women scholars and administrators at Rural University and Coastline University, which are two historically Black universities; Seashore University, a historically White university; and City Technikon, a historically Black technikon. These four institutions, like other postsecondary institutions, are shaped by the legacy of South Africa’s racial and ethnic lines. They were selected because they reflect the diversity of the South African higher education sector and because their geographic locations, with three urban and one rural institution, are representative of higher education institutions across the country. The participants in this study reflect a wide range of professional experiences, from junior lecturers to senior university administrators.

These participants were comparable to faculty and administrators at other South African universities in terms of their academic qualifications and professional experiences. George Subotzky notes that 50 percent of faculty members at historically White universities had doctorates, compared to 25 percent at historically Black universities. Of the 20 women interviewed, eight had Ph.D.s or other terminal degrees and eight had a master’s degree; of the latter group five were enrolled for their doctorates. The remaining four participants were enrolled in M.A. programs at the time of data collection. Among the six participants who occupied a senior academic or administrative position (that is, dean, head of department, director of research, or director of an academic unit), all possessed terminal degrees and extensive professional experience. The length of the participants’ professional experiences ranged from 8 to 25 years. While the women who occupied senior-ranking positions were relatively new to these positions, having had less than 5 years in their current positions, they possessed extensive, and relevant, professional experience from other sectors and, for several, other countries. Half of the participants in this study (10) acquired a portion of their professional and academic experiences abroad; some were political exiles, a few had received academic scholarships to other countries, while others had visited on short-term professional exchange programs.

The data were gathered through intensive semistructured interviews. These interviews varied in duration from 1.5 to 3 hours. They sought to capture each participant’s personal experience as a female scholar. Each interview was tape-recorded and later transcribed. The analysis of the data employed practices associated with the constant comparative method and cross-case analysis to identify recurring themes within and across data sources. This allowed important themes and categories to emerge inductively from the data across cases.

Given the use of various racial categories in South Africa, it was important that the analysis of race should transcend the dual Black-White paradigm. The cross-case analysis was particularly constructive in identifying commonalities and differences across women scholars from the four racial groups. This level of analysis had the potential to provide cross-cultural insights on how women from different cultural, historical, social, and institutional contexts negotiated obstacles within the academy. It also enabled us to discern patterns in the women’s responses that were a result of institutional particularities, some of which were rooted in the institutions’ historical foundations and others influenced by recent changes in the higher education system. As the following discussion of themes will demonstrate, each woman’s account is unique, although there were common incidents that transcended all of their experiences.

Themes

The themes that emerged from the interviews highlight the continuing significance of race and culture on the professional experiences of South African women scholars. The four themes that we will discuss are professional mentoring, impact of culture, continuing significance of race, and understanding the academic game.
Professional Mentoring

Caroline Turner and Samuel Myers assert that association with senior colleagues is a major contributor to success in the academy. All the participants in this study reported that they received “virtually no mentoring” in their work. As a lecturer at Rural University explained, “They simply put you in an office and you’d better figure out how you are going to survive.”

The majority of the participants shared concerns about their lack of experience with research, writing for scholarly journals, and presenting papers at professional conferences. Ms. Adams at Rural University stated she had “little confidence in her research skills and was intimidated by the idea of presenting a conference paper.” She lamented,

There is absolutely no support of any kind. If you are going to present a paper at a conference or if you are going to publish, you are competing against people who are at a very high level in terms of academics. It's not easy; you don't feel confident. It's not easy to write papers, even for some of the senior professors here. ... It's the same thing with research grants. They keep telling us that there is money; we should apply for research grants. My point is, it is useless to tell us there is money when we don't know how to write proposals. The starting point is to write the proposal.

She also noted that on several occasions she requested assistance from her senior colleagues to prepare a conference proposal, but all of them claimed to be busy. Ms. Adams told of an experience where she approached one of her senior colleagues about writing a collaborative conference paper. She volunteered to “do all the dirty work” to prepare the paper, but the senior colleague indicated that he was too busy. She believes that if she had an “opportunity to get one good example of how to write a research paper, she would be fine.” Other colleagues shared Ms. Adams’s anxieties and frustrations about the lack of support and mentorship for research. They provided account after account of how their senior colleagues did not seem to care very much about the development of junior scholars.

A number of the women speculated that their senior colleagues were reluctant to help because they themselves did not engage in research-related activities. Many of these senior scholars came through the ranks at a time when research was not a requirement for promotion. Therefore, rather than expose their own ignorance, they hid behind the facade of being busy. In addition, as long as the women did not have access to the tools that were necessary to secure a promotion, their senior colleagues, the majority of whom were male, would maintain their position of power. Therefore, the female faculty viewed their colleagues’ behavior as a strategy to keep women out of important positions within the university structure.

They also expressed grave concern about the lack of mentorship for graduate students. Dr. Mazibuko noted that at Rural University, indifference toward mentorship spills over to graduate students. Therefore, it becomes a challenge to inculcate students with a culture of research and expose them to “rules of the academic world.” She explained that “when it comes to mentorship for students, there is no recognition. As a lecturer, you feel that you are wasting your time because you are not going to be promoted based on your mentoring skills. Therefore, people do not want to volunteer because the university does not recognize their efforts. Maybe if there were some recognition of mentorship, then more people would be willing to do it. Not only for students but junior academics as well.”

Out of the 20 women who participated in this study, only three reported that they received some professional support and mentorship. Such support came primarily from mentors or relationships they forged with people outside their workplace. For example, one of the women viewed her husband as her mentor because he occupied a senior position within university management. Therefore, he could provide “inside tips” and information about the inner workings of the university system. She conceded that without his assistance, “understanding this place would be like a maze.” Another reported that a German colleague she met at a conference a few years back had been instrumental in the development of her writing. At the time of this study, she had just completed an article that had been accepted for publication, an accomplishment she credited to the support of the German mentor. Although most of these participants have not received any mentoring, they themselves have made a commitment to mentor scholars who recently joined the ranks.
of the academy, as well as graduate students. In their words, they do not want to “repeat the painful experience of trying do understand the rules of the game, without any guidance or support.”

**Impact of Culture**

The participants discussed the role of culture in their professional experiences in three ways: (1) broader societal norms and values that influence male and female relationships, (2) organizational practices and policies, which are still male-dominated and marginalize “women’s ways of knowing and doing,” and (3) its relation to interethnic and interracial relationships and interactions on campus. A faculty member at City Technikon who was actively involved in the activities to promote gender equity within her institution, lamented the dire position of women when she stated, “At this institution a woman is a woman and women don’t really matter.” As we probed for further clarification, she explained,

> The culture here is very patriarchal. Women are treated as if they cannot think for themselves, yet they are expected to do all the hard work. They are the ones that maintain the family. They are really the pillars of the community but all of their hard work is not appreciated. The Indian community is highly religious, and in my religion, there are some very oppressive practices relating to gender. You have the treatment of women as being lesser than men are. The African community is also oppressive in terms of traditional belief systems and Christianity. You find that these cultural practices really influence the way that women and female students are treated here.

Another faculty member, at Rural University, evinced similar concerns about beliefs and attitudes portraying women as inferior and incompetent that are rooted in culture. She stated that in her language there is a proverb that “if you give an institution to a woman, it will collapse.” Such statements and beliefs, she argued, carry over into the workplace, where men believe that they have the “divine right” to occupy all leadership positions. Each participant gave account after account of women doing all the hard work but not getting the credit.

Six of the participants in this study were acting heads of their departments or had recently served in that capacity. Being in this position meant that the women acquired the additional workload of being an administrator without the remuneration or the authority. As one faculty member observed, these acting heads “do amazing work behind the scenes but their male colleagues get all the glory and limelight. These departments would collapse if the women were not behind them.”

The treatment that these acting heads receive from their male counterparts places them in a tenuous situation. Often, they are the only female among their colleagues, but more importantly, their acting status compromises their authority relative to their male colleagues who are not in similar positions of authority. Ms. Gobodo, who served as acting chairperson of her department at Rural University, noted that often in meetings with other heads of departments, they did not pay attention to what she said because she was a woman. If one of her male counterparts repeats one of her ideas, he is more likely to get credit. She further noted that she is extremely careful when she criticizes, because her colleagues are more likely to attack her and silence her criticisms.

Another faculty member, Dr. Mazibuko, echoed Ms. Gobodo’s concerns. Dr. Mazibuko was appointed as course coordinator for third-year level courses in her department at Seashore University. In addition to her regular teaching load, as a course coordinator she was expected to develop outlines for all courses offered at this level, coordinate the activities of the courses’ instructors, set third-year course examination dates, serve as a liaison between students and faculty, and attend student and faculty meetings. Dr. Mazibuko noted that the chairperson of her department was very pleased with her work and appointed her to be the coordinator of the undergraduate program. This required her to participate in a number of university and college committees even though they would not be considered under the new guidelines for promotion. While department and institutional service are important elements of these women’s professional lives, they do not lead to upward mobility when they are not acknowledged.

A number of the women acknowledged that their colleagues, especially their male counterparts, frequently challenged their authority and expertise. At City Technikon, where Africans are critically underrepresented among the faculty, the women reported that their Indian and White counterparts, both male and female, often negatively criticized their professional contributions. In
the interviewees’ view, race coupled with gender played a pivotal role in their interactions with colleagues. Dr. Mazibuko, who had extensive experience as a senior faculty member at a historically Black university, noted that her White colleagues were not overtly hostile but that their subtle discriminatory practices were a hindrance in her job. Dr. Mazibuko’s account supports Taylor Cox’s assertion that imbalanced group representation has serious consequences for those individuals who occupy minority status, leading to stereotyping and subtle forms of discrimination.47 As Dr. Mazibuko noted,

When it comes to prejudice and discrimination among people who are highly educated, it becomes very difficult to have any tangibles. People are very subtle. Sometimes you find yourself thinking, am I the one with problems? With academics, they always have counter-arguments to convince you that “I did not mean it that way.” You experience subtle things, it’s not as overt as all that... My White colleagues [at Seashore] are not as open as my Black colleagues were. At the [historically Black university] where I taught before, it was very easy to know whether I was accepted or not. Here at Seashore, it’s difficult to say that people are negative. They are not overtly negative. Attitudes are very subtle.48

Continuing Significance of Race

The issue of race pervaded many of the conversations that we had with the women at this institution. For example, among the recently hired African women, there was a perception that both male and female Indians colluded against Africans to keep their position of privilege. As a result, the African women did not necessarily view their Indian counterparts as allies. In their assessment, Indian women were as much the oppressor (toward African women) as the oppressed (by Indian men). One of the faculty members explained, “There is a lot of fear from the Indian staff members about Africanization.”49 There is a tendency by the Indians to highlight negative ways in which Africans might impact the technikon rather than the positive contributions they could make.

The continuing significance of race was further highlighted by the “frequently disrespectful, sometimes rude and completely unprofessional treatment” of African lecturers at City Technikon. Ms. Modise, an African administrator, noted that administrative and custodial staff, the majority of whom are Indian, treated the African faculty as if they were “nothing.” She remarked that she has observed differences in the way the administrative staff treated men and people of other races relative to Africans. As she observed, “When I go to the administration offices or the finance department the [administrative staff] will ask, ‘Do you have an appointment?’ Even when they know you are [a faculty] member. But if there is a man standing there, they will always help the man first. Even with race, other people [Indians and Whites] get preference. I don’t know if I am being paranoid, but I see this treatment all the time when I go to the admin building.”50

A number of the faculty expressed frustration at their lack of authority and formal power to effect policies at the institution in question. Ms. Vishnu, a lecturer at City Technikon, noted that even though she works extremely hard on her institution’s gender forum to raise awareness about gender inequities, all of her efforts are voluntary. Her gender work is not part of the formal institutional structure, and therefore senior administrators are not required to take her recommendations seriously. Ms. Vishnu also lamented the tokenism trend she has observed in recent years—that is, the tendency to employ a few females or a few Africans just to fulfill the quota. She noted that the few women in top positions within the university were often co-opted within the male culture and became equally unsupportive of other women. Faculty members at Seashore and Rural also expressed concerns about the position of the very few women in senior management positions—that is, they are isolated, overextended, and under constant scrutiny.

People, even other women, do not have confidence in women’s abilities. . . . There are very few women in leadership positions in institutions of higher education. These few women tend to be on every committee and they end up being overextended. . . . I have often seen that when women take up senior positions, they emulate men. I sincerely believe that there is contribution that women bring with their femininity. I admire women who go into these senior positions, maintain their femininity, and do not aspire to be men.51
What has emerged from the preceding discussion are the ways in which women scholars’ professional contributions are undermined and how they must constantly justify their presence in higher education. Another critical issue is the challenge that confronts institutions of higher education to systematically address deeply seeded racial and gender attitudes. While the government passes laws (e.g., the Higher Education Act and the Equity Employment Act), these statutes will not bring any meaningful change until individual attitudes are addressed, institutional policies about equity are enforced, and women are provided with opportunities to become full-fledged contributors in the higher education sector.

Understanding the Academic “Game”

Many of the participants in this study reported that understanding the newly implemented promotion requirements is comparable to walking through a maze. Until recently, South African scholars were not required to have a Ph.D. or its equivalent. This change concerned the women, not because of the requirement itself but because of the conditions under which they must attain the degree. This is in part because of the heavy teaching loads these women have. For example, at Rural University, which was established as a teaching institution, the junior faculty had two teaching sessions per day, with a day session of full-time students and an evening session with part-time students. Typical enrollments ranged from two hundred to four hundred students per class. As Ms. Jafita, a lecturer at Rural University who is currently pursuing her Ph.D., explained, “We teach day and night here, literally. We have large numbers of students. . . . We teach from 8 A.M. until lunchtime and in the afternoon we have tutorials. Then we have to repeat in the evening beginning at 5 P.M. When do you get time to do your own work? This is a serious constraint. . . . I would like to take a year off and finish my Ph.D. I can’t see myself finishing without taking time off. I would never finish.”

Another new requirement for promotion is doing research and getting published. All historically Black universities in South Africa were established as teaching institutions and not intended to be centers of research, inquiry, or scholarly debate. They were staffed by conservative White faculty members, whose role was to repress the pursuit of intellectual activities. Thus, many of the women interviewed were not exposed to a culture of research while they were students and did not have to pursue research as a condition of employment until recently. Therefore, some still view research as a mysterious process, which induces great anxiety.

As lecturers, many of the women have only limited exposure to and involvement with research, making it an even bigger challenge for them to supervise students. The following statement by Ms. Van Wyk, a lecturer at Rural University, succinctly captures the range of problems related to research:

There is an effort to make our environment conducive to research. There is a small research center and new director of research. But these initiatives are less than a year. We have a very poorly stocked library and our inter-library loan department is not up to scratch at all. It is very slow and sometimes you never receive the material you request. Our computer technology is behind. The majority of the people here do not have access to computers and the Internet. I have to use my personal computer to access this information. We are geographically isolated and far away from other institutions. So, we do not have access to a community of other scholars to engage in scholarly activities. Also, our infrastructure is very poor. We spend too much time getting small things done. A whole day can be absorbed making a few photocopies or sending a fax. It sounds ridiculous but that’s how it works here. All of these factors contribute to our lack of performance in research.

Unsurprisingly, publishing and presenting one’s research is also an area where the they lack experience. Ms. Adams, a lecturer in social studies education, lamented the lack of support and guidance from senior colleagues in preparing conference proposals, papers, and manuscripts for publication. She noted that in her department, her senior colleagues who had substantially more research experience than she did were reluctant to share their knowledge with her. In her assessment, such sharing threatened her colleagues’ position of power over her. Another lecturer from Coastline University noted that many of the senior scholars in her department were extremely uncomfortable offering any support for her research efforts because they did not engage...
in research themselves. Therefore, they used resistance as a tool to shield their own inadequacies in this area. These colleagues, she reported, received their promotions during an era when “being White or Indian and male were the only necessary conditions” for upward mobility at Coastline.55

The dissemination of scholarly material in journals presented a number of challenges for many of these women. They noted that most of the mainstream journals are still controlled by what Ms. Soraya identified as the “old boys’ network.” The few faculty members who had submitted papers for publication reported that the mainstream journals were not receptive to their “kind of work,” which typically focuses on rural areas, non-Western perspectives, or gender perspectives. With respect to gender, a lecturer from Coastline University explained that she would never submit her papers to a particular gender-focused journal because her colleagues perceive it as a “softer option.” As she explained, “There is a perception that it is easier to publish in [this gender journal] as a woman . . . but you don’t get the recognition as with another hard-core journal. If I worked on an article, I would not waste my time and send it to this [gender] journal. I know this sounds like I am in conflict with my own position, but I am just being honest with you.”56

According to all of the faculty members in this study, another factor that complicated the promotion process was having a clear understanding of the process itself, including what materials needed to be completed for promotion, where such items could be obtained, and when the deadlines for their submission were. What emerged from our conversations regarding this process was the number of promotion models that existed for different individuals, departments, and universities. These models ranged from recommendations made by the heads of departments, to applications submitted by junior faculty, to no application process whatsoever and faculty receiving notification that they had been promoted without knowing they were even under consideration. The two common threads about this process were the arbitrariness and subjectivity of promotion proceedings and the lack of understanding and confusion that all faculty interviewed expressed. A lecturer at Seashore exclaimed, “It’s very confusing to move from lecturer to senior lecturer. Right now as a lecturer, I have a Ph.D., and I am doing everything that a senior lecturer does. But it’s still not clear to me what it takes to be promoted to senior lecturer.”57

A number of women expressed similar concerns about pervasive discrepancies in the treatment and evaluation of women’s credentials and contributions to their institutions. The case of Ms. Jafta, a lecturer at Rural University, illustrates these discrepancies. Like most of the women represented in this article, she has had the same academic rank since she arrived at her university more than 10 years ago despite the fact that she maintains an active research program, has published a number of articles, has presented papers at national and international conferences, is well known as a seasoned researcher, and has been appointed as acting chairperson of her department. The following quote illuminates Ms. Jafta’s situation:

When I came in from [another university] I was a lecturer, but when I got here they took me back to junior lecturer. I stayed in that position for one year and I was promoted to lecturer the next year. I have been in that position ever since. I did a bit of publishing but I was told that conditions of promotion are tailored for you. Other women here will tell you, don’t look at the conditions of service and interpret them as they are. It depends on who you are. For men certain things are overlooked but for women it is tighter. . . . Take my case, my department advertised a senior position that I was interested in. They said the minimum requirement was a Ph.D. and so many publications. Since I did not have a Ph.D. I did not apply. . . . Then I saw the applications, they were all men and not one of them had a Ph.D. I challenged the applications and made many people angry.58

Another lecturer confirmed that women often operate in an environment where they have to “prove, prove, prove themselves.” In her assessment, female faculty members are under constant scrutiny to perform, whereas their male counterparts do not experience the same type of pressure. This is a phenomenon that Ellis Cose refers to as a “dilemma of the qualified” where minorities have to justify their skills and abilities to insure their place within the majority group.59 As Ms. Goba, another junior faculty member who acted as chairperson of her department, reflected, “If you place a woman in a position, she must be dynamic . . . . If you are a head of department, as a
woman, you must overprepare. When you go to those executive meetings, you need to make sure you have read the reports and have something substantial to say. . . . When men are given positions, they don’t have to prove anything. They just have to work.”

The position of being an acting head of department places these women in a tenuous situation. They assume the additional administrative responsibilities of the chairperson without relief from their teaching. This means they have even less time to devote to their research and studies, the key determinants for promotion. They must also make decisions that will affect their senior colleagues and risk the chance for future promotion if they offend or make decisions that are unfavorable to the senior colleagues.

What have we learned from these women’s experiences? The preceding discussion of our findings suggests similar trends in the experiences of South African women scholars and those of women academics globally. The first theme is the lack of professional mentorship, especially in light of recent and intensified expectations for research and publication. This lack of mentorship also affects students because there are no rewards for faculty members who engage in these activities. Despite this lack of mentorship, women have established alternative strategies of support through collaboration and pursuit of support networks outside of their institutions with other successful scholars.

A second theme is the discussion of culture and how it underscores the integral relationship between broader sociocultural norms and values, and their impact on the professional roles and responsibilities of women scholars. In other words, the conflict between the public identity of women as professionals with authority and their private persona as wives, mothers, and daughters with particular socially constructed roles was often mentioned as a problem. Women are constantly engaged in the struggle to maintain a balance between these sometimes conflicting identities and roles, with race adding another layer of complexity to the dynamics. This paradox reveals what Patricia Hill Collins termed “interlocking systems of oppression,” a phenomenon worth investigating in future for South African scholars.

Our final theme has been the importance of the academic “game.” This game is somewhat reflective of the entire process of political, economic, social, cultural, and economic transformation that South African society is undergoing. Institutions of higher education are challenged to discard their old image as extensions of the apartheid system and to redefine new identities that are inclusive of historically marginalized groups, such as women and Blacks. This change inevitably introduces new rules of the game that confuse people and hinder their efforts, as evidenced by the experiences of our participants, who are struggling to implement and to articulate these rules.

The Road Ahead . . .

Given the challenges addressed in the preceding discussion, how do South African universities and technikons establish institutional cultures that embrace, commit to, and value contributions of women scholars?

Implement Institutional Hiring Policies and Practices That Strive to Attain Gender Equity and Balance

Women are overrepresented in the lower ranks of the academy. In the few cases where women occupy senior positions in the university structures, they are subjected to treatment that undermines their professional contributions. Institutions of higher education are still steeped in cultural values that privilege the “male way of doing things.” Therefore, those who do not embrace these values risk being ostracized. In order to be successful in these male-dominated organizations, women constantly have to prove themselves and outperform their male counterparts. As one of the women exclaimed, “If you are a woman you always have to prove, prove, prove; if you are a man, you just have to work.” Although the government has passed legislation that requires equitable representation of women in various sectors (e.g., Employment Equity Act), institutions of higher education are dawdling on implementing and enforcing these laws.
Implement a Reward System That Acknowledges and Compensates Women’s Contributions

The majority of participants in this study were either acting head of a department or had served in this capacity at some point in their career. These women acquired the additional responsibility of being chairperson of a department without the rewards. Because all of the women were junior-level faculty, they could not be offered a departmental chairpersonship on a permanent basis. What is problematic is that these women had academic credentials similar to or better than those of male colleagues who were heads of departments. The women were subjected to higher standards of requiring a Ph.D. for a promotion than their male colleagues were. This clearly demonstrates the double standards and pervasive disparities that exist in conditions of employment for women. The government can pass laws and require policies to attain equity. However, these laws and policies are ineffectual unless they are enforced and there are consequences for their violation. At this stage, these conditions do not yet exist in the South Africa higher education context.

Create and Support Culture of Scholarship Opportunities for Mentorship and Training

Historically Black universities were created as teaching institutions. The new requirements for promotion call for increased productivity in research and publication activities. Yet, there is little training that has been provided to faculty members in this area. The inadequacy of faculty in the research area also affects the quality of supervision of their students’ work. In order to break this cycle, there needs to be a systematic effort to introduce research to students so that it does not become such a mysterious process. Two of the participants received their graduate training abroad and, therefore, became especially astute about integrating research as part of their courses. For example, Ms. Jafta required all her students from the second-year level to conduct small research projects and present their findings in the class. She noted that for the majority of her students doing a class presentation was a formidable challenge because most of their other courses required them to “memorize and regurgitate the facts.” Dr. Magadla conducted informal monthly workshops for colleagues to discuss various topics related to the research process as an effort to break this cycle of fear.

Create a Balance between Teaching and Research Expectations

As South African universities strive to create a new culture of research, there needs to be a realistic evaluation of the traditional demands of teaching and the new requirements for higher productivity in research and publishing. The data suggest that the requirements for research have been added to faculty workload without any consideration of or adjustments in historical patterns of employment. Most of the participants have double teaching loads, which leave little time for research. In addition, there have been no adjustments in institutional structures to accommodate research activities beyond the 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., Monday through Friday work schedule. For example, computer labs are often not open beyond 5 P.M., or during weekends. Libraries have similarly restricted hours, and at some historically Black universities the resources are not very good.

Introduce Better Communication Strategies

South African institutions are currently undergoing major changes in an effort to become more inclusive and effective. As part of this transformation process, there are a myriad new initiatives, policies, programs, and procedures being introduced. Based on the data from this study, there appears to be concerns about how these new initiatives are conveyed. For example, the women in this study have not received any communication that clearly spells out the new requirements for promotion. Though promotion requirements are a significant change that has a direct impact on the professional lives of faculty members, there are no documents that clarify them. As one faculty member exclaimed, “If you don’t know the rules, how can you play the game.” Some women
believe that poor communication is simply another strategy for those in power to preserve their position of privilege.

Conclusion

The year 2004 marks South Africa’s 10-year anniversary as a democracy, and there seems to be an acknowledgment that innumerable changes have occurred. There has been a great deal of introspection among politicians, academics, and civil society.64 There is increased participation of marginalized groups in systems of governance and an increased sensitivity to and understanding of gender and diversity. These changes have coincided with many structural and policy reforms that address and advance the status of women in government, public, and private sectors. It is therefore in the context of these societal changes that South African universities are compelled to pursue equality for women in academe. University policies such as equal opportunity employment, employment equity, and affirmative action policies have created both a discursive space and a practical means for universities to inject and support the advancement of women in academe.

Our research, however, has shown that there is a lot of work to be done to ensure that black women are retained and supported as they pursue their academic professions. The recommendations made here are feasible, given that they are based upon existing structures and incentives available to universities. For example, there is Thuthuka, which is a mentoring initiative launched by the National Research Foundation programs in a mix of six historically advantaged and disadvantaged universities.65 Another example is Women in Research, which aims to help develop and strengthen the research skills of women, particularly Black women. This helps to increase the number of women in postgraduate studies, academia, research positions, and leadership positions at South African tertiary institutions. The Research Development Initiative for Black Academics and Researchers in Training programs connect black women scholars conducting comparative research to their African and international peers. We argue that these types of programs can help our recommendations to be achieved.

The accounts of faculty members and administrators in this study, with their mutual themes, clearly demonstrate the pervasive presence of inequitable and discriminatory practices. It is important to illuminate these experiences as a way to reflect on initiatives that need to be implemented to make South African institutions of higher education truly inclusive and equitable.

Notes

1. In the context of this article, the term “scholars” refers to faculty members and others who hold teaching and research appointments within the university. In the South African higher education system, faculty members are ranked in descending order as follows: professor, associate professor, senior lecturer, lecturer A (exists only at some universities), lecturer, and junior lecturer.

2. The country’s legal codes classified people as African, Colored, Indian, or White. The racial classification terms used in this article carry particular historical undertones specific to the South African context. The authors acknowledge that these terms are contentious, particularly as South Africa attempts to shed its legacy of apartheid and carve a new identity as a democratic country. As vestiges of the apartheid past are still pervasive in institutions of higher education, these terms are used to facilitate a concise discussion. In the context of this article African refers to people of indigenous ancestry. Colored refers to South Africans of mixed heritage, usually with Dutch, African, Malay, or Khoisan heritage. Indian refers to people of Indian descent, and White refers to South Africans of European descent. The term Black is used to refer collectively to Africans, Coloreds, and Indians. It is a term that emerged during the Black Consciousness era of 1970s to refer to the “oppressed” peoples of South Africa.


7. Ibid.


12. Ibid.


17. Ibid.


22. Hackney and Runnerstrand.


26. Hackney and Runnerstrand (n. 16 above).


33. Newman and Williams (n. 14 above).
34. Technikons are postsecondary education institutions that structurally and functionally fall between U.S. community colleges and traditional four-year colleges. They were established as vocational education centers to provide practical technical training. They evolved over time to become technical colleges, and since 1995 they have been certified to grant bachelor (B Tech), masters (M Tech), and doctoral (D Tech) degrees in technology. The institutional names used in this study are pseudonyms.
36. The authors do not wish to compromise the anonymity of the women who participated in this study. Many of the participants in our study represent one of very few and in some cases the only Black woman in a given department or unit. Therefore, providing extensive details about each participant might reveal her identity.
39. While this article reports only findings from African, Colored, and Indian women, a small number of White women faculty were also interviewed.
41. Interview with Ms. Adams, July 2000, South Africa.
42. Interview with Dr. Mazibuko, July 2000, South Africa.
43. Interview with Ms. Gobodo, July 2000, South Africa.
44. Interview with Ms. Jafta, July 2000, South Africa.
45. Interview with Ms. Vishnu, July 2000, South Africa.
46. Interview with Dr. Sithole, July 2000, South Africa.
48. Interview with Dr. Mazibuko, July 2000, South Africa.
49. Interview with Dr. Trokoza, July 2000, South Africa.
50. Interview with Ms. Modise, July 2000, South Africa.
51. Interview with Ms. Vishnu, July 2000, South Africa.
52. Interview with Ms. Jafta, July 2000, South Africa.
54. Interview with Ms. Van Wyk, July 2000, South Africa.
55. Interview with Ms. Soraya, July 2000, South Africa.
56. Interview with Ms. Soraya, July 2000, South Africa.
57. Interview with Dr. Mazibuko, July 2000, South Africa.
58. Interview with Ms. Jafta, July 2000, South Africa.
60. Interview with Ms. Goba, July 2000, South Africa.

62. Interview with Ms. Mzivanele, July 2000, South Africa.

63. Interview with Ms. Goba, July 2000, South Africa.


Higher Education in South-East Asia: An Overview

Molly N. N. Lee and Stephen Healy

Introduction

South-East Asia is a region of vast developmental diversity, from wealthy Singapore to the much poorer Greater Mekong Sub-region countries. This continuum provides a great opportunity for analyses of many themes and issues, for lessons learned to be shared across borders and for mutual cooperation to enhance the presence of South-East Asia within the global community.

Higher education is one area where people aspire to advance themselves. In South-East Asia, it started from different historical backgrounds and has undergone various stages of development. Similar to the situation in other parts of the world, it has, and still is, facing numerous challenges, including increasing student enrolments, knowledge and information overload, economic restructuring and financial constraints. Amidst such challenges, and changes, there is general consensus within the South-East Asian higher education community that closer cooperation is beneficial and, indeed, necessary to produce highly qualified graduates who can contribute to sustainable development and increase their competitiveness throughout the world. For constructive and productive cooperation, policy makers and practitioners must be well-informed about higher education development and trends in other countries so that they can convert such information into useful policies and practices within the confines of their national needs and circumstances.

To provide such an opportunity, UNESCO Bangkok and the SEAMEO Regional Centre for Higher Education and Development coordinated a research study to conduct a situational analysis of higher education development in eight South-East Asian countries, namely Cambodiа, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam. Both organizations hope that these country reports will create an informed basis for higher education dialogue and exchange among the countries and beyond the Asia-Pacific region, addressing issues and challenges in the following areas:

- Higher education reforms
- Access to higher education
- Diversification of higher education
- University governance and management
- Restructuring of faculties and academic progress
- Developing research capacities
- Change to the academic profession
- Roles and function of private higher education
• Internationalization of higher education
• Accreditation and quality assurance
• Challenges and future developments

The reports analyze the challenges facing higher education in the region, and reveal an interplay between global higher education trends and national (and regional) needs and developments. This overview highlights some of the more significant trends and explores how they are being responded to in each case.

An Overview of Higher Education in South-East Asia

The analyses in the case study countries illustrate that higher education is greatly influenced by the countries’ historical past, nation-building efforts, and current global trends. The differences in the region are significant, but also deceiving. At a superficial level, they range from geographical size, economic wealth, political ideologies, and educational traditions. For example, Singapore is an island state compared to Indonesia, which has a huge population and large geographical area. Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand are newly industrialized countries, whereas Cambodia, Lao PDR and Viet Nam are countries in transition (e.g. from an agricultural economy to an industrialized economy). All the countries except Thailand have a colonial history, and their education systems are very much influenced by this colonial heritage.

Among the less-developed countries in the region, higher education systems are chronically under-funded and face escalating demand, under-qualified academic staff and poorly planned curricula, thus poorly taught students. Many of these systems are undergoing restructuring against a national, regional and global backdrop of higher education reforms in areas such as funding, resources, governance and curriculum development.

Despite the diversity in the region, the higher education systems in South-East Asia face similar problems and challenges. All these systems have budgets to balance, standards to maintain, faculties to satisfy, and social demands to meet. Furthermore, all countries are united by facing similar domestic challenges that are increasingly influenced, distorted and determined by developments at the global level. One of the key developments in this regard has been the increasing growth of transnational education and cross-border exchange, as documented below and in the country papers.

Massification of Higher Education

One of the key and recurring developments and trends in higher education reform is the need to increase the overall access for university-age students. “Massification of higher education” reflects the global trend of improving higher education opportunities for all, and transforming higher education systems from being elitist to ensuring mass participation across different social, income and geographical groups. These massification programmes seek to serve student/professional groups who may not have the educational opportunities to undertake initial or further study and professional development at higher levels.

All the case studies experience greater participation in higher education and all reveal increasing numbers of students in higher education. Some countries have achieved significant increases in participation rates, and have also tackled social exclusion agendas, e.g. Malaysia. However, further challenges exist in matching increased provision with quality and in balancing the interests of the different suppliers of higher education as the private sector plays an increasing role.

An ever escalating demand for higher education brought about by population growth is augmented by the democratization of secondary education and the growing affluence of many countries in the region. At the individual level, higher education is perceived as an avenue for social mobility. At the national level, it is seen as a key instrument for human capital development to sustain economic growth as well as being a means to restructure society and to promote national unity. In addition, many countries stress the importance of higher education institutions in maintaining the
countries’ national competitiveness in a globalized knowledge economy, e.g. Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia.

Table 1 illustrates the university participation rates across the countries in the region as measured by gross enrolment ratios. They show differences in development and participation that can be broken down into three groups: those with ratios of 30 percent and above (Singapore, Thailand and Philippines), between 10-30 percent (Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and Viet Nam) and below 10 percent (Myanmar, Cambodia and Lao PDR).

**Diversification of Higher Education**

The massive expansion of higher education as highlighted above has led to a higher education sector that is differentiated by the type and variety of higher education institutions. Various types of higher education institutions with their respective missions or purposes to cater to the different needs of the diverse groups of students have emerged. This diversification, whether by funding or programme, has been central to how countries in the region have been able to expand and respond (or not as the case may be) to social and economic demands for higher education.

At its most simple level, diversification can be defined between public and private sector providers. Many countries witness the rapid expansion of the private sector, while there are other levels of differentiation that include traditional teaching and research universities, virtual universities, polytechnics, technical institutes, open learning institutes, and community colleges. Not only are there different types of higher education institutions in terms of focus and provision, there are also different types of private sector higher education providers, including those run by for-profit corporations, non-profit organizations and religious bodies.

Open and distance learning universities and regional universities have been established in many countries to make higher education more accessible to people, especially working adults and those in remote rural areas. This process has been crucial in widening participation and access to higher education in all countries in the region. The papers on Indonesia and Thailand provide particular detail on these processes and experiences.

Most countries have public and private universities, while Viet Nam has semi-public universities and Malaysia has universities owned by public corporations. Malaysia has university colleges (with limited number of faculties) and Thailand has Rajabhat universities (which used to be teacher training colleges). Several countries have community colleges, but Viet Nam has people-founded universities and colleges. Quite a number of countries, e.g. Malaysia and Viet Nam, have branch campuses from foreign universities.

A trend towards increased transnational education has also been noted, with Malaysia identified as one of the most developed and experienced in the region. Many countries in the region

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remain importers of cross-border education from advanced countries like Australia, UK and USA, but increasingly there are intra-regional cross-border activities as shown by the Malaysian and Singaporean provider activities in Thailand and Viet Nam.

**Internationalization of Higher Education**

Over the course of the last ten years, mobility of students and academics around the world has become commonplace. Student flows among countries in the region and beyond continue to rise. There are increasing efforts to match student mobility with support programmes for students and academics from countries that will benefit from the educational and cultural experience of overseas study and professional development programmes.

Worldwide growth of transnational education and the increasing development of foreign branch campuses have also revealed a trend whereby the educational values associated with higher education in developed countries such as USA, UK and Australia can be exported to give access to a new generation of students who may not be able to afford or obtain the scholarships necessary for overseas study.

Transnational education can be defined as any teaching or learning activity in which the students are in a different country (the host country) to that in which the institution providing the education is based (the home country). This situation requires that national boundaries be crossed by information about the education, and by staff and/or education materials (GATE 1997).

Many countries in this region, such as Malaysia, Thailand and Viet Nam, are importers of transnational education from Australia and UK. This trend is forecast to grow: for example, the UK alone expects the demand for UK-sourced transnational education in Malaysia and Singapore to grow from 67,000 students in 2003 to 271,000 by 2020 (British Council 2005).

In importing transnational education on the one hand, countries such as Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore have also become exporters on the other by providing educational services to students from neighbouring countries and in setting up institutions across borders.

All three countries have national objectives to become educational hubs in the region. This strategy is most developed in Malaysia and Singapore, where active government support and incentives have been given to overseas providers to set up branch campuses in their countries, e.g. Nottingham University in Malaysia and the University of New South Wales in Singapore.

Internationalization not only includes international student mobility, but also mobility of academic staff, educational programmes and institutions. The UNESCO Convention of Studies, Diplomas and Degrees in Higher Education in Asia and the Pacific formulated in 1984 anticipated this trend and the need for accompanying support and recognition measures. The Convention aims to promote greater cooperation to support the educational development for students, researchers, academics and professionals through the mutual recognition of studies, diploma and degrees in higher education in the Asia-Pacific region. At the heart of the Convention is the creation of conditions to facilitate greater and smoother mobility for educational and cultural exchange. To date, 20 countries have ratified the Convention, reflecting the growing commitment and trend for internationalization and cross-border exchange of students and academics to support economic, social and educational development.

A key trend related to internationalization has been international mobility of leading academics and students to support the future capacity and development of local host institutions. For example, Singapore is “cherry picking” some of the best students, the best professors, the best institutions with the aim of them staying on to develop and build the international reputations of their institutions.

Nevertheless, not all cross-border activities are for commercial purposes. International development aid from more developed countries has supported countries such as Lao PDR and Cambodia in student fellowship and academic staff development programmes as part of wider strategic initiatives to develop the capacity of the higher education systems. Clearly the General Agreement on the Trades of Services (GATS) will have a direct impact and influence on the higher education policies and developments in the region.
Marketization of Higher Education

The rapid expansion of higher education and the rising unit cost has caused tremendous financial strain on many governments. The result has been the urgent need to seek other sources of funding and to restructure their higher education systems. The restructuring of higher education in many countries has involved the privatization of higher education, corporatization of public universities, implementation of student fees and formation of strategic partnerships between the public and private sectors in the provision of higher education. This has also led to the establishment of foreign providers through transnational education either as a market response or via pro-active government policy measures.

The drive of market forces in higher education has also led to more entrepreneurial universities which are seeking additional and new sources of funding through either traditional and/or innovative services. Thus, increasingly universities are aiming to market their teaching, research and other knowledge-based services, together with maximizing the commercial value of their physical assets, setting up commercial enterprises of their own, or joint ventures with the business sector.

The development of private higher education has helped expand enrolments in many countries. Private higher education institutions in the Philippines and Indonesia outnumber public providers and have been absorbing the growing demands and expectations of higher education from society. While private provision has been a long tradition in these two countries, it is a relatively recent development in Malaysia, Singapore, Cambodia and Viet Nam.

In Indonesia, the objectives of private higher education institutions are related to the traditional public service role, i.e. to meet excess demand. In some countries, private higher education institutions not only meet excess demand, but can also raise standards, and some are positioned to serve the elite who can afford it, e.g. De La Salle University in the Philippines, Monash University in Malaysia, and RMIT in Viet Nam. Private provision also fosters the opportunity to diversify curriculum and instruction, e.g. in Malaysia, the language of instruction in the private sector is English instead of Malay, or it may lead to foreign degrees instead of a local degree; in the Philippines there are sectarian providers in the private sector which may have strong religious influence as well.

The papers present a number of policy issues for governments, such as determining the role of the state in the provision of higher education, the relationship between private providers and governments, and issues linked to monitoring mechanisms, accreditation of courses and quality assurance. Several countries like Malaysia, Thailand, and Cambodia have passed private higher education institution acts to regulate the provision of private higher education in their countries.

Institutional Restructuring

The growing internationalization and commercialization of higher education has significant implications for how higher education institutions are organized. The forces behind the continued drive towards autonomy and accountability stem from several factors:

- As higher education systems expand, they become more bureaucratic and regulated to ensure consistency in the management of higher education systems. Thus, they also become more complex, creating a variety of institutions with different missions and scattered in different geographical locations, making it increasingly difficult for central management. Thus, a more decentralized management is needed to cope with these challenges.

- In adopting a neo-liberal ideology, many governments are reducing their public and social expenditure, which has resulted in drastic budget cuts in state funding to universities. To overcome these budgetary constraints, universities need to seek alternative sources of funding, and they are being given freedom to generate their own revenues through engagements in different kinds of market-related activities.

- As universities find themselves operating in a more competitive and market-oriented environment, they need to be flexible and able to respond quickly to market signals and pressures. Therefore, many academic leaders have started searching for ways to make their institutions more entrepreneurial and autonomous.
As many universities continue to grow and expand with limited resources, their stakeholders, including the state, are becoming progressively concerned with the quality of education they provide. Thus, universities are increasingly subjected to external pressures to achieve greater accountability for their performances, and encouraged to develop systems for self-evaluation and assessment.

The country studies have demonstrated a broad array of approaches in the restructuring of higher education institutions, and their experiences serve to highlight areas for sharing lessons learned and collaboration on what is clearly a common and global issue.

Trading Autonomy for Accountability

The relationship between higher education institutions and the state is largely dependent on the issue of autonomy and accountability. The global experience has revealed that the state and higher education institutions are constantly engaged in redefining their interactions and relationships, with governments demanding more accountability and the higher education institutions insisting on more autonomy. A significant global trend is an increase in institutional autonomy in return for more accountability. This trend can be seen in the South-East Asian region with the corporatization of public universities in Malaysia and Singapore, the establishment of autonomous universities in Indonesia and Thailand, and the prevalence of charter universities in the Philippines. Institutional restructuring has led to many changes in university governance and management.

Assuring the quality of education provision is a fundamental aspect of gaining and maintaining the credibility of programmes, institutions and national systems of higher education worldwide. The same is true in South-East Asia, and quality assurance is one of the prime concerns. Indonesia, Philippines and Malaysia have already set up quality assurance mechanisms to monitor their higher education institutions, and Cambodia and Lao PDR are in the process of setting up their own quality assurance and accreditation bodies.

Academic Restructuring and Strengthening Research Capacities

To enhance the quality and relevance of their academic programmes and to ensure cost-effectiveness, many higher education institutions in the region have undergone academic restructuring that may involve the merging of departments and faculties (e.g. Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia), the establishment of niche areas in Singapore (which has set up ten specialized research institutes for life science and information technology), the introduction of credit systems in Viet Nam and Cambodia, or the establishment of new departments for interdisciplinary and multi-disciplinary studies in Thailand.

Many countries in this region do not have very conducive environments for research, and in some countries there is hardly any research activity as a result of heavy teaching loads, lack of research funds, and lack of qualified researchers. In many instances, the academics are so poorly paid that they have to take on a second job. However, in the more developed countries like Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, there have been significant scientific research contributions in areas such as marine biology, forestry, tropical medicine and agricultural crops such as rubber, cocoa, oil palm and rice.

Examples of innovative approaches to strengthen research capacities in universities in this region include the move towards setting up research universities in Malaysia, the setting up of specialized research institutes in Singapore, and the introduction of competitive research grants in Indonesia.

Changing Academic Profession

The global and local trends in higher education highlighted above present a number of challenges for the academics in higher education institutions. The changing external and internal environment places new professional demand and context on these academics, as highlighted below:
Subjected to more rules and regulations: The emphasis on accountability has required academics to be subject to tighter fiscal control, to increase productivity, and to be governed by more rules and regulations as well as rigorous assessment procedures.

Pressure to raise funds: The development of the corporate culture into higher education institutions has required academics to behave like entrepreneurs and to market their expertise, services and research findings.

Limited academic freedom: Academic freedom in some countries remains limited with restrictions on what can be researched and what the academic community can relay to the public.

Delinking from civil service: In the past, academics in this region have had both tenure and civil service status, but with the restructuring of higher education, they are now (or in the process of being) delinked from the civil service, e.g. Thailand, Indonesia, and Singapore.

Each country has its own particular challenges, ranging from the more advanced systems in Singapore (where academics are increasingly imported), to Thailand (where a traditional civil service status is now being transformed), to Laos and Cambodia (where more academic development and training is required).

Future Developments and Challenges

Future trends in the development of higher education in South-East Asia and other parts of the world will become progressively similar. They will include continuing expansion, the need to seek different sources of funding, and the growing diversity of higher education institutions. More calls for institutional autonomy, financial diversification and quality control in higher education will be made, as will demands from different social groups for access. Greater pressure will be exerted for relevance and flexibility in curriculum development, and for adaptability to changes in the society as a whole and in the workplace, in particular.

Universities throughout the world, including those in South-East Asia, will no longer be the sole producer and disseminator of knowledge amid the emergence of multiple competitors such as corporate universities, research institutes, industrial laboratories, think tanks and various kinds of consultancies. Greater cross-border provision through transnational education expansion and the concentration of research expertise and funding will ensure that this area will continue to be of interest and concern to higher education providers and policy makers.

Universities have a role to play in promoting inclusive multiculturalism and universal values. This has become even more significant given the greater polarization of communities and religions around the region and the world. Student and academic mobility and exchange can serve to share a greater sense of cross-cultural understanding and tolerance.

South-East Asian higher education institutions, like their counterparts in other regions of the world, face multiple challenges. How well they redefine and reinvent themselves to suit the changing societal needs in the era of globalization is critical for their development and future. The country papers serve as a baseline for discussion and a shared understanding of issues in the region. This report will be useful in supporting greater cooperation and collective effort in tackling the challenges of making higher education more relevant and competitive within the global knowledge economy.

References


AFRICAN HIGHER EDUCATION:
CHALLENGES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

DAMTEW TEFERRA & PHILIP G. ALTBACH

Abstract
African higher education, at the beginning of the new millennium, faces unprecedented challenges. Not only is the demand for access unstoppable, especially in the context of Africa’s traditionally low postsecondary attendance levels, but higher education is recognized as a key force for modernization and development. Africa’s academic institutions face obstacles in providing the education, research, and service needed if the continent is to advance. Generalizing about a continent as large and diverse as Africa is difficult. Yet there are some common elements—and there are certainly some common challenges. In our discussion, we are not generally optimistic either in analyzing the current reality in much of Africa or in pointing to future prospects. The fact is that African universities currently function in very difficult circumstances, both in terms of the social, economic, and political problems facing the continent and in the context of globalization, and the road to future success will not be an easy one.

Based on Africa-wide research, this article discusses such topics as access to higher education, the challenges of funding, the growing role of private higher education institutions in Africa, governance and autonomy, management challenges, gender (including the access of women to higher education and the problems faced by women students and academic staff), the role of research and the problems of scholarly communication, language issues, and the brain drain. These issues are at the heart of Africa’s future academic development.

Keywords: academic freedom, access, Africa, brain drain, funding and finance, gender, language, private higher education, student activism.

Introduction
African higher education, at the beginning of the new millennium, faces unprecedented challenges. Not only is the demand for access unstoppable, especially in the context of Africa’s traditionally low postsecondary attendance levels, but higher education is recognized as a key force for modernization and development. The dawning of the twenty-first century is being recognized as a knowledge era, and higher education must play a central role. In this essay, we reflect on some of the key challenges facing African higher education.

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Generalizing about a continent as large and diverse as Africa is difficult. Yet there are some common elements—and there are certainly some common challenges. Given the complex challenges facing higher education in the continent currently, our optimism for the future is quite guarded. The fact is that African universities currently function in very difficult circumstances, and the road to future success will not be an easy one.

If Africa is to succeed economically, culturally, and politically, it must have a strong postsecondary sector; academic institutions are central to the future. After being shunted to the side by national governments and international agencies alike for almost two decades, higher education is again recognized as a key sector in African development.

Africa, a continent with fifty-four countries, has no more than 300 institutions that fit the definition of a university. By international standards, Africa is the least developed region in terms of higher education institutions and enrollments. While a few countries on the continent can claim comprehensive academic systems, most have just a few academic institutions and have not yet established the differentiated postsecondary systems required for the information age (Task Force on Higher Education and Society 2000). Nigeria, Sudan, South Africa, and Egypt each have 45, 26, 21, and 17 universities, respectively, and each country has many additional postsecondary institutions as well. A few countries, including Cape Verde, Djibouti, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Seychelles, and Sao Tome and Principe have no universities; but even in these countries, preparations have been underway to create one or more major postsecondary institutions. Others, including Somalia, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), have lost university-level institutions as the result of political turmoil and are trying to rebuild a postsecondary sector.

Generalization is difficult because of the tremendous diversity evident in Africa. There are exceptions to almost every rule. For example, we sometimes underestimate the extent of postsecondary education by ignoring the nonuniversity sector. Zambia has only two universities, but it also has fifty or so colleges for “further education.” Our distinction between universities and colleges is based on how they are considered at the local level, irrespective of their size and the program of studies. The overall state and trend of higher education in northern Africa is considerably different from the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. Even in sub-Saharan Africa, a few countries, such as Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa do not fall perfectly well in a number of generalizations that we make.

Diversity in function, quality, orientation, financial support, and other factors are evident in Africa; national circumstances and realities vary significantly. Nonetheless, generalizations can be made, and it is important to understand the broader themes that shape African higher education realities at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

The overall reality of inadequate financial resources combined with unprecedented demand for access, the legacy of colonialism, longstanding economic and social crises in many countries, the challenges of HIV/AIDS in parts of the continent, and other significant issues present a particularly difficult reality. It is our purpose here to provide a broad portrait of African higher education realities as a backdrop for further analysis and future change.

African Higher Education in Historical Perspective

Higher education in Africa is as old as the pyramids of Egypt, the obelisks of Ethiopia, and the Kingdom of Timbuktu. The oldest university still existing in the world is Egypt’s Al-Azhar, founded as and still the major seat of Islamic learning. Indeed, Al-Azhar is currently the only major academic institution in the world that is organized according to its original Islamic model. All other universities in Africa, and, indeed, the rest of the world, have adopted the Western model of academic organization. While Africa can claim an ancient academic tradition, the fact is that traditional centers of higher learning in Africa have all but disappeared or were destroyed by colonialism. Today, the continent is dominated by academic institutions shaped by colonialism and organized according to the European model. As is the case in the developing world, higher education in Africa is an artifact of colonial policies (Altbach and Selvaratnam 1989; Lulat 2003).

A multitude of European colonizers—including Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Portugal, and Spain—have shaped Africa’s route of development. These colonial
legacies affect contemporary African higher education. The most important of the colonial powers in Africa, Britain and France, have left by far the greatest lasting impact, not only in terms of the organization of academe and the continuing links to the metropole but in the language of instruction and communication.

Colonial higher education policy had some common elements. Among these are:

Limited access. Colonial authorities feared widespread access to higher education. They were interested in training limited numbers of African nationals to assist in administering the colonies. Some colonial powers, notably the Belgians, forbade higher education in their colonies. Others, such as the Spanish and the Portuguese, kept enrollments very small. The French preferred to send small numbers of students from its colonies to study in France. Throughout all of Africa, the size of the academic system was very small at the time of independence. A World Bank (1991) study reports that at independence less than one-quarter of all professional civil service posts were held by Africans; most trade and industry throughout the continent was foreign-owned; and only 3 percent of high school-age students received a secondary education. With all its copper wealth, Zambia had only 100 university graduates and 1,000 secondary school graduates. In 1961, the University of East Africa (serving Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda) turned out a total of only 99 graduates for a combined population area of 23 million. Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo), for example, reached independence without a single national engineer, lawyer, or doctor. Between 1952 and 1963, French-speaking Africa produced a mere four graduates in the field of agriculture, while English-speaking Africa turned out 150 (Eisemon 1982).

Language. The language of instruction in every case was the language of the colonizer. In some countries, existing forms of local languages used in "higher forms of education" were replaced by the language of the colonizers.

Limited freedom. Limits on academic freedom and on the autonomy of academic institutions were the norm.

Limited curriculum. The curricula of universities in Africa at the time of independence was dramatically restricted. The colonizers tended to support disciplines such as law and related fields that would assist colonial administration and that were not costly to implement. Scientific subjects were rarely offered.

The legacy of colonialism remains a central factor in African higher education. Independence has been the national reality for most of Africa for less than four decades, and the ties to the former colonizers have, in general, remained strong. The fact that no African country has changed the language of instruction from the colonial language is significant and illustrative. The impact of the colonial past and of the continuing impact of the former colonial powers remains crucial in any analysis of African higher education.

This analysis is mainly concerned with contemporary higher education. We now examine key elements of higher education in Africa. These include access, governance, the role of research and publishing, information technology, the academic profession, the "brain drain" and migration of talent, and others. While these topics do not discuss all aspects of African higher education, they are central to any understanding of the continent’s challenges.

Access

In virtually all African countries, demand for access to higher education is growing, straining the resources of higher education institutions. Students have had to be admitted into institutions originally designed for fewer students and enrollments have escalated, but financial resources have not kept pace. In many countries, resources have actually declined due to inflation, devaluation of the currency exchange rate, economic and political turmoil, and structural adjustment programs, further stressing the financial stability of institutions and systems.

We estimate that between 4 and 5 million students are currently enrolled in the continent’s post-secondary institutions. A report by the Task Force on Higher Education and Society (2000) puts this figure at 3,489,000 students. Over 150,000 academic staff work in Africa’s postsecondary institutions. Egypt has the highest enrollment in Africa, with over 1.5 million (including about a quarter of a million part-time) students. It also has the largest number of members of the academic profession.
at about 31,000. The enrollment ratio for the 18–22 age group is approximately 22 percent (Elmahdy 2003).

Nigeria is second with close to 900,000 students enrolled in its post-secondary institutions. It has forty-five universities, sixty-three colleges of education, and forty-five polytechnics—the largest number in Africa. Of the total student population, 35 percent go to universities and 55 percent to colleges of education. However, the gross enrollment ratio for ages 18 to 25 is only about 5 percent (Jibril 2003). South Africa, with more than half a million students in its twenty-one universities and fifteen technikons (postsecondary vocational colleges), is third in the number of enrolled students on the continent. Of these, 55 percent go to universities (Subotzky 2003). Tunisia and Libya have enrollments of close to 210,000 and over 140,000, respectively (Millot, Waite, and Zaiem 2003; El-Hawat 2003).

With a population of 32 million, the enrollment in Tanzanian higher education institutions for the year 2000 was under 21,000 (Mkude and Cooksey 2003). With a population of about 65 million, Ethiopia has no more than 50,000 students in its postsecondary institutions (Wondimuu 2003). Today Guinea counts 14,000 students from the population of 7.66 million (Sylla 2003), Senegal has 25,000 students for 7.97 million inhabitants (Ndiaye 2003), and Côte d’Ivoire has 60,000 for its population of 13.7 million (Houenou and Houenou-Agbo 2003).

It should be noted that the number of institutions and student figures are not always directly correlated. Sudan, for example, with its twenty-six public universities and twenty-one private universities and colleges, has an enrollment of about 40,000 (El Tom 2003). In some countries, academic institutions may be quite small.

Enrollment in Ghana is less than 3 percent of the eligible age group, and in many countries the figure is under 1 percent of the eligible age cohort. For instance, in Malawi and Tanzania, the proportion is 0.5 percent and 0.3 percent of the eligible age group, respectively (Chimombo 2003; Mkude and Cooksey 2003). Those who have access to postsecondary education in Africa overall represent less than 3 percent of the eligible age group—the lowest in the world by a significant percentage. This is one of the reasons for the current surging demand for access to education as Africa seeks to catch up with the rest of the world.

Africa faces a significant challenge in providing access to higher education, not only to reach the levels of other developing and middle-income countries but also to satisfy the demand of populations that are eager for opportunities to study and that have achieved a level of secondary education that qualifies them for postsecondary study.

**Funding and financing**

The central reality for all African higher education systems at the beginning of the twenty-first century is severe financial crisis. Academe everywhere, even in wealthy industrialized nations, faces fiscal problems, but the magnitude of these problems is greater in Africa than anywhere else. The causes are not difficult to discern, and include:

- The pressures of expansion and “massification” that have added large numbers of students to most African academic institutions and systems
- The economic problems facing many African countries that make it difficult, if not impossible, to provide increased funding for higher education
- A changed fiscal climate induced by multilateral lending agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
- The inability of students to afford the tuition rates necessary for fiscal stability and in some cases an inability to impose tuition fees due to political or other pressure
- Misallocation and poor prioritization of available financial resources, such as the tradition of providing free or highly subsidized accommodations and food to students and maintaining a large and cumbersome non-academic personnel and infrastructure, among others.

Not all of these elements are, of course, present in every African country, and financial circumstances vary, but overall, funding issues loom very large in any analysis of African higher education.
Higher education is a four-to-five-billion-dollar enterprise in Africa. With Africa’s largest student population, Egypt’s higher education is a US$1.29 billion enterprise (Elmahdy 2003). Nigeria, with an estimated half-a-billion-dollar budget (Jibril 2003) accounts for about a third of the remaining total figure. South Africa, Tunisia, Libya, and Algeria appear to dispense a significant portion of the remaining expenditures when compared to other countries of the continent.

For a continent of more than 700 million people, this expenditure is depressingly small. The total yearly expenditure for higher education in Africa as a whole does not even come close to the endowments of some of the richest universities in the United States. The budgets of individual universities in many industrialized countries exceed the entire national budgets for higher education in many African nations. These comparisons clearly illustrate the disparity between the financial situations of higher education institutions in Africa and in industrialized nations.

It comes as no surprise, then, that virtually all African universities suffer from the effects of scarce financial resources. Serious shortages of published materials of books and journals, the lack of basic resources for teaching, the absence of simple laboratory equipment and supplies (such as chemicals) to do research and teaching, and, in some countries, delays of salary payments for months are just some of the common problems faced by institutions across the continent.

The bulk of funding for higher education is generated from state resources. While small variations in the proportion of resources allotted to higher education by country exist, African governments consistently provide more than 90 to 95 percent of the total operating budgets of higher education. The remaining percentages come from fees for tuition, services, consultancy, renting facilities, and other sources. In addition, there is a growing trend toward funding from external sources. Research, for example, is largely funded by donor agencies, and this naturally has implications for the nature of the research and for its impact on African higher education.

In many countries, governments pay stipends and living allowances to students, and this consumes a substantial proportion of university resources. In Guinea, for instance, scholarship money given to students accounts for as much as 55 percent of the total government allocations to the universities (Sylla 2003). In most countries, student fees have traditionally not provided more than token support.

There are some rare exceptions. In Lesotho, for instance, much of the income for the University of Lesotho comes from student fees. Students in Lesotho also repay student loans as soon as they have completed their studies and have secured jobs. The arrangements for loan payments are also contingent upon where graduates eventually work; that is, in public, private, regional, or international sectors (Ntimo-Makara 2003).

The enormous support for the provision of nonacademic activities and facilities, such as allowances, free accommodation, and catering, is now facing scrutiny in many countries. Such support not only consumes major portions of university budgets, which consequently undermine the raison d’être of a higher learning institution, but it may also serve as an incentive for students to take longer to complete their studies. In situations where jobs for graduates are not immediately available, students have been reported to delay the completion of their studies, which then blocks the opportunity for potential upcoming students to enroll. Initiatives to curtail such support schemes are often precipitated by declining resources from governments and by multinational pressures on African governments to cut social services.

We can measure the scope of the financial challenges facing African higher education by examining what universities request from their governments and what they actually receive. In Ghana, according to Paul Effah (2003), five universities requested a total of $32 million in 2000. The government only provided $18 million—a mere 56 percent of what they requested; and the pattern is the same for the former polytechnic institutions whose statuses have been upgraded. In 1999–2000, the education sector in Uganda received 33 percent of the total government discretionary recurrent budget, and tertiary education accounted for only 18 percent of this total (Musisi 2003).

Without exception, African universities are under considerable financial pressure and face serious financial problems. That said, there are a few places where the financial situation appears to be relatively less severe or even improving gradually. In Nigeria—a country that suffered serious social, economic, and political upheavals during a series of military regimes in the past—funds are expected to increase by 252 percent under the current elected government (Jibril 2003). Botswana,
which has a small population and considerable mineral wealth, has provided its higher education sector with adequate funding.

Over the last decade or so, the pressure to expand the revenue base of higher education has been clear. Universities have either taken it upon themselves or have been pressured by governments to expand the financial and resource base as resources have dwindled against mounting enrollments and escalating demand. Various forms of ideas to generate revenue and a variety of programs have been experimented with and implemented in many countries. While governments, sometimes with pressure from external donor agencies specially the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, have been exploring the possibilities of expanding revenues from and the resource base for higher education, there has often been resistance from the public and, especially, from students.

Some universities, such as Uganda’s Makerere University, however, have been claimed as models of successful transformation in funding higher education for moving away from the entrenched culture of government support as sole funding source of universities. Musisi (2001) reports that in 1992–1993, 5 percent of the students in Makerere paid their way; seven years later, 80 percent were doing so. In Tanzania, the new trend is to adopt policies to equitably share costs between the government and those who use the university’s services. The government is confining itself to funding the direct costs of education and leaving the remaining costs (such as residence fees, food, and the like) to be met by students, parents, and family members.

The complex dynamics that enabled fiscal reforms to succeed in some countries and to fail in others needs careful analysis. The sustainability of such reforms; their perceived, real, and potential benefits and concealed drawbacks and ramifications; and the significance of external and internal forces toward such a change are interesting topics for further research.

In virtually all cases, researchers observe the constant decline of direct and indirect resources allocated for higher education by governments. The impact of this trend and how this over time has eroded the quality of teaching and research, the moral and physical well-being of the academic profession, and the general state of the universities as a whole remains a subject for more discussion and analysis.

Governance

Public higher education institutions predominate in Africa, and governmental involvement in university affairs is the norm. The current governance structure in most African universities reflects this legacy. Throughout much of Africa, the head of state holds the ultimate authority as the chancellor or president in appointing vice-chancellors and others down the administrative line; this is especially typical in Anglophone Africa.

In Anglophone countries, the chancellorship is a symbolic position. The vice-chancellor, who is equivalent to an American university president, has the executive power as furnished by the board of directors, who themselves are composed largely of government-appointed members and, in some countries, students. The vice-chancellors have also been known to be appointed by a minister of education with or without the approval of Parliament or even a chancellor. For example, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, under normal circumstances, university presidents are nominated by the members of the academic community; however, it is the president of the republic who makes the final decision on the selection of the vice-chancellor upon the recommendation of the minister of education (Lelo 2003).

The chain of administrative power starts with the vice-chancellor, then moves to deans/directors, and then department heads. The deans and directors in most cases are appointed either by the vice-chancellor, directly by government officials, or by boards of directors or trustees. In many cases, fellow members elect the department heads. In a few countries, a short-list of candidates for the highest positions is submitted to the government as a compromise between the university community and the government. In most cases, the professorial authority that is typical in Western industrialized nations is lacking in much of Africa. The academic profession has less power in the African context than it does in the West.
Excessive Non-Academic Staff

The teaching and research staff in quite a large number of African institutions is smaller than the nonacademic/administrative staff. The administrative bureaucracy in African universities is disproportionately large. A few examples illustrate this disparity:

- At National University of Lesotho, Matora Ntim-Makara (2003) reports, there are twice as many nonacademic support staff as there are academics, and more than 60 percent of the institution’s budget goes to staff costs. The financial resources of the university are, therefore, mainly used on nonteaching personnel costs. This imposes limitations on the creation of additional teaching positions to enhance capacity in academic programs.

- In Madagascar, James Stiles (2003) reports, the student-to-administrator ratio remains high relative to other countries (with 8 students to each administrator) and high relative to the ratio of students to teachers (47 to 1 in 1993 and 22 to 1 in 1996). This remains true even after the number of administrative staff was reduced in 1997 by 5 percent while the teaching corps increased.

- Togo, Emmanuel Edee (2003) reports, has 1,136 administrative and technical staff in higher education, yet the academic staff numbers fewer than 730, of whom only 55 percent are full-time. While the number of nonacademic staff is high, they face several problems, including over-staffing and lack of communication between the different services and the students.

The number of nonacademic personnel and the proportion of resources allocated to this sector are disproportionately high, and the quality and performance of the administrative cadre leaves much to be desired. Bureaucracy and inefficiency are rampant. Training and skills development for the non-academic staff are rarities.

While the nonacademic staff of African educational institutions are crucial, their disproportionate presence takes away the resources needed for the basic functions of universities: teaching and research. In countries where such resources are very scarce, universities must consider minimizing this significant and unsustainable fiscal burden in order to direct resources to the priority areas. While seldom discussed as a key issue for academic development in Africa, the complex issues surrounding the administrative staff in African universities deserves careful attention.

Management Issues in Universities

Efficient management and administrative systems are of paramount significance to the productivity and effectiveness of any enterprise; academic institutions are no exception. By and large, however, African universities suffer from poor, inefficient, and highly bureaucratic management systems. Poorly trained and poorly qualified personnel; inefficient, ineffective, and out-of-date management and administrative infrastructures; and poorly remunerated staff are the norm throughout the many systems.

Accounts of serious corruption charges and embezzlement of funds in African universities are not common. Some blame misappropriation of funds and poor prioritization as one of the factors for financial difficulties in the universities. For instance, the fiscal crisis in Kenyan public universities, Charles Ngome (2003) observes, is worsened by the misappropriation of the scarce resources. As students continue living and studying under deplorable conditions, the top administrators in the universities are regularly accused by the national auditor general’s office of mismanaging funds and having misplaced priorities. During the 1995–1996 financial year, it was reported that Maseno University lost over US$660,000 (Kshs. 50 million), most of it through theft and false allowance payments. Even though the issues of mismanagement tend to be generally similar across nations and systems, it is important to note that the manner in which the university is governed and the leadership is appointed often contributes to the magnitude and scope of the problems.
Private Higher Education

In many African countries, the provision of higher education by private institutions is a growing phenomenon. When compared to other parts of the world, however, most African countries have been slow to expand the private sector in higher education (Altbach 1999). The trend toward private higher education has been enhanced by a number of factors: a burgeoning demand from students for access, the declining capacity of public universities, the retrenchment of public services, pressure by external agencies to cut public services, a growing emphasis on and need for a highly skilled labor force that targets the local market, and the beginning of interest by foreign providers. In terms of numbers, there are now more private institutions than public ones in some countries, although the private schools are smaller and tend to specialize in specific fields, such as business administration. The following examples showcase the development of private higher education in Africa:

- Kenya has nineteen universities, of which thirteen are private (Ngome 2003).
- In Sudan, Mohamed Elamin El Tom (2003) observes, the number of private higher education institutions increased from one in 1989 to sixteen in 1996 and to twenty-two in 2001. The number of students enrolled in private higher education institutions increased nearly ninefold within four years—from under 3,000 in 1990–1991 to close to 24,000 in 1994–1995.
- In the Democratic Republic of Congo, over 260 private institutions were operating in 1996, of which 28.9 percent were approved by the government, 32.3 percent were authorized to operate, and 38.8 percent were being considered for authorization. Many newly established institutions, unfortunately, do not meet the required higher education standards because of their organization and the conditions within which they operate (Lelo 2003).
- In Ghana, there has been an upsurge, especially among religious organizations, in the establishment of private higher education institutions. By August 2000, the National Accreditation Board had granted accreditation to eleven private tertiary institutions to offer degree programs. Ghana has five public universities and eight polytechnics whose status has been upgraded (Effah 2003).
- In Uganda, more than ten private universities have been established or being established. Currently, Uganda has two public universities; and the founding of two more public universities was also recently announced by the government (Musisi 2003).
- Togo—a country that has one major university and four other postsecondary institutions—has encouraged the creation of private institutions of higher education. Today, there are twenty-two private postsecondary institutions, of which eighteen were created between 1998 and 2000 (Edee 2003).
- Ethiopia, with a very small public academic sector, has seen the establishment of 20 private postsecondary institutions recently.

It is important to point out that most of these institutions are based in the major capital cities and in cities where the student pool is robust and the infrastructure is relatively good. It also should be noted that even though the number of private institutions on the continent has increased dramatically and appears higher in absolute numbers than the number of public institutions, student enrollment in public institutions outnumbers enrollment in private institutions in nearly all countries. For instance, while the enrollment in the six public universities in Madagascar was not more than 9,000, the total enrollment of the sixteen private institutions was less than 2,000, and none of the private institutions had more than 500 students (Stiles 2003). Kenya is one of the few countries in Africa that has a well-developed private university system, yet only 20 percent of the 50,000 enrolled students attend the thirteen private universities (Ngome 2003). In Uganda, the total student population of the ten private institutions amounts to 3,600, while the two public universities enroll 23,000 students (Musisi 2003).

Private institutions in Africa are secular as well as sectarian. In religious-based private institutions, the funding of the institutions relies heavily on the founding religious organizations—based both locally and abroad—or their affiliates. Most other secular private institutions in Africa depend
on student tuition and fees to generate their revenue. As a consequence, the cost of education in these institutions is generally higher in comparison to other educational institutions.

Governments do not give financial support to private institutions in most African countries. In certain cases, however, the private institutions receive direct financial support from governments. In Liberia, for instance, the state provides subsidies to private and church-operated postsecondary institutions. It also provides financial aid to students attending these institutions to cover the cost of tuition and textbooks (Seyon 2003). In Togo, private institutions that offer short-period technician degrees are subsidized by the state in the same way as other institutions are (Edee 2003). In Mozambique, some scholarships are also made available to private higher education students to help them pay their tuition fees (Chilundo 2003).

Private for-profit higher learning institutions provide high demand and relatively low cost, skill-based courses rather quickly. These institutions are free from the obligations that constrain other public institutions whose responsibilities span wider and broader national objectives. Private institutions also play an important role in serving as immediate safety-net in addressing the overwhelming need of higher learning in the continent whose over all enrollment rate in higher education institutions is very low. In some countries, such as South Africa, the private for-profit sector has come under scrutiny because of perceived problems of low quality offerings. The challenge of ensuring that the for-profit sector, and private higher education in general, contributes to national goals for higher education is considerable in a context where there are few constraints on these emerging institutions.

The courses taught in most private higher education institutions are generally similar across the continent and narrow in their program coverage. The most common ones are computer science and technology, accounting and management, banking, finance, marketing, and secretarial science. The courses are generally targeted toward the needs of the local market.

Most private institutions hire academic staff from public institutions. Characteristically, most of the academic staff continue to hold part-time positions in these public institutions. In some countries, the massive flow of academic staff from public institutions to newly established private institutions has seriously constrained certain departments in public universities. For many academic staff, however, these private teaching positions have become an important source of extra income.

The general trend, then, has been to moonlight at the newly established institutions while maintaining bases in major public universities. In some cases, lured by highly lucrative salaries and benefits, academic staff have been reported to join private institutions full-time by abandoning their public institutions. Unable to control this growing trend, some universities and departments enter into negotiations with academic staff whose disciplines tend to have an attractive market value at private teaching institutions and elsewhere.

There still looms a strong public perception across Africa that public institutions are academically better than private institutions—even when a few of the private institutions hire the best academic staff and maintain new and up-to-date instruments, equipment, and facilities. It is plausible that this prevalent attitude emanates from the rigorous selection process prior to enrollment and fierce competition for admission in limited, yet “free,” public universities. As student enrollment escalates across the continent, the entrance requirements for the limited spaces in public institutions have become increasingly rigorous so that those students that are admitted are clearly the nation’s best. In general, private institutions primarily enroll those students who cannot make it to public institutions—for numerous reasons—and that continues to affect the general perceptions of private institutions as secondary to public institutions.

Whereas the emergence of private higher education as a business enterprise is a growing phenomenon, a number of issues plague its development, including legal status, quality assurance, and cost of service. The status of many private postsecondary institutions in Africa is shady. Many operate without licenses, commensurate resources, or appropriate infrastructure. The quality of service by many is also shoddy, even at a few of the institutions that possess better equipment, newer buildings, and better facilities than the major universities in their country.

The quality of education at many private postsecondary institutions has also been an issue of some concern. Many multinational businesses across the world provide educational services today that are driven by profit motives. Multinational companies and a few foreign-based universities have established satellite campuses in countries where there is a big market for higher education.
These transplanted institutions are often criticized for lack of accountability or social responsibility and for potentially threatening and eroding the cultural fabric of a nation.

Private higher education is a growing trend in much of Africa and is being propelled by a variety of forces. The forces behind this private diversification and expansion are both internal and external. A thorough examination of the process of diversification of private institutions must take into account national as well as international economic, political, and educational realities.

Gender

Gender imbalance is a common phenomenon in the continent’s educational institutions. Cultural, sociological, economical, psychological, historical, and political factors foster these inequalities. While a number of efforts are now underway to rectify gender imbalances, much still remains to be done across all of the educational sectors. The gender imbalance in higher education is acute in virtually all African countries and in most disciplines. Various efforts and initiatives have been made to increase the participation of female students in postsecondary institutions.

- In Ethiopia, according to Habtamu Wondimu (2003), efforts have been made to improve the female enrollment rate—which has been only about 15 percent for the past several years—by lowering the cutoff in the grade point average required for admission. This “affirmative action,” he notes, has improved the admission rate of female students. The higher attrition rate among women, however, continues to plague the overall status and numbers of women in Ethiopian higher education.

- In Malawi, where only 25 percent of the student population is female, an affirmative selection policy for women has been implemented (Chimombo 2003).

- In Mozambique, the proportion of female students has gradually increased since 1992. The ratio between genders remained high (at the range of between 2.79 and 3.06) between 1990 and 1996 but fell to 2.45 and 2.59 in 1998 and 1999. This improvement was partly due to the opening of private higher education institutions, where, on average, 43 percent of all students enrolled in 1999 were female; only 25 percent of students enrolled were female in the public sector (Chilundo 2003).

- Most Tanzanian institutions have been taking steps to improve the participation of female students, who currently make up between 25 and 30 percent of enrolled students. The Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at the University of Dar es Salaam was able to register 49 percent females in the 2000–2001 first-year intake. As in Ethiopia, the grade-point-average cutoff point for female candidates has been lowered to enable more females to qualify for admission (Mkude and Cooksey 2003).

- Uganda’s gender disparity is reported to have decreased in the past ten years. Women constituted 27 percent of University of Makerere’s total student intake in 1990–1991 but today account for 34 percent of the enrollments. Like institutions in Ethiopia, Malawi, and Tanzania, Ugandan universities are giving preferential treatment to female students. With awarding of additional points, the proportion of female students enrolled has risen to 34 percent (Musisi 2003).

- In Zimbabwe, university entry qualifications have also been reduced to increase female enrollments (Maunde 2003).

Significant gender disparities remain, however, in the more competitive faculties and departments and in the hard sciences, where female student participation is particularly low. In Kenya, for instance, female students make up about 30 percent of total enrollments in the public universities but only 10 percent of enrollments in engineering and technically based professional programs (Ngome 2003). The female student population in the natural sciences across African public higher education is consistently lower than that of male students. The pattern appears to be a universal phenomenon around the world, though the proportion of the disparity across countries can and does differ significantly.
There are, however, examples of exceptions where female students outnumber their male compatriots in African countries. In Mauritius, even though overall enrollment shows a more or less even gender distribution (47 percent female), these enrollments do vary by gender across faculties, with a predominance of male students (76 percent) in the Faculty of Engineering and a predominance of female students (68 percent) in the Faculty of Social Studies and Humanities (Baichoo, Parahoo and Fagoonee 2003).

In Lesotho, more females than males are enrolled in education, social sciences, and humanities (arts) programs. Overall, the total number of females represents about 56 percent of all enrolled students in the University of Lesotho (Ntimo-Makara 2003). In Uganda, the private universities, Uganda Martyrs and Nkumba, report female student enrollments of over 50 and 56 percent respectively (Musisi 2003). In Tunisia, female student enrollments went from 21.1 percent in 1987–1988 to 50.4 percent in 1999–2000 and currently stands at 51.9 percent—the first time more women than men were enrolled at the university level (Millot, Waite and Zaieem 2003).

Female academic staff are even smaller in proportion than female students in African institutions. In Guinea, out of 1,000 academic staff members only twenty-five—a mere 2.5 percent—are female (Sylla 2003). Out of 2,228 academic staff in Ethiopia, 137—or 6 percent—are female (Wondimu 2003). In Congo, Nigeria, and Zambia, no more than 15 percent of all university academic staff is female. In Uganda, female academic staff occupy fewer than 20 percent of the established academic posts (Musisi 2003). In a few countries, the figures are a little better: Morocco, Tunisia, and South Africa, have 24, 33, and 36 percent female academic staff respectively (Ouakrime 2003; Millot, Waite and Zaieem 2003; Subotzky 2003). The underrepresentation of female academic staff in higher ranks and qualification levels and in certain fields of study is particularly severe. For instance, in 1997, men in South Africa constituted 90 percent of professors, 78 percent of associate professors, and 67 percent of senior lecturers, but only about 47 percent of the junior ranks (Subotzky 2003).

Overall, gender disparities are common trends across the continent’s higher education institutions. The disparity increases in magnitude as one climbs the educational ladder. The gravity of the disparity is most severe in the academic ranks with some variations in different fields and disciplines. Gender issues in African higher education are complex and require and deserve further study. As we discussed above, a variety of initiatives have been implemented to remedy this unhealthy scenario. While a few of these initiatives have been productive, others have yet to achieve any real change. These initiatives continue to be plagued by subtle resistance, implicit and explicit oversight, a lack of serious recognition, and ignorance.

**Research and Publishing**

Long before the world entered into what is being called the knowledge era, research was recognized as a central priority for higher education. Since the founding of the University of Berlin in 1810, research has been a defining element for many academic institutions and systems (Ben-David 1968; Ben-David 1977). In the increaselly global world that is largely being shaped by knowledge and information, establishing a strong research infrastructure has more than ever before become a sine qua non in this highly competitive world.

Universities, as creators and brokers of these products, are situated at the center of the knowledge and information supermarket. For all practical purposes, universities remain the most important institutions in the production and consumption of knowledge and information, particularly in the Third World. This is particularly so in Africa, where only a few such institutions serve as the preeminent and dominant centers of knowledge and information transactions.

By all measures, research and publishing activities in Africa are in critical condition. The general state of research in Africa is extremely poor, and its research infrastructure is inadequate. Scarcity of laboratory equipment, chemicals, and other scientific paraphernalia; a small number of high-level experts; poor and dilapidated libraries; alarmingly low and declining salaries of academic and research staff; a massive brain drain out of the academic institutions; the “expansion” of undergraduate education; poor oversight of research applicability; and declining, nonexistent, and unreliable sources of research funds all remain major hurdles to the development of research capacity across the continent.
Most countries in Africa have practically no funds allocated to research in the university budgets. Expenditures on research and development (R&D) in Ghana, for example, show a declining trend from around 0.7 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in the mid-1970s to 0.1–0.2 percent of the GDP in 1983–1987. There is little evidence to suggest that this trend has changed. Paul Effah (2003) reports that the University of Ghana received only US$1.4 million to fund the operations of its ten research institutes in 2000.

In Uganda, the amount earmarked for research at Makerere University for the financial year 1999–2000 was a mere US$80,000. As a consequence, research in the country has remained underdeveloped and heavily dependent on donor funding (Musisi 2003). In Malawi, a mere 0.7 percent of the whole University of Malawi budget was allocated to research and publications in 1999 (Chimombo 2003).

Tracking frontiers of knowledge is crucial for research and development. Having access to indicators of the knowledge frontiers, such as journals, periodicals, and databases, is a major prerequisite to undertaking viable, sustainable, and meaningful research. In much of Africa, these resources are either lacking or are extremely scarce. The escalating cost of journals and ever-dwindling library and university funds have exacerbated the problem. Many universities in Africa have dropped most of their subscriptions, while others have simply cancelled their subscriptions altogether. Such extreme measures cannot be surprising in light of the fact that some of these universities cannot even pay salaries on a regular basis.

The local publishing infrastructure has traditionally been weak and, generally, unreliable. The paucity of local publications is complicated by many factors, including the small number of researchers with the energy, time, funds, and support needed to sustain journals; the lack of qualified editors and editorial staff; a shortage of publishable materials; a restrictive environment that inhibits freedom of speech; and a lack of commitment to and appreciation of journal production by university administrators.

It is remarkable that even though the state of research in much of Africa remains precarious, many researchers report that academic promotion depends to a large extent on publishing. Even when the environment does not appear to support research, publishing, as a universal tool of measuring productivity, remains a yardstick for academic promotion in Africa. It is a stark contradiction that African academics are expected to publish their work in an academic context that does not even provide them with access to the journals, databases, and other publications that are vital in keeping abreast of international developments in science and scholarship (Teferra 2002).

Many of the research activities that are undertaken on the continent are largely funded and to a certain extent, managed and directed—by external agencies, such as bilateral and multilateral bodies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), foundations, and others. Estimates of the percentage of external support for research in Africa range from 70 percent to as much as 90 percent. The ramifications of this external funding, especially with regard to what is researched, are far reaching and have become the focus of discussions at numerous national, regional, and international forums.

Academic institutions in many countries are frequently linked by their participation in an international system of knowledge distribution. Universities in the large industrialized nations are the major producers and distributors of scholarly knowledge. Academic institutions in other countries, particularly in developing countries, are largely consumers of scholarly materials and research produced elsewhere.

It will be extremely difficult—perhaps even impossible—for Africa to compete effectively in a world increasingly dominated by knowledge and information unless it consciously, persistently, and vigorously overhauls its potential and its most crucial institutions: its universities. Africa should and must do much more to develop its universities—its only institutions that generate and utilize knowledge and information. The international knowledge system has centers and peripheries in the production and distribution of knowledge. Africa, as a continent, finds itself on the very edge of the knowledge periphery (Altbach 1987) and appears to be increasingly isolated from the center.

Research and publishing must be strengthened. Governments, major donor institutions, NGOs, and bilateral organizations should and must direct their policies toward prioritizing the revitalization of these important areas of African higher education if Africa is to cope effectively with the challenges of the present and the future. The current situation, in which donor agencies and international organizations fund the large proportion of Africa-based research, presents additional chal-
lenges. While it is unlikely that major research funding will be available from indigenous sources in the near future, it is important to ensure that the research that is taking place, regardless of the source of funding, meets the needs of African scientists and the broader interest of African societies.

**Academic Freedom**

Academic freedom makes it possible for new ideas, research, and opinions to emerge; for widely accepted views to be tested and challenged; and for critics to comment on and scrutinize the status quo. Academic freedom is an ideal that faces challenges all over the world. There is, however, little doubt that academic freedom is crucial in nurturing national academic and scholarly cultures. Ideally, academic freedom ensures that academics will be able to teach freely, undertake research of their own interest, and communicate findings and ideas openly and without any fear of persecution.

A civil society thrives on tolerance and freedom of expression. A country with robust freedom of expression allows a great variety of perspectives and views to be considered, entertained, and contested. Academic freedom is a crucial element of a civil society, and the development of a civil society is stunted in the absence of freedom of expression and academic freedom.

Most African governments are intolerant of dissent, criticism, nonconformity, and free expression of controversial, new, or unconventional ideas. Aman Attieh (2003) notes that since 1992 serious violations of freedom of speech and expression by security forces, opposition groups, and militant groups in Algeria have silenced not only scholars but also the citizens as a whole. In Kenya, Charles Ngome (2003) writes, unwarranted government interference and abuses of academic freedom have eroded the autonomy and quality of the higher learning institutions. The summary expulsion of over forty university professors and lecturers from Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia in the mid-1990s (Wondimu 2003) also epitomizes a gross violation of academic freedom and illustrates the intolerance of academic freedom that governments in many African countries have.

In such an environment, the academic community is often careful not to overtly offend those in power. This contributes to the perpetuation of a culture of self-censorship. Those who courageously speak their mind and express their views often find themselves facing dictators capable of using terror, kidnapping, imprisonment, expulsion, torture, and even death to silence dissident voices.

The stability of a culture of academic freedom in a nation is measured by that nation’s tolerance of open and frank debates, criticisms, and comments. As African countries slowly move away from one-party authoritarian and autocratic rule to elected democratic governments and leadership, it is hoped that academic freedom will eventually improve in African academic institutions. African universities have a special responsibility to build a culture of academic freedom in teaching, research, and learning, as well as in societal expression. Developing such a culture in the post-colonial context of political instability and dictatorship will prove a daunting task.

**The Brain Drain and the Issue of Capacity Building**

One of the most serious challenges facing many African countries is the departure of their best scholars and scientists away from universities. The flow away from domestic academe takes a form of internal mobility (locally) and regional and overseas migration. The term “brain drain” is frequently used to describe the movement of high-level experts from developing countries to industrialized nations. Much of the literature reflects this particular phenomenon—often pointing out its grave immediate and future consequences—within the context of capacity-building issues. In much of the literature on academic mobility, we read about the brain drain of academics in the context of migration overseas. The classification and the terms we use here reflect that idea of brain drain, and we are aware that the movement of high-level expertise is an area of much discussion and debate.

The internal mobility of scholars can be best described as the flow of high-level expertise from the universities to better-paying government agencies and private institutions and firms that may or may not be able to utilize their expertise and talent effectively. As the state of African
universities has deteriorated, academics have sought employment opportunities outside universities, consequently draining institutions of their faculty members. Major public institutions in many countries have lost significant numbers of their key faculty to emerging private higher education institutions and other commercially-oriented institutions, perhaps not only in their physical removal, but in terms of the time, commitment, and loyalty. In many countries, academic staff often hold more than one job outside the university to help ends meet and, as a consequence, may spread themselves too thin to fulfill their university responsibilities of teaching, research, and service.

Academic staff are also lured away by a variety of government agencies, where salaries are often better and the working environment more comfortable. In many cases, the salaries and benefits in universities are lower than comparative positions in and outside of the civil service. For instance, a comparative salary analysis in Ghana in 1993 revealed that salary levels in sectors such as energy, finance, revenue collection, and the media were all higher than those of the universities (Effah 2003).

In many of the emerging private institutions, salaries and benefits are rather handsome when compared to salaries and benefits in academe. In Ethiopia, for instance, a private college is reported to be paying academic staff a monthly salary as much as three times what a public university is paying. In Uganda, the migration of senior staff from tertiary institutions, especially from Makerere University, was of paramount concern in the early 1990s. The relative improvement of employment conditions, salaries, the standard of living, and fringe benefits to the academic staff, Nakanyike Musisi (2003) holds, have combined to halt this exodus and brain drain from Uganda. However, the growing and better-paid private sector and the higher-level civil service continue to lure seasoned academicians away from tertiary institutions. The internal brain drain, though rarely discussed, is nonetheless an issue of great importance to higher education. It is especially important because it is something that African countries can themselves at least partly solve.

Civil strife, political persecutions, and social upheavals instigated the massive exodus of highly trained personnel from countries such as Somalia, Liberia, Ethiopia, Togo, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria. Rwanda and Algeria have also seen systematic killings of academics and intellectuals because of their ethnicity and religious predilections.

Regional migration—academic migration to regional and neighboring countries—has also brought about serious shortages of high-level academics in some countries. Many academic departments have lost their preeminent faculty members to regional universities in other parts of Africa. For instance, several senior scholars from Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia, hold faculty positions at the University of Botswana. Southern African countries such as Zambia have also been complaining about the migration of their graduates and academic community to South Africa and Zimbabwe. Some have observed that expatriate Zambians staff entire departments in some institutions in these countries.

A 1998 study shows that in 1990, nearly 7,000 Kenyans with tertiary-level education migrated to the United States (Ngome 2003). In the same year, nearly 120 doctors were estimated to have emigrated from Ghana. Between 600 and 700 Ghanaian physicians, a number equal to about 50 percent of the total population of doctors remaining in the country, are known to be practicing in the United States alone (Sethi 2000); and yet, according to Paul Effah (2003), an analysis of existing vacancies in the tertiary institutions in Ghana indicates that about 40 percent of faculty positions in the universities and more than 60 percent of those in the polytechnics are vacant. Munzali Jibril (2003) reports that two-thirds of the 36,134 faculty position in Nigeria remain vacant.

Quoting several sources, Habtamu Wondimu (2003) describes the large number of Ethiopian academic staff who quit their teaching profession to take other jobs or go abroad for training or other reasons and do not come back. Though the number varies from institution to institution, the estimate of the brain drain from Ethiopian universities might be as much as 50 percent. In Eritrea, one of the critical bottlenecks to the university’s development plans, according to Cheryl Stemman Rule (2003), has been the shortage of qualified academic staff and its excessive dependence on expatriate staff.
In Rwanda, as Jolly Mazimhaka and G.F. Daniel (2003) report, skilled personnel and professionals have been either killed or have gone into exile, leaving a huge vacuum in the intellectual labor force, a phenomenon that has greatly affected every domestic sector and curbed the process of national development. Even before 1994, when the infamous genocide took place, many sectors of the national economy suffered from a serious shortage of professionals and management staff; the war and genocide have aggravated this situation.

Matora Ntimo-Makara (2003) points out that Lesotho’s capacity to retain highly trained personnel is low. The South African job market provides better salary packages, and many leave. Lesotho’s institutional capacity is eroded as a result. Students from Lesotho who study at and graduate from South African institutions seldom return home upon completion of their studies and instead take positions in South Africa. In Swaziland, according to Margaret Zoller Booth (2003), not only has the flight of schoolteachers created a negative climate for educational progress but the university has also suffered from the exodus of professors seeking better positions in other countries, particularly South Africa. To curb this problem, a review is being considered to improve conditions for the academics and staff.

Academics and other professionals in Nigeria have migrated to other countries, most notably the United States, South Africa, Botswana, Saudi Arabia, and member countries of the European Union. According to Munzali Jibril (2003), it is estimated that there are at least 10,000 Nigerian academics and 21,000 Nigerian doctors in the United States alone.

Reports indicate that many of the best and most experienced academics from South Africa are migrating to Australia, Britain, Canada, the United States, and other developed countries. It is ironic that while several countries complain about the loss of their highly skilled labor to South Africa, South Africa itself bemoans its loss of talent to other countries. It is useful to understand this “hopping” phenomenon in discerning the effects of brain-drain issues nationally, regionally, and internationally.

The causes of migration—be it regional or international—are a complex phenomenon. The reasons why scholars migrate or decide to stay abroad are products of a complex blend of economic, political, social, cultural, and psychological factors. The impact and chemistry of each factor varies from country to country and individual to individual and fluctuates with time— even for the same individual (Teferra 2000).

While African countries and many major regional, international, and nongovernmental organizations have tried to stem massive movements of African expertise, the results of these efforts are far from satisfactory. Even though various attempts have been made to stem the brain drain, efforts were rarely made to tap the expertise of immigrant communities at their new places of residence. As communication technology is slowly expanding across Africa and physical distance is becoming a less serious obstacle, an active policy of mobilizing the remotely stationed intellectual capital and vital resource of migrated nationals needs to be given more emphasis (Teferra 2000).

Africa is not alone in seeking to stem the brain drain. Developing countries on other continents and, indeed, many industrialized countries have also sought to minimize the migration of talent in an increasingly globalized labor market. These efforts have largely been unsuccessful. Migration from poorer to wealthier countries is commonplace, as is migration from smaller and less cosmopolitan academic systems to larger and more central systems. At present, there is a small exodus from the United Kingdom to the United States and several other countries because of lower academic salaries in Britain. The international migration of highly educated people is by no means limited to Africa. It is a worldwide and perhaps unprecedented phenomenon.

The challenges to capacity building in African institutions also emanate from health-related problems. Recent studies indicate that the impact of HIV/AIDS has taken its toll on the academics and students, and the scourge of this disease on African academic institutions is massive. The levels of sickness and death among faculty members from this disease have added to the teaching, financial, and administrative burdens already facing the rest of the academic community (Kelly 2001).

Social upheavals, political instabilities, economic uncertainties, real and perceived persecutions, and poor working and living conditions are often the most common variables facing the migratory
community. Most African countries are yet unable to rid themselves of these economic, social, and political hurdles that drive away many of their highly qualified and trained experts.

Language of Instruction

More than half a dozen languages are currently in use in African higher education. These include Afrikaans, Arabic, English, French, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish. Only Arabic and, arguably, Afrikaans are languages indigenous to Africa. Overall, Arabic, English, French, and Portuguese remain the major international languages of instruction at African higher learning institutions. At a time when globalization has become such a powerful force, the dominant position of European languages has become even more accentuated and evident. English has become particularly powerful, even dominating over other major European languages. The predominance of English is fueled by, among other things, the Internet and globalization.

In some African countries, languages struggle for dominance in the higher education sector. There is an interesting trend toward a transition in the language used as the instructional medium in Rwanda, for instance, where the core of the leadership in government and power is changing. This is also the case in Sudan, where the political predilections are shifting, and in Equatorial Guinea and, to some extent, Somalia, where perceived socioeconomic benefits appear to be dictating the choice of language for instruction. South Africa is discussing the future of Afrikaans as a language of higher education in a context of English domination. Language remains a volatile social issue in many African countries.

The development of vernacular languages into an instructional medium in higher education will continue to be confronted by numerous issues, including:

- the multiplicity of languages on the continent
- the controversy surrounding the identification and delegation of a particular language as a medium of instruction
- the developmental stages of languages for use in writing and publications
- a paucity of published materials
- poor vocabularies and grammatical conventions of indigenous languages that make it difficult to convey ideas and concepts
- a poor infrastructure for producing, publishing, translating, and developing teaching materials locally, and
- the pressures of globalization.

African universities rely on the knowledge system that has been conceived, developed, and organized based on Western languages. The Western world produces the majority of knowledge conveyed in those languages. African universities do not have the capacity to generate enough knowledge of their own, nor do they have the capacity and infrastructure to process and translate existing ones virtually from the Western world—yet. Most books, journals, databases, and other resources that are used in higher education institutions are imported, and these are communicated in Western languages. In the age of the Internet, globalization, and expanding knowledge systems, which are all driven by a few Western languages, no country can afford to remain shielded in a cocoon of isolation brought about by language limitations. Such isolation would prove both disastrous and, likely, impossible to achieve.

Many charge that the use of European languages in higher education in Africa has contributed to the decline of African higher education and the alienation of academe from the majority of the population. Others have argued that the use of metropolitan languages has contributed to national unity. Language conflict is by no means limited to Africa. It is a central issue in many developing countries as well as in a number of multilingual industrialized nations. Canada, for example, faced the possibility of the secession of the province of Quebec because of largely linguistic conflicts.
Language also remains an issue of tension in Belgium, and it will remain one of the most significant challenges facing African academic development.

**Student Activism**

Student activism is prevalent in many African countries. Students have protested alleged social, economic, cultural, political, and personal injustices, and they are vocal in defending their interests and benefits. Student protests about poor student services, delay of stipends, and/or removal of perquisites and benefits are dominant confrontational issues in many African countries today.

As universities have been forced to cut budgets and resource rationalization has become a reality, students have fought fiercely to maintain elements of the status quo. While students have been known to fight vigorously to ensure the continuation of their benefits or resist an increase in tuition and fees, they have not been much concerned about issues of academic quality or the curriculum. Self-interest seems to be the dominant force driving student unrest in Africa today.

University protests have led to government instability and have played different roles in political power shifts. In a few cases, they have even toppled governments. When such protests take place, officials conscious of their possible consequences take them seriously—often brutally crushing and subduing them. Hundreds of students have been seriously hurt, imprisoned, persecuted, and even killed during protests in Africa. According to a study by Federici and Caffentzis (2000), there were over a total of 110 reported student protests in Africa between the years 1990 and 1998. This study demonstrates that government responses to student protests were “inhumane,” “brutal,” and “excessively cruel.”

Student protests are generally perceived as a reflection of the grievances of the wider community. As civil societies are slowly developed and opposition groups become legitimized and tolerated in Africa, it will be interesting to track how these protests are perceived and how they are going to evolve.

**Conclusion**

That African higher education faces severe challenges is unquestionable. This essay has provided a discussion of some of the key problems evident throughout the continent at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The problems are difficult and may even be getting worse as the pressure for academic and institutional expansion comes into conflict with limited resources. Continuing political instability exacerbates the economic decline seen in many African countries, yet there are signs of progress as well. The emergence of democratic political systems and of civil society is positive. The revival of academic freedom and the commitment by many in the higher education community to build successful institutions despite difficult circumstances shows the viability of academic systems. A recent recognition—by the international community, particularly the leading donor agencies and major lending institutions—that African higher education is a vital area for development is also positive. African higher education is at a turning point. Recognition of the aforementioned problems can lead to positive solutions with proper planning and effective leadership.

**Note**

References


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PART V

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BEYOND NATIONAL STATES, MARKETS, AND SYSTEMS OF HIGHER EDUCATION: A Glonacal Agency Heuristic

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Abstract

This paper offers an overarching analytical heuristic that takes us beyond current research, anchored in conceptions of national states, markets, and systems of higher education institutions. We seek to shape comparative higher education research with regard to globalization in much the same way that Clark’s (1983) “triangle” heuristic has framed comparative higher education research in the study of national policies and higher education systems. Our “glonacal agency heuristic” points to three intersecting planes of existence, emphasizing the simultaneous significance of global, national, and local dimensions and forces. It combines the meaning of “agency” as an established organization with its meaning as individual or collective action. Our paper critiques the prevailing framework in cross-national higher education research, addressing the liberal theory that underpins this framework, the ways scholars address the rise of neo-liberal policies internationally, conceptual shortcomings of this work, and emergent discourse about “academic capitalism”. We then discuss globalization and our heuristic. Finally, we provide examples of how states, markets, and institutions can be reconceptualized in terms of global, national, regional, and local agencies and agency.

Keywords: academic capitalism, comparative education, globalization, markets, methodologies, nation-state, neo-liberalism.

Introduction

Globalization processes in higher education are under-studied and under-theorized. Although there is much comparative research, the dominant analytical framework for higher education scholars concentrates attention on governmental policies of the nation-state and on national systems of higher education. Studies map out developments in terms of coordinates such as the relationship between

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national governments and higher education institutions, the impact of governmental policies on that relationship, the structure of national systems, and the role of market pressures such as student and employer demands in those systems. Most comparative higher education research foregrounds national states, national markets, and national systems of higher education. It offers cross-national comparisons of national patterns. Global forces are not so much analyzed or theorized as they are identified. Thus, scholars note that across countries there is a push for higher education to be more efficient, self-sufficient, and accountable, but there is little analysis of what global forces promote the pattern.

In our view, the world in which we now live takes us beyond the conceptual confines of current comparative higher education scholarship. Today, higher education in every corner of the globe is being influenced by global economic, cultural, and educational forces, and higher education institutions themselves (as well as units and constituencies within them), are increasingly global actors, extending their influence across the world. Moreover, the political, economic, and educational contours of countries (and of regions and continents) are being reshaped by regional trading blocs that lead higher education to become more similar across national boundaries and more active in regional markets. Finally, at the same time these global forces press upon higher education, the legitimacy of nation states and of national higher education systems that express national cultures are being challenged by movements to preserve and promote local cultural identity and independence. The prevailing model and concepts neither capture nor explain these dimensions of higher education.

We are not alone in our critique of the literature. A 1996 special issue of *Higher Education* provides critiques by several top comparative higher education scholars suggesting that there is a need to utilize new conceptual categories and develop new conceptual frameworks to explain transnational activities and forces in higher education (Clark 1996; Kogan 1996; Neave 1996; Teichler 1996). A recent special section of *Higher Education* (Vol. 41(4)) takes important steps in that direction, with articles (Tierney 2001; Stromquist 2001; Slaughter 2001) that draw on three of significant developments and traditions in social science—postmodernism, feminism, and political economy/political sociology—to frame future comparative study of higher education. Moreover, this current special issue of *Higher Education* provides empirical explorations of globalization, enabling a further advance of the field’s conceptual boundaries.

Informed by the above work we fashion an analytical heuristic that takes us beyond current models anchored in conceptions of national states, markets, and systems of higher education institutions. We aim to conceptualize and shape comparative higher education research with regard to globalization in much the same way that Clark’s (1983) “triangle” heuristic, extended by Becher and Kogan (1992), and by Kogan and Hanney (2000), has framed comparative higher education research in the study of national policies and higher education systems. Not unlike the three points on Clark’s triangle (professional/collegial, governmental/managerial, and market), our approach points to three intersecting planes of existence, emphasizing the simultaneous significance of global, national, and local dimensions and forces. Not unlike the combination of structure and activity evident in Clark’s concepts (e.g., “professional/collegial”), our approach combines the meaning of “agency” as an established organization (such as the World Bank) with its meaning as individual or collective action (i.e., human agency). Thus, we denote our approach a “glonal agency” heuristic.

Before elaborating our heuristic, we critique the prevailing framework in cross-national higher education research. We address the liberal theory that underpins it, the ways scholars address the rise of neo-liberal policies internationally, conceptual shortcomings of this work, and emergent discourse about “academic capitalism”. We then discuss globalization and our heuristic. Finally, we provide examples of how states, markets, and institutions can be reconceptualized in terms of global, regional, national, and local agencies and agency.

**Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism, and Shortcomings of Higher Education Studies**

*Liberal theory.* Liberal theory presents the state and the market as separate from and in opposition to each other (Smith 1776/1979; Hayek 1980). The market is understood as a terrain of natural private freedom that is prior to the state, and that functions according to natural laws. Such assumptions are deeply embedded in Western cultures (particularly Anglo-American ones), and have shaped higher
education studies, in which much of the analytical focus and policy debate turns on the antinomies of nation-state regulation and higher education institutional and systemic autonomy. Thus, scholars typically characterize national systems of higher education in terms of a zero-sum balance of state and market control (Neave and Van Vught 1991, 1994). The more there is of one, the less there is of the other. Countries are classified on a continuum between state and market control.

Clark (1983) extended this model to include a third point in space, professional-collegial control. Countries are identified in two-dimensional space on an equilateral triangle defined by the points of state, market, and professional control (see Figure 1). Moving towards one is moving away from the others. The focus is on governance and policy. The triangle model is a heuristic for studying, comparing, and classifying national higher education systems according to the influence of nation states, national markets, and national professions in them.

Clark provides an additional schema for classifying professional-collegial control that consists of six formal layers of governance ranging from the basic academic unit to the nation state (Becher and Kogan 1980; Clark 1978). Thus, one can classify the professional-collegial control in a national higher education system in terms of where that influence is located organizationally: in departments or chairs/institutes; faculties or colleges; universities; multi-campus systems; state governments; and national ministries. Analytical attention is focused on the national character of formal political structures of institutions and government.

Neo-liberal policies. The worldwide proliferation of neo-liberal policies further reinforces scholars’ bipolar focuses on states versus higher education institutions, and states versus markets. The neo-liberal pattern is to reduce state subsidization of higher education, shift costs to “the market” and consumers, demand accountability for performance, and emphasize higher education’s role in the economy (Neave and Van Vught 1991). Higher education institutions are conceptualized as being embedded not only in a nation state and national system, but in a national marketplace. Studies focus on the impact of state policy on universities’ independence or on universities’ involvement in and responsiveness to national markets. With regard to the former, much recent scholarship focuses on changing relations between national ministries and higher education institutions (Gornitzka 1999; Kogan and Hanney 2000; Salter and Tapper 1994). With regard to the latter, scholars have focused on universities’ entrepreneurial activity in and adaptation to external markets (Clark 1998; Slaughter and Leslie 1997; Sporn 1999). U.S. scholars have emphasized the emerging and growing private sectors of higher education that introduce market influences into national systems (Geiger 1986; Levy 1986). Australian scholars have emphasized the role of the state in structuring more market-like conditions for higher education systems and institutions, a neo-liberal paradox of “steering from a distance” (Marginson 1997; Meek et al. 1996), even as those same governments, defined by some as “evaluative” states (Neave 1998) increase their demands on higher education for accountability. Finally, in this context some scholars have studied the concurrent weakening of professional control vis-à-vis managerial control in higher education institutions (Currie and Newson 1998; Marginson and Considine 2000; Rhoades 1998).
Conceptual shortcomings and exceptions. Several shortcomings define the literature. The field lacks a framework for conceptualizing agencies and processes that extend beyond the nation state. In addition, for all the discussion of national states and markets, there is limited analysis of the complex agencies and processes that define them. Finally, in all the attention devoted to the general national character of higher education systems and of organizations within them, there is too little exploration of local demands and variations within nations, and of the ways in which local institutions extend their activities beyond national boundaries.

Current conceptualizations of comparative higher education lack a global dimension. Scholars note the prominence of neo-liberal reform across nations, but there is little theorizing about or empirical analysis of the inter-national and/or regional agencies and activities through which these common policy changes are effected (by “regional” we refer to a supra-national entity, not to regions within a country). The global is not a problem for study; it is invoked as a residual explanation for observed commonalities across countries. What forces push one nation after another to adopt various neo-liberal policies in higher education, such as introducing tuition? What agencies and mechanisms have led to the introduction of similar quality assurance efforts and increasingly common degree structures from one national system to the next? The field needs to enrich our understanding of global political and economic forces that shape national higher education systems, and the global dimensions and influences of those national states and higher education systems themselves.

In addition, despite a conceptual model that focuses on nation states and national markets, most comparative higher education studies offer limited exploration of national governments and markets. In Clark’s (1996, p. 418) words, the research agenda “attends too much to the surface of current events, particularly to passing debates about formal policies and the enactment of laws.” Scholars focus more on the outputs of the administrative state than on processes and structures of the legislative and judicial branches (Rhoades 1992). Although there are exceptions (see Kogan and Hanney 2000), we know far too little about the distinctive mechanisms and operation of different nation states. What is their position within regional and international politics, and what balance between national traditions and regional/international trends is expressed in their policies? Similarly, little comparative higher education research examines the distinctive nature of different national economies, of their impact on nation states, and their position in relation to regional and international economies. Scholars note the subordination of educational to economic policies and concerns (Neave 1988), but with some exceptions (see Altbach and Selvaratnam 1989; Marginson 1997; Rhoades and Smart 1996; Slaughter 1990), we know far too little about the economic agencies, structures, forces, and actors that impact nation states and higher education policies in different countries; and the international position and role of national markets of goods and services, and of students, professionals, and graduates. Finally, little comparative higher education research considers the human agency that shapes nation states and higher education policies. Policies are about the mobilization of partisan politics, shaped by various interest groups and social movements, organized efforts by social classes and other groups to shape social opportunity. We know too little about this dimension of politics, the contest by social groups to shape and be served by national higher education systems.

A further conceptual shortcoming of the literature is that it fails to adequately address the local dimension, including the global activity of local institutions and agents. In Clark’s (1996, p. 418) words again, “Largely pursuing macro trends and structures, it has undervalued micro dynamics and determinants.” Much of the literature focuses on policies, remaining suspended at the level of the state, overlooking local responses and variations. As Kogan (1996, p. 397) notes, policy analyses “fail to have much force” if they lack “very fine grained analyses” of change in classrooms, departments, and institutions, in the actual practices of academics (see also Teichler 1993). Research builds on Cerych and Sabatier’s (1986) effort to develop cross-national generalizations regarding higher education reforms. National systems and reforms are cast in terms of universal, ideal types and models of reform. Yet, in Teichler’s (1996, p. 251) words, it should be possible, even as we note “the global spread of standardized educational models,” to perceive “persistent peculiarities of higher educational systems and distinct national political options.” Policy analyses should attend to policy implementation at various levels, down to the professionals who enact and formulate policies in the ways that they ration their time and organize their activity. We need work that attends to local response and reality, explores local institutions, and considers local
practices. More than that, we need to study how local actors and institutions extend their activities to the international stage. In what ways do local universities and departments move in international circles, not just subject to international forces, but being subjects that exercise influence regionally and globally?

*Academic capitalism.* Recent studies of “academic capitalism” take a step towards investigating global mechanisms in higher education. Slaughter and Leslie (1997) see the global economy as increasingly commodifying students, faculty, and intellectual products. Yet, their empirical focus is on national policies and funding patterns, not global agencies and agency. And in identifying a global pattern of privatization in academe they understate national and local forces that push higher education’s continued performance of public, not-for-profit functions. Universities have not been reduced to businesses. If the profit motive has been inscribed in these not-for-profit entities, higher education institutions nevertheless continue to be many-sided entities performing a wide variety of roles for various constituencies. They are public and private, spanning the boundaries between these sectors and performing functions for each. Even as universities pursue technology transfer to private sector enterprises, they also continue to prepare public service professionals who staff and perform the educational and social service functions of the state. Even as close to the market fields such as computer science grow, students continue to be prepared in far from the market fields such as history. In nearly every country, universities still receive substantial funding from government sources (from 40–80% in industrialized countries) to fulfill public purposes, including the provision of subsidized higher education to a growing proportion of the national population.

The metaphor of academic capitalism reveals a powerful global trend but blinds us to the power of national traditions, agencies, and agents in shaping the work of higher education, as well as to the local agency exercised by students, faculty, non-faculty professionals, and administrators, pursuing prestige, knowledge, social critique, and social justice. In two regards, academic capitalism requires fuller conceptual development at the local level. First, higher education institutions are changing their internal management systems and governance. If Slaughter and Leslie speak to some implications of academic capitalism for managing universities, we must look to others for more in-depth treatment of changes in and struggles in regard to the management and control of academic work (Currie and Newson 1998; Marginson and Considine 2000; Rhoades 1998). Second, although Slaughter and Leslie argue that national policies promote academic capitalism among faculty and universities, they do not detail the global extent and scope of universities’ competitive activities. To what extent, for instance, do students become the focus of global competition (Rhoades and Smart 1996)? To what extent do universities market their programs internationally? To what extent do they establish international outposts of educational activity? We see universities as increasingly global actors, extending their influence internationally. They are globally, nationally, and locally implicated. Those multiple realities are central to our glonal agency heuristic.

**Globalization and Our “Glonacal Agency” Heuristic**

*Globalization.* Inter-national influences in higher education have existed from the origins of formal higher education. The flow of students and professors across national borders took place from the earliest days of universities in continental Europe and the Arab world. So, too, the trans-national influence of specific dominant institutions and models on higher education has long been a key to understanding national higher education systems. The Catholic Church is a powerful example of global influence in the structural and ideological underpinnings of higher education. Over time, other imperial models of higher education gained influence, often through powerful (militarily and economically) nation states. The effects of British and French models are plain in former colonies; the Bonapartist model also shaped universities in Spanish-speaking America. The effects of the German model are equally evident in the U.S. and throughout Europe and Scandinavia. Most recently, the U.S. model, based on mixed public-private provision and mixed public-private funding of autonomous institutions, is a prominent force shaping the higher education systems and institutions of various countries.

We do not, then, see “globalization” as a new phenomena. In a field focused conceptually on the nation-state we simply argue that global forces and processes have a major and growing
impact on higher education systems and should be a focal point of theorizing and empirical study. We use the term “globalization” to mean “becoming global,” to refer to the development of increasingly integrated systems and relationships beyond the nation. Such systems and relationships are more than economic: they are also technological, cultural and political (Appadurai 1996; Held et al. 1999). As much as anything, globalization is the shrinkage of distance and time-delay in communications and travel, leading to increasingly extensive and intense global relations. In the current context, it makes sense to go beyond nation states and national markets and institutions/systems in studying globalization and higher education (Marginson and Mollis, forthcoming).

A glonacal agency heuristic. We offer a “glonacal agency” heuristic for comparative higher education research. One of our aims is to advance the significance of studying global phenomena. Yet we do not see such phenomena as universal or deterministic in their effects; thus, we also feature the continued significance of the national dimension. Further, as we do not see either global or national phenomena as totalizing in their effects, we feature the significance of the local dimension. For these reasons, we construct the term, “glonacal,” which is phonetically pronounced, glow-nackal. The particular pronunciation depends on the type of English one speaks: it sounds different when spoken in one author’s California U.S. English, versus in the other author’s Melbourne Australian English. Indeed, the pronunciation clarifies the significance of the global (English), national (U.S. and Australia), and local (California and Melbourne) dimensions of existence.2

With the second term in our heuristic, “agency,” we emphasize two meanings of the word. First, we utilize agency in the sense of an entity or organization that could exist at the global, national, or local level. There are international organizations such as the World Bank (or regional entities such as the European Union). There are also governmental units within nation states such as Ministries of Education and national legislatures. And there are local entities such as individual institutions of higher education. Each of these is an agency. Yet there is a second meaning of the term that refers to the ability of people individually and collectively to take action (exercise agency), at the global, national, and local levels. For example, there are international professional groups that extend across national boundaries, such as associations of physicists (and of higher education policy analysts), which shape national policy and local practice. There are also national groups such as Committees of Rectors or of Vice-Chancellors, and business-higher education forums, that work to influence national policy and local institutional practices. And there are local collectivities such as professors and administrators in a department or institution that influence local practice and undertake initiatives for their units to compete in international higher education markets. Each of these groups has agency. In short, at each level—global, national, and local—there are formal agencies and collective human actions that are central to understanding globalization and higher education.

In presenting our glonacal agency heuristic, we emphasize the intersections, interactions, mutual determinations of these levels (global, national, and local) and domains (organizational agencies and the agency of collectivities). We do not see a linear flow from the global to the local; rather, we see simultaneity of flows. In the stories that we want to offer and facilitate about higher education we do not see global agencies and agency as fully defining national and local agencies and agency. National and local entities and collective efforts can undermine, challenge and define alternatives to global patterns; they can also shape the configuration of global flows. At every level—global, national, and local—elements and influences of other levels are present. A glonacal agency approach leads us to trace these elements and domains.

The latter point is critical to understanding how we intend for our heuristic to be utilized. As noted earlier, there are similarities between our approach and Clark’s (1983) triangle model: both have three dimensions of existence and dual domains of structure and action. However, the aims of the two heuristics are different. It might be natural for readers to use our heuristic as Clark’s triangle has been used, to classify countries in a fixed typology of influence—in our case, to identify their place in an international hierarchy of nations. But that would tend to perpetuate an ongoing focus on the nation state, ignoring the global and glossing over the local. The aim of our heuristic is to foster exploration and analysis of types and patterns of influence and activity, to reconceptualize social relations and actions globally, nationally and locally.
Thus, our glonacal agency heuristic can be pictured not as a triangle in two-dimensional space, but as a set of interconnected hexagons in three-dimensional space. These interrelated crystals represent a constellation of agencies and agency in a global system (see Figure 2).

The six sides of the central hexagon that is pictured represent the basic building blocks of our heuristic: global agencies, global human agency, national agencies, national human agency, local agencies, and local human agency. In addition, the figure provides three other hexagons, representing the foregrounding of any one of the three levels in our heuristic, as we move beyond nation state, national markets, and national systems/institutions of higher education. The six sides of these more specified hexagons again represent the basic building blocks of our heuristic: global government and non-governmental agencies, human agency in global polities, global economic agencies and markets, human agency in global economies, global educational and professional agencies, and human agency in higher education. It should be evident that one can go into greater and greater depth in the analysis, generating additional hexagons specifying, for example, multiple agencies of and agency in the nation state, or multiple agencies of and agency in local colleges and universities. The heuristic encourages a focus on specific organizations and collective action rather than overgeneralized conceptions of polities and states, economies and markets, or higher education systems and institutions.

Figure 2. Glonacal Agency Heuristic
In beginning to conceptualize and theorize multiple levels and domains, as well as multiple agencies and agency, we start by posing the connections and flows as marked by *reciprocity*. We then pose other dimensions of the activity and influence of organizational agencies and collective human action: *strength, layers and conditions, and spheres.* These dimensions are represented in our hexagonal figure(s) as follows.

*Reciprocity* refers to the idea that activity and influence generally flow in more than one direction. Consider the international migration of students. In some countries, such as the U.S. and Australia, there is a greater influx of students from other countries than there is an outflow of a nation’s students to other countries. Yet the flow of influence is different than the flow of students.

By educating students from other countries, American and Australian universities are participating in global markets, thereby impacting those countries, whether the students return (with their American/Australian ideas) or not (then the impact is a brain drain). At the same time, the local American and Australian universities are themselves impacted by the global flow of students. There is reciprocal influence not only among countries, but also among the global, national, and local agencies and human agency, which are interconnected and interactive.

Our hexagon heuristic encourages conceptual focus on the reciprocal interconnections among the various domains, and among agencies and human agency. It suggests a two-way, not a unidirectional pattern. A hexagon is non-hierarchical, in contrast to a triangular pyramid. The global sides of the hexagon are not “above” the national and local sides—the hexagon can be rotated in any direction. Moreover, its sides are connected to one another, in two ways. The first connection is on the outside of the figure. A second connection is through lines of activity and influence between the six hexagonal points, which may, for example, directly link the top and bottom sides of the hexagon. Arrows signify the direction of influence.

*Strength* refers to the magnitude and directness of the activity and influence, as well as the resources available to agencies and agents. Links between levels and domains may be stronger or weaker, more direct or indirect. For example, in the case of an international agency such as a consortium of institutions surrounding the North American Free Trade Agreement, the influence may be fairly modest and indirect. By virtue of belonging to the consortium, institutions in different countries may develop relationships and agreements regarding the professional development of staff in Mexican universities (by getting advanced training and degrees from U.S. and Canadian universities) and the exchange of students and faculty among the three countries. Given the limited numbers of people and institutions concerned, the effects may be relatively modest. And the consortium’s influence is indirect. Of course, it is important to determine the basis of strength in terms of the economic, cultural, or political resources of an agency or a group. For example, the ability of some private universities in the U.S. to achieve global influence is clearly influenced by the vast material resources that are available to them.

Within our hexagon dimensions of strength are portrayed in two ways. First, direct influence is identified by a solid line between two domains of the hexagon; indirect influence is identified by a dotted line. Second, strength is conveyed by the thickness of the line—from one layer of thickness to multiple layers, suggesting a stronger connection.

*Layers and conditions* refer to the historically embedded structures on which current activity and influence are based, and the current circumstances that make it possible for lines of force and effect to move from one level to another, global, national, and local. For example, in the case of a national agency such as the Ford Foundation, the influence it has in shaping policy and practice in the U.S. and Mexico by philanthropically sponsoring models and curricula is layered on top of historically embedded structures and practices. In the U.S., universities have been shaped by models of colleges and universities in England and Germany, which themselves were built on a foundation of feudal systems of work and authority. In Mexico, universities have been shaped by Spanish and Napoleonic models, and by Mexico gaining independence. In addition to historically embedded layers, there are current conditions that affect agencies and agency. In the case of a global agency such as the World Bank, the influence it has in shaping national policy and practice is dependent on economic structures and circumstances, including the structure and condition of global, national, and local economies, as well as the existence of managers and professionals trained in various practices. Policies that encourage universities to generate revenues through privatization will be more effective in economies in which there is a sufficient availability of private wealth. The point is that
higher education institutions, systems, and countries have long histories shaped through centuries of sedimentation of ideas, structures, resources, and practices. Contemporary agencies and agency generally do not sweep all this away; their influence and activity is layered on top of powerful and resilient structures and commitments. It is also contingent upon and shaped by a range of current structural conditions.

In our hexagonal heuristic, the layers and conditions can be seen as lying within the external boundaries of the figure. Indeed, the outside lines of global, national, and local agency and agencies are in some sense constructed on embedded internal structure formed of various strata of historical layers and current conditions. Thus, the layers and conditions can be represented as part of the internal crystalline structure of the hexagon.

A final dimension is the spheres of agency and of agencies’ activity, which refers to the geographical and functional scope of activity and influence. For example, in the case of an international agency, what parts of the world does it operate in, and what aspects of higher education does it impact? Or in the case of a local agency such as the Education College of a university, to what parts of the world do its webs of activity and influence reach, and in what ways does it impact the world beyond its own borders?

Here, the three-dimensional configuration of the hexagonal crystals is useful. It should help the reader conceptualize each of the levels and domains across space. In identifying a global, national, or local agency, our heuristic should trigger the question, what is the volume, the extent of this agency’s reach, how much space in the world does this agency encompass?

A last point about our three-dimensional hexagonal heuristic is worth emphasizing. Although our figure presents each hexagon as similar in form, this is but an abstract model. In practice, we would expect the structures that are generated by our heuristic to be distinctive, in various ways, depending on the issue and settings in question, just as crystals are similar in general form but distinctive in their particular configuration. Most obviously, different spheres of activity and influence will make for smaller or more expansive hexagons. Similarly, depending on the particular issue and setting the hexagon will have a different internal crystalline structure of layers and conditions. So, too, the strength of the internal (fault) lines and connections will vary, as will their directional flow or reciprocity. We fully expect, then, that there will be differences in the particular hexagons that are generated from future empirical work. At the same time, we expect that there will be patterns to these differences, which can be the focus of propositions and hypotheses, leading to further empirical work and theorizing. In other words, the conceptual structure, the building blocks of our glonal agency heuristic, are a starting point for triggering and guiding inquiry in comparative higher education, for elaborating new understandings of higher education phenomena.

Applying Our Glonal Agency Heuristic: Moving Beyond (and below) National States, Markets, and Institutions

In this section of the paper we walk the reader through examples of how our “glonal agency” heuristic can be applied, illustrating how it takes us beyond nation states, national markets, and national higher education institutions and systems. In developing our examples we aim to feature and frame phenomena and conceptualizations that can guide future study.

Beyond nation states. The growing and changing potency of the global and the local has implications for nation states and national policy making in higher education. It leads us to rethink the relationship between universities and national governments, to extend our analysis of their negotiations upward to the regional and global level (and downward to the local level). In short, there are polities above the nation state.

The state of comparative higher education research in this regard is conveyed by a 1999 special issue of Higher Education, on “Changes in Higher Education and its Societal Context.” One of the articles in the issue (Gornitzka 1999) seeks to generate a theoretical framework for analyzing organizational change in eight Western European countries. Two other articles (Harman 1999; Henkel 1999) present country based studies of changes that are emerging throughout the world. Each represent an important contribution to the literature, and at the same time reveals the
limitations of scholarship focused on nation-states. Gornitzka draws on resource dependency and institutional theory to fashion schemata of different models of states and state pressures. Yet she stops at the nation state, overlooking the fact that the “normative environment” that shapes what is valued goes beyond the nation state. What is defined as a viable higher education policy or university structure in one European nation is shaped by the policies and structures of other European nations, or of countries outside of Europe. Historically, the German model was a defining force for several of the countries Gornitzka considers—e.g., Austria, Finland, the Netherlands, and Norway; whereas currently, the U.S. model has considerable normative influence. Such global issues are left unconsidered. Similarly, Henkel and Harman point to significant restructuring of research activity and evaluation in the U.K. and Australia. Henkel (1999) tracks the modernization and stratification of research and higher education in the U.K., detailing the effects of the Research Assessment Exercise. The stories the articles tell are important ones. Yet the reader is left asking, why? What global mechanisms and processes helped lead to the introduction of the RAE, and similar efforts elsewhere? In opening, Harman (1999) hints at a connection, noting that the changes he traces in Australia can be found in many other OECD countries. That international agency is not the subject of Harman’s careful empirical study of academic links to industry. But it could serve as a starting point for studying global patterns.

Our global agency heuristic suggests that scholars need to explore polities above the level of the nation state. These can be governmental collectivities—e.g., regional trading blocs and associations such as the European Union or the North American Free Trade Agreement—or non-governmental organizations, such as OECD or the World Bank. Scholars need to study the ways in which these polities impact nation states’ policies and local practices. They need to consider hierarchies within regional trading blocs, the differential influence of different nations on the work of international agencies such as the World Bank, and the ways in which local and national agencies and agency influence international agencies and agency.

Several of the articles in this special issue address the role of the World Bank and of trading blocs. Each of these entities have influenced national policies about: access and tuition (the World Bank’s structural adjustment policies, and the industrialized world’s neo-liberal policies promoted by regional trading blocs); degree programs (the World Bank push for short-cycle and distance education, and the EU movement to establish equivalency among programs to facilitate the movement of students among EU countries); accountability/quality assurance (the World Bank promotes performance based measures, and within the EU various professional and managerial groups promote quality assurance); the management and control of institutions and of professional work (the World Bank promotes institutional independence and market-like behavior, as well as managerial flexibility and control, and such patterns are evident within and across the EU as well).

Out of such work, we can construct a picture of international agencies’ different spheres of global activity and influence. We can also begin to identify the different capacities of these agencies, and of collective agency by groups of professionals and managers. Thus, the World Bank has more influence over the developing world, compared to the OECD, which most directly influences the Western, industrialized world, or the EU, which has largely regional, European influence. The source of these agencies and organizations’ influence lies in quite different capacities, exercised through quite different mechanisms, with the World Bank’s capacity lying in the monies it has for loans, and the EU’s capacities being more political and cultural in nature, with its financial resources consisting more of monies that can be invested at the margins in various sorts of projects. The same can be said of international associations of professionals and managers. Thus, in the case of NAFTA, U.S. professional associations and accrediting bodies in engineering wield considerable influence on accrediting bodies and standards of engineering in Mexico, through their interactions with national and professional bodies in Mexico and by virtue of the Mexican’s desire to enable their students to compete in regional employment markets dominated by U.S. multinational corporations.

In addition to tracking the spheres and capacities of international organizations and networks of professionals, we can also begin to identify differing conditions that will likely impact the success of various higher education policies. For example, World Bank policies are premised on the existence of sufficient private wealth to enable higher education institutions to generate their own revenues. Yet such conditions may not exist in Eastern Europe. Our global agency heuristic also
encourages us to attend to historically layered structures that would suggest different patterns of local resistance to global agencies’ initiatives. For example, we would expect the local layers to be more resistant to World Bank policies in countries such as China, which have powerful, historically shaped indigenous institutional structures, than in some developing countries with less well developed local structures.

Beyond resistance, there is also reciprocity, a reverse flow of influence from the local to the global. As powerful as the World Bank is, its policies are influenced by some nation states, particular local experiences, and agency. Some nations can create conditions for changes in the Bank’s policies: structural adjustment can be adjusted. Its policies are also shaped by the agency of professionals, who individually and collectively fashion a discourse and pursue research agendas that offer ideas, data, legitimacy, and challenges to the World Bank.

The latter point suggests the importance of considering linkages among various global agencies and collectivities. In this special issue, for example, it is striking to see the commonalities among the higher education policies promoted by the World Bank in the developing world and those policies promoted by the EU and various collectivities in the industrialized world. How has that happened? We would suggest looking to flows of personnel and influence among global agencies. We would also suggest looking to ways in which various international agencies reflect the differential capacities and spheres of influence of nations and of national professional groups in the global arena.

Beyond national markets: In the study of markets, comparative higher education research is limited in several regards. First, to the extent that the effects of supra-national markets are considered, scholars tend to simply invoke their significance on state policy. Thus, although Slaughter and Leslie (1997) note global economic pressures and forces, for them the principal empirical focus is on national higher education policies. A second limitation is that although some scholars in the U.S. have gone beyond “the economy” to analyze academic labor markets (Bowen and Schuster 1996; Breneman and Youn 1988; Caplow and McGee 1958; Carter 1976), there is little cross-national research along these lines, and little treatment of international academic labor, student, and employment markets. Thus, a recent special issue of *Higher Education* (2001) provides country-based studies of “The Changing Academic Workplace.” Although the editorial introduction indicates that the issue’s aim is to understand “the changing academic workplace worldwide,” the focus is on nation based studies as a means of revealing global trends, rather than on international markets of faculty, or on international mechanisms that structure academic labor markets. Finally, comparative higher education studies generally conceptualize markets as being separate from the state, shaped by an “invisible” hand or by the rational choices of individuals in the “marketplace.” Thus, it is marked by a disembodied view of the market.

Our glonal agency heuristic takes us beyond these limitations. We look to the specific mechanisms by which global markets influence national and local markets, practices, and experiences. We consider the choices available to higher education institutions seeking to capitalize on global employment markets, for markets are shaped by agency, by patterns in choices. Here lies a local mechanism by which global markets operate. Three examples illustrate our points. We examine the linguistic coin of the realm in the global educational marketplace, and its impact on academic work. We consider academic careers, structures, and labor markets, internationally. And we examine choices facing U.S. community colleges in the employment markets to which they orient their academic programs and investments.

A baseline for understanding the international marketplace in higher education is to explore the effects of the prevailing terms and currency of exchange. Just as global economies are shaped by the languages and currencies of the dominant national economies, so it is with the higher education economy (indeed, the patterns are related). To be a player in the international economy of higher education, whether through conferences, travel, exchanges, or other forms of communication or interaction, one must be conversant in English (Altbach and Selvaratnam 1989). More than this, a prevailing coin of the realm in higher education internationally is scholarly publication in English speaking academic journals, which literally pays more than publication in non-English speaking outlets, not only internationally, but in national higher education economies. For example, in Mexico publications in U.S. journals or with English speaking presses pay off more than publications in Mexican or Latin American sites in terms of membership in select national societies of
researchers, and in terms of an academic’s pay. Or publishing in English speaking journals may enable an academic to establish and work through international networks of researchers, thereby enhancing their national and local standing.

In non-English speaking parts of the world, such an incentive structure encourages scholarship that is of interest to English speaking more than to national or local audiences (and a form that is privileged in the English speaking world, the academic journal article). Thus, scholars should study the ways in which such incentive structures are established (e.g. how are international agencies implicated), and how they shape the orientation of academics’ work. Of course, there may be a reciprocal flow of influence: as more scholars from various parts of the world contribute to English speaking journals, the range of international issues addressed by scholars native to English speaking countries may expand.

The study of academic labor markets, nationally and internationally, represents a second example of the value of our global agency heuristic. As noted above, a recent special issue of Higher Education offers a comparative perspective on academic careers and markets: eight of the articles, each based on a Western, industrialized country, track changes in academic positions in the types of appointments held by academics. What is striking is the convergence of the patterns, towards fewer full-time, permanent academic positions and increased fluidity in the careers of academics (Altbach and Chait 2001). From one article to the next, there are subheadings about tenure and the more “hybrid” forms of employment in academe, more akin to private sector patterns of employment. Why are these countries, with such distinctive higher education traditions and structures of academic employment, moving in such similar directions in academic employment? Articles in the special issue refer to increased numbers of students and constraints on public resources, and to public policy trends that emphasize performance and are embodied in so-called new public management (e.g., Enders 2001). But what mechanisms and processes generated these pressures and led to their diffusion throughout the Western world? Our global agency heuristic leads us to consider the international agencies and agency that contribute to the diffusion of pressures and ideas. For example, what is the role of various international agencies that gather comparative data on national higher education systems in impacting policy discussions? Data gathered by international agencies such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, not to mention the various conferences and publications of these agencies, contribute to a climate in which national comparisons seem “natural.” Similarly, what is the role of various international agencies, and what is the agency exercised by various groups of public sector (and higher education) managers, in shaping policy discussions about academic employment and careers? Government and higher education leaders and managers network with each other, they go to conferences where such issues are discussed, and in some cases they draw on an international pool of consultants about how to reform their systems. We need studies exploring how policy ideas are diffused throughout the world, to map the spheres and strength of various agencies and networks. For example, Altbach (2001, p. 206) notes, academic freedom is “not high on the international agenda, and does not appear on the declarations and working papers of agencies such as UNESCO or the World Bank.” That is a political choice that impacts academic employment. Academic labor markets are shaped by political actions and choices.

Our heuristic leads us to consider not only global patterns, but the nationally and locally embedded layers of structures that will likely effect considerable resistance to the current trends. We are sensitized to the fact that globally shaped patterns are layered on top of existing structures, and lead to varying patterns of national and local adaptation and resistance. We are also sensitized to the possibility of counter trends, initiated through the agency of various groups internationally. As Altbach suggests, it is possible to effect different political choices, and he offers ideas for developing networks of professionals that define and advance academic freedom internationally, and through their agency put it on the global agenda.

Our third example relates to the prevailing view that national higher education policies are defined by the country’s position in the global economy. By contrast, we believe choices are possible. Thus, historically black universities in South Africa, by virtue of their history in a country defined by apartheid, may focus more on contributing to the social, political and economic development of local communities than on integrating into the global economy (Subotzky 1999). There are also choices available to community colleges in the U.S. in the employment markets to which
they orient their programs and investments. Consider community and technical colleges in two distinct regions of the U.S., the Silicon Valley of California and the comparatively poor region of north central Kentucky. The global economy is locally present in each setting, yet the cases clarify that there is not one global imperative but multiple economies and multiple choices. In both the Silicon Valley and north central Kentucky there is the lure of high tech jobs in the new economy, and rapidly growing immigrant populations, largely from Pacific Rim countries in the case of California, and from Eastern Europe in the case of Kentucky. In this context, the colleges face a choice: should they invest more of their scarce resources in high tech fields or in ESL (English as a Second Language) programs? At a college visited by one of the authors not long ago in California, the path chosen was clear, in a massive high tech facility that housed various programs, many of which turned out to be underenrolled (the new economy may be more driven by selected skills than by formal education and certification). Although vast numbers of students were clamoring for entry into ESL programs, the college had invested its resources elsewhere and the program could not accommodate student demand. However, there are other choices. In talking recently with a faculty member of a Kentucky community college, the same author related the story of the California college. She responded: “Don’t they realize that most of the ESL students want jobs in the new economy,” she asked? They should be coordinating the programs in such a way as to invest in them both. Her framing of the issue points to the significance of agency.

As with our other examples, our global/local agency heuristic leads us to consider local resistance to global patterns. There are historically structured patterns of response to immigrants: in California, which has experienced various waves of immigration, there are long-standing patterns of racist response; in Kentucky, there is a history of immobility (it has the largest proportion of state natives in the country), leading to backlash against immigrant populations. (There also is a reciprocal flow of influence from the immigrants, evident in California after several waves of immigration.)

Beyond and beneath national institutions and systems of higher education. Current comparative higher education scholarship is increasingly focusing on universities as innovative, entrepreneurial, adaptive organizations (Clark 1998; Slaughter and Leslie 1997; Sporn 1999). In most countries, universities have increasingly become market actors of a sort. They compete with other institutions in their countries for students, public monies for instruction, research monies, and private funds (Marginson 1997; Williams 1992). Thus far, studies frame university activities as an effort to enhance institutional revenues or position within the national higher education system. Such a perspective underplays the global dimension of, and overlooks the local constraints on and character of such institutional efforts.

We see colleges and universities as increasingly global and at the same time local actors. It is important to explore the global activities, competition, and stratification of higher education institutions. We offer two examples: U.S. universities establishing MBA programs abroad, and U.S. and Australian universities competing for international students from Asia. In exploring these global activities it is also important to explore local constraints on (and effects of) global competitive activity, and local dimensions of such activity within the institutions. That means not only looking at colleges and universities in their local environs, but looking within them, recognizing significant variations among university units. Entrepreneurial or capitalistic universities are not single enterprises, but are conglomerates, with some units devoting more energy to local or national activities and others more pursuing regional and global activities.

In their recent work, Clark (1998) and Slaughter and Leslie (1997) each provide examples of institutions’ international activities. Clark notes the international entrepreneurial activity of universities such as Warwick, which set up “satellite operations” in Hong Kong and Kuala Lumpur, and which actively sought out foreign students (who paid higher student fees than did students from the U.K.). Slaughter and Leslie connect academic capitalism to shifts in the global economy. The structure of each of the books’ story line features analysis of institutions diversifying revenues in response to shifts in national policy and resource patterns. However, such work does not feature the international expansion of and competition among higher education institutions. Universities increasingly market their programs not only nationally but also regionally and internationally: what, then is the international stratification system among institutions? The potential is there to go beyond normative discussions of which countries and universities have the highest quality education, to empirical studies of institutions’ international market share, and/or international
market prestige of various curricular and research domains. Such work would enable us to speak
about international and regional hierarchies of universities in engineering, life sciences, sociology,
and a range of other fields. With the growing significance of regional trading blocs, and reciproc-
ity agreements among the higher education systems of countries within those blocs, it makes increas-
ing sense to study the stratification of higher education across national boundaries.

In specifying particular fields of study, we are emphasizing that not only institutions but depart-
ments and colleges can be international in their activities, entering and seeking to monopolize for-
eign markets by establishing footholds abroad. An excellent example is the masters degree in
business administration (MBA). In recent years U.S. MBA programs have established sites in vari-
ous parts of the world, competing with national and local business and economics faculties. Such
programs should be conceptualized as part of an international higher education competition and
stratification system. What are the spheres of influence and activity for U.S. MBA programs, and
how might we map different spheres of other programs in U.S. institutions, and for universities
in other countries? One of the key sites is continental Europe (Sporn et al. 2000). To understand
why MBAs have been successful in Europe, we need to understand the historically layered structures
that leave this market niche open. Although there are business schools in Europe, the MBA sort of
masters degree has not been part of the European tradition (that is now changing). In addition,
the prominence of U.S. multinational corporations, and the related value of the MBA in this employ-
ment market, creates a niche market for U.S. programs abroad. To operationalize the strength of
these programs’ influence we might focus on the market share of students they establish (direct
influence) as well as the extent to which any emergent indigenous MBAs are modeled on U.S.
programs (indirect influence). And we might detail material and cultural resources available to dif-
ferent programs, which might help explain the differential involvement of U.S. programs in Europe.
Finally, research should attend to reciprocal flows of influence and activity related to U.S. MBA pro-
grams, and other internationally marketed programs in higher education. One response might be
efforts by nations and local institutions to develop their own MBAs. Another might be efforts by
European institutions and programs to establish their own cross-national outposts, across Europe,
and perhaps in the U.S. In short, applying a global agency heuristic to the study of U.S. MBA pro-
grams in Europe would involve mapping out the coordinates of global, national, and local
activity.

Similar suggestions would apply to studying the efforts of U.S. and Australian programs and
universities to attract international students from Asia. Existing research on international students
focuses on international flows, and in some cases on national orientations to such students, but it
does not tend to focus systematically on the international entrepreneurialism of higher education
institutions and programs. For example, Chen and Barnett (2000) use World Systems Theory and
network analysis to study international student flows in 1985, 1989, and 1995. Their results iden-
tify countries that are at the center or core of “exchange networks” and those that are in the semi-
periphery or periphery. Thus, the analysis yields countries’ place in an international stratification
system. In comparing policies and practices in Australia and the U.S. towards international stu-
dents Rhoades and Smart (1996) challenge the presumption that the U.S. is the principal, exemplary
site of entrepreneurial activity. Yet their results still relate to a classification of countries in terms
of entrepreneurial policies and practices.

We are suggesting the need to go beyond nation states and systems to focus on institutions (and
on programs within them) as international agents. Such a focus sharpens the significance of the regional
and local in the global. In comparing U.S. and Australian college and university efforts to attract stu-
dents from Southeast Asia, we can focus on specific spheres of influence. Rather than comparing the
centrality of the two countries in an international flow of students, we would focus more on the
activities of higher education institutions in the two countries in a particular regional sphere. In doing
so, we might come to a more sophisticated understanding of global activity than by simply identi-
fying core and peripheral nations. Consider the conditions affecting the influence of Australian and
U.S. higher education institutions, and the related capacities of those institutions. U.S. institutions cer-
tainly benefit from the prominence of U.S. corporations in the Southeast Asian economy, which
make an education in English attractive, but so do the Australian institutions, which have the added
facilitating condition of geographical location. Similarly, U.S. institutions certainly enjoy more sub-
stantial available revenues to support their recruitment efforts, but Australian institutions actually
offer academic units greater academic incentive (and resources) to engage in recruitment (and in the Australian context new institutions—colleges teaching students English—emerged to tap into Asian student markets). Rather than simply identifying place in the international higher education economy, our heuristic concentrates attention on dimensions and mechanisms of global influence and activity by local agencies and agents, such as universities, programs, and faculty. We can thereby come to an understanding of how there may be many agents with a significant global role, in a particular region of the world.

Moreover, our heuristic draws attention to the reciprocity of influence, the distinctiveness of locales, and the response to global patterns of influence. For all the discussion of higher education systems moving from elite to mass to universal access, and the impact it has on universities, there is little study of the proliferation of international students in the last two decades and of the implications that has for universities and students. In tracking the flows of students internationally, there is a sense that the principal influence is of the institution on the student. But to what extent do changing student populations impact institutions, educationally, materially, and culturally? Changes in the proportion of international students may influence educational processes in classrooms. Such students may also impact institutional resource allocation, in the tuition they pay, and the costs of additional services that must be provided to them. Further, international students may have a cultural influence. They are not only acted upon by the culture of the institution, these students themselves help shape that culture.

In addition, locale matters. It matters whether an international student does an MBA at Harvard or MIT. By focusing on individual institutions, we move away from totalizing the influence of “studying in the U.S.” The brand of business education one learns varies by institution, with Harvard preparing more for Fortune 500 employment, and MIT preparing more for employment in smaller, innovative enterprises (Van Mannen 1983).

Further, local communities respond to and shape the global activity of local institutions. The flow of activity and influence is not simply one way, top down, from global to local. Even as universities position themselves globally, there is heightened local and state governmental and public pressure to expand their involvement in local contexts. For example, in many states of the U.S. there is strong policy pressure to limit the proportion of out-of-state students, not to mention international students, in public universities. The idea is that state tax dollars should be used for state residents. In fact, there has sometimes been hostile reaction to “foreign” teaching assistants. Moreover, universities are increasingly being challenged by groups demanding that they be more sensitive to and promotional of local variations in and diversity of cultural heritage. Thus, it is important to not only move beyond national systems but to move below the level of the nation state in studying universities globally.

In regard to institutions, then, our global agency heuristic focuses on colleges and universities (and units and faculty within them) as global agents, encouraging studies of activity and stratification regionally and internationally. The international system may be consistent with patterns of stratification within nations, or less prestigious and specialist schools may move into international niches as a way to bypass (or move up within) national stratification systems of higher education. We are led to recognize the possible international influence of institutions located outside the “core” countries in the global economy. Further, we are led to consider the local in exploring the global, to search for the reciprocity in international relations.

**Conclusion**

We believe that comparative higher education requires a new analytical framework, one that can take us beyond the hitherto almost exclusive reliance on national policy and national markets as the horizon of possibility. In using the nation-state as the dominant unit of analysis for international comparison, global forces remain shadowy, local variations are flattened out, and issues of “street level” implementation are obscured. Further, analysis tends to lock into recurring antinomies of state/market, and global/national, in which the relationship between the elements in each pair is understood in zero-sum terms. Thus, it is often assumed that global linkages and convergence subtract from national and local dimensions.
We offer a Glonacal Agency Heuristic to frame comparative higher education research. ‘Glonacal’ incorporates three constituent terms—global, national, local. “Agency” refers to organized agencies and to the agency of human action. Within these domains, we focus on the concepts of reciprocity, strength, layers and conditions and spheres.

Our heuristic highlights the growing saliency of global agencies and relationships, including meta-national regions, in both the national and the local domains. At the same time, it emphasizes the continuing fecundity of local institutions and other agents at the national and global level. And it takes us beyond nation states, national markets, and national systems and institutions of higher education to consider organizational agencies and human agency at various levels. Such agencies and activities operate simultaneously in the three domains or planes of existence—global, national, local—amid multiple and reciprocal flows of activity.

The Glonacal Agency Heuristic allows us to more clearly imagine polities, markets and professionals—the three elements earlier identified by Clark (1983)—as operating in all three domains and not just at the national level. They are analytically distinct, yet interconnected and interdependent. We can consider global systems of activity and regulation, alongside national policies and administration and local political relationships, and we can examine the inter-relationship between different global agencies. We can more effectively observe international markets and consider the shaping roles they have on higher education institutions, operating across national boundaries, and yet shaped in practice by national and local polities, economies, and professional conditions. And we can give due weight to the globally networked character of much university and faculty activity, noting the weight of an international coin of the realm in English-language networks of scholarly practices, even as we acknowledge and analyze the ongoing significance of national and local professional economies.

In this paper we have played out but a few examples of how our glonacal agency heuristic can take us beyond national states, markets, and systems of higher education institutions. We have offered a few concrete examples of how we might enrich our understanding of global, national, and local phenomena, of how our heuristic leads us to pose new questions and explore new issues comparatively. The conceptual building blocks of our heuristic can take us in many directions as we specify more and more agencies and human agency at global, regional, national, and local levels, and as we consider the interactive and reciprocal flow of activity and influence among them, the varying strengths of these interconnections, the historical layers and conditions on which they are grounded, and as we map their spheres of influences across space. We hope that our hexagonal glonacal agency heuristic will trigger ideas for much future research, and that other scholars will join us in more fully exploring its potential.

Notes

1. Although used comparatively, the notion of academic “profession”, per se, is an Anglo-American concept (see Neave and Rhoades 1987).
2. In Marginson’s case, the city (Melbourne) dominates the state (Victoria) culturally (and demographically), although there are traditional rural accents, which are much broader with more “twang.”

References


NONUNIVERSITY HIGHER EDUCATION REFORM IN FRANCE, GERMANY, AND GREECE: A COMPARISON OF CORE AND SEMIPERIPHERY SOCIETIES

ELENI PROKOU

Introduction

The purpose of this article is to analyze a number of Greek higher education reforms in comparative perspective. Emphasis will be placed on the rationale of the state’s policies in creating the nonuniversity sector within higher education. The case of Greece will be compared to the cases of France and Germany because approximately the same reforms took place for more or less the same reasons. My analysis will focus on the period from the late 1960s to the 1990s. It should be noted, however, that in both France and Germany, the nonuniversity sectors were established within higher education during the 1960s and 1970s, while in Greece this occurred at the beginning of the 1980s. Since the Greek reforms were apparently “lagging behind” by ten or more years, the Greek reforms of the 1980s and 1990s will be initially compared to the reforms in France and Germany in the 1960s and 1970s.

The major similarities between the Greek and the French and German patterns of higher education reforms can be grouped in terms of the policy concepts of “equity” and “efficiency.” These similarities can be reanalyzed and reinterpreted by taking into consideration the “semiperipherality” of Greece within Europe (and the world system more generally).

The Notions of “Equity” and “Efficiency” in Higher Education Reforms

Overall, the factors that propelled higher education expansion were the development of science, the need for qualified labor for economic growth, the close relationship between education and opportunity, and the increased wealth of the society that permitted higher education to stress cultural enrichment or to be treated as a “consumer good.” As the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) points out, the expansion was made possible in most western European countries because they experienced high rates of economic growth and improvements in their overall standards of living. Rates of inflation and unemployment remained at low levels, and steadily growing gross national products and trade surpluses enabled national governments to support the rapid growth of tertiary education.

During the 1960s and 1970s, two arguments framed the expansion of higher education (and the introduction of the nonuniversity sector) in most western European countries: equity, or “social
justice,” and efficiency, or “economic development.” The first argument was that of “social justice”—that is, that removing artificial barriers in the educational system would create true equality of educational opportunity. This, in turn, would lead to the democratization of access in higher education as well as to the preferred occupations for which education provided preparation. The second argument was that of “economic development”—that is, that depicting higher education as a productive investment would contribute directly to economic growth. The emphasis was often placed on technological advances and the need for a workforce that could “adapt to changing conditions.”

The arguments of social justice or equity and economic development or efficiency have been interrelated in most western European countries. According to Guy Neave, the mission conferred upon higher education was to raise the general level of education among the population (the state investment in human capital) and to act as a vehicle for broadening equality of opportunity by bringing forward talent irrespective of social origin. Within this context, the nonuniversity sector was introduced along with universities.

Similarities in Nonuniversity Higher Education Reforms in France, Germany, and Greece

Equity

The first major similarity was concerned with equity. In the French and German reforms of the 1960s and 1970s, as well as in the Greek reforms of the 1980s, equity was initially interpreted both in terms of the expansion of the higher education system to respond to strong social demand for education as an avenue of social mobility and in terms of the provision of new technological institutions in higher education.

In France, in the late 1960s, extensive changes in university administrative structures took place, the most significant of which was the formation of universities as substantial administrative entities, in place of the traditional faculties. After the Loi d’Orientation of Edgar Faure in 1968, under the banner of “pluridisciplinarity,” the faculties and the intellectual rigidities of the old regime were swept away and replaced by department-like Unités d’Enseignement et de Recherche (UERs). The goal of the new organization was functional diversification, leaving each university with its distinctive research specialties and curricula. This contributed to the reconciliation of the imperatives of research with the needs of mass higher education. Within this context, although the Instituts Universitaires de Technologie (IUTs) were originally set up as university institutes in 1966, they were transformed into UERs by the decree of 1969. Therefore, the IUTs were not autonomous establishments in relation to the universities, and a possibility was left open for making the IUTs public establishments of a scientific and cultural nature attached to the universities. The IUTs (as UERs) were subject to protectionist provisions, which gave them a unique position within the universities. It is noteworthy that after the 1968 higher education reform there was still no policy of numerus clausus in the university sector. “Manpower” planning remained of limited importance, given the dominance of open admission to higher education and the consequent reliance on private demand.

In the Federal Republic of Germany, in each decade after World War II, the number of students almost doubled. The increase in demand for higher education meant that German universities developed into massuniversitäten (mass universities). In the postwar period, higher education policy was designed to create a unitary system. From this period until the 1960s, emphasis was placed on blurring the existing institutional differences. After the mid-1960s, educational planners and scholars discussed the need to restructure higher education in the face of an increased student population. New policies led to efforts to coordinate educational planning nationally and to found new universities with the aim of providing a broad local and regional range of higher education institutions.

From 1970 onward, the new policies led to a diversification of institutional types. The treaty between the German länder (states) in 1968 to upgrade the former engineering schools, along with higher vocational schools, into Fachhochschulen (FHSs) in 1971 was a first step taken toward a diversified system. One of the reasons why this decision was taken was to raise the standard and
reputation of these institutions and to ensure the international recognition of their graduates. Universities, in admitting students to courses, tended to favor upper-class applicants. The FHSs were to cater more specifically to students with the Fachabitur or Fachhochschulreife and were meant to alleviate inequality of opportunity in higher education.

Overall, up to the 1960s successful secondary school students used to choose a variety of fields of study in the university sector. From the mid-1960s until the mid-1970s (when medicine and other fields introduced a numerus clausus) more and more students achieving high grades turned to numerus clauses fields. Mobility from one university to another was made difficult, and “manpower” planning became a controversial issue.

In Greece, at the beginning of the 1980s, a number of higher education reforms took place. Law 1268/1982 provided for the reorganization of the structure and function of the university-level establishments called AEI (Ανώτατα Εκπαιδευτικά Ιδρύματα [Highest Educational Institutions]). The KATEE (Κέντρα Ανώτερης Τεχνικής και Επαγγελματικής Εκπαίδευσης [Centers of Higher Technical and Vocational Education]), the earlier technical education institutions, were abolished, and the TEIs (Τεχνολογικά Εκπαιδευτικά Ιδρύματα [Technological Educational Institutions]) were created by Law 1404/1983. The government emphasized that the TEIs would help toward the reduction in inequalities of educational opportunity, and the approach adopted was that of “social” rather than “manpower” demand.

During the 1980s, Greek tertiary education had experienced the highest growth rates ever, and the government decided to increase considerably the number of places for technical higher education. The reforms continued with the 1983-87 “Five-Year Plan,” which had as its main objective to create structures that could admit more students. At the undergraduate level a much broader range of programs in the arts and sciences was developed, and more opportunities for postgraduate studies and for research were created. Finally, the regional universities already in operation were further expanded, while new universities were founded in peripheral regions of the country.

The expansionist phase continued throughout the 1990s. From 1996 onward, committees and working groups were set up within the Ministry of Education to elaborate action plans related to a number of issues, including the further development of all nonuniversity higher education institutions and the increase of university places, thus reducing the number of Greek students studying abroad.

**Efficiency**

In addition to equity concerns, higher education reforms were framed with respect to two aspects of efficiency. The first aspect of efficiency meant providing the right kind of higher education that would respond to the needs of the economy, for example, by emphasizing the practical orientation of the nonuniversity sector and its response to local demands. The second aspect of efficiency pertained to relieving the overcrowded universities by having the nonuniversity sector absorb some of the strong social demand for higher education.

**Contributing to economic development.**—In France, as defined in the founding decree of January 1966, the mission of the IUTs was to train skilled, middle-level graduates to assume “technical functions in production, applied research and the services.” Initially, the IUTs were established as 2-year institutions for training upper-level technicians for a variety of industrial, administrative, and service positions. Employers and union representatives expressed the desire to ensure good relations between the IUTs and the business world. Although, later on, the IUTs were partly integrated with the universities, their pragmatic and vocational orientation as well as their school-like methods were quite alien to the university system, though in some ways very similar to those of the grandes écoles. The IUTs were organized into subject departments whose curricula were determined nationally, although 20 percent of class time was reserved for adaptations to local requirements. In general, provision was made for a lot of practical work, and in the second year a period of working in industry was compulsory.

In Germany, in the 1960s a debate focused surrounding the Bildungskatastrophe (educational catastrophe): that the German education system, in general, and higher education, in particular, no longer met the needs of an advanced industrialized country. This debate led to calls for more Praxis-orientierung (practical orientation) and greater educational opportunity. The major proposals
discussed and, to some extent, implemented were creating a variety of types of institutions, developing a comprehensive model of higher education, instituting short-cycle courses at universities alongside long courses, diversifying and stratifying universities, and organizing a sequential system of courses. The FHSs were introduced because university courses in some applied subjects (e.g., business studies or engineering) had been subject to the criticism that their syllabi were too theoretical in content and lacking in practical orientation. The FHSs were planned to be more practice oriented and job relevant. They were also supposed to be well suited to respond to regional demand for study places and for graduates.

In Greece, concern about economic efficiency was prominent in the reform movements of the 1980s. Technical/vocational education was important in overcoming stagnation and inflation and in reviving and modernizing the economy. The TEIs were developed to contribute to national research as well as regional, economic, and social development. Their contribution to a self-reliant development would be through the evaluation, assimilation, and application of imported technology as well as the creation of Greek technology and technical knowledge. These institutions were to provide specialized labor to produce advanced technology as well as personnel for high-level services and middle-level/self-governing enterprises. The TEI students were to acquire advanced knowledge and abilities, convertible and adaptable to a changing economy. Their practical preparation was to enable them to transfer scientific and theoretical findings to the solution of particular problems in the productive process. The TEIs were also expected to maintain a two-way relationship with productive enterprises in their regions as well as to cooperate among themselves and with domestic and foreign educational or technological institutions or bodies.

Reducing enrollment pressure from universities. —The second aspect of efficiency was identified in the case of France, in that the traditional universities were very overcrowded at the time when the IUTs were created. This was caused by an increase in the number of pupils passing the baccalauréat, which gave automatic entrance to university. It was assumed that many bacheliers were not necessarily suited to university degree work, and a shorter, more vocationally oriented course—provided in the new IUTs—was viewed as more suitable for such people. To increase the number of students choosing short-cycle higher education, IUTs introduced innovations, such as (a) employing a third of the teachers with vocational experience in such areas as industry, management, and computer science, and (b) sharing teaching tasks between IUT instructors and personnel from secondary education (the technical lycées), higher education, and the relevant professions.

In Germany, the traditional universities, organized according to the needs of only about 5 percent of the respective age cohorts, were unable to cope with the increasing demand for enrollment. In this context, new forms of advanced professional training were established. The former engineering schools and higher vocational schools were upgraded to create in 1971 the FHSs, which were designed to have courses or programs that took less than the 4–5 years required for university degrees. The FHSs were also expected to adopt a more structured teaching approach in contrast to the “take-it-or-leave-it” attitude displayed by university teachers, a major factor viewed as contributing both to high failure and dropout rates and to students’ propensity to extend their period of studies. Programs at the FHSs were application oriented, in contrast to the research-oriented programs in universities. The FHSs were generally assumed to serve a terminal precareer function, and only a few advanced courses were provided for their graduates. Nevertheless, all universities and all FHSs were to have the same entrance qualifications, the same standards for exams, the same curricula, the same level of funding, the same regulations governing appointments and promotions, the same salary scales, the same organizational structures, and the same basic conditions for research, teaching, and studying. Such policies were aimed at making higher education institutions more alike, especially with respect to quality.

In Greece, the KATEE were abolished because they were not accepted by the Greek population, who only valued university education. Given that increasing social demand for higher education put pressure on the AEIs, the Greek government introduced the TEIs within higher education. The TEIs played their role as an alternative to universities, through the harmonization of the internal structure and function of the two types of educational institutions (AEIs and TEIs). Harmonization could be seen in the similarities in the self-government and legal foundation of
both types of institutions. The educational personnel were expected to have high academic standards, albeit with emphasis on professional experience. There was also an effort for the coordination of the purposes of the TEIs and the AEIs to the aim of the self-reliant economic development of the country, and a research role was given to the TEIs in the application of technology. Due to their theoretical orientation, the AEI graduates would be more suitable for work in research, planning, and high managerial positions, while the TEI graduates would have as their basic orientation the assimilation and transfer of scientific data to practical applications. The main mission of the TEIs was the provision of sufficient theoretical and practical education to their graduates to be able to apply scientific, technological, artistic, and other forms of knowledge and skills to certain occupations.

Dissimilarities in Nonuniversity Higher Education Reforms in Greece Compared to France and Germany

In contrast to France and Germany during the 1960s and 1970s, when nonuniversity (technological) higher education was expanded in response to the needs of the economy, the expansion of Greek higher education during the 1980s, through the birth and growth of the TEIs, was not fueled primarily by the needs of the existing economy. In Greece, “efficiency” concerns meant supporting a process of economic development and modernization toward self-reliance and competitiveness (on equal terms with members of the European Economic Community [EEC]). Within this context, the success of the FHSs and the IUTs by the end of the 1970s in Germany and France, respectively—at least in terms of labor market demand—was not matched by the Greek TEIs in the 1980s and 1990s.

In the case of France, during the 1960s and 1970s, the IUTs were successful in terms of labor market demand. As Philippe Cibois and Janina Markiewicz-Lagneau argue, the steadily increasing need for qualified personnel at the intermediate level as well as an effort to get over the disadvantages of the earlier institutions led to the creation of the IUTs. In the beginning, the IUTs fell far short of the goal of constituting half the total enrollment of the first 2 years of university and roughly 25 percent of the total number of university students. Nevertheless, from 1970 until 1980, despite the fact that the IUTs were selective, there was a gradual increase in the number of the IUT graduates, exceeding the rate of expansion of university graduates.

In the case of Germany, the FHSs were quite popular with industry and with students. Their success was based on their more practical and vocational orientation, together with more flexibility in relation to the expectations of the labor market and industry. In 1977, after an agreement by the federal and Länder governments to maintain the policy of open access to higher education, student numbers continued to rise, and higher education institutions were led to a process of rethinking their functional contributions to society. Through organizational measures and a policy of greater public accountability, as well as responsiveness to the expectations of the labor market, the FHSs were in a better position than the universities to demonstrate their social relevance and importance.

In Greece, along with the dramatic increase of the number of new entrants (described above), graduate unemployment gradually increased, such that unemployed youth comprised 29 percent and 52.4 percent, respectively, of all unemployed in 1981 and 1989. The unemployment rate for TEI graduates was even higher than that for their AEI counterparts (9.8 percent against 6.6 percent, respectively). In contrast to the nonuniversity sector, about 80 percent of the university graduates were employed in the public sector, and possessing a university degree was associated with a higher rate of return (3–5 percent) compared to having TEI qualifications (below 2 percent).

The TEIs did not respond to the economy (since it was a failing economy, as will be argued later in more detail), and at the same time they did not resolve the relationship between equity and efficiency as this was interpreted in the western European context. Instead, the TEIs responded only to concerns over equity, in terms of the expansion of the higher education system to satisfy social demand, and to the second aspect of efficiency, the relief of the overcrowded universities. The nonuniversity sector was actually functioning as a “breakwater” for the very strong social demand for higher education, an exceptional Greek phenomenon.
More Recent Higher Education Reforms in France, Germany, and Greece

Similarities and dissimilarities between France and Germany, on the one side, and Greece, on the other, continued to be evident during the more recent period. In the 1980s and 1990s, there were several changes in the higher education patterns of the three countries.

France.—In the 1980s in France the “equity” aspect was still quite powerful: there were calls for a dramatic increase in the number/percentage of students passing the *baccalauréat*, which gave automatic entrance to university.\(^{51}\) However, this was, at least in part, for “efficiency” purposes: the economy needed more and more qualified graduates.\(^{52}\) The public interest was in the relationship between higher education and the state; the links between research and teaching; the notion of autonomy, research, and industry linkages; and the perennial tension between excellence and social equality in access to higher education.\(^{53}\) The 1984 Guideline Law provided for the above themes and also placed emphasis on more opportunities for vocational/professional studies.\(^{54}\) Within this context, short-cycle courses were expanded, and a two-track system within the university was created (e.g., the introduction of the Diplôme d’Études Universitaires Générales [DEUG] and the Diplôme d’Études Universitaires Scientifiques et Techniques [DEUST]).\(^{55}\) Themes such as vocationalization and regionalization were interlinked. Higher education, it was argued, was to respond to regional development and decentralization by being increasingly “vocationalized.”

In the 1990s, there were efforts to reduce the state’s role in higher education and have the “market” serve as the instrument for shaping these institutions. These efforts were based on the assumptions that demands made by society, industry, and the economy were increasingly more complex, and, therefore, centralized planning and coordination were too rigid.\(^{56}\) Vocationalization was part of the plan for reorganizing French higher education at the beginning of the 1990s. A number of changes took place that meant reorganizing higher education offerings to link them more closely to employment policies, ensuring closer integration of higher education and the economy, as well as establishing closer partnerships between higher education institutions and private sector organizations.\(^{57}\)

In the context of a shortage of qualified engineers and technicians, which had threatened to hinder economic growth in the 1980s, France’s central administration in the 1990s decided to increase the number in the technology courses and introduce new vocational university courses aimed at producing more qualified engineers. These new vocational university courses were the Instituts Universitaires Professionalises (IUTs) and the Nouvelles Formations d’Ingénieurs (NFIs), offering a new approach to training engineers. The French government hoped to raise the proportion of students entering the first year of technology courses.\(^{58}\) The number of departments in the IUTs rose, together with the average number of new students admitted per department.

In spite of the tremendous growth in the numbers of entrants, the structures of the French higher education system did not change a lot. To limit university enrollments, the government encouraged a growing proportion of school leavers to opt for short courses (such as those offered by the IUTs) that lead to qualifications after 2 years prior to entering the labor market.\(^{59}\) Between 1977 and 1995, IUT or STS (Sections de Techniciens Supérieurs) graduates entering the labor market increased by 17 percent, thus representing a major part of the graduate labor market.\(^{60}\)

Germany.—In the 1980s in Germany the debate about equity diminished due to the excess of graduates.\(^{61}\) Among the major issues raised were efficiency, competition, differentiation, and institutional autonomy, all of which were made explicit in the 1983 Framework Act for Higher Education.\(^{62}\) The act formulated common tasks for all institutions of higher education, acknowledged the right of the individual länder to define different tasks for the institutional types, and emphasized different curricular patterns of universities and FHSs.\(^{63}\) Comprehensive higher education, in the form of the Gesamthochschulen (GHSs), was not generalized, despite the success of this institutional approach in reducing inequality of opportunity.\(^{64}\) The issue of efficiency prevailed, and “hierarchization” was promoted.\(^{65}\) The failure of the GHSs was due partly to the strong vertical differentiation within the German higher education system and partly to the neoconservative government’s demands for subjecting higher education more fully and directly to “market forces.”\(^{66}\)
Since the mid-1980s, these neoconservatives pushed German higher education to become more entrepreneurial and more competitive. In their view, government should not define how much of what types of higher education should be supplied. Instead, they argued that higher education institutions should compete both for students and for obtaining extra research funding based on the employment successes of their graduates and the reputations of their departments. The link between higher education and industry was getting closer, and there was concern about how to keep pace with the rapid rate of technological change. Alternatives to traditional forms of higher education courses as well as to innovative and more flexible programs were considered, with a special emphasis on more vocationally oriented offerings. The unification with the two Germanys in the early 1990s had consequences for the unified higher education system, as it reinforced all the above choices. “Differentiation” as well as the concept of the German research university continued to be promoted.

Until the early 1990s, more and more FHSs were established, while the proportion of new entrant students at FHSs gradually increased. The quantitative extension of FHSs (diversification) was considered an essential dimension of the expansion of higher education. In 1993, the Science Council recommended a considerable increase in the capacities of FHSs and diversification of their types of course programs (though without an extended range of advanced programs). Toward the end of the decade, to attract foreign students, the and the federal government funded a number of pilot projects offering bachelor’s and master’s degrees, though at that time it was unclear whether the introduction of internationally recognized degrees would change the binary system of universities and FHSs in Germany. Overall, the FHSs were attractive due to their public image of pursuing the right kind of aims and purposes in a rapidly changing environment. In contrast to universities, FHSs were still gaining ground in terms of both student demand and the expectations of the labor market. Throughout the 1990s, the percentage of higher education graduates in the labor force with FHS degrees grew by 4 percent (at the expense of those with university degrees).

Greece.—The policies, discussed above in relation to France and Germany, were not visible in Greece. In the early 1990s Greece’s aspirations to reach parity with other European Union nations made pressure for modernization even stronger. Within this context, the nonuniversity sector had recently been expanded and upgraded. However, there were no explicit statements about the vocationalization of higher education as a response to the market. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the new millennium, the Greek government justified its decision to try to upgrade the nonuniversity sector of higher education by emphasizing the experience of other more advanced countries. It stated that the nonuniversity sector contributed to the advancement of such societies and met the needs of the countries’ economies. Political leaders claimed that Greece needs the nonuniversity sector even more than other European societies, since this sector could contribute to the application of technological and scientific findings and to the transformation of knowledge into practice in the social and economic life of the country. Such an approach should be widely adopted, if the country were to be rapidly developed and advanced, given that the low competitiveness of Greece in the various sectors could possibly be related to the limited contribution of the technological sector to the developmental process.

In more recent times, as in earlier periods, higher education was given the duty of contributing to economic development and modernization, but policies designed to promote and expand the nonuniversity sector seem mostly to have been responding to meet strong social demand and to reduce the large number of Greek students who study abroad. Yet, such policy choices continue to be made in the context of increasing unemployment, particularly among TEI graduates.

Discussion

To sum up, what has been argued in this article is that the rationale for the introduction of the nonuniversity sector of higher education in Greece during the 1980s and 1990s was apparently similar to the rationales in France and Germany during the 1960s and 1970s. In these three countries, the creation of the nonuniversity sector was part of the reconstruction of higher education as a complex response to the needs for equity and efficiency. In the Greek reforms of the 1980s and 1990s,
as well as in the French and German reforms of the 1960s and 1970s, “equity” was initially interpreted in terms of the expansion of the higher education system to respond to strong social demand for education as an avenue of social mobility. “Efficiency” (its first aspect) meant providing the right kind of higher education, for example, in the nonuniversity sector, to respond to the needs of the economy. Thus, in all three countries emphasis was placed on the practical orientation of the nonuniversity sector and its response to local demands.

However, only in France and Germany was equity interrelated with the issue of efficiency, that is, the nonuniversity sector was introduced within higher education as an expression of higher education expansion to answer both social demand and labor market demand (where it proved to be successful). This was because for Greece, the concept of efficiency did not mean serving the needs of the existing economy (as in the other two European countries) but the contribution of the nonuniversity sector to economic development and modernization. In this context, economic development (understood as self-reliant development in the 1980s) and modernization were seen as necessary for the country to catch up with the more developed nations, particularly in Europe. The introduction of the TEIs within higher education in Greece was part of the modernization of the education system to respond to the expected modernization and economic development of the country, but it was also seen as a strategy for competing on more equal terms in the EEC.

These three countries appeared to be alike only in terms of giving an answer to equity, in the form of the expansion of the higher education system to satisfy social demand, and to the second aspect of efficiency, the relief of the overcrowded universities. The major advantage of this new type of higher education—compared to the earlier institutions—was that it belonged to the higher education subsector. Thus, the unity of the higher education system was promoted—with a differentiation between the more theoretical universities and the more practically oriented nonuniversity sector.

During the 1980s and 1990s, there was a new rationale in the higher education reforms of France and Germany. This was the promotion of the nonuniversity sector as part of the vocationalization of higher education, viewed as a response to the needs of the market. In Greece at the beginning of the new millennium, the nonuniversity sector was upgraded and promoted, mainly under the logic of the contribution of the nonuniversity sector to economic development and modernization of the country.

To explain the dissimilarities between the French and German cases and that of Greece we need to examine these nations as being located in different positions within the world capitalist economy, or at least within the European region. That is, we have to take into consideration that France and Germany are core societies, while Greece is a semiperipheral society.

Greece as a semiperipheral society within Europe.—The above major similarities, equity and efficiency (and their interrelationship), between the Greek and the French and German patterns of higher education reforms will be reinterpreted by taking into consideration the “semiperipherality” of Greece within Europe (and the world system). Since 1815 (and until the 1960s), southern European countries had at no point been the locus of the most advanced sectors of world production in terms of technology and productive capacity, nor the focal point of accumulation of capital. For most of that time, the governments and capitalist strata in the core countries tried to expand the amount of unequal exchange in which this zone was involved, that is, to peripheralize still further the economic processes within southern European societies to the advantage of the core countries. To participate in the world capitalist system, many leaders and analysts believed, southern European societies needed “modernized” state structures—with adequate bureaucracies and weak political superstructures that could oversee the creation of a relevant economic infrastructure, create (where necessary) personnel training systems, and guarantee conditions of order (against potential labor unrest). In the mid-nineteenth century and after, the model for these state structures was a liberal constitutional one. This would have defined boundaries and a relatively efficacious state-oriented national culture and linguistic unity.

In Greece, in particular, the capitalist mode of production dominated after 1922. What provided some of the basic preconditions for the development of capitalism in the Greek social formation were territorial and population growth, the influx of foreign capital, the development of an extensive transport system, and the creation of a unified internal market, as well as the establishment of an institutional framework facilitating state intervention in the economy. However, “the manner
in which these preconditions were created (the impetus originated mainly from the outside and
serving foreign diaspora interests) presaged the kind of peripheral, underdeveloped capitalism that
in fact did flourish in the next period—a capitalism radically different from and much less
autonomous than that of the West.82

The effects of World War II led to the political, economic, and military unification of the south-
ern countries under the aegis of the United States. This unification made economic autarky in the
framework of capitalism impossible. The Soviet Union emerged as a superpower. Simultaneously,
the expansion of international exchanges and investment increasingly led to the establishment of
an international division of labor. This came to impose itself on all nations and disrupted the cohe-
rence of national economies (where they existed).83 In the era of its hegemony, the United States
insisted on the end of all economic autarkic tendencies, the reopening of the (peripheral) economies
of the southern European societies to core interests (to the extent they had been closed), and the
further development of their structured participation in the world economy’s division of labor.
“This translated itself in terms of economic ‘development’ and ‘modernization.’”84

The pace of economic development and modernization was at first slow but became quite rapid
by the 1960s. The difference with the era before 1914 was that the economic integration of the
world had deepened considerably. Many more zones could then play the peripheral roles that had
been assigned to southern Europe in the nineteenth century, from the point of view of the core coun-
tries. Part of the problem of the core zones was to maintain a sufficient demographic weight in the
world system. So, they tried to expand the intermediate sector. Thus, it was in core states’ interests
to have southern Europe play a strong semiperipheral role in the world economy—especially if
they were closely linked to the core in both political and ideological terms.85

Since the early 1950s, among the major measures taken for the promotion of economic growth
and the advancement of industrialization of the Greek economy was the devaluation of the Greek
drachma, implemented to attract foreign capital.86 Since the 1960s, the Greek economy has been
characterized by an indigenous capital directed toward traditional areas of production.87 National
capital was always about short-term solutions since it was small and mainly oriented toward com-
merce and services. Therefore, foreign capital was the only possible agent for promoting industri-
alization and establishing the political system.88

In the period 1966–77, investment rates were quite high. In the period 1951–75, 30.6 percent of
total investment (or 43.3 percent of private investment) was absorbed by the housing sector. Only
14.1 percent of total investment was absorbed by the manufacturing sector and 11.3 percent by agri-
culture (the remainder being in infrastructure, energy, and transport). Greece’s investment in manu-
facturing, as a percentage of gross domestic product, was the lowest among all OECD countries
during the 1960–76 period. Consequently, the bulk of foreign capital inflow to Greece (1953–79) was
invested in the industrial sector. Foreign capital was concentrated in some of the strategic advanced
technology sectors, such as chemicals, plastics, petroleum products, and base metals. During the
1960s, multinational firms were the main exporters of nontraditional products.89

The Greek economy (as those of other southern countries) was thus characterized by the dual-
istic nature of industry—with small and not internationally competitive enterprises alongside a few
large enterprises.90 The economy was also characterized by technological transfer, emigration, and
tourism.91 There was also a shift from agriculture to industry and services—accompanied by the
subsequent overexpansion of the services and housing sectors—as well as an increase of the “infor-
mal” economy (the activity of undeclared economic agents).92 Agricultural investment was state
financed, while agrarian capital was invested in property in the towns.93 The decline in agricultural
production as well as the transnational investment process led to a very unbalanced pattern of
development, with high levels of regional disparities and the “deformation” of regional develop-
ment.94 By the early 1980s, “outward-looking industrialization” had led to the increasing depen-
dency of the economy on imported capital and technology. Greece was in a phase of deindustrializa-
tion, before having reached industrial maturity.95

In 1981, a socialist inspired government took power and emphasized the socialist transforma-
tion of the Greek economy that (while still supporting private initiative) stressed regional and
self-reliant development.96 During the same year, accession to the European Economic Community—
a crucial external actor for the Greek society—meant regional development and industrial restruc-
turing.97 However, the actual economic situation—as distinct from the expected economic
situation—was that in the 1980s exports to the EEC fell, and imports increased, while the agricultural balance of payments with the EEC showed a substantial deficit. Problems in the manufacturing sectors were accentuated. By the early 1990s, Greece was facing difficulties in adapting to the European Community (later, the European Union) on equal terms.

These problems were largely due to the nature of the Greek state. The patrimonial, authoritarian, and particularistic features of the Greek state—inhigated from Ottoman rule—resulted in the gradual and then systematic dominance of the logic of the political over the logic of the market. This was due to the weakness of civil society in Greece, where state-led industrialization had generated state-dependent industrial classes—a semiperipheral phenomenon. This weakness of civil society has continued; Greek civil society has not managed to challenge the state effectively. As a consequence, the state has not disturbed cultural and social relations or occupational hierarchies. On the contrary, the state has reinforced clientelism.

Thus, the state hindered a pattern of indigenous development (and instead sought to attract foreign capital) to advance Greece’s core activities as part of a strong association (the EU) in the world economy. Due to the “late-late” industrialization of Greece, the only chance for the integration of the country into the world economy in a more self-reliant way would be from the state. However, the state was unable to intervene flexibly to modernize agriculture, to create strong linkages with industry, or to develop an industrial sector well articulated with the rest of the economy. The state apparatus was overexpanded and had clientelistic characteristics. The more the state failed to modernize agriculture, the more it acquired characteristics that hindered both its own and the economy’s rationalization.

Conclusion

In recent years, the promotion of the nonuniversity sector as part of the vocationalization of higher education to respond to the needs of the market has been a kind of discourse affecting primarily higher education patterns in northwestern European countries. This rationale for the vocationalization of higher education fits well with these countries’ political economies. However, Greece is different. Policies stressing the vocationalization of higher education to respond to the needs of the market fit badly with the present economic, social, and political context of Greece as a European semiperipheral society. It is probably the case, on the basis of the analysis in this article, that policies for the improvement of technological higher education in Greece should be indigenously generated.

In the absence of major structural changes in the economy, and with the Greek state continuing to be an obstacle to the developmental process, education was charged with changing society toward self-reliant development and modernization. However, as has been argued within a neo-Marxist perspective, education does not have a direct, lasting, and predictable effect upon the economic and political development of a nation. The outcome of educational institutions is significant only in interaction with the external political and occupational structures. Development planners and educational policy makers should therefore be more modest in the expectations they have for education as a malleable institutional solution for the complicated problems of development.

Finally, the question of convergence or divergence in the higher education patterns of semiperipheral societies can be raised. Here it would perhaps be interesting to ask in future research. Do the higher education patterns in other semiperipheral societies correspond to the Greek case? Is the Greek pattern similar to Portugal, Spain, or Italy? Are there patterns of convergence in the higher education systems of semiperipheral societies? Can the theory of semiperipheral societies explain the possibility of a convergence? And if there is divergence, is the theory of semiperipheral societies still useful as an analytical tool, or should other theoretical perspectives be considered?

Notes

1. I would like to express my thanks and gratitude to Robert Cowen, professor of education at the University of London’s Institute of Education, who supervised my PhD thesis titled “Higher Education Reforms in
Greece, France, and Germany: A Comparative Approach with Special Reference to the Nonuniversity Sector in Greece, as a European Semiperiphery (1999), on which this article is based.

2. Technological Educational Institutions (TEIs) [Τεχνολογικά Εκπαιδευτικά Ιδρύματα in Greece, Instituts Universitaires de Technologie (IUTs) in France, and Fachhochschulen (FHSs) in Germany.


7. Several models of nonuniversity institutions were introduced. The multipurpose model followed the characteristics of the community colleges of North America, offering vocational courses and qualifications, the first 2 years of the undergraduate university first-degree programs, and a wide range of continuing education. The specialized model appeared in Continental Europe and offered shorter, mostly vocationally oriented courses in a limited number of areas, leading to below-first-degree-level qualifications. The binary model, represented by the British polytechnics, offered courses and qualifications intended to be distinct from, but comparable to, those in universities (OECD, Alternatives to Universities, 12).


24. For the academic year 1992/93, there was a total of 212,745 students in the AEIs (the increase of graduates was 39 percent, compared with the academic year 1981/82) and a total of 85,068 students in the TEIs (the increase of graduates was 29 percent, compared with the academic year 1984/85) (OECD, *Reviews of National Policies for Education: Greece*, 109–10).
27. Ibid., 190–200.
35. It should be noted, however, that the dropout rate among undergraduates was very high.
47. The percentage of 18-year-old, new entrant students in France by type of institution was 2.2 in 1970 and 3.6 in 1980 for the IUTs, and 14.9 in 1970 and 18.5 in 1980 for the university. For the STSs (Sections de Techniciens Supérieurs)—the technical schools that belong to the lycées and award the BTS (Brevet de Technicien Supérieur) after 2 years of study—the relevant percentage was 1.7 in 1970 and 4.3 in 1980, evidence that the STSs expanded even more than the IUTs during that period (Jean-Jacques Paul and Jake Murdoch, “Higher Education and Graduate Employment in France,” *European Journal of Education* 35 [June 2000]: 180–81).
49. OECD, *Reviews of National Policies for Education: Greece*, 116–21. The cost-benefit approach to educational planning uses a quantitative methodology to calculate for any given country separate rates of return on past educational investments in primary, secondary, and higher education. This is done by comparing the previous average cost per student at each educational level with the subsequent average earnings of workers emerging from the different levels. National decision makers used this approach to determine how best to allocate future resources, both within education and between education and alternative types of investment (Philip H. Coombs, *The World Crisis in Education: The View from the Eighties* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985], 175).
50. Education is highly esteemed by all segments of the Greek society and is considered to be the defining factor both in shaping the Greek identity throughout its historic vicissitudes and in advancing the life chances of individuals. Yet, the existing system seems incapable of responding to this popular demand or meeting the aspirations of a highly motivated and gifted clientele (OECD, *Reviews of National Policies for Education: Greece*, 135).
51. From 1983, the new political motto in education was that 80 percent of the relevant age group should reach the level of *baccalauréat* in 15 years. This implied that, even if the level of *baccalauréat* did not open automatic

52. The rhetorical balance between efficiency and equality varied. Higher education policy rested on the conviction that not enough students continued beyond secondary education, that France should invest more in higher education, and that a sustained effort was required to develop a mass system of higher education (Guy Neave, “The Reform of French Higher Education, or the Ox and the Toad: A Fabulous Tale,” in Neave and van Vught, *Prometheus Bound*, 67–69).

53. Ibid., 55.


56. Ibid., 70.


58. Ibid., 49–50.


61. The oil crisis in the second half of the 1970s led to economic problems in the 1980s. In this context, public expenditure was cut, and higher education expansion slowed down (Gellert and Rau, “Diversification and Integration,” 91). The decline of quality in German higher education was an outcome of the stagnation of personnel and material resources that took place alongside a continuous growth of enrollments and a substantial increase in the average duration of studies (Kehm and Teichler, “Federal Republic of Germany,” 258). The policy of “opening up higher education” remained a controversial topic during the 1980s. Proposals (clearly resting on structural concepts) were introduced on how to avoid further increases in the number of students without introducing additional restrictions to admissions (Teichler, *Higher Education in the Federal Republic of Germany*, 29).


64. Ulrich Teichler, *Changing Patterns of the Higher Education System: The Experience of Three Decades* (London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 1988), 41–42. During the 1960s and 1970s reforms, there was an agreement on the concept of comprehensive higher education: all universities and FHSs should be institutionally merged into GHSs (Teichler, *Higher Education in the Federal Republic of Germany*, 33).


67. Teichler, “The Federal Republic of Germany,” 46. In the early 1990s, there was no longer a lack of graduates. This intensified the call for “quality,” related to the issues of “performance,” “autonomy,” and “effectiveness”/“efficiency” of the higher education system. In 1992, the Rectors’ Conference decided on a “Concept for the Development of Higher Education in Germany,” focusing on the improvement of the quality of research and teaching through the improvement of the sagging student-teacher ratio. Deregulation, more institutional autonomy, and a system of evaluating and monitoring quality and performance were particularly stressed (de Rudder, “The Quality Issue,” 201–16).


69. Gellert and Rau, “Diversification and Integration,” 89.


72. Ibid., 131–32.

75. The number of graduates in the labor force showed a constant increase over the last 4 decades: 1 million in 1960, 1.4 million in 1970, 2.3 million in 1980, and 3.1 million in 1990. In 1997, the absolute number reached about 5.5 million. In 1990, two-thirds were graduates from universities, and one-third were from FHSs. In the late 1990s, those with FHS degrees represented 37 percent of all employed graduates (Harald Schomburg, “Higher Education and Graduate Employment in Germany,” European Journal of Education 35 [June 2000]: 193).
76. TEIs have recently been upgraded with respect to the qualifications of the teaching personnel, the content of the curriculum, and the possibility given to graduates to study up to the level of the doctorate. For more information, see “Law under the Number 2016,” Journal of the Government of Greek Democracy, 1, no. 114 [in Greek] (June 11, 2001).
77. It was only at the beginning of the new millennium that Greece began to discuss issues such as a national system of evaluation (“The European Turn of the Greek AEl: The Upgrading of the TEI, the Institutes of Life-Long Learning and the New Evaluation System,” To Vima [in Greek], October 8, 2000, A48). A draft law concerning the (internal and external) evaluation of higher education was submitted to the Greek parliament in 2005 (“Preliminary Report to the Draft Law ‘Quality Assurance in Higher Education—Credit Transfer System—Diploma Supplement’” [in Greek] [Ministry of National Education and Religion Affairs, Athens, 2005], http://www.ypepth.gr/docs/eisigiti_ekthesi_s_n.doc).
79. Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Relevance of the Concept of Semiperiphery to Southern Europe,” in Semiperipheral Development: The Politics of Southern Europe in the Twentieth Century, ed. Giovanni Arrighi (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1985), 36. This had taken multiple classical forms, such as “external investments, comparatively lower wage levels for salaried work, use of this zone as a labor reserve area, fiscal extraction via indebtedness, mechanisms, and technological (and ideological) dependence” (36).
82. Ibid., 21.
84. Wallerstein, “The Relevance of the Concept of Semiperiphery to Southern Europe,” 38.
85. A semiperipheral state is a state with a roughly even balance of corelike and peripheral-like activities (it exports the peripheral products to core countries and core products to peripheral areas of the world system, doing both in roughly equivalent degrees); see Immanuel Wallerstein, “World-Systems Analysis: Theoretical and Interpretive Issues,” in World-Systems Analysis: Theory and Methodology, ed. Terence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982), 93; Alvin So, Social Change and Development: Modernization, Dependence and World-System Theories (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990), 180–81.
87. Ibid., 39.
90. Allan M. Williams, “Introduction,” in Southern Europe Transformed: Political and Economic Change in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, ed. Allan M. Williams (London: Harper & Row, 1984), 14–15. The Greek industrial structure was characterized by fragmentation, with small- and medium-sized, family- owned units being dominant, with the exception of the tobacco and chemicals sector. At the same time, there existed a technologically advanced sector based on, or controlled by, foreign capital (Ioakimidis, “Greece: From Military Dictatorship to Socialism,” 42).
96. Ibid., 44–59. According to Arrighi, Keyder, and Wallerstein, the deepening of the world depression had brought a change in the balance of social forces to the fore, by intensifying competition within and across national borders. Labor-repressive policies to enhance accumulation had lost their previous legitimacy, and social-democratic regimes had been established in southern Europe, in exchange for labor acceptance of the imperatives of accumulation in a capitalist world economy (Giovanni Arrighi, Caglar Keyder, and Immanuel Wallerstein, “Southern Europe in the World Economy in the Twentieth Century: Implications for Political and Social Transformations,” in Studies of Development and Change in the Modern World, ed. Michael T. Martin and Terry R. Kandal [New York: Oxford University Press, 1989], 415–16).
100. For more information, see Nicos P. Mouzelis, Politics in the Semiperiphery: Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialization in the Balkans and Latin America (London: Macmillan, 1986), xv–xvii.
UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL AUTÓNOMA DE MÉXICO AS A STATE-BUILDING UNIVERSITY

IMANOL ORDORIKA & BRIAN PUSSER

Visitors to Mexico and international scholars alike frequently notice that the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) is commonly called the máxima casa de estudios\(^1\) by a large majority of Mexicans (Rhoads and Durdella 2005). This title expresses the people’s deep appreciation of Mexico’s most prominent university. Admiration for the Universidad de la Nación\(^2\) or Mexico’s alma mater is deeply embedded in Mexican society and runs across different classes and social groups.

UNAM is one example of a distinctive institutional type that we identify as state-building universities. UNAM—and other such universities, including the Universidad de Buenos Aires, the Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, the Universidade de Sao Paulo, and the Universidad Central de Venezuela—are dominant teaching and research-oriented universities. They have also been central in building the material conditions for the expansion and consolidation, as well as the intellectual and social legitimacy, of their respective states. While scholars of international higher education have endeavored to understand universities on the periphery in light of models of higher education at the center of global economic and political power, insufficient attention has been paid to the role of state-building activities in defining prominent universities on the periphery (Ordorika forthcoming).

To conceptualize these universities, we have focused essentially on Latin American institutions and more particularly on the Mexican case of UNAM. However, there are a number of other institutions around the world for which a similar case could be made. These institutions are in most cases located in nations on the periphery of world economic and political power. While the state-building university shares many of the attributes of flagship universities in the United States and abroad, its distinctive and historically contingent role in the formation of states on the periphery marks the state-building university as a unique institution. However, under the political economic pressures of neoliberalism and globalization, UNAM, like other state-building universities, has been hard pressed to maintain its dominance and centrality in state projects. In this chapter, we examine the current state of these universities, the pressure they face to emulate the flagship model, and their future prospects. We also consider the likelihood that these institutions might transform themselves into something closer to flagship universities, and we offer some speculations on the meaning of such a shift for postsecondary education in nations on the periphery. Because we see UNAM as a fundamental example of the origin, emergence, and contemporary crisis of a state-building university, we present its case in some detail.
The Case of Unam

The history of UNAM goes back to the Real Pontificia Universidad de México, established in 1553. After undergoing a number of transformations over the centuries, the university was reconstituted in 1910. It has taken the better part of a century for the national university in Mexico to develop fully the attributes of a state-building university. At various points in its long history, UNAM has played a major role in the creation of such essential state institutions as public health ministries and the Mexican judicial system. The national university has also played a key role in the design of innumerable government bodies and offices and in educating and credentialing the civil servants who dominate those offices. UNAM has served since its founding as the training ground for Mexico’s political and economic elites as well as for a significant portion of the nation’s professionals (Ordorika 2003b).

Perhaps most important, at many key moments in Mexican history, UNAM has served as a focal point for the contest over the creation and re-creation of a national culture that placed such postsecondary functions as critical inquiry, knowledge production, social mobility, and political consciousness at its center. This role was particularly relevant during the late 1940s and the 1950s in a period that has been labeled the “Golden Era” of this university. The strength and clarity of purpose of UNAM during this period were deeply connected to its centrality in state-development projects. With the demise of these projects and the precarious state of the Mexican economy since the late 1970s, UNAM has faced critical challenges. Institutional identity has been eroded and the university’s capacity to respond to multiple demands has been called into question.

UNAM is not alone. The crisis of legitimacy that UNAM faces has emerged over the past 20 years in a context in which public institutions across the world, in every sphere of society, have been challenged. The crisis of legitimacy faced by state-building universities is fundamentally the crisis of public-sector institutions under siege from neoliberal restructuring and privatization projects (Marginson 1997; Levin 2001). In Mexico, as is the case with other nations on the periphery, the number of private higher education institutions and their enrollments have expanded, often with state support. In concert with the shifting postsecondary context, the discourse of institutional legitimacy has also changed. In the wider political economy, private organizations and practices have been depicted as more successful and efficient than their public counterparts, while public universities have become the object of close scrutiny and intense critiques. The intensity of the contest between the historical legitimacy of state-building universities and the contemporary push for market-based and privatized institutions reflects both the rising tide of neoliberal challenges and the continuing symbolic and functional importance of the public sector.

The enduring legitimacy of state-building universities is understandable, as these institutions are a powerful representation of the communal knowledge and power of the intellect in the state.

The Concept of the State-Building University

The concept of the state-building university is rooted in a broad understanding of the state as the web of relations between individuals and among social groups in a given societal arrangement shaped by historical traditions, culture, economic development, and political processes. The state is organized in institutions or apparatuses that express these social relations. These social relations are also essentially unequal and imply the domination of some groups over others. Both the government and universities are institutions of the state (Ordorika 2001, 2003b).

State-building universities are defined by their assumption of central roles in building nation-states. They have been key players in the development, expansion, and maintenance of the state as an integral entity as well as other state institutions (i.e., the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government), and particularly in the national project of building and extending postsecondary education. Their role as state-building institutions has been both historically contingent and key to shaping the character of national institutions and national postsecondary capacities.
State-building universities share many of the attributes of flagship universities, yet they are distinctive in important ways. First, state-building universities often embody the aspirations of the emerging society, with powerful linkages to historical and contemporary social and intellectual movements, in ways that are increasingly distinct from the emerging missions of flagships. Second, state-building universities stand as the reification of a particular form of national sovereignty, as sites of the preservation of collective autonomy through intellectual development and social contest. Third, the state-building university embodies the creation myth of the national intellectual, social, and political projects, the legacy and promise of scholarly purpose and national advancement. The presence of the state-building university reifies the symbolic national saga of national pride, opportunity, and development through higher education. It is an institution that nurtures the intellectual and personal aspirations of the nation and its people, its social movements, revolutions, and restorations. To describe these complex and often contradictory institutions, which are understood at the same time as temples of learning, crucibles of social justice, seedbeds of knowledge generation, and hotbeds of social protest, tests the limits of language. State-building universities exist not only in the hearts and minds of the people, they are of their hearts and minds. The institution is an anchor and a point of departure, both a statement of nación and a manifestation of el pueblo.

The purpose of this chapter is to delineate the conditions that have enabled state-building universities to emerge in nations on the periphery and to consider the degree to which this vision of the university can be preserved in a rapidly globalizing world. We believe UNAM, in its transformation into the máxima casa de estudios, and in its relationship with the Mexican state, the political system, and the broader society, offers a useful case for understanding the future of state-building universities on the periphery. It is also a helpful example of the distinction between the state-building universities and the flagships.

Flagship Universities

Can we talk about a Mexican flagship? The answer is a qualified “no.” Although state-building universities have been a distinct form that reached particular prominence during a developmentalist era, internal and external pressures are driving state-building universities to emulate flagship universities. To understand this assertion, and the pressures for adaptation faced by state-building universities, it is useful to explore the notion of the flagship university in its original context.

The term flagship university has three different though deeply interconnected connotations in the English-speaking world. First, it is used in a simple way as a strictly descriptive term. Second, it is a concept that characterizes a particular type of higher education institution that developed in the United States and subsequently appeared in a few other parts of the world. Finally, the term has been used in a prescriptive way to symbolize a model of an institution that prominent universities in every country face demands to emulate.

A Descriptive Term

References to flagship universities immediately imply an allusion to the leader, the most prominent or the finest among a broader group of state or national higher education institutions. The term flagship is derived from naval warfare and in its more contemporary usage refers to leading or prominent institutions in competitive arenas (e.g., the flagship of the department store chain). In these uses it entails an understanding that can be common to different nations, states, regions, and realities. flagship universities constitute, almost universally within the English-speaking world, postsecondary institutions that constitute the pinnacle of a state or national higher education system, those that excel among others. This understanding usually depicts the largest, oldest, most traditional, and most highly regarded institutions within a larger set of colleges or universities. The flagship has long implied the dominant public institutions in a postsecondary system. Contemporary analyses often include private universities. While this may be analytically appropriate for flagships, it is at odds with the historical development of the flagship concept and serves as a useful starting point for understanding the distinction between flagships and state-building universities.
The Historical Concept

In the United States, the flagship concept is fundamentally connected to the historical development of the land grant universities founded in the United States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Berdahl 1998).

The flagship concept is complex and, like the public universities it characterizes, its meaning has evolved historically. According to various authors (Rudolph 1965; Flexner 1994; Kerr 2001), the contemporary “American model” of higher education is the product of a fusion between two distinct higher education traditions: on the one hand, the German-based graduate schools that provided research and high level professional education (essentially in medicine and law); and on the other hand, the British tradition of the liberal arts college, with its strong emphasis on the humanities. The emerging hybrid form developed in the United States at private institutions like Johns Hopkins, Harvard, and Cornell.

The success of these institutions had a strong influence on the land grant colleges created under the Morrill acts of 1862 and 1890 (Kerr 2001). Over time, such powerful public state colleges as Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin evolved toward the research university model (Rudolph 1965). In this way, public land grants became flagships and then what Kerr termed, “multiversities,” on the way to becoming some of the world’s most influential postsecondary institutions. Berdahl offers three key reasons for the evolution of the flagship concept. The first is the expansion of enrollments in postsecondary education in the United States after World War II. That expansion led to the creation of branch campuses of the original state universities, branches that lacked the resources and prestige of the original campuses. Second, in the 1960s, as the college-going population continued to increase and more campuses were opened, state postsecondary systems were created—as was the case, for example, with the University of California system under the California Master Plan (Douglass 2000). Another key reason for the creation of systems was to ensure political and economic support for the original campuses as the number of public institutions within a state expanded. In this manner the original dominant public and land grant universities within each state emerged at the head of powerful systems of public universities with widespread popular and political support (Berdahl 1998).

The evolution of the flagship universities in the United States is linked to strong state support and commitment toward the emergence, expansion, and maintenance of public higher education institutions in the states. Historically this commitment has been expressed in state and federal support for undergraduate teaching, graduate and professional education, and scientific research (Kerr 2001). Over the past decade, flagships in the United States have rapidly raised undergraduate, graduate, and professional tuition in order to continue to compete for institutional prestige and influence (Geiger 2004). These tuition increases, in combination with rapidly increasing college costs, have strained relations between flagships and the state legislatures that have long supported them. These conflicts are not new phenomena.

Over the past two decades, the prestige competition has engendered significant contest over access and affordability in the flagships. In the 19th century, negative popular perceptions about the elite nature of emerging higher education institutions were in some places so strong that the creation of new public institutions was intensely contested. This was the case, for example, in the struggle over the foundation of the University of California (Douglass 2000). In spite of these conflicts, throughout the land grant movement new state universities that would combine elite teaching, training, and research were created across the United States.

There is a paradox embedded in the mission of the flagship university today. On the one hand, the flagship generally upholds the elite traditions of private universities, through selective admissions, high-quality research, and training for elite professions. On the other hand, the flagships endeavor to democratize access, as they attempt to create diverse student cohorts, participate in community service, and devote significant energy to generating public goods.

The latter goals, while less prominent in public discourse and policy debates, are expressed in the flagships through a variety of historical roles and commitments, including:

- dedication to professional education and training for the public good
- relative democratization of access to education, knowledge, and training
• a “democratic” role in the reproduction of society through the inculcation of democratic values and through the creation and recreation of identities, shared beliefs; and norms
• commitment to equality and social justice
• commitment to critical inquiry and autonomous knowledge creation

As a consequence of pursuing these goals, the flagship university has also come to symbolize a site of strong state commitment to the public good through federal and local state funding, oversight, and reinforcement of institutional legitimacy.

Flagships at the Core: A Prescriptive Model

Over the past two decades, a number of authors have pointed to rapid changes in the nature of flagship universities in the United States, with an increased emphasis on applied research, graduate and professional training, and a status competition for elite students (Slaughter and Leslie 1997; Kirp 2003; Geiger 2004; Slaughter and Rhoades 2004). The titles and content of a set of reports and policy documents available on the Internet support this emerging vision as they suggest a different understanding of the notion of flagship university. Louisiana State University’s LSU campus online news reports an agenda:

The National Flagship Agenda is a seven-year plan focused on the historical significance of the year 2010, LSU’s 150th anniversary. The agenda has been designed to build the University into a nationally competitive flagship university and serve the short- and long-term interests of Louisiana. Focusing on the action steps will increase research and scholarly productivity and will improve the quality and competitiveness of our graduate and undergraduate students.4

A similar commitment to competitiveness and funded research has begun to emerge at universities beyond the United States. The University of Edinburgh’s 1999–2000 annual report calls for “A Flagship University for Scotland,” stressing the importance of a “commitment to internationalism” and the need to attract international students from beyond the European Union in an “increasingly competitive environment.”5 A web search for flagship universities reveals other examples like these for the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom.

These emerging mission statements reveal a different view of the flagship. From this perspective, a flagship university is a symbol of the changing contemporary relationship between the state and higher education and a vehicle for a new set of social and individual aspirations (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004). Contemporary university leaders, policymakers, and administrators cite similar characteristics of the emerging flagship ideal:

• knowledge production–centered (emphasis on research and graduate studies)
• strong ties to business and the knowledge economy
• competitive (for students and funds)
• focused on excellence and prestige
• productive and efficient
• locally grounded and internationally oriented
• autonomous through financial diversity

Not surprisingly, these emerging redefinitions of the flagship university are consistent with those that define a category of prominent universities variously labeled as entrepreneurial universities (Clark 1998), enterprise universities (Marginson and Considine 2000), or centers of academic capitalism (Slaughter and Leslie 1997; Slaughter and Rhoades 2004). What these redefinitions share in common is a portrayal of the most successful research universities in Europe and the United States in a global competition for greater resources, prestige, and legitimacy. Despite the rapid adaptation to the demands of globalization at elite universities, most retain one element central to the historical role of flagships: a discursive emphasis on service to the local community, state, and region.
Contemporary research on postsecondary organization and governance has also depicted flagship universities as political institutions (Pusser 2003; Ordorika 2003b). As such, they are sites of interest group competition over a range of issues, including student access, knowledge creation, funded research, and a myriad of social issues (Pusser forthcoming). As interest group competition has intensified, the flagships have increasingly aligned themselves with industry and the private sector, at increasing distance from their historical sources of legitimacy (Pusser, Slaughter, and Thomas forthcoming; Slaughter and Rhoades 2004).

The flagship is also a self-referential and self-replicating concept. As the leaders of the postsecondary arena, the flagships shape and give substance to the meaning of excellence in academe and in turn legitimize the entrepreneurial and political behaviors that solidify their positions as leaders. The concept of the American flagship university has become enticing to postsecondary institutions around the world on the strength of its success—where those global perceptions of flagship success, while genuine, are nonetheless shaped by the flagships themselves. In the words of Clark Kerr:

The American research grant university has been an enormous intellectual success, particularly in the sciences. Since 1950, when the development of the federal research grant universities was in its infancy, 55 percent of all Nobel and Fields (mathematics) prizes have been awarded to scholars resident in the United States; in the 1980s, 50 percent of all citations in leading scientific journals around the world were to members of the same group; in 1990, 50 percent of all patents registered in the United States were of U.S. origin; and by 1990, the United States had 180,000 graduate students from foreign nations, clearly making it the world center of graduate study. Not since Italy in the early centuries of the rise of universities in western Europe has any single nation so dominated intellectual life. (Kerr 2001, 151)

The flagship model is a prescriptive model because of the power of the flagship concept in international higher education. The flagship form is so dominant in discourse, planning, and prestige rankings that the concept exerts an almost coercive force on institutions, systems, and policymakers. As Kerr noted, the hegemonic influence of the American flagship has been unrivaled for centuries. That dominance establishes global norms for postsecondary excellence and demands conformity from those institutions and systems that would emulate the success of the American flagship model. Ironically, despite a perpetual contest within the United States over the appropriate missions of the flagships, the idealized version of the flagship may reduce the traditional role of the university in the periphery as a site of social protest and contest. Instead, peripheral universities increasingly find themselves contesting demands to conform to the idealized norms of the American flagship. The prescriptive concept of the flagship also shapes the criteria for ranking postsecondary institutions and establishing international benchmarks for institutional performance.6

Flagships on the Periphery?

There is no doubt that American flagships are the source of the dominant postsecondary model in contemporary society and that they are the most successful institutions within that model. Yet, to understand whether it is appropriate to expect that model to establish itself on the periphery turns our attention to three key questions: (1) Is the flagship concept understood on the periphery in the same way as it is understood at the core? (2) Is it appropriate to adopt the American flagship model in peripheral countries? (3) If the flagship model can be adopted in the periphery, will it supplant the state-building institutions?

Where flagship university refers to the most notable, most important, finest, or even largest institutions in a country we see little conflict between the concept of a flagship and that of a state-building university. In either case the term used refers to the most distinctive colleges or universities at a state, regional, or national level.

Where the concept of the flagship diverges significantly from the state-building university is when each institution is considered in its own historical perspective and grounded in its specific context. The American flagship and the state-building universities on the periphery considered in historical context are quite distinctive, and distinct, from one another. This is largely due to the
unique historical processes and events that have shaped individual institutional traditions, normative values, and organizational cultures and beliefs. The concept that distinguishes flagships and state-building universities as unique institutional archetypes and distinguishes one university from another within those archetypes is *historical centrality*. Historical centrality is shaped by social, political, economic, and cultural processes occurring within higher education institutions and between those institutions and other institutions of the state, social actors, and economic forces. It is also an outcome of the internal dynamics of the professions and the disciplines, as well as a consequence of teaching and knowledge-creation processes that take place within colleges and universities. Flagships and state-building universities have quite different degrees of historical centrality in their respective states. In part, this is due to the historical decentralization of higher education in the United States, where there are many unique and prominent state universities, but no national university. In many countries on the periphery there are national universities, with considerable historical centrality in the creation and sustenance of their respective states.

As noted earlier, the prescriptive influence of the flagship university generates coercive pressures on aspiring institutions throughout the world to conform to the norms of the American flagship and to adapt the structures and policies associated with the flagship. Those demands have historically been met with considerable contest and resistance. It is important in the case of institutions on the global periphery to focus on the dynamic concept of the university as a contested autonomous space, the process of opposition and resistance to demands to emulate the successful and dominant model from the core. The ways in which higher education institutions and constituents have resisted the prescriptive norms of the flagship model are central to understanding the distinction between flagships and state-building universities and the challenge that faces those who endeavor to create and sustain flagships on the periphery.

**Distinctiveness, Historical Centrality, and Contested Autonomous Space**

A thorough understanding of most prominent public research universities on the periphery requires that we move away from implicit comparisons between universities on the periphery and the dominant institutions at the core. An effective comparison must be grounded in historical and contextual explanations for institutional distinctiveness and centrality on the periphery. Further, the university as a public sphere, an autonomous space for contest and resistance to conformity (Pusser forthcoming) has historically been a major component of the construction and shaping of colleges and universities on the periphery. In postcolonial peripheral countries, the university itself, as a concept and as an organization, is a historical product of contest entailing resistance and acquiescence to colonial powers and their hegemonic projects. This resistance to coercion by dominant models can be thought of as contested conformity. It can be located in any number of historical and contemporary struggles over higher education on the periphery (Ordorika 2003b).

Using UNAM as a lens for bringing clarity to these concepts, we turn attention to the historical contests, competing forces, and contradictions that have shaped UNAM’s prominent position as a state-building university within Mexico. We then apply the insights from UNAM in an analysis of the role of distinctiveness, historical centrality, and the university as a contested autonomous space in distinguishing state-building universities from flagships.

**La Universidad de la Nación as a Distinctive Institution**

UNAM is the most legitimate and prestigious of all Mexican universities. It is also the most distinctive, distinguished by its unprecedented mix of academic programs and unique relationship to the state. The magnitude, centrality, and history of UNAM have firmly rooted the university within the Mexican society. UNAM is also involved in a wide array of activities beyond the realm of higher education, including government, economics, business, and health care. UNAM is truly Mexico’s university.

As with other state-building universities, UNAM’s distinctiveness, its historical centrality, and its legacy of resistance to conformity are key to its legitimacy and prestige. Legitimacy and prestige, in turn, are deeply related but distinct indicators of the status of UNAM. One cannot
understand UNAM, or the nature of state-building universities, without understanding the sources of the legitimacy and prestige these institutions have long enjoyed.

**The Attributes of UNAM**

UNAM is a large and multifaceted institution. The university offers three levels of degrees: baccalaureate, undergraduate (which includes professional schools), and graduate studies. These levels encompass 2 baccalaureate programs; 70 undergraduate and professional programs, as well as 9 technical and vocational programs; 45 doctoral, 110 master’s, and 60 specialized study programs.

In the 2003–2004 academic year, nearly 270,000 students were enrolled at UNAM; 143,405 in undergraduate and professional programs, 104,554 in baccalaureate programs, and 18,987 in graduate programs. UNAM accounted for 3 percent of the nation’s baccalaureate enrollments and 7 percent of its undergraduate enrollments. UNAM also held 13 percent of total national graduate enrollments, with 30 percent of the enrollments in specialized studies, 6 percent of the master’s programs, and 26 percent of the doctoral programs. According to data provided by CONACYT (Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología [National Council for Technology]), Mexico’s national science and research government agency, in 2003 UNAM awarded 30 percent of Mexican doctoral degrees.

Research at UNAM is organized into two systems: the sciences (natural and physical) and the social sciences (including the humanities). Research takes place in 26 research institutes, 13 research centers, and many schools and departments. It is estimated that more than 50 percent of all research in Mexico takes place at UNAM. In 2003, the university produced 37 percent of all research articles in Mexico in the physical sciences that were published in international refereed journals, and in 2004, faculty at UNAM comprised 29 percent of the nation’s academic researchers. UNAM has also been entrusted with the National Seismologic System as well as the National Observatory and sails two research vessels along the Mexican coasts. The university is also a repository of Mexico’s most important archives and book collections, held in the National Library administered by UNAM.

The university’s reputation is further enhanced by the more than 60,000 extension programs and cultural events sponsored by UNAM each year. These presentations include musical concerts, theatrical performances, dance recitals, literary readings, movies, conferences, book presentations, guided tours, and seminars. UNAM has one of the nation’s most prestigious classical music orchestras (Orquesta Filarmónica de la UNAM); a number of arts and sciences museums; several cinemas, theaters, and music halls; and even a professional soccer team that won the last two national league championships. Radio UNAM’s two frequencies reach the entire country and TV UNAM, though not a channel on open access television, is a constant presence through private and public broadcasts.

The Ciudad Universitaria, the extensive campus built in the 1950s, is the center of UNAM’s activities and a key site for public gatherings in Mexico City. Many of its buildings host murals by Mexico’s most famous artists, including Rivera, O’Gorman, Siqueiros, and Chávez Morado. In addition to Ciudad Universitaria there are 14 baccalaureate and 5 graduate and undergraduate campuses in Mexico City, augmented by research and graduate campuses in other states and cities, including Cuernavaca, Ensenada, Mérida, Morelia, and Tlaxcala.

As is the case for other state-building universities, UNAM is more than a university—it is a distinctive institution of the state. The depth and breadth of its offerings demonstrate the extent of its intellectual, social, cultural, and political activities; and its essential contributions set it clearly apart from other institutions in the country. They also clearly distinguish UNAM from flagship universities on a number of dimensions. First, there are many flagships in the United States, but only one national university in Mexico. Second, while there are some flagships that have a complexity and breadth of academic and research offerings similar to what is available at UNAM, none approach the cultural, political, and social prominence of UNAM. It can be argued that all of the flagships of the United States taken together do not influence the national character to the degree that UNAM shapes the Mexican state. It is also the case that UNAM emerged as the sole higher education institution in Mexico and remained so for many years. As the system expanded and new universities were created, UNAM became the pinnacle of a relatively undifferentiated higher education arrangement.
Unlike prominent universities in master-planned postsecondary systems, UNAM has evolved with many of the responsibilities of a differentiated system built into its own structure and processes. Finally, flagships in the United States differ in degree rather than in kind. The University of California, the University of Texas, the University of Michigan, Harvard University, and Yale University have a great deal in common. If one stands above the others at a particular moment, it is for the quality of its undergraduate education, the total size of its research productivity, and the excellence of its graduate schools; and those distinctions are subject to rapid change. UNAM, like many other state-building universities, has since its founding been like no other Mexican institution.

The historical centrality of the UNAM and much of its legitimacy can be explained by the fact that the institution has been closely linked to many of the most significant events in Mexican history. As is the case with other state-building institutions, UNAM has shaped the Mexican state and, in turn, its intense involvement with the country’s key historical moments has shaped UNAM. This symbiotic process of shaping and being shaped, often through contest, is central to understanding the historical centrality of state-building institutions. While flagships in the United States have had significant influence upon the American political economy (Pusser 2003), the impact has been of an entirely different magnitude than the influence exerted by state-building universities.

Antecedents of the Universidad Nacional

UNAM in its contemporary form was established in 1945 by an act of the Mexican Congress. The antecedents of the university, however, can be traced to the Real y Pontificia Universidad de México, founded by a royal decree in 1551. In the aftermath of the war of independence and through the early years of the new republic, the Real y Pontificia Universidad suffered a long period of uncertainty and lack of stability leading to its closure in 1867. Despite the demise of this first incarnation of the national university, its memory stands as a powerful symbol of Mexican higher education, a tradition that predates the founding of Harvard College, with a lineage older than that of the contemporary Mexican state. The power of the symbol of the ancestral university, progenitor of the modern university and the modern state, has given UNAM an almost transcendental legitimacy in its conflicts with the various national regimes that have sought to use the state to shape the university.

Along with a powerful symbolic legacy, modern Mexican higher education inherited four strong principles of the colonial university that shape UNAM today. These were the principles of autonomy, internal election of university officials, student participation in university governance, and public funding for the university (Ordorika 2003b).

Autonomy and Academic Freedom

The university was reestablished in its modern form through the consolidation of existing postsecondary institutions in 1910, at the end of the 40-year dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz. The reconstituted university was called Universidad Nacional de México (Alvarado 1984; Marsiske 1985). That iteration of the institution reflected a complex mixture of philosophical traditions: conservative scholasticism, spiritual humanism, and positivism. The relationship between the national university and the populist governments emerging from the Mexican revolution was extremely confrontational. After considerable conflict, the tension between the university and the Mexican state was eased in 1929 by the formal granting of autonomy from the state to the university. The tension between the desire for self-governance by the universitarios and the state’s continuing interest in shaping national educational practices also gave rise to a powerful norm of academic freedom within the university.

Over time, the conflict between the university and the state emerged as a symbol of the struggle between urban middle classes that had been sidelined by the populist policies of the Mexican state and the leadership of the revolution. It was in every sense a political conflict involving definitions of society and the university (Ordorika 2003b). At such defining moments the historical centrality of the university as state-building institution comes into focus. The university becomes both site and symbol of broader national contests, shaping those contests as it is shaped by the conflict.
Developmentalism and Authoritarianism

In the ensuing years UNAM played a major role in the consolidation of the authoritarian political system and in the subsequent construction of a developmentalist state, one devoted to self-determination in economic and social improvement and increased independence in core-periphery relations (Marini 1994; Wallerstein 2004). The university was instrumental in the expansion of the urban middle class that accompanied national economic growth from the 1940s to the early 1960s (Guevara Niebla 1980). University credentialing and professional preparation were the vehicles for social mobility through which urban middle classes developed into a significant segment of Mexican society. The prestige of UNAM’s degrees was widely advertised by professionals in urban and rural settings alike. To this day it is common to see physicians, engineers, and lawyers publicizing their UNAM degrees as a mark of expertise, merit, and high professional standards.

*Universitarios* were also instrumental in the creation of new public institutions of the state. Physicians from UNAM created the Ministry of Health as well as the most important National Institutes of Health. Engineers from the university organized and staffed the Ministry of Public Works, while lawyers trained at UNAM created the modern judicial system and wrote significant pieces of legislation that constituted the foundations of the Mexican state.

Beginning in the 1940s, UNAM also gave form and provided leadership for the Mexican political system. In 1946 Miguel Alemán was elected president of Mexico. He was the first president after the revolution who was not a member of the army, and he was a graduate of UNAM. Since that time *universitarios* have dominated government posts at every level. UNAM became the single most significant source of formal political leaders in the country (Smith 1979; Camp 1984, 1985). Roderic Ai Camp (2002) has argued that UNAM became the most important center for elite formation, as politicians, intellectuals, businesspeople, and a few members of the Catholic and military hierarchies were educated and recruited and then created networks at UNAM. From 1946 to 1994 every Mexican president was a graduate of UNAM.

Between 1940 and 1968, the Mexican state was governed by a powerful and politically stable authoritarian regime. A primary source of its legitimacy was its ability to incorporate professional expertise and intellectual networks from the national university. UNAM helped to shape, strengthen, and reproduce an authoritarian political system, and in turn UNAM was shaped by Mexican authoritarianism. These professional groups also became the most powerful actors within UNAM, as attorneys, physicians, and engineers controlled the governing board, the rectorship, and the university council (Ordorika 2003b).

The State-Building University and the Discourse of National Unity

The developmentalist state was grounded in a discourse of class collaboration and national unity. UNAM contributed in many ways to the creation and re-creation of this discourse and that society. Its very existence epitomized the notion of a unified, merit-based society as a vehicle of social mobility. This key attribute of UNAM is one that has been widely shared by state-building universities in other nations.

The role of UNAM as a state-builder, a distinguished institution of the developmentalist state, and a vehicle for social mobility earned it great legitimacy in the eyes of Mexican society. As a key function of the authoritarian state and a central source of legitimacy for that state, UNAM was held in great esteem by many sectors of Mexican society.

In this context, academic groups and intellectuals within UNAM expanded their research and related activities. Although there are important antecedents, organized research and knowledge production in Mexico are essentially products of the 1960s and 1970s. During these early years, research in the sciences and the humanities essentially took place at UNAM. Few other institutions, the National Institutes of Health among them, were active in research activities. While research in the sciences and humanities added to UNAM’s prestige, research and knowledge creation were secondary to the professional degree orientation of UNAM in the opinion of the government, the public, and the university itself.
The University as a Contested Autonomous Space

Alongside its centrality in the academic, social, and economic life of Mexico, UNAM plays a critical role as a symbol, a site, and an instrument in relation to state political contests (Ordorika 2003a; Pusser 2003). In part, this function of UNAM emerged from the university’s defiant stance toward the populist governments of the revolution. Since that time, while UNAM has by no means been a monolithic political entity, various constituencies within the university have been awarded a certain degree of leniency by the state despite their defiant stances and critical discourses at crucial political moments (Ordorika forthcoming). The university has also served as a central public sphere, which Pusser (forthcoming) has described as “a space that is at once physical, symbolic, cultural, political and semantic, not in relation to the State or the broader political economy but as a site of complex, autonomous contest in its own right.” This concept of UNAM as a critical oasis in the midst of state contest further increased its legitimacy among vast segments of Mexican society. The role of the university as a public sphere is another defining characteristic of state-building universities. While it has been argued that a number of flagship universities have served as key public spheres at various historical moments (Pusser forthcoming), this characteristic is decidedly more prevalent at state-building universities. However, over the past four decades state-building universities and flagships have faced new and significant challenges to their autonomy.

The End of Developmentalism in the Late 20th Century

The radical exercise of critique and the rebellious stance of university students in Mexico in the 1960s foreshadowed a coming crisis of developmentalism and a loss of legitimacy for the authoritarian political system. The miraculous economic growth that had characterized the developmentalist state was coming to an end, and the subsequent economic crises diminished the expectations of the professional urban middle classes. In 1968 the political expression of dissatisfaction took the form of a massive protest movement at UNAM, Instituto Politécnico Nacional, and other higher education institutions, where students challenged the foundations of the authoritarian political system (Gonzalez de Alba 1971; Guevara 1990; Martinez della Rocca 1986; Ordorika 2003b). The ferocious repression exercised by the government against students, faculty, and university buildings alike shattered the relationship between the universitarios and the Mexican state. In the wake of the economic crises of 1976 and 1982, the connections from the university to national economic development and the political system were further eroded. Government-enforced economic structural adjustment policies profoundly impacted public higher education and UNAM was no exception. In spite of the increasing difficulties of the authoritarian political regime, UNAM’s elites maintained their close ties with the government and the government party.

Over the past 25 years, efforts to impose structural adjustment policies and efficiency models have dominated the state-university relationship at UNAM and at state-building universities around the world (Ordorika 2004). During this period, traditional sources of legitimacy and prestige have been challenged, and, like many other public institutions, UNAM has become the object of neoliberal challenges. Under the guise of critiques of the efficiency and quality of the university, the traditional role of the institution has been called into question.

The State-Building University in Crisis

The past two decades have introduced a unique period of crisis for state-building universities, one that emerges from the end of developmentalism. The shift from developmentalist policies to neoliberal restructuring has entailed changes in form, process, and discourse that challenge the historical centrality, autonomous space, and distinctiveness of state-building universities. As these institutions increasingly emulate flagship universities, these shifts have also altered the relationship between the state and state-building institutions.

This crisis is clearly evident in the case of UNAM. Since the 1970s, in response to external demands, dominant groups within the university have redefined institutional priorities (Muñoz Garcia 2002; Díaz Barriga 1997b; Ordorika 2004). Research for economic development and elite
professional education have been framed as the most appropriate objectives of UNAM. Though the university continues to serve vast numbers of students, undergraduate education has become secondary to research institutes and centers that have been redefined as the core of the university. Over the past decade even the hegemony of traditional research practices at UNAM has been challenged by demands for entrepreneurial postsecondary organization. As is the case at postsecondary institutions around the world, a rather nebulous discourse of efficiency and productivity has been adopted, with emphasis placed on commercial knowledge production, competitiveness, excellence, and economic development at the expense of undergraduate studies, democratization, and social justice (Marginson and Considine 2000; Slaughter and Rhoades 2004).

Along these lines, Mexican university administrators have established faculty evaluations and merit pay systems modeled on those used by successful flagships (Ordorika 2004; Bensimon and Ordorika forthcoming). Research has been privileged over teaching, and faculty members have been driven into intense competition for their salaries and research funds. Articles published in international journals have been more highly valued than those placed in refereed national or local academic publications with significant implications for national research, academic work, and the role of the faculty as a social body (Díaz Barriga 1997a; Canales Sánchez 2001; Acosta Silva 2004).

Under the banner of increasing quality, admissions regulations were changed and access to UNAM restricted. Calls for “financial diversification” were immediately translated into proposals for significant tuition increases. As the historical record demonstrates, state-building universities do not respond willingly to state coercion. The attempted transformations at UNAM generated intense conflicts in 1986, 1991, and again in 1999. After protracted public contest, tuition increases were reversed three times in response to student movements and prolonged strikes (Ordorika 2006).

The resistance at UNAM has come at a great cost. Attacks by government officials and the business community have increased throughout these contests. However, efforts to introduce the entrepreneurial model of postsecondary organization have contravened the historical understandings of UNAM as a state-building university with commitment to access and the redress of inequality. Knowledge creation and research, as a new source of prestige, is not immediately appealing to broad segments of the Mexican population. As the social responsibilities and aims of an institution like UNAM are redefined so that the institution becomes a site for state interaction with markets and global development, the historical centrality of the institution as the harbor of the aspirations of those traditionally excluded from higher education has been diminished. For a variety of reasons, the effort to move to a flagship model has alienated many of UNAM’s constituencies, just as the move from developmentalism to neoliberal restructuring has alienated many constituencies on the periphery.

Flagships and the Future of Higher Education on the Periphery

The future of higher education institutions in the peripheral societies of a globalized world is unclear. Nascent adaptations to globalization and neoliberal restructuring have diminished the legitimacy of state-building universities. The purported benefits of the flagship model loom large in postsecondary planning on the periphery, yet we are reluctant to predict the evolution of state-building universities into flagships, and even more reluctant to predict success for such transformations. There are two fundamental reasons for caution. First, the flagships themselves are changing rapidly, moving in an intense drive for prestige toward ever-more-elite undergraduate training, professional credentialing, and commercially focused research (Geiger 2004; Slaughter and Rhoades 2004). In the process, public and private flagships have lost a considerable degree of the “public” character and legitimacy that could be traced, in the case of the publics to their land grant origins, and in the case of the private flagships to their role in the development of the political economy in the United States after World War II. As they have turned increasingly to private sources of funding, higher tuition, the commercialization of academic work, and demands for greater institutional autonomy, the flagships have also reduced their legitimacy as public spheres (Pusser forthcoming). Taken together, these shifts move the flagship model farther from the historically central and distinct projects of the state-building universities, broad access, the redress of inequality, and knowledge production for the benefit of society.
Our second caveat with regard to the transformation of state-building universities into flagships emerges from our understanding of historical centrality and distinctiveness as keys to understanding higher education on the periphery. We have argued here that the distinctiveness of a university like UNAM, its magnitude, moral authority, relevance, and impact, can only be understood as part of a dynamic historical process. The prestige and legitimacy of UNAM developed from historical interactions between the university, society, and the state in the political, economic, social, and cultural realms. It is the perception of its contribution to the public good at the national and the individual levels that has sustained the power of UNAM as a state-building university. Although higher education institutions at the periphery have historically faced demands to conform to visions and models from the dominant countries, state-building universities have led the resistance. While their future is undoubtedly linked to the success of emerging political-economic forces pressuring states on the periphery, history suggests it is the distinctive character of state-building universities and their ability to serve as sites of contest that have enabled them to transcend pressures for adaptation across various epochs.

There is no doubt that UNAM remains the most important research institution in Mexico, as do other state-building universities in their respective contexts. The relevance of UNAM in this regard is widely recognized nationally and internationally. However, the connection between post-secondary research, knowledge creation, and the public good for a peripheral country in the context of globalization is unclear. Prestige derived from international recognition of disciplinary excellence and significant external research funding is not enough to maintain the legitimacy of an institution like UNAM.

As sociohistorical products, legitimacy and prestige are not static concepts. UNAM and other state-building universities on the periphery are in a critical phase of their histories. The contemporary sources of prestige for universities at the periphery are not widely understood. Of more immediate concern, there is an intense contest over how to define the legitimate activities of these institutions. The dominant contemporary administrative approach, a comprehensive effort to emulate the flagship model, has had two distinct and negative effects. Demands for conformity to a flagship model have increased internal conflict, and they have weakened the internal cohesion of the university. In the case of UNAM these conditions have been exacerbated by the continuing adherence to authoritarian practices and structures of university governance, despite democratic changes occurring in the broader society and the Mexican political system. On balance, efforts to conform to the goals of the flagship model have widened the distance between UNAM and its traditional constituency, the Mexican people.

Nevertheless, UNAM and the other state-building universities face considerable pressure to emulate flagships. Without remarkable changes in the initial pattern of demands for adaptation, there is little likelihood for success in such a transformation. In pursuit of flagship status, UNAM and other state-building universities would be expected to increase their reliance on private funding and industry support. They would be encouraged to enhance their infrastructures to compete for partnerships with private commercial ventures, emphasize research with the potential for patent and licensing income, and establish partnerships with Mexican and multinational corporations for research and development. Revenues would have to be reallocated, shifting funds away from undergraduate and professional education in favor of investments in graduate studies and commercial research activities. Greater financial resources would need to be devoted to the hard sciences and technology development to the detriment of the social sciences and the humanities. Tuition would have to be increased. Student admissions practices and enrollment guidelines would need to be revised to increase selectivity and institutional prestige. As we have argued throughout this work, these policies run counter to the essential historical purposes and commitments of state-building universities.

In the final analysis, state-building universities differ from one another, and from flagships, in many of the same ways as the states from which they have emerged differ. The crises faced by state-building universities, and by flagships, reflect state crises in their respective national contexts. At the beginning of the 21st century the cradle of global flagships, the United States, faces exceptional political polarization and uncertainty over the future of public and private institutions of all sorts. As the flagships struggle to maintain their prestige and their historical commitments to
public and private goods, they reflect the uncertainty at the center of globalization projects (Wallerstein 2004).

Postsecondary institutions that are distinctive, are historically central, and resist demands for conformity as they serve as sites for contest succeed by establishing themselves in mutually supportive relationships with the state. States that foster the centrality of public higher education, privilege the creation of critical discourse and knowledge production, nurture universities as public spheres, and are dedicated to the redress of social, economic, and political inequality can foster a symbiotic relationship with a state-building university. This sort of collaboration can be sustained for universities at the core and on the periphery. As the case of UNAM demonstrates, state-building universities on the periphery offer an important historical lesson for the flagships at the core. Despite repeated challenges from authoritarian regimes and a variety of internal and exogenous shocks and crises, UNAM has persisted by relying on its historical commitment to serve the people of Mexico and to build the Mexican state. When a state moves away from its commitment to support the missions of its essential institutions, it reveals its own crisis and moves away from its own history and sources of legitimacy. Our hope for the future is that the prominent institutions of higher education and their respective states endeavor to serve as sites for critical inquiry and contest at this essential juncture and remain mindful that one cannot succeed without the other.

Notes

1. Máxima casa de estudios can be translated as the “highest house of studies” or the “highest institution of knowledge.”
2. This title can be translated as the “nation’s university.”
3. The nation and the people.
7. In the Mexican case, baccalaureate (or preparatory) refers to a secondary degree that is required to move into the higher education system. This component of the secondary process is labeled Educación Media Superior (middle higher education) in the Mexican education system.
10. See sources in note 9.
11. This is the term used to refer to members of the university—it includes faculty as well as students.
12. Between 1982 and 1988 federal funding for all levels of education decreased 43.65 percent; UNAM’s budget was reduced by 49.47 percent between 1981 and 1987 (Martínez Della Rocca and Ordorika 1993).
13. UNAM was ranked among the top 100 universities by the Times Higher Education Supplement. According to this benchmark UNAM is the first institution in Latin America and also among the Spanish-speaking universities of the world. In 2004 UNAM was ranked among the top 200 universities in the world in the Academic Ranking of World Universities of 2004, by the Institute of Higher Education, Shanghai Jiao Tong University. According the this ranking UNAM is first among Latin American universities and second among universities from Spanish-speaking countries.
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Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, and the Asian Tigers all provide excellent examples of the successes and failures of globalization. Although the explanations of globalization are quite numerous, Giddens (1990, p. 64) provided a simple and elegant definition that matches well the argument we advance in this chapter: “Globalization can thus be defined as the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa.” This definition helps clarify Giddens’s observation that “every cup of coffee contains within it the whole history of Western imperialism” (p. 120). This is, of course, a defining statement for our focus in this chapter on Brazil.

Our intent in this chapter is to discuss, first, the role that neoliberal theory plays in the economic, social, and cultural crisis in the developing world. In pursuit of our argument, we present supporting literature that addresses the failure of the Washington consensus, particularly in South America, where pressure to adapt the neoliberal policies of privatization and import substitution were strongest from external agencies. Our principal argument here is that nations have the inherent right of sovereignty to set their own economic and social policy. We argue further that these sovereign nations are also in the best position to understand the cultural and social consequences of externally imposed policies, particularly when such policies are not in the best interests of the country and its people. As the Commission of Economics for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL—a UN agency) has argued, breaking out of the “iron circle of underdevelopment” should be the goal, as opposed to serving the hegemonic needs of the core (Folha de São Paulo 2002, p. A23). In our discussion we also note the rise of regionalism in the face of globalization. The consequences of globalization are confusing at best, especially for countries on the periphery that are losing their identities. Giddens (1990, p. 66) noted, “Nation-states, it is held, are becoming progressively less sovereign than they used to be in terms of controls over their own affairs.” He divided the world system into three units: the core, the semiperiphery, and the periphery. Although such a division is fraught with difficulties, it does avoid the political relegation of countries to the “third world.” Giddens’s division does recognize, however, the economic reality of the major economic powers (United States, Japan, and Europe as the core), the newly industrialized or semiperipheral countries (e.g., Brazil, Mexico, and the Asian Tigers), and the peripheral countries that are primarily agricultural and can provide only cheap labor (e.g., Cambodia, Vietnam, and much of Africa).

Central to our argument on development in the face of globalization is the priority that education, principally higher education, must take in solving the economic and social problems at the regional and national levels. We are in complete agreement with Stiglitz (2002, p. 82) that “education is at the core of development.” How education is to solve the problems of development at the national level is an unresolved issue that requires the integration of all levels of education within a country. As with the other contributors to this book, our focus is on how higher education in particular is necessary to mediate the effects of globalization through local educational solutions. Universities,
as the major national institutions that produce knowledge, have a special social obligation to seek locally developed solutions to global problems. We argue, however, that globalization devalues the knowledge production of national universities. Under the dictates of neoliberal globalization, externally imposed solutions have the highest currency, so there is little need to support or develop an internal infrastructure of knowledge. From the perspective of the semiperiphery and periphery, local solutions and problems are rendered irrelevant, as are local universities and the intellectuals within them.

Following our consideration of the literature on the consequences of externally imposed solutions to globalization and the declining role of universities, we turn to Brazil as an example of a country that despite globalization is exercising its national sovereignty by developing locally derived alternatives to education. In particular, Brazil has created internally based educational programs through the Brazilian Service of Support to Micro and Small Enterprises (SEBRAE) and TELECURSO (a televised distance education program funded by the Roberto Marinho Foundation). SEBRAE is a Brazilian agency that focuses on the educational needs of small business owners, whereas TELECURSO provides education for young people and adult learners who missed the opportunities for basic education. This need to educate those who missed an earlier opportunity for education is a critical problem for Brazil and other newly industrialized countries. The continuing need to educate adults for whom advanced or even basic education was never a possibility prevents the full development of the workforce and continues exclusion on the basis of race and class. Educational and government agencies have a specific role to play in helping provide education to develop the capacity of the adult population. Whereas in developed countries education of adults is considered “continuing education,” in developing countries the education of adults is basic education, or, as Paulo Freire (1970) named it, the “pedagogy of the oppressed.” Universities, in particular, are in the best position to foster the educational development of adults because they are engaged in teacher education and social development programs. University economics and sociology professors in developing countries also are typically central figures in state welfare and employment policy debates and often move into the ministries, if not the presidency (former Brazilian president Fernando Henrique Cardoso was a sociology professor).

State educational agencies, labor organizations, and higher education institutions in Brazil provide excellent examples of how educational solutions are being developed at the local level to maintain the dignity and sovereignty of the people. This emphasis on local solutions to global problems is not just a national issue. In a country as vast as Brazil, regional differences and local culture are a critical issue of federal policy. The dictates out of Brasilia do not often match the regional needs of communities and states on the periphery that are far removed in distance and economic circumstances from Brazil’s own core. Such regional comparisons are critical to understanding the cultural and economic reality within a country as well as between countries (Fry and Kempner 1996).

Finally, in this chapter we consider how SEBRAE offers an educational model of local solutions to global problems. These problems are not unique to Brazil, however, and are similar to the problems that many other countries face in opposing intrusions on their national and regional sovereignty by external agencies. Because only a small fraction of the Brazilian population has access to higher education, SEBRAE is an excellent example of a local solution for the advanced or “higher” education of poorly educated adults.

We conclude our discussion by addressing neoliberal theory’s greatest failure: the cultural assumption that a unitary model of causes and solutions, as exemplified in the concept of developmental association (Kempner and Jurema 2002), is sufficient to solve each country’s economic and social problems.

The Neoliberal Model of Development

Stiglitz (Chang 2001, p. 5) argued that the goals of the Washington consensus, which is responsible for implementing the neoliberal model, were “too narrowly defined in terms of economic growth.” Therefore he maintained that “goals such as environmental sustainability, equity, and democracy” need to be “explicitly incorporated in policy design” (Chang 2001, p. 5). The failure of neoliberal theory and the consensus to understand the ramifications of such a restrictive strategy have led to CEPAL’s conception of the “iron circle of underdevelopment.” Because it appeared to be in the best interests of the core countries (the United States in particular) to control peripheral
economies, the Washington consensus followed a modernization process that simply diffused the theories of Western hegemony rather than recognizing the unique economic, cultural, and social circumstances of each country—the basis for our argument in this chapter.

The Washington consensus has failed because, unfortunately, the cultural realities of developing countries do not uniformly fit the economic model or structural adjustment models of neoliberal theory imposed on them by external agencies. Paths to development are not linear, because each country faces its own unique cultural, geographic, and historical circumstances. The unexpected failures in Russia’s transition to adapt to the shock therapy imposed by the neoliberal models of external agencies was, to quote Stiglitz (2002, p. 8), “fundamentally flawed in that it ignored informational inadequacies, opportunistic behavior and human fallibility.” Stiglitz argued further that the key to economic success needs to be based on the “construction of a regulatory framework that ensures an effective financial system” (p. 31). The inability of global agencies to understand the unique cultural circumstances of each country and to account for this in the implementation of the imposed structural adjustment policies is clearly the reason for the failure. Again, Stiglitz explained: “In other words, development advice should be adapted to the circumstances of the country” (p. 62). This is the key to our argument in this chapter: Local solutions are necessary to resolve global problems.

The goals of the Washington consensus, under the premise of neoliberal theory, are often diametrically opposed to the social and cultural needs of the country allegedly being aided by external agencies. We have argued elsewhere (Kempner and Jurema 1999) that it is in the best interests of core countries to promote economic and political stability in all sectors of the periphery. Not to attend to these needs is to risk continued instability and uncertainty. How best to understand these social and cultural needs to avoid economic and political instability should be at the heart of any proposed solutions to a nation’s difficulties. Unfortunately, external agencies have a mixed record on the effects of proposed solutions through structural adjustment policies. For example, Chossudovsky (1998, p. 201) attributed the breakdown of Peru’s public health infrastructure and increased poverty to the results of International Monetary Fund (IMF) policies.

The inappropriateness of the neoliberal model uniformly imposed on developing countries is found in the economic difficulties faced by, among others, Argentina, Uruguay, and Mexico. Francisco Panizza (Folha de São Paulo 2002, p. A23), a Latin American specialist at the London School of Economics, explained: “The model has very clear systemic problems: excessive dependence on external capital, enhancement of social inequalities, and lack of politics to promote productive and technological changes, which can make these countries less dependent in exporting raw materials.”

Although the 1990s began with great optimism in Latin America for the neoliberal imperative of privatization, commercial openness, and free markets, the decade ended with economic inequalities at the same levels or at even lower levels. “The virtuous circle announced by the liberal ideas of the early ’90s was pure illusion,” argued Clovis Rossi (Folha de São Paulo 2002, p. A24). In a recent report CEPAL noted that the economic deceleration in most Latin American countries, including Brazil, brings consequences:

> Poverty has affected more people than before. This phenomenon has been reinforced by the persistent inequalities in income distribution that persist in the region and by the characteristics of the performance of the labor market, which has been unable to incorporate workers into the formal economy with a consequent increase of informal workers and unemployment. (Folha de São Paulo 2002, p. A23)

The implications of growing economic inequalities and the increase of the informal sector place countries not just at economic risk but also at considerable political risk. Again, as we have argued (Kempner and Jurema 1999), the creation of a well-behaved economy is justified not only for economic purposes but also for cultural, social, and humanitarian reasons.

Our premise is that international agencies and their consequent policies should be guided as much by cultural and social concerns as by economic ones. Sen’s (1999) concept of “development as freedom” provides what should be the basis for the formulation of global policy for individual countries and regions. Sen explained, “Social and economic factors such as basic education, elementary health care, and secure employment are important not only on their own, but also for the
role they can play in giving people the opportunity to approach the world with courage and freedom” (p. 63). By not necessarily encouraging cultural freedom, the consequences of international agencies’ policies on political stability and human agency have not been widely recognized. The IMF, for example, has typically been guided by one set of specific neoliberal policies (i.e., privatization, open markets, import substitution) that ignore the possibility of local-level solutions. Typically, little if any debate is allowed over alternative solutions to the unitary dictates of neoliberal theory.

The outcomes are quite clear in Latin America: Economic activity has declined, unemployment has increased, poverty and consequent malnutrition have increased, and violence has flourished (Stiglitz 2002). Stiglitz explained further that the IMF has compromised the ability of nations to preserve their social contracts with the people to maintain employment and to warrant social security. He noted elsewhere (Chang 2001, p. 17) that the Washington consensus needed to broaden its objectives of development “to include other goals, such as sustainable development, egalitarian development, and democratic development.”

The perspective of the Washington consensus to see development principally as an economic pathology has led to a variety of national and regional crises and organized resistance to globalization, as evidenced by the World Trade Organization protests in Seattle and Cancun. In response to the external manipulations and intrusions by international agencies, under the guidance of the Washington consensus, developing countries have attempted to create their own internal solutions. Brazil, in particular, has engaged in its own defensive strategies by refusing to accept money from international agencies and multinational corporations. Paulo Freire refused to accept money from the World Bank when he was secretary of education for the city of São Paulo (Torres 1995); the governor of Amapá state refused to continue with a World Bank project (VEJA 1999), and the governor of the state of Rio Grande do Sul turned down Ford Motor Company’s offer to build a plant in his state (Kempner and Jurema 2002).

Even with such resistance to the intrusion of international agencies into a nation’s sovereignty, the demands of the IMF are sometimes perplexing. For example, in the Amazon region of Brazil a large number of individuals and institutions are involved in the creation of a system to watch and survey the Amazon. The goal of this organization, SIVAM (Sistema de Vigilancia da Amazonia), is to collect information to combat drug and weapons trafficking and mineral and resource theft—known as biobuccaneering. SIVAM was to have been in place by June 2003, but the connection between the regional centers to share data and integrate the radar system and network of computers has not been possible. This vital project for the protection of the Amazon was a victim of cuts that were necessary to meet the debt obligations to the IMF. For Brazil to meet its obligations to the IMF, it had to postpone efforts to protect the Amazon. The president of SIVAM’s Coordination Committee, Ramon Borges Cardoso, said: “We have a Formula I Ferrari, with no wheels. It is the best car, but it does not move” (2003, p. 52).

As with most developing countries that are in debt to the IMF, Brazil had little choice but to cut funding for crucial social projects, such as SIVAM, in order to maintain the positive reserve balance demanded by the IMF. The problem for debtor nations is simply that more currency is leaving the country than is entering. When external payments are higher than the reserves available, the country falls into debt and is unable to meet its credit obligations. Because the IMF has such enormous control over a country’s finances, the IMF can demand monetary reforms, such as the 4.25 percent primary surplus on the debt to GDP ratio. The IMF actually demands a ratio of 3.75 percent, but the Brazilian government decided on 4.25 percent, even though at this rate it is still a bitter pill for Brazil to swallow. To maintain such a positive reserve, Brazil has had to cut its expenses and control inflation through macroeconomic measures by reducing the federal deficit through reduction of federal jobs and cutbacks in retirement, health care, and other human resources. Although such fiscal austerity may be good for maintaining the deficit balance, it may destabilize the social fabric of society. The IMF may know what is best financially for a country, but it is the country itself that bears the burden for social instability. Brazilians, not an external agency, should decide which measures are safe to implement and at what risk.

These examples are indicative of the growing distrust of and resistance to the Washington consensus at the national and regional levels. Although neoliberal globalization is pervasive, it is not inevitable (Currie and Newson 1998). Brazil, for example, does have a large enough economy
to provide some resistance to the Washington consensus that less developed countries do not have. We turn next to a discussion of a local alternative in Brazil, SEBRAE, which provides an education and economic program that is more appropriate to the cultural reality of its people.

The Case of Brazil

The outcome of the structural adjustment policies that developing countries must accept produces even greater inequalities. In opposition to the alleged benefits accrued from globalization, structural adjustment policies are bringing more poverty, more hunger, more unemployment, and more insecurity to daily life, according to Santos (2002, p. 41), “in a world that fragments and where social fractures are amplified.” Santos continued, “Globalization affects the whole national territory, changing, brutally and blindly, balances and perspectives, and foremost, bringing a ferment of desegregation, an impulse to breaking cement patiently built, and putting in risk the idea of nation and of solidarity” (2002, p. 41).

The effects of globalization and the consequent imposition of structural adjustment policies by international agencies are not always immediately apparent on a nation’s economic or social sectors. The consequences of such intrusions are manifested in the pressures and demands associated with the loans that cause the borrowing nation to fail in meeting the social demands of its citizens. Although the IMF’s major concern is controlling inflation, the borrowing nation is more concerned with levels of unemployment, access to health care, availability of public education, and levels of nutrition for its families—its social contract with the people.

Globalization, as dictated from above by the core nations, imposes required methods of economic production, circulation, and distribution that alter the internal division of labor. Such imposed structural changes reinforce an international division of labor that determines how and what developing nations produce and export, what levels of employment they are to sustain, and how the distribution of political power is maintained on a global scale. Although currently it appears to be in the best interests of the core nations to subjugate peripheral nations, this may no longer be the case in a globalized future. Rifkin (1995) explained that with a “workforce in retreat in virtually every sector . . . at issue is the very concept of work itself. . . . New approaches to providing income and purchasing power will need to be implemented. Alternatives to formal work will have to be devised to engage the energies and talents of future generations” (pp. 168 and 217). By not attending to the changing nature of the workforce itself, advocates of the Washington consensus fail to recognize the ramifications of their policies on the economic and social future of developing nations and their workers.

Foremost in maintaining this social stability is recognition of the inherent conflict between knowledge workers and service workers. The social challenge for the future, both in developed and developing countries, is to understand the “class conflict between the two dominant groups in the post-capitalist society: knowledge workers and service workers” (Drucker, cited in Rifkin 1995, p. 176). The inherent conflict between workers who have access to education and those who do not is the foundation of “new and dangerous levels of stress” at the larger societal level (Rifkin 1995, p. 198).

Unfortunately, the ideological system of neoliberal theory that justifies globalization leads policy makers to ignore the dangerous levels of societal stress caused by class conflicts, particularly in developing countries fighting for economic and social stability. A notable example is the rioting in the streets of Buenos Aires following Argentina’s economic collapse in 2001, despite Argentina having been the poster child for the IMF. But the effect of globalization is not uniform in every country, nor is there a true and inevitable path to economic development (Currie and Newson 1998). Unfortunately, under neoliberal policies of globalization, countries, places, and people are expected to organize their actions as if every crisis is the same and can be solved by the same recipe. This process of unconditional globalization from external agencies weakens the capacity of independent discovery of new solutions from within developing countries. The nation’s universities and the intellectuals in them are disassociated from the problems of the larger society because solutions are dictated externally by international agencies rather than developed internally. Local research and the internal development of intellectuals in the national universities to solve local problems are devalued.
Within this context of globalization and imposed solutions, neoliberal policies compel economic reforms that make universities directly accountable to the market. Chauí (1999) observed that, gradually, neoliberal policies are moving universities from a condition of a public institution to a condition of a private organization. Similarly, Marginson and Considine (2000) used the term “enterprise university” to label the changing nature of universities whose priorities have shifted from the public good to profit seeking for the private good. The expansion of private universities in many countries coupled with the increased development of partnerships with private companies is creating what Chauí (1999) called an operational university—an organization focused on results and becoming a contract mediator rather than an institution devoted to creating knowledge. Such institutions can no longer afford to be focused on the public discovery of disinterested science and are no longer the exclusive place where knowledge is produced. Although the academic community does not respond alone to the emerging demands of society for information, the unfettered search for public knowledge is being substituted little by little by the operational, enterprise, or entrepreneurial university, the main goal of which is private profit. This profit-seeking behavior has created what Slaughter and Leslie (1997) called “academic capitalism.” A principal concern over the capitalistic nature of universities is that having to engage in such economic competition displaces the focus of the university from its role as a social institution that preserves, inculcates, and creates dispassionate knowledge and science. As Readings observed, “The university is on the way to becoming a corporatation” (1996, p. 22). Chauí explained further:

Transformed into an administrative organization, the public university loses the idea and the practice of autonomy . . . (and) reduces its function to manage earnings and expenses, according to an administrative contract through which the State establishes goals and performance indicators. (1999, p. 216)

These policies, guided by neoliberal theory’s focus on privatization, transform the ideology of the public’s right of education into a private service that presents the university as a service-delivery enterprise with powerful economic interests rather than as a public institution. The pivotal point in moving from a public to a private entrepreneurial university is the shift from the society being viewed as the institution’s referent to the university being guided by the principle of resource management, performance strategies, and competition. There is a permanent divorce between the public university devoted to the production of knowledge and creativity and the enterprise university that directs, orders, dictates, and controls the distribution of knowledge. The effects on academic life in this divorce are highly visible in the fragmented scenario presented by the public universities in Brazil. This fragmentation within the public universities does appear somewhat functional, however, because it offers a way for the institutions to survive the complex crises of Brazilian higher education. In reaction to this internal conflict and crisis within Brazilian universities, Trindade (2003) divided public higher education, euphemistically, into three different “universities”:

1. “UNIMEC universities” are under the exclusive orientation of the Ministry of Education (MEC). These universities are noted for their poorly equipped classrooms, weak libraries, and professors with frozen salaries. “Substitute professors” are the main professional workforce of UNIMECs. These temporary teachers have only master’s degrees and teach undergraduate courses with no expectation for conducting research or producing academic work.

2. “UNICC universities” have the support of governmental higher education agencies such as CNPq (Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa [National Council for Research]), CAPES (Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior [Coordination for Human Resources in Higher Education]), and FINEP (Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos [Funds for Studies and Projects]). Professors usually have a scholarship or stipend to complement their salary. Professors at UNICC universities receive allocations to participate in academic congresses along with money to equip their classrooms, libraries, and laboratories. UNICC professors also typically have a student team of researchers provided with scholarships.

3. “UFA universities” provide a support foundation for other institutions. UFA professors work as consultants and assessors on external projects for other universities.

Trindade’s sarcastic observation of three “universities” coexisting within the same institution is, however, a realistic description of the fragmentation of Brazil’s public universities. His three-part
A National Solution: SEBRAE

In an attempt to solve the dilemma of the educational system, Brazil created SEBRAE in 1990 as a technical institution to support the development of small entrepreneurial activities. Focused on increasing and empowering micro and small enterprises (micro e pequenas empresas, MPEs), SEBRAE is a government-sponsored institution composed of representatives from both the private and public sectors. These representatives work in partnership to stimulate and promote small enterprises in accordance with the national policies of development. SEBRAE is composed of a central coordinating agency with connected units distributed in all states and the federal district of Brasilia. The income to support SEBRAE’s infrastructure is derived from a 3 percent salary tax on all Brazilian enterprises. This income supports the following (SEBRAE 2001, p. 2):

- Modernization of the management of Micro and Small Enterprises (MPEs).
- Increasing the MPEs’ technological capacity and competitiveness.
- Diffusion of entrepreneurial information among the MPEs.
- Generation and dissemination of information about the MPEs’ reality.
- Regulation and a differentiated legal status for the MPEs.
- Connecting the SEBRAE system with the supporting institutions to the MPEs.
- Technical support and implementation of the SEBRAE system for the MPEs.
SEBRAE makes these programs viable through a number of different activities, which include promotion of fairs and expositions and the development of training programs through courses and conferences. SEBRAE offers specialized consulting to MPEs on franchising and investments and distributes technical publications on issues of economic interest to MPEs. Since July 1995 SEBRAE has provided credit lines for development loans through the Banco do Brasil for small entrepreneurs. SEBRAE also has become engaged in advancing the federal government’s social programs in the development of agricultural projects to support small rural properties, and SEBRAE works extensively on supporting tourism. Since 1994 SEBRAE has supported more than 6,000 enterprises through management support and technical courses. Such small enterprises are a significant part of the Brazilian economy, accounting for 48 percent of national production, 60 percent of employment openings, 42 percent of the paid salaries, and 21 percent of the gross domestic product (SEBRAE 2001, p. 4).

The central priorities in SEBRAE’s strategic plan are the integral development of the human being, the growth of productivity, and the efficiency of the small entrepreneur. In this regard SEBRAE provides the local Brazilian solution to further education for adults. Because so many Brazilians are undereducated, it is perhaps more appropriate to think of SEBRAE as a “postelementary” educational solution, since it serves a similar population as the community college does in the United States. For example, US community colleges and many universities provide continuing education for individuals in small businesses and other entrepreneurial activities. Similarly, SEBRAE serves the needs of entrepreneurs who may be engaged in private business, public service agencies, nonprofit organizations, or philanthropic organizations. The foundation of SEBRAE’s educational policy is (1) increasing access to continuing education and (2) creating and diffusing an entrepreneurial culture that fosters the growth of MPEs for sustainable development. This educational policy is drawn from the orientation of the UNESCO (1994) report *Education for the 21st Century*. This report proposes that education should be related to the principles of learning theories (cognitive, humanistic, and sociocritical); that is, “knowing how to do, how to be convivial and live together, how to share, and how to be” (SEBRAE 2001, p. 11).

The intent of SEBRAE’s educational principles is to look at the entrepreneurial individual in a holistic way, not just as someone who simply needs and receives information. SEBRAE orients its educational process so that individuals not only will be able to perform their entrepreneurial activities with efficiency but also will know how to learn and how to enhance their personal abilities. This form of educational praxis is focused on preparing people to face problems, create and define solutions, and find alternatives both in their personal and entrepreneurial lives. SEBRAE’s educational courses give emphasis not only to cultural and scientific knowledge but also to strategic abilities that enable individuals to be lifelong learners, able to continually grow and adapt to the changing social context (SEBRAE 2001, pp. 43–45). In many ways, SEBRAE is advanced or “higher” education for the underclasses that would never have had the opportunity for additional education. Because SEBRAE’s pedagogical objective is to educate adults with little formal education, its intent is to “stimulate the transformation of the theory into action, the application of knowledge in planned and reflected practices” (SEBRAE 2001, p. 39). Based on the work of Paulo Freire, SEBRAE’s goal is to “build knowledge in interaction with the world” (Freire 1979, p. 14) and to view individual learners as subjects, not objects. SEBRAE uses Freire’s perspective of “learning how to do” to “shift knowledge into life, to self-development and to the student’s enterprise” (SEBRAE 2001, p. 40). By connecting theory to practice, SEBRAE’s pedagogy is related directly to action, initiative, and Freire’s *conscientization*—personal awareness: “The education has an indirect action, and the learner has an active participation in the learning process applying different activities which stimulate reflection on meaningful and situated contents” (SEBRAE 2001, p. 40).

From this educational context of moving theory directly into practice, SEBRAE seeks to develop the capacity of the undereducated adult population of the informal sector, a characteristic of unstable and poor economies. Little attention is typically given by the state to the social and economic problems endemic to an informal economy and its educational needs. For this reason SEBRAE is an unusual government and private organization combination, because it works directly with the undereducated population of the formal and informal sectors. In Brazil, earning a traditional salary (wages subject to taxes that are paid by a legitimate business or government service) is not the dominant form of acquiring income, and therefore the higher education needs of these individuals are

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much different from those of the United States, for example. Because a relatively smaller percentage of Brazil’s population have jobs in the formal sector, many individuals earn no salary paid by a traditional employer (i.e., legitimate income from equally legitimate employers). As we explained in an earlier work:

The informal sector can be characterized as an unofficial part of a nation’s economy that consists of relatively unskilled jobs not regulated by government, not susceptible to taxation, not providing job security or health insurance, as well as “outlaw jobs” where individuals make their living stealing or selling drugs or weapons. (Kempner and Jurema 1999, p. 111)

Although the informal economy may at first glance appear inefficient and disorganized, in reality many aspects of it are quite modern. The informal economy in Brazil provides a surprisingly dynamic economic environment with unique crafts, commerce, and finance that reveals a vibrant entrepreneurial capacity, well adapted to the local conditions. Brazilians know very well that the informal economy is responsible for the yearly success and pageantry of Carnival. The primary Samba Schools (the dancing and musical performance groups that compete in Carnival) are huge organizations expertly run by the black matriarchs of the favelas (slums). Within this highly dynamic informal sector, SEBRAE’s challenge is to give individuals access to modern technology and provide a “higher” education. In this manner, SEBRAE enables individuals to acquire advanced knowledge while not neglecting the unique capacities for innovation and creativity that are based in the local context and culture of the informal sector.

Unrecognized sufficiently by neoliberal theory and its adherents in international agencies, the informal sector in Brazil and most developing countries is huge. For example, in September 2003 the Brazilian statistical agency, IBGE (2000), reported that there were 43.6 million formal workers in the country compared to an astounding 42.7 million informal workers. The city of Recife, capital of the state of Pernambuco, leads in the percentage of informal workers, with 49.4 percent of the workforce working informally, and only 34.3 percent of the local population is employed as registered formal workers (IBGE 2000, p. 10). Obviously, global solutions based on neoliberal theory’s structural adjustment policies of privatization, opening capital markets, and lowering minimum wages make little sense in locations such as Recife, where most of the workforce is informal and receives no minimum wage to be reduced.

A Model of Action: SEBRAE-Pernambuco

To further explain the unique role that SEBRAE plays in Brazil’s development and how SEBRAE parallels the US model of postsecondary education, we turn to the example of the program in the northeastern state of Pernambuco. Pernambuco is a small contributor to Brazil’s overall GDP, with 2.71 percent of the nation’s total output (IBGE 2000). The main industries in Pernambuco are involved in the processing and production of nonmetallic minerals, textiles, furniture, leather, and sugar. The Pernambuco government has invested mainly in developing economic sectors such as medicine, gypsum mining and processing, information technology, and tourism. The state’s decision to concentrate its development policies and programs in these areas is aligned with SEBRAE’s educational focus to provide support for these specific sectors. This regional focus allows a unified economic and social policy in keeping with the reality of the region, an understanding gained only with intimate knowledge of the local situation and culture. SEBRAE has a local educational role similar to community colleges in the United States that provides workforce development and contract training for local employers.

In Pernambuco, small formal companies from the industrial, commercial, and service sectors total nearly 160,000. This total represents about 77 percent of the enterprises operating in the state, which accounts for almost 40 percent of the employed individuals in the economy of Pernambuco. These data, of course, do not include the contingent of informal activities and businesses that have no official recognition. Government estimates are that for each formal registered company there are four informal ones (SEBRAE-PF 2002, p. 23). The state and national economies are dominated by small businesses, mostly informal. This situation shows the critical role that small entrepreneurs (formal and informal) play in the national economy and the need these individuals have for some form of higher education. Even though many of these entrepreneurs never completed an elementary
education, they have grown to be knowledgeable adults who would now benefit from advanced education. Data from IBGE indicate the existence of approximately 4.4 million formal MPEs in Brazil, corresponding to 98.5 percent of all formal productive companies that operate in the country (IBGE 2000). This percentage of companies is responsible for 21 percent of the GDP, absorbing about 59 percent of the occupied laborers.

Because the MPEs are such a large part of the Brazilian economy, formal and informal, they provide the path to Brazil’s economic development. And herein lies the importance of SEBRAE in providing targeted education to small business owners, because they account for such a large portion of the economy. Because most of these individuals lack education beyond the eighth grade, they have no resources or little time to enroll in advanced training from traditional educational institutions. SEBRAE offers a local solution to fit the cultural context of Brazil and a parallel form of higher education for these adults. By working mainly with MPEs, SEBRAE attempts to focus the economic planning processes of the state and city government on the role of MPEs in the formal and informal sectors. The intention is to build a favorable environment to create, increase, and maintain MPEs in the state of Pernambuco. To support the MPEs, SEBRAE-Pernambuco (SEBRAE-PE) prioritizes joint working relationships based on the collaborator’s needs, such as assistance from external consultants and partners and configuring a network of institutional agents.

An example of SEBRAE’s local solution is in the Litoranea zone in north-eastern Brazil, an area known for its sugar cane plantations. SEBRAE-PE has created a program to develop and energize the economy of the region based mainly on its sugar and alcohol production. There are 16 cities participating in this program. In an attempt to diversify the one-product economy of the region, sugar, SEBRAE-PE is using its educational and community resources to shift the regional focus from reliance on sugar to the creation of a sustained and competitive economy that embraces new products and services. In this manner SEBRAE-PE is bringing together local entrepreneurs, rural producers, asentados (those who received land through agrarian reforms), and MPEs of different sectors to diversify the economy across the areas of industry, commerce, services, agriculture, and cattle. Whereas the more traditional educational institutions, such as the universities or national services (SENAI, SENAC), provide education or apprentice programs, SEBRAE uses a holistic approach to the economy. Centered on integrating methods that sustain local development, SEBRAE-PE identifies and then addresses local agenda and priorities of the communities to provide appropriate opportunities—in the case of the Litoranea, going beyond its concentration on sugar cane plantation activities.

Yet another example of SEBRAE-PE’s integration and understanding of local solutions is found in the sector of Confecções (fashion industry), which covers three cities in the Agreste region of Pernambuco (Caruaru, Toritama, and Santa Cruz do Capibaribe). In the Confecções there are 8,000 small companies generating more than 20,000 jobs, using about 600 tons of fabric a month. These enterprises sell the equivalent of US$27 million a month at more than 24,000 points of sale in the free markets of Pernambuco and other states. Research by SEBRAE-PE (2002, p. 17) has indicated that most administrative and marketing decisions in these myriad informal mini-industries were intuitive by nature. Therefore SEBRAE-PE created a partnership network to reach better solutions based less on intuition and more on knowledge of production activities, increased competition, and access to markets in the Confecções to achieve a greater level of sustainability among the MPEs. The solutions were to utilize continuing education to increase an MPE’s knowledge of technological development and management and organizational skills. The creation of a fashion school by SENAI-PE (SEBRAE’s partner in the service system—“S system”) has made a recognized difference in this sector. The SEBRAE educational effort organizes MPEs according to different subjects, such as computerized modeling, industrial sewing in fabric and textiles (malha cloth), sewing machine mechanics, planning, and cutting and styling in sales techniques that attend to the specific demands of the local sector. Again, we see local educational and economic solutions that are particular to this region—cultural knowledge that is rarely available to international agencies and often to a nation’s federal government.

**Defining Strategies**

SEBRAE understands the necessity of knowing a regional culture and therefore uses informed and competent agents to respond to the needs and demands of local MPEs. SEBRAE’s agents or experts are then responsible for accomplishing measurable and effective results for all involved
MPEs, which results in stimulating sustainable development of the local economy. To achieve its goals, SEBRAE-PE has developed the following strategies (SEBRAE-PE 2002, p. 28):

- **Interiorização** (*interiorization*): Promotes inclusion and disseminates knowledge that enhances sustainability for small companies all over the state.
- Social capital/sustainability: Founded on citizenship and local governance, this is the competence to accomplish social and economic development through educational processes using Freire’s (1970) *conscientization* (the act of becoming aware of one’s own circumstances for which one is not necessarily responsible, especially poverty) so that local citizens are the agents of their own development.
- Valorization of cultural diversity: Focuses on cherishing local culture, seeking competitiveness in the differences among products and services.
- Internationalization of MPEs: Develops the capacity in technology and administration to promote competitiveness and entry into local, national, and international markets.
- Network action: Catalyzes, connects, and motivates a network of partners.

Among its strategic priorities in executing its projects, SEBRAE-PE provides entrepreneurial education for millions—the goal being to universalize entrepreneurial education (SEBRAE-PE 2002, p. 29) and to provide a higher education for those who have missed earlier educational opportunities not available to them. In its educational efforts SEBRAE-PE targets specifically (SEBRAE-PE 2002, p. 28):

- Micro and small businesses of all branches of activities, formal and informal, at any entrepreneurial level of development.
- Cooperatives and societies formed by micro and small producers and people dedicated to family businesses (rural and urban) organized around any branch of activity.
- Entrepreneurs and people in general, of any social class, social and economically excluded or integrated, dedicated to any nature of economic activities.
- Young people in the process of entering the social and economic sphere.

**Acting in the Sebrae Network**

Central to the philosophy of SEBRAE in the state of Pernambuco is the creation of a network of individual entrepreneurs working together with institutional agents (see Figure 8.1). Establishing a connected, informed, and competent network allows individuals to respond to the demands of the MPEs and businesses with the ultimate goal of maintaining a sustainable economy for the state. As indicated in Figure 1, each SEBRAE-PE project has a manager who is responsible for connecting the various partners and for mobilizing the community to accomplish the planned results. These partners include a variety of educational, public, and private agencies. For each project manager there is a contact person, or “leader,” at SEBRAE who is in charge of finding internal solutions to help meet the MPEs’ demands. The SEBRAE leaders have at their disposal a variety of resources and cooperative arrangements. These resources include access to legal, banking, and management professionals in an “associativismo” (*associativismo* in Portuguese) network, as it is termed in Portuguese, of entrepreneurs and small business leaders who work collectively with the SEBRAE leader to assist MPEs.

Herein lies the chief strength of the SEBRAE-PE model, which exists in opposition to externally created, prepackaged solutions or structural adjustment policies imposed by world organizations. Local solutions are found to local problems because of the mutual interaction and respect of SEBRAE’s leadership through its institutional agents with the MPEs. The MPEs know their needs best when they are educated to articulate these needs through SEBRAE’s educational programs. For example, in the dry lands of the Sertão in the state of Pernambuco, the focus on developing productive arrangements with the local MPEs has led to positive results for the group of tecelões (weavers) in the city of Tacaratu. This city concentrates on the manufacturing of textile products,
such as hammocks, carpets, blankets, and other accessories. The local SEBRAE, in partnership with the Federal University, has financed several design workshops to help the tecelões create new textures, colors, patterns, and products closer to the buyer’s taste. Such university-SEBRAE connections are growing in importance with the recognition of the need for intellectual-worker solidarity in the face of globalization.

**Educating Entrepreneurs and Workers**

The unique and decidedly local aspect of SEBRAE-PE is that it invests directly in young people’s entrepreneurial and citizen education. SEBRAE-PE assists the next generation of MPEs by opening paths to education and community participation. The philosophy in assisting these youths is to insert them directly into the economy with an integrated emphasis on the sustainable development of the local economies. For example, Projeto Aprendiz (“Project Learner”) works with young people, 16 to 21 years old, who are concurrently enrolled at the public high schools. The project’s objectives are to identify labor opportunities and to establish business opportunities for these youths while they are still in school; the overarching goal is to provide a sustainable future for them within the context of the local economy. The project introduces young people to the ambiance of the local business culture and promotes, through work experience, the development of self-management skills and creative independence. The young people who join the project participate in meetings where they reflect on professional practices and evaluate the working environment, market, and public policies. This aspect of SEBRAE is similar to school-to-work programs in the United States but is directed toward local circumstances, educational capacity of the youths, and the local economy.

SEBRAE’s accomplishments are based on its integrated view of development, which is typically lacking in externally imposed programs or projects. SEBRAE-PE, in particular, owes its success to the understanding and promotion of vocations that are suitable to and sustainable in the economic and cultural conditions of the immediate region. By reflecting on the local needs of social and human capital, SEBRAE-PE with its connections to business, industry, and educational institutions is in a unique position to assist contemporary MPEs and their future generations. Although SEBRAE-PE’s
knowledge of the life circumstances, conditions, and culture of Pernambuco’s entrepreneurs and workers surpasses understanding by any international or national agency within Brazil, it is limited in its linkage across the spectrum of workers who need educational support. Although SEBRAE is able to meet the needs of many MPEs, it is still a limited educational solution for the needs of the larger Brazilian workforce. For this reason workers have had to look elsewhere for assistance with their educational needs. One promising solution, again at the local level, has been developed by the Integrar Institute of the Central Única de Trabalhadores (CUT; Workers Central Union) in conjunction with the public universities.

University-Worker Solidarity

In 1996 the Integrar Institute of CUT developed and offered courses on different levels to union workers, the unemployed, union managers, and other trabalhadores. CUT took the initiative to contact the major public universities in Rio de Janeiro, Campinas, and São Paulo for assistance in the development of courses in basic education, management and planning, computing, and economics. CUT’s purpose was to create other ways for workers to manage for themselves their collectively owned industries and enterprises and to improve their profits. This cooperative venture between CUT and the universities is an example of a union movement producing and developing its own professionals. By taking it upon themselves, CUT has created an internally developed alternative to public policy for the preparation of workers that unites them to fight unemployment and social exclusion of the underclasses. It is not coincidental that the president of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, is a worker and union organizer himself. Indeed, CUT’s initiatives reflect the power of workers’ movements within Brazil and the growing support for local solutions to global problems.

The initial offerings by CUT and the universities were considered “extension” courses because they were not of standard academic rigor. The State University of Campinas in São Paulo (UNICAMP) provided “Work Economy and Unionism” and the Federal University of São Carlos, São Paulo (UFSCar) offered “Planning and Public Management.” Although the courses had little academic value in the traditional sense, they did give workers the opportunity for the first time to become familiar with academic work and the ways of academic culture. Because academe has its own rules and bureaucracy, these courses are not part of the official university curriculum, but they were offered at the initiative of individual schools or institutes operating within the university. The universities are now working with CUT to help build a professional strategy that educates workers to satisfy local needs of the workplace and the demands of labor. The universities therefore have introduced their own demands for the curriculum related to necessary qualifications for work and the development of workers who are able to exercise their citizenship—again, along the lines of conscientization.

All parties involved in this university-worker experiment agree that they want to offer answers to emerging social demands. However, this requires higher education to consider educational compromises aimed less at meeting academic standards than the needs of the workers. Obviously, the challenges to the universities are great, but this program with CUT has provoked an ongoing debate on university reform and the need of universities to attend to local demands for creating new fields of knowledge. The union movement is responsible for initiating this program, but universities have responded admirably with a need to merge the vision and needs of CUT with the social role of the university. The vision of the Integrar program team, which developed the concept, is “to open the university to the workers” (CUT 2002, p. 2). This vision and program has led to a dialogue between workers and academics that mirrors the larger political change in Brazil with the current president, Lula, a former labor leader, heading the discussion. The workers, who have accumulated vast experiences, now are having professors recognize the depth of their knowledge and raw intellect. In addition, the workers have given the universities an opportunity to adapt and redirect the curriculum to help satisfy local needs and contribute to social inclusion. The challenges ahead are to deepen this dialogue and to create public policy from the success of this program.
Conclusions and Implications

SEBRAE’s holistic approach to the economy seeks sustainable development practices rather than the one-time inoculation of externally imposed and culturally inappropriate policies of structural adjustment. SEBRAE addresses local needs by providing educational opportunities appropriate to the circumstances of the individuals it is serving. Attending a university was not a possibility for most of Brazilian workers, but SEBRAE provides a “higher education” for these adult workers. As we have discussed, the worker-designed courses developed by CUT advance the role of a university-worker connection in higher education that is unique to the needs of Brazil’s workforce. Such idiosyncratic differences of the local and regional economies can be served adequately only by agencies that understand the unique demands of the informal and formal sectors in each specific location. Even federal policy within a country is often incapable of understanding the needs of local communities, especially in a country as large as Brazil. SEBRAE is able to find local solutions because of the mutual interaction and respect created between its leadership (institutional agents) and the MPEs. This integrated view of development is successful because SEBRAE is able to promote sustainable businesses suitable to the economic and cultural conditions of the immediate region. Likewise, CUT provides a model for advanced education that connects the needs of workers with the role of universities to offer local solutions to Brazil’s unique workforce.

Because there is no single path to economic development, the individual social reality of a nation must be considered by international lending agencies. Holding developing countries hostage to uniform neoliberal policies of globalization exacerbates social crises under the guise of economic recovery. Each country does not suffer from the same problems of development, and therefore uniform solutions are not likely to result in consistent outcomes. Much more economic variation is possible than allowed by the rules of neo-liberal theory. Local and independent discovery of solutions, as SEBRAE has aptly shown, needs to be promoted by international agencies. Rather than imposing globalized solutions, international agencies should seek a greater understanding of local needs and promote local research and development. Developing countries with limited resources are typically forced to rely on imported knowledge that often has little relevance to the social and cultural reality of the country. Rather than forcing the implementation of solutions derived from external theory and research, international agencies should further assist countries in the development of their own research and researchers to seek local solutions to local needs. The relationship between universities and workers, developed by CUT, is indicative of the role that higher education can play in a nation’s development of the underclasses. Nurturing programs that align universities with small entrepreneurs (SEBRAE) and with workers (CUT) are examples of how internally created solutions are more appropriate for the cultural and social circumstances of the country.

The disintegration of Brazilian higher education is especially troubling. The lack of education for the midlevels of technology is equally disconcerting, especially given IBGE’s estimate that 98.5 percent of all formal companies are small and micro businesses. Brazil should be developing further its capacity for education at all levels, especially at the middle and lower levels of technology and business, but instead it is dismantling higher education to repay its international debt. Rather than strategically developing Brazil’s capacity for educational development, the IMF is forcing short-term tactical decisions for immediate debt repayment at the risk of Brazil’s educational and intellectual infrastructure.

The implications for all developing countries are that the economic and political hegemony of core countries has the potential for disastrous social consequences. The policies of the Washington consensus reinforce developing nation’s dependency by keeping them on the periphery, further strengthening international inequalities and stimulating internal violence and instability. The distance to becoming a developed country is ever greater when generations rather than years are needed to rebuild the quality of the educational and social infrastructures. The viewpoint from the periphery is that the present policies of the Washington consensus are condemning generations to the technological hinterlands at a time when developing countries need a new, creative, well-educated workforce. Because undereducated citizens are unlikely to successfully compete in a global economy, short-term decisions for debt repayment at the cost of quality education doom a nation’s youth in a globalized future. Unable to transform their lives or conceive of a brighter
future, the young are unable to exert their citizenship and turn instead to alternative social futures. Certainly, more is at stake here than simply repaying a debt to the IMF.

References

IN RESPONSE TO AUSTERITY: THE IMPERATIVES AND LIMITATIONS OF REVENUE DIVERSIFICATION

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Higher Educational Austerity

Higher education has never been more important than today at the start of the 21st century. It is central to an increasingly technological and knowledge-driven economy. It is a major engine of individual social and economic mobility, supporting the belief that one can rise above the socioeconomic station into which one was born. It is demanded by the increasing complexity of governance, and the political and civic conviction that social problems are to be analyzed and solved—not just in traditional ways, but also with new solutions emanating from increasing knowledge and training. And at least in the high-income countries, part of the increasing demand reflects higher education becoming another “high end” consumer good.

In spite of—and to some degree because of—this increasing demand, higher education seems almost everywhere besieged with austerity: an uneven but nonetheless unrelenting worsening of the financial condition of most universities and other institutions of higher education, particularly to the degree that they are dependent on governmental, or tax-generated, revenue. In response, a standard nostrum for higher education economists, consultants, and policy advisors (and one that is abundantly familiar in the UK) is the recommendation that universities and other higher educational institutions lessen their revenue dependence on governments, or taxpayers. The prescription is easy to rationalize, and is theoretically (and even practically) virtually unassailable. However, there are also significant limitations in a revenue diversification policy, especially in the less industrialized world where the need for such a policy may be most compelling. These limitations go far beyond the ideological distaste that many have for the neo-liberal economic medicines of cost sharing, downsizing, and privatization, and extend to certain technical and strategic dilemmas that confound even the staunchest believer in tuitions, privatization, and student lending. This article discusses some of these technical difficulties, especially of making cost sharing and student lending work in developing countries, but that may also serve to lend some perspective to the continuing debate in the UK and especially in the year 2002 to its constituent parts of Scotland and Wales.
Austerity in higher education is a function of costs outrunning available revenue—counting as costs both per-student, or unit, costs as well as total costs driven by the accommodation of enrollment and degree expansion, and including as revenue both public, or tax-generated, revenue as well as tuition and fees from parents and/or students. Per-student, or unit, costs in higher education tend to be high throughout the world because of the high input of relatively costly labor, costly equipment (especially scientific equipment, computing, and library materials), and the expenses of student living—which are not, strictly speaking, a cost of higher education, but are expenses that must be borne nonetheless and that may be particularly significant in situations where commuting to a university while residing with parents is either impractical or impossible.

As significant and troublesome as these high costs may be, the real harbinger of austerity is the rate of increase over time of these costs. Neither economies of scale nor the infusions of capital that traditionally bring down unit costs in the larger, goods-producing economy, seem to dampen cost increases in higher education. Like other labor intensive industries, especially those where the application of technology tends to increase the quality of the product or the comfort and convenience of the producers instead of lowering the cost (and also presumably the price) of the product, higher education, over time and in the absence of measures that simply force down these "natural" increases, tends to get more expensive relative to the average increase in the cost of goods and services generally. One consequence is that both costs and prices (i.e. tuitions) of higher education tend generally to outpace the rate of inflation. This is the well known "cost disease," or the tendency to rising relative cost in the labor intensive, largely productivity-immune sectors of the economy such as health care, education, most services, and the arts (Baumol and Bowen, 1966; Bowen, 1968; Johnstone, 2001).

In the case of public higher education, the effect of these high and naturally rising per-student costs are greatly magnified by pressures to expand enrollment. Greater percentages of the populations of most countries are demanding more and more higher education. Thus, the demand for higher education is rising rapidly especially in countries characterized by rapidly growing populations and low current levels of participation—conditions describing much of the developing, or less-industrialized, world.

Together, the high and rapidly increasing unit costs and the rapidly rising enrollment pressures place enormous strains on whatever part of the total higher educational expenditure is being borne by the government. (Or, as most economists would prefer to say, that is being borne by taxpayers, including within the concept of "taxpayer" the citizen whose purchasing power is not directly taxed, as such, but is indirectly taxed through taxes on businesses that are simply passed on to consumers, or even more indirectly confiscated by the government through the inflation brought about by the printing of money to finance governmental obligations.) Simply put, the "natural trajectory" of those higher educational costs traditionally borne by the government, or taxpayer, would take increasing portions both of the gross domestic product and of the public budget. Underlying the case for cost-sharing and revenue diversification is the assumption that substantially increased public revenues for higher education is becoming less and less likely, for several reasons.

One such reason is the limitation in public revenue itself, beginning with limitations in tax capacity. Tax capacity is partly a function of the overall state of the economy. In Russia and many of the new republics carved from the former Soviet Union as well as in much of Africa, for example, gross domestic product has been static or declining, and prospects for vigorous economic growth remain dim. But even more serious than static or declining economies generally has been the declining ability of more and more governments to collect taxes at all. Taxes on income and sales are technically difficult to collect and too easily avoidable, depending so much on the government’s ability to monitor income and sales cost-effectively, as well as on a developed culture of tax compliance—neither of which are characteristics of most middle- and low-income countries.

Globalization—the heightened international mobility of capital, information, and productive capacity—is also taking its toll on government’s ability to tax. Substantial increases in taxes on corporations are increasingly problematic because of this greater mobility of capital and production facilities and the resulting inclinations of multinational corporations to move to lower tax jurisdictions if they perceive their tax burdens to be too high. What used to be an easy way to "tax"—that is, printing money and effectively confiscating the purchasing power of the citizenry via the resulting inflation—is also becoming more difficult as countries are losing sovereignty over
monetary policies (or even, as in Europe, over their actual currencies), and are otherwise constrained by a growing dependence on World capital markets. Finally, in the case of the formerly centrally planned socialist economies, governments can no longer rely so heavily on the value added, or turnover, taxes that used to enable the state to extract purchasing power at each stage of the governmental production process. The consequence of all these factors is that most countries, and especially those with less-industrialized and/or so-called transitional economies, are having enormous technical difficulties—quite apart from any political resistance to taxation—in diverting purchasing power for use in their public sectors.

A final limiting factor in the likelihood of higher education getting a larger slice either of overall Gross Domestic Product, or of the government’s share thereof, is the diminished relative priority of higher education among the other major claimants on these increasingly scarce public revenues. This relatively low (or at best “middle”) position in the queue of claimants on available public resources, in spite of the rising importance of higher education as mentioned above, is due in part to the formidable priorities of other needs: elementary and secondary education, public health, public infrastructure, housing, and care for impoverished elderly, children, and other dispossessed persons. This diminished priority for higher education may also be due (somewhat ironically) to the demonstrated ability of universities and other higher educational institutions to help themselves. Most competing claimants simply do not have higher education’s ability to raise tuition or to generate revenue from the sale of faculty time and expertise or the lease of university assets. This ability is not lost on politicians straining to meet more public needs than there are available public revenues to support. So, while it may seem like the proverbial “punishment for good deeds,” higher education’s seeming ability somehow to withstand the loss of public revenues make it all the more likely for these losses to continue.

In summary, higher education in most countries, absent policies to alter the natural trajectories of either costs or public revenues or both, will almost certainly continue to experience a worsening austerity. Significantly, the condition of austerity is both dynamic and relative, befalling rich and poor countries alike. This is because austerity (or adequacy) is in part relative to the level of revenue in the last allocation. Most expenditures in higher education are recurrent—that is, must continue over time. Generous support in one year, particularly of such obligations such as wages and salaries, utilities, consumables, or student support, can become inadequate almost instantly if not continued in the next expenditure year. This is why many of the universities in the UK and elsewhere in the OECD countries can experience genuine austerity in their higher education establishments even at quite substantial levels (relative to the rest of the world) of public expenditures for higher education, and why the president of one of America’s great (and certainly wealthy) private universities could puzzle over “… why we can be so rich and feel so poor?”

Consequences of Austerity

The consequences of austerity, whether absolute or relative, can be felt either by the producer (the university or other tertiary-level institution) or the consumer, or client (the student and to some degree the parents), or most likely both. When impacting the institution, austerity may be manifested by:

- a loss of institutional capacity to respond or to change;
- loss of faculty, or loss especially of the best faculty, or loss of faculty allegiance and morale (due to declining salaries), or loss of much of the faculty’s time and attention (as they are forced to “moonlight” elsewhere to maintain real wages);
- an erosion of equipment, including computers, laboratory equipment, and library materials; and
- a deterioration of physical plant, and inability to expand physical capacity to keep up with increasing enrollment.

The impact of higher educational austerity on students depends on the institutional response to its shortfall of revenue. To the degree to which the institution (or the government) has responded to a lack of sufficient public revenue by increasing tuition and fees, and especially as these increases
are unmatched by means-tested grants and/or available and affordable student loans, the effects will be felt predominantly by middle and lower income students, who may be forced:

- to move to part-time student status and seek part- or full-time employment (if this is even possible);
- to continue full-time study, but still seek part-time or even full-time employment, possibly to the detriment of their studies and the prolongation of time to degree;
- to attend, or move to, an institution within commuting range of their parent’s home to cut down at least on the expenses of student living (again, impossible in many developing countries due to the lack of nearby institutions and the difficulties of transportation);
- to decide against higher education altogether, or to drop out (perhaps intending only to stop out), or even to cease pursuing an academic track in middle or high school, all due to a perception of the financial unattainability of higher education.

To the degree to which the institution (or the government) has responded to a lack of sufficient public revenue by capping enrollments, particularly in the most sought-after public institutions, the effect on students will be limited enrollments and disappointed student applicants, almost certainly to the detriment of those less academically prepared—who are almost certain to be disproportionately made up of those from weaker secondary schools and probably from lower socioeconomic or rural backgrounds. And if the country has limited its public university capacity but responded to the pressures for higher educational massification by allowing and even encouraging a demand-absorbing private sector (similar to many East Asian and Latin American countries), the consequences of the capacity limitation will be leveraged into those aspiring students who are neither bright enough to get into the inexpensive but increasingly selective public universities, nor with sufficiently affluent parents to be able afford a private alternative.

The Imperative of Revenue Diversification

The classic response to this condition of austerity in higher education is to combine measures of greater efficiency (e.g. enhancing scale, eliminating redundancy, closing low priority operations, increasing both student / faculty and student / staff ratios, and the like) with revenue enhancement by diversification. The remedy of revenue diversification follows from the cost-sharing perspective (Johnstone 1986, Johnstone and Shroff-Mehta, 2000), which views the costs of higher education as shared by five parties: (1) the government, or taxpayer (or the average citizen via the inflationary-driven confiscation of purchasing power by governmental printing of money); (2) parents (or spouses or extended families) via tuition and fees, paying from current income, past income (savings) or future income (borrowing); (3) students, also through tuition, fees, and other costs of student living, paying mainly from term-time or summer earnings, or from borrowing (future earnings); (4) donors, from endowments, current gifts, or “redistributive tuition” by which wealthier parents pay more in tuition so that some students or parents can pay less (presumably for the better quality education made possible by the tuition discounting and the attraction of bright and educationally enriching students whose parents cannot afford full tuition); and (5) institutional entrepreneurship and the revenue brought in via the sale or lease of university assets, or the sale of faculty expertise, whether in teaching or research.

Cost-Sharing

The case for cost-sharing—that is, the shift of some costs from governments and taxpayers to parents and students—as a response to worsening austerity is quite apart from the case that can be made for public tuition fees on the neo-liberal economic presumption of greater equity, or simple fairness: that is, that those who are reaping considerable private benefits from a public good (especially one that is partaken of disproportionately by the more affluent) should bear at least a commensurate share of the costs. This case for cost sharing because of a sheer need for revenue is also
apart from the presumption of a greater institutional *efficiency* and *responsiveness* when universities are forced to compete for the enrollments of students. While these classic theoretical rationales for revenue diversification seem entirely valid to the author, they also remain ideologically contested, and the imperative for revenue diversification can rest quite well simply on the need to surmount the virtual certainty of insufficient governmental, or taxpayer, revenue.

Enhancing revenue from parents and/or students can take one or more of the following eight main forms, depending on the country and its policies:

1. *A beginning of tuition* (where higher education was formerly free). This would be the case in China in 1997, for example, or Britain in 1998, or in Austria in 2001.

2. *A very sharp rise in this tuition* (where public sector tuition has already existed). A shift toward greater cost sharing requires that the rise in tuition be greater than the rise in institutional costs generally in order for the government’s, or taxpayer’s, share to be lessened, and the parent’s and / or student’s shares to rise commensurately. This has been the case recently in the US, where many state governments have failed to maintain their former “shares” of public university expenses.

3. *Tilting admissions and enrollments toward students who can pay.* In the US, this increasingly widespread practice is called *enrollment management*: a technique of enhancing the net tuition revenue by rationing the scholarships, or tuition discounts, to those who can truly help the institution—e.g. the very brilliant or the very talented—and concentrating otherwise on those students who require the least amount of tuition discounting.

4. *Maximizing the enrollments of fee-paying students.* Similar to #3, this is a “tilt” toward those whom the institution is legally allowed to charge tuition. This is increasingly the practice in Russia and other countries (many from the former Soviet Union) in which students have a legal right to free higher education, but in which the definition of those students who are so entitled can be narrowly construed—e.g. to only those first-time students who pass the entrance examination with the requisite score—all others being “free game” for being charged tuition. Although the government limits the proportion of fee-paying students, there are enough “loopholes” in the law such that more than 25 percent of all Russian University income is said to come from tuition—this in a country that nominally guarantees students a free higher education! (Bain, 1998).

5. *An imposition of “user charges,” or fees to recover the expenses of institutionally provided and formerly heavily subsidized residence and dining halls.* This has been happening in China and in most countries, including African countries where subsidized living costs were said by the World Bank to absorb the bulk of many country’s higher educational budgets. In the Nordic countries of Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Denmark, for example, where higher education remains “free,” the expenses of higher education are exclusively the costs of student living, which are very high in those countries, and which are “shared” neither by the taxpayer nor (at least officially) by the parents. They are thus borne entirely by the students, largely in the form of student loans (which are indirectly shared somewhat by the taxpayer in the form of repayment subsidies).

6. *A diminution of student grants or scholarships.* This is sometimes accomplished simply by “freezing” grant or loan levels, or by holding them constant in the face of general inflation, which then erodes their real value. This may be accompanied by a shift in the dominant form of financial assistance from grants to loans, as has happened in the US over most of the decades of the 1980s and 90s. Such a policy also diminished the once very generous grants in Britain (which were later abandoned altogether), and has happened to the value of the maintenance grants in Russia and most of the rest of the former Soviet republics, and in Eastern and Central Europe.

7. *An increase in the effective cost recovery on student loans.* This can be accomplished through a diminution of the subsidies on student loans (similar to the diminution in the value of non-repayable grants), and might be accomplished through an increase in interest rates, or a reduction in the length of time that interest is not charged, or through a reduction in the numbers of loans for which the repayments, for any number of reasons, are forgiven. Or the effective cost recovery might be accomplished through a tightening of collections, or a reduction in the instances of default, with no change in the effective rates of interest paid by those who were repaying anyway.
8. The official encouragement, and frequently a public subsidization, of a tuition-dependent private higher education sector. A number of countries—notably Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, Brazil, and other countries in Latin America and East Asia—have avoided much governmental expenditure on higher education by keeping a limited public sector—usually elite and selective—and shifting much of the costs of expanded participation to parents and students through encouraging private (often profit making) higher educational institutions.

Other Forms of Revenue Diversification

Non-governmental revenue may also come from donors or from faculty and institutional entrepreneurship. Among the popular forms are:

1. Contract research. Contract, or sponsored, research that carries an appropriate “overhead” charge can provide supplemental faculty salaries and new equipment, and also contribute toward general institutional and administrative costs.

2. Teaching high demand courses, frequently to non-degree students, for substantial tuition. Tuition from the teaching of specialized courses can include enough to cover all marginal expenses plus a “profit” to the department and sometimes to the larger institution. This is especially popular in those countries that prohibit tuition for “regularly admitted students” (# 4, above). Where the competition is especially keen for “regular” admissions, the university faculty will sometimes provide private fee-paying tutoring to secondary students preparing for the university’s own examinations.

3. The sale or lease of university assets. In a similar fashion, universities sometimes own large amounts of desirable land or other assets (in China, extending to factories and other businesses) that can contribute to institutional revenue. One of the issues, particularly in the former Communist countries, is the rightful ownership of university facilities. Absent well-developed non-profit laws, it is not clear how free a university is to sell, lease, develop (for resale), or otherwise dispose of university assets without the proceeds therefrom being claimed by the state.

4. Donations. Finally, universities are turning to donors and other philanthropists for other-than-governmental revenue. This can be donations, including bequests (at death) or annual gifts, or donations from corporations and foundations, any of which can be designated or undesignated (i.e. left to administrative discretion) and given either for endowment or current operations.

Limitations on Revenue Diversification

Political and Ideological Opposition to Cost-Sharing

All of these forms of non-governmental revenue are important. Yet each has limitations. Some—particularly the forms that would shift some of the higher educational costs burden from government, or taxpayers, to parents and students—have opposition that is both ideological and self-interested. Any policy that seeks to impose a new, or a sharp increase in, the price of a good or a service that has come to be viewed as an entitlement, especially one so seemingly noble and socially important as higher education, will be fiercely contested. The first difficulty in attempting to implement a policy of higher educational cost-sharing, especially where there has been a tradition of free public higher education as a virtual entitlement to all academic secondary school graduates, is to surmount the almost inevitable ideological and political opposition. Although the politics of cost-sharing are particularly country specific, three factors buttress this opposition and thus strengthen the political and ideological limitations to cost-sharing as a form of revenue diversification:

1. The politicization of cost-sharing. Clearly, when opposition to tuition becomes an important political plank, especially for an opposition party (which is almost always more able to take vocal stands against inherently unpopular policies like taxes, tuition, or user fees), governments will feel constrained, especially when students are politically active and influential.

2. The absence or inadequate provision of means-tested grants or student loans. Opposition will be far greater (and properly so) when tuition is first adopted or sharply raised in the
absence of some form of assistance to those who are most likely to be denied access to higher education in the face of such a shift in the cost burden.

3. The failure (or the perceived failure) of the shift of costs to bring any benefits to current or future parents and students. An increase in tuition or other fees is more likely to gain at least some acceptance if it can be perceived as going toward an expansion of places, and thus of accessibility, or toward improved on-campus living conditions or new academic equipment. In the absence of such a perception, the shift of costs to parents and students may be perceived as benefiting some other public good (perhaps an unpopular one, such as the military) or going to line the pockets of a supposedly corrupt government or university administration.

### Technical Limitations to Parental Cost-Sharing

However, beyond the political and ideological challenges to cost-sharing, particularly in developing countries, are some essentially technical limitations. Two of these apply to the expectation of parental contributions. The first is the difficulty of determining and verifying parental ability to contribute. Establishing a reasonable parental contribution requires a determination of that income (or combination of income and assets) at which this financial responsibility ought to begin, as well as the rate at which this expected contribution should increase with increasing measured ability to contribute. But “financial ability to contribute” is a complex and elusive concept even with a high degree of voluntary willingness to comply. Furthermore, income and assets are relatively easy to disguise, as all countries that make extensive use of income taxes have discovered. Only in the US, the UK, and a few other advanced industrial countries has there been developed both a culture of voluntary tax compliance and the technical means to verify incomes such that measures of “ability to pay” might be generally trusted. In most countries (and in virtually all less industrialized countries) the determination of “ability to pay”—or its converse, “eligibility for need-based assistance”—can be only crudely approximated by such indicators as parental education, occupation (especially if it is a governmental job), type of housing, and other indicators of relative affluence or poverty.

A second problem (actually a set of problems, also essentially technical) in connection with the shift of higher educational costs to parents is the duration of this presumed obligation and the related issue of financial dependence and independence. An assumption of greater financial contribution from parents assumes that the student is appropriately financially dependent—at least to the limit of the parents’ ability to contribute. But what if the “child” is a young adult, several or many years out of secondary school who only now wants to enter a college or university? Are the parents still financially responsible? For how many years, or for how many degrees, or through what levels of higher education does this expected parental financial responsibility continue? What of the complications of divorce or “non-custodial parenthood”? What if the parent or parents simply refuse at some point any longer to support the child (or the young adult) for further higher education? Or what if the student refuses the parents’ financial assistance, but then wants to qualify for need-based assistance? Should such a refusal, whether by the child or by the parents, oblige the taxpayer to replace the missing parental contribution? Or should such a choice (on the part of either the child or the parents) preclude the student from receiving “need-based” aid on the grounds that governmental policy must reinforce the bedrock assumption of *cost-sharing* that parents are financially responsible (within some necessary limits) for the higher education of their children? None of these questions is unanswerable. But together they reinforce the need for, and the difficulty of constructing, consistent policies that will be perceived as fair and workable in any particular country or culture. And these limitations reinforce the politically- and culturally-situated nature of such policies, reminding us that what works in the US or Germany might well not work in China, Indonesia, Ethiopia, or Brazil.

### Limitations on Student Cost-sharing

The attempt to supplement governmental with student revenue is quite different than the attempt to obtain parental revenue, both in its theoretical rationale and in its implementation. A student
share requires either real part-time employment opportunities (that is, employment that does not require government subsidization and also does not interfere unduly with academic progress) and/or student loans (or graduate taxes) with some real cost recovery—that is, with a present discounted value of anticipated repayments that is approximately equal to the amounts lent, or deferred.

The limitation on part-time employment is that there are, especially in less industrialized countries, few part-time jobs that are both accessible to the students and non academically-intrusive, and that do not depend on governmental subsidization (which obviates the purpose of the cost sharing to begin with). The problem with student loan programs (again, especially in less industrialized countries) is that the anticipated cost recovery is so low—frequently only a small fraction of the amount lent. This is due to the combination of high defaults, excessive interest rate subsidization, and very high administrative costs, all of which are presumably amenable to policy reforms, but all of which are both politically and technically difficult. And these limitations are over and above the underlying financial and employment difficulties that beset university graduates in many countries, leaving little income for the discharge of indebtedness, even if they were fully inclined to repay their loans (Johnstone, 2000).

A number of countries, including the UK—possibly intrigued by claims of great success from Australia’s Higher Education Contribution Scheme—have instituted income contingent repayments schemes, buttressed by incorporating the collection of student loans repayments within the official governmental machinery of tax withholding or pension contributions at the point of wage payment. However, this course requires an efficient, highly inclusive, and politically accepted system of income taxation and pension withholding: characteristics found in very few countries, and probably in none of the less industrialized countries. In addition, the inability of income contingent loan plans to tap a private capital market makes the loans, particularly at the outset of a program, almost entirely dependent on governmental revenue—again partly obviating the purpose of the loan program to begin with. Thus, while student loans must remain an important part of any cost-sharing scheme that purports to tap the students for a portion of the costs of their higher education, there are few examples of loan programs that have brought substantial relief to their governments and taxpayers for the support of higher education. (The US, Canadian, and Swedish plans being possible exceptions, although the Swedish plan is designed mainly to shift cost not from the government, but from the parents, who are not officially expected to contribute to the costs of their dependent children’s higher education.)

Limitations on Faculty and Institutional Entrepreneurship

Entrepreneurship, both faculty and institutional, has the potential to contribute not only to university revenue, but also to the quality and responsiveness of the curriculum and even the teaching. Clark (1998), in his study of five entrepreneurial European universities, claimed evidence for the entrepreneurial spirit extending even to the so-called heartland departments—the humanities and social science departments that are not generally thought of as market-oriented or able to augment revenue from the sale of their services. Court (1999), in his study of what he termed the “quiet revolution” at Uganda’s Makerere University, cited the enhancement of faculty salaries, in turn slowing the exodus of academic staff, as the most important impact of faculty and institutional entrepreneurship.

There are, however, at least three possible limitations, or “downsides,” to faculty and institutional entrepreneurship. The first is the potential of entrepreneurial activities to divert faculty and institutional time and attention from the core mission and activities of the institution. Clearly, some faculty entrepreneurial activities only enhance the university’s mission; particularly those that provide new research and practice opportunities for both faculty and students. However, when faculty and staff attention is drawn to activities, the main purpose of which is simply to augment salary, both the students and the institution can lose. Given the very great amount of autonomy enjoyed by the academic profession, the pervasive absence in many countries of clear rules for what are and are not appropriate faculty activities away from the classroom, and the very low levels of faculty remuneration in so many countries, it is not surprising to hear of abuses. (What is needed, but what is also more difficult than generally assumed, is for there to be clear policies regarding the time
that faculty are expected to be on the campus, in their offices or laboratories, and available to their students and colleagues.)

A second limitation is the potential for entrepreneurial attractions to be in actual substantive conflict with the academic canons of scholarly integrity. Such can occur (at least in appearance) when a funding source has a vested interest in the result of the research that the source is funding. The compromise of academic values does not have to be so blatant as the outright falsification of evidence or suppression of findings. The very decisions of what to investigate (and perform what not to investigate) can be affected by funding sources with vested interests—including government agencies. Or, the academic compromise can come in the form of limitations on dissemination of the findings. The only way to be altogether free from all such potentially compromising influence is to be free from the need for any revenue from discretionary sources—which we have already established as completely unattainable. The best protection for academic values is probably the combination of clear rules and enforceable transparency in all contracts and transactions.

A third limitation to entrepreneurship is the inherently uneven distribution within the academy of entrepreneurial possibilities, and the tendency, therefore, for academic entrepreneurship to widen the gap between the haves and the have-nots: mainly between the sciences versus the humanities, the applied versus the basic, and the politically au courant versus the esoteric. For academic entrepreneurship to be institutionally beneficial, there must be a recognition that the revenue-generating parts of the institution have acquired this capability at least in part because of the academic reputation (e.g. for quality and integrity) that the entire institution has built up over many years. In short, the departments of management, computer science and English can market themselves in part because of an academic reputation that has been built up over the years by the faculty in, say, mathematics, history, anthropology, and ancient languages. Indeed, most of the applied fields with entrepreneurial potential continue to draw intellectual and methodological sustenance from departments and faculty who have little immediate value in the marketplace. Thus, all departments should receive some benefit from the marketability of management, computer science, and English via an appropriate cross subsidization. But this, again, requires clear rules and sensitive attention to the balance between the need to reward the faculty most engaged in entrepreneurial activities, and the rest of the institution. None of these limitations in itself is sufficient to deny the need for more faculty and institutional entrepreneurship. But it is well to keep in the public mind these limitations and potential “downsides” of entrepreneurship lest government come to believe that all faculty and all departments can live as can the “marketable few.”

Limitations on Donations

To most institutions in most parts of the world, donations—from alumni, corporations, foundations, or merely wealthy and generous “friends”—represent in theory the most attractive kind of “third stream” revenue. No source of revenue is quite as benign and reliable as revenue from unrestricted endowment once the institution has it. However, getting sufficient endowment (or the less reliable and also the more costly counterpart, which is yearly revenue from current giving) to provide a substantial portion of the institution’s operating and capital needs is formidably difficult. Truly unrestricted endowment—the kind that provides a reasonably predictable revenue stream, in perpetuity, for whatever purpose the governing authority deems advisable—comes from money that has been invested, with only the income (sometimes plus a reasonable portion of capital appreciation) available for operations so as to preserve the real (i.e. inflation-adjusted) value in perpetuity. But this means that for each dollar of predictable annual revenue stream, there must be approximately twenty dollars of endowment (assuming the trustees spend only a prudent five percent of the portfolio’s total return).

Raising significant revenue from private donations requires four elements:

1. donors with substantial wealth who have been carefully cultivated, sometimes for many years, and who are prepared to give the donation to the higher educational institution—as opposed
to all other claimants and good uses that are probably also cultivating the same potential
donors;

2. a culture of philanthropy, including widespread acceptance of an obligation to give (in so far
as one is able) to the college or university from which one graduated or which one otherwise
believes to be creating real social value;

3. well maintained records on the names and addresses (and if possible, the “giving potential”) of
alumni and potential “friends”—which requires staff and other institutional expenditures; and

4. favorable tax treatment of the donations—ideally with the amount of the donation deducted
from otherwise taxable income, thus reducing the real sacrifice to the donor and effectively
shifting some of the “cost” of the donation to the government via its foregone tax revenue.
(This, of course, presumes a workable income tax system, and substantial voluntary tax com-
pliance on the part of the potential donors.)

These are substantial limitations. A handful of institutions, generally “elite” universities, may
get lucky and find a wealthy alumnus or “friend” who is willing to give a very large donation,
maybe even enough to begin an endowment. But most colleges and universities will have to spend
a good deal of time and money simply to begin the necessary first steps of reconstructing past
alumni records, cultivating their alumni and potential “friends” (that is, making them proud of
“their university”), and getting them used to the idea that an annual donations or a large bequest
in their will is an appropriate expectation.

There are, of course, corporations and foundations capable of making donations. However,
there are not enough to reach more than a small number of (probably elite) universities. More seri-
ously, corporations and foundations generally want to fund something specific that neither the insti-
tution nor the faculty are likely to be able to do, or wish to do, in the absence of their contribution.
They generally do not wish to give unrestricted revenue, to be used at the discretion of the gov-
erning board or institutional leadership—which is exactly what the institution needs in order to
fill the gap left by declining governmental revenues. In fact, it is not uncommon for the accep-
tance of a restricted gift to actually cost the institution money (in the sense of constituting another
drain on otherwise unrestricted revenues) in spite of the advantages and new benefits that the gift
may make possible.

In short, philanthropy, or a reliance on donors, is a potentially important source of non-
governmental, or third stream, revenue. However, its ability to make up for serious shortfalls in
governmental revenue, particularly in the short term, and in the absence of the conditions noted
above, will be unevenly distributed and limited. It will generally make the already affluent and suc-
cessful more so. It can make a difference in a few instances between mere institutional survival
and real excellence. It can enable change. And it needs to be vigorously pursued. But absent a
combination of wealthy friends and alumni, a culture of giving, and the favorable tax treatment of
philanthropy, it will not effectively make up for the widespread diminution of governmental revenue
to higher education.

Conclusion

Austerity is endemic to higher education as the natural trajectory of higher education costs over
time outpaces the likely trajectory of available revenue. While this general condition applies for
high- and low-income countries alike, it is especially the case in countries experiencing heavy enroll-
ment pressures from high birthrates and low current tertiary participation rates—conditions found
particularly in the low-income, less-industrialized world. Austerity is further exacerbated where
the per-capita gross domestic product is low to begin with and where the ability of government to
tax or to borrow is also low. For all of these reasons, the financial viability of higher education,
including both the viability of individual institutions, and also the ability of the system as a whole
to accommodate legitimate enrollment pressures and to maintain accessibility, depends in large part
on the ability of higher education to diversify its revenue base—specifically, to lessen its depend-
ence on the government. This situation explains the worldwide trend toward cost sharing and
other forms of revenue diversification.
This paper has stressed limitations on revenue diversification. This has not meant to diminish the importance of cost-sharing, faculty and institutional entrepreneurship, and the cultivation of donors. But these measures, while absolutely essential, are also complex, technically complicated, and frequently accompanied by unintended (and sometimes undesirable) consequences. Higher education needs the continued and dependable support of public revenue. Revenue diversification must not be thought of as a replacement for governmental, or taxpayer, support, but as an essential and theoretical appropriate, if limited, supplement. Some institutions and some students will stand to gain more from cost-sharing and revenue diversification than others. And some students and parents, compared to students and parents in the past, when public revenue seemed abundant and higher education was “free” (at least for the fortunate few), will legitimately observe that they are having to pay for a highly valued service that their parents may have obtained from the general taxpayer. But the times are indeed different, and the totally “free” higher education is simply not likely to be seen in countries trying to solve all of the other public problems of the early 21st century, and attempting also to accommodate one-half or more of their youth in tertiary education.

So the message of this paper is to continue seeking ways to expand non-governmental revenue to higher education—but to remember as well the limitations, complexities, and unintended consequences of revenue diversification, and to maintain higher education as a priority, requiring a continued commitment of public attention and public tax revenues.

References


No corresponde exactamente a la versión final
PART VI

GLOBALIZATION
IN EDUCATION AND IN WORK: THE GLOBALIZED COMMUNITY COLLEGE*

JOHN S. LEVIN

Abstract
This is a multiple case study of seven colleges using field methods research to examine institutional life and organizational context. This study determines that community colleges in both Canada and the United States exhibited educational and work behaviors in the 1990s consistent with the globalization process. Education was oriented to the marketplace, and the needs of business and industry received high priority in educational programming. Work within these institutions was valued for and carried out with economic ends: to realize productivity and efficiency.

Résumé
Cette étude de cas multiples a été réalisée auprès de sept collèges communautaires et utilise des méthodes de recherche sur le terrain afin d’examiner ces établissements d’enseignement supérieur et leur contexte organisationnel. Cette étude constate que, dans les années 90, les collèges communautaires aux États-Unis et au Canada fonctionnaient dans le domaine éducatif et du travail de manière compatible avec le processus de mondialisation. L’éducation s’orientait vers le marché, et les besoins des entreprises et industries avaient une priorité très élevée dans le cursus éducatif. Le travail dans l’enceinte de ces établissements était valorisé et mis en œuvre avec cet objectif économique: production et efficacité.

The general argument of this article is that community colleges in both Canada and the United States exhibited educational and work behaviors in the 1990s that can be identified with the globalization process. Educational behaviors include the formal curriculum and instructional practices. Work includes both instruction and administration. Specifically, the argument indicates that work tends to be valued for and carried out with economic ends: to realize productivity and efficiency. These behaviors are referred to as “economizing.” Education is most prominently oriented to the marketplace, and the needs of business and industry receive high priority in educational programming. These behaviors are referred to as “the new vocationalism.” Although both behaviors were evident in these institutions in the 1980s, they did not become ascendant until the 1990s. As a consequence of the central place of “economizing” and “the new vocationalism,” community colleges have become globalized institutions: that is, they adhere to the tenets of “corporatism” (Saul, 1995) and respond to the demands of a global economy and the neo-liberal state (Manzer, 1994).

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The Community College in Canada and the United States

As relatively new postsecondary institutions in Canada and the United States, community colleges are often viewed as educational institutions placed mid-way between the high school and university. Such a perspective characterizes community colleges first as primarily educational institutions and second as part of a stratified system (Labaree, 1997). Often ignored in these conceptions are the multi-purposes and multi-functions of the institution. Indeed, the variant purposes of the community college are reflected in claims that the institution has an identity crisis (Clowes & Levin, 1989; Dougherty, 1994). It has also been argued that with few traditions and multiple functions, the community college is subject to considerable influence from external pressures and societal conditions, including governments and economies—local, regional, national, and international (Cohen & Brawer, 1996; Dennison, 1995; Dennison & Levin, 1989; Levin, 1998). Responsiveness to social and economic needs is a hallmark characteristic of community colleges (Dennison & Gallagher, 1986; Dennison & Levin, 1989). Embedded in this responsiveness is a commitment of the institution to serve the underserved (Cohen & Brawer, 1996; Dennison & Gallagher, 1986).

Part of the evolution of the community college is a consequence of institutional responsiveness to changing demographics within the communities served. As illustrated in Table 1, U.S. community colleges have enrolled increasing numbers of minority students from the 1980s to 1999. For example, the Hispanic population of U.S. community colleges comprised 5.8% of the total in 1980 compared to 13.2% in 1999. These changes also reflect immigrant patterns in both the United States and Canada, where societal demographics have altered considerably over the past two decades as can be seen in Tables 2 and 3.

Such demographic changes in the population—changes propelled by immigration, specifically from non-European countries—are driving forces of mission expansion in community colleges, as exemplified by the growth of English language training programs and a more multi-cultural curriculum. Institutional responses to these demographic changes are one mechanism that brings community colleges into a globalizing process (Levin, 2001). However, whereas in the late 1970s and 1980s, responsiveness was characterized as the democratizing intent of community colleges (Cohen & Brawer, 1996; Dennison & Gallagher, 1986; Dennison & Levin, 1989), by the late 1980s and 1990s responsiveness can be viewed as service to markets and consumers rather than to communities and citizens. This shift has become a pattern in community college organizational behaviors and is connected to the globalizing process.

Globalization and the Community College

Globalization is both a concept and a process. Conceptually, globalization entails the drawing together of disparate locations and the compression of time. As a process, globalization intensifies social and political relationships and heightens economic competition. Globalization in the past two years...

### TABLE 1

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<tr>
<th>Enrolments, Public Two-Year Colleges by Ethnicity/Race*</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Year</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hispanic</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>%</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Asian</strong></td>
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<td><strong>%</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Black</strong></td>
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*U.S. Department of Education, 1999. Categories are those of Department of Education. Also, American Indian student enrollments are basically unchanged at 1% as a percentage of the total from 1980 to 1999.
decades has been propelled by capital, electronic technology, the movement of people, specifically migration, as well as by government policy and actions.

As a practical term, globalization reflects a perception "that the world is rapidly being moulded into a shared social space by economic and technological forces and that developments in one region of the world can have profound consequences for the life chances of individuals or communities on the other side of the globe" (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton, 1999, p. 1). For Robertson (1992), the cornerstone of globalization is the consciousness of a global society, culture, and economy, as well as global interdependence. Consciousness and interdependency have saliency in knowledge-based enterprises, such as universities and colleges. Held and McGrew (1993) characterize globalization as a multi-dimensional process, noting that distance and time are no longer primary constraints upon social interactions. The process of globalization is evident in several institutional types such as political, military, cultural, economic, and legal. Higher education institutions, because of their cultural, social, and economic roles, are caught up in and affected by globalization as well.

The process of globalization has been connected to numerous alterations in higher education. For example, with emphasis upon international competitiveness, economic globalization is viewed as moving postsecondary institutions into a business-like orientation, with its attendant behaviors

TABLE 2

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>3,321,700</td>
<td>4,493,300</td>
<td>7,338,100</td>
<td>7,682,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>1,238,600</td>
<td>801,300</td>
<td>707,600</td>
<td>988,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>445,000</td>
<td>1,633,800</td>
<td>2,817,400</td>
<td>1,921,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>443,000</td>
<td>637,200</td>
<td>1,653,300</td>
<td>2,330,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Soviet Union (included in Europe figures) 15,700 43,200 84,000 365,400


TABLE 3

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>128,618</td>
<td>192,001</td>
<td>230,834</td>
<td>252,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>46,295</td>
<td>52,105</td>
<td>48,073</td>
<td>50,050</td>
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Soviet Union (included in Europe figures) 15,700 43,200 84,000 365,400

of efficiency and productivity. For the management and operations of research universities in both the U.S. and Canada, globalization can be equated with corporatism, with the marketplace playing a more pronounced role than in the past. The placement of higher education institutions in closer proximity to the marketplace, especially in fields connected to techno-science, through corporate partnerships and associations, is an obvious manifestation of economic globalization. Many consider training and education as synonymous, much like the interchangeability of “knowledge” and “skills” (Aronowitz & Di Fazio, 1994; Currie, 1998; Leslie & Slaughter, 1997; Levin, 1999a; Newson, 1994; Slaughter, 1997; Slaughter & Leslie, 1997).

Globalization literature either implicitly or explicitly suggests a number of organizational behaviors that are influenced by globalizing processes (Appadurai, 1990; Aronowitz & Di Fazio, 1994; Bridges, 1994; Castells, 1993; Castells, 1996; Held et al., 1999; Rifkin, 1995; Teeple, 1995; Waters, 1995). These processes include not only economic globalization but also cultural and social. These behaviors suggest how higher education institutions (their members) respond to global forces as well as to the behaviors of the state in its responses to global forces such as global competitiveness. Behavioral sets or categories include internationalization, multiculturalism, commodification, homogenization, marketization, re-structuring, labor alterations, productivity and efficiency, and electronic communication and information. Furthermore, with the role of the state increasing in the affairs and operations of public higher education institutions, the state has become a more noticeable institutional actor, intervening or interfering in organizational actions. This set of behaviors is referred to as state intervention (Levin, 2001). These behavioral categories are not only consistent with globalization but also reflect both the impact of global forces upon higher education institutions and the reproduction of the globalization process (Alfred & Carter, 1996; Aronowitz & Di Fazio, 1994 Currie, 1998; Dudley, 1998; Levin, 1999b; Leslie & Slaughter, 1997; Marginson, 1997; Newson, 1994; Ritzer, 1998; Schugurensky & Higgins, 1996; Slaughter, 1997; Slaughter & Leslie, 1997).

Recent scholarship on universities (Clark, 1998; Marginson & Considine, 2000; Slaughter & Leslie, 1997) emphasizes the global political economy in the development of universities internationally. These scholars suggest that global forces are penetrating universities in numerous countries. For Clark (1998), universities are businesses with capitalistic behaviors, including contracting with business and industry to generate revenues for sustaining university mission and activities. There are, thus, “entrepreneurial universities.” Slaughter and Leslie (1997) investigate “academic capitalism” and argue that research universities are driven by the marketplace, especially through research where faculty become independent entrepreneurs who seek resources. The diminution of state funding gives rise to these behaviors. Marginson and Considine (2000) identify the “enterprise university” where organizational behaviors are directed at generating institutional prestige as well as income. For them, and particularly applicable to Australian universities, research and scholarship are subjected to new systems of competition and performance measures. For all of these scholars, universities are influenced by economic globalization and the institution is conceptualized as a component of the political economy.

Although behaviors and actions at community colleges suggest that economic motives play a significant role in globalization, there is more to globalization than economic behaviors, which include relationships between labor and capital and market forces. Specifically, electronic technologies not only drive globalization, they have also become part of the culture or behavioral patterns of globalization. Immigration, in both its patterns and its sheer numbers, also contributes to globalization, as do ideological shifts and international associations (Appadurai, 1990; Barnet & Cavanagh, 1994; Clegg & Gray, 1996; Dudley, 1998; Friedman, 1999; Lash & Urry, 1994; Waters, 1995).

For community colleges, economics, electronic technology, and immigration patterns serve as dominant globalizing influences. Economics includes the wide area of global production, both government and private sector behaviors in response to a global economy, and fiscal resources available to community colleges. Electronic technology includes computer-based information and production processing technologies, communication technologies such as electronic mail (e-mail), voice mail, and video broadcasting, and software programs from financial accounting packages to content-rich data sources that might be encyclopedic in nature. This technology grouping incorporates production, communication, and knowledge technologies. And finally, immigration patterns include the rationales for immigration, such as political upheaval, the geographical locations
of immigration origination, essentially non-European and non-English speaking regions in the 1990s, and the demographic characteristics of immigrants, including skill and income levels. In addition to these three domains of influence, the roles and actions of governments are significant catalysts and sustainers of organizational change. This is a domain of politics, and government, specifically state and provincial government, is conceived as a principal agent of globalization.

The Study

This is a qualitative multiple case study of community colleges in Canada and the United States, beginning in April 1996 and concluding in November 2000. State, provincial, and national jurisdictions were also investigated to determine both government policies relevant to community colleges and census and demographic statistics pertinent to the patterns of change affecting the case institutions. The qualitative multiple case study design was used because of several factors that made case study appropriate for the research questions and given the comprehensive scope of the topic with its emphasis upon the understanding of organizational life and institutional contexts (Berg; 1995; Burgess, 1984; Hardy, 1996; Mason, 1996).

The choice of sites followed two basic patterns. The first was along the lines of theoretical or purposeful sampling. The second was associated with site access. Purposeful sampling consists of choosing a sample of a population (in this case, community colleges) which fit characteristics of the study’s purpose and which may conform to working hypotheses (Mason, 1996). Thus, colleges possessing characteristics that suggested connections to globalization and internationalization were chosen as part of the sample pool. This pool included those colleges with reputations for international projects and programs; those colleges that served diverse populations; and those colleges reputed to be innovative, especially in their use of electronic technology. Sampling also included those colleges that were in jurisdictions where influential policy bodies promoted change along marketplace—both domestic and international—lines; those colleges in geographical areas where there was considerable international activity, in finance, business, industry, and culture; and those colleges where college officials possessed high profiles in national and international educational forums, or reputations as participants in international education activities.

Additionally, in order to provide cases that were not identical to each other and reflected as a whole a variety of other sites, the sample pool was further refined to include different organizational systems. This selection included, for example: colleges that were part of a multi-college district; colleges that were part of a larger educational system; and colleges that were independent, that is, with their own governing board. Also included were colleges in different political jurisdictions (that is, the U.S. and Canada on one level and different states and provinces on another), and of differing sized institutions, especially because of the widely held view of organizations that size is related to complexity and that, primarily, differences among organizations can be a factor of size differences. Thus, the sample pool was limited conceptually.

The second pattern was associated with site access. From the sample pool of fifteen colleges, those where there was known opportunity for uncontested access were the preferred choices. Ultimately, seven colleges were selected and agreed to participate.

The investigative strategy was to study multiple sites in depth through interviews and informal conversations with college personnel and students, through the review and analysis of institutional documents, and through observations. A group of researchers undertook site visits—from three to five investigators at one site at the same time. The use of a group approach not only assisted in data collection but also in analysis during collection. The multiple viewpoints, the discussion of individual on-site observations, and the confirming and disconfirming of preliminary hunches all contributed to a richer and more accurate understanding of the site (Eisenhardt, 1989).

The study of multiple sites was augmented by the collection and analysis of other related data covering the period of 1989 to 1999. Data sources included federal (Canada and the U.S.) departments, agencies, and commissions, state and provincial government departments and agencies, and individual colleges and college districts. Document data included institutional documents, government documents, and institutional survey data. Institutional documents were comprised of college calendars, annual reports, collective agreements, policies, institutional reports, program/course
schedules, and institutional communications (e.g., memoranda); they also included material such as student newspapers and informational brochures gathered during site visits. Government documents comprised legislation, policies, policy discussion papers, and reports. Data also included regional and local demographic figures related to jurisdiction served by each community college.

In addition to existing public documents, personnel from each college were surveyed and asked to provide quantitative information on budgets, students, programs, and graduate employment placements. This survey was intended to provide a comparative guide for the sites as well as a quantitative measure against which qualitative assessments could be compared within sites. Survey data not only provided for a validity check but also enhanced the investigator’s understanding of participant perceptions.

The multi-site investigation was both cross-sectional and longitudinal. The first site visit was on the one hand an extensive examination involving interviews, conversations, and observations, using the concept of organizational change over a five year period as an analytical tool to gain understanding of the present. On the other hand, a second site visit at each college, from between 12 and 18 months subsequent to the first, permitted a longitudinal analysis, enabling the research to address observable change over time, as well as a validity check on initial observations.

At each institution, the following college personnel were interviewed: president or chief executive officer, president’s assistant or secretary, chief business officer, chief academic officer, chief student services officer, chief human resources/personnel officer, samples of mid-level administrators (deans, directors), samples of full time faculty and part-time faculty, faculty union president and vice-president, support staff union president, student government leaders, and one to two board members (if available, the board chair was interviewed). Additionally, if a college was part of a multi-college district, the district chancellor and other district officials were interviewed. As well as formally arranged interviews, more informal interviews and conversations were held with administrators, faculty (full-time and part-time), support staff, and students.

At the second set of site visits, only the principal investigator was on site for all visits, with a collaborator present at a majority of sites. During these site visits, the principal investigator and collaborator interviewed faculty and administrators as well as one or two support staff, using follow-up questions derived from the questions and responses in the first round of interviews. Questions addressed changes to missions and structures over a period of 12 to 24 months. The purpose of the second site visits was to explore a limited number of questions in greater depth and to ascertain the extent of institutional change over a one to two-year period, relative to the changes identified in the previous five years (see Levin, 2001 for a more extensive use of interview data including student data).

In all, interviews were conducted over a two-year period at seven colleges in the U.S. and Canada, in the states of California, Hawaii, and Washington and the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia. Approximately 60 individuals were involved in interviews, formally or informally, at each college, for a total of approximately 430 people interviewed, with the majority of formal interviews lasting from 50 minutes to two hours.

Following site investigations, the principal investigator reviewed data collected at each site and subsequently wrote a detailed case study report, combining analyses of observations, documents, and interviews as well as historical and social analyses drawn from secondary sources. The case study write-up aided in making sense of the enormous quantity of data collected during site visits (Eisenhardt, 1989).

The seven colleges in this study were given fictitious names, consistent with the agreement with each college president to maintain relative anonymity of institutions. The colleges were named City Central College (CCC); City South Community College (CSCC); East Shoreline College (ESC); North Mountain College (NMC); Pacific Suburban Community College (PSCC); Rural Valley College (RVC); and Suburban Valley Community College (SVCC).

In order to determine the ways and the extent to which globalizing forces affected and influenced community colleges, several analytical frameworks were employed to understand organizational behaviors. These frameworks were developed from globalization theory discussed above and from organizational theory (e.g., Cameron, 1984; Di Maggio & Powell, 1983; Gephart, 1996; Levy & Merry, 1986; Mintzberg, 1983; Morgan, 1997), as well as upon recent applications of
globalization to institutions (e.g., Appadurai, 1990; Carnoy, Castells, Cohen, & Cardoso, 1993; Castells, 1996; Held et al., 1999; Marginson, 1997; Newson, 1994; Slaughter & Leslie, 1997). Specifically, the frameworks used were: Cameron’s (1984) organizational adaptation framework; Levy and Merry’s (1986) organizational transformation framework; and a third framework created from the literature relevant to globalization and higher education. This specific analytical framework drawn from higher education literature that addressed globalization was used to categorize all data. Thirteen major behavioral categories were applied to these data (See Exhibit 1). Furthermore, additional literature on globalization (Robertson, 1992; Teeple, 1995; Waters, 1995) served to clarify the analysis of data. The goal of analysis was to identify patterns and themes that helped to explain the organizational effects of globalizing forces and how the globalization process affected college behaviors.

Data were coded according to the categories noted in Exhibit 1, and coding identified recurring patterns and noted relationships between variables (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Furthermore, national and state and provincial policy document data underwent a second iteration of coding and thus another analysis process. First, documents were categorized according to their jurisdiction: Federal Canada; Federal U.S.; state; or province. Second, documents were categorized according to their source: government; government affiliate; non-government body; non-government organization; institution; and private. And, finally, documents were categorized by type, including

**EXHIBIT 1**

Higher Education Globalization Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Abbreviation Code</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Internationalization (students, curriculum, delivery)</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Workforce training</td>
<td>WT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Electronic technology—real time communications</td>
<td>ET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Labor alterations (e.g., additional work)</td>
<td>LA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Productivity and efficiency</td>
<td>P/E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Public sector funding constraints</td>
<td>LPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Restructuring</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. State intervention</td>
<td>SI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Marketization</td>
<td>MRK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Partnerships</td>
<td>PA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K. External competition</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. Homogenization</td>
<td>HOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Commodification</td>
<td>COM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EXHIBIT 2**

Categories for Government Policy Document Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Abbreviation Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internationalization</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector funding constraints</td>
<td>LPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector interaction</td>
<td>PR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electronic technology</td>
<td>ET</td>
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<tr>
<td>Productivity and efficiency</td>
<td>P/E</td>
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<tr>
<td>External competition</td>
<td>C</td>
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<tr>
<td>Restructuring</td>
<td>R</td>
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<tr>
<td>Partnerships</td>
<td>PA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Workforce training</td>
<td>WT</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marketplace</td>
<td>MRK</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
legislation; policy (formal policy, policy discussion, policy background, policy draft); review of legislation; review of policy; research; and report. Analysis then proceeded to include coding, using a modified pattern of the higher education globalization categories discussed previously, as noted in Exhibit 2 (Categories for Government Policy Document Analysis).

After pattern coding, content analysis of the extracted data included counting of coded data by category and the identification and explanation of specific themes. Counting ensured that there was a substantial quantity of data for the established patterns. Thematic analysis led to a clearer understanding of the meaning of the patterns.

Observational data were analyzed both during site visits at each college and following site visits for all colleges, and treated in two distinct ways. On the one hand, observational data served as evidence of the presence of patterns related to concepts consistent with those drawn from globalization literature and theory. On the other hand, observational data were coded using categories derived from globalization theory and used in conjunction with other types of data, such as data from interviews.

Finally, interview and journal data were coded thematically, relying upon patterns identified as those connected to college mission and college operations, such as mission alteration that favors higher level programming in instruction and operational changes to institutional decision-making. These themes and patterns were then used to explain alterations to institutional mission and operations.

Economizing

Where institutional decisions are grounded on economic values and justified as efficient or productive, or both, the term “economizing” was used for these decisions and the resultant behaviors. “Economizing” is a community college behavior that reflects the impact of the globalization process upon institutions: in these institutions, state and provincial governments serve as intermediaries, directing public institutions to model private sector behaviors and to view communities as a marketplace.

Policy documents from the various jurisdictions clearly indicate the pressures from government upon institutions to achieve greater productivity in meeting student and employer demands and improving operational efficiencies in order to reduce the financial burdens of the state. Table 4 displays the dominant intentions expressed in policy documents from each jurisdiction that pertain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jurisdiction</th>
<th>Explicit Intent</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal Canada</td>
<td>Reduce unemployment nationally and train for marketplace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>Offer less expensive education, provide greater responsiveness to business and industry, and achieve greater productivity of institutions, with less reliance upon public funds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>Provide workforce training to meet the needs of business and industry and assist province in global and economic competitiveness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal U.S.</td>
<td>Meet national economic needs for global competitiveness through workforce training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>Achieve economic competitiveness for business and industry through workforce training and increased institutional productivity to assist state economy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>Assist economic performance of state by increasing productivity and efficiency and train a globally competitive workforce.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>Improve economic condition of the state within a globally competitive environment by training and retraining the workforce.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
to community colleges. Federal Canadian policy, for example, emphasizes the requirement to reduce unemployment and increase job training that will be relevant for a global marketplace. Alberta policy during the 1990s aimed at cutting educational costs while requiring colleges to become more responsive to the training needs of business and industry. British Columbia policy stressed workforce training both to meet the requirements of business and industry and to assist the province generally in global economic competitiveness. A sample of policy documents from the Canadian jurisdictions is displayed in Exhibit 3.

Interview data indicate that institutional behaviors during the 1990s were directed at “economizing” through re-structuring, labor alterations, productivity and efficiency measures, and the use of electronic communication and information, as well as revenue generation through internationalization, commodification, and marketization. At Pacific Suburban Community College in Hawaii, David, a department chair, speculated about the college’s altered future:

“We’re going to increasingly be tasked to pay our own way. Raising tuition is inevitable. We have become more entrepreneurial and [have] moved closer to the market. Rising costs will squeeze the college. The answer [to rising costs] is in changing operations to become more effective.

At Suburban Valley Community College, in California, Douglas, a faculty union official, noted that administrative decisions were motivated by finances: “money drives.” But “there is no money for faculty and staff salaries,” as a result of economic recession in the state in the early 1990s. These fiscal decisions and administrative behaviors demonstrated “how faculty are no longer necessary.”

EXHIBIT 3
Canadian Policy Documents

Alberta

British Columbia

Canada
Douglas’ view was supported by another faculty leader, Henry. He observed further that labor relations and actual or threatened alterations to faculty work dominated organizational life in the middle of the decade to the extent that the college lost its “collegial” atmosphere. A college counselor at City Center College in British Columbia, Janice, explained that “economic survival is the real mission” of the college as a consequence of “government cutbacks”:

We are trying to sell the place: [this is] almost exploitative behavior and the opposite of student centered. There is false advertising. There are no computers but we do have an Internet address logo. We make students pay for placement tests and we make them take prerequisite courses. The commitment to our mission and goals’ statement is not borne out by reality.

For Janice, the education of students as an institutional goal was superseded by financial behaviors. At another Canadian college, Rural Valley College in British Columbia, the Dean of Continuing Education outlined the dramatic alterations that have affected her college:

There have been changes in funding, there have been changes in federal and provincial policy. The demographics of the local communities have changed and the expectations of the communities have increased . . . The mobility of the learner is shifting: they have jobs; they move; they have another job; they train; they have night classes; and they have children . . . there’s been a blurring of the public and private sectors: the private . . . is getting public money and the public is entrepreneurial.

At East Shoreline College, in British Columbia, which has a history of market-oriented behaviors going back to the 1980s, the college president noted that personnel were “stretched” to their limits. Robert, a senate executive member, observed that East Shoreline was “a free-market organization: we offer what is marketable.” In the 1990s, he noted, “economic expediency” and emphasis upon applied education within the provincial system had altered the “value placed upon education.” East Shoreline nonetheless increased its emphasis upon a market orientation and the acquisition of resources became a central feature of institutional life:

There is more pressure to be entrepreneurial. There is competition for offshore revenues.

Doreen, a nursing faculty member at East Shoreline, noted that, “in trying to deal with economic constraints, the college has taken on an entrepreneurial role, and competition adds to severe stress within the institution.

At North Mountain College in Alberta, Alan, the college president, explains his rationale for marketplace behaviors at his institution:

In the college, there are higher levels of work; there are higher levels of stress. We are confronted with a less supportive and more hostile government. We are being challenged by government, by the private sector, by taxpayers generally. People at North Mountain are wondering whether their work is really valued or appreciated or understood. We are facing rising levels of expectation and demands . . . Education institutions: these are knowledge industries, companies . . . In this highly competitive environment, you feel enormous pressure to be adroit, nimble, flexible, and to respond to rapidly shifting corporate, government, student demands and needs. It takes years. We just had to operate in a far more business-like way: [this has] become a pattern now.

For Alan, North Mountain College had little choice but to alter the institution to fit the expectations of “government,” the “private sector,” and “taxpayers.” As a consequence, the college became a different institution over the decade, operating less like an academic institution and more like a business. Faculty reflected this trend at North Mountain College. Doreen, a business instructor, observed these alterations in a less than flattering manner and described how economic goals altered organizational behaviors:

Power is centralized at the top. The president and vice-president are control freaks. [The college is] bureaucratic, dictatorial, stultifying.

Another faculty member suggested that organizational goals were shifting: “we are to a certain extent abandoning our community, looking for opportunity in a global marketplace.” An English instructor, Randall, asserted that “the big change at the college is the orientation toward business
and the business model of education.” Finally, Constance, a business instructor, referred to faculty as “volume oriented worker bees,” indicating the effects of economic objectives:

Stress is placed upon instructors. They are not supported and have no time. There is no release time for curriculum development. Faculty are burned out with classroom size increased.

Observational data also suggest that institutional behaviors during the 1990s were directed at “economizing.” Field notes from a meeting with the Dean of Continuing Education at Rural Valley College in British Columbia indicate that this administrator sees the diminution of government funding for the public sector as a key government policy that has set the course for public institutions to engage in competition for resources. That is, funding is a vehicle of policy.

She [the Dean] is confident that provincial and federal policies are directing all colleges in the province. She acknowledges the privatization of post-secondary education and also recognizes the inadequacies of policies and practices in encouraging high level job training . . . She says that 30% of the revenues at the college are non-government and that in five years 50% will be non-government. (Field notes, May 9, 1997)

Observations from meetings with other Rural Valley College members including faculty and administrators indicate that they are preoccupied with the provincial government and its funding behaviors, but not aware of policy shifts and impending long-term alterations to post-secondary education. Rural Valley College is an institution caught up in its concerns for funding. For example, the college pursues additional provincial government dollars through the addition of more and more students, yet organizational members are unaware of the implications for institutional mission given an expanding program base and an enlarging budget—one that grew 200% over the period of 1990–1991 to 1995–1996, a 40% a year growth.

Although college members at the seven institutions are cognizant of the financial stresses upon their institution, they do not acknowledge, with few exceptions, the larger arena of globalization, such as global competition and transformations in production following technological innovation, particularly increasing computerization in the workplace. These innovations lead not only to the redesign and reorganization of the workplace but also to changes in the nature of work (Aronowitz & Di Fazio, 1994; Rifkin, 1995; Teeple, 1995). Governments transform themselves and their institutions to address the needs of business and industry (Saul, 1994) and the means of transformation are based upon efficiency (Taylor, 1991). Thus, decisions in community colleges are grounded on economic values and justified as efficient or productive, or both, and reflected in, if not precipitated by, provincial, state, and national objectives for a competitive, international economy.

The New Vocationalism

The process of globalizing education considers education as an adjunct of the managerial economy and treats education as instrumental, altering it from a knowledge to an acquisition base. “The new vocationalism” in the community college orients curriculum and instruction to a global economy. In this economy, global capital dominates, production is increasingly automated, more rapid, and efficient, and the labor force has been restructured and re-stratified (Bridges, 1994; Carnoy et al., 1993; Friedman, 1999; Held et al., 1999; Teeple, 1995).

At North Mountain College in Alberta, Mary, an English instructor, lamented the shift of institutional emphasis to a global economy:

There is a heavier focus upon entrepreneurship and money making. We have lost the focus on the soulful part of education. Jobs drive students who want technical training and the college responds. These influence the teaching of writing and [writing becomes] applied communications. The social function is being lost.

At North Mountain College, “the new vocationalism” is exemplified by and is contained within the programming of the applied baccalaureate degree (referred to as applied degrees) established by the Alberta government for colleges and technical institutes in the mid-1990s. According to the legislation, “applied degree programs must . . . be designed with the object of preparing students for careers” (Province of Alberta, 2001). The Minister of Advanced Education and Career Development
in Alberta noted in October of 1998 that “[t]he main purpose of applied degrees are [sic] to prepare Albertans for work” (Government of Alberta, 1998). The views of college members at North Mountain reflected this intent. The college’s vice-president noted that “the applied degree initiative was very important . . . [these programs] were driven by workplace and students’ needs to be in a competitive situation . . .” A department chair indicated that the college’s “mission has changed to include applied degree programming.” Another instructor expanded on this mission alteration:

[Programming is] shifting upward and away from the low end of the mission. I don’t like seeing the college movement away from reaching the under-prepared, remedial, and working class students. (Economics faculty, North Mountain College)

A senior administrator described the new vocationalism as a change in the college from “the liberal arts core to having more of a focus on technology and entrepreneurship.” Faculty described these new applied degree programs as responses to local business and industry demands for a competitive workforce, and they indicated that the curriculum was moving not only towards the increased use of technology but also towards an outcomes-based focus. According to several administrators, the curriculum is “more training focused” with a “more practical orientation.” They referred as well to the “global skills requirement” in the curriculum. The college president referred to the altered curriculum as the inclusion of “new economy skills.”

Observations at North Mountain College—during the second site visit to the institution—highlight the change to both college curricula and to college mission.

One major change is the establishment of two degree programs and the development of five other degree programs. Justified and formed around critical concepts of employment, [such as] competitive skills, knowledge economy, and market-sensitive, these four-year programs capture considerable institutional energy and serve as beacons of the new mission—positioning the college as a four-year institution, with its focus upon employment. No longer educating generalists, such as Arts and Sciences’ baccalaureates, the college is beginning to educate and prepare specialists—small business and entrepreneurship, journalism, public relations, and technical writing. Future proposals include industrial ecology, policy studies, applied justice studies, interior design, and child, family, and community studies. (Field notes, October 7, 1998)

The claim of “learner-centered” education (Barr & Tagg, 1995; Dolence & Norris, 1995; O’Banion, 1997) can be seen at North Mountain College as addressing the needs of business and industry and conforming to government policy for economic development. “Learner-centered” means more practical education, practical for employers and thus for students to obtain employment. North Mountain’s president at a public address on September 19, 1997 noted that there was a list of skills required for the new economy and that “retraining is lifelong learning.” Two days earlier, a chief executive officer of an oil company and member of the college’s foundation spoke to an assembly of North Mountain College members promoting organizational change so that “education could be more like a business” and adapt to “an evolving marketplace.” The applied degrees represent a response to the marketplace and contain vocationally-oriented curricula: preparing students for work, for careers in a competitive marketplace, and strengthening a managerial economy.

At Pacific Suburban Community College in the State of Hawaii, college programming adjusted to rapidly changing state economic conditions and to business needs locally and internationally. Observations from two site visits indicated that education at Pacific Suburban has become commodified so that college actions serve what has been termed the managerial economy (Marginson & Considine, 2000).

Commodification looms: efforts to make education products marketable, such as distance education, [a] special Emergency Medical program; looking at Asian markets; pilot testing distance education programs; and on-line programs—microbiology, emergency medical technician. Moving closer to [the] marketplace to secure business support. New Japanese language courses for business, Japanese [courses for] credit . . . New type of ESL [English as a second language], for those who want English as another language . . . to market in China. (Field notes, March 17, 1998)

At Pacific Suburban Community College, remedial programming and courses were shifted from credit to non-credit status and expected to be self-supporting. At the same time, the college increased its focus and energies on the local as well as the Pacific Rim market. Furthermore, the college began
to develop advanced training programs, notably in Culinary Arts, with the goal of establishing a four-year degree program on campus. A mid-level administrator described these developments as “looking for new markets.” A college counselor added that the college “was always looking for new markets.” A department chair noted that there were efforts to “maintain the core curriculum,” because the college continued to add new programs as the college “redefines [its] educational population.” “The trick is to keep our eye on curriculum,” he said speculatively. On the minds of most, if not all, organizational members interviewed was the state’s economy, which was suffering because of a weakening Asian economy and thus less tourism, and the continuation of threats from the state government of public sector budget cuts. The college’s mission expanded: doing more programming, reaching international students, increasing distance education yet preserving a multicultural focus. As well, however, programming emphasis shifted to address marketplace needs and to meet demands for programs and courses that bring financial gain, including higher-level offerings for offshore Asian markets.

The new vocationalism not only shapes curriculum to employment and careers for students, but also shapes institutional responsiveness to the marketplace—to revenue sources and their requirements for training. The new vocationalism expands the community college’s curriculum but at the same time it stratifies programs. Programs are added in high demand employment areas, such as in business and computer-related subjects; programs are re-structured or even discarded in areas where employment needs are minimal or where there is no obvious connection to employment, such as in adult basic and remedial education. At North Mountain College in Canada, English as a second language programming, a non-credit area, was a profit center; at Pacific Suburban Community College in Hawaii, remedial education, removed from the credit area to the non-credit one, was expected to be self-supporting. In both cases, tuition for these programs rose either to cover costs or to generate a profit; and in both cases those who could not afford these costs went elsewhere or nowhere.

Seen through this perspective, community colleges have altered their public role, changing from serving communities to serving a managerial economy. Their comprehensive curriculum has become skewed to the extent that educational goals are synonymous with those of private business. Former goals including personal development of students and the provision of general education are re-defined in economic terms, with skills and employment substituting for learning and knowledge as outcomes.

Conclusions: The Globalized Community College

Globalization is not a one-way process; interpretations and responses of organizational members, and especially key decision-makers, are influential in how globalization affects an organization. Institutional members, including faculty, board members, administrators, and professional and support staff, contribute to globalization and thus to the alteration of their institution. Organizational ideology that values competition, the marketplace, and the instrumentality of education favors and pursues the reduction of goods, services, people, and organizational relationships to an economic value. In higher education, this ideology underlies the treatment of students as consumers and citizens as economic entities (Levin, 2001; Marginson, 1997; Ritzer, 1998). Globalization understood this way has played a significant role in the alteration of the community college to a globalized institution. In this sense, we can understand the community college as a conflicted institution, suspended within traditional values of responsiveness and serving the under-served. This conflict is captured in observations at Suburban Valley Community College in California.

Suburban Valley Community College reflects several of the characteristics and conditions confronting American [and Canadian] society in a global environment. They value and reward achievement, responding to competition but they also feel the need (guilt) to serve the under-served: capitalistic on the one hand . . . social democrats on the other . . . They run fast, respond, adopt the latest fashion, [and] want to stay ahead. They want to extol their way, but change in order to accommodate the ways of others . . .

The mission is changing, moving toward accommodating new learners . . . They are also addressing short-term training . . . and they are moving increasingly to distance education, especially on-line and Web-based delivery. Changing demographics, changing industry needs, federal welfare policy, more work . . . for students and less school, new immigrants, and new
technologies are driving forces, as is the state [and provincial] funding system which promotes enrolment growth as the only way to generate additional money. (Field notes, May 22, 1998)

Observations of North Mountain College in Alberta provide a perspective on an institution that has moved beyond traditional conceptions of the community college; yet, not all organizational members embrace the new ideology.

North Mountain College is a post-modern globalizing institution in progress, showing the tensions between a solid comprehensive institution and a market-oriented business. There is a rise in training for the marketplace, but not the vocationalism of the past: no mechanical or industrial programs. There is adaptation to a competitive environment, especially a local business ethos. North Mountain seeks to redefine and re-identify itself... But... the managers and their strategies are in a different place than and not necessarily consistent with the views and the behaviors of the rest of the institution. (Field notes, September 1997)

Traditionally conceived, community colleges are responsive, adaptable institutions that meet community needs (Cohen & Brawer, 1996; Dennison & Gallagher, 1986; Dennison & Levin, 1989). Notwithstanding this traditional conception of the institution, the community has become re-defined as part of a managerial economy, which is promulgated by global capital, by large corporations, and supported by governments at the federal, provincial, and state levels (Barnet & Cavanagh, 1994; Lash & Urry, 1994; Schugurensky & Higgins, 1996; Teeple, 1995). Local business and industry profit by the community college’s responsiveness: economic development is fostered through the training of a workforce and the re-training of workers. In responding to this community and to pressures of government, community colleges have fulfilled part of their mission but perhaps at the expense of their social and educational function of serving the under-served. In both education and work, community colleges exhibit characteristics of globalizing behaviors as they pursue “the new vocationalism” in education and “economize” in work.

References


Globalization practices, such as entrepreneurialism, managerialism, and privatization, are increasingly evident in higher education. They are profoundly affecting institutional life in most parts of the world. More and more, institutions are being run as business enterprises in a managerialist fashion and are being pressured to generate new forms of income. They are also being held increasingly accountable for their responsiveness to social and economic needs, especially regarding their contribution to regional and national competitiveness in the global economy.

Under these conditions, the entrepreneurial university—characterized by strong partnership links with hi-tech industry, corresponding new organizational forms of knowledge production, and a managerialist mode of governance—has become the dominant model of institutional innovation (Clark, 1998; Slaughter and Leslie, 1997). This competitive, market-oriented model and the globalization practices that underlie it are in direct tension with the collegial ethos and with democratic institutional governance and tend to marginalize higher education concerns about community development, equitable social renewal, and the public good.

How universities respond to these trends, however, depends upon a range of interrelated factors. Among these are the political economy of the particular country and its position in the global economy and, linked to this, the degree of its acceptance of neoliberal economic reforms. Other factors include national culture, the structural features of the particular higher education system, and individual institutional mission and function.

Given these dominant tendencies and the impact of globalization on higher education, key questions arise. How can the broader social purpose of higher education be maintained in the face of the increasing prevalence of globalization practices? What organizational arrangements, especially regarding internal governance and external responsiveness, will provide the basis for maintaining concerns for democracy, social justice, and community development? In the competitive market ethos associated with these practices, what role will be played by institutions that are not at the cutting edge of innovation?

These issues are addressed in this chapter by approaching the concept of globalization in both its ideological and material forms and analyzing its impact on universities. We explore two sets of practices that may provide alternative models for universities to counter the seemingly inevitable drift toward globalization practices. One set of alternative practices relates to the internal organization of universities, and the other to the external responsiveness of universities to community development service.

The alternatives to the managerial model focus both on democratic internal governance practices and on external community service. We see the coupling of these as significant, as similar values underlie both. Maintaining democratic traditions ensures more collegial and participatory practices within the university. Likewise, community-oriented service partnerships, driven by the
goals of social equity, embody democratic values and concerns for the public good. Our main claim is that, together, these internal and external practices constitute important alternatives to the ubiquitous drift toward the entrepreneurial university, managerialism, corporate interests, and the private good.

France, Norway, and South Africa, in disparate ways, provide national contexts conducive to developing alternatives to the neoliberal model of “best practice” that is sweeping the world. This model has its origin in Anglo-American countries and is infused through supranational organizations, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank (Lingard and Rizvi, 1998). France, Norway, and South Africa, with different traditions from those of the United States and Great Britain, have adopted some neoliberal economic reforms but have resisted others.

For example, despite OECD urgings to jettison the election system in Norwegian universities and to apply more modern managerial systems, these institutions have preserved their collegial forms of governance and have an election process that generates interest and debate beyond the university community (OECD, 1997, 1998b). French universities have also maintained their democratic traditions and have not adopted Anglo-American managerial styles of governance. In both countries, interviews with academics attest to their tenacity to retain democratic models of governance. In South Africa, given the strong socialist character of its struggle against apartheid, the post-apartheid government has voluntarily adopted many neoliberal structural adjustments favored by transnationals, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, in the context of the vast disparities generated by apartheid, the imperatives of equity have given rise to a highly progressive constitution and public policy framework. This provides the opportunity for the nation and its higher education institutions to balance concerns for the redress of social injustices with neoliberal economic reforms. Research has suggested that one important way of achieving this balance is through the higher education–community service partnership model (Subotzky, 1998a, 1998b). In addition, given the enormous inequalities between historically advantaged (white) institutions and historically disadvantaged (black) ones, the issue of how non-research universities can position themselves within the competitive entrepreneurial model is starkly posed by the South African case. Important lessons can be gained by observing how higher education institutions in each of these countries is challenged by the reality of global trends, and also how the political economic conditions in each case have created some space to set and maintain alternative responses to globalization.

The Concept of Globalization and its Ideological Underpinnings

It appears that Roland Robertson (1992) was the first sociologist to use the term globalization in the title of an article in 1985. The term was barely used before 1980 but has rapidly assumed currency. A recent search for titles using “globali” on the Internet revealed a dramatic rise in hits, from two in 1986 to 196 in 1997 and a total of 692 hits over that period.

While some authors have argued that globalization is not a new phenomenon (Hirst and Thompson, 1996; Frank, 1998), others argue that despite this, the use of the term, its ideological underpinnings, and the heightened sense of compression of the world in terms of space and time are new phenomena (Heydebrand, 1997; Koc, 1993). Arrighi concludes that “careful advocates of the globalization thesis concur with critics in seeing present transformations as not novel except for their scale, scope and complexity” (1998, p. 61).

Globalization is manifest in distinct but related economic, cultural, discursive, symbolic, and ideological dimensions. Among the signifiers of the process are the growth in world financial markets in which the foreign exchange market in 1992 was “sixty times larger than world trade” (Sassen, as quoted by Arrighi, 1998, p. 40). Bentley identifies “the dawn of the ‘electronic age’ and ‘information society’ as a convenient marker for distinguishing contemporary globalization from all its earlier forms” (Bentley, as quoted by Riggs, 1998). Along with citing the extensive use of the Internet and all related information technologies as an important marker of globalization, another is the downfall of the Soviet empire, which is linked to the dominant neoliberal discourse
surrounding globalization. Koc (1993) concludes that globalization is not new, but only intensified in recent decades, and is accompanied by certain discursive practices:

What is new about globalization is its entry into our daily language as an expression of “reality.” In this sense, I argue that globalization is not only a process but also a discourse, defining, describing and analyzing that process. I point out the neoconservative ideology as the most prevalent influence in this discursive debate (Koc as quoted by Riggs, 1998).

The end of the Cold War implied a distinct ideological victory for the liberal market economy as the dominant paradigm in contemporary times. In considering the impact of globalization on higher education, it is therefore essential to identify the ideological currents and growing internal contradictions that underlie it.

Globalization, in its ideological dimension, is widely seen to be the outcome of doctrines aimed at serving the hegemonic interests of world capitalism (Smyth, 1994; Chomsky, 1997; Kraak, 1997; Orr, 1997). Following the minimalist government prescriptions of the neoliberal consensus, nations are urged to adopt structural adjustments that create conditions conducive to unregulated trade, the free flow of capital, speculative short-term investments, the repatriation of profits, and unfettered access to new markets. These policies entail reducing state control of the economy, restraining state spending, and encouraging the pursuit of export-led policies. Failure to follow these injunctions purportedly leads to loss of competitiveness in the global market. According to the monetarist-inspired rhetoric of globalization, governments are inefficient and, consequently, the demise of the welfare state is justified.

Critical concern for the effects of globalization on equity, social and financial stability, and the environment are growing (Mander and Goldsmith, 1996; Martin and Schumann, 1997). Critics argue that, in favoring the minority rich, globalization has widened the wealth gap. Through the integration of consumer markets, the process of globalization has created new inequalities and threatens peripheral consumer interests and rights as well as environmental conditions, especially in developing countries.

Within the neoliberal framework of globalization, the increasing determination of national economic policy by transnational corporations (TNCs) has resulted in the decline of national sovereignty (Smyth, 1994). Related to this, structural adjustment programs, in creating conditions that maximize TNC profits and short-term investment returns, are in direct tension with policies aimed at the redistribution of wealth and opportunity and meeting basic domestic needs, especially in developing countries (Chomsky, 1997). Autonomous by their very nature, TNCs are accountable to no one but their own shareholders. The vast global capital flows that characterize current short-term speculative investment trends can severely damage national short- and long-term interests.5 The underlying notion of the free market is also seen as something of a myth (Chomsky, 1997; Marais, 1998). Rapid and prosperous economic development—for example, until recently in the East Asian emerging economies and, as is shown below, in Norway and France—occurred precisely where the orthodoxy of neoliberal market principles was subverted, where the state controlled capital flight and assured greater equity, and where protectionism was retained.

Significantly, in response to recent turmoil in world financial markets, mainstream neoliberal economists (Sachs, 1998; Fischer, 1998) have called for a fundamental review of the global financial system and proposed some form of regulation of the large capital flows that have been so detrimental to emerging economies. Implicit in this call are crucial shifts in attitudes among establishment figures, which would have been unthinkable two years ago: that a liberalized and deregulated world economic system does not spell unparalleled global prosperity (Marais, 1998); that this flawed “free” market mechanism favors the minority, rich short-term speculators in the north to the vast detriment of developing countries; and that the growing global interdependence that is the consequence of globalization renders everyone vulnerable to market fluctuations resulting from short-term speculation.

Similarly, the seemingly sacred orthodoxy of the World Bank has recently been questioned from within by its prominent chief economist, Joseph Stiglitz, who has called for an end to the “misguided” debt relief policies of the IMF and the World Bank. He argues that “policies which underlay the Washington Consensus are neither necessary nor sufficient, either for macro-stability or
longer term development” (Stiglitz, as quoted in Hanlon, 1998). The goal, he states, is equitable
development “which ensures that all groups in society enjoy the fruits of development, not just
the few at the top. And we seek democratic development.” Stiglitz contends that “markets are not
automatically better” and that “the dogma of liberalism has become an end in itself and not a means
to a better financial system” (Stiglitz, as quoted in Hanlon, 1998).

It is important to note that these global developments do not manifest uniformly in different
contexts; they are mediated by local and national conditions (Wolpe, 1995). Henry et al. argue
that “there is no essential determinacy to the ways in which globalization processes work, since
for various globalization pressures there are also sites of resistance and counter movements” (1997,
p. 68). Following this logic, any study of globalization and higher education must seek not only
to identify commonalities in higher education policy directions across national boundaries, but
also the ways in which particular local contexts mitigate against wholesale or simplistic adoption
of macro trends that serve selective interests.

As is the case with global economic relations, a totally deregulated market in higher educa-
tion may not be the panacea that free traders imagine (see OECD, 1998a, on the benefits of open
markets). The long-term value of the uncritical introduction of market-oriented managerial prac-
tices into public universities should therefore be seriously questioned. Increased competition, pri-
vatization, and managerial practices aim at more efficient universities. Yet efficiency at all costs and
unmitigated business practices are in direct tension with existing practices and with the social
purpose of higher education through its contribution toward the public good, social renewal, and
basic development. Despite strongly encouraging a number of what we have categorized as glob-
alization practices for its member countries, the OECD (1998b) has indicated some hesitancy in
unleashing market forces totally on universities. This is evident in the following statement:
“However, maximizing profit is not the purpose in education and it is necessary to ask whether
the adoption of practices from the business world is consistent with the multiple services expected
of educational institutions” (OECD, 1998b, p. 77).

The Emergence of the Entrepreneurial University

In both its ideological and material forms, globalization has profoundly impacted on higher edu-
cation. Universities have been affected by monetarist fiscal constraint and the general distrust of
public sector agencies. The state has reduced university budgets, urging institutions to restructure
and become leaner and more responsive to social and economic needs, while simultaneously
demanding expanded enrollments to reduce unemployment. Governments have strongly encour-
gaged universities to generate income from patents and innovations and to foster closer partnerships
with industries to apply knowledge in the development of new products and services within the
rapidly changed information-led economy.

Global trends in higher education have given rise to the “entrepreneurial” or “market” uni-
versity (Dill, 1997; Orr, 1997; Slaughter and Leslie, 1997; Tierney, 1997; Clark, 1998). The entrepre-
neurial university is characterized by closer university–business partnerships; greater faculty
responsibility for accessing external sources of funding; and a managerialist ethos in institutional
governance, leadership, and planning. It thus entails increasing market-like behavior by both
management and faculty. Universities are clearly functioning increasingly as market-like organi-
zations and are therefore engaging in “academic capitalism” (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997). Universities
are appointing new kinds of “knowledge workers” or “entrepreneurial scientists.” Faculty across
the board are being urged to assume fundraising roles, develop skills in interdisciplinary and
team project management, and deal with the media and an increasingly better-informed general
public.

As a result of new organizational forms of partnerships between higher education and indus-
try, new modes of applications-driven knowledge production, which are characteristically inter-
disciplinary and heterogeneous in nature, have emerged (Gibbons et al., 1994). Under these
prevailing market conditions, knowledge is being reconceptualized so as to value entrepreneurial
research, especially that on the leading edge of science and technology and innovation, more highly
than nonmarketable knowledge (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997). Conventional norms of academic
freedom, critical reflection, peer-review evaluation, rewards, and curiosity-driven research are therefore in tension with income-generating market-like activities. Merit and rewards are increasingly being interpreted in terms of entrepreneurial activities. The devolution of budget responsibility to operating unit level threatens the concept of the university as a community in which individuals are primarily oriented toward the greater good of the organization. Undergraduate education in public research universities has declined as a result of the reduction of block grants, which are being expended more in market-oriented activities. Consequently, teaching and research are fragmented (Clark, 1997).

Faculty and disciplines far from the market are marginalized, as are concerns for the public sphere. The professional autonomy of faculty is infringed, and intellectual property rights have been eroded and commodified (Polster and Newson, 1998). Research shows that as a result of managerialism academics feel excluded from decision making and perceive that the academic function of the university has been made secondary to managerial imperatives (Currie and Vidovich, 1998). Although many universities have complied with these globalization trends, others have subverted these policy directives.

The Political Economies of France and Norway

In general, European countries have not moved as far to the “Right” in their economic policies as has the United States (Kim and Fording, 1998). However, variations among these countries will arise, depending upon their current economic situation and the political party in power.

The two European countries under consideration, namely France and Norway, are more socialist in their political orientation in 1999, and they have higher levels of public sector expenditure per gross domestic product than the United States. The French and Norwegian governments have maintained a commitment to the welfare state, although certain aspects of this have disappeared in these societies. They both are moving toward the “Third Way,” which is between the dogmas of free-market capitalism and big-government regulation. French prime minister Lionel Jospin (a Social Democrat) has adopted a managerial socialist administration that retains the principle of strong state regulation. As Barry James writes, “While being prepared to accept some ideas from the right, such as the privatization of state industries, Mr. Jospin has derided capitalism as ‘a force that moves, but which does not know where it is heading’” (James, 1998, p. 1). It is, he believes, “the state’s role to supply the necessary direction and protect fundamental values of egalitarianism and justice” (1998, p. 1). Jospin is quoted as saying recently that without the guiding hand of the state, there would be “an explosion of inequality, the erosion of the social bond, the menacing of our environment, the enfeebling of our cultural wealth, the loss of long-term perspectives” (James, 1998, pp. 1 and 7). Further, the French have a strong antipathy toward the Americans and their attempts to impose their model on the world, as evident in the response by French president Jacques Chirac to United States president Bill Clinton’s advice on following the “American Model”: “Would France strive to be like America? No, of course not. Each country has its own model” (Time, 1997, p. 37).

Norway is one of the very few countries in the world where public revenues exceed public spending. It is one of the few countries in western Europe that has voted not to join the European Union (EU). While the “no” vote has increased in each referendum, more recent polls are, however, indicating a shift in this opinion. Tjeldvoll and Holter (1998) suggest that this should not be seen as a wish to withdraw from Europe but more likely an indication of Norway’s self-confidence and a wish to preserve its culture. As stated by Tjeldvoll, “Just before the year 2000 and under the strong influence of a globalized market economy ideology, Norway is still a distinct welfare state. Education for all from kindergarten to university is free of charge and tertiary education is open to all who qualify” (1998, p. 1).

The Norwegian Labor Party (equivalent to Social Democrats) is leaning in the same direction as the social democratic governments of France, Great Britain, and Germany, which would in many ways be parallel to the “Third Way.” In 1999 the Labor Party was in opposition in Norway, and the country was administered by a minority government of three center parties, which had to rely increasingly on support from the Conservative Party and the extreme right-wing Progressive Party.
Although there was still a high level of political consensus about welfare state principles, the largely informal coalition of the Conservative, Progressive, and Labor Parties continuously pushed in the direction of neoliberal market reforms. Interestingly, they were all in favor of joining the EU, which signals a change in policy. A poll taken in December 1998 showed, for the first time, a clear majority of the population in favor of joining the EU. Another change has been indicated by the minister of education in the minority government, who has given public signals that he prefers the “American Model.” This may lead to greater privatization of universities and greater competition among universities in which tenure is more difficult to obtain.

Democratic Traditions in French and Norwegian Universities

France's change toward greater participation in university governance originated in the 1968 student revolt. The 1968 Loi d'Orienterion (Loi Faure or Law Giving Guiding Principles for Higher Education) created a democratic system in which all levels of staff and students participate in representative councils, including some external representatives from the community. These representative councils sit as one body to choose the university president, who is elected for five years and cannot serve a subsequent term.

With the first left-wing coalition in the history of the Fifth Republic in 1981, France received a government committed to democratization and participation as well as to reforming higher education. The government wanted to extend the research base, open the university to its region, and strengthen links to industry. The 1984 Loi sur l'enseignement supérieure (Loi Savary or Higher Education Law) regulated the governance and management structure of universities and introduced the concept of contracts concerning educational activities, which institutions sign with government. The composition of councils and the democratic process are stipulated in this law. The 1984 Higher Education Law also gave autonomy to universities and independence regarding research activities to researchers. This legislative framework provides the foundation for strengthening the democratization of French higher education.

In Norway during the mid-1960s, the process leading toward a more democratic decision making system began at the University of Oslo. This occurred before the 1968-69 student revolts as a result of an ongoing process initiated some years before. An interesting aspect of this process of democratization was that it was initiated by professors, rather than by students or other groups traditionally excluded from decision making. In 1972, professorial autocracy was replaced by a governance structure based on elected boards.

Other universities adopted a similar system, and in 1990 a new law incorporated all four universities and six colleges. The OECD review team, which visited Norwegian universities in October 1995, concluded that they were moving in line with international trends. The reviewers noted that “the recent legislation has resulted in streamlined governance arrangements, greater external participation in smaller governing bodies and increased executive power (OECD, 1997, p. 10). Norway now has a structure that blends executive power with its democratic tradition.

Case Studies of Avignon and Oslo

This section reports on findings of a study investigating a range of globalization practices affecting universities. In September and October 1998, Jan Currie and Arild Tjeldvoll interviewed academics and administrators at the Universities of Avignon and Oslo. We focus in this chapter on responses to one question: Would you like to keep the value of democratically electing the president/rector, deans, and heads of departments?

Norwegian respondents were overwhelmingly in favor of democratic elections (100 percent). No one said that they would prefer appointed positions. All the French, except one, wanted elections. The one exception was a younger academic who favored appointing the president and heads of departments but still wanted to elect deans. A few respondents in both countries were in favor of democratic elections but also supported some changes to the current system in the areas of term of office and voter composition. Some noted the need for more training for leaders and for more decision making power to be given to those elected. The reasons given for wanting elections
were varied. The following responses from both Avignon and Oslo academics indicate some of the underlying values that can be maintained in a democratic tradition:

The university has survived for centuries and one of its strengths is its democracy. It ensures that there is a rotation of leadership within the institution. (Oslo 828)

We should be able to have our say in our choice of leaders. This is important, that we are able to choose—we don’t want just anybody presiding over us. Obviously, people don’t always agree, but it is important that everybody gets to participate. (Avignon 921)

I want to elect my leader because I want to know what kind of solidarity that person has with me. I want to know what kind of values that person has. (Oslo 805)

Absolutely, I believe that this is the best way of functioning for an establishment like the university. This way of thinking is part of our history in France, we have had a democratic society for the last two hundred years so this is really part and parcel of our mentality. Our culture has an absolute, deeply founded respect for the system of democratic elections. People don’t like the idea of having their leaders designated for them, apart from in the private sector, where money intervenes on all levels. If somebody is elected by his or her peers, this generally inspires a climate of mutual trust and respect. This gives a guarantee of their qualities. (Avignon 930)

Other respondents who favored democratic elections remarked on the need to rotate leadership, maintain a sense of solidarity, and ensure that policy was debated in the university community. They felt it was important to have someone who was familiar with the institution and someone of their own choice. Those who were elected spoke of it as being a positive starting point because it was an indication that they were accepted and not imposed upon the faculty. These responses indicate that faculty in these two universities in France and Norway have resisted the global trend toward increased managerialism.

In weighing the benefits and disadvantages of managerialist versus democratic governance, we draw from interviews in these two universities and in an American and an Australian university, which summarize the differences between the two practices of appointed versus elected deans. Appointed deans within a managerialist approach allow a free market for talent based on meritocracy. It allows new ideas and new “blood” to enter the university. It entails choosing a charismatic, inspirational leader—one who can take charge and make tough management decisions. It tends to reflect a top-down, hierarchical, managerial structure. Decision making is streamlined into the hands of an autocratic few and tends toward secretiveness. Staff are not as involved and often do not know the direction of the organization. They tend to become more cynically alienated from the organization.

By contrast, elected deans within a collegial/democratic approach are leaders who are first among equals and are known quantities. On the other hand, they may be too well known and can be manipulated by friends and can destroy enemies. The limited term of elected deans (usually five years in Europe) means they have to return to previous positions among peers. This curtails the practice of destroying one’s enemies. It allows for a rotation of leadership and a change of policies. Collegial decision making puts control into the hands of colleagues, or at least allows for democratic representation. Information flows more quickly, and workers feel involved. A more collective/community feeling and a desire to work for the goals of the organization are developed.

In determining which type of governance system to develop, there have been some interesting studies that suggest that a mixture of managerialism and collegiality can serve universities best. For example, de Boer, Denters, and Goedegebuure (1998) describe the Dutch pre-1998 system as a mixed system of leadership that may bring the best results. Their analysis suggests that while academic democracy is not all virtuous, the loss of participatory decision-making processes is equally unfortunate.

Clearly, the neoliberal agenda will persist in universities in the near future. In this climate, leaders need to balance traditional academic values with pragmatic management. University leaders may need to be more cautious in adopting the crudest forms of managerialism and entrepreneurial practices so that democratic participation remains strong and curiosity-driven research remains an integral part of universities along with applied and community action research. The main challenge, as Rice (1998) recently put it, is to develop a “bilingualism” between the contrasting managerial and collegiate cultures within institutions. This implies instituting efficient management
and entrepreneurship without succumbing wholesale to managerialism and entrepreneurialism, in which market assumptions and values dominate.

**The Political Economy of South Africa**

Given its particularly politicized history, South Africa represents a vivid case of the challenge faced by all countries to respond to global pressures and simultaneously achieve a more equitable distribution of wealth and opportunity. It thus provides an interesting comparative case in which to observe these political economic tensions as a backdrop to understanding their impact on higher education policy.

South Africa completed in 1999 the first five years of its post-apartheid history. Since the 1990 unbanning of political opponents to apartheid and the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners, and the first democratic election in 1994, a progressive constitution and public policy framework have emerged to redress the ravaging injustices of apartheid. Simultaneously, South Africa has gradually reinserted itself in the international context, grappling with the challenges of positioning itself competitively as an emerging economy in the rapidly changing global scenario.

Given its deeply divided social order, South Africa remains a dual but interdependent society shaped by apartheid and largely determined along racial lines. This dual social structure consists of a relatively advanced, globally interconnected political economy dominated by the mainly white rich minority, which is linked to a relatively underdeveloped stratum comprising the poor, mainly black, majority. The former has depended on the latter in many critical ways for its existence and reproduction (Wolpe, 1995). Characteristic of this dual society is the extreme disparity in advantage and power between the rich minority and the poor majority. The tension in South Africa’s macroeconomic policy manifests in its two-fold development imperative of simultaneously achieving global competitiveness and addressing the basic needs of its impoverished majority through the redistribution of wealth and opportunity.

Given the pronounced socialist leaning of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) during the years of its anti-apartheid resistance, the unanticipated moderateness of its current macroeconomic policy may appear somewhat anomalous. This bears testimony to the persuasive power of the neoliberal global consensus. Following the reforms of the old regime during the late 1980s, the new government has initiated a voluntary structural adjustment program designed to create a conducive climate for foreign investment, win World Bank and IMF favor, and assuage the concerns of local business. It has therefore positioned itself squarely within the prevailing neoliberal paradigm of unfettered capital flows and monetarist fiscal restraint, while retaining a broad moral and political commitment to the redistribution of wealth and opportunity and reconstructive development.

This duality manifests in two strongly contested and contradictory policies. The first is the redistributive development path embodied in the government’s 1994 Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP)—an integrated program aimed simultaneously at meeting the basic needs of the people, thereby kickstarting growth through redistribution and sustaining this growth through the export-led high-tech competitive engagement in the global. The second path prioritizes globally oriented development and is premised on structural adjustments and redistribution through growth. It is linked to the government’s 1996 Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, which aims at job creation through a projected growth rate based on increasing foreign investment. It is consistent with World Bank macroeconomic principles of budget deficit reduction and restricted social spending. To date, GEAR targets have not been reached, apart from reduction of the budget deficit.

While there has been constant rhetorical commitment to the RDP goals of meeting basic needs, not only have there been severe delivery problems and organizational haphazardness in grounding the RDP, but deep contradictions have also emerged in the formulation and implementation of macroeconomic and fiscal policy measures. For example, while offering relief to the low-income groups, the proportional tax burden has increasingly shifted from companies to individuals in order to create conducive conditions for investment.

These developments represent significant ideological shifts in government policy from its previously more unconditional commitments to the redistribution of wealth and have severely strained...
its alliance with trade unions and the South African Communist Party. In particular, recent sustained opposition by its partners to the GEAR strategy has been premised on the argument that it fundamentally favors the global development path at the expense of RDP concerns and the interests of the poor. The GEAR policy has come under sustained pressure from its alliance partners and others. Even the Church has opposed GEAR on the grounds that it does little to assist the poor. The ANC has subsequently agreed to modify GEAR targets but remains committed to its framework.

Clearly, South Africa must follow a “Third Way” complementary development path that accommodates global and redistributive concerns. Achieving this implies demonstrating considerable political will in critically challenging the neoliberal orthodoxy and justifying a strong role for the state in regulating transnational capital flows and in fulfilling its redistributive agenda. The state must actively drive basic development to complement the private sector’s role in driving growth.

**Higher Education Policy in South Africa**

These wider tensions are embedded in emerging higher education policy in South Africa, which has undergone a fundamental restructuring. The 1996 report of the National Commission on Higher Education (NCHE, 1996) provided the framework for the reconstruction of the system and laid the foundation for the 1997 White Paper on higher education and the subsequent Higher Education Act. This framework borrows heavily from international policies on financing, quality assurance, and national qualifications models, mainly from the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. The new policy framework establishes the foundation for a unified, equitable, well-planned, program-based system. It aims to overcome the prevailing mismatch between higher education output and the demands of economic and social development, to ensure quality; reduce wasteful duplication through planning; and redress the severe race, gender, geographic, and institutional inequalities that are the legacy of apartheid.

Tensions among higher education stakeholders were high during the formulation of the NCHE report and the subsequent Green, Draft, and Final White Papers on Higher Education Transformation (Subotzky, 1998a). Mirroring the broader macroeconomic tensions outlined above, the main contestations were around the emphasis on the role of higher education in contributing toward global competitiveness as opposed to serving the basic needs of the poor majority. Significantly, the final White Paper shows numerous references to and a balanced consideration of both global and redistributive development priorities. According to the White Paper, higher education must “contribute to and support the process of societal transformation outlined by the RDP, with its compelling vision of people-driven development leading to the building of a better quality of life for all” (Department of Education, 1997, p. 7). It must also “provide the labor market, in a knowledge-driven and knowledge-dependent society, with the ever-changing high-level competencies and expertise necessary for the growth and prosperity of a modern economy” (Department of Education, 1997, p. 7).

However, without exploring the basis upon which reconstructive community development can be institutionally operationalized, these goals remain unresolved, contradictory challenges. While numerous accounts in the literature characterize the new organizational and epistemological features of the “market” university, policy debates are relatively silent on the corresponding features of the reconstructive development function of higher education. A recent review of trends in the literature on *Higher Education and the Public Good* (Educational Resource and Information Center, ERIC, 1996, p. 1) suggests that “economic development is most represented in the literature, with political and social development significantly less discussed.” New ways, it is suggested, “for higher education to support these goals regionally or locally—for example, through service learning or action research—should be studied.”

**New Concerns About the Contribution of Higher Education to the Public Good**

Renewed interest in the contribution of higher education to the public good and community development is part of a growing worldwide concern for recapturing the broader social purpose of higher education in the light of globalization practices. In response to evidence of the widening disparity
between conventional academic practices and societal needs, the role of universities in fostering the public good has come under rigorous scrutiny recently (Fairweather, 1996; Tierney, 1997). This concern has been accompanied by a new emphasis on the policy dimension of research, establishment of collaborative linkages with government and the private sector, and reappraisal of the service and outreach function of higher education (Terenzini, 1996; Keller, 1998).

In a similar vein, Braskamp and Wergin (1997, p. 62) argue that, given the degree of social fragmentation in the environment, “higher education today has an opportunity unique in its history to contribute to our society.” Despite the numerous roles that higher education has played in the progress of society, in Boyer’s words, universities are “increasingly viewed as a place where students get credentialed and faculty get tenured, while the overall work of the academy does not seem particularly relevant to the nation’s most pressing civic, social, economic and moral problems” (Boyer, as quoted in Braskamp and Wergin, 1997, p. 62). There is increasing pressure to bridge the gap between higher education and society and “to become active partners in addressing and solving our social ills and be more competitive internationally” (Boyer, 1996, as quoted in Braskamp and Wergin, 1997, p. 62). Higher education institutions now need to “reorient themselves as active partners with parents, teachers, principals, community advocates, business leaders, community agencies, and general citizenry” (1997, p. 64). Higher education, in the view of these authors, will enhance its usefulness to society by “becoming a forum for critical community dialogues, by advancing practice-based knowledge and policies as well as upholding the creation of theory-based knowledge, and by utilizing faculty expertise in new ways—in short, by forming new social relationships” (Braskamp and Wergin, 1997, p. 64).

Community Service Partnerships and Community Service Learning

As part of these contemporary concerns, the community service partnership model—and within this, community service learning—has emerged as an important means by which higher education institutions can directly serve social development. Like the process of globalization, the idea of service in higher education is not new. It is, however, receiving much more intense focus currently as a policy option. Most institutions’ mission statements identify community service as part of the universally recognized tripartite function of the modern university, namely, teaching, research, and outreach. Nonetheless, only recently has the partnership model provided a systematic operational basis for pursuing this goal as an institution-wide initiative that combines community development and academic benefits.

Community service learning (CSL) has grown rapidly recently, especially in the United States (Bringle and Hatcher, 1996; Ward and Wolf-Wendel, 1997). CSL is defined as “a form of experiential learning in which students engage in activities that address human and community needs together with structured opportunities intentionally designed to promote student learning and development” (Jacoby in Ward and Wolf-Wendel, 1997, p. 1). Its distinguishing feature is the systematic integration of community service into the formal curriculum. CSL is closely associated with problem-based learning, the hallmark of innovative teaching, especially in the Health Sciences.

Claimed positive outcomes for students include more effective learning, especially with regard to lifelong learning; the linking of theory and practice; enhanced career goals; improved civic responsibility; changed perspectives on social issues and appreciation of others’ cultural and socioeconomic situations and personal efficacy; exposure to other cultures and race groups; and critical reflection upon own attitudes (Perold, 1998). While these benefits are of course intrinsically valuable, they should ideally be integrated into a social change and partnership model to contribute also toward community development and integrate research activities. Recently therefore, greater emphasis has been placed on the community partnership model, of which CSL comprises a key component. This model involves the academic institution, community structures, and service providers (public, private, nongovernmental organizations, and community-based organizations) in a three-way partnership. Ideally, the concern is not only with the effectiveness of student learning and research opportunities, but also for community development, academic staff research, and curriculum development. The notion of partnership is therefore central to achieving these goals. As in all social relations, partnerships are vulnerable to unequal power relations. Within these “politics of
partnerships,” the interests of one partner (especially the academy) easily dominates. The ideal is
to recognize and mediate the partners’ differences in identities, roles, capacities, and interests through
relations of mutuality and reciprocity. This implies building capacity toward the joint ownership,
design, control, and evaluation of community service programs so that the interests and needs of
all three collaborating partners are addressed.

Where successful, a partnership grounded on mutual relations provides reciprocal benefits. In
the model, integrated service, learning, and research activities occur at an academic/service site
located in the community. Context-rich opportunities are provided at these sites for experiential
learning and applications-driven research (for students and staff alike, the latter both in discipli-
nary fields and in experiential learning), curriculum development, and community development.
Service is enhanced and enriched by cutting-edge research findings.

In practice, however, this is a highly illusive ideal. A recent discourse analysis of the current
literature on CSL indicates an alarming preoccupation with student outcomes and institutional
interests (Ward and Wolf-Wendel, 1997) at the expense of symmetry, reciprocity, and mutuality in
partnerships. The value of CSL appears to be perceived predominantly as a vehicle for achieving
academic aims and bolstering the interests and power base of the academy rather than for fulfill-
ing the goal of changing the social order.

Implications for Higher Education Institutions

To achieve the partnership ideal, therefore, a fundamental shift is necessary for academics from see-
ing the role of the university as providing applied knowledge to help for the solution of problems,
to one in which the university is jointly responsible for social change in partnership with relevant
bodies in the community. Under this new social contract the institution becomes an advocate for
social justice (Braskamp and Wergin, 1997).

Based on experience in education outreach projects at the University of Illinois at Chicago (UIC),
Braskamp and Wergin highlight lessons for higher education institutions in engaging in collabo-
rative work within community partnerships.

Collaborative work often creates a conflict of institutional cultures; that political and community
groups want to use the prestige of the university to enhance their agenda; that faculty members
often have less experiential knowledge of the problem context than do teachers and reformers but
compensate by using their theoretical perspectives; that failed experiments outside the academy
are more visible than a failed experiment in a laboratory; that compromise is essential; that new
forms of communication are needed to reach different audiences; that partnerships can be intel-
lectually exciting and challenging; that faculty scholarship is enhanced; and that continuous sup-
port is needed for long-term impact (Braskamp and Wergin, 1997, pp. 77–78).

They argue that the success of such ventures depends on substantial reorientation of the mission
and focus of higher education, particularly at research universities.

These changes must begin, they contend, with a new social contract between higher education
and the greater community, of which there is already growing evidence. Renegotiating the
social contract implies dispelling the public perception that academic freedom is a smokescreen
for furthering the private benefit of the individual and institutional interests. The role of the modern
university is to become more responsive to social problems and function as a forum for the
expression and negotiation of social discourse. Both of these functions have clear implications for
the nature of faculty work and the focus of academic leadership.

While there are greater demands to address social ills, the academy remains currently on the
one hand increasingly preoccupied with the market ethos, and on the other still largely inwardly
turned toward maximizing quantifiable and rewarding publications output, which is the currency
of conventional academic practice. This separation of the academy from society “has been conscious,
deliberate, and defining” (Braskamp and Wergin, 1997, p. 80). Without including communities in
defining research goals and agendas, higher education institutions “will become victimized by their
own myopia” (1997, p. 80) or, we may add, narrowly market-oriented.

Encouragingly, against the tendency toward the increasing commercialization and privatiza-
tion of faculty work Braskamp and Wergin identify the emergence of “public intellectuals.” These
activist academics want to influence public policy, notably by publishing in nonacademic publications, and integrate societal concerns into their personal and professional lives by establishing the social utility of research and by emphasizing new particularist epistemologies by which truth should not be separated from personal experience. Thus, “to the extent that the emerging perspectives of scholarship are both more political and more relevant, they parallel, without necessarily paying homage to, social forces pushing for change” (Braskamp and Wergin, 1997, p. 83).

A key insight is that “through partnerships, the research and instructional agenda can be intricately connected to the communities outside the academy” (Braskamp and Wergin, 1997, p. 87). This provides the principal means of linking academic freedom with social accountability and responsibility, of escaping the insular sanctuary of the academy and addressing the clamoring demands made on it by its social partners. In this way, the function of the modern university will be met: to be a “very active partner in shaping its social relationship with society, being responsive while retaining its core purposes and standards” (1997, p. 89). Braskamp and Wergin’s account thus corroborates the partnership model as an alternative to the marketization of higher education.

Adopting the partnership model has clear implications and benefits for higher education. Its success depends on substantial shifts not only at the mission level, but also in terms of epistemological attitudes and academic practices, particularly at research universities. These changes entail a new social contract between higher education and the greater community. They thus constitute a complementary alternative to entrepreneurialism.

**Developments in Community Partnerships and CSI in South Africa**

Given its political history, a strong community service ethos emerged in South Africa during the 1980s, as activist faculty attempted to link their academic pursuits to the anti-apartheid struggle and make their expertise accessible to civil society (Cooper, 1992). Given this activist tradition, the current challenge is to ensure that academic knowledge, including its local and indigenous forms, is produced and disseminated so that practice can be improved (Kraak and Watters, 1995). In this way, rigor and relevance can be linked. These, as Cooper (1992) argues, are not necessarily contradictory, as is often claimed by disciplinary purists.

Community service is currently receiving close attention, partly in response to the government’s recent decision to implement community service for medical and legal graduates and partly as the consequence of the argument that “community service in higher education has the potential to contribute to the reconstruction and development goals of the new government” (Perold, 1998, p. 2).

A review of the literature as well as recent case studies (Perold and Omar, 1997; Subotzky, 1998 and 1998b) reveals an interesting array of community service programs and community service learning opportunities. These clearly are contributing toward social upliftment in diverse ways and, central to our argument throughout, constitute complementary alternatives to the entrepreneurial university. Predictably, the most developed of these programs are in the health and other professional fields, but many also involve inter- and transdisciplinary elements.

It is noteworthy that while South Africa’s historically black universities are generally very poorly disposed toward functioning as entrepreneurial institutions as a direct consequence of the multiple effects of apartheid, there is evidence of excellent community-oriented programs that serve as models for community development partnerships (Subotzky, 1997 and 1998a). The missions of historically disadvantaged institutions have always been closer to community concerns, and they have had close links to the communities they serve. Academics in these institutions can potentially combine their tacit and explicit knowledge of these contexts and thus turn disadvantage into comparative advantage (Kraak, 1997; Subotzky, 1997). This is evident in an interviewee’s comment in a major recent study of historically black universities (Education Policy Unit, EPU, 1997):

> We try to use our disadvantages and change them into advantages... especially if you look at our institution in the context of the new dispensation, the RDP and so on. I think we have an ideal opportunity to use our rural environment to do relevant research. Obviously we cannot compete with [the historically white research universities of] Wits or Cape Town in nuclear physics, and I don’t think we should (EPU, 1997, p. 429).
However, all institutions are strategically positioning themselves within the new and increasingly competitive higher education context. Historically white universities, and especially the Afrikaans-speaking ones (which were historically more supportive of apartheid and whose future in the new South Africa is now threatened), are developing innovative community-oriented initiatives (Subotzky, 1998b). To take one instance: the historically white Afrikaans Pretoria University has established a semirural satellite campus in 1993, about fifty kilometers north of the capital, Pretoria. Here the university applies community service learning to provide a comprehensive teaching approach in which theory and practical experience are merged. The aim is to produce graduates better equipped to meet labor market demands.

In South Africa currently, the Community–Higher Education–Service Partnerships initiative is piloting partnership projects at eight institutions with the aim of replicating the model more widely. A noteworthy aspect of this project is that it is accompanied by a leadership capacity-building program at the master’s level, in which three participating partners from each sector are enrolled. The modules of the program and the assignments within them are designed not only to build the necessary capacity in the three participating organizations, but also to form part of an integrated and systematic planning framework for implementation of the pilot projects. One module involves comparative crossnational research in the form of site visits to U.S. universities where community partnerships have been well established as institutionwide initiatives.

In summary, we agree with Ward and Wolf-Wendel (1997) when they argue that the gap between “needy” communities and “knowing” campuses must be dissolved and the charitable model must be supplanted by the social change model. This model focuses on the processes of building relationships within stakeholder groups to address collaboratively root causes of complex problems.

**Conclusion**

Clearly, the pressures and challenges of globalization and their impact on higher education are here to stay. However, their effect is neither uniform nor inevitable, and, where conducive political economic and cultural conditions prevail, they can be mediated. To do this successfully, alternatives to the increasing currency of globalization practices must be identified and strengthened. In highlighting two sets of such practices, we have argued that the combination of alternatives to internal management practices and external service activities may provide institutions with viable options in this regard.

The case study findings from the two European universities show that the professoriate resists moves toward greater managerialism in the universities. There was overwhelming support for democratic decision making and a more collegial model of governance. Nevertheless, global forces are beginning to penetrate these universities in the guise of public sector reforms (quality assurance and evaluation programs). What will actually happen in France and Norway is a rather open question. Because of the strength of the democratic cultural traditions in the two countries, as well as the strong position of the university as a public institution, it may very well take considerable time to change the institutions in a managerial direction.

Developments in the community partnership model in South Africa and elsewhere corroborate our contention that this model represents a significant countertrend to the entrepreneurial university. The innovations identified in the case studies are directed toward the solution of complex development problems and clearly involve new forms of applications-driven, transdisciplinary knowledge production. In this way, they serve as important sites for actualizing the social purpose of higher education and of countering the negative impact of globalization on higher education.

Despite the emphasis placed in this chapter on the value of community partnerships as a complementary alternative to higher education–industry research partnerships, two other aspects of the function of higher education must not be neglected. These are curiosity-driven research, which needs to remain a high priority within universities, and the role of the university in providing an independent critical voice in society. Regarding the latter, the maintenance of state-funded, autonomous institutions is vital to ensure that higher education is not narrowly driven by the agendas of industry or the policy priorities of the state. These institutions have a timely
and important role to play in consolidating and disseminating critical perspectives on the contradictions and uncertainties appearing in the global market paradigm. Higher education institutions need to be seen to be actively working toward a more equitable society by championing and grounding the values of democracy and social solidarity in both its internal and external practices.

Notes

This chapter has benefited from funding from the Australian Research Council and draws on work done by Tove Kvill and Arild Tjeldvoll in Norway and Claude Lacotte in France.

1. The features of national higher education systems can only be fully explained by reference to surrounding political economic conditions (Tierney and Kempner, 1997). However, this relationship is complex and cannot be treated in any depth in the context of this chapter.

2. It is important to stress that the higher education–community partnership model is proposed as a complementary alternative, and not simply as a dichotomous opposite to serving market needs. Along with curiosity-driven research, meeting market needs is undeniably an important function of contemporary higher education. However, this overwhelmingly favors selective private sector interests, which are dominant under prevailing neoliberal conditions. There is therefore an unavoidable ideological tension between managerial market-oriented higher education practices and those which foster participatory governance and address community concerns. Furthermore, promoting the community partnership model does not imply crudely championing equity over efficiency. A distinction can therefore be drawn between “entrepreneurship” and “entrepreneurialism.” The first refers to efficient and innovative financial management measures such as cost reduction and diversified sources of income including the marketing, where appropriate, of academic services. This is not necessarily in conflict with democratic practices. Indeed, good management is a prerequisite for achieving democratic goals. The second refers to the dominance of market interests and managerial practices that marginalize democratic values and related internal and external practices.

3. This discussion benefits from the extensive work of Fred W. Riggs in developing a Home Page on the Internet on the concept of globalization and its discussion at a roundtable at the International Sociological Association World Sociology Congress in Montreal in July 1998 <http://www2.hawaii.edu/~fredr/glotexts.htm>.

4. This was a search of titles using “global” in the Social Science Citation Index by Jim Quigley on behalf of Henry Teune, April 1998, <http://www2.hawaii.edu/~fredr/glotexts.htm>. This number of hits represents a relatively high number of journal articles using “global” as a key term over that period of time.

5. The recent turmoil in the global financial market, which had deleterious effects on emerging economies, including South Africa, bears testimony to the vulnerability of developing countries to the damaging effects of hostile and manipulative short-term currency speculation.

6. Jan Currie interviewed all the respondents at the University of Avignon and most at the University of Oslo, and Arild Tjeldvoll made contacts with respondents and did several of the interviews at the University of Oslo. Claude Lacotte arranged the interviews at University of Avignon and translated the documents as well as organized the transcription of all the interviews from French into English. Four interviews at the University of Avignon were done in English and the rest in French; all the interviews at the University of Oslo were done in English.

The interviewees comprised ten academics from the natural and physical sciences; and ten from the social sciences; and ten from professional areas such as education, applied languages, business, and law in each university. Some of these were in elected positions as deans, heads of departments, vice presidents/pro-rectors, and president. In addition, at the University of Avignon, a retired secretary-general and the current secretary-general were interviewed. Those interviewed ranged from professors to lecturers (or their equivalent ranks in each country) and were a mixture of men and women (almost an equal number of each at the University of Oslo and slightly more males than females at the University of Avignon).

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GLOBALIZATION AND EDUCATIONAL RESTRUCTURING: UNIVERSITY MERGING AND CHANGING GOVERNANCE IN CHINA

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Abstract
This article sets out in the context of globalization to identify, examine and discuss issues related to structural adjustment and educational restructuring in China, with particular reference to university merging and changes in higher education governance models. While it is basically an historical and documentary analysis of policy change in Chinese higher education, this article focuses on restructuring strategies that the Chinese government has adopted to make its university systems more competitive and efficient in the global market context. University merging in China should not be simply understood as a pure higher education reform but rather a fundamental change in higher education governance model from an ‘interventionist state model’ to an ‘accelerationist state model’. Rather than globalization bringing about the decline of the nation state, this article shows transformations taking place in Chinese universities may not necessarily diminish the capacity of the state but instead make the Chinese government a more activist state in certain aspects.1

Globalization Challenges to Modern Nation States
In the 1990s, globalization has become the leading social science mantra and is adopted to conceptualize and account for changes in the economy, developments in technology, culture and value, politics and governance, and political unification of the world (Giddens 1999; Petrella 1996; Pierre and Peters 2000; Sklair 1999; Waters 2001). Interpretations of globalization impacts on contemporary societies are diverse, strong globalists put forth the convergence thesis, painting a bleak and depressing picture of the future of the nation state and the options for autonomous domestic policy choice (Boyer and Drache 1996; Fukuyama 1992; Moses 1994); while skeptics and transformationists have questioned the actual extent of globalization and actual changes caused by globalization processes (Held et al., 1999; Hirst and Thompson 1999).

When examining the capacity of modern states in the context of globalization, different scholars may have diverse interpretations (Hirst and Thompson 1999). For skeptics and transformationists, they oppose to the convergence thesis proposed by the strong globalists that modern states
are declining in capacity under the impact of globalization. Instead, they believe nation states still retain the ultimate claim of legal legitimacy within their territories even though they have to respond to external pressures generated by international laws and authorities (Jayasuriya, 2001; Pempel 1998). Criticizing the strong globalizists for overstating the impacts of globalization, other scholars have argued there has not been sufficient empirical evidence to develop the causal relationship between globalization and the receding role of modern states (Hinnfors and Pierre 1998; Rodrik 1997). Meanwhile, a group of scholars have called for bringing the regional and national dimensions back in the analysis of changing state roles and new governance (Dale and Robertson 2002; Evans and Harding 1997; Sassen, 1999). They argue, instead, that national governments are far from diminished but are reconstituted and restructured in the growing complexity of processes of governance in the context of globalization (Held et al., 1999, pp. 7–9; Weiss 1998).

To cope with intensified globalization pressures, modern states have changed their governance strategies from ‘positive coordination’ to ‘negative coordination’, thereby the architecture of modern states has transformed. For ‘positive coordination’, it refers to an ‘attempt to maximize the overall effectiveness and efficiency of government policy by exploring and utilizing the joint strategy of options of several ministerial portfolios’; while for ‘negative coordination’, is designed to ‘ensure that any new policy initiative designed by a specialized sub-unit within the ministerial organization will not interfere with the established policies and interests of other ministerial units’ (Scharpf 1994, pp. 38–39). The change in the coordination mode has prevented modern states from being over-burdened by welfare and social/public policy commitments (Jayasuriya 2001; Scharpf 1994). Likewise, the institutionalized state-society linkages (i.e., the mobilization of non-state sources and actors to engage in social/public policy provision and financing) may generate additional resources for the state to finance and provide social services and public policies. In this regard, globalization could be conducive to reconfiguring modern states, driving modern states to restructure their governance models and reform the ways that the public sector is managed (Pierre 2000; Pierre and Peters 2000). These changes could also be seen as productive forces for modern states to change their roles and reform their institutions in order to accommodate to, and not just adapt to, the demands and pressures generated from the external environments.

Even though there may have seen similar trends and patterns in the public policy and public management domain along the line of privatization, marketization, commodification and corporatization, governments in different parts of the globe may use similar strategies to serve their own political purposes. Modern states may tactically make use of the globalization discourse to justify their own political agendas or legitimize their inaction (Cheung and Scott 2003; Hallak 2000; Mok 2003). Most important of all, such restructuring processes could have enhanced the state capacity rather than weakening the role of modern states, particularly when modern states may adopt a spectrum of adjustment strategies to cope with globalization challenges. In certain aspects, such restructuring and reconstituting processes may make modern government a more activist state especially when modern states have chosen the role as regulator, enabler, facilitator instead of heavily engaged in the role as provider and funder (Kooiman 2000; OECD 1995; Yang 2003).

Globalization, Educational Restructuring and University Merging

Education, like other public policy areas, is affected by the same globalization processes. Therefore, globalization’s substantial effects on education is hardly disputed any more, indeed a number of authors have pointed out in recent years (Burbules and Torres 2000; Crossley 2000; Currie and Newson 1998; Jones 1998; Mok 2001; Mok and Chan 2002; Mok and Welch 2003; Welch 2000, 2001). In order to make individual nation-states more competitive, schools and universities in different parts of the globe have been under tremendous pressures from government and the general public to restructure/reinvent themselves in order to adapt to the ever-changing socio-economic and socio-political environments. As Martin Carnoy has pointed out, ‘globalization enters the education sector on an ideological horse, and its effects in education are largely a product of that financially driven, free-market ideology, not a clear conception for improving education’ (Carnoy 2000, p. 50). Education reforms, under the context of globalization, could be characterized by a finance-driven reform emphasizing decentralization, privatization and better performance (Carnoy 2000; Mok and Welch 2003).
With heavy weight being attached to the principle of ‘efficiency and quality’ in education, schools, universities, and other learning institutions now encounter far more challenges, and are being subjected to an unprecedented level of external scrutiny. The growing concern for ‘value for money’ and ‘public accountability’ has also altered people’s value expectations. All providers of education today inhabit a more competitive world, where resources are becoming scarcer; but at the same time, providers have to accommodate increasing demands from the local community as well as changing expectations from parents and employers (Currie and Newson 1998; Mok and Currie 2002). Attaching far more weight to entrepreneurial efficiency and effectiveness, contemporary universities are under immense pressures to transform their roles to adapt to changes generated from rapid socio-economic and socio-political changes. It is particularly true when modern governments have encountered reduced financial capacity to finance growing demands for higher education.

In order to generate additional revenues to sustain the development of universities, academics nowadays are increasingly involved in applied, commercial, strategic, and targeted research to generate additional resources, proactively engaging in securing research grants and contracts, service contracts, establishing closer partnerships with industry and government, technology transfer, or recruiting more fee-paying students (Apple 2000; Slaughter 1998). ‘Satellite operations’ or off-shore campuses have been set up in Southeast Asia or other parts of the globe by institutions based in Britain, Australia and the United States to market their programmes not only regionally but also internationally, academic institutions and university faculties are increasingly involved in business-oriented activities to generate additional resources (Clark 1998; Slaughter and Leslie 1997; Yang 2003). Thus, a process of ‘academic capitalization’ is becoming increasingly popular in shaping the higher education sector across the globe (Clark 2002; Mok 2001; Slaughter and Leslie 1997). Therefore, a new ‘university–academic–productive sector relations’ has emerged (Sutz 1997); while notions such as ‘corporate academic convergence’ (Currie and Newson 1998), ‘entrepreneurial universities’ (Marginson 2000), ‘campus inc.’ (White and Hauck 2000), ‘capitalization of knowledge’, ‘strong executive control’ and ‘corporate characters’ are used to conceptualize current changes in contemporary universities (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 1997). It is, therefore, not surprising that ‘the language of human capital dominates official policy recommendations dealing with growing economic and social problems’ (Spring 1998, p. 163).

In response to the demands for greater efficiency and quality education alongside the reality of growing financial stringency, university merging has become a common phenomenon for the latest developments of the higher education systems in the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, mainland China and Taiwan. Comparative studies reveal that the principal goal for university mergers is to achieve administrative, economic and academic benefits by merging institutions into a larger unit based on the assumption that larger units would yield qualitatively stronger academic institutions, better management and use of administrative resources. Being influenced by the ideas of New Public Management (NPM), one of the most popular beliefs in public management in recent years emphasizing the importance of efficiency, effectiveness and economy, the maximization of economies of scale is conceived to be the most important driving force for university mergers to get a more professional and efficient administration and to save public expenditure being spent on the university sector (Eastman and Lang 2001; Mok 2002; Rowley 1997; Skodvin 1999; Tai 2002). Similarly, Goedegebuure and Meek argue that large institutions joining the merger process to bring in scarce resources from the government and to diversify to cover as many subject fields as possible. Particularly during times of retrenchment, the more comprehensive institutions can grasp a better chance to protect their flows of funds than the relatively vulnerable specialized institutions (1991, p. 19). In addition, another major impetus to merger has come from government policy stressing the importance of effectiveness, rational coverage and efficiency in running higher education (Sanyal 1995, p. 60).

Fig. 1 shows how globalization accelerates higher education restructuring along the line of ‘marketization’, ‘corporatization’ and ‘privatization’, university merging is becoming an increasingly popular restructuring strategy for promoting efficiency, effectiveness, economy and competition in the higher education sector (Mok 2002; Tai 2002). Up to this point, we have discussed how globalization has challenged modern states, accelerating processes of structural adjustments and education restructuring. The following examines the origin, recent developments and changing higher
education governance after higher education restructuring and university merging has been started in mainland China.

**Changing Policy Contexts for University Mergers in Mainland China**

Before the economic reform started in the late 1970s, China was heavily influenced by the former Soviet Union, whereby a planned economy model had been adopted. Since 1978, the post-Mao leaders have engaged in reforms to promote economic development and improve people’s livelihood in China. Starting from the mid-1990s, the Chinese government has endorsed the market economy approach to foster further economic growth (Lieberthal 1995; Wang and Wong 1999). China, like other parts of the world, has never immune itself from the growing impact of globalization particularly when the Chinese economy is becoming increasingly open to the global market. Since 2001, China’s accession to the World Trade Organization has unquestionably subjected the mainland to keener regional and global competitions and challenges. Realizing the newly emerging knowledge economy requires competent and highly qualified and professional people, the Chinese government believes the changing domestic, regional and global social and economic environments have rendered its higher education systems inappropriate and less competitive in the global marketplace. In order to improve the ‘global competence’ of its citizens and to make its higher education systems more efficient, higher education restructuring along the line of ‘university merging’ has been launched in the mid-1990s (Yang 2000). A better understanding of the origin and development of university merging in China could be obtained by comparing and contrasting the policy models and policy environments in which higher education policies were made before and after the economic reforms took place in the late 1970s.

**Centralized Governance Model of Higher Education in the Pre-Reform Era**

Before the communists came to power in 1949, there was a co-existence of state-funded universities and non-state universities and a large number of universities were run by missionaries. A new structure of governance of universities was taken shape after the foundation of the new China through the adoption of the Soviet model in Chinese higher education system. The reason for using
Soviet system was to adapt the higher education system to meet the economic development needs. The Soviet patterns had reinforced the tendencies toward the centralization of knowledge and uniformity of thought (Hayhoe 1989).

Soviet influence was reflected not only on the organization and administration of higher education but also on the way that textbooks, teaching methods and classroom were designed. At the ideological level, Chinese higher education in the Mao period was heavily influenced by the Soviet model (Yang 2000). In 1952, the Chinese government implemented policies to nationalize all higher education institutions, including all public, private and missionary universities and colleges. Significant restructuring and readjusting of institutions of higher education was also implemented in 1952. The reorganization of higher education sector carried out under Soviet guidance was part of the efforts associated with the First Five-Year Plan (1953–1957). These reforms involved both a geographical rationalization of higher education provision and a complete rethinking of curricular patterns and institutional identities. After the reorganization, all universities and colleges became state-run institutions, which were made narrowly specialized according to the manpower planning derived from the central planning economy (Min 1994). Then a hierarchical, centralized and well-organized network was developed (Agelasto and Bob 1998, p. 31). The newly nationalized system was organized and structured based on a ‘centralized model’, characterized by the direct leadership of the government in implementing the unitary instructional plans, course syllabi and textbooks in all the colleges and universities throughout the country. At that time, it was believed that such a ‘state control model’ could best serve the centrally planned manpower needs.

Although almost all universities in China were funded and regulated by the state before the reform started in the 1980s, they were rather diversified in terms of governance. Many universities and other higher educational institutions were run and administrated by different departments at the central level, while others were under the control of local governments. We can identify three categories of higher education institutions in terms of governance: (a) those under the direct administration of the Ministry of Education (MOE); (b) those under the non-educational central ministries; and (c) those under provincial and other local authorities. Under the planned economy, a large number of specialized economic management departments were established and maintained in China to implement government’s direct intervention in business. In order to train professional manpower for the specific industries, these non-educational central departments also established and administered their own universities. Therefore, higher education institutions, under those specific economic management departments, were made narrowly specialized in order to fit the manpower planning under the planned economy. This caused ‘matrix fragmentation’ (tiao/kuai fenge) in educational governance, leading to functional overlapping, resources wastage, low economy and efficiency in higher education sector.

As the top government agency was in charge of educational policymaking, the MOE was to provide general guidance for all institutions of higher education and to control major policy decisions concerning higher education. In addition, the MOE retained direct control over certain key universities, taking the responsibility for designing curricula and syllabuses, designing textbooks, student admission, graduate job assignment, and exerted control over matters like budgets, salary scales and personnel issues (Mok 1996). Provincial and local education commissions and bureaus were just mediators to reinforce and implement national policy. Since the central government had the absolute control over financing, provision and management of education, the enthusiasm of local governments and higher education institutions was jeopardized. Moreover, such a governance model was also notorious for the separation of the center and the locality, under which each higher education institution was directed by their departments in charge at the central and local levels, resulting in lack of coordination among these levels and inefficient administration and ineffective service delivery (Fan 1995, p. 43).

Policy of Decentralization and Higher Education Restructuring in Post-Mao China

Since the late 1970s, the modernization drive, the reform and opening up to the outside world has transformed the highly centralized planning economy into a market oriented and more dynamic economy. In the new market economy context, the old way of higher education governance is
rendered inappropriate. Acknowledging that over-centralization and stringent rules would kill the initiatives and enthusiasm of local educational institutions, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) called for resolute steps to streamline administration, devolve powers to units at lower levels so as to allow them more flexibility to run education. Central to the reform strategies are closely related to the policy of decentralization, whereby higher education institutions have been given more autonomy to run their own businesses (Min 1994; Mok 2002a).

The promulgation of the Decision on Reform of Educational System (hereafter 1985 Decision) by the CCP Central Committee in 1985 marks the first comprehensive reform in Chinese higher education sector. The Decision stated that the key to restructuring higher education lies in eliminating excessive government control over the institutions of higher education and, under guidance of the state policies and plans in education, extending the decision-making power of the colleges and universities and strengthening their ties with production units, scientific research institutions and similar sectors, so that they will have the initiative and ability to serve economic and social development (CCP CC 1985). It is noteworthy that this comprehensive higher education reform blueprint put emphasis on local responsibility, diversity of educational opportunities, multiple sources of educational funds, and decentralization of power to individual institutions’ authorities in governing their own affairs. Although the State Education Commission (SEC) [a central administrative organization responsible for higher education policy and management] still performed the role of ‘guiding’ and ‘monitoring’ the whole higher education sector, the SEC no longer directly controlled and managed nearly every aspect of the higher education system. Instead, the SEC just assumed an overall leadership, providing policy guidance and direction instead of routine management and administration after the 1985 reform.2

The Outline for Reform and Development of Education in China issued by the Communist Party of China in 1993 identified the reduction of centralization and government control in general as the long-term goals of reform (CCP CC 1993). The government began to play the role of ‘macro-management through legislation, allocation of funding, planning, information service, policy guidance and essential administration’, so that ‘universities can independently provide education geared to the needs of society under the leadership of the government’. Thereafter, we have witnessed a large-scale development of higher education in the 1990s and different types of tertiary institutions have evolved in the mainland, including both national (public) and private/minban (non-state run) higher education institutions.3 (Chan and Mok 2001; Mok 2001a). With the rapid expansion of both higher education institutions and number of students, the Chinese government sees the need to develop a better governance model to run and monitor the higher education sector in the mainland (Fan 1995). Through implementing a series of policies of decentralization and marketization, the Chinese government has initiated fundamental changes in the orientation, financing, curriculum, and management of higher education (Agelasto and Bob 1998; Chan and Mok 2001; Mok 2001b). It is against the changing policy context discussed earlier that university merging and higher education restructuring was started in the 1990s. In 1995, the SEC issued a policy document entitled ‘Suggestions on Deepening Higher Education Structural Reform’ (‘Suggestions’, hereafter), recommending the four major restructuring strategies, namely, ‘joint development’ (gongjian), ‘restructuring’ (huazhuan), ‘merging’ (hebing) and ‘cooperation’ (hezuo) to reform its higher education systems. The following discusses these restructuring strategies, the consequences and the policy implications of university merging and higher education restructuring in China.

University Merging and Higher Education Restructuring in China

Restructuring (Huazhuan)

Before the proposed restructuring, the majority of regular higher education institutions were directly under different central ministries, including Ministry of Coal Industry, Ministry of Machine-Building Industry, Ministry of Metallurgical Industry, Ministry of Internal Trade, Light Industry Council and Textile Industry Council, Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, and Ministry of Forestry, etc. With the abolition of these central ministries, the management structures of 91 universities need to
be restructured. Following the 1995 ‘Suggestions’, the strategy of ‘restructuring’ was adopted to change the leadership and governance structures in higher education, including:

- Transferring all universities originally under the leadership of the central ministries mentioned above to be led and governed by local governments;
- Restructuring the leadership and governance structures among non-education central ministries;
- Transferring universities originally led and governed by different ministries to education bureaus at the provincial level, autonomous regions and centrally administering cities;
- Restructuring institutions of adult higher learning into training centres under the leadership of different government departments.

Such restructuring initiatives have been the largest scale of management reform and governance change in China’s higher education sector since the early 1990s. As a result of the restructuring processes, the bulk of the central departments in charge of specialized economic management have been abolished. In 1998, the leadership of 151 universities originally led by different central ministries in the State Council was transferred to local governments; while 81 out of them were jointly developed and administered by central government and local governments (General Office of the State Council 1998). In 1999, 59 universities originally run and led by the Ministry of Defence were transferred to be run and governed by local education bureaus. In 2000, 97 universities originally run and led by different ministries at the central level were run and governed by local governments; while 55 institutions of adult higher learning previously run by ministries at the central level were transferred to local governments (General Office of the State Council 2000). In order to resolve the problems of overlapping and wastage, the leadership of an additional 66 universities previously run and led by ministries in the central government was transferred to the MOE. Among these 66 universities, 22 were led and governed by the MOE, while 27 of them were merged with the existing universities under the jurisdiction of the MOE, 11 of them were merged into 5 new institutions (General Office of the State Council 2000). After adopting the restructuring strategy, non-educational central ministries have rolled gradually back from higher education sector, the relationship between the MOE, non-educational central ministries and provincial governments have gone through significant changes.

### TABLE 1

Current Developments of Higher Education Restructuring in China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Joint Development (gongjian)</th>
<th>Restructuring (huazhuan)</th>
<th>Merging (hebing)</th>
<th>Cooperation (hezuo)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4 (2)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>70 (28)</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>103 (42)</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>162 (74)</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>258 (105)</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>304 (125)</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>556 (232)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Figures in blankets refer to the reduced number of institutions after merging.

Table 1 shows the number of higher education institutions involved in the restructuring processes, some of them have taken the restructuring strategy while the other are readjusted and transformed by other reform measures like ‘joint development’, ‘merger’ and ‘cooperation’.
Joint Development (Gongjian)

'Joint development' refers to how higher education institutions are readjusted to be under the dual-leadership of central ministries and provincial (municipal and autonomous regional) governments without the change of financing channel (Zhou 2000, p. 15). The idea of joint development was first brought by the Guangdong provincial government in its study on higher education reform in 1992. In 1993, the former SEC and Guangdong provincial government proposed to jointly administer Zhongshan University and South China University of Technology in order to allow the two universities to play a more distinct role in the economic and social developments of Guangdong. The proposed 'joint development' strategy has not changed the leadership relationship between the universities and their supervising authorities since they are still under the direct administration of the SEC. This ensures that the funding from the central government would not be affected. And the provincial government would place the universities under the local economic and social development plans and provides the capital investment funds for them. In return, the universities would gear to the need of local economic and social development in their curriculum and programme design, admission, employment of graduates, and scientific research (Zhou 2000, p. 15).

Under such a policy direction, the School of Communications and the School of Electric Power have been developed jointly by Zhongshan University and the relevant departments of the provincial Government of Guangdong. Other examples include the Automobile and Engine Research Centre, the Chemical Engineering Science and Technical Research Centre, and the Ultrasonic Electronic and Information Equipment Engineering Research Centre which have been jointly developed by the university and relevant local organizations and industrial conglomerates. In addition, joint development projects also include those between the South China University of Technology and other institutions of higher learning and research institutes in Guangdong (Mok 2003a; South China University of Technology Leaflet 1998, p. 1).

Having seen the success of the Guangdong experience, the MOE began to launch a nation-wide university restructuring project in light of the four principles of 'joint development' (gongjian), 'restructuring' (huazhuan), 'merging' (hebing) and 'cooperation' (hezuo). The MOE has been charged with responsibilities to coordinate the entire restructuring/readjustment project. Given the special features and the distinct roles of some institutions in students mentoring, teaching and research, a differentiated administering management model was introduced in the mid-1990s for these universities. The basic guiding principle of restructuring/readjustment is 'joint development' by the central and local governments (gongjian). Among the 91 regular higher education institutions, 10 leading universities are under the joint development by the central and local governments with the former prevailing in major decision-making and the latter prevailing in the daily management of the universities. In fact, all these 10 universities are directly managed by the MOE. The Ministry is responsible for providing the general expenses and the capital investment funds for these universities. The MOE, together with the Ministry of Finance, and other related ministries are obligated to work out the managing methods over these 10 universities with the provincial and municipal governments where these universities are located. The State Economic and Trade Commission and the related state bureaus will continue to take care and support these universities for their work in scientific research and information communication, their liaison work with enterprises, and assisting the development of special programs.

After the administrative reform, the other 81 universities are jointly administered and jointly run by the central and local governments with the latter prevailing in the management. Local governments will manage their state assets, and be responsible for the management of their staff establishment, labor and wage. The universities will be placed under the local economic and social development plans. The provincial governments have the responsibilities to take measures to allow these institutions to play a more distinct role in the promotion of local economic and social developments. Preferential treatment such as financial support from the local governments available usually to the local institutions must be made available to these institutions. In the first several years, the central government must provide funding to these universities. After the transitional years, the local government will take over the funding responsibility. In addition, the Ministry of Finance must transfer funding to the local financial departments to cover expenditure of these institutions on official medical care and housing reform (earmarked mainly for the housing provident fund).
After such a restructuring exercise, these universities will recruit mainly local students and serve to promote local socio-economic development. It is obvious that the role of the central government is gradually reduced in terms of administration and structure, education financing, curriculum or graduate employment assignment. As a result of such an administrative restructuring, many universities have been transferred to be under the jurisdiction of the MOE and provincial governments.

With decentralization policies in place, especially the retreat of the non-educational central departments in higher education, local governments, especially at the provincial level have strengthened their coordinating function and enhanced their financial responsibility in higher education sector. Meanwhile, the local governments have established a close cooperative relationship with MOE to run and fund all MOE-led universities located in their territories. These developments mark the new trend of localization of higher education in China. The 'joint development' between universities could be seen as the testing ground for further collaboration or pre-merger study to see how well the partners/participants involved could really benefit from the collaborative processes. More importantly, 'joint development' in the Chinese context could also be understood as pragmatic strategies adopted by local governments and universities to pull resources together to strengthen the overall teaching and research performance in the region. With enhanced capacity and improvement in performance, the universities involved in 'joint development' could have occupied higher position in the national university league table, thus attracting additional resources and funding from the central government.

**Mergers (Hebing)**

One of the major motives for launching university merger in mainland China is to do with the enhancement of efficiency and effectiveness, standard and competitiveness. Instead of a merely formalized merger, pragmatic merger is stressed in the implementation of the reform. It refers to the unification of leadership and governance mechanism of institutions. Besides, its progress also involves the readjustment of programme setting, resource distribution, staff personnel and support units management. The reform advocates a principle of ‘1 + 1 > 2’, that is an extra value could be added and ‘productivity gain’ could be achieved via merger.

Apart from that, merger is also seen as a way to readjust the strategic structure of higher education institutions. Through merger, the number of higher education institution has been decreased. This readjustment effectively responds to the problems of functional overlapping, narrowly specialized and small scale of institutions. At the same time, comprehensive universities were established by merging mono-disciplinary universities/colleges without new investment and establishment. The establishment of new Zhejiang University in 1998 is a very good example for illustrating how university merging is done in mainland China. The Zhejiang project was established on the basis of the merger of Zhejiang University, Hangzhou University, Zhejiang Agricultural University, Zhejiang Medical University. As a comprehensive university, programmes of the merged university covers arts, humanity, education, economics, management, law, agriculture, sciences, engineering and medicine. In addition, there are national laboratories, research centers, post-doctoral stations (areas being identified as excellence in research) at the university. By transforming it to be a comprehensive university, the merger was successful to place Zhejiang University in a leading position in size and diversity (Zhou 2000, p. 16). Other examples of university mergers in mainland China include: Shanghai University was merged with four higher education institutions, including Shanghai Industrial University and Shanghai Science and Technology University, in 1994. In 2000, Guangzhou University was merged with eight higher education institutions in Guangzhou, the capital city of Guangdong Province, such as Guangzhou Normal Institute and Guangzhou Institute of Education (Ministry of Education 2002).

Merger is also regarded as a way to reform the management of higher education institutions through organizational restructuring (Fang 2000, p. 64; Wang 2000, p. 86). The traditional organizational structure of higher education institutions in China is a university–faculty–department establishment, in which university is on bureau (ting) rank; faculty is on vice-bureau (fu-ting) rank; and department is on department (chu) rank. In the progress of merger, the establishment of faculty and department will be readjusted/restructured in order to reinforce the leadership and prevent
overlapping. Therefore, in accordance with historical background and specific situation of the institutions, there are three types of organizational restructuring of higher education institutions in China: (1) preserving the original mode of three levels of establishment; (2) three levels of establishment with two levels of management in a transitional mode, in which university is on bureau (ting) rank; the existing faculty is on vice-bureau (fu-ting) rank, while the new established faculty is on (chu) rank; and department is on department (chu) rank; (3) three levels of establishment with two levels of management, in which university is on bureau (ting) rank; faculty is on (chu) rank; and department is teaching and research unit without administrative rank but preserves its conditions of service. After the merging, faculty does not exist as an autonomous establishment. It usually consists of a general office only. In some cases, it may consist of a general office, a teaching and research office, and a student affairs office which are obligated to the organization and coordination of teaching, research and student affairs of its subordinated departments (Fang 2000, pp. 64–65).

**Cooperation (Hezuo)**

As university merger requires a huge amount of energies and time to materialize, a middle way to promote university collaboration is to adopt the strategy of ‘cooperation’. ‘Cooperation’ refers to the collaboration or cooperation between academic units or academic institutions. The adoption of this reform strategy can pull resources of those involved institutions together, colleagues and students from these institutions joining the collaboration project can enjoy better resources, including facilities and equipments for teaching, learning and research. In order to strengthen the higher education sector in Guangdong, universities in the province are encouraged to share resources and facilities among universities. Realizing the limitations faced by the Guangzhou city-run higher educational institutions (particularly in terms of small student population size, limited space for school buildings, and inadequate resources and faculty members), a ‘University City’ in Guangzhou was conceived to pull resources from those local higher education institutions such as Jiao Tong College, Vocational College, Industrial and Business College, College of Arts and Law, and College of Finance together (Ding and Min 1997; Min 1999; South China University of Technology Leaflet 1998, p. 1).

In addition, the Guangdong Government has started another initiative to offer favorable policy to attract leading universities from other parts of the country to engage them in collaborative project by establishing their branch/campus in the province. Leading universities like Beijing University of Science and Technology, Harbin University of Industry, Xian Jiao Tong University, North West University of Industry, Beijing Foreign Language University, Tsinghua University and Peking University have already set up their branches to offer education programmes to citizens in the Pearl River Delta. Similarly, the Zuhai government has reached agreements with Zhongshan University and Jinan University in Guangzhou, both of them are leading universities in the province, to set up their branch campuses at Zuhai. Engaging universities into such a collaborative project, local governments can mobilize more resources to offer higher quality education (Chen and Lin 2001).

In Beijing, Peking University and Peking Medical University reached an agreement in 1995 to join a cooperation project. Having the collaboration, students can freely choose courses offered by these universities and the credits are mutually recognized. Moreover, they also jointly offer taught master programmes and PhD research degrees. Staff and students from these universities also share library resources and other facilities are made available to them (Min 1999). In 1999, 13 higher education institutions at Xueyuan district of Beijing city started a ‘teaching consortium’ to pull resources of 13 institutions together. With improved human resources and resources for research and teaching, students from the institutions involved can enroll courses and share facilities by the member institutions. In addition, institutions joining the cooperation project also set up academic accreditation mechanisms to assure high quality in education (Shen 2001). Similar cooperation projects can be easily found in other parts of the country such as the collaborative projects between Beijing University of International Business and Economics, Beijing University of Chemical Technology, Beijing University of Chinese Medicine, Beijing Fashion College, Financial and Banking Institute of China to offer programmes for training. In Nanjing, Nanjing University and Southeast.
University jointly offer academic programmes; while other institutions like China Pharmaceutical University, Nanjing Railway Medical College, Nanjing Civil Engineering and Mechanics, and Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications also reach a collaborative agreement for offering training and learning programmes (Wang 1999). All these examples have clearly indicated that universities in mainland China have tried different restructuring strategies to improve the efficiency, effectiveness and quality of their higher education systems.

Discussion

University Merging as Administrative Reform in China

Like university merging experiences elsewhere (see, for example, Goedegebuure and Meek 1991; Harman and Meek 2002; Skodvin 1999), university mergers in China could be understood as a way to enhance the research and teaching performance of universities and as a means to promote efficiency, effectiveness and economy in higher education. Nonetheless, university merging and higher education restructuring taking place in mainland China should not be purely understood as only reforms in higher education. Rather, university merging and higher education restructuring is closely related to the administrative reform initiated by the State Council in 1998. Therefore, a better understanding of university merging in mainland China could be obtained from the wider administrative reform initiated by the State Council in 1998, which injected new dynamics for the changing of university governance in China. As the market reform proceeds, the mechanism of specialized economic management departments directly controlling enterprises became increasingly incompatible with the requirements of establishing a modern enterprise system. In order to establish an administrative system which could be compatible to the market economy in China and to promote economic and social development, a new round of administrative reform of the State Council was launched in early 1998. The goals of the 1998 administrative reform were: to streamline the bureaucracy and to establish an efficient, well coordinated and standardized governmental administrative system; to perfect national civil service system; to train government personnel to be highly qualified professional administrative personnel; and to gradually establish an administrative system adaptive to the socialist market economy as well as to Chinese society (Luo 1998).

Against this policy context, the Chinese government realized the conventional higher education governance structure inappropriate in the socialist market context and therefore adopted reform strategies discussed earlier to resolve the problems caused by ‘matrix fragmentation’ and the heavy involvement of specific central economic management departments in higher education. After the restructuring processes, a new governance system which is characterized by the two-tier management, based on the division of labor between the central and provincial governments, and dominated by the coordinated management of the provincial government has been established. All the efforts discussed above aim to eliminate the co-existence of small, specialized and duplicative disciplinary institutions, and to improve the economies of scale in the higher education sector. Rationalizing the distribution and utilization of resources and improving the quality of teaching and academic research are the most obvious imperatives for university mergers in mainland China, where there have been insufficient resources available for sustaining the mass higher education system (Wang 2000). The restructuring of university systems through mergers is to eradicate the problem and situation of having higher education institutions governed by central ministries, central and local education authorities, provincial governments, municipal governments, and state-owned enterprises that confusion of higher education policies can be avoided (Guo 1998). Merger is therefore a means to streamline the governing and administrative structure of universities and higher education institutions and, more importantly, and to clarify and rationalize the relationships between the state and higher education institutions (Fang 2000).

One point which deserves attention here is that university amalgamation has taken place in China for quite some years. In the 1980s, there were strong arguments in China dating back to the 1980s that some leading Chinese comprehensive universities should have faculties of medicine and
agriculture, for instance. Nonetheless, the market ideology had not been popular enough at that time as compared to the recent years to drive for reforms. In addition, institutional amalgamation had led to many unintended results such as creating huge administration problems, failure to have efficiency gains, wasting time on traveling between various campuses. University amalgamation in the 1980s and early 1990s were heavily criticized by eminent professors such as Prof. Zhu Jiusi and Pan Maoyuan, leading comparative education analysts; while other scholars have suggested problems of different types when trying to merge universities (Wang 2000; Guo 1998). With considerable resistance from the university sector, institutional amalgamation had not been widely implemented in the 1980s. Until the late 1990s, the MOE attempted to capitalize the opportunity provided by the State Council to deepen administrative reform. In responding to the call for governance and administration reform and the call for making Chinese universities ‘world class universities’ in the twentieth century, university merging was made the top of higher education reform agenda in the late 1990s (Yang 2000).6

Changing Higher Education Governance

Having contextually and historically analyzing the university amalgamation in China, higher education restructuring and university merging taking place in mainland China has indicated a fundamental change in higher education governance. Putting the above observations, coupled with my previous studies of higher education, as well as my various field observations generated from various field visits to different parts of the mainland conducted in the past few years together, a new higher education governance model has gradually evolved (see Mok 1999, 2000, 2002; Mok and Chan 2001; Ngok 2002). In the post-Mao period, the Chinese government has allowed different types of institutions of higher learning and various governance models to flourish in the mainland in order to fulfill the policy objective of creating more education opportunities. Realizing the fact that depending upon the central government alone could never meet the pressing demands for better quality education, local governments therefore have seized on the decentralization policy and made use of the market and other non-state sources to fill the ‘gap’. In fact, the implementation of the decentralization policy has allowed individual higher education institutions more flexibility and autonomy and empowered local governments to chart the course of higher education development in response to the local needs (Mok 2002; Ngok and Kwong 2003). As of 1998, there were 1277 minban (non-state run) higher learning institutions in China (Yang 2000). In 2000, there were nearly 1 million students registered in the minban higher learning institutions in the whole country (Yang 2002). The continual increase in enrolment in these minban higher education institutions has indeed shown the market, non-state sector and other local forces have been revitalized and mobilized to finance and provide more learning opportunities for higher education (Mok 2001, 2002a).

When we contextualize the higher education restructuring and university merging in the wider public policy contexts of decentralization and marketization, we realize that China’s higher education has been experiencing a fundamental governance change. The diversification of coordinating institutions [i.e., the empowerment of local governments, the autonomization of individual higher education institutions, the involvement of the market and the community] has suggested the nature of the work the state does has changed from directly coordinating and administering education itself to determining where the work will be done and by whom. Unlike the governance model in the Mao era that the central administration imposed control on every aspect of higher education management and governance, leading to the problems of over administration and over intervention in the three major governance activities. As the policy trends and style of the ‘interventionist state model’ is characterized by centralization and state-dominance, the ‘bureaucratic governance’ is rendered inappropriate in the socialist market economy since it would kill the initiatives and enthusiasm of local educational institutions and other social forces in creating more education opportunities. In order to unleash non-state sources and mobilize non-state resources, the Chinese government therefore has started the reform and restructuring processes to make its higher education systems more responsive and competitive in the global market place.

The diversification of actors and sectors in higher education financing and provision, the revitalization of the market, the community, the society and the individuals and families to contribute
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to higher education financing and provision have shown that the state has attempted to choose these non-state sectors/actors as new policy instruments to resolve the state’s major financial difficulties in sustaining the traditional ‘interventionist state model’. By making use not only the market forces but also other forces such as individuals, families, local communities and the society, the state is now saved from being over-burdened with continual increase in education financing. The growing interdependence between the state (public) and non-state (private, community, family and individual contributions) and the exchange relationships, I anticipate there will be a decline in hierarchical forms of intervention from the state but other forms of governance will emerge. When education financing and provision is no longer monopolized by the state, the conventional ‘interventionist regulation’ framework (implying a hierarchical intervention of the state in imposing micro control of every aspect of education delivery) is found problematic. The ‘rolling back’ of the state as a regulatory state has been clearly shown from the trends of decentralization, deregulation, privatization, marketization and administrative reforms in education.

Fig. 2 shows how the three major coordinating institutions change their role/involvement in the three major education governance activities. The state gradually reduces its role in higher education financing and provision; while the market and other non-state sectors are becoming more important in these aspects. Conceptualizing the efforts that the Chinese government has adopted to restructure its higher education sector, it is clear that the state has gradually moved beyond the ‘interventionist state model’ towards the ‘deregulated state model’ and the ‘accelerationist state model’. By ‘deregulated state model’, the policy trend and style is characterized by decentralization and mobilization and ‘deregulated governance’ is central to this model. The central features of the ‘accelerationist state model’ are marketization, privatization and societal-sources-led. When analyzing education provision, financing and delivery in light of this model, the state may instrumentally make use of the market and other non-state sectors/actors to resolve the problems originally be addressed and resolved by the state. I anticipate ‘market governance’ will become popular, whereby internal competition and efficiency drive will be the determining forces to higher education policy and development.

Although the overall responsibility for providing education still lies within the central government in China, the state cannot adopt the same interventionist regulatory framework to govern the relationship between the state and the non-state/private/non-state actors; special arrangements are to be made in allowing private/non-state actors to participate in policy making and implementation; delegating power to these non-state actors and self-regulatory framework should be established in governing these newly emerging private/non-state education coordination institutions. The proliferation of private/non-state actors in education will certainly pose challenges to the conventional regulatory framework, driving the state to move away from the ‘interventionist regulation’ framework to ‘interfering regulation’ and ‘regulated self-regulation’ frameworks, especially

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coordinating Institutions</th>
<th>Governance activities</th>
<th>Provision</th>
<th>Financing</th>
<th>Regulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>+ +</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community/Civil society</td>
<td>+ +</td>
<td>+ +</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
+ - Important but reduced in importance
++ More active role and become more important
+++ Anticipated more participation

Figure 2. Changing Roles of Coordinating Institutions in Education Governance
when cooperative patterns of interaction between private and public actors in education delivery (see Fig. 3).

One point deserves particular attention here is that even though I argue the higher education restructuring processes taking place in China seems to suggest a fundamental change of higher education governance towards the ‘deregulated state model’ and ‘accelerationist state model’, I have never underestimated the central government and local governments still maintain a considerable extent of control over higher education policy and development. Hawkins (1999) has rightly pointed out ‘China, unlike other socialist states in transition, has moved cautiously in all of its efforts to disengage the state from various aspects of Chinese society and as a result has avoided some of the catastrophic problems other nations have faced’ (p. 7). Such observations lead us not to overstate the degree of autonomy of the university sector by arguing that there already exists a ‘civil society’ or a ‘public sphere’, by which we would mean a binary opposition between state and society. When analyzing how the processes of decentralization and marketization in general and higher education structural reforms in particular has affected the modes of governance of China’s higher education, we must be aware that the relationship between the authoritarian state and the more autonomous university sector is an interactive one (Mok 2000a). As the center still keeps close watch on developments and changes that taken place in the university sector, it is less likely that a genuine devolution of authority can take place in mainland China especially under a single dominant party retaining Maoist and Leninist traditions (Hawkins 1999).

Most significant of all, the changing mode of the state, together with the changing mode of governance and policy trends and styles, has pointed out that the dichotomy between the market and the state is analytically problematic and practically unrealistic. The Chinese case has clearly demonstrated that the state may tactically make use of the market as a policy instrument to reduce the burden of the state in higher education financing and provision, the adoption of such a policy instrument may well strengthen the state capacity. Such observations draw us to a special issue edited by Rhodes in Higher Education, highlighting the importance of interactions between national, regional and global levels when doing policy analysis (Rhodes 2002). Attempting to take comparative studies beyond the conceptual confines of national states, economies, and systems of higher education, Marginson and Rhodes (2002) offer an alternative model, namely, ‘glonacel agency heuristic’, for stimulating comparative policy analysts to pay particular attention to examine the interactive dimensions of global, national, and local organizational agencies and human agency. Analyzing policy changes in the higher education sector across different parts of the globe in light of the proposed framework, Marginson and Rhoades discover organizational agencies and human agency at various levels operate simultaneously in the three domains of existence—global, national and local. In addition, they also find policy change and policy making processes are so complicated that politics, markets and professionals working at global, regional, national and local levels interact frequently, heavily involving in bargaining and negotiating processes in shaping policy agendas and decisions.

Thus, we must pay particular attention to the interactions, tensions and changing relationships between the state, the market, the society and other non-state sectors. The case study discussed earlier has shown how the Chinese government can reconstitute and restructure the way that the higher education sector is managed, the restructuring processes of which may make...
the state a more activist state rather than diminishing state capacity. By adopting adjustment strategies and changing the governance modes appropriate to the changing socio-economic and socio-political environments, the national entities not only can challenge, undermine and define alternatives to global patterns but also can shape the configuration of global flows as Marginson and Rhodes (2002) have rightly suggested. Hence we must appreciate the dynamic and tensions between various forces ranging from local, regional and global dimensions. Particular attention must be given to examine what strategies of adjustment modern governments have adopted in response to external and domestic changes. The choice of policy instruments is becoming far more complicated and we must be sensitive to the contexts in which policy changes and policy transformations take place, trying hard to make sense of the interactions between local, regional and global forces in shaping governance in modern states. If the nation state can successfully ride over the national, regional and global forces, the restructuring processes could have rejuvenated the state and make it more proactive and active in shaping local/national policy agendas and policy directions.

Conclusion

This paper has discussed how globalization has accelerated changes and restructuring processes in contemporary societies. Our above discussion on higher education restructuring and university merging in mainland China should be understood as strategies adopted by the Chinese government to deepen the administrative reform and to reinvent its bureaucracy. The university merging and restructuring projects conducted in mainland China are to reduce the financial burden of the state in higher education financing and provision. Only when we place the higher education restructuring in China’s unique political cultural context and its broader decentralization in both political and economic realms, could we be able to have a better grasp of the tensions and dilemmas that China is now facing. On the one hand, the central government is keen to make use of the energies and potential unleashed from the socialist market. On the other hand, the socialist regime is worried that the state’s ability to exercise control over social and political scenes will be weakened during the same process of liberalization/decentralization.

Therefore, we should not discard the role of the state in determining policy options and we must be sensitive to the unique constitutional and institutional context in which the choice and the mix of policy instruments are determined. The Chinese government may well articulate its legitimate call for pushing higher education restructuring by the justifications of globalization. The paradigm shift from the ‘interventionist state model’ to the ‘accelerationist state model’ may be interpreted as pragmatic and instrumental strategies adopted by the state to strengthen its capacity to deal with pressing demands for higher education rather than a genuine ideological shift from socialism to a philosophical commitment to the neo-liberalism values of the market economy. Such observations and findings have indicated that globalization may not necessarily bring about ‘the end of the state’, comparative policy analysts must be sensitive to the interactions and dynamics between various levels of governments and particular attention should be given to how local, national, regional and global entities and agents organize themselves in shaping local policy agendas in the context of globalization.

Notes

1. The author wants to thank City University of Hong Kong for offering research grant to support the present research project. Special thanks also extends to Prof. Jon Pierre and the reviewers of this article, their comments are very useful to improve the present article.

2. When discussing about decentralization in higher education in China, we should not simply interpret the process of decentralization would automatically provide local governments and individual institutions a significant degree of autonomy and freedom to run their institutions as those higher education institutions in westerns societies (particularly for those in the democratic and developed economies). One may argue that even with decentralization policy in place, Chinese higher education system remains highly centralized by international standard. Nonetheless, the relaxation of SEC control over the higher
education sector in the 1990s has significantly changed the role of the state in higher education governance, see following discussion.

3. For ‘minban’ higher learning institutions, I refer to those higher education institutions run and operated by the non-state sectors. The funding sources of these minban academic institutions primarily come from students’ tuition fees, donations from local communities, enterprises’ investment or other sources generated from society at large. For details, see, for example, Huang (2003).

4. When ranking universities in China, performance of individual universities is assessed along the lines of the number of doctoral programmes and doctoral advisors, research output and the amount of research grants. Such ranking exercises conducted in China in recent years have aroused heated debates.

5. Universities run by the state sector follow the organizational structure adopted by the Chinese government. Before merging taken place in Chinese universities, the traditional organizational structure of state run universities was a university–faculty–department (three-level structure). After institutional restructuring, the three levels of establishment will gradually be reduced into two-level structure to streamline the structure to make university administration more efficient.

6. The author wants to thank one of the reviewers of this article, whom has directed him to various sources to develop a more comprehensive analysis of university merging in China.

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The Privatization of Higher Education

JANDHYALA B. G. TILAK

The Context

Privatization of higher education is not a new phenomenon in the world economy. In many countries of the world, the private sector has come to play either a limited or predominant role in higher education. In some countries, the origin of privatization can be traced back a few centuries. But privatization has assumed greater significance as a policy strategy of the development of education in recent times, essentially, but not wholly, due to stagnating—and in some countries declining—public budgets for education, on the one hand, and on the other, increasing social demand for higher education, manifested in slogans like ‘higher education for all’ (Roderick and Stephens, 1979).

There has been remarkable growth in privatization during the last two to three decades in several countries of the world, as shown in Table 1. The number of private colleges and universities has increased, and enrollments in private institutions increased at a much faster rate than in public institutions. Enrollments in private institutions increased by several times in many countries—for example, in Colombia, by 1.7 times the rate of growth of public education and 2.03 times in Peru from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s (Brodersohn, 1978, p. 176). In a good number of countries the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Earlier Year</th>
<th>Latest Year</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1953 33.6</td>
<td>1983 60.4</td>
<td>+26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1950 57.0</td>
<td>1980 81.3</td>
<td>+24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>1955 55.2</td>
<td>1986 76.9</td>
<td>+21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>1955 14.2</td>
<td>1975 33.7</td>
<td>+19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1967–71 1.9</td>
<td>1977–81 5.5</td>
<td>+3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1970 14.6</td>
<td>1987 9.8</td>
<td>-4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1950 49.7</td>
<td>1988 24.7</td>
<td>-25.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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share of enrollments in private education and the number of private institutions as a proportion of the total number of institutions are more than half of the total (see Tables 2 and 3). ¹

Private education has grown for several reasons, which can be summed up in two categories: excess demand and differentiated demand for higher education (James, 1987). First, the social demand for higher education exceeds the public supply, and the private market seeks to meet the unsatisfied demand. ² Secondly, demand for different quality (presumably high quality) and content in education (such as, for example, religious education) also contributes to the growth of privatization. On the supply side, private entrepreneurs are ready to provide higher education either for philanthropic or other altruistic motives, or for profit. The dividends could be social and political gains, or quick economic profits.

**Diversities in Privatization**

Higher-education systems in the world present enormous diversity. Two major categories of higher education can be found in this context: predominantly public higher-education systems, where higher education is provided and funded by the state (as it is in socialist countries, for example), and mixed higher-education systems with varying roles by both public and private sectors (as found in the rest of the world). Again under the latter category, there is significant diversity from country to country. Some systems are dominated by the private sector, which can be termed as 'mass private and restricted public sectors' as in several market economies (e.g. Japan, Republic of Korea, Philippines, and Latin American countries such as Colombia). Then there are mixed systems dominated by the state sector, as in several developing countries of South Asia (including India), Africa,

### TABLE 2

**Enrollments in Public and Private Higher Education (Percentages)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Total¹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1984/85</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>84.7</td>
<td>1504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>1262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>2067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1985/86</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1986/87</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>mid-1980s</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>mid-1980s</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>mid-1980s</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1986/87</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>mid-1980s</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>8500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>91.2</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>7531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>mid-1980s</td>
<td>94.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>mid-1980s</td>
<td>94.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1981/82</td>
<td>97.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>mid-1980s</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>mid-1980s</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. In thousands.
2. Not available.

Comparative Education

These systems can be aptly described as ‘parallel public and private sectors.’ In some welfare states such as the Netherlands and Belgium, both coexist under state funding. Systems where the private sector has a very limited role, as in Sweden, the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Thailand, etc., can be described as ‘peripheral private sector’ (Geiger, 1987a).

In practice, the public/private distinction of a higher-education institution is not very clear. If the criterion used to define it is its source of funding, a private university may be receiving substantial financial resources from the government; and a public university may generate large amounts of resources from private sources. On the other hand, if it is to be defined on the basis of management, a private institution may be effectively controlled by the state and may be administered according to government regulations. Alternatively we may prefer to define institutions in terms of their character, that is, whether they be ‘profit-making’ or ‘non-profit making’. All this shows how ambiguous the term ‘privatization’ can be.

Several forms of ‘privatization’ of higher education may be noted and classified into four categories (Tilak, 1991).

First, an extreme version of privatization implying total privatization of higher education, colleges and universities being managed and funded by the private sector, with little government intervention. These pure or ‘unaided’ private institutions do provide financial relief to the government in providing higher education, but at huge long-term economic and non-economic cost to the society.

Second, there is ‘strong’ privatization, which means recovery of full costs of public higher education from users—students, their employers or both. Due to the externalities associated with higher education, privatization of this type may not be desirable and of course not empirically feasible.

Third, there is a moderate form of privatization implying public provision of higher education but with a reasonable level of financing from non-governmental sources. Since higher education is a quasi-public good, 100 percent public financing of education can be seen as economically unjustified. Since private individuals also benefit, it is reasonable that they share a proportion of the costs. So the state, students/families and the general public pay for higher education. This will be discussed in more detail below.

Lastly, there is what can be termed ‘pseudo-privatization’, which cannot be really called privatization. Higher education institutions under this category are private but government-‘aided’. They were originally created by private bodies, but receive nearly the whole of their expenditure from governments. Thus these institutions are privately managed but publicly funded. A substantial number of private higher-education institutions in several countries belong to this category, and they receive government aid to meet almost all their recurrent expenditure. Hence strictly from the financial point of view, such private colleges do not play any significant role.3

Despite these diversities, a broad generalized analysis of the role of the private sector in higher education can be made. However, the generalizations made below refer mostly to the first and the fourth categories of privatization, as described above. Some of the following general features may

TABLE 3
Percentages of Public and Private Sectors in Higher Education: Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1985/86</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>1158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>1103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1976/77</td>
<td>96.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Actual numbers.
2. Not available.

also fail to take account of certain particularities of some private institutions which are exceptions to the rule.4

**Myths and Facts About Privatization**

The case for privatization of higher education exists mostly on the basis of financial considerations. Public budgets for higher education are at best stagnant, and are indeed declining in real terms, more particularly in relation to other sectors of the economy. Privatization is also favored on the grounds that it would provide enhanced levels of internal and external efficiency of higher education, and higher quality of education; and as the private sector would have to compete with the public sector, the competition would result in improvement in quality and efficiency not only of private education but also even public higher education. In the long run, due to economies of scale, private institutions provide better quality education at lower cost than public institutions, as in Japan. Furthermore, by reducing public subsidies to higher education, the ‘perverse effects’ of public subsidization of higher education on income distribution could be reduced, and, through privatization, inequities in funding education would be substantially reduced (see Psacharopoulos, 1986; Psacharopoulos and Woodhall, 1985; Roth, 1987; James, 1987).

On the other hand, privatization is opposed on at least three sets of grounds. The existing market system does not ensure optimum social investment in higher education, as externalities exist in the case of higher education, which is a ‘quasi-public good’ (Tilak, 1991). The market system also fails to keep consumers well informed of the costs and benefits of higher education. It is likely that the costs of private education are much higher than public education as in the United States and the Republic of Korea. Finally, a private system of higher education is also insensitive to distributional considerations and in fact contributes to socio-economic inequalities. Accordingly, public education is not only superior to private education, but private institutions cannot even survive without state support.

All these arguments for and against privatization, by its defenders as well as its opponents, are open to empirical verification, without which they may be brushed aside by the opposing side as merely politico-ideological arguments. Sophisticated arguments based on hard core evidence are rarely made in favor of privatization (Breneman and Finn, 1978, p. 6). Without empirical evidence, all the arguments, however well-formulated and articulated, remain as ‘myths’. With this in mind, a few of these myths are empirically examined below, by examining the scanty evidence available, with examples drawn from diverse countries.

**The First Myth**

There is huge demand for private higher education, as private education is qualitatively superior to public education.

**The Facts**

The evidence shows that the higher quality of private education compared with public higher education is exaggerated. In Japan, public higher education provides better facilities, which are significantly related to quality, than private universities and colleges. The number of pupils per teacher in public universities is only eight, compared with twenty-six in private universities (James and Benjamin, 1988). While more than 75 per cent of students enrolled in higher education in the country are in the private sector, teachers in this sector constitute less than half the total. The pupil/teacher ratio in private institutions is three times the ratio in state institutions in Indonesia and the Philippines, and more than double in Thailand. The difference is not as high in Brazil, but the ratio clearly favors public higher education, the ratios being fourteen and ten respectively in private and public universities. Private universities are found to employ more retired, part-time, and underqualified teachers in Japan, Colombia, Brazil, Argentina, Indonesia and in several other countries. The teachers are also paid less. Only government subsidies could raise the salary levels of teachers in private universities in Japan. On the whole teachers in private institutions have less academic prestige.
Even the availability of space per student and other facilities are reasonably higher in public universities than in private universities in Japan. In all, private universities spend less than half of what public universities spend per student (see Table 4). For example, in Japan, in 1980, expenditure per student was 1,982,000 yen in public universities, compared with 848,000 yen in private universities (Kaneko, 1987). It is only in the United States that the difference is in favor of private universities. All this should indicate that quality differences are indeed more favourable to public than to private universities.

Yet private universities may sometimes show better results in final examinations, as essentially they admit only the best prepared students. However, ‘graduation of the “best” graduates is not by itself proof of the “best” education’ (Levy, 1985, p. 454).

Even if the quality of output is taken into consideration, that is, internal efficiency, measured in terms of academic achievement, success rates, drop-out rates, failure rates, etc., private education does not compare favorably with public education. The large body of evidence available on this issue refers to the school sector, and not to higher education. Even with respect to the school sector, recent studies (Willms, 1987) have found that the advantage of private schooling with respect to academic achievement for an average student is not significant, as reported earlier (Coleman et al., 1981). The limited information available on higher education leads us to question the beliefs regarding the superiority of private education. Drop-out rates are higher in private colleges than in government colleges in Thailand (NEC, 1989, p. 287), and in the Philippines (Arcelo and Sanyal, 1987, p. 154), and the rates of failure are high in Colombia (Patrinos, 1990). The productivity of private universities in Indonesia is found to be much lower than public universities (Pramoetadi, 1985, p. 33).

In the Philippines, while the private sector increased accessibility to education to the people, it was found to have contributed to a deterioration in the quality and standards of higher education to such an extent that many people argued for a halt of the public laissez-faire policy in the growth of higher education and for the expansion of state supported institutions (Tan and Alonzo, 1987, p. 159). In Brazil and Peru, the quality of private higher education was described as ‘disgraceful’ (Levy, 1985, p. 453).

In India, except for those institutions recognized by the public sector, private colleges, which receive no aid from the government, have been increasing in number essentially due to the existence of excess demand for higher education, particularly from the upper classes and those who fail to gain admission to government colleges. Rarely is the quality of these institutions regarded as superior. Their growth also has to do with the fact that people tend to equate high fees with a high quality of education (Breneman, 1988). Above all, many non-elite private universities and colleges were created, as is the case in some Latin American countries, to provide job-related training, rather than higher education per se.

It is also argued that as the private sector has to compete with the public sector, the efficiency of the former and, equally important, the efficiency of all higher education, including public, improve significantly. But in countries where mass private sectors prevail, or in countries where private sectors play a peripheral role, there is little scope for competition, and as a result, the private sector may turn out to be very inefficient, and even economically corrupt. Thus the arguments on efficiency and quality of private higher education do not withstand close scrutiny.

### TABLE 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1977–81</td>
<td>0:25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>0:71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0:72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1:60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Second Myth

It is widely believed that graduates from private universities receive higher rewards on the labor market in the form of lower unemployment rates, better paid jobs and consequently higher earnings (Jimenez and Tan, 1987b; Patrinos, 1990). In short, the external efficiency of private higher education is argued to be greater than public higher education, which would explain the growth of privatization.

The Facts

The empirical evidence does not support these assumptions. Unemployment rates among graduates from private universities are about 2.8 times higher than those from public universities in the Philippines (Arcelo and Sanyal, 1987, p. 190). This is also the case in Thailand where 27 percent of graduates from private universities are unemployed during the first year after graduation, compared with 13.3 per cent of the graduates from national universities (Setapanich et al., 1990, p. 420). Private universities in Cyprus are found to be fuelling the diploma-inflation problem, leading to a serious problem of graduate unemployment (Koyzis, 1989. p. 18).

Estimated rates of return, a summary statistic of the external or labor-market efficiency of education (presented in Table 5), show that public higher education pays better than private higher education, particularly from the point of view of individuals in several countries, including Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand. Social rates of return for public and private university education are close in Thailand, showing little significant advantage for private higher education, even from the point of view of the society?

The Third Myth

Private institutions provide considerable relief from financial burden to the governments, as they are self-financing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Rates of Return to Private Versus Public Higher Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private rates of return</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private rates of return</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social rates of return</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private rates of return</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private rates of return</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All higher(^1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social rates of return</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All higher(^1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The Facts

States such as Malaysia allocate huge investments—more every year—to prop up dubious private institutions, while growth and expansion of public institutions are frozen. In Thailand, while 30 per cent of students attend private institutions, the ratio of government expenditure to private expenditure on higher education is 97:3 (Malakul, 1985). Explicit appropriations may not be very high; but implicit subsidies or indirect government support to the students to purchase higher education is an important source of funding for private universities in the United States. State scholarships have exposed the myth of the pure privateness of universities like Harvard, Columbia, Yale, etc. (Levy, 1986b, p. 171). Around 85 to 90 per cent of scholarship money in California goes to students in private universities, while private enrollments form only 10–12 per cent of the state’s total (Levy, 1986b, p. 174). In Japan, 21.5 per cent of private higher-education expenditure is covered by state subsidies (this figure was nil in 1951). State subsidization of private institutions in Japan originated due to the bankruptcy of private higher education. The resources of the private institutions are boosted ‘through infusion of significant amounts of public funds’ in several countries (Geiger, 1987b, p. 18). In many countries, state subsidies cover more than 90 per cent of the recurrent expenditure of private institutions. In Sweden and Canada, the government provided the capital needs of the private institutions. More than 77 per cent of the government budget on higher education in Uttar Pradesh in India goes as aid to private colleges (Muzamil, 1989, p. 247). Whatever the reasons, private and public universities in Belgium and the Netherlands receive equal funding from the state (Geiger, 1988). All this leads us to conclude that most private institutions are not totally private, at least from a financial standpoint.

The Fourth Myth

The private sector responds to the economic needs of the individual and society, and provides relevant types of education. ‘The major advantage of private universities has been in responding more quickly or efficiently to market demands’ (Balan, 1990, p. 17).

The Facts

In most countries, private higher-education institutions offer mainly low capital-intense disciplines of study. It is true that not only are there few private universities involved in research activities, but they are also involved in providing cheap commercial and vocational training as in the case of several Latin American countries, or in the case of ‘parallel’ colleges in Kerala in India (Nair and Ajit, 1984). As can be seen in Table 6, no private institutions in Bolivia offer higher education in law, medicine, exact sciences, engineering: 58 per cent specialize in ‘commercial’ courses, and 12 per cent in the humanities. In Peru, Colombia and Ecuador, a negligible proportion of private institutions offer courses in medicine and exact sciences. However, when the potential for economic profit is high, the private sector entered into professional fields and opened engineering and medical colleges, as in India (Kothari, 1986). On the whole, research and broad educational needs of the economy are barely served by the private sector. Private institutions tend to provide more personal and fewer social benefits to students. The private sector responds to market demands, but only in the short term, while ‘improvement of schools requires long-term planning—not the quick alteration of a commodity to meet changing fashions’ (Ping, 1987, p. 21).

The Fifth Myth

It is generally believed that private enterprise has genuine philanthropic motives in opening private colleges and universities, which are by definition part of the ‘non-profit sector’. They also make huge investments in higher education.

The Facts

Private institutions are largely funded either from students’ tuition fees and charges or from public subsidies. Very few private institutions make any investment from their own resources. These
institutions are in fact operated in a kind of seller’s market, recovering the full costs plus profits from some source or other. For instance, in Japan 70 percent of the costs of higher education in private institutions are met from tuition fees, while the corresponding proportion is 82 percent in the Republic of Korea. The role of private finances other than fees, such as donations, endowments etc., is not at all significant. In the United States, however, tuition charges account for only slightly more than one-third of the total costs. Private institutions are involved in disguised profit-making operations in almost all countries, including Brazil and India.

The private colleges that receive little public support in India expect huge donations and capitation fees, and charge abnormally high fees, ten to twenty times higher than those charged by government colleges. While universities and colleges are, by definition, non-profit institutions; these private institutions do not merely cover their costs, they also make huge ‘quick profits’, which are not necessarily reinvested in education. Educational considerations hardly figure in this context (Tilak, 1990). As a result, higher education is subject to vulgar commercialization.

**The Sixth Myth**

It is generally noted that private education is elitist, and caters to the needs of the wealthy. For example, I have hypothesized earlier (Tilak 1986), largely based on evidence on the school sector, that the benefits of education in private institutions—costly and presumably of high quality—accrue largely to the elite (as the private sector caters mainly to the needs of the elites), while the benefits of education in public schools—which are generally compelled to choose quantity rather than quality and, accordingly, provide inexpensive education—mostly for the masses.

**The Facts**

Private universities generally serve a privileged clientele. In Colombia private universities are dominated by high-income groups. Barely 2 percent of the students are from the bottom quintile and
13 percent from the bottom 40 percent of the income group population. The picture is similar in Japan. In Thailand, students in private universities have parents with, on average, one and a half times the income of those of students in public universities. The democratization of public higher education has reduced considerably the elitist character of higher education. The social elitism attached to private higher education was found to be one of the most important factors in the growth of an elite private sector in higher education in Latin American countries (Levy, 1985). The private institutions lent an elitist or secular-elitist character to higher education.

In countries characterized by ‘mass private and restricted public sectors’ such as Japan, the Philippines and Brazil, the evidence is not clear cut, as there are significant diversities within private universities. Some private universities are highly elitist and selective, while others are not. In these countries, there are a few elite private universities, and a large number of low-quality, low-cost private universities and colleges—for example, in Colombia and Brazil.

On the whole, however, as fees in private universities are very high compared with public universities, only the relatively well-to-do opt for private higher education. In the United States and Thailand, for example, fees per student in private universities are five times those in public institutions; the corresponding ratio in Japan is 2.5:1. But as access to public higher education is restricted, students from the upper and professional classes are more or less forced to go to private universities. However, ‘public universities continue to be the first choice for many’ for educational and financial reasons (Levy, 1985, p. 454).

The Seventh Myth

Most public higher-educational institutions are politicized. Only private institutions are a political.

The Facts

Basically the inadequacy of public policies results in the growth of the private sector. In some Latin American countries, as public policies favored leftist political activism in public universities, private universities have grown to counter these forces. But to argue that private institutions are free of political forces is not true. Private education has been found to strengthen a given political ideology and to help in reproduction of class structure (Salter and Tapper, 1985). In several countries, state support to private universities is based on political and ideological factors, which can be called ‘political-economic’ factors. In India, for example, more than half the private engineering colleges in Maharashtra are owned by politicians, and used for political purposes. Motives of profit, influence and political power explain the growth of these private colleges (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987, p. 296; Kothari, 1986).

The Eighth Myth

Privatization of higher education improves income distribution, as public funding of higher education, with all its ‘perverse effects’ is generally found to be regressive (Psacharopoulos, 1977; Blaug, 1982).

The Facts

As evidence from Japan—one of the few countries to have carried out elaborate investigations on this issue—shows, public universities seem to have slightly higher redistributive effects than private universities in transferring resources from the top income quintile to the others. The advantage enjoyed by public institutions is greater in the school sector (James and Benjamin, 1988, p. 127). In the case of India, it has been found that the private education system contained forces that contribute to disparities, and that the state sector was not adequate enough to counteract these forces. As a result, the whole education system was found to be a contributing factor towards accentuating income inequalities (Dasgupta, 1979).
An Assessment of Pros and Cons

Previously, I classified privatization into four categories: (a) extreme privatization (total or pure private institutions); (b) strong privatization (full cost recovery); (c) moderate privatization (partial cost recovery); and (d) pseudo-privatization (government-aided private sector). The above analysis largely refers to the first and last forms of privatization only. Based on available evidence on a few major countries of the world, this analysis has exploded some of the myths.

In many countries, the growth of privatization can be attributed largely to the failure of public universities, while private universities have certainly made positive contributions. Private universities in some countries, such as the United States, have contributed in-important and unique ways to diversity, independence, quality, efficiency and innovation (Breneman and Finn, 1978, p. 6). In countries like Japan, each private university has its own identity, tradition, culture, etc. In contrast, public universities hardly offer any diversity or individual choice. In this sense, privatization increases the possibilities for individual choice in the type and quality of higher education. But ‘the stress upon individualism—upon individual preference—at the expense of social responsibility and cohesiveness must be a matter of concern’ (Ping, 1987, p. 291).

In many countries private higher education eases the impending financial burden faced by the public authorities. One noteworthy example is Chile, where total public expenditure on higher education was reduced from $171 million in 1981 to $115 million 1988 (Schiefelbein, 1990) as private education grew. Without this, governments would either have to suppress the huge demand for higher education, or find themselves in deeper financial deficit. In fact, political and economic stability would have been threatened in some Latin American countries, if it were not for the role of private sector (Levy, 1985, p. 451). In most cases, however, resources come from students, not from other private sources. Private institutions supplied manpower not only to the private but to the public sector of the economy as well. Private universities are also believed to reduce the number of students going to foreign universities, as in the case of Greece (Psacharopoulos, 1988).

But the goals and strategies of the private sector in higher education are on the whole highly injurious to the public interest. First, the private sector has turned the ‘non-profit sector’ into a high-profit-making sector not only in terms of social and political power, but also in terms of financial returns, and as profits are not allowed in educational enterprises in several countries, private educational enterprises have resorted to illegal activities in education. When governments attempted to regulate profits by allowing state subsidies and restricting fee levels, all the private institutions found they had one thing in common—a demand for subsidies. In the first instance, state subsidies eased the financial crisis of the private universities, as in Brazil, and in the long run contributed to ‘private enrichment at public expense’. As a result of all this, many countries today have ‘bass- tard’ private-sector colleges, either illegally set up to do legal business, or legally created to do illegal work (Singh, 1983).

Secondly, by concentrating on profit-yielding, cheap, career-related commercial studies, the market-oriented private universities provide vocational training under the name of ‘higher education’ and ignore ‘broader higher education’. Private universities also totally ignore research, which is essential for sustained development of higher education.

Thirdly, by charging high fees, private institutions create irreparable socio-economic inequities between the poor and rich income groups of the population. As a World Bank study noted, private education turns out to be ‘socially and economically divisive’ (Psacharopoulos and Woodhall, 1985, p. 144). Access to higher education by lower income groups is negatively affected by the rapid growth of privatization.

It is generally felt that ‘even if one assumes that the private sector is generally superior to the public sector, it does not logically follow that proportional expansion of the private sector would make for a better system’ (Levy, 1985, p. 458). In short, private education is not found to be economically efficient, qualitatively superior, and socially equitable. Accordingly, it is feared that increased privatization of higher education would present more problems than solutions, as in case of Colombia (Patrinos, 1990, p. 169). Thus the inappropriateness of the market metaphor in higher education is abundantly clear.
Towards a Desirable Pattern of Privatization

Privatization of the second and third categories mentioned above may not be characterized by so many problems. As higher education is a quasi-public good, 100 percent cost recovery may not be desirable. In other words, the second type is neither desirable nor practically feasible. At the same time, since individuals do benefit from higher education, it is natural that they are required to pay for their education (Tilak, 1991). The dwindling economic abilities of governments also make it necessary. Hence the notion of choice relates only to the third category.

Under this category, privatization implies provision of public education, but with reasonable levels of costs recovered from the users. In other words, it means private purchase of public education at less than full cost. In this context, there are a few major proposals being discussed in several countries, such as increase in fees, student loans, graduate tax, etc. (World Bank, 1986). Some of these are being tried out in a few countries. The experience of those countries makes it clear that each of these alternatives has its own strengths and weaknesses (see, for example, Tilak and Varghese, 1991). A tax on graduates would be efficient if there were a strong relationship between education, occupation and productivity, and a low degree of substitution between different layers and types of higher education, so that those with higher education do not find themselves unemployed. Student loans transfer the burden from the present to the future, and for the loan schemes to work effectively, well spread credit markets to float educational loans are required, without which the recovery of loans would be a serious problem. Of these three measures, fees seem to be the most effective. The experience of the Republic of Korea is encouraging in this regard: nearly half the costs of public higher education are met by students in the form of fees (Table 7). However, instead of a uniform increase in fees, selective pricing (Tilak and Varghese, 1985; Jimenez, 1987; Tilak, 1990) may be more efficient and equitable. Under selective pricing, students belonging to different socio-economic groups would be required to pay different rates of fees, which would be related to the ability of the students to pay and the costs of courses. Privatization of this type would be more efficient, generating additional private resources for higher education, and also more equitable, as it would not create dual structures of higher education, as do the other forms described above—one for the élite and another for the masses. As Ping (1987, p. 291) noted, ‘All children matter, not just those whose parents have learnt to play the market effectively.’ In fact, privatization of this form will be free from most of the evils of other forms discussed above, and may assimilate the diverse strengths of privatization.

Notes

1. However, even though the private market mechanism is, in general, strong, the share of the private sector in higher education in enrollments, in the United States decreased from about half in 1950 to a quarter in 1988.

2. For example, in 1988 the rapid growth of demand, including overseas demand, for higher education in Australia, led to privatization of hitherto public higher education (Stone, 1990).

TABLE 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>mid-1980s</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>73.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1986/87</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Other types of classification have been proposed. (See, for example, Khadira, 1900).
4. Universities, colleges and other higher education institutions, either public or private, vary in size and other characteristics. Here they are referred to as if they were homogeneous.
5. The private higher-education system in the United States seems to be distinct from others, with respect to several other characteristics.
6. While Latin American countries may present an excellent example of the first kind, countries like India provide examples for the second category.
7. In Kenya, government schools are found to yield returns 50 percent higher than private (harambee) schools, both to the individual and to society (Knight and Sabot, 1990, p. 291). See also Psacharopoulos (1987) for similar data on Colombia and Tanzania.
8. Voucher schemes also come under the same category.

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INTERNATIONALIZATION OF CURRICULA IN HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES: CASE STUDIES OF CHINA, JAPAN AND THE NETHERLANDS

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Abstract
This article discusses the major issues and character of internationalization of curricula in higher education institutions in recent years in three non-English-speaking countries—China, Japan and The Netherlands. By making a comparative analysis of curricula provided for international students and curricula with international subjects, perspectives or approach offered in both English and the local language, the author examines development and character of internationalized curricula in the three countries, describes the similarities and different aspects of how the three countries internationalized their university curriculum and met the needs of different regions and social, economic and higher education systems.

Keywords: China, comparative perspective, internationalization of university curriculum, Japan and The Netherlands.

Introduction
Since the 1990s, internationalization of curricula in higher education institutions has played an increasingly important part in reforms of higher education system in many countries. In this paper, the author is particularly concerned with internationalization of curricula in higher education institutions in three non-English-speaking countries—China, Japan and The Netherlands. The three countries are chosen in this study for the following reasons. First, international perspectives and activities are being increasingly integrated into curricula in higher education institutions in each
country. Internationalization of curricula in higher education institutions has come to be regarded as a very important indicator of the internationalization of higher education. Second, the three countries can provide examples of internationalization of curricula in higher education in the non-English-speaking context: China represents developing Asia; Japan represents developed Asia; while The Netherlands offers an example in Europe, that has long offered many programs in English. By making comparative studies, we may discover similarities and distinctive aspects of internationalization of curriculum in higher education among the different countries and obtain insights into how internationalization of curricula in higher education institutions has been undertaken in order to meet the needs of different regions and the general trend of higher education worldwide.

Internationalization of curriculum in higher education institutions can be interpreted in many ways. The definition and types of internationalization of curricula in higher education institutions by the OECD research group are widely influential and considered as most useful indicators (OECD 1996). Further, the book on Internationalizing the Curriculum in Dutch Higher Education: an International Comparative Perspective, based on the case study of internationalizing the curriculum in Dutch Higher Education by Professor M.C. van der Wende, is published in English and lot of information about internationalization of university curricula in The Netherlands is provided (van der Wende 1996). As for the internationalization of China’s higher education, Dr. Rui Yang made an analysis of the role of the English language in the internationalization of China’s higher education in his book Third Delight: The Internationalization of Higher Education in China (Yang 2002). Besides, Professor Anthony Welch also examined the current situation and issues of internationalization of China’s higher education based on the comparative study in educational services in Southeast Asia (Welch 2004). With regard to the internationalization of Japan’s higher education in recent years, Professor Ruth Hayhoe’s paper based on her field study and interviews in Japan is worthwhile to be mentioned (Hayhoe 2001).

However, as the meaning of curriculum varies greatly in different countries and the definition and typology by the OECD in 1996 cannot be totally applied to some particular countries with changing context. In this paper the author defines the term of internationalized curriculum as a group of programs with an international name, content or perspective; it can therefore be used interchangeably with programs, subjects or courses. While making a comparative study of the three countries in particular, the author makes an analysis of internationalization of curriculums in according with different target groups: programs for international students, for domestic students and programs for all students. Based on the target group, the author discusses similarities and differences in internationalized programs by field of study, by educational level, by final qualification, the teaching language, and institutions responsible for related programs in the three countries.

The Cases: China, Japan and The Netherlands

China

In recent years, there has been a rapid growth in the number of incoming international students in Chinese higher education institutions. There have been however no radical changes in students’ composition by country of origin. For example, from 1990 to 2002, students from Asian countries constituted 70% of all international students in China. Among them, a majority came from Japan and South Korea, indicating that students from East Asia accounted for a major group. In regard to curricula by field of study for international students, while since the middle of the 1990s international students have increasingly taken courses in economics, management, law, international politics, chemistry and mathematics, a large number of international students are still majored in humanities, mostly studying Chinese language or Chinese medicine. For example, in 1995 the percentage of international students who took courses in humanities, including Chinese language, literature and history etc., constituted nearly 90% (China Education Yearbook Editorial Board 1996) of all curricula followed by international students. Even in 2002, the same group still accounted for 86% (Table 1). In terms of institutions in which curricula for international students are provided, there has been a continuing rise in the number of institutions qualified to recruit international students (Figure 1). Furthermore, international students have moved from classes or educational
structures that are specifically designated and separated from local students to departments or institutes where they can take courses in the same classes as Chinese students. For example, by the 1990s, in Fudan University more than 90% of international students followed courses in the Section of Chinese-Language Training or the Section of Chinese Language and Culture, a structure totally separated from other departments or institutes and catering only to international students; by 2002, 35% of international students were enrolled in departments or colleges in the university (http://www.fudan.edu.cn accessed on August 10, 2003).

**TABLE 1**

Programs Learned by International Students by Field of Study in 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discipline</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanities</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese medicine</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western medicine</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical education</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


However, it should be stressed that, unlike the other two countries, in China not all higher education institutions are qualified to recruit international students; and even in institutions that are authorized to recruit international students, not all curricula in the institution are open to foreign students. In other words, programs specially designated for international students and programs that these students can attend are limited to accredited institutions. In regard to teaching language for international students, normally curricula provided for international students majoring in Chinese language, Chinese medicine and humanities are delivered in Chinese language. But in some prestigious universities, there is indeed an increase in the number of non-degree programs in Chinese language or culture that are delivered in English for short-term international students. In addition, there has been also a growth in the number of degree-conferring programs in English language at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels in some leading universities, especially in natural science and engineering. For example, in Tsinghua University, at present there are about 57 professional programs that are delivered in English and it is planned that the number of English language programs will be increased to about 30% of all programs in the university in near future. (http://news.cic.tsinghua.edu.cn accessed on October 10, 2003).

![Figure 1. Increase of Universities Recruiting International Students](http://news.cic.tsinghua.edu.cn)

On the other hand, changes are also taking place in the internationalization of curricula mainly for domestic students. As there are nearly 1200 higher education institutions in China and the situation varies greatly between different institutions, it is extremely difficult to describe the whole picture. A case study of Fudan University, one of the most prestigious comprehensive universities in China with about 2,353 international students in 2002 (Annual Report 2002, Foreign Affairs, Fudan University), is provided here (Table 2).

Table 2 indicates that about 273 new programs with international subjects or contents were introduced from 1990 to 2002, among the newly-introduced programs, the number of programs in foreign languages or linguistics and interdisciplinary programs such as regional and areas studies covering more than one country was increased most rapidly, rising by 166 and 85 respectively. What is especially worth noting is that some programs leading to joint or double degrees, in partnership with foreign countries and universities in Hong Kong, appear. For example, in recent years, six master-degree programs came into being in Fudan University, which were led to degrees of universities of Norway, Hong Kong, Australia and the USA, mostly being programs concerning international trade, accounting or MBA (http://www.jsj.edu.cn/mingdan/002.html accessed on October 11, 2003).

In fact, compared with internationalized curricula at the undergraduate level, at a national level, it is estimated that by July 2003 there were nearly 100 higher education institutions and about 110 joint programs in China that were approved by the government with authority to award degrees of foreign universities or degrees of HK universities (http://www.jsj.edu.cn/mingdan/002.html accessed on October 11, 2003). Among these, almost half of the joint programs lead to an MBA degree, and about 90% of them are delivered at the postgraduate level and awarded with master’s degrees (Huang 2003).

Another important way to internationalize programs at both undergraduate and graduate levels is to import original foreign university textbooks and to teach bilingually or in English. From 2000, the most recent original English textbooks in 20 subject areas, which deal with information science and techniques, have been imported and introduced into Chinese university campuses (China Education Daily, September 6, 2001). A similar effort was also undertaken at institutional level. For example, in 2002 about 10 of the most famous universities in China decided to buy and utilize almost all of the textbooks now being used in Harvard University, Stanford University and MIT. The list of materials includes not only books, tapes and CD’s concerning Natural Science, Engineering and Medicine, but also those related to Law, Trade, Management, and some Humanities (China Youth Daily, May 13, 2002). Further, with increased import of original textbooks in English, and China’s participation in the WTO, more and more higher education institutions in China have begun to make use of English language or bilingual instruction (in most cases, referring to Chinese and English) in university teaching and research activities. In 2001, a document issued by the Ministry of Education indicates that in the coming 3 years, from 5% to 10% of all the curricula in the leading universities must be taught in English, especially in such areas as Biology, Information Science, New Materials, International Trade, and Law (China Education Daily, September 22, 2001).

Japan

Strongly stimulated by the government, by 2000 the number of international students in Japan had doubled over the past decade. Similarly to China, 92% of incoming international students in Japan originated from Asian countries in 2000: the biggest share, 56%, came from China, followed by students from South Korea, accounting for 16% of the total (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Japan, MEXT 2001). In terms of international students by field of study, as indicated in Table 3, more than half of the students took their courses in humanities and social science. However, in contrast to China and The Netherlands, there were also many students majoring in science, and especially in engineering. Differing largely from China and The Netherlands, many private institutions in Japan also play an important role in providing a variety of curricula for international students. With some variation over time, while over half of graduate students are located in national institutions, more than two-third of undergraduate students and almost all students of short-cycle programs are enrolled in private universities (Division of International Students Bureau of Higher Education, MEXT 2001A). By education level, in 2000, 37% of international students entered the graduate schools, pursing master’s or Ph.D. courses, the rest of students
### TABLE 2
Change of Internationalized Curricula in Fudan University from 1990 to 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Internationalized Curricula Based on OECD</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International subject</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationally comparative approach</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curricula preparing students for defined</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>international professions</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign languages/cross-culture</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>+166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdisciplinary region/area studies</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>+85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partly offered abroad (graduate)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>+7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>+273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of the total</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

being enrolled in either undergraduate courses (43%) or short-circle programs (20%) (Division of International Students Bureau of Higher Education, MEXT 2001B).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field of study</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social science</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanities</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visual performing arts</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home economics</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical science</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


With increases in the number of incoming international students, great efforts have been made in the development and implementation of programs designated for international students. Among these, increasing numbers of English language programs, specifically provided for international students, have been introduced in many institutions. In general, the English language programs are divided into two types. The degree-conferring courses or programs specially designated for international universities form one type. These special courses or programs are largely provided in national universities at graduate level, mostly being concerned with physical science, engineering, biology and medicine. For example, by 2001, such graduate programs were provided in 34 national universities and 2 private universities. The other type refers to courses in English specifically designed for students from North America, Europe and other English-speaking countries at the undergraduate level. According to the duration of programs, this type can be further divided into two groups. One group comprises the one-year programs, all provided by national universities, covering subjects in humanities, social science and science as well as other fields of study: credits of 30 units can be conferred by completion of these courses. The other group extends from 4 months to 1 year and is almost entirely provided by private universities with courses in humanities and social science. In 2001, these two kinds of non-degree-conferring programs were provided in 21 national universities and 20 private universities (Division of International Students Bureau of Higher Education, MEXT 2001C). While many degree programs are offered in English, in graduate schools of physical science, engineering and medicine of prestigious universities, very few English language programs are provided in most other faculties or graduate schools of humanities and social science. For example, in the School of Engineering at the University of Tokyo, it is considered that English language has almost an equal significance for Japanese students as a way to communicate and conduct research work. Not only are faculty members encouraged to offer their lectures and presentations in English, but students are also recommended to make their reports or write their masters’ or doctorate theses either in Japanese or in English (http://www.t.u-tokyo.ac.jp/international/gwp02.html accessed on October 9, 2003) However, in the Faculty of Economics of the same university, it is clearly stated that no degree-conferring programs are provided in English at either undergraduate or graduate level: all programs are delivered in Japanese and international students are strongly advised to have a good mastery of Japanese language (http://www.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/index-j.html accessed on October 9, 2003).

Elsewhere, much progress has also been achieved in the internationalization of curricula that are open to both international and domestic students. In particular, since the later 1990s, various attempts have been made in private universities in providing more curricula with an international or cross-cultural communication. For example, from 1998 to 2002, 16 private universities established
faculties with international or cross-cultural communication titles. Among these, curricula with an international subject and cross-cultural communication or understanding (international communication or culture, etc.) constituted 27% of the total; curricula preparing students for defined international professions (international business and international management, etc.) accounted for 18%; and curricula in foreign languages or linguistics made up of 12% of the total. In addition, the number of graduate programs closely associated with an international orientation has also increased in some prestigious private universities. For example, in the Asia and Pacific University of Ritsumeikan (APU) which was founded in 2002, as half of the students on the campus come from some 50 countries and regions, most of subjects are offered in both Japanese and English in the first and second years. In the third and fourth years, classes are offered in one of the two languages. Furthermore, two graduate schools—the Graduate school of Asia and Pacific Studies, which consists of Asia—Pacific Studies and International Cooperation Policy, and the Graduate School of Management that offers MBA programs. As indicated in their names, many of the programs in the two schools are concerned with regional or area studies and internationally recognized professions or diplomas. (http://www.apu.ac.jp accessed on September 8, 2003)

In comparison with the private sector, at the undergraduate level in national universities the number of newly established faculties or universities with international or cross-cultural names has not increased so rapidly. In the national institutions, the internationalization of curricula is mostly implemented through development of new programs or broadening the traditional or original subject areas with an international/comparative approach in the existing faculties or is based on the framework of existing specifications. Except for the newly-established special graduate programs for international students mentioned above, far fewer new faculties with international or cross-cultural names have been established at the undergraduate level than in the private sector. Similarly to China, the majority of curricula with international subjects and contents are programs in foreign languages and linguistics. According to the syllabus of Hiroshima University in the 2003 academic year by field of study in humanities and social science, at the undergraduate level, the number of curricula in foreign languages account for about 90% of all those with international subjects or perspective; while those dealing with history and culture of one country, or taught in an internationally comparative approach, or interdisciplinary programs covering more than one country, such as regional and area studies, occupy about 21% of the total. In most cases, these curricula are offered in the first or second years as selective courses, being open to any students, including international students. In contrast, at graduate level, the number of curricula focusing on one foreign country or on regional and area studies increases to about 60%, while the number of curricula in foreign languages is restricted to about 28% of the total curricula related to the international subjects or perspective (http://www.bur.hiroshima-u.ac.jp accessed on October 8, 2003).

As pointed out in the OECD documents, in more recent years, internationalization of curricula in Japanese higher education institutions is increasingly undertaken through institutional structures based on numerous bi-and multilateral co-operation agreements between Japanese and foreign institutions. For example, in 2002, about 600 universities were registered as engaged in a total of 10,014 such agreements, an increase from 6,133 agreements in 1995 (http://www.next.go.jp accessed on October 9, 2003). This type of co-operation greatly supports the development and implementation of internationalization of curricula. Additionally, efforts have also been made in all sectors, especially in private universities, to employ more foreigners as faculty members with the purpose of facilitating development and implement of international programs. According to the data, the total number of foreign faculty members being employed in all sectors increased from 3,955 in 1992 to 9,378 in 2002; the percentage of foreign faculty members in the public and private sectors was 18% and 77%, with few changes over the decade (Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture, 1992 edition and 2002 edition). In some private universities, for example, in APU, half the faculty members are employed from countries outside Japan.

The Netherlands

Compared with China and Japan, in which a majority of international students come from Asia, international students in Dutch higher education institutions from EU countries constitute the largest component (Table 4). Among curricula designated for international students, many are provided in English.
The development and implementation of English language programs is an important part of internationalization of curricula in Dutch higher education institutions. From the early 1950s, institutes for international education have been established to provide curricula specifically designed for international students and taught in English. Since the latter part of the 1980s, many more English language programs have also been introduced into Universities and Universities of Professional Education (Table 5). In particular, the number of these programs has increased much more rapidly in the universities. Normally, in both universities and universities of professional education, except

**TABLE 4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>North America</th>
<th>Oceania</th>
<th>East Europe</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>5,982</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of the total</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**TABLE 5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change of English Language Programs From 1995—2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of professional education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute for international education</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figure 2. English Language Programs by Field of Study

for a very few courses specially designated for international students, almost all of the English
language programs are open to any students, including domestic students.

The distribution of English programs by field of study is shown in Figure 2. In 2003 in all higher
education institutions, programs relating to business, administration and management rank top
and account for 17%; the second largest programs are those concerning agriculture, forestry and
fishery, making up 15%; and programs relating to social and behavioral science provide 14% of
the total. In terms of final qualification, as indicated in Figure 3, the number of programs offered
at master’s level approached 300, more than any other programs, followed by programs confer-
ing a certificate of attendance for short-term international studies, mostly ranging from 6 months
to 1 year.

**TABLE 6**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case studies/Types based on OECD</th>
<th>Univ. of Amsterdam</th>
<th>Univ. of Leiden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International subject</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationally comparative approach</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparing for defined international professions</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign languages or linguistics/cross-culture</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdisciplinary region/area studies</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curricula leading to joint or double degrees</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of the total</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
<td>40.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Particularly in some leading universities, such as the University of Amsterdam and the
University of Leiden (Table 6), the number of English language programs has exceeded that of
programs offered in the Dutch language. For example, by March 2003 in the University of
Amsterdam, the percentage of the programs delivered in Dutch constitutes only about 38% of the
total programs: 62% of programs are all provided in English (based on the data from
http://www.english.uva.nl/education, accessed on April 27, 2003). The same situation is seen also
in Leiden University, in which the number of English language programs surpasses 50% of the total, more than those offered in Dutch language (based on the data from Leiden University Programmes. June 2002 and http://www.leiden.edu/ accessed on April 27, 2003.)

However, it should be stressed that in both universities, while the Dutch language programs are mainly provided at undergraduate level, evidence shows that all English language programs are delivered at graduate level and in particular at masters’ degree level.

On the other hand, and as in both China and Japan, of all the programs offered in both English and Dutch with international subjects or perspective, almost all of the Dutch language programs are curricula in foreign languages or linguistics and provide training in intercultural skills; in contrast most of the English language programs have curricula that prepare students for defined international professional and interdisciplinary programs such as regional and area studies.

Compared with China and Japan, a majority of the English language programs are normally introduced and implemented by faculty members at individual institutions in The Netherlands. Most recently, English language programs related to English language teaching and international administration or business in cooperation with Turkey, U.K. and Australia, have been provided in some universities for both international students and Dutch students. For example, in Leiden University there have existed joint international programs, such as the European studies program in co-operation with Istanbul Bilgi University in Turkey, International Masters Asia with the University of Melbourne in Australia, the Leiden-Oxford Diploma Program and the Medical Anthropology & Ethnobotany Program in co-operation with the Universitas Padjadjan in Indonesia (Universiteit Leiden, 2002).

Discussion and Analyses

As stated above, several similarities can be found among the three countries. First, since the 1990s there has been a rapid increase in the number of internationalized programs in the three countries. In particular the number of programs in foreign languages, most of them being English subjects at the undergraduate level, has increased substantially. Second, programs specially designated for international students mostly cater to international students from a particular region or countries or from nearby countries. For example, in The Netherlands the vast majority of incoming international students come from EU countries; and in China and Japan, the majority of international students come from East Asian countries. The three case studies reflect the fact that not only foreign students in developing countries are mainly from their neighbors, as being pointed out by some scholars (Akinpelu 1994; Yang 2005), but also it is are true in developed countries. Third, the internationalized curricula in the three countries are normally composed of two types: the first type represents programs concerning languages, history or culture of the host country, which explicitly address cross-cultural communication issues and provide training in intercultural skills. A majority of them belong to non-degree-conferring courses that are provided in a specially designated classes or centers for international students on short-term, courses lasting from several weeks to one year or so. Though some of them are still taught in local languages, the number of programs delivered in English language has grown very rapidly. The second type covers professional programs that are regionally or internationally recognized for their high academic quality in the host countries. These include, for example, programs of Chinese medicine provided in Chinese universities, programs of engineering and medicine in Japanese national universities and programs of agriculture, forestry or management offered in Dutch institutions. Nearly all of them belong to degree-conferring programs, mostly provided at the graduate level. In most cases, they are not especially designated for international students in a separate class but are also open to domestic students. In this second type, the language of teaching varies greatly among the countries. However, it is likely that increasingly such programs will be delivered in English. For example, in The Netherlands, as mentioned above, the number of English programs at graduate level has already exceeded 50% of the total in some research-oriented universities; In Japan, they are mostly provided in English in graduate schools of physical science, engineering and medicine both in leading national universities and in a few prestigious private institutions at both undergraduate and graduate levels; In China, compared with the other two countries, few English programs can be found in most
institutions except for a very limited number of faculties or colleges of engineering and natural science in leading universities, but since the latter 1990s, the number of English programs is growing. Moreover, since the 1990s, the English language has also been widely adopted in teaching various degree-conferring programs; especially in the most recent years, the development and implementation of English programs at graduate level. In addition, the wide use of English language as a medium of instruction in non-degree-conferring programs and development of English programs in some professional areas at graduate level are not only considered as a means of attracting more international students, and as a tool to transmit one national character and identity, but are also regarded as an effective way to improve domestic students’ competency in English, internationalize educational programs of one’s own country and enhance the quality of education and research.

On the other hand, difference can also be found in the development and implementation of internationalized programs among the three countries. In China, as more non-degree-conferring programs concerning Chinese language, Chinese history and Chinese medicine are provided for international students and few English language programs are offered for all students, the internationalization of curricula is language/culture-oriented, characterized by more informal and local language programs. With regard to The Netherlands, since the internationalization of university curriculums is heavily influenced by the European labor market, it is more academically and professionally oriented, and mostly delivered in English at a graduate level. Hence, it is academic/professional-oriented with a strong European and international dimension. As for Japan, on the one hand, similarly to China, there are many non-degree-conferring programs concerning Japanese and Japanese culture offered in Japanese language, mostly in the private sector and focused on humanities and social science at undergraduate level; on the other hand, as in The Netherlands, in the national institutions there has been a rapid growth in the number of degree-conferring programs at postgraduate level, in natural science and engineering, among which there has been an increase in the number of English language programs. In a sense, the internationalization of curricula in Japanese higher education institutions is moving from the traditional language/culture-oriented type to a more intensive academic/professional one, with a further emphasis on internationally recognized professional programs and certificates.

Concluding Remarks

First and foremost, over the past decades the number of programs about learning English at the undergraduate level for local students, mostly offered in the domestic language and English language programs concerning national character or culture for international students as well as professional programs have greatly increased. In other words, programs concerning English teaching and English language programs have played an increasingly important role in the internationalization of curricula in higher education institutions. Similarly, it implies that in the non-English-speaking countries there has been a growing importance of English as the language of communication, distribution of knowledge, and instruction in higher education in the internationalization of curricula in higher education institutions. A combination of courses taught in English with courses on local language, culture, and history appears to be one effective way of providing a multilingualistic and multicultural dimension (De Wit 2002). The driving force behind the development of English language programs lies not only in the ability to attract more incoming international students, but also as an important way to internationalize the curricula in one’s own institution and upgrade quality and standards, and as a mechanism for facilitating the internationalization of the higher education system.

Moreover, all the three countries are making efforts to provide more academic and professional programs in English at the postgraduate level for both international and domestic students instead of relying on traditional programs especially designated for international students in language teaching or cultural understanding. Non-degree, short-term programs for international students still continue to exist and constitute an integral part of the internationalized curricula. However, more emphasis has been placed on development of degree programs particularly at graduate level, which are open to all students. These programs now constitute a growing share of the internationalized curricula of higher education institutions.
Finally, due to the growing importance of the English language it is likely that in future more and more internationalized curricula will be provided in cooperation with foreign partners, especially jointly with institutions in English-speaking countries rather than, as at present, be restricted to the national context or individual institutions in the host country. This may take the form of providing joint programs in cooperation with foreign partners, leading to both local and foreign degrees and delivered in English or bilingually, as is being done in China and the Netherlands; or it may also be implemented, as is being conducted in Japanese higher education institutions, with programs of international subjects being offered based on numerous bi-and multilateral cooperation agreements between Japanese and foreign institutions.

References
Hoyhoe, R. (2001). Nihon no daigaku to sono kokusaiteki yakuwari (Japanese universities and their international roles), syakai kyokkyuu nenpou, Nagoya University. No. 15.
OECD Documents. (1996). Internationalisation of Higher Education, OECD: Paris, P. 48. According to the OECD research, nine types of internationalized curriculum are identified, namely, 1, curricula with an international subject. 2, curricula in which the traditional/original subject area is broadened by an internationally comparative approach. 3, curricula which prepare students for defined international professions. 4, curricula in foreign languages or linguistics which explicitly address cross-cultural communication issues and provided training in intracultural skills. 5, interdisciplinary programs such as region and area studies, covering more than one country. 6, curricula leading to internationally recognized professional qualifications. 7, curricula leading to joint or double degrees. 8, curricula of which compulsory parts are offered at institution(s) abroad, staffed by local lecturers. 9, curricula in which the content is especially designed for foreign students.
INTERNATIONALIZATION AS A RESPONSE TO GLOBALIZATION: RADICAL SHIFTS IN UNIVERSITY ENVIRONMENTS

NELLY P. STROMQUIST

Abstract

This case study probes recent developments in a number of academic and non-academic aspects of a private research university in response to current globalization trends. Under the name of internationalization, university administrators and external firms are emerging as powerful decision-makers shaping academic content and even academic governance. This is manifested in student recruitment and in the hiring of prestigious professors and researchers to increase university reputation and thus to appeal to more students and secure more research funds. Among disciplines central to economic and technological globalization, such as communication, business, and engineering, patterns of convergence are emerging. Rather than internationalism, internationalization is found to prevail, and internationalization is found to signify predominantly a search for student markets domestically and abroad rather than positioning the university’s knowledge at the service of others in less advantaged parts of the world.

Keywords: academic governance, entrepreneurial university, globalization, higher education, internationalization, internationalism, organizational change, US universities.

Introduction

As technological innovations relentlessly compress the world in space and time and our economies become rapidly impelled into the highly competitive environment of global markets, educational institutions are being challenged to follow suit. At the university level, globalization is manifested by what is termed by insiders as “internationalization,” a subtle response that not only affects academic programs, faculty, and students, but also creates new administrative structures and privileges.

The majority of US research universities mention internationalization in their current mission statements, and about half include it in their strategic plans (Siaya and Hayward 2003). The Association of American Colleges and Universities (AACU) endorses global education to prepare students for the global world of work as well as to bring about a shared future marked by justice, security, equality, human rights, and economic sustainability. Ideally, to meet this challenge universities will incorporate an international/intercultural dimension into their teaching, research, and service functions (de Wit 1999). In practice, internationalization covers a wide range of services, from study abroad and greater
recruitment of international students, to distance education and combinations of partnerships abroad, internationalized curriculum, research and scholarly collaboration, and extracurricular programs to include an international and intercultural dimension (Altbach 1998; Biddle 2002; de Wit 2002).

According to Jones (2000), “internationalism” is different from “internationalization.” He defines the former as: “Common sense notions of international community, international cooperation, international community of interests, and international dimensions of the common good,” including promotion of global peace and well-being (p. 31). Husén offers a view of learning close to internationalism when he maintains that “global learning means a focus on global issues and the learning needs which are associated with them” (p. 160). In a related vein, concepts of global citizenship also point to the notion of internationalism. McIntosh (2005, p. 23) proposes as global citizenship, “the ability to see oneself and the world around one, the ability to make comparisons and contrasts, the ability to see ‘plurality’ as a result . . . and the ability to balance awareness of one’s own realities with the realities of entities outside of the perceived self.” For her part, Ladson-Billings (2005) holds that competent and responsible citizens are those with the capacity to think critically, are willing to dialogue with others, and are concerned for the rights and welfare of others. She finds that schools tend to be undemocratic spaces because, among several other traits, they focus on passive learning, emphasize compliance and obedience, and lack attention to global issues. Internationalization, in contrast, refers to greater international presence by the dominant economic and political powers, usually guided by principles of marketing and competition.

Are universities moving toward internationalism or rather internationalization? A study that represented a landmark in the examination of universities under market-led forces was that by Slaughter and Leslie (1997). Their study, which focused on public universities in four countries (US, Canada, UK, and Australia), covered institutional trends between 1970 and 1995 and documented the impact of competition for external funds upon university performance. In the years elapsed since then, there have been additional developments such as increased global economic competition and new information and communication technologies.

There is consensus that higher education is undergoing substantial change in the face of globalization, which brings a greater emphasis on market forces to the process of educational decision-making. However, universities experience pressures in different ways, depending on whether they are private or public institutions. Among the public universities, there are significant trends toward decentralization, mergers, privatization, and accountability. Among private institutions, there are considerable pressures to position themselves as the universities of choice for students and to be highly competitive in the procurement of research funds, both of which generate complex dynamics in their functioning. Since private institutions are more dependent on external support than public institutions, they are forced to monitor current trends in the economic environment and look for new opportunities; hence, private universities by the nature of their organization are likely to be more sensitive to globalization forces.

Interpretations of the changes going on in higher education under the influence of globalization are by no means uniform. While the majority asserts that we are increasingly facing homogenizing tendencies in the administration, teaching, and research practices of universities, others hold that we are experiencing more localized responses, because it is not only economic forces that are at work but also cultural and environmental processes that create differences in adoption of new ideas and practices. Thus, speaking for changes in the United Kingdom, Deem (2001) considers that, while teaching and research audits were brought in for finance-driven reasons, in some cases they were introduced to reassure the public that universities’ academic standards remain high.

A mechanism that will further expand the globalization of education is the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). This agreement includes tertiary education among the 12 trade-related sectors now being negotiated among countries. GATS will have major repercussions on the types of tertiary institutions that are created abroad and on the presence of private universities in many parts of the world. GATS functions through a set of “commitments,” some general and some voluntary. Education is considered a voluntary commitment, so WTO member nations will decide the degree of access to provide for different education sectors, but once agreed upon, all members are to be treated equally (OECD 2004). The United States was a major actor in requesting free trade for education and health services. Education and training represents indeed its fifth largest service sector. Globally, education investments abroad resulted in capital flows of more than $30 billion in 2003 (Aviles 2005).
From a theoretical perspective, I explore two theses. One is that globalization gives rise not only to new economic dynamics but also to new social relations, and that these in turn have consequences for social and organizational structures. In education, the expanded economic and social forms that have come to dominate the landscape of many nations are creating “a master discourse informing policy decisions at all levels of education” (Gough 2000, p. 78). Technological innovations influence the dynamics of social relations, either by concentrating certain kinds of power in the hands of few or by dispersing it among the many and, while being constantly constructed, these “resources of power and differential knowledge about the working of institutions are implicated in the construction, manipulation, and maintenance of the social world, at both the national and international level” (Welton 2001, p. 16).

My second thesis asserts that the strong links developing between business firms and educational institutions produce a tendency for the latter to imitate the former, a phenomenon first detected between schools and the economy in the United States under the principle of “correspondence” (Bowles 1972; Bowles and Gintis, 1977). Along the same lines, noting the substantial homogeneity of organizational forms and practices among a wide variety of institutions, Powell and DiMaggio (1991) ask: What causes the similarity? They identify two forms of isomorphism: competitive (present in fields that have free and open competition), and institutional (visible in organizations that compete not just for resources and customers but for political power and legitimacy). This second case would seem to apply to universities. Powell and DiMaggio use the term “institutional isomorphism” to explain the ways organizations develop similarities in methods, procedures, purposes, and outcomes, a convergence that they attribute primarily to the frequent movement of administrators from one organization to another. Agre (1999) highlights the influence of information technology in bringing standardization to courses as independent universities negotiate degrees. I modify the concept of “institutional isomorphism” by positing that new cultural practices—including those adopted by universities—derive from material conditions and thus are not totally independent innovations as the simple circulation of administrators would seem to imply. I further use the concept of institutional isomorphism to explore convergence among units within a single institution. Universities—long considered examples of loosely coupled sets of units and even taken as examples of “organized anarchies” (Weick 1976; Cohen and March, 1986)—are irresistibly generating patterns of conformity in objectives, processes, and outcomes of disciplines touched by economic and technological globalization. Since universities are leaders in the process of knowledge production, they engage in practices with demonstrable positive consequences for recognition and access to financial resources. Universities, dependent on external resources acquired through competition, are evincing a rapid change from their immediate past as well as an increased similarity with each other.

**Study Methodology**

This article centers on a private university, which I will call Progressive University (PU hereafter). Located on the west coast of the United States, PU sees itself as uniquely positioned to develop ties with the Pacific Rim. Its brochures describe itself as ranking among top 10 private research universities in federal research and development support. Indeed, PU receives about $400 million annually in sponsored research, which situates it in the 8th position for research funding among all private university and in the 18th position among all universities. PU has also been quite successful in attracting private donations, averaging over $350 million annually in cash gifts. According to the *Philosophical Gourmet Report* and *US News & World Report*, PU is ranked among the top 50 research universities in the country.

To examine PU’s internationalization efforts, I use the case study approach (Ragin and Becker 1992; Yin 1994), which fosters a holistic understanding of organizational processes by being attentive to a number of trends combine and reinforce each other to create particular impacts. The naturalistic method of the case study enables the researcher to present the points of view of the social actors involved, and to link these perceptions to their particular locations in academic units.

Deem argues that studies which do not offer full comparative and longitudinal data do not permit research to capture the substantial hybridity that is occurring; in particular, she maintains that case studies are not suitable tools to engage in local-global analysis. While comparative (and
longitudinal) studies provide valuable data; one could argue, on the other hand, that case studies provide an in-depth look into phenomena that might easily be missed when using questionnaires that cover a large number of universities but minimize the particular context and location in which they operate. Case study approaches bring to life the interrelated parts of an organization while enabling us to see the interplay between the organization and its environment.

Understanding the details of key aspects of university functioning in a non-profit private institution—which despite the formal legal name status, is vulnerable to profit making—offers a window to useful knowledge and insight, as some of the transformations they undergo today may dramatically forecast patterns that public universities will evince tomorrow.

Universities comprise numerous fields of study. The intention here is not to represent the full university but rather to understand its internationalization dynamics. To do so, I focus on four key axes of university work: governance, research, teaching, and student and faculty selection. Since Slaughter and Leslie (1997) argue that business, vocational, and professional programs have benefited most from globalization, I have limited our study to these types of programs in order to update the nature of the globalizing influence. Focusing on three professional schools: engineering, communication, and business, I interviewed 12 professors, evenly distributed across each of the three selected schools, to explore their experiences and perspectives. In addition, on two occasions I interviewed a top-level administrator in charge of advancing the university’s strategic plan. The faculty interviewed in communications and business included prior experience as former deans and associate deans, program directors, and department and curriculum development chairs. Planning documents sketching PU strategies over mid- and long-term scenarios were also analyzed. Data analysis was sensitive to predetermined themes such as program offerings, curriculum, governance, university/industry ties, and the effect of all of these on faculty roles and hierarchies, but it was also alert to new themes. Among these, student recruitment and study abroad turned out to be unexpectedly vigorous.

PU’s Definition of Internationalization

The first time internationalization is mentioned in PU’s strategic planning discourse, it appears in the context of the growing importance of globalization, which it defined as the sharing of information across borders, developing international research collaboration, and enabling students to come from overseas or to work overseas (PU 1994a). Ten years later, PU’s strategic plan of 2004 continues to refer to internationalization. It appears as one of its three strategic pillars, and the term is now translated as an “expanding global presence,” which is defined as having two dimensions: “developing a global perspective and presence...to ensure that the work of our faculty is read and applied worldwide,” and assuring that “PU will attract the most talented students in the world” (PU 2004a, p. 3). The internationalization section of the plan highlights the effectiveness that students will achieve by understanding the language and cultures of the people with whom they interact. However, it circumscribes involvement to the Pacific Rim and Latin America and states that connections are to be made with universities, communities, alumni, and corporations abroad to increase research collaboration, attract students, and develop opportunities in other countries for PU faculty and students (PU 2004a). The 2004 strategic plan ends stating, “We seek to become the university of choice for future leaders in all parts of the world” (PU 2004a, p. 3).

Competition with Other Universities for Faculty, Students, and Rankings

Interview data indicate that PU’s faculty is on top of developments in other private universities. Faculty is also quite cognizant of the rankings academic units have in comparison to those in other elite universities (what PU faculty call their “reference” universities). They are knowledgeable as well of how other academic units within their own university are doing; namely, which departments are nationally known and therefore can be considered “major selling points” for PU.

To compare well with other universities, PU seeks to augment its research funding and to attract well-known and proven academics. It also engages in numerous less visible maneuvers: merging
weak and strong departments to produce increased average reputation ratings, reallocating research funds to make a particular school appear more able to attract research grants/contracts, having researchers from peripheral units serve as “joint appointments” to decrease the faculty/student ratio, and pursuing a much higher number of student applications than it will ever admit in order to produce high student selectivity indices. These efforts are carried out at the departmental/school level, but they are fully known and supported by central administrators.

Shifts in Program Offerings

All three academic departments in the study engage in efforts to promote a greater global presence. This often means seeking what respondents call “multilateral collaboration” among universities, which implies the creation of worldwide university networks. Partnerships have therefore been achieved with foreign universities, carefully choosing reputable institutions with leading departments or schools. PU’s school of communication has successfully secured a joint master’s in communication management with the London School of Economics, while its business school has crafted a joint MBA with the University of Shanghai. In addition, both schools have study-abroad exchanges with universities in Amsterdam, Singapore, and Hong Kong. For its part, the school of engineering is now developing a new collaborative research program with a Korean institution. Faculty indicate that over the past five years, there has been a sizable growth in the number of international study programs in PU as a whole. There is also greater participation of PU faculty in international conferences.

Programs whose internationalization importance increases succeed also in augmenting the numbers of their faculty. Twenty years ago, the business communication department within the business school had only six faculty members; by 2004, it had 33 full-time faculty. The business school as a whole has 184 full-time faculty. Even larger is the school of engineering, with 202 full-time faculty (PU 2004b). Specialization in fields that ensure a solid return on investment are allowed to grow; in contrast, other specializations that suffer from a lack of external funding—even though they may serve to address the important societal problems targeted by the university’s strategic plan—are closed down gradually through non-replacement of faculty or abruptly by simply declaring them unproductive. Ironically, thus, the specialization on international and comparative education, which deals with the relevant issues of globalization and intercultural education, was summarily shut down.

Several new fields have been emerging in the past 10 years at PU. Some of this growth might be attributable to the competition frenzy that leads to the development of innovations, which in turn calls increasingly for interdisciplinary approaches. Three such fields making a solid appearance are bioengineering, neurobiological sciences, and the biosciences. These fields receive much attention and are favored with funding to hire “star” faculty, defined as those who both have attained national and worldwide reputation and are engaged in multi-million dollar research grants that will be brought to PU as they join the university.

Student Recruitment and Expectations

A number of PU administrators maintain regular contacts with heads of international schools abroad (which produce highly mobile high school graduates) to identify potential recruits. A large number of international faculty come to PU to teach on a short-term basis; they usually bring additional contacts and referrals with them.

As students come to PU with a job already in mind, professors are concerned with serving them. Seeing them as consumers, faculty members try to satisfy their expectations. Several business professors stated that, “a faculty member can forget the idea of [acquiring] tenure if he does not please the students who evaluate him.” Faculty share the view that students are increasingly seeing university education as a path to job procurement rather than as an occasion to deepen their knowledge of the surrounding world. They note that, in many cases, the reputation of a particular university is shaped by its ability to place students in high-paying jobs when they graduate. In some programs, such as the master’s in business administration, it is not uncommon for a student to invest $60,000 to $70,000 in student loans, obliging him or her to seek immediate placement after graduation.
The expectation of students in seeking skills for careers is also justified because in the competitive economic world climate there is less emphasis on well-rounded individuals. Practical experience has become more highly rewarded than the traditional broad-based knowledge. For students, this translates into getting good grades, not learning. According to several professors of engineering, many students do not learn what they need to know to succeed in life, and show attitudes very different from those of their parents, who went to college with a greater sense of scholarship and pursued knowledge for the sake of knowledge. The targeting of students as the new customers has also brought changes in the relationship between faculty and students. As tuition rates are high and rising, students expect higher levels of institutional responsiveness and professor responsiveness. In the view of one administrator, “Students are now very demanding consumers who perceive the university as a vendor. Conversely, the university looks at students as paychecks.”

Students have changed in other significant ways. Professors with lengthy experience at PU recall that 20 years ago, several students could articulate what liberal arts education means. In their view, today, even faculty have difficulty understanding this concept. Hence, it seems that the idea of a liberal arts education is dying. An anthropologist professor working at PU for over 20 years, and normally very nuanced in his judgment, comments that the undergraduate students from engineering and business he encounters in his classes (which are part of the general education requirement) rarely have the ability to think abstractly and synthesize diverse pieces of information. He finds them skilled in solving problems within a narrow and predetermined range, and unwilling to learn subjects whose practical application is not immediately visible.

As with other institutions in a market-led economy, universities—including the non-profit—seek to accumulate capital. This is manifested in the recruitment of students who pay their tuition fully, although a few scholarships are available to them. For many years, PU has had one of the largest numbers and proportions of international students of any private US university. Some 20 years ago, most international students came to PU from the Middle East; today, most of them come from South and East Asia. The regions have changed but the common denominator is that these students come from countries that enable them to pay for their studies. PU is extremely interested in maintaining this advantage since higher education is seen as an export commodity; the recruitment of Asian students, at both undergraduate and graduate levels, from China, India, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, and other Asian countries has therefore become aggressive.

The recruitment of international students by the business school is justified on multiple counts, some of which stand in contradiction to each other. The respondents argue that business schools today need to link to the international community and to remain competitive as a university requires greater recruitment of international students; here the assumption is that a global presence and recognition generates more students and connections that feed into an expanding cycle. Business schools throughout the US are indeed making significant efforts to reach overseas students. They do so through satellite schools abroad and by joint partnerships, as exemplified by the links between the University of Chicago and schools in Singapore and Spain, a joint program between the University of Texas at Austin and the Monterrey Institute of Technology and Higher Education Studies (ITESEM) in Mexico, and between PU and the University of Shanghai. Arguments are presented that “the international scope requires greater international sensitivity, more awareness of foreign cultures.” Finally, related comments by the business faculty but focusing on US students state that, “because business has become more global, we have to educate more global-minded students.” Contradictions emerge, however, because students from poorer regions such as those from Africa and many Latin American countries are not recruited. Contradictions surface only because, while recruitment has been intensified, the curriculum has not been adapted to global needs. Guided by the need to recruit more students as well as to develop more connections with other institutions, PU has now established four “development offices” in four Asian countries and one in Mexico. An important objective of these offices is to organize recruitment fairs, especially for prospective science and business students.

The search for international students is officially limited to students who can speak English well enough to take classes. A business professor assures that, “We use great caution to limit our recruitment to students who can speak English fluently.” To this end, some Asian students are contacted by phone early in the morning in their homes to verify their English proficiency. However, instructors at PU’s Language Institute serve yearly over 600 Asian students (mostly in engineering)
whose English is so incipient that they must take intensive language classes often for two semesters before joining regular classes.

International students have become more common in US universities as national boundaries have become more blurred: the increasing homogenization of cultures has made it psychologically easier to travel and to live and study in a foreign culture. It is surprising, however, to learn that in some cases PU does not seek to respond to students’ needs and identities but rather to cater to those who already buy into US culture and society. This is evidenced in the following comment by a business professor:

> We limit our recruitment efforts to students who share an American market ideology because we don’t have the resources or time to preprogram students to think like Americans. If they don’t think like capitalists before they come to the States, they likely will not find jobs in the US when they graduate. We assume that all the students we recruit will stay in the country to work, even though some return back home. (Professor with 28 years at USC)

Part of the students’ practical experience, especially for US students, involves study abroad to become familiar with other contexts. In the case of the schools of communications and business, there are programs that take students for intensive tours of firms and institutions. Since all major firms today have international subsidiaries in all regions of the world, the business school seeks to “train our students to work for these firms.” Its programs, therefore, have been redesigned so that business students may visit a foreign corporation to help solve problems the corporation is facing. Some professors assert, “We identify problems and then offer solutions on how to fix them.” Others say, “The students become aware of international business and gain more awareness of international and global sourcing activities.” Such experiences have already taken students to Thailand, Cuba, Mexico, and China. But since these are brief visits to the other country (about 10 days) and even briefer to the corporation involved, it is doubtful that considerable cultural or organizational knowledge is gained. Often, students go to these countries with a minimal understanding of the culture and even more frequently with no knowledge of the language spoken there. Students have greater exposure abroad, but such experience seems superficial since not only is their stay brief but they live in an English-speaking cultural bubble.

Internationalization of program offerings and student recruitment have become today the new form of entrepreneurialism, moving into new conceptions of students and knowledge. In turn, this permeates faculty governance. The search for new student markets and attractive programs unleashes a need for more students, more faculty to teach them, and timely decisions based on constant scanning of the environment—both national and international. Globalization and internationalization therefore become entangled.

**Faculty Governance**

Although PU never had a very strong faculty participation in major decisions, there is ample consensus that decision-making by the faculty has been reduced greatly over the past 30 years, while that of the administration has grown considerably. Faculty assert most power resides with the PU board of trustees and the “Central administrators.” Several factors are identified as contributing to the current situation: First, a decrease in tenured faculty has brought considerable increase in full-time and part-time adjuncts and clinical professors. While prestigious universities have more tenured or tenure/track professors than less prestigious ones, slightly less than half (49.6%) of the PU faculty is tenured or on tenure/track. However, the three schools in the study, whose fields are deeply involved in the globalization process, have a greater proportion of tenured or tenure-track faculty (62% for business, 66% for communication, and 81% for engineering) (PU 2004b). It would seem, therefore, that powerful (i.e., wealthy) schools and departments are able to negotiate better conditions for their faculty and to address the “problem” of teaching by less secured faculty by enlarging their faculty, rather than by changing the faculty status.

Second, even though most research universities are run primarily by faculty, this is not so at PU, where deans have traditionally had more power than the faculty. This dominance is justified by the need to differentiate between governance and leadership. Presumably the latter calls for a greater visionary role and the ability to act within short windows of opportunity. According
to the respondents, the deans’ dominance in decision-making processes has often resulted in the promotion of managerial over intellectual interests, with budgetary and profit-seeking rationales prevailing over academic considerations.

Echoing a pattern detected at national level, in which faculty in doctoral institutions stated having substantial influence in general standards of promotion and tenure and for evaluating teaching, and in setting graduate education policy, but relatively little in setting strategic and budget priorities for the institution. For their part, administrators (academic vice presidents) acknowledged high influence in setting strategic priorities and slightly less so in setting graduate education policy. While there is an emergent bifurcation of decision making in the university, the majority of faculty in the study were in agreement with the current state of affairs as the large majority felt there was “sufficient trust” concerning actions on governance issues (Tierney and Minor 2003).

The faster rate of growth of administrators over professors, as well as the increasing rate of part-time faculty also noted by Rhoades (1998), who observed the phenomenon between 1977 and 1989. PU professors saw it as having accelerated significantly in the 1990s. Rhoades detected also a simultaneous stratification of faculty (into tenure and non-tenured track) and the solidification of university professors as merely university employees, whom he termed “managed professionals.”

The contrast between governance and leadership is often made among the respondents, with leadership the dominant concept. University leaders are said to be much needed if an academic unit or university is to be competitive, for they are the ones with fundraising experience and the “business savvy required to perform the job.” Because of the increased leadership role by administrators, the number of mid-level management positions has grown tremendously at PU and its structure is becoming more complex. In the voice of one engineering professor, “I cannot believe how many provosts and associate deans are hired today!” Explaining the situation, a communication professor makes the analogy, “Just as hospitals no longer hire the most talented doctors to head up administration, universities no longer credit the most talented professors to run them either.” Corroborating this view, a professor from the school of engineering indicates that leaders today must be “marketers, politicians, and administrators.” Some decisions based on funding rationale run into opposite consequences. For instance, in the school of engineering it would be impossible to hire as a faculty member someone who cannot raise a substantial amount of money for the university. Presumably, faculty who get external funding are addressing problems with major social implications, but this is not always the case.

Third, a number of fields have seen the formal incorporation of business firms into the governance of the academic unit. A recent development has been the formation of Corporate Advisory Boards (CAB), which provides an opportunity for the universities to invite the most generous donors to participate in them. According to a business school professor who served as curriculum coordinator for several years, once on the board, these influential figures shape course offerings.

Facing the current changes, some faculty express ambivalence. This is reflected by a communications professor, who states:

The number of faculty involved in governance is down. But I do not believe this is a negative shift because faculty are not always known for having a positive influence on the direction of the university. They tend to think conservatively. But on the other hand, I am concerned that many deans today do not have a vested interest in academic life either. Often we hire administrators with little or no research experience. They come from outside of the university culture, often with little knowledge of the disciplines they oversee. (Faculty with 24 years at PU)

### The Impact of Industrial Ties on the University

According to the administrator with key responsibilities for implementation of PU’s strategic plan, there has been an “exponential increase each year in the degree of collaboration with industry.” Increased connections are reported by all three schools in the study. Longitudinal data on PU’s funded research (Table 1) confirms a steady decline of federal research funds and, concomitantly, an increase in private research funds, going from 8% of all sponsored projects in terms of amount in 1985 to 19% by 2004. The federal government remains the main source of research funds, but it is clear that competition for public and private funds is on the increase.
Although the link between academia and industry has always characterized journalism programs, the relationship has become even more pronounced in the school of communication because industrial leaders in the media industry expect universities to produce students with specific communicational skills. In engineering, some industries, such as aerospace, have long connected to PU, but now the links have expanded to cover electronics, media, and computers, resulting in significant contractual research. The school of engineering has a Board of Counselors made up of domestic and international advisors from industry; this board promotes connections especially with the Pacific Rim. IBM and other industries have endowed several chairs in engineering, and these endowments have been used to hire specific faculty who have interests that align with the interests of those industries. The number of endowed chairs that industry finances within each department has also grown significantly over recent years. Respondents noted that though industry has traditionally supported endowed chairs across business school departments, the number of faculty in the PU business school who are sponsored by corporate donors has escalated.

In describing the connection with industry, some engineering professors indicate that the relationship goes both ways. Thus, many professors often work for industrial firms before, after, or while they work as university professors. Also, many faculty have started their own companies. Communication professors consider that they have a say in industrial administrative matters as well because many boards of industry recruit academicians and thus professors have an increasingly important voice in corporate boardrooms. The links are not free of problems. Especially in engineering, it is noted that industry and the university have different timelines, with industry seeking quicker cutting-edge ideas than academia produces.

The links between PU and industry not only affect research and governance; they affect curriculum as well. The Accrediting Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET) has issued directives pressuring engineering schools to de-emphasize theory and promote application. ABET is shaped by the views of professional societies that are staffed by industry. Its views are strongly considered in determining undergraduate programs in engineering. Similar influences can be detected in business schools. Reportedly, a very small number of CPA firms influence what accounting schools should teach. These firms are known as the “Big Four”—large professional firms offering a wide array of services, such as “auditing, taxes, consultation, and an increasingly broader focus on international business.” At PU the Big Four support the school of accounting by matching alumni donations. In return, these firms also expect to recruit from the universities they sponsor. To be responsive to industry, the school of communications established an entertainment track about five years ago for undergraduates. The influence of industry on the university is sometimes subtle. As one communication professor puts it, “Industrial sponsors cannot tell universities what to study, but they can choose to sponsor only programs that align to their interests” (Faculty with 26 years at PU). Yet another communication professor offers a sharper judgment: “Faculty are forced to become prostitutes, because today they are forced to recruit the support of industry. We, here at [PU’s school of communication], are fortunate because of the endowment we have received. If faculty are the prostitutes, then administrators have become the pimps” (Faculty with 32 years at PU and six years as a former department chair).

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**TABLE 1**
PU Sponsored Projects by Sponsor (in Thousands of Dollars), 1985–2004

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>98,595</td>
<td>141,387</td>
<td>176,487</td>
<td>240,506</td>
<td>328,845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State/local</td>
<td>3059 3%</td>
<td>4,474 3%</td>
<td>10,777 5%</td>
<td>16,975 5%</td>
<td>12,203 3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>9215 8%</td>
<td>28,593 16%</td>
<td>44,053 19%</td>
<td>67,875 21%</td>
<td>80,014 19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>110,869</td>
<td>174,454</td>
<td>213,317</td>
<td>325,356</td>
<td>421,062</td>
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Shifts in Faculty Roles and Hierarchies

As noted above, to move up in ranks compared to other universities, the hiring of “star” professors is a common strategy. These faculty instantly bring with them large research projects and the high probability of new research funds in the future. Often, “star” projects are allowed to create their own research centers. However, as these faculty take on research projects, they “buy out” their teaching responsibilities, a practice that results in hiring of adjuncts to teach classes at PU and seriously compromises the quality of instruction students receive, according to several professors.

The pressing need to engage in problem-solving research in certain areas is promoting an interdisciplinary approach by which entrepreneurial faculty seek partners in fields perceived to make contributions to a greater understanding of a given issue and its potential solution. PU itself is presently involved in efforts to increase interdisciplinary research and has shown willingness to make exceptions to its revenue center management, a practice which makes each academic unit exclusively and totally responsible for generating the revenues it needs to function. The interdisciplinary initiatives offer much promise: they are also creating a typology of faculty into the “old guard” (traditional academics who commit themselves to one disciplinary area) and the “new guard” (the growing number of faculty with interdisciplinary preferences).

With research given greater weight than teaching, and with the increasing need to serve the practical interests of industry, universities are changing their hiring practices. In the school of engineering, the tendency is to hire faculty who have real world experience, especially those who own their own business. Faculty across all engineering specializations are being hired for their potential to raise money for the school or to bring in research funds. As one engineering professor observes:

> The only way to improve the ranking of PU in the US News and World Report is to increase grant money from industry. We live and die by this ranking. We are now ranked [among the top ten] in the nation. Our graduate program is ranked by the quality of our faculty. Faculty who are affiliated with professional organizations, those who publish, and those who raise money for research increase the ranking of the school. (Faculty with 17 years at PU)

The recruitment of “star faculty” creates new dynamics and contradictions. PU’s strategic planning officer states that the “compensation offered to hot faculty has skyrocketed in its lavishness, up to a half million [dollars] for the most desirable.” Of course, this is not true of every discipline; business and law are identified as two fields that have the resources to pay these salaries. Some star faculty use agents today, especially if they publish frequently. Hiring the best means satisfying a whole array of demands. Usually an academic position has to be offered also to the spouse. Facilities for housing, labs, travel expenditures are part of the negotiations. “The amount of money we spend on labs and other perks to bring in the big guns would amaze you,” asserted a former department chair.

The increased presence of international students is also creating pressure to hire professors from abroad. The majority of the respondents noted, however, that most of these international faculty are trained in the US or in the West because “foreign-trained academics do not command the same respect the American-trained academics do.” In addition, some schools, such as business and engineering, seek recruitment of international faculty with both international teaching experience and business experience. According to a business professor with 20 years experience at PU, the university has a particular interest in hiring faculty with first-hand familiarity in Asian affairs to increase the number of students it can recruit from the Pacific and Asian mainland. Several external political events have also affected the internationalization of PU’s faculty. Professors in the school of engineering report that the collapse of the Soviet Union led to an increase in hiring of Russian engineers for US industry and academic positions. Innovations in communications and transportation are also identified as having facilitated the intense exchange between academics abroad and those at PU.

Task-Focused Curricula

As a whole, the curricula emerging in all three fields investigated in this article show a marked tendency toward practical applications and job relevance. Many academicians observe that PU has shifted away from funding and supporting certain programs that promote a more comprehensive
education while pushing more money into other programs that promote skills-based education. The influence of ABET in the field of engineering extends to selection of the kinds of courses that are preferred by industry. These are described as courses that teach skills like communications and how to be interdisciplinary team players. A professor of engineering exclaims, “Today, skills, skills, skills. Nobody cares about anything other than skills. Education means hands-on engineering. Students learn computer programs and computer language.” Engineering faculty are unanimous in expressing the view that today industrial leaders look for a workforce that is more broadly skilled; thus, there is a greater tendency toward general skills-related education as opposed to specialized knowledge at the undergraduate level.

Professors of engineering, a field notorious for emphasizing practical applications, consider that university education has become diluted, for “If you ask a student today to conduct research on a topic, and I am not only talking about undergraduates, even a graduate student . . . he would enter his search on a Google or another popular Websearch engine. They do not even think about the authenticity of the research they undertake” (professor with 12 years at PU). Echoing opinions made by other faculty in the school of engineering, the same professor observes that the curriculum focus on skills has displaced the traditional emphasis on the science curricula the students should receive: “We promote jobs skills over life-long enduring knowledge. There are faculty who try to nurture students to become whole individuals, but most faculty today push students to develop marketable skills.” PU’s school of business has established a very extensive study-abroad program to promote global awareness and to make its students more competitive in international markets.

In the field of communication, the curriculum is now said to be much more sensitive to the international media, and thus courses are described as being more varied. The curriculum changes include globalization as a subject area, more coverage of cultural diversity, and introduction to new media forms to promote a range of technological competencies. On the other hand, the school of communications has decreased the number of mandatory coursework requirements in order to encourage students to pursue double majors or double minors, but with an emphasis on acquiring practical skills. For example, an English major might minor in communications, to gain some professional preparation. In addition, the school of communications has come up with the notion of tracks. This is explained thus by a former department chair: “Today we have tracks rather than majors. Our programs are geared toward careers as opposed to knowledge for the sake of knowledge. These tracks help students to develop focus in their concentration area.” The need to connect university training to jobs is encouraging an interesting blurring of fields; thus, for instance, students in communication are moving into business track fields, such as advertising and media culture.

Faculty report changes in instructional methodologies, as there is an emphasis away from rote memorization of facts to skills that stress writing, working in groups, and communication. The curriculum, especially in engineering, is constantly changing because the US technology is said to undergo substantial change every five years. A trend that seems to be quite strong in all departments is the use and reliance on educational technology within the classroom. Industry grants have allowed these academic units to make technological renovations in every department and classroom. In addition, student research must involve technological resources, which make it possible for every student to incorporate the most current information, facts and figures in their presentation and papers.

Mutually reinforcing ties have developed between students, industry, and programs, as this business professor explains: “New alumni networks enable [PU] to connect with industry abroad to recruit more and more international students. These industrial firms conversely inform the new programs that we develop here. If we want international corporations to send their employees to PU to train, we need to formulate programs that meet their needs” (Faculty with 30 years in business and 10 years as a PU faculty member).

**Conclusions**

Dynamics linked to economic and technological features of globalization have led to university responses known collectively as internationalization. This term seems to be the new and more palatable term for the “entrepreneurialism” observed by Slaughter and Leslie (1997).
What we can see from the PU examination, is that: (1) there is a major effort to recruit more international students and faculty; (2) there is considerable shift toward convergence among schools in strategies and decisions affecting the issues of governance, curriculum, and selection of both faculty and students; (3) there is a growth of “star” faculty in the pursuit of higher institutional rankings and thus of higher number of student applicants; (4) there is a sustained increase in the proportion of administrative positions, as internationalization is based on “strategic planning” that requires knowledge of external forces and quicker response times; and (5) the expansion of the student markets leads to a dissociation between teaching and research, with increased numbers of professors in non-tenure, part-time, and clinical positions being reported. In all, notions of knowledge have been reshaped and become predicated on utility and narrowly focused problem-solving rather than on seeking broader understandings or an expanded vision of reality which might in the long term provide greater resilience and adaptability to the rapid and seemingly inexorable obsolescence of the transitory technologies that are the staple of these fields.

There are, nonetheless, different dynamics at work in the three schools investigated. Business and communications feel a stronger pressure to develop international contacts and expand their array of international experiences. Engineering is quite successful with its recruitment of international students, in part because the US is considered by most observers as the most technologically developed country. Communications puts the greatest weight on curricula that will give practical experience to students.

While it is still not clear how the new internationalization efforts of joint programs and study abroad will impact the university culture on a long-term basis, the hierarchies now being formed within PU are clearly giving greater salience to those fields that can be directly linked to growth in revenue. Among faculty who have been at PU for more than 15 years, there is consensus that significant changes have occurred. Behaviors analogous to those of business firms are increasingly evident, for new university rankings receive top priority, presumably because they give information as to the quality of the product. As knowledge becomes a product, then the market logic dominates. If customers are willing to buy the products in sufficient numbers for the projected class size to make a profit, then the product is offered. If not, courses and programs simply disappear. They risk disappearing also when the job market does not favor their alumni with salaries high enough to make them potential donors. As internal differentiation continues, the sense of common purpose that traditionally united different disciplines will decrease and the private university will emerge instead as a collection of economically productive units.

DiMaggio and Powell (1991) detected three mechanisms that secure institutional isomorphism: the coercive, the imitational, and the normative. At least the latter two would seem to apply to universities today as staff/faculty transfers are increasing due to constant raids by competitors to acquire the best people, and elite universities (those that supply most of the faculty) are characterized by training, academic practices, and professional norms that closely resemble each other. We find that the competition fueled by globalization increases turnover of faculty (and likely also administrators) and accelerates border-crossing between industry and the academic world. Competition for excellence also leads to standardized norms of performance, both in quality and quantity of academic production.

DiMaggio and Powell (1991) predict an alignment of organizations with successful models when technologies are not clear. Universities, especially private universities, consider imitating the business world a safe approach and thus introduce criteria of competitiveness, marketability, and profitability that have done well in the marketplace. A second reason for the imitation, however, is that universities feel compelled actually to join the market and its strategies. The translation of such features to the university signals the beginning of a process that has deeply transformed the conception of higher education and the disciplines it has traditionally housed. PU's case study did not reveal that at the faculty level any changes in the purpose of education had occurred, but students have now become more interested in practical training to succeed in the new economy, and industry is happy to help. Students and some of their funders are shaping academic programs to promote their economic potential not their intellectual growth. While faculty still hold on to the more expansive views of knowledge and would like to think of themselves as a community of scholars, they are becoming complicit in the ongoing transformations. The evidence from PU's
priorities and activities is that internationalization reigns, with little contestation of its full-range, long-term consequences.

Contacts between PU and institutions in other countries are increasing. There is also greater recruitment of international students and greater exposure of US students to conditions abroad. This internationalization is an expression of economic and technological globalization in which university “entrepreneurs” are not merely looking for more contracts and contacts with industry but, ultimately, are concerned with establishing regular international sites and presence. The current pursuit of overseas expansion and recognition at PU is to a large extent internationalization and even though its own discourse refers to sensitivity and usefulness to other cultures, it is not internationalism. Finally, this case study sees internationalization from the perspective of an advanced industrial country’s response to the process of globalization; it would be useful to examine whether private universities located at the periphery of globalization dynamics are experiencing a similar process.

Notes

1. Many scholars have described unprecedented changes in higher education (for a full set of references see Slaughter and Leslie 1997, p. 208) and several have linked the transformations to the global economy.

2. The sample consisted of 10 men and 4 women, all full professors with an average of 22 years at PU, and thus able to comment on perceived academic and organizational changes over time. Their length at USC ranged from 10 to 40 years. I sought to interview a larger number of women, but since women faculty were underrepresented in these disciplines. I could locate only these few respondents. The interviews with faculty and administrators lasted about one hour each, they were followed by additional communications to clarify points as needed. Data were conducted between 2002 and 2004. The meticulous and persistent research assistance of Carlos Cortez in the procurement of the interview data is gratefully acknowledged. Anthony Tambascia’s help for some of the literature references is also acknowledged.

3. Another phenomenon, widespread in US universities, is the growth of part-time faculty, or what Kirp (2003) calls the “outsourcing of higher education” (2003, p. 114), which results in considerable reduction in teaching expenses. By 2004, 46% of PU’s faculty was part-time.

4. Recent data indicate that doctoral recipients from other countries in science and engineering have firm plans to stay in the US; this is the case for about 55% of students in those fields from India, 53% from the UK, and 48% from China (Johnson and Regets 1998, p. 2).

5. PU statistics on the breakdown of faculty by full-time and part-time status or by tenure/tenure track and other full-time status could be obtained only for 2002 and 2003. Perhaps because this represents a very brief period, no shifts could be detected in the distribution of faculty in the three schools selected for this study.

6. Some connections between industry and the academy predate globalization. If industry leaders had never sponsored the construction of the first business schools, it is likely that Tier I universities would not have created MBA programs. Schools of communication were established after World War II, in the 1950s, with the impetus from the media industry.

7. Approximately 70% of the global economic growth is estimated to be produced by the 21 member countries of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). The attention to Asia, therefore, has a strong economic rationale.

8. Indicative of the increased importance of private firms is the change in the classification of research universities. The Carnegie Corporation, whose role it has been to develop classifications for higher education institutions, changed its classification in 2000. Whereas before the top segment of universities were classified as Research I universities and defined as those that granted 50 or more doctoral degrees and received $40 million in federal support per year, the 2004 definition dropped the federal research criterion and created instead the “research university—extensive” to refer to those that granted “50 or more doctoral degrees per year across at least 15 disciplines” (The Carnegie Foundation 2001, p. 10).

References


PU. The Strategic Plan of the PU. Adopted by the PU Board of Trustees, 8 June 1994a.


