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COLLECTIVE IDENTITY AND PUBLIC POLICY: FROM RESISTANCE TO RECONSTRUCTION IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1986-1995

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF EDUCATION

AND THE COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDIES

OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Ihron Lester Rensburg

July 1996

I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

6/17/96

M. Carnoy, Principal Advisor Date

I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

S. Olzak

I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Approved for the University Committee on Graduate Studies

Dissertation abstract

Social movement organizations advance projects of social change which shape and are shaped by social transitions and public policy. Studies incorporating resource mobilization theories and theories of social constructionism have sought to understand and predict changes in the collective identity of social movement organizations. Drawing from these theories, I put forward a set of propositions to predict social movement organization behavior in the context of fundamental political and social change. Using the case study research design, I collected data on four South African anti-apartheid education organizations covering the country's anti-apartheid and post-apartheid periods (1985-1995).

This study confirms the usefulness of a combined social constructionist and resource mobilization theoretical model for understanding and predicting changes in the collective identity of social movement organizations. The research method deployed, viz., case study analysis of the emergence and evolution of social movement organizations over an extended period that overlaps with national level protest cycles, demonstrates the utility of the theoretical model.

This study confirmed the transitions I postulated about organizational identity induced by changes in the political regime, viz., (i) social movement organizations undergo organizational routinization and professionalization in response to successful mobilization of new resources created by changes in political regime, (ii) social movement organizations undergo a decline in mobilization and militancy, experience role ambiguity and may wither when their interests are successfully incorporated into the social project of the emerging democratic state, and (iii) university student and high school pupil social movement organizations will be unsuccessful in the mobilization of resources, will increase the use of contentious collective action and will experience goal maintenance, although the study uncovered an exception to this general proposition. Future research can explore the differences in resource mobilization and collective action between high school and university student organizations.

This study shows that the emergent state, unevenly penetrated, leads and dominates much of the public policy process. South Africans still have a window of opportunity through which to construct an activist, democratizing state and a flourishing, dynamic civil society, for the successful creation of an open polity and deepened democracy depends on the vitality of both.

Preface

This study started off with the simple objective of providing a record of how social movements and their organizations shape and are shaped by the South African transition to democracy given their history. Later it turned to an additional objective of enlisting social movement theory to study the dynamic relationship between social movements and their organizations and emergent policy and policy domains in a transition society. There was always an underlying assumption which accompanied this search for answers. Social movements and their organizations, undisturbed by their success and the shift to open polities and democracy, would march on into the emergent democracy with greater commitment to what the South African Students Congress has called the thoroughgoing transformation of the apartheid-scarred political, social and economic fabric of South Africa.

This study has turned out to be much more than even that. It is an account of the transitions in my own identity, given my history, and of coming to terms with that identity. That identity shaped and was shaped by two decades of work as an activist, organizer and leader, in the heart of, and against discrimination, racism, sexism, political and ciass oppression and exploitation against an enemy skilled in classifying, threatening, silencing, teargassing, torturing, banishing, interning, assassinating and counter-guerrilla warfaring against myself, family, friends, comrades and ordinary citizens. And of realizing and valuing that not only are societies in transition but that social movements and their organizations are in transition. And that even I am in transition.

Acknowledgments

This dissertation would not have been possible without the encouragement, guidance, support and understanding of my advisor, Professor Martin Carnoy. Nor without the confidence shown in me by Professor Hans Weiler and Dr. Peg Sutton. Nor without the SIDEC Program and the School of Education for its commitment to scholarship on transitions in the Third World and providing a home-from-home for many Third World students and scholars. It is here where I met and established cross-border friendships and comradeships, including and especially those with Imanol and Mireya Ordorika and Joel and Rachel Samoff whose homes and hearts were always warm and open to me and my wife.

The dissertation has gone through a number of drafts en route to this final product. It was the enthusiasm, encouragement, close scrutiny and pages of suggestions for improvements from Professors Martin Carnoy, David Abernethy, Susan Olzak, and later from Karen Mundy, that made this possible. Guidance and counseling came from Professors John Meyer, Francisco Ramirez, Richard Roberts and Patti Gumport. And later, in South Arica, from Drs. Johan Olivier, Linda Chisholm, and her colleagues at the Education Policy Unit at the University of the Witwatersrand, and Professors Tom Lodge and Bert Klandermans.

I want to express my appreciation to the WK Kellogg International Fellowship Program for the confidence they displayed in me and for providing much needed support to my family throughout my fellowship program. Few fellowship programs can match and none which I am aware of are superior to the WK Kellogg International Fellowship Program.

Research for the dissertation was made possible through grants from the Ford Foundation and the Human Sciences Research Council. The completion of this work at Stanford University, on the twentieth anniversary of the student uprising in 1976, was made possible through a continuation of my fellowship from the WK Kellogg Foundation and a

grant together with a generous leave arrangement from the Ministry of Education (Pretoria, South Africa).

Colleagues, friends and advisors who through their encouragement and support also made me believe that what I was doing was the right thing were John Samuel (former Director of the Education Department of the African National Congress and now Deputy Director-General in the Ministry of Education, Pretoria, South Africa), Dr. Harvey Liss (my adviser and promoter at the WK Kellogg Foundation) and Professor Jonathan Jansen (SIDEC doctoral graduate and now Professor of Curriculum Studies at the University of Durban-Westville, kwaZulu-Natal, South Africa).

I also want to thank the administrative and support staff at the Stanford School of Education for their help, support and encouragement. I wish to extend special thanks to the doctoral degree programs and area coordinator, Philippa Macfarlane-Thorne and the program are administrator, Pat Kennedy.

I am convinced that the doctoral program at Stanford University has strengthened my ability to continue to take up the challenge of social transformation, especially in my new role in the Ministry of Education.

Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to those fallen heroes and heroines who believed in our ability to meet the challenge of rooting out racism and to overthrow the apartheid regime, and who made social movements and their social movement organizations possible. To the majority of our people who stood tall even under the overbearing yoke of oppression and exploitation. And to our leaders who, now in transition themselves, have within their hands the opportunity not only to reverse racism but also to build an activist, democratizing state and a dynamic and flourishing civil society.

For most of my life I lived with and cherished two persons who always believed in me no matter what. Each day that I spent in prison during the dark days of apartheid they would shed tears in silence and say their prayers to God. Somehow, come rain or sunshine and despite their age, for they were now into their seventies and not anymore in good health, they would find their way to my prison cell to encourage and to provide moral strength where mine had been weakened by torture and loneliness. We started this program together back in August 1992. You are no more. But fond memories of you will never fade. This dissertation is to you, Mum and Dad. I know how proud you would have felt today.

This work is also dedicated to my wife, Sizeka who has been my partner and friend for more than six years. Although a professional working woman and mother, you have unselfishly dedicated yourself to making my development and growth your priority even at the cost of your own. You have always believed in me without reserve and it is your ideas, encouragement, confidence, support and strong-will which has enabled me to see this through. The time has now come for me to return that in full measure.

This is also dedicated to my son, Lizolethu. You will never know the brutality of apartheid, of its land theft and of its forced removals. Nor visit its prison cells, nor hear its guns, nor smell its teargas, nor stomach its torture. You are a son of the South African soil, of a democracy made fertile through the blood, tears, sweat and strength of your people. May you have a fruitful and fulfilling life in the full knowledge of our history and of our future as we march together prepared for the next task.

List of main acronyms used in text

ANC, African National Congress. Leading national liberation movement. Established 1912. Now leading partner in South Africa's first democratically elected Government of National Unity.

AZAPO, Azanian People's Organization. National liberation movement. Leading proponent of Black Consciousness philosophy. Established 1979 after banning of Black Consciousness Movement allied organizations in 1977. Voiced deep opposition to the negotiated political settlement in South Africa, arguing that the settlement constituted defeat for the forces of liberation rather than progress. Refused to participate in national, provincial and local government elections in 1994, 1995 and 1996.

AZASO, Azanian Students Organization. National university and college student organization. Established after the 1977 banning of the South African Students Organization. Initially a proponent of the Black Consciousness philosophy, later of non-racialism and of the Freedom Charter. Renamed in the 1980s the South African National Students Congress to reflect this shift in ideology.

AZASM, Azanian Students Movement. National high school student organization. Established in the 1980s. Leading current student proponent of the Black Consciousness philosophy. Political ally of the Azanian People's Organization.

COSAS, Congress of South African Students. National high school student organization. Established in 1979 after banning of the South African Students Movement. Leading public proponent of the Freedom Charter its from establishment. Banned in 1985 but continued to operate under name of National Students Coordinating Committee. Re-established after ban lifted in 1990.

COSATU, Congress of South African Trade Unions. Leading and dominant trade union formation. Established in 1985 as a federation of industry-based trade unions. Played leading role in transforming labor and industrial relations in 1980s despite state repression. Together with the African National Congress and the South African Communist Party, a member of the Tri-Partite Alliance which has dominated South African resistance and now dominates the political transition.

NAPTOSA, National Professional Teachers Organization of South Africa. National teachers organization. Established in 1990 as an alliance of conservative ethnic-based teachers associations to counter the establishment of the South African Democratic Teachers Union.

NECC, National Education Coordinating Committee. Leading proponent of People's Education as a counter to proponents of Liberation before Education. Established in 1985 as a grassroots coalition of students, teachers, workers, religious, women, youth and civic organizations to end boycott of schools in 1984-1985. Leadership then largely drawn from political, civic and parents organizations. Led movement for People's Education as alternative to race-based and inferior Bantu Education. Restricted in late-1980s but relaunched in 1990 as a formal coalition comprising the Congress of South African Students, the Congress of South African Trade Unions, the National Union of South African Students, the South African Democratic Teachers Union, the South African National Students Congress and the South African Youth Congress

NEHAWU, National Education, Health and Allied Workers Union. Industry-based affiliate of the Congress of South African Trade Unions. Established in the 1980s. Organizes amongst others service staff at universities and technikons. Key ally of the South African Students Congress' campaign to transform power relations and programs at the country's universities and technikons.

NEUSA, National Education Union of South Africa. National teachers union. Established in 1979. Leading proponent of Freedom Charter. Played leading role in unity talks that lead to the formation of the South African Democratic Teachers Union in 1990, into which it merged.

NASCCO, National Student Coordinating Committee. National high school student organization. Established in 1986 to continue student mobilization when the Congress of South African Students Organization was banned, as a federation of local, township-based students congresses. Dissolved when the Congress of South African Students was re-established in 1990.

NTUF, National Teacher Unity Forum. National forum of teacher organizations. Established in 1988 to pursue unity amongst militant teachers unions and conservative teachers associations. Dissolved in 1990 when the South African Democratic Teachers Union was established.

NUSAS, National Union of South African Students. National university student organization. Established in first part of twentieth century with non-racial identity. Later, with Black Consciousness surging, black students walked out of the organization and formed the South African Students Organization. It then mobilized mainly white students. In 1991 the organization merged with the South African National Students Congress to form the South African Students Congress.

PAC, Pan Africanist Congress. National liberation movement. Established in 1959 as breakaway from the African National Congress, arguing for a more militant Africanist, rather than non-racial identity. Holds a small number of seats in the country's first democratically elected National Assembly.

PASO, Pan Africanist Students Organization. National high school, university, technikon and college student organization. Established in the 1980s as student proponent of a militant Africanism. Leading student formation of the Pan Africanist Congress.

PTSA(s), Parent-Teacher-Student-Association(s). Established as radical alternative governance structures to state-appointed school committees in mainly Black schools. Key element of the strategy of the Movement for People's Education led by the National Education Coordinating Committee. Now taken up in post-apartheid government education policy.

SACCAWU, South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union. Industry-based affiliate of the Congress of South African Trade Unions. Established in the 1980s. Organizes amongst others service staff at universities and technikons. Key ally of the South African Students Congress' campaign to transform power relations and programs at the country's universities and technikons.

SADTU, South African Democratic Teachers Union. National teachers organization. Established in 1990 as a progressive union and alternative to the conservative teachers unions. Played leading role in the creation of new industrial and labor relations in the education sector.

SANCO, South African National Civics Organization. National association of township-based civic associations which focus on tenant and ratepayers issues. Led campaign of rent boycotts in country in 1980s which crippled administration of the black townships. A leading partner of the African National Congress in resistance and now in government.

SANSCO, South African National Students Congress. National university, technikon and college student organization. Established in mid-1980s, as a change of name from the Azanian Students Organization, dropping "Azanian" which became synonymous with Black Consciousness, and adopting "Congress" which became synonymous with the Freedom Charterists, to reflect a shift to a Freedom Charter identity.

SASCO, South African Students Congress. National university, technikon and college student organization. Established in 1991 as a merger of the South African National Students Congress and the National Union of South African Students. Seeks to transform power relations and programs at universities, technikons and colleges through militant collective action.

SASO, South African Students Organization. National university and college student organization. Established in late 1960s as breakaway from the National Union of South African Students to advance the Black Consciousness ideology. Banned in 1977 when state cracked down on Black Consciousness Movement.

SASM, South African Students Movement. National high school student organization. Established in early 1970s as militant student coalition. Banned in 1977 when state cracked down on Black Consciousness Movement.

TASA, Teachers Association of South Africa. National teachers organization. Membership drawn from Indian teaching population. One of the few conservative teachers unions to join ranks with the militant teachers unions to form the South African Democratic Teachers Union into which it dissolved in 1992.

UDF, United Democratic Front. Leading anti-apartheid coalition. Established in 1983 to unite internal resistance movement to oppose the adoption of the 1983 Tri-Cameral constitution that included Coloureds and Indians but excluded Africans from participation in the polity by the White government. Later coordinated national mobilization for people's power as alternative to apartheid state power. Dissolved in 1992 as the African National Congress took full charge of the internal liberation movement.

UDUSA, Union of Democratic University Staff Associations. National federation of university staff associations which are mainly drawn from academic staff. Established in 1988 to transform power, labor and industrial relations at the country's universities.

UTASA, Union of Teachers Associations of South Africa. National federation of provincially-based teachers associations. Membership drawn from Coloured teaching population. Adopted a militant anti-apartheid stance in mid-1980s, including adopting the Freedom Charter, but later returned to a conservative stance and refused to dissolve into the South African Democratic Teachers Union. Later formed an alliance with the conservative National Professional Teachers Organization of South Africa.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1

A Review of the Literature and a Theoretical Model for Organizational Transitions

Broad societal, national and international change is widely claimed to be partly the outcome of national and international social movements. The trajectory of several of these movements is characterized by a national as well as inter- and intra-social sectoral focus. Specifically their impact could be illustrated in the size and impact of the Anti-Slavery Movement, the Civil Rights Movement, the post-1980s Movements for Democracy, the Women's Movement, and the Anti-Apartheid Movement. Their projects have been transparently social and ideological. However, these social movements, and their successes and failures, have been and are made possible by member-based and publicly-supported grassroots or social movement organizations that create mobilizing opportunities, push the frontiers of possibilities and construct meaning for their participants, bystanders and opponents. In fact, it is social movement organizations that are the building blocks of social movements and which are key elements in a democratic society. Social movement organizations are also the most visible part of social movements and the subject of this dissertation.

This study seeks to unravel the puzzle of how social movement organizations (SMOs) are affected by periods of fundamental social change, and, equally how social movement organizations impact on the processes of change. The social and political transition in post-apartheid South Africa provides an important opportunity to study these processes. For several decades the social organization in South Africa was dominated by the apartheid system. With official apartheid having statutorily ended, a restructuring of the organization of society is taking place. In this period, some organizations are flourishing, new ones are emerging, others are lingering on, and some will die. On the other hand, grassroots organizations' projects of change may become more moderate or even more radical, more specific or more expansive. It is the central assumption of this dissertation

that the transition in South Africa is shaped by and shapes its grassroots organizations. This dissertation describes and analyzes these processes of change. Insight into the factors that affect the formation and transformation of social movement organizations is not only of fundamental significance for the study of social movement organizations, but also for the process of policy making [Klandermans and Olivier, 1995]. Insight into these processes will also assist policy makers' and organizational activists' efforts to establish and strengthen democracy in South Africa and elsewhere.

In order to develop an understanding of the processes that frame the emergence and subsequent trajectory of SMOs, the dissertation examines these questions through a study of the evolution of education social movement organizations that made possible, and were, in turn, themselves made possible by the movement for democracy in South Africa. For the purposes of this study, external organizational determinants are defined as the re-emergence and rise of the national liberation movement, shifting regimes of national collective action, multi-organizational fields and the changing focus of international support. Endogenous organizational determinants interact with these and impact the trajectory of SMOs. Those studied are organizational leadership, membership recruitment and staffing characteristics.

The remainder of this chapter provides a review of the literature on social movement and social movement organization (Section 1), elaborates a research methodology and research agenda (Section 2), describes the research setting (Section 3), presents the research design and data collection procedures selected for the study (Section 4), and details the limitations (Section 5) and significance (Section 6) of the study.

1. A review of the literature on social movements and social movement organizations

1.1 Resource mobilization theories

Explanations of the trajectory of SMOs and collective action are dominated by resource mobilization (RM) theories [Buckler, 1993]. These theories typically specify the characteristics, resources, and strategies of SMOs and their supporters and participants [Ash, 1972; Gamson, 1975; Piven and Cloward, 1977; Klandermans, 1993; Zald, 1988;

Zald and McCarthy, 1987]. In societies that are densely populated with social movement organizations, the shape of social movement organizations is closely connected to the technologies, forms, opportunities, and targets created by that society [Zald, 1988]. The trajectories of social movement organizations reflect several characteristics: growth of a relatively continuous social movement sector; development of SMOs as enduring features of society; professionalization of movement leadership; and, a transition from a search for membership in the polity to the search for specific policy outcomes [Zald, ibid]. These theories have historically focused on larger societal level processes. Recently though, this literature has been expanded to incorporate issues such as the framing and reframing of goals, interests and activities by SMOs[1] [Snow, et al., 1986; Snow and Benford, 1988; Gamson, 1988] and the creation and transformation of collective identity. Syntheses of RM theories and collective identity theories have also recently been attempted by Klandermans [1984; 1987]. For these, see Section 1.3 below.

This narrow focus on rationality and resources, despite contemporary modifications which seek to mute the effect of rationality, continues to receive criticism. RM theories ignore movement goals such as changes in public awareness, changes in the practices and beliefs of protesters themselves, or changes in the attitudes and practices of other targeted, but non-state institutions [Jasper and Poulsen, 1992]. Their exclusive emphasis on material incentives as a basis for mobilization of participants causes them to ignore questions of non-material inducements such as motivation [Benford, 1993], "grievance" [Oliver, 1989], "sense of justice" [Turner and Killian, 1987], of "cognitive liberation" [McAdam, 1982] or of human rights which bind SMOs, their members and supporters. RM theories also largely ignore historical [Foss and Larkin, 1986] and cultural [Touraine, 1977, 1985] forces in the generation of movements, and fail to examine the problems of underlying consciousness of SMO participants as they engage in praxis. For RM theories, efficacy of the SMO is based on the quality of leadership who can control SMOs from above and without, and on the formal organization, resulting in an overemphasis on organizational explanations of SMO evolution [Foss and Larkin, 1986]. RM theories' neoclassical economic and exchange

[1] This issue is also taken up in the 'formal' organizational literature. See especially Westenholz, 1993.

theory domain assumptions are patriarchal [Ferree, 1992], and its conceptions "may reflect masculine experience" and hence fail to "capture the more nuanced, relational, communal, nurturant and empathic world which is more typical of female experience" [Buckler, 1993; Giroux, 1991; Griffin, 1981; Lehman, 1992; Shearer and Arrington, 1993; Taylor, 1991; Weiler, 1991]. Finally, RM theories' exclusive focus on the SMO as the unit of analysis fail to illuminate the dynamics among a set of SMOs in the same broad movement, for as Gamson [1990:160] argues, "challengers sometimes complement and sometimes undercut each other's strategies but one can understand this broad process only at a more aggregate level of analysis."

Tilly [1964, 1978] offers a more complex RM explanation of SMO evolution. By focusing on historical shifts in class relations, Tilly concentrates on conflicts over power and the differential ability of groups to mobilize resources in their search for power. For Tilly [1978], the main determinants of a group's mobilization are, "its organization, its interest in possible interactions with other contenders, the current opportunity/threat of those interactions and the group's subjection to repression" [ibid:56]. Tilly [1978:54] defines *interests* as "the shared advantages or disadvantages likely to accrue to the group in question as a consequence of various possible interactions with other groups." *Organization* is "the extent of common identity and unifying structure among the individuals in the group," and as a process "it is an increase in common identity and/or unifying structure (we can call a decline in common identity and/or unifying structure *disorganization*)." *Mobilization* is "the extent of resources under the collective control of the contender," and as a process, it is "an increase in the resources or in the degree of collective control (we can call a decline in either one *demobilization*)." *Collective action* is "the extent of a contender's joint action in pursuit of common ends" and as a process it is "the joint action itself". *Opportunity* describes the relationship between the group's interests and the current state of the world within which it is embedded, and it includes three elements, *power*, which is "the extent to which the outcomes of the population's interactions with other groups favor its interests over those of others; *repression*, which is "the costs of collective action to the contender resulting from interaction with other groups"; and, *opportunity/threat*, which is the

> extent to which other groups, including governments are either (a) vulnerable to new claims which would if successful enhance the contender's realization of its interests or (b) threatening to make claims which would if successful, reduce the contender's realization of its interests [ibid:55].

The focus in Tilly's study is on the strategic dimension of SMOs. Thus, (i) with respect to interests, Tilly gives priority to economic and political life; (ii) with respect to organization, by his own admission, Tilly neglects two types of questions, "how new groups oriented to new world-views come into being, and under what conditions ill-defined sets of people, such as passerby or friendship networks, become important collective action actors" [1978:8]; and, (iii) with respect to mobilization, Tilly stresses, "the factors of production - land, labor, capital, technology", admitting once more his neglect of, "the possibility that attitudes are more important resources for collective action than any of these" [ibid]. Additionally, the Tilly model, given its major contributions to theory, has further limitations: the model lacks allowance for uncertainty and for strategic interaction; and, the model focuses on quantitative rather than qualitative issues. Given these constraints, the Tilly model offers several improvements on the Zald model for conceptualizing the emergence of SMOs, but remains incomplete because of its exclusive focus on instrumental reasons for SMO evolution, including the processes of collective identity formation. For, as Melucci [1985, 1988, 1989] argues, collective identity cannot be assumed to exist prior to mobilization. Rather, it is, "socially constructed and created by the mobilization process" [Jenkins, 1983:549]. Melucci thus offers a set of qualitative analytical tools for understanding the emergence and death of SMOs.

In a further improvement on the RM theoretical perspective, Herman [1993] offers important propositions. In the advanced phases of their life-cycles, social movements gain complex and politically sophisticated features as they undergo expansion and elaboration of the scope of their goals, interests and activities. Changes such as these may be perceived as a shift from spontaneity to pragmatic rationalizations, but they increase the flexibility of the SMO and hence its capacity to respond adequately to various challenges. There are, however, drawbacks to this trajectory. These changes may impair the SMO's internal harmony, as over-flexibility and over-responsiveness to pressures may alienate many of its activists [Herman, 1993; Oliver, 1989]. Also the increased demand for scarce assets and

energies due to expansion may cause wastage and ruin. Once more, though, the emphasis is on strategic rationality, although attention is given to processes of collective identity formation and fragmentation. However, this advanced model still excludes historical and cultural forces as explaining some of the sources of variance in the evolving trajectory of SMOs.

1.2 Institutional theories

Institutional theories [Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Thomas et al., 1987; Meyer and Scott, 1992, DiMaggio and Powell, 1983] have been applied to and tested in social movement research [McCarthy et al. 1991]. Social and cultural pressures, or rationalized myths, account for structural and functional isomorphism among organizations. Whereas most social theory assumes actors - from the level of individuals to states - and their actions as real, *a priori*, elements of modern social processes and institutional forms, the institutional model sees existence and characteristics of actors as "socially constructed and highly problematic" [Thomas, et.al.1987:13]. Acknowledging the impact of Berger and Luckman [1966], institutional models see action as "the enactment of broad institutional scripts," rather than as "internally generated and autonomous choice, motivation, and purpose" [Thomas, et al.: ibid]. Action arises from the enactment of socially constructed recipes or prescriptions, rather than from habits or customs. Organizations such as the state emerges within a "world institutional order" which "is an accounting structure or an ontology that comprises a set of taken-for-granted rules and conventions that constitute the institutional environment for international discourse and nation-state development" [Thomas, et.al. ibid: 39]. The world polity which has "developed out of a peculiar rationalization of Western society", is the "cultural and institutional environment" of the state, from where scripts or recipes are selected and enacted by the state [Thomas, et.al., ibid: 40].

Institutional theorists point to the extraordinary expansion of educational systems as well as the degree of convergence in organizational structure and ideological charters (across nation-states) of these systems throughout the world after World War II. These factors, institutional theorists argue, cannot be accounted for by "standard comparative education discussions that treat national systems as essentially autonomous units developing

in accordance with endogenous social, political, and economic forces" [Ramirez and Boli, 1987: 150]. This perspective also suggests that while early adoption of innovations within a population of organizations can be predicted based upon rational or technical considerations, over time, these considerations account for less of the adoption of the innovation within that population of organizations [Tolbert and Zucker, 1983].

Specific empirical evidence from this theory suggests that channeling mechanisms such as national or federal tax laws and policies governing nonprofit and non-government organizations, the mobilization of resources and the employment of modern communication techniques create a powerful external impetus for structural isomorphism among social movement organizations. Studies of the Nuclear Freeze Movement [Meyer, D, 1993], the women's movement [Freemen, 1975], poor people's movements [Piven and Cloward, 1979] and the civil rights movement [McAdam, 1982] in the United States of America show SMO institutionalization and decline characterized by fragmentation of political action accompanied by the institutionalization of part of the coalition. The development and decline of SMOs reflect both the explicit goals and strategies as well as the institutional structure of U.S. politics [Meyer, D, 1993]. The relevance of these ideas to the South African case studies will be conceptually unpacked later in this study.

Tilly [1978: 114] draws attention to the "channeling" of collective action by governments in the 19th century preference of political elites for mutual-aid societies over trade unions: "Western governments generally discouraged the banding together of workers who sought to control production. They diverted workers into presumably safer organizations oriented to consumption. The tactic worked in the short run; until they became legal, trade unions attracted few members.... In the longer run, however, they became the nuclei of action against employers and against the state". Similar channeling mechanisms with similar intent can be enumerated for South Africa, where the apartheid government (until the 1970s) sought to channel black workers into the preferred liaison committees rather than trade unions in order to have "less disruptive" and pliant worker's committees which accept the legislative criminalization of the right to strike. Also in the political sphere, Blacks were provided with racially divided political institutions at national and local levels to channel and deflect black political collective action and mobilization into

these powerless and ineffective institutions. For example, at national level and following the removal of the limited franchise from Blacks, the first generation of these political institutions included the Native Representative Council, the Coloured Persons Representative Council and the South African Indian Representative Council, all created in South Africa's turbulent 1940s and 1950s. These were followed more recently (1983) by the establishment of the Coloured House of Representatives and the Indian House of Delegates as parallel structures to the legislatures created for the ten African Homelands, all under the "guidance" and control of the White House of Parliament. Through the creation of these political institutions, black political and social movement organizations' projects of change were thus to be channeled through this elaborate system of legislative and political structures.

Like the RM theories though, institutional theories fail to take fully into account processes of identity formation and the underlying consciousness of participants and hence reify structure at the expense of actors. These theories also largely underrate the prior historical and cultural forces in the generation of social movements and SMOs. At the risk of repetition, but for emphasis, this thesis will foreground the voluntarist nature of SMO agendas for change.

1.3 Social constructionist and collective identity theories: The social construction of protest

Social movement organizations and actors are actively involved in the production and maintenance of meaning for membership, supporters, opponents and observers. Such collective beliefs and the way they are formed and transformed are "at the core of the social construction of protest" [Klandermans, 1992: 99]. The production and maintenance of meaning may involve the "amplification and extension of extant meanings, the transformation of old meanings, and the generation of new meanings" [Snow, et al., 1986]. SMOs thus function "in part as signifying agents that often are deeply embroiled, along with the media, local governments, and the state, in what has been called the 'politics of signification'" [Snow and Benford, 1992]. But, additionally for SMOs, the media, local governments and the state are key sources and locations for the production, generation and articulation of meaning. Klandermans [ibid: 78-81] identifies five frameworks - four of

which are of significance here - that social movement scholars have developed for the analysis of the social construction of protest.

McAdam [1982] sees shifting political conditions as a crucial impetus to the process of *cognitive liberation* that signifies the transformation of consciousness among potential participants in collective action. Cognitive liberation is a change in consciousness in three ways: "(1) the system loses legitimacy, (2) people who are ordinarily fatalistic begin to demand change, and (3) they develop a new sense of political efficacy" [Klandermans, ibid: 79].

For Gamson [1989], the mass media is of crucial importance for the mobilization of social movements; and in modern society, the mass media plays such a crucial role that it becomes a center for the symbolic struggle over meaning and interpretation. Examination and analysis of media discourses over time thus becomes a vital source for tracking the political themes in a society. SMOs also contribute to the *public discourse as sponsors of ideological packages* and as organizers of collective action in support of these packages they influence the discussion in the media.

For Snow and his colleagues [1986] SMOs frame relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, acquire bystander support and demobilize antagonists. In modern societies SMOs act as carriers and transmitters of alternative social meanings, and are actively engaged in the production of new meanings for participants, antagonists and observers [Snow and Benford, 1988]. *Framing* thus refers to a schema that simplifies and condenses the world by selectively "punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one's present or past environment" [Snow and Benford, 1992]. But, Snow and Benford [1992] aver that *collective action frames* - the product of the framing activity - also function at the same time as modes of attribution and articulation, enabling activists to articulate and align a vast array of events and experiences so that they hang together in a relatively unified and meaningful fashion. Thus SMO activists employ collective action frames to (i) punctuate or single out some existing social condition or aspect of life and define it as unjust, intolerable, and deserving corrective action, (ii) identify the problem and develop measures to resolve this, and (iii) weave together encoded and punctuated threads

of information in such a manner that what was previously inconceivable, is now meaningfully interconnected [Snow and Benford, ibid].

Melucci [1985, 1988, 1989] argues that social movements are themselves social constructions, and collective action is a process through which actors produce meanings, communicate, negotiate, and make decisions. A fundamental task facing groups of participants that constitute a social movement is the formation of *collective identity*. To achieve this, a group must define itself as a group, and its members must developed shared views of the social movements, shared goals, and shared opinions about the possibilities and limits of collective action.

To supplement Klandermans' categories, Touraine holds that SMOs and actors are actively engaged in a *struggle over historicity*, that is, over who controls the political cultural model upon which action is based [Touraine, 1988:x. See also Williams, 1977, 1982]. For Touraine, social action should thus be investigated not as modes by which the cultural model reproduces itself in social situations and is internalized by social actors, but as the product of struggle over historicity. Actors are knowledgeable and reflexive [Giddens, 1984] although bounded somewhat by: the situated nature of action, the difficulty of articulating tacit knowledge, unconscious sources of motivation, and unintended consequences of action [Giddens, 1979]. And, the production and reproduction of culture and of cultural forms is creative, dynamic and lived rather than predictable, passive and compliant [Willis, 1977].

However, grassroots organizations do not exist in isolation, and every organization can be conceptualized as embedded in a *multi-organizational field* comprising the total possible number of organizations with which an organization may have links [Curtis and Zurcher, 1973; Klandermans, 1992]. Links may be both supportive, giving rise to an organization alliance system, or conflictual, giving rise to an organization conflict system. Whereas an organization alliance system provides resources and creates political opportunities, conflict systems drain resources and restrict opportunities [Klandermans and Olivier, 1995]. By embedding SMOs in multi-organizational fields, movements are conceived of as much more dynamic than "the self-contained phenomena that appears in earlier studies" [Klandermans, 1992: 99]. Moreover, factors such "as the relationship

between an organization and its opponents, the presence of countermovements, the formation of coalitions, the movement's relationship with sympathetic and oppositional political parties, and its relationship with the mass media all shape the field of tension in which social movement organizations develop, change, and decline" [Klandermans, ibid]. It is within the context of a community's multi-organizational field that the social construction of protest takes place, that grievances are interpreted, means and opportunities defined, opponents appointed, strategies chosen and justified, and outcomes evaluated [Klandermans, ibid].

Drawing now on Snow and Benford, Klandermans' multi-organizational field can be expanded to incorporate the notion *master frame.* Collective action frames can sometimes function as "master algorithms that color and constrain the orientations and activities of other movements associated with it ecologically and temporally" [Snow and Benford, 1992: 138]. But, SMOs that emerge early in a cycle of protest are likely to function as "progenitors of master frames that provide the ideational and interpretive anchoring for subsequent movements within the cycle" [ibid: 144]. Similarly, SMOs that emerge later in the cycle will typically find their framing efforts constrained by the previously elaborated master frame [ibid: 145]. But master frames can also emanate from non-domestic movement organizations, such as international supporter organizations, governments and international organizations, which are sources of SMO change that are also the subject of this research.

Ideology, and the role of SMOs and actors as producers and reproducers thereof, thus figure very prominently in the conception and analyses that accompany this research. It is because of the primacy of SMOs in this process - the production and reproduction of ideology - that the research seeks to explore and understand the shifts in SMO collective identity. Moreover, the model developed here provides, like that of Snow and Benford [1992], the conceptual tools for a systematic examination of the relationship between *existing ideologies and challenges to them*, and their dialectical relationship in a manner consistent with Gramsci [1971, 1977a, 1977b, 1988] who regards ideational factors as important variables in the collective action dynamic.

The contribution of this set of theories to this research is significant. Concurring with Benford and Snow [1992], this study holds the view that purely structural explanations are not sufficient in accounting for periodic shifts in the level of SMO activity, a key subject of this study. This is because SMOs and citizens at times fail to act collectively on their shared grievances even when structural conditions are otherwise ripe. Moreover, purely structural explanations ignore non-material inducements which bind SMOs, their members and supporters. Indeed, as Lewis Coser points out, many movement participants do so at great sacrifice because "they draw sustenance not from the enhancement of present satisfaction but from a long-term time perspective sustained by the firm belief in the coming of a society embodying justice and democratic equality instead of the here and now of exploitation and denial of human dignity" [quoted in Morris and Mueller, 1992: x].

1.4 Restatement

The central thesis advanced in this study is that whilst the emerging or prevailing social, economic, political and cultural context within which SMOs are embedded may shape and color the scope of their goals, tactics and structure (i.e. their collective identity), it is expected that change is adopted by SMOs as conscious, rather than ritualistic actions and that these decisions are shaped and colored by SMO history, collective identity, its multi-organizational field, social justice *and* resource constraints. These decisions, it is argued, are arrived at through the active participation of members and supporters, and may involve conflict among those members favoring and those opposing change. Further, SMOs which do not or cannot make this transition will experience a decline in their legitimacy and resources, and they will have a less (direct) influence on the emerging polity which may cause them to adopt more aggressive and destabilizing actions, which in turn can have a major direct effect on the reconstitution of the polity. Fundamental macro-societal transitions thus bring into sharp focus SMO projects of change and ideology on the one hand, and emerging and new resource patterns and mobilizing opportunities, on the other. In the final analysis, residual and emergent ideological practices of SMOs are powerfully influenced by a set of complex - but contested - environmental issues and an equally contested set of shared grievances that drive their projects of social change.

2. Research methodology

The period of negotiating a democratic constitution for South Africa and the subsequent first national elections of April 1994 have triggered dramatic changes in the political-cultural environment of traditional anti-apartheid social movement organizations (SMOs). This research project seeks to analyze how and why SMOs respond to these changes. Whilst several sources and implications for change can be described, this study specifies the impact of four sources of change in these political-cultural patterns which have direct implications for the trajectory of education SMOs. These are the re-emergence and rise of the national liberation movements, shifting regimes of national collective action, multi-organizational fields and the changing focus of international support. Whilst previous work have drawn attention to the political-cultural models dominating education policy - such as a "discipline-centered" curriculum [Apple, 1978: 367], the legitimation of experts and top-down, technocratic education systems [Young, 1971], and a culture of the inevitability of incremental change [Bowles and Gintis, 1976:127] - these studies have addressed these issues as outcomes. In this research I identify *the evolution of political cultural processes*, processes that are subject to contestation and challenge.

2.1 Conceptualizing the Research Problem

SMOs emerge in order to advance projects of social change. To this end, they develop goals, tactics, organizational forms and practices. These goals, tactics, forms and organizational practices also constitute their collective identity. The model advanced here proposes that environmental and endogenous SMO organizational factors interact to color and shape patterns of SMO change. While dramatic change in the political-cultural environment of SMOs may cause them to review their collective identity, the outcome of this process of review is not sufficiently well predicted by relying only on exogenous explanations. Thus, it is argued here that, on the one hand, SMO identity is constructed in relation to external organizational determinants (i.e. in the case of South Africa the re-emergence and rise of the national liberation movement, shifting regimes of national collective action, multi-organizational fields and the changing focus of international support) which constitute and construct the political cultural environment of the SMO. On

the other hand, it is argued, SMO identity is constructed in relation to evolving organizational leadership, membership recruitment and staffing characteristics, all defined as endogenous factors. This research project therefore relies on an integrative model to predict SMO behavior. Accordingly, were this model to be put in causal terms, it could be represented as follows:

Diagram. *Conceptual relationship between endogenous and exogenous variables and SMO collective identity.*



In order to conduct this research project, propositions are put forward for predicting SMO behavior in the context of fundamental political-cultural and social change. Studies incorporating RM theory, institutional theories and theories of social constructionism have sought to understand and predict changes in SMO collective identity (i.e. goals or objectives, collective action, membership and leadership, practices and structure). These studies are reviewed and propositions arising from these predicting SMO behavior in the context of fundamental change are put forward as a research agenda. Three categories of propositions constitute the theoretical underpinnings of this study, each of which reflects a dominant organizational response to societal democratization and the transition to an open polity. In the Category I or Type I response organizational routinization and professionalization is the postulated response to the success of SMOs in initiating an open polity and democratization of society. In the Category II or Type II response a decline in organizational mobilization and less use of contentious collective action is the postulated response to the successful incorporation of the interests of SMOs into the emerging social

project of the emerging democratic state. Whereas in a Category III or Type III response an increase in contentious collective action and goal maintenance is the postulated response to unsuccessful mobilization of resources released by the societal transition and their preference for more dramatic collective action and results. These categories are further elaborated below. The cases are then presented in ascending age of the key constituencies which are mobilized as well as ascending age of organizational leadership.

2.2 Propositions[2]

2.2.1 Organizational routinization and professionalization (Type I)

SMO goals have been the unit of analysis in several studies within the RM perspective [Hermann, 1993; Stoecker, 1993; Weitzer, 1991; Piven and Cloward, 1977]. When confronted with changes in their environments induced by political-cultural change or change in the priorities of resource providers, SMOs expand and elaborate the scope of their goals, interests and activities. These steps are necessary for SMOs to be able to sustain their centrality and audience [Hermann, 1993].

In the period 1990-1995, South Africa underwent dramatic political-cultural change to an open polity and democratic society. These changes are expected to affect the goals of those social movement organizations which until then had focused their social projects on opposition to a repressive and authoritarian state and social system. These organizations are more likely to expand and elaborate the scope of their goals, interests and activities in order to sustain their centrality and audience. In particular, it is expected that the shift in the collective action frame, as generated within alliance systems, from opposition to apartheid and repression to policy and programs for reconstruction and development after apartheid would dominate the shift in goals, interests and activities.

However, SMO goals, interests and activities are also likely to be affected by changes in resource mobilization patterns, as resource providers, especially the international

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[2] These propositions are put forward as a guide for the dissertation research project rather than to be tested and then either accepted or rejected. However for the cases selected, those propositions which are clearly confirmed would be indicated as such.

anti-apartheid solidarity movement and international donors shift the focus of their resources from resources for mobilization against apartheid to resources for post-apartheid reconstruction and development. Successful mobilization of these resources by SMOs would require an elaboration and expansion in the goals, interests and activities of SMOs.

- *Proposition 1: SMOs which had maintained an activist, grassroots participatory, open discussion model and which had sought radical change will respond to changes in their environment induced by the opening up of the polity and the democratization of society by (a) expanding the scope of their goals, interests and activities by including a new set of issues that were not previously considered, and (b) elaborating general goals into more specific change goals, objectives and demands.*

In parallel studies, RM theorists have also considered SMO tactics as a unit of analysis [Stoecker, 1993; Barkan, 1979, 1986; Fainstein and Fainstein, 1974; Shlay and Faulkner 1984; Lowe, 1986; Schumacher, 1978; Zald, 1988; Khawaja, 1993; Jasper and Poulsen, 1993]. SMOs need favorable policy decisions and resources from actors in the political opportunity structure, including allies and potential allies, the public, and resource providers [Stoecker, 1993; Barkan, 1979]. Militant tactics such as boycotts, strikes, civil disobedience and the propagation of alternative and parallel programs carry the threat of reprisal and counter-movement actions, making these tactics difficult to mobilize around [Lowe, 1986]. Such tactics may also alienate moderate supporters [Schumacher, 1978] and may raise fears that external support may be withdrawn [Barkan, 1986]. Also, in transition societies collective action frames generated within alliance systems are more likely to favor reconstruction and development of society over oppositional tactics. This further increases the pressure for a shift from militant tactics to collaboration with the emergent state in the transformation of society within a new set of rules.

Membership recruitment has typically been a unit of analysis in the RM perspective [Cohn, et al., 1993; Klandermans, 1993; Olson, 1965; Piven and Cloward, 1979; McAdam, 1982; Williams, 1985; Wandersman et al., 1987]. Particularly when SMOs experience partial response to their goals (or objectives), or "high-risk" activities, such as contentious collective actions are pursued, support and commitment wanes. However, social or

ideological incentives promote greater commitment from central activists, although internal difference may then disrupt SMO unity as some members may consider SMO goals to have been reached whereas other may dispute these [Hermann, 1993].

Organizational structure and practices have been the unit of analysis in several RM theory based research [Stoecker, 1993; Zald, 1988; Weitzer, 1991; Valochi, 1993; Weed, 1989; Perucci and Lewis, 1989]. Studies in this tradition focused on the routinization of charisma [Weber, 1946, 1947] and goal displacement and oligarchization of SMOs [Michels, 1962; Cousineau, 1987; Shavelson, 1989]. Later studies suggest that centralized bureaucratic organizational structures are more efficient [Gamson, 1975] and stabilize relations with establishment groups [Jenkins, 1985]. Other studies however suggest that this organizational form may hinder tactical flexibility [Staggenborg, 1988], that decentralized organizations mobilize membership more effectively [Zald and Ash, 1966] and promote strategic innovation and diversity. In this study the focus is also on the type of organization from those representing a distinct interest in civil society to those with a more expanded and ambitious agenda, and those which mobilize a single constituency to those which mobilize more diverse constituencies. Moreover, divergent interests which are successfully organized under conditions of repression are less likely to be successfully organized when repression fades and the common social project, opposition to repression declines.

In the period 1990-1995, South Africa underwent dramatic political-cultural change to an open polity and democratic society. These changes are expected to affect the tactics, programs, membership recruitment practices and organizational structure of those social movement organizations which until then had mobilized around militant tactics such as boycotts, civil disobedience and the propagation of alternative and parallel programs to a repressive and authoritarian state. Similarly, membership recruitment and organizational structure are also likely to undergo change. These organizations, which had been responsible, through their collective action for the transition to an open polity and democratic society, are more likely to change their tactics to less disruptive and non-contentious actions, including the lobbying of the emerging democratic state and participation in state structures. At the same time, membership recruitment and

organizational structure may have to deal with differences among members who feel that participation in the polity is warranted and those who seek to pursue more radical goals.

SMO tactics, programs, membership recruitment practices and organizational structure are also likely to be affected by changes in resource mobilization patterns, as resource providers, especially the international anti-apartheid solidarity movement and donors shift the focus of their resources from resources against apartheid to resources for reconstruction and development after apartheid. Additionally, the opening up of the polity and the democratization of society would increase the expectation of accountability for resources allocated to SMOs. This is because state repression makes accounting for resources allocated difficult as organizational leaders are required to operate clandestinely and would find that transparent accounting for resources increased the risk of detection by vigilant state security forces. Successful mobilization of these resources by SMOs and managing and accounting for them would in the context of an opening up of the state and the democratization of society require a shift in their organizational structure and culture. These social movement organizations are more likely to undergo a shift from a more grassroots, participatory model to a routinized and professional organizational model.

- *Proposition 2: SMOs which in their emergent phase had adhered to an activist, grassroots, participatory, open discussion model and which had sought radical change, will respond to the opening of the polity and the democratization of society by undergoing processes of routinization and professionalization.*

- *Proposition 3: SMOs which represent a distinct interest rather than diverse interests in civil society are more likely to endure changes in their environment induced by an opening of the polity and the democratization of society.*

- *Proposition 4: SMOs with a more specific and focused agenda rather than a more ambitious and expansive agenda in civil society are more likely to endure changes in their environment induced by an opening of the polity and the democratization of society.*

2.2.2 Decline in mobilization and in use of contentious collective action (Type II)

Studies of corporate identities [Hunt, 1991, 1992; Taylor and Whittier, 1992] in SMOs have built on the theoretical work of Melucci [1988, 1989] and other New Social Movement scholars. These studies focus on SMOs and the construction of meaning, and seek to examine empirically how collective identities are constructed in the course of participation. Earlier interpretive scholars [Bittner, 1965; Zimmerman, 1970; Sudnow, 1965; Emerson, 1970] have tended to neglect the historical, cultural and structural context in which movement construction of reality occurs [Burrell and Morgan, 1985; Benford, 1993] or have simply specified macro background factors to account for the heightened sense of urgency and pessimism represented in the vocabularies of SMOs [Mills, 1940; Habermas,1987]. Later studies focus on the development of group solidarity, esprit de corps and collective character [Hunt, 1991, 1992] which, it is argued may account for how SMOs overcome structural impediments [Gamson and Meyer, 1992; Benford, 1993] arising from the new mix of resources. Recent studies have also sought to combine interpretive theories with RM theories [Benford, 1993].

To restate an earlier point, SMOs emerge in order to bring about change in their political-cultural and actual existing environments, and hence SMOs consider changes in the direction of their goals (or objectives) as victories. These changes have less direct implications for SMO goals than for SMO tactics, practices and structures, although even these tactical, practice and structural changes may generate a new SMO identity. The study argues that whereas the exogenous frame now may favor and reward alternative goals, tactics, practices and structures, SMOs may overcome this transition through modifying their tactics, practices and structures rather than their goals. Further, these changes may be more the outcome of changes in the political-cultural and institutional environment than the outcome of consciously adopted strategies. Change, it is thus argued, is not discussed within SMOs because of its potential influence on SMO identity, but rather because the rewards incumbent on change will facilitate a deepening of the struggle. A South African example may be instructive: the negotiated transition which created a Government of National Unity and the Interim Constitution placed limitations on the competence of the national liberation movement to bring about radical change in the country's social

organization. SMOs which constitute that national liberation movement may argue that despite these limitations, the creation of an expanded democracy that incorporated the previously disenfranchised, and the new culture of human rights ignited by the Interim Constitution, provide a sufficient platform from which to pursue radical social change. The short-run sacrifices made in the creation of an apartheid-free South Africa, it may then be argued, are thus insignificant when compared with the more medium-run gains associated with further struggles.

In dealing with the transition this study proposes that SMOs develop new commitments among members and supporters. These new commitments are consolidated and a revitalized or new collective identity is developed around the following themes: "modified tactics, forms and structures are necessary to continue and deepen the struggle for democracy, equality and real change in 'actually existing' conditions", rather than "modified tactics, forms and structures are necessary because of the constraints imposed by the political-cultural and political-opportunity structures."[3] SMO activity may thus increase and reflect new forms of tactics, organizational structures and practices, rather than decline during the immediate post-transition period. However, in the transition the emerging democratic state is likely to play a leading and dominant role in the transformation of the political structures, the economy and social relations of society. SMOs are also more likely to experience a loss of leadership and activists to the emerging democratic state. Issues, demands and social projects are now transferred to the state in the form of programs of societal transformation. It is these elements of identity of the SMOs which are taken up in the project of the emerging democratic state and it is in this manner, through the transfer of goals, demands and social projects to the state, that the SMOs contribute to the construction of the identity of the emerging democratic state.

- *Proposition 5: SMOs which in their emergent phase had adhered to an activist, grassroots participatory, open discussion model and which had sought radical change will change their goals to participation in the polity and the achievement of incremental*

[3] For a recent study which reaches this finding see Roberts [1992].

rather than radical change in response to changes in their environment induced by an opening of the polity and the democratization of society.

- *Proposition 6: SMOs which in their emergent phase had engaged in contentious tactics and practices that were oppositional and mass-based will change their tactics and practices to non-disruptive and non-contentious policy and program development in response to changes in their environment induced by an opening of the polity and the democratization of society.*

- *Proposition 7: SMOs will experience a decline in mobilization in response to changes in their environment induced by an opening up of the polity and the democratization of society.*

2.2.3 The special case SMOs: More contentious collective action and goal maintenance (Type III)

A considerable number of empirical studies have drawn attention to the role of students and youths in SMOs. The impact of the role of students and youths in SMOs located on the left of the ideological continuum is particularly dramatic in South Africa. Ever since the formation of the ANC Youth League in 1949, and more recently since the 1976 Soweto uprising of high school students against Bantu Education with the formation of the Congress of South African Students in 1979 and the South African Youth Congress in the early 1980s, students and youths have taken a leadership role and effected a shift toward the left in anti-apartheid SMOs' goals, tactics and practices. These SMOs then had adopted radicalized programs of action. New leaders replaced those who moved into civic, teacher, faculty and other more established organizations, resulting in the age, level of experience and the political-cultural model of change of the student leadership remaining stable and their revolutionary goals and tactics largely a repetition of those of earlier leaderships. The result is a cohort effect, in which the SMO goals, tactics and practices remain largely intact. Furthermore, SMOs which have a continuous infusion of a young leadership will be less likely to take a universal perspective of social change in which they

analyze the costs and benefits of tactics and practices. They are more likely to be influenced by the actual existing relations and material conditions in their organizational sphere/field, thus resulting in a focus on short rather than medium and long-run social change. Given the necessary short terms of office of leadership and accompanying short terms of membership which are both limited by periods of study, recruitment strategies among high school and university students are more likely to focus on the immediate and tangible within the high school and university environment, as well as the dramatic and visible rather than the longer term social reconstruction of society. Lastly, the high turnover in leadership and membership will paradoxically, lead more to a continuity rather than change in SMO tactics and practices.[4] Were such a perspective to hold, it would provide further evidence negating the traditional view of the long-run tendency of all SMOs to adopt oligarchic practices.

- *Proposition 8: SMOs with transient rather than stable leadership and membership patterns will be less successful in gaining access to changing and expanding resources, which in turn produces less change in SMO goals, tactics and practices.*

- *Proposition 9: SMOs with transient rather than stable leadership and membership patterns will be less successful in gaining access to changing and expanding resources, which in turn leads them to engage in more contentious forms of action.*

To summarize, activist, grassroots participatory and open discussion model SMOs undergo three kinds of organizational transformation which themselves are induced by changes of political regime. SMOs which successfully mobilize the expanding and new resource opportunities created by the change in political regime are likely to experience over

[4] In response to this discussion, Charles Tilly made an important and vital contribution. He argued that SMOs were best understood as operating within a national, macro-societal field, and thus a set of national master frames and multi-organizational fields, and an immediate organizational field. SMOs may thus in the pursuit of their social projects be seen to shift between these two fields depending on variables such as the strength of and solidarity within the macro-societal master frame and multi-organizational fields on the one hand, and the nature of the stakes within the immediate organizational field on the other. It is this analytical tool which may be more critical for understanding the emergent programs and collective action of SMOs, in short their collective identities, than the nature of their leadership patterns as is argued here. International Workshop on Social Movements in South Africa. *Human Sciences Research Council (South Africa)-Kurt Lewin Institute (Netherlands).* University of Natal. Durban. South Africa. March 1996.

time organizational routinization and professionalization. SMOs which acted as quasi-state formations and which mobilized more diverse interests are more likely to experience a transfer of their goals, programs and demands, and even leaders and activists to the new state formation, shifting their orientation to participation in the emerging polity, decreased mobilization and a policy and program orientation. On the other hand SMOs which are unable to mobilize the expanding and new resource opportunities created by the change in political regime are more likely to continue to participate in contentious collective action which are linked to the field or site of mobilization, such as the campuses of universities and schools, rather than linked to national socio-political transformation. These three transformation types are graphically represented in the table below.

Table. Organizational transformation in response to transitions to open polities and democratization processes.

TypeI. Organizational routinization and professionalization	i) expansion and elaboration in scope of goals ii) more specific goals, objectives, demands iii) new organizational structure and culture
TypeII. Decline in mobilization and in use of contentious collective action	i) participation in new polity ii) incremental pursuit of goals iii)program and policy orientation iv)decline in activity, collective action v) losses of leaders and activists to new state
TypeIII. More contentious collective action and goal maintenance	i) poor linkages with new resources ii) more dramatic collective action iii) localized or SMO field-based

3. The research problem and setting

Four dominant and external events, three of which are interlinked, influence the evolution and trajectory of SMOs in South Africa. These are, firstly, the re-emergence and rise of the national liberation movement from banishment and exile after 1990. Second and thirdly, and interlinked with the first, are changes in multi-organizational fields and shifts in the master frames of collective action. And, lastly is the changing focus of international support and aid. The effects of selected endogenous organizational determinants on the trajectory of SMOs are also studied.

3.1 Re-Emergence and Rise of the National Liberation Movements

The re-emergence of the national liberation movements in South Africa in 1990 as legal entities that mobilized support affected the evolution and trajectory of SMOs. Whereas until this occurrence, a broad united front of organizations had made the internal

liberation movement possible, the rise of the formerly banished, but externally based liberation movements dramatically narrowed the political space and mobilizing opportunities for SMOs. The effect on the legitimacy and mobilizing capacity of SMOs was constricting and dramatic, especially from 1992 onwards, and occurred both directly and indirectly.

Directly, this occurred through the transfer of leadership of the internal movement from SMOs to the liberation movements, which in turn assumed this leadership role without any debate over its correctness or otherwise. Specifically, the closure of the internal liberation movement's national front, the United Democratic Front (UDF) signaled the assumption of leadership of the internal liberation movement by the African National Congress (ANC). But, leadership transfers from the SMOs to the liberation movements, as well as the sharing of leadership between SMOs and the liberation movements were additional factors that framed the subsequent trajectory of SMOs.

Indirectly, SMO evolution was shaped and colored by the focus of the leadership of the liberation movements: their focus on a representative versus a collective and direct democracy; their concern for developing a more narrow set of organizational policies aimed at capturing state power and preparing itself for governing a South Africa after apartheid; and their concern for winning the widest support even beyond its traditional support base in preparation for the first democratic elections. In opposition to this narrowing of the mobilizing space for SMOs, and parallel to the collapse of statist regimes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, a debate evolved in South Africa on the future role of civil society-based SMOs. The early phase of the 1990s saw the trajectory of SMOs framed by an optimism for a symbiotic form of civil society-state relations: there were few doubts about the need for and role of SMOs after the country's first democratic elections.

3.2 Shifting Regimes of Collective Action

The lengthy process of negotiating a political settlement (1990-93) that ultimately led to the establishment of a special, but limited form of democracy in South Africa, and that resulted in the first open and democratic elections there in April of 1994, changed the resource and mobilizing possibilities of SMOs. Earlier periods were, for these SMOs,

marked by insurrection, civil disobedience and ungovernability (1984-85), a commitment to replacing state power with people's power (1986-87), a move to underground and clandestine action in the face of a National State of Emergency (1988-89), and a resurgent civil disobedience program (1989-90). The negotiations period itself was not continuous, and was comprised of moments of rolling mass action (1992) to unblock the negotiations deadlock, a peace movement (1993-94) to negate state, para-state and counter-state violence, and an elections campaign and the development of a program for reconstruction and development after apartheid (1993-94). The development of the program for reconstruction and development was the extension of an earlier developmental frame that was initiated in 1991. In this frame, SMOs and the liberation movements were expected to undergo a shift from a resistance and an anti-apartheid frame to a development of policy and programs frame in preparation for assuming a governmental role as opposed to an oppositional one. These different frames, some super-imposed on each other, all directly and dramatically shaped and colored the evolving collective identity of SMOs, through the opportunities and constraints that they provided.[5]

3.3 Multi-organizational Fields

Grassroots organizations do not exist in isolation. Rather, they can be conceptualized as embedded in multi-organizational fields. Multi-organizational fields can be defined as the total possible number of organizations with which a grassroots organization might establish particular links. Multi-organizational fields have framed the evolving trajectory of leading SMOs in South Africa in the modern period, more so from the time of the establishment of a national anti-apartheid front (the United Democratic Front) to oppose the Second Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (of 1983). Both the support mechanisms within alliance systems and competitive relationships within conflict systems have been crucial in the evolution of South African anti-apartheid SMOs. Moreover, collective action frames or master frames have been created and developed within multi-organizational fields. Whereas in the early period of this study, lead

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[5] The assumption in this research is that collective action frames are actively created. Hence, internal SMOs actively created the new and emerging frame in collaboration with the emerging national liberation movements.

organizations were the United Democratic Front (UDF), the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the then banned African National Congress (ANC); that picture had changed in 1990, with the re-emergence and rise of the unbanned ANC inside the country. Despite the formation of a Tri-partite Alliance involving the ANC, COSATU and the SACP, at this time, the ANC assumed a leading role, and set collective action or master frames for the rest of the organizations in its wider alliance system to follow.

3.4 Changes in the Focus of International Support

The shift from the initial commitments of the international community and its subsequent visible and large-scale ethical support for the movement for democracy in South Africa are characterized by three transitions.[6] In the initial phase (1960s-1990), international support was marked by a dual focus of support for humanitarianism and support for democracy that backed the creation and expansion of anti-apartheid SMOs. In the second phase (1990-1994), international support focused on support for institution building and for the establishment of development projects. In the current phase (from April 1994 onward), international support is focused on support for the new government's Reconstruction and Development Program, at least initially at the cost of support for SMOs and NGOs.

3.5 Endogenous Organizational Determinants

There are also internal organizational factors that shape and color the evolution and trajectory of SMOs. These include evolving organizational leadership, membership - whether individual or organizational (as in the case of coalition organizations) - recruitment and staffing characteristics.

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[6] The research understands that there are differences across providers of support in terms of their political and ideological intentions, program focus, commitments to political and social movement organizations and scale of support. This is illustrated in the differences across the Anti-Apartheid Movement and national governments and their development agencies. But also, in the case of national governments and their development agencies, differences are discernible. This however does not negate the finding of this research of the transitions in shape and color of international support. The implementation of the transitions identified here may however be more or less tightly linked to support or development aid for a particular organization or institution.

3.6 Collective identity as ideology

Having specified these layers of interacting external and internal organizational determinants, the study examines the evolving collective identity of four SA anti-apartheid education SMOs. In this regard, the study understands collective identity to be emergent and dynamic, and to comprise the (1) ideology, (2) goals arising therefrom, (3) programs and campaigns to implement organizational goals, and (4) forms of political action to advance organizational goals.

This study thus poses the questions: How do SMOs transit through this path of continuous and fundamental change? More specifically, do they routinize and become oligarchic in their later phases in contrast to their genesis as mass- and grassroots-based? Do they shift to an incrementalism in contrast to their emergence when they were committed to dramatic and radical societal change? Do their forms of collective action to reach their goals shift from militant, forceful and even violent, to the peaceful pursuit thereof? Are their trajectories at any moment or throughout the period of the study dominated by any of the several sources of organizational change to be studied here? And, why do they take the path that they do - postulated here to be characterized by less opposition and an institutionalizing role - especially taking into consideration their earlier role in changing public policy through practice, and in shaping and constructing an alternative public policy domain? And what are the implications thereof for democratization? Will these movements be subsumed by the dominant culture, linger on and die, leaving the new state as the only actor responsible for deepening democracy?

The issues raised in and by this dissertation have important implications for our understanding of how SMOs evolve in their later phases and for our body of knowledge of the role of SMOs in shaping transitions, and of how transitions shape SMOs. But, additionally, the dissertation has important implications for our knowledge of processes of democratization and the construction of a civil society and state. The dissertation will contribute to the study of these processes by providing actual accounts of SMO evolution, and their relationship to societal change and democratization.

4. Research Design and Data Collection

4.1 A Case Study Research Design

Using the case study research design, data was collected on four SMOs in the education sector, The case study is the preferred research strategy for answering "how" and "why" questions, which are intended to explain events and their "operational links" [Yin, 1989: 18]. Such questions need tracking over time, rather than the measurement of frequencies or incidence. The case study is ideally suited for this research because as an empirical inquiry, it, "investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used" [ibid:23]. Further, the case study is preferred for examining contemporary events when relevant behavior cannot be manipulated such as in an experimental or quasi-experimental research design. In addition to relying on historical events/data as sources of evidence, the case study also draws evidence from direct and participant observation, systematic interviewing, archival records, physical artifacts and documentation.

To ensure that a concern for construct validity and reliability is maintained during the data collection process, three principles offered by Yin were adopted [Yin, ibid: 103]. Firstly, multiple sources of evidence were used with the intention of facilitating the possible convergence on the same set of findings. Secondly, a case study data base - which is a formal assembly of evidence - was created, which is separate from the final case study report. Thirdly, a chain of evidence was used, which explicitly links the questions asked, the data collected, and the conclusions drawn.

Data was collected by triangulation, as "no single method ever adequately solves the problem of rival interpretive, causal factors" [Denzin, 1989: 25]. However, the value of triangulation here is "not as a technological solution to a data collection and analysis problem", but "as a technique which provides more and better evidence from which researchers can construct meaningful propositions about the social world" [Mathison, 1988:15]. But, as Mathison [ibid] argues, "whether the data converges, are inconsistent, or

are contradictory, the researcher must attempt to construct explanations for the data and about the data."

The methods of data collection were direct and participant observation, the unstructured schedule interview, a collection of evidence from SMO documents, and the collection and establishment of a data base of media reports over the study period.

4.1.1 Direct observation

Using the technique of direct observation I was able to make field visits to the case study sites, such as SMO offices and meeting places. Additionally I directly observed evolving SMO responses to (i) the publication of the annual school leaving and university entrance (matriculation) results (December, 1994 through January, 1995) which has until now been a controversial issue given the historically low success rates among black candidates; (ii) the opening of schools and institutions of higher education (January, 1995 through March, 1995) which has always been a fertile period for SMO campaigns directed at improved facilities, access, democratic governance and increased state funding for black education/students; and, (iii) the annual celebration (1994) of the June 16, 1976 student uprising against Bantu Education, which until now has been marked by national school boycotts and student campaigns for equality and democracy in education.

4.1.2 Participant observation

As a participant observer I participated in the activities and meetings of these SMOs, with the exception of SADTU. Detailed field notes were taken, recorded and coded fully within 24 hours after participation. The intent was to collect evidence on members' and leaders' *in situ* discussions and decision-making on SMO goals, practices and tactics. Participant observation's strengths lies in the investigator's ability to "gain access to events or groups that are otherwise inaccessible to scientific investigation. ...the ability to perceive reality from the viewpoint of someone 'inside' the case study rather than external to it" [Yin, 1989: 91]. Thus, whereas the use of documents and interviews all assume a passive investigator, participant observation allows the investigator the opportunity to manipulate events or situations.

The main drawback has to do with the potential bias introduced by the investigator's manipulation of situations or events [ibid]. Participant observation was conducted at the end-point of the research period (1994-95), to determine the initial responses of the SMOs to the release of the government's Draft White Paper on Education, its (Final) White Paper on Education[7], and the events in the specific sub-sectors of education, viz., schooling and higher education, as well as teaching.

4.1.3 Formal intensive interviews

Formal intensive interviews were conducted with core activists of the national and regional chapters of the SMOs who represent different time periods in the evolution of the SMOs. While the same information was desired from each respondent, the particular phrasing of the questions and their order were redefined to fit the characteristics of each respondent. This method was preferred as it reflects an awareness that individuals have unique ways of defining their world [Denzin, ibid:105].

Problems arising from bias, poor recall or inaccurate articulation were experienced, for which a sound approach is to support interview data with information from other sources [Yin, ibid: 91]. A total of 46 formal intensive interviews of 2 hours duration each were conducted with SMO leaders in South Africa for the specific purpose of this study during the period November, 1994 through March, 1995. Additionally, 26 formal intensive interviews and 5 focused group discussions were conducted for a project closely related to this study during the period May, 1994 through July, 1994.[8]

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[7] Like its predecessor, the (Final) White Paper on Education represents the first steps of restructuring of education in South Africa. The policy proposals also "address the areas which require urgent direction as the new government seeks to transform the fragmented and ethnically-based system into a non-racial system of education and training." Additionally, the policy proposals set out in the document are directed at "initiating fundamental change in the character and content" of the education and training system [Education and Training in a democratic South Africa. First steps to develop a new system. Department of Education. Pretoria. February 1995.].

[8] This project involved reviewing Swedish support to the education of South Africans, and recommending guidelines for future Swedish involvement in South African education after the country's first democratic elections. Samoff, Joel. After Apartheid, What? A Review of Externally Initiated, Commissioned, and Supported Studies of Education in South Africa, *(Paris: Donors to African Education and UNESCO, Division for Policy and Sector Analysis, May, 1994). Samoff, J., Z. Groener., and I. Rensburg.* Anti-Apartheid and Development. *A Review of Swedish Support to the Education of South Africans. Prepared for the Education Division, Swedish International Development Authority. 21 September 1993. Samoff, J., Z.*

4.1.4 Organizational documents

SMO-generated documents and artifacts (policy documents, goal statements, project proposals, conference documents, minutes of key policy meetings, memos, newsletters, fliers, speeches, press releases, T-shirts, billboard posters, pamphlets) were collected, coded and analyzed with the purpose of corroborating and augmenting evidence from the other sources [Yin, ibid: 86]. Where there are contradictions, these are clarified through the use of other sources.

The goal of using SMO documents was to collect evidence on SMO ideology, goals, tactics and practices. Document analysis was also used to identify key decision-making moments, such as decisions to change SMO ideology, goals, tactics and practices, and to identify in the discourses, membership and leadership motivations for and representations of these decisions.

Over-reliance on documents can though affect the validity of the research, as documents such as project proposals may not contain the "unmitigated truth" [Yin, ibid: 87]. Clearly documents are written for specific purposes and audiences other than the case study investigation, and my responsibility was to take due care in the reading, interpretation and analysis of documentary evidence.

4.1.5 Mass media accounts

A final source of evidence involved the collection of mass media productions pertaining to the shifting political and social issues, and instances and changes in forms and

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Groener., and I. Rensburg. Anti-Apartheid and Development. Interim Recommendations. *A Review of Swedish Support to the Education of South Africans. Prepared for the Education Division, Swedish International Development Authority. 27 January 1994. Samoff, J., Z. Groener., and I. Rensburg.* Anti-Apartheid and Development. *A Review of Swedish Support to the Education of South Africans 1994. Prepared for the Education Division, Swedish International Development Authority. 28 January 1994. Samoff, Joel, Zelda Groener, and Ihron Rensburg.* "Anti-Apartheid and Development: Education in South Africa," *San Diego: Comparative and International Education Society Annual Conference, March, 1994. Samoff, J., Z Groener & I Rensburg.* Anti-apartheid and Development. Education in South Africa. *Paper presented at the Comparative and International Education Society, 38th Annual Meeting. March 21-24, 1994. San Diego. Samoff, J., Z. Groener., and I. Rensburg.* Contested Transitions. A Review of Swedish Support to the Education of South Africans: Final Report. *1994. Prepared for the Education Division, Swedish International Development Authority. Revised 12 September 1994. Samoff, J., Z. Groener., and I. Rensburg.* Contested Transitions. A Review of Swedish Support to the Education of South Africans: Final Report. *1994. Prepared for the Education Division, Swedish International Development Authority. Revised 28 September 1994.*

goals of collective action of the SMOs in the study. The mass media are also a key institution through which SMOs mobilize public support and insert their collective identities and social projects into the public discourse. As a result, the mass media can be an indispensable source for mapping not only the waxing and waning of SMOs, but also for identifying the shifting collective action frames, and hence the ideology of SMOs [Gamson, 1988].

From this data source, letters to editors, advertisements of the SMOs, editorials and syndicated columns as expressions of opinion, were collected. Apart from its control by a narrow section of the population, the South African mass media has a particular history of restriction by the apartheid state. Consequently, media reports on SMOs on the political left for the period before the liberalization of the mass media (1990 onwards) are thin, and reports since have focused especially on matters that have direct implications for the white sector of the community. Particular care thus had to be exercised in the collection and organization of these accounts (close to 12,000 articles from about 20,000 reviewed). But there were also advantages in that particularly contentious campaigns and forms of collective action by the SMOs on the political left after 1990 were particularly well reported by the mass media.

The study augmented mass media accounts with a review of the student and alternative media, especially for collective social and political action before 1990. This is because that media tended to take greater risks than the mass media in reporting that collective action and in providing detailed accounts of the early emergence and evolution of the student movement. The student media also served as a valuable source for focused interviews they had conducted with SMO leaders at earlier moments of the research period.

4.2 The cases

The four SMOs in the study were selected because of their common social project that was generated within their alliance system in the mid-1980s: a common commitment to the attainment of *People's Education for People's Power* which was an alternative social project to those SMOs which espoused a more radical *Liberation before Education* social project. This common social project of the four SMOs sought to transform both policy and

power relations in education by advocating the return to rather than outright boycott and collapse of the educational institutions of the apartheid state. For this social movement the programs of and power relations within educational institutions had to be transformed alongside the struggle against apartheid and state repression. A key theme that thus underlies this research relates to the genesis, elaboration and survival of this social movement of *People's Education for People's Power.*

To increase the scope of the research, and to introduce variance by education sub-sector, organizational age, organizational material and political resource dependence, membership age and leadership turnover, two schooling sub-sector (one high school student organization, COSAS, and one teacher organization, SADTU), one higher education sub-sector (one student organization, SASCO), and one broad coalition SMO drawing membership from and organizing across the education sector (NECC) were selected. Because the research is limited to a study of the evolving identity of the social movement organizations in the study, at national level, data was collected mainly from national offices and officials.

Additionally, each of the cases were selected in such a manner as to allow for the evaluation of each of the three sets of propositions which underpin this study. To recall, these propositions were organized into three categories, viz., (i) organizational routinization and professionalization, (ii) a decline in ideology, militancy and contentious collective action and for the special case SMOs, (iii) goal maintenance and more contentious collective action.

For the period of the study, 1986-1995, time-linked phases were classified in (i) the re-emergence and rise of the national liberation movement, (ii) the shifting regimes of national collective action (including the evolution of the policies of the apartheid South African government over the study period), (iii) the multi-organizational fields of the social movement organizations, (iv) the transition frames of international support, and (v) the evolution of social movement organization goals, tactics and practices in the study. This methodological device enabled the location of these processes on parallel time lines through which major lines of reciprocal influences between the contextual environment and social movement organization could be established and shown over time. Because these are

overlapping lines of influence, the study does not intend to separate them, but merely to report the lines, direction and effect of reciprocal influence. Given this caution, a similar methodological device is employed to sort out causal influences arising from endogenous organizational determinants.

The study also analyzed organizational documents, searched organizational artifacts and publications and asked specific questions during interviews with organizational members to establish to what extent the social movement organizations in the study had during their emergent/founding or later phases developed any concrete alternatives to apartheid education. In this manner the research would establish whether participation in the development of concrete alternatives makes a difference in how social movement organizations evolve over time.

Much of the data was collected during the period after the country's national elections, representing the advanced stage of political-cultural (environment) change. This was an opportune moment to analyze initial SMO responses. Also, key policy conferences were staged by the SMOs at the end of 1994 to review their achievements, and to chart the way forward for the period, 1995 through 1999. Data for the emergent phase of the SMOs were collected earlier, and are incorporated in this research, but are also reported elsewhere [Rensburg, 1993].

It should also be pointed out that I had played a leadership role in the coalition SMO (the National Education Coordinating Committee, NECC) during its founding phase (1985-1989) and its middle phase (1990-1992) until the beginning of this current research project. I thus played a direct role in establishing and leading the SMO through its emergent and middle phases. This situation provides both opportunity and limitations; opportunity in that I have access to space and relations which otherwise may not have been available, and limitations, in that my interpretation may be biased or partisan. To limit the latter phenomenon, I propose to constitute a South African committee of two or three social movement theorists which would be charged with reading my preliminary findings with the intent of offering alternative explanations and interpretations of the data. Additionally, Van Maanen's [1988: 93-94] advice on what constitutes "a minimally acceptable table of contents for an account of fieldwork" will be closely followed. Such a table includes (i) the

author's pre-understandings; (ii) the author's self-interests in the event/scene; (iii) modes of entry, sustained participation or presence, and exit procedures; (iv) responses of others on the scene to the author's presence (and vice versa); (v) the nature of the author's relationship to various categories of informants; and, (vi) the author's modes of data collection, storage, retrieval and analysis [ibid]. Fieldwork thus begins with the "explicit examination of one's own preconceptions, biases, and motives, moving forward in a dialectic fashion toward understanding by way of a continuous dialogue between the interpreter and interpreted" [Rabinow and Sullivan, 1979]. In this manner, the dictum, "fieldwork is now an interpretive act, not an observational or descriptive one" [Agar, 1986] will be heeded.

5. Limitations of the research

Because the research is limited to a longitudinal analysis of the trajectory of four anti-apartheid education SMOs - and hence loses the variance which a longitudinal cross-societal- sectoral study may introduce - its theoretical contributions and substantive policy implications will be largely informed by the specific contours, material conditions, discourses and social constructions of the education sector. This has clear implications for the generalizability of the results that will emanate from this research. On the other hand, the advantage of a substantive and detailed study of four education SMOs lies in the ability to get beyond analysis and description of broad contours and societal level shifts. Notwithstanding this limitation, I expect to find sufficient variation in these matters across the schooling and higher education sector which are likely to mimic some of the effects which a broader analysis may have elicited. In this regard, a cross-societal-sectoral longitudinal comparative research design would be the ideal, but because of time and resources, it is not attempted here. It is however a task which is important and should be tackled.[9]

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[9] This research is formally part of a larger research project, *Social Movements in South Africa*, that studies social movements, protest events and contention in South Africa during the period of major socio-political transformation there. That project involves three longitudinal studies (1994-1999), *Citizenship in transition* (and is based on public opinion data collected in annual surveys among random samples of the South African population, n=2000), *Grassroots organizations* (based

In this research individual actors are both subjects and informants, thus accounting for individual agency as a factor in the interpretation, enactment and evolution of SMO goals, tactics and practices. Here, though, individual accounts are assumed to be reflective of wider social dynamics and events.

Finally, I want to draw attention to a fundamental assumption implicit in this study. SMOs are engaged in a dialectical process of challenge and constraint by their political-cultural environment. They seek to change it, yet their actions are also determined by it. Because the impact of SMOs on their political-cultural environments is best studied over longer time periods, this issue is beyond the limits of this present study.

6. Significance of the research

This research fills an important void in the research on SMOs. Research on the emergent, middle phases and decline of left SMOs, particularly education SMOs, in post-colonial Africa is virtually non-existent, whereas research on the political left of extra-parliamentary social movement trajectories in the context of large-scale societal change such as is currently experienced in South Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union continues to be rare. Moreover, research which explicitly incorporates a consolidated resource mobilization, institutional, social constructionist, and collective identity approach continues to be uncommon.

But, additionally, the research seeks to understand the evolution of SMOs in relation to the emerging state, as well as the creation of a civil society. Both processes are understood to be vital for the democratization of a society wracked by apartheid and anti-democratic practices. The study hopes therefore to contribute to the strengthening of SMOs, and democracy, by elaborating their organizational determinants and by informing SMO leaders about these. It is because of the primacy of SMOs in this process -

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on interview with key figures of a purposive sample of social and political organizations, n=100), and *Protest events* (involves the establishment of an extensive database on collective action, both peaceful and violent forms of protest in South Africa since 1970). The researcher is also a member of the inter-disciplinary research team that heads this larger research project. [See Klandermans and Olivier, 1995.]

democratization as the production and reproduction of ideology - that the research explores and understand the shifts in SMO collective identity.

Chapter 2

The Congress of South African Students, 1979-1995: From grassroots movement to routinized and professionalized identity (Type I).

In this chapter, the emergent, middle and later evolution of the high school student organization, the Congress of South African Students is described, and analyzed, with the view to identifying and specifying the transformation of the organization's collective identity, its evolving impact on the politics and culture of education, on the education policy environment, and on the dominant exogenous and endogenous sources of organizational change. The account of the Congress of South African Students also explores whether youth and student social movement organizations share the characteristics of social movement organizations that have more stable and established rather than transient leadership and membership patterns.

This account of the Congress of South African Students is above all a qualitative account of the emergence and evolution of the *national* organization, and it relies on five different sources of evidence. Fifty three organizational documents of the national chapter, including reports on and discussion at congresses, national executive committee meetings, and leadership and planning workshops, funding proposals and reports to donors, media statements, pamphlets, billboards and posters were collected, coded and analyzed. Eleven formal intensive interviews, each more than two hours in length, were conducted with core activists of the national chapter who represent different time periods between 1986 and 1995. Additionally, the account relied on eight other focused interviews with core activists reported in the student and alternative (left) media from different time periods between 1979 and 1993. Direct observation was the technique used to collect qualitative data on the end-point for the research, and included visits to the head office of the organization, and attendance at the organization's national general council at the end of 1994, the first such representative meeting to be held after the country's first democratic and national elections

earlier in the year. Photographic evidence of these observations were also compiled. Lastly, mass-alternative (left) and student media accounts on the emergence and evolution of the organization were collected for the period 1982-95, coded and analyzed.

Finally, the account of the emergence and later evolution of the organization within the context of political turbulence and struggle of the 1980s and early 1990s will serve as a general historical context for situating the emergence and later evolution of the remainder of the cases studied in this dissertation.

In the remainder of this chapter I will explore the founding of the organization in 1979 as an organization of high school students which refocused the political agenda of the Charterist Alliance inside South Africa after the decline of its political rival - the Black Consciousness Movement - will be explored. The account will also describe how the organization led a resurgence of militant anti-apartheid mass struggles in education which climaxed in the consolidation of the movement of *People's Education for People's Power* (Section 1). The account then moves through the middle phase of the organization which was characterized by resurgent state repression of the anti-apartheid opposition and which saw the organization outlawed in 1985 (Section 2). The account then continues to describe and account for the evolution of its successor, the National Students Coordinating Committee, until the lifting of the prohibition on the Congress of South African Students on February 2, 1990, and its re-launching and re-emergence in the early 1990s. This period was marked by a transition from anti-apartheid opposition to programs for social reconstruction and development (Section 3).

This account will show that the changes in the organization's environment, induced by the wider societal transition as well as its successful mobilization of new resource opportunities created by this societal transition, will result in the transformation of its identity including organizational routinization and professionalization. It will also show that unlike SMOs which display goal maintenance and continue to engage in contentious collective action (the Type III transformation), the Congress of South African Students experienced goal displacement and used less contentious collective action into the mid-1990s.

1. Charterist, Militant, Ungovernable, People's Power, 1979-85

1.1 1977-79, From Black Consciousness[10] to Charterism,[11] 1977-79

The history of the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) takes us through two decades of student mobilization against Apartheid and Apartheid Education. Led by young high school students who were both the target of mobilization and the leaders, the organization was established two years after the apartheid state had outlawed its predecessor, the South African Student Movement (SASM) in October of 1977, a fate the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) was to follow itself in 1985. Like its higher education counterpart, the South African Students Organization (SASO), SASM was a product of the Black Consciousness Movement that revitalized internal black opposition to apartheid (1969-1977). Like SASO it also gave meaning and form to the Black Consciousness ideology. But this period of mobilization and cycle of protest ended with brutal state repression after the high school student uprising, led by SASM, had mobilized workers and parents in the wake of the June 16, 1976 uprising against Bantu Education. In 1979, COSAS was formed in a bid to re-mobilize students, to unite them, and "to let them speak with one voice."[12]

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[10]During this period, black social movement organizations emerged and focused on the exclusive mobilization of that part of the population disenfranchised by apartheid rule, Black South Africans. That mobilization sought to raise and develop consciousness, dignity, leadership, self-reliance and resistance against apartheid rule among this majority section of the population, hence the signifier, *Black Consciousness*.

[11]The signifiers "charterism," "charterist" or "charterists" has its origins in the alliance of organizations established in South Africa the 1950s. This alliance of organizations, called the Congress Alliance, was led by the African National Congress, and was the product of resurgent mobilization against apartheid. More specifically, in 1955, these organizations met in Kliptown to draft a set of demands and political program around which to mobilize their members and supporters, and to escalate the struggle against apartheid. This set of demands and political program became known as the Freedom Charter, and is a key signifier of the African National Congress and its alliance partners. The resurgence of Charterism in the late 1970s was a continuation of this movement, carrying forward and mobilizing around the ideas of the Freedom Charter. This resurgence, principally propagated by the Congress of South African Students (COSAS), several trade union organizations, and later the South African National Students Congress (SANSCO), continued the traditions of the banned African National Congress. Notwithstanding the ban imposed on the African National Congress, its ideology, strategies and identity found its way into emergent township politics.

[12]*Interviews* P2, P3 and P4. Also, Congress of South African Students. *Funding Proposal. 1994-1997.* Johannesburg. ? 1993. Congress of South African Students. *Environment and Sustainable Development Programme. Proposal for Funding. 1995/6.* Johannesburg. ? 1995.

1.2 Militant and combative. Building mass opposition to apartheid, 1979-83

In its short life-span, 1979-1985, COSAS embodied students demands for democratically elected Student Representative Councils (SRCs), democratic education, solidarity with parents and workers, and a non-racial democratic South Africa.[13] But in its founding and emerging phases, 1979-1983, the organization was more concerned with the building of mass-based organizations to oppose Apartheid. COSAS participated in, and initiated opposition to, celebrations in 1981 to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the apartheid republic, calling for a People's Republic (1981). It mobilized the black community to reflect on thirty years of Bantu Education and to resist it (1983). It launched mass campaigns against the apartheid government's reforms (1983) intended to (i) incorporate Coloureds and Indians into the formal and whites-only polity, and (ii) to consolidate the exclusion of Blacks through entrenching the homelands and tightening the grip on black townships (the Second Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1983 and the so-called Koornhof Bills). It was one of the first member organizations of the United Democratic Front (UDF) that was formed to oppose and resist the new constitution and the Koornhof Bills (1983). It popularized the Freedom Charter and later an Education

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[13]ERIP, University of the Western Cape [source of copy of original document]. "United Action for Democratic Education." *Interview with COSAS National Executive Committee members.* ? 1984. *SASPU National.* "Student struggles a school for unified democratic action." COSAS leadership speaks out on government strategies in the classrooms, the current school boycotts and the long-term struggle for 'peoples education.' ? 1983. And, "COSAS: an organizing force in classrooms." SASPU National speaks to the executive committee about COSAS' development, its aims today and the tasks and problems it faces. ? 1982. "COSAS puts the class back into struggle." Issues dominating COSAS' campaigns, and problems the organization faces. ? 1983. "Each One, Teach One. The future challenge: building a student movement." ? 1983. Source of copy of original document: ERIP. University of the Western Cape. Bellville, South Africa. *SASPU National.* "Tight structures make SOSCO strong." Students are organizing into deep-rooted structures in Soweto schools. SASPU interviews Soweto Student Congress president, Eric Nkomo. ? 1985. Source of copy of original document: ERIP. University of the Western Cape. Bellville, South Africa. *State of the Nation* (16). COSAS 1979-1981. Organizing South Africa's students. 1985. Source of copy of original document: ERIP. University of the Western Cape. Bellville, South Africa. *State of the Nation* (17). COSAS 1982-1983. COSAS power and popularity grows. ? 1985. Newsprint. Source of copy of original document: ERIP. University of the Western Cape. Bellville, South Africa. *State of the Nation (18).* COSAS 1984-1985. National unity grows as the boycotts spread. ? 1985. Newsprint. Source of copy of original document: ERIP. University of the Western Cape. Bellville, South Africa.

Charter[14] (1983), campaigned for a non-racial democratic South Africa, and so became a carrier of the ideology, programs and strategies of the outlawed African National Congress (1983). Throughout this period, COSAS built youth organizations to mobilize the working, unemployed, and learning youth. In 1984, as opposition to apartheid threatened to overrun the government, COSAS was at the helm of this resistance movement, stepping up pressure through militant tactics and combative campaigns such as bus, rent and consumer boycotts. COSAS, its higher education student ally, the Azanian Students Organization (AZASO), and allied youth organizations, themselves now organized into the South African Youth Congress (SAYCO), became the stormtroopers of insurrection, ungovernability and the rejection of township based community councilors. In addition, SAYCO tactically used armed combat to support the quest for people's power (1984-6) as they formed boycott and township-based defense committees.

1.3 Building a student base. Putting the class back into struggle, 1983-85

It was in 1983 that COSAS directed more energy to consolidating and expanding its base in schools. This was possible because hundreds of urban social movement organizations had by now been established. These social movement organizations were now successfully organizing and mobilizing women, workers, youth, teachers and local residents. And later, most of them were organized into a national front, the United Democratic Front, to resist apartheid and campaign for a non-racial democracy based on the principles of the *Freedom Charter*. Immediately following the conclusion of its Second National Congress in May 1982 in Cape Town, COSAS shifted the focus of its militancy and combativeness to the control and quality of education, and to the day-to-day practices in schools. Its objective was the attainment of a compulsory, free and democratic education.[15]

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[14]Education Charter Campaign. *Pamphlet.* The National Coordinating Committee. Education Charter Campaign. Johannesburg. 1986. See also, Education Charter Campaign. *Pamphlet.* Pupil's Awareness and Action Group. Cape Town. ? 1986. Education Charter Campaign. *Education Charter News.* November 1986. Cape Town. Education Charter Campaign. *Summary of demands collected in the Education Charter Campaign up to 1 December 1986.* ? 1987.

[15]*Interviews* P2, P3, P4 and P6.

But, for COSAS, this could only be achieved with the destruction of apartheid as a political and social system.[16] And then only with the support of parents, teachers and workers.[17]

Key campaigns in the struggle for education and schools became student empowerment and participation in decision-making in schools.[18] This was a departure from existing practices: Apartheid and Bantu Education had denied students any role in education. For that matter, parents and teachers had not been expected nor allowed to play a critical and reflexive role. In this policy model, disenfranchised Blacks had no substantive role nor critical and reflexive contribution to make. The apartheid government believed it knew what was best and necessary for them. The exclusion of Blacks, including Coloureds and Indians, from the polity, and their dis- and non-enfranchisement confirmed this axiom.

In 1983 COSAS demanded that the prefect system, operative within schools be replaced with democratically elected Student Representative Councils (SRCs). Later, in 1985, the government acceded to the demand for democratically elected SRCs, although with the caution, never heeded by COSAS that these would: (i) be strictly educational

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[16]ibid.

[17]ibid.

[18]*Interviews* P2 and P3. Also, ERIP, University of the Western Cape [source of copy of original document]. "United Action for Democratic Education." Interview with COSAS National Executive Committee members. ? 1984. *SASPU National.* "Student struggles a school for unified democratic action." COSAS leadership speaks out on government strategies in the classrooms, the current school boycotts and the long-term struggle for 'peoples education'. ? 1983. "COSAS: an organizing force in classrooms." SASPU National speaks to the executive committee about COSAS' development, its aims today and the tasks and problems it faces. ? 1982. "COSAS puts the class back into struggle." Issues dominating COSAS' campaigns, and problems the organization faces. ? 1983. "Each One, Teach One. The future challenge: building a student movement." ? 1983. Source of copy of original document: ERIP. University of the Western Cape. Bellville, South Africa. *SASPU National.* "Tight structures make SOSCO strong." Students are organizing into deep-rooted structures in Soweto schools. SASPU interviews Soweto Student Congress president, Eric Nkomo. ? 1985. Source of copy of original document: ERIP. University of the Western Cape. Bellville, South Africa. *State of the Nation* (16). COSAS 1979-1981. Organizing South Africa's students. 1985. Source of copy of original document: ERIP. University of the Western Cape. Bellville, South Africa. *State of the Nation* (17). COSAS 1982-1983. COSAS power and popularity grows. ? 1985. Newsprint. Source of copy of original document: ERIP. University of the Western Cape. Bellville, South Africa. *State of the Nation* (18). COSAS 1984-1985. National unity grows as the boycotts spread. ? 1985. Newsprint. Source of copy of original document: ERIP. University of the Western Cape. Bellville, South Africa.

bodies and not be involved in wider politics, (ii) be democratically elected, and (iii) not govern or take over the running of schools from school committees.[19]

Also for COSAS, parents had to be activated to play a meaningful and empowered role in school governance. But democratic governance and control could only be possible through the collaborative efforts of parents, workers, teachers and students. Thus began the campaign to establish Parent-Teacher-Student Associations (PTSAs) for high schools and Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs) for primary schools.[20]

Free, state-provided textbooks and stationery, collectively determined rather than arbitrarily decided and imposed school fees, the abolition of corporal punishment and the scrapping of age limits - mechanisms designed to deny more militant students access to schools in the wake of the student uprisings of 1976 and 1980 and which government later scrapped because of the concerted campaigns of COSAS[21] - were the major campaigns launched by COSAS in the quest for a compulsory, free, quality and democratic education. The tactic used to exert pressure and draw attention to their campaigns was the boycott. Class and outright school boycotts were understood to be the same as workers' strike weapon.[22] But additionally, COSAS led students in the renaming of schools after outlawed leaders and armed combatants of the banned African National Congress.

These militant and combative campaigns permanently altered the education policy environment. It also changed educational practices, as COSAS and its education allies removed government appointed school committees and replaced these with elected representatives in SRCs and PTAs and PTSAs.

1.4 To people's power, and people's education, 1985-86

It was a short step to the next level of combat, as the political resistance movement shifted the offensive from insurrection and ungovernability to insurrection, ungovernability

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[19]*Rand Daily Mail*, October 10 and 12, 1994, and December 29, 1984. *The Star*, May 5, 1984 and October 3, 1985.

[20]For example, 1983 became the year of *Student-Worker Unity and Action*, and 1984, the year of *United Action for Democratic Education*.

[21]*Rand Daily Mail*, February 4, 1984, and October 12, 1984.

[22]*Interview* P1.

and the establishment of centers of people's power. Elected SRCs, PTAs and PTSAs assumed state authority for school programs and school governance. Local education crisis committees, formed by civic associations, teachers, youth, women and labor organizations and COSAS, mushroomed in all black townships and lead the way from ungovernability to government by the people, and from Apartheid and Bantu Education for Domination to People's Education for People's Power.[23] This new level of struggle was itself intended to be a short step away from armed combat and seizure of political power. COSAS was at the head of this new thrust as were the hundreds of youth organizations that threw caution to the wind in their pursuit of people's power and people's education. The ultimate prize was the seizure of political and economic power away from the apartheid state.

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[23]Carrim, Y., & Sayed, Y. "Civil society, social movements and the National Education Coordinating Committee." *Perspectives in Education*, Vol. 14 No 1 Summer 1992/93. Chisholm, L. "From Revolt to a Search for Alternatives." *Work in Progress*. Nov. 1986. Gardiner, M. "Efforts at creating alternative curricula: conceptual and practical considerations." In Nkomo, M. (ed.) *Pedagogy of Domination*. Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, Inc. 1990. Hawarden, J. "Apartheid Education 1986." *Conference on Education Against Apartheid*, International Federation of Free Teachers Unions, Lusaka, 23-25 March 1987. Hyslop, J. "Teacher Resistance in African Education from the 1940s to the 1980s" In Nkomo (ed.) *Pedagogy of Domination*. New Jersey: Africa World Press, Inc. 1990. Kruss, G. "People's Education: An Examination of the Concept." *People's Education Research Project No.1*. Center for Adult and Continuing Education (CACE). Bellville: University of the Western Cape. February, 1988. Levin, R. "People's Education and the Politics of Negotiation in South Africa." *Perspectives in Education*. 12, 2(1991) 1-18. Mashamba, G. "A Conceptual Critique of the People's Education Discourse." *Review of African Political Economy*. 48. 1990. And, *People's Education: the people's choice*. Maskew Miller Longman: Cape Town. 1991. Mkhatshwa, S. "Keynote Address." In *Report on the National Consultative Conference on the Crisis in Education*.1985. Muller, J. "People's Education and the National Education Crisis Committee." In Moss, G and Obery, I. *South African Review 4*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press. 1987. Naidoo, K. "The politics of student resistance in the 1980s." In Nkomo, M. (ed.) *Pedagogy of Domination*. Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, Inc. 1990. Obery, I. *South African Review 4*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press. 1987. Rensburg, I. *States, Actors and Conflict. Contesting Education: The People's Education Movement of South Africa and the State, 1984-1986.* Unpublished monograph. Stanford University School of Education. 1993. Resolutions form the First National Education Consultative Conference, 1985. Reprinted In Nkomo, M. (ed.) *Pedagogy of Domination*. Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, Inc. 1990. Resolutions from the Second National Education Consultative Conference, 1986. Reprinted In Nkomo, M. (ed.) *Pedagogy of Domination*. Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, Inc. 1990. Sisulu, Z. Keynote Address: People's Education for People's Power. *Second National Education Conference On the Crisis in Education*. Durban. 1986. Wolpe, H. *Three theses on people's education*. Research on Education in South Africa (RESA). Occasional Paper No 5. University of Essex. 1990. *Work In Progress*. 1986a, December. "People's Education: Creating a Democratic Future." 42, May. 1986b. "The NECC: Doing Battle with the DET." 45, Nov/Dec. 1986c. "DET destroys education in Duncan Village." Nov/Dec.

1.5 The Return of the State. The State of Emergency and Total Strategy, 1985

Threatened by the increasing and ever-widening momentum of the anti-apartheid front and that movement's quest for people's power, the apartheid state first declared political war and later a State of Emergency, against the combative and militant campaigns of the United Democratic Front (UDF) and its affiliates. With this action the apartheid state signaled its intent to smash the organs and institutions of people's power and to retake control over the black townships and educational institutions. But it was impossible for the state to gain control without extraordinary powers. The State of Emergency was the vehicle for that control. The State of Emergency was declared in July of 1985. It impacted more than thirty black townships which were at the front-line of combat against the apartheid state, with dawn-to-dusk curfews, massive deployment of the military and police, powers of lengthy detention without trial, and restrictions on the movement of opponents and on the organizations of the UDF. And because of the role of students and youth and their organizations in the struggle for people's power and for a People's Republic, these were the first targets of the state. For example, more than thirty per cent of all detainees held without trial during this State of Emergency were students and youth under the age of twenty-one years old. Their organizations were also targeted, as the state issued restrictions and imposed outright prohibitions on their activities.

1.6 COSAS banned! August 1985

Hardly two months into the State of Emergency, on August 28, 1995, the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) was banned. COSAS had joined the ranks of its student organization predecessor, the South African Students Movement (SASM), banned in 1977, and of the African National Congress, banned in 1960. The banning triggered immediate and intensive defensive campaigns by students to unban COSAS. A large media campaign was launched by students under the campaign slogan, "Unban COSAS, Ban Apartheid." The campaign also began to collect a target of one million signatures demanding the unbanning of COSAS.[24] Students implemented their campaign to unban

[24]It is unclear how many signatures were eventually collected but the campaign was later abandoned in the face of state repression.

COSAS, regardless of the State of Emergency. COSAS T-shirts and banners defiantly appeared in large numbers at the funerals of students, youth, teachers, workers and ordinary township people killed by the military and police in its implementation of the State of Emergency and the Total Strategy. They appeared at meetings and generally in the townships. But the organization also contested the ban in Natal's courts.[25]

Notwithstanding the ban on COSAS, local and regional student organizations mushroomed and replaced COSAS throughout the country. Whereas COSAS was a unitary organization, with membership organized into branches, students regrouped, this time within a federal organizational structure. This structure they felt would be more durable in the face of the state's Total Strategy and State of Emergency. Thus, local township based student organizations (e.g. Port Elizabeth Students Congress, Pesco, and Soweto Students Congress, Sosco) came together in regional structures (e.g. Eastern Cape Students Congress, Ecasco, and Southern Transvaal Students Congress, Strasco) and a national coordinating committee, the National Students Coordinating Committee (NASCCO).[26] Student leaders were confident that they could continue the work of COSAS. They also felt that, despite uneven development, they now had more contact with their student base. But, the state had struck a significant blow from which student mobilization was not to recover for some time. Student leaders were detained for lengthy periods, some were assassinated by hit-squads, many were excluded from high schools, yet others joined the exodus out of the country to take up membership in the ANC's military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe. Moreover, police confiscated property, closed organizational bank accounts and shut down offices.

1.7 Commemorating the Soweto uprising. Ten years on, June 16, 1986

The ban on COSAS was particularly severe, as students had already begun preparations for the commemoration of the 1976 uprising. This was to be the tenth anniversary of the June 16, 1976 lethal state repression of Soweto students' uprising against Bantu Education. The context of ungovernability, insurrection, people's power and armed

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[25]*SASPU National*, Apr/May 1986.

[26]*SASPU National*, February 1986.

combat gave this celebration a particularly militant and combative character. June 16, 1986 was to be the climax of ungovernability, insurrection and people's power. It was to be the moment of seizure of power. And a significant number of students and youth, incensed by the State of Emergency, Total Strategy, the ban on COSAS, and the failure of the state to heed the educational demands of students and their organizations, were now calling for a year-long boycott of schools to commemorate the anniversary of June 16. Under campaign slogan, "Liberation before Education," several, but not all were calling on students to devote all their efforts to fighting apartheid[27] and realizing people's power. The absence of the influential voice of COSAS was significant in the face of the need for a united vision and strategy.

Faced with the potential crisis of a year of school boycotts, political leaders in the United Democratic Front (UDF) and local parents and education crisis committees called a national education conference to consult and to decide strategy. Organized by the Soweto Parents Crisis Committee (SPCC), several hundred education, youth, religious, worker and political organizations met in Johannesburg on December 28, 1995, to develop a collective response to the education crisis. The conference decided to reject the call for a year-long boycott of schools. Instead, it called for students to return to school in 1986 under the campaign banner, *People's Education for People's Power.* But the strategy also included meetings with the state to present the demands of students, which had now become the demands of parents, workers, youth, students and teachers. The state was given three months to meet these, and a follow-up review conference was scheduled for March 1986.[28]

Students returned to classes in large numbers in 1986, but there were several townships where students were unhappy with the return to school decision. This unhappiness boiled over into the March, 1986 conference. Held under conditions of strict security, the conference once more confirmed the return to school, citing some forward motion by the state on some of the demands, and arguing for the intensification of the move to people's education. It argued further that people's education could not be realized while students and teachers were out of school. Student organizations had also collapsed because

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[27]*SASPU National*, February 1986.

[28]*New Nation*, March 26, 1986.

students were not in their organizing base. Thus the December 1985 decision was reinforced.

But again not all student representatives who represented their township-based student organizations at the conference agreed with the decision. Some expressed misgivings about the acceptability and implementation of conference resolutions in their constituencies, saying that demands made at the first conference had not been met, while the second conference had issued new demands instead of a program of action. Students also complained that they wanted action rather than more words. They claimed that students still did not have school books and sat around every day with nothing to do. Boycotts, they felt were more likely to resume. While these student leaders all expressed understanding of the strategic reasons behind the *Back to School* decision, they anticipated problems with winning the support of out-of-school high school students. State disruption of student organizations through the banning of COSAS also had its effects: the resultant crumbling of organization and co-ordination had seriously affected student activities. This made it all the more important to group SRCs into regional and eventually national structures.[29]

Thus, the disruptive effect of the banning of COSAS had taken its toll. By banning COSAS, the state had removed the single, legitimate and national voice of student organization. With that move it had struck a blow against democracy and student organization. Whereas the collective identity of COSAS and student organization had initially (1979-85) been dominated by the master frames of mass resistance and mass organization to eliminate apartheid, ungovernability, insurrection and people's power, in its terminal phase (1985-86) it was dominated by state repression and resultant organizational disruption. It was now left to an emerging National Students Coordinating Committee (NASCCO) to step up and fill the role of COSAS. While there was some continuity with the banned COSAS in terms of leadership, politics, vision and strategy, the earlier collective identity marked by militancy and combativeness had now been disrupted. And another blow was awaiting student, but also teacher, parent, worker and local resident organizations.

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[29] *Weekly Mail*, October 4, 1986.

2. Disrupted, Defensive, Resurgent, 1986-1991

2.1 The State of Emergency and the transformation of identity, 1986-90

In February, 1986, the state lifted the State of Emergency it had introduced seven months earlier. But, in response, militant combative mass action, insurrection and the push to people's power escalated and widened. Prompted by media reports speculating about the imminent release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners, and a start to political negotiations, member organizations of the UDF stepped up the pressure to the seizure of power. The presence of a high-level delegation nominated by the British Commonwealth Organization, the *Eminent Persons Group*, to open discussions with political organizations, political prisoners and the apartheid government on the political future of South Africa, only raised expectations for a solution to the political conflict. The coming ten-year anniversary commemoration of June 16, 1976 was to be the fuse to light the final offensive to people's power.

Aware that it was being outflanked by the democratic movement, those in government who earlier had launched the *Total Strategy*, notably the military and police, launched a renewed attack on their opponents in the democratic movement. This time it was *Total War*. Four days before the commemoration of June 16, 1976, a national State of Emergency, affecting every township and village, was declared (June 12, 1986). Ungovernability, insurrection, people's power and armed combat were met by an even more vigorous counter-attack. Extensive emergency regulations that saw mass detentions without trial of student leaders, the deployment of police and defense force personnel in townships, and a clamp-down on media reporting on mass and state action became the order of the day for an extended period of three years and seven months from June 11, 1986 through February 2, 1990. Through this action the state had now raised the costs of mobilization and collective action. Prohibitions on organizations, closure of schools, tightly controlled access to schools, extensive deployment of security forces in townships and on school and university campuses, and the use of vigilante and para-state violence against the democratic movement were combined with re-introduced age limits and expulsions of student activists from public schools.

Positive struggles, that is the positive assertion of identity and the construction of alternatives [Touraine, 1985], here people's power, now gave way to *critical struggles of defense* against the new crisis precipitated by state action. A critical social movement, of which COSAS was an initiator and leading member gave way to a defensive social movement. The quest for people's power and people's education was replaced by campaigns against detentions, against state retaliatory closure of schools, against state prohibitions on organizations, and against free-roaming para-state and vigilante gangs hell-bent on eliminating activists not yet detained.

2.2 Defying Apartheid, Defying the State of Emergency, 1989

The release of hundreds of activists from detention without trial beginning January, 1989, some after almost three years, and only after their "hunger strike till death" for their release, opened the way for rebuilding organization and re-launching collective action. Unfazed by the national State of Emergency regulations, restrictions on their freedom of movement and the bans on gatherings of more than ten persons, bans on mass meetings, rallies and marches, and catalyzed by the "defeat" of the South African military in Angola, the resurgent collective action in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union that provided an international breathing space for democracy, these activists set about planning a new offensive against the apartheid regime and the regulations of the State of Emergency. And, from late July 1989, in a campaign of defiance of apartheid and the national State of Emergency, also known as the *Spring Offensive*, the Mass Democratic Movement (successor to the outlawed United Democratic Front, UDF) launched a phased multi-prong campaign.

In its first phase, starting in August, the campaign targeted the defiance of the Separate Amenities Act that enforced apartheid in schools, hospitals, beaches and all other amenities. In the second phase, starting in September, the campaign now shifted to defiance of the bans on rallies, mass meetings and marches. In its third phase, starting in October, the campaign now targeted the prohibitions imposed on organizations and individual activists by unilaterally unbanning the organizations and restrictions on individual activists. Despite initial state clampdowns, the campaign rolled on and forced the state to retreat. Mass organizations were unilaterally unbanned: COSAS T-shirts, flags, banners, pamphlets

and posters were announcing the return of COSAS, of mass organization and collective action. But, it would be at least another two years before a formal organization called COSAS would be launched and established as a successor to NASCCO.

The outlawed African National Congress, National Education Crisis Committee, South African National Students Organization (successor to the Azanian Students Organization, AZASO), National Union of South African Students, United Democratic Front, and its supporter organizations were now resuscitated by activists whose confidence and defiance was inspired by the retreat of the state. Against this backdrop the State President announced on February 2, 1990 the lifting of the prohibitions on all outlawed organizations and the State of Emergency. In fact, these announcements only affirmed what was already practiced in the townships, on campuses of schools, universities, teachers training colleges and places of work.

Thus, where the collective identity of student mobilization and of NASCCO was earlier (June 1986-June 1989) significantly influenced by the national State of Emergency, a part of it was now significantly influenced by national defiance and the *Spring Offensive*. Whereas the national State of Emergency had increased the costs of organizational mobilization through for instance bannings and detentions, the campaign of national defiance had created new opportunities for mobilization particularly as alliance systems became reactivated.

2.3 Student dis-organization. Searching for direction amidst crisis, 1989

Late in 1989, the South African Council of Churches which had assumed a leading role in politics during the period of state action against mass organization and activists, called a three day consultative conference on education. The conference sought to provide leadership and to allow space for education activists to meet and re-insert themselves into leadership of the decimated education movement.

The conference was told that conditions in black schools were not conducive to learning. This assertion was based on assessments that, (i) there was very little discipline at schools, (ii) there was little respect for teachers, and (iii) the presence of Department of Education and Training evaluators was non-existent. The conference was also told that, "pupils are at school in the flesh but not in spirit" and, "We now have a crisis of authority

and a shift of power."[30] To a great extent, these opinions reflected more the strong presence of residual elements of ungovernability rather than an outright rejection of teachers and education. But the intervention of the South African Council of Churches was not welcomed by all. For some education activists it was an incursion on their terrain and a usurpation of education leadership.[31]

Later, two conferences were staged by the re-emerging education movement and activists released from detention. Both conferences, in September and December were held despite ongoing state repression, the bans imposed on organizations and restrictions against the freedom of movement of activists. Both conferences sought to rebuild organization, restore earlier advantages (1985-86) and advance the struggle for people's education.[32] Special attention was reserved for student organization. First, "a student organization with the legitimacy and political discipline of COSAS had to emerge."[33] Second, "students have to be reminded of their political tasks. Having destroyed a debased education and its authority relationships, they must reconstruct new relationships informed by the spirit of People's Education."[34] The December conference also expressed

> concern at the leadership capacity of the present NASCCO [sic] National Executive Committee. Their inability to transform the present interim committee into a national student organization is a cause for concern ... The way forward from here lies in a national campaign that will seek to rebuild student organization within the context of the program [sic] to re-establish People's Education...[35]

That conference also decided to launch a *Back to School Campaign*, to defy exclusions of students by principals and teachers acting as the state, to call on parents to register students at schools of their choice in defiance of school apartheid which required the attendance of pupils at schools of their official racial classification, to re-establish

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[30]*The Star*, October 6, 1989.

[31]NECC. *National Conference Report and Resolutions.* 15-17 December 1989. p. 13.

[32]ibid. pp. 3-15.

[33]ibid. p. 12.

[34]ibid.

[35]ibid.

democratically elected and accountable SRCs and PTSAs and to set up monitoring mechanisms to measure the success of the campaign.[36]

2.4 Back to School. The struggle for free education and educational resources, 1989

The successful call for a return to school, that had now received the support of the just released Nelson Mandela, saw student enrollments increase by more than twelve per cent, representing a doubling of normal growth.[37] Schools, already overcrowded and under-resourced experienced an even greater crisis now exacerbated by the *Back to School Campaign*, a campaign that was intended to demand "free education for all, in particular the provision of free textbooks, free setworks, and free stationery," and to

> force the State into meeting its moral, social, political and economic responsibility of providing free education for all South African citizens ... to cause admissions of an estimated 3,4 million African children ... who are not in schools for reasons of poverty ... political exclusion and 'academic' exclusion rules ... to once more highlight the high priority that education has as a means for transformation and reconstruction ... to cause the State to open schools, presently categorized along racial lines.[38]

Now, students and their organizations, but also parent organizations, focused their campaigns on conditions in schools: the supply of adequate textbooks, stationery and teachers by the state,[39] the full commitment of teachers to teaching,[40] and the abolition of the school fee in the quest for free education. Critical defensive campaigns against detentions and restrictions on students and their organizations had now given way to critical defensive campaigns against conditions in schools. Militant combative campaigns were resurfacing again roused by residual elements of the national defiance campaign.

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[36]ibid. p 71.

[37]NECC. *National Conference Report and Programme 1990.* 7-9 December 1990. University of Durban-Westville. p 24.

[38]ibid. p 24.

[39]*Sowetan*, June 26, 1990.

[40]*New Nation*, April 28, 1990.

2.5 Rebuilding student organization, 1990

August, 1990 represented an important moment for student mobilization. While some parts of the country had already moved to re-launch COSAS, the National Student Coordinating Committee (NASCCO) opposed this and was seeking a coordinated and disciplined launch of the organization. The National Interim Committee of NASCCO met in Umtata to develop a program of action on the re-launching of COSAS. They also met to define campaigns for the student movement. Four campaigns were adopted, *The Right to Learn*, *The Back to Learning Campaign* (including effective learning), the *Education Charter Campaign*, and the *Leadership Training Campaign.*[41]

With these campaigns, the organization was

> showing the DET that we are serious about studying. But not only this, we need to go back to school in order to address the problems students are facing in the schools and to build democratic SRCs and PTSAs ... one day we will have a democratic South Africa and we will need skills to ensure that the country is run successfully. So, as COSAS, we must ensure that students go to school to learn and to organize themselves."[42]

The *Leadership Training Program* also had its goals, "students need skills to make organizations effective. For example, to take minutes in meetings, for public speaking and to be able to analyze the situation."[43] Significantly, only the *Education Charter Campaign* was continuous with past programs and collective identity. And, even then, it was difficult for the campaign to regain its earlier momentum and for it to be firmly re-established.

In December, 1990, at a National Consultative Meeting in Cape Town, NASCCO defined its program as, (1) building COSAS, (2) strengthening SRCs and PTSAs, (3) broadening COSAS to white schools, (4) establishing a national high school sports formation to be part of the National Sports Council (which was part of the Charterist Alliance) (5) strengthening women's structures, (6) the *Intensive Learning Campaign*, and (7) the *Open Schools Campaign.*[44] Again, only one program was continuous with the past

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[41]Horizon. *Fighting for the right to learn.* Interview with Oupa Masenkane. National publicity secretary of COSAS. May/June 1991. pp. 15-17. *Interviews* P2, P3 and P4.

[42]ibid. p. 15.

[43]ibid. p. 15.

[44]*Mayibuye.* February 1991.

collective identity of COSAS and NASCCO, viz. the program to strengthen SRCs and PTSAs. But, once again, the organization found it difficult to re-establish and sustain a program from its past identity. Let us now turn to exogenous and endogenous causes of these developments.

2.6 From NASCCO to COSAS. Transformed identity? Wither People's Power, and People's Education? 1989-92

Analysis of the campaigns of NASCCO and the re-launched COSAS reveal a transformed identity. Programs now focused on calls for students to return to schools and for the state to provide adequate educational resources (*Back to School Campaign* and *The Right to Learn Campaign*, 1990-91). Later, programs focused on calls to students to return to schools to learn (*Intensive and Effective Learning Programs* and the *Back to Learning Campaign*, 1991-92). Other programs focused on organizational maintenance (Leadership Training, Building COSAS, and Broadening the organization to white schools). Historic campaigns such as the *Education Charter Campaign* and building and strengthening SRCs and PTSAs were also inserted into the emerging identity, but with less success. The overwhelming focus and emerging collective identity now was that of "learning to govern," revealing a strong shift to and link with the emerging development theme and master frame of nation-building.

But significantly absent was the campaign for people's power and people's education. Absent also were calls for armed combat and armed insurrection, as were campaigns to build organs of people's power. Learning for people's power now became learning to govern. The previous focus of building and strengthening SRCs and PTSAs as institutions of people's power became building and strengthening SRCs and PTSAs to manage educational institutions.

What were the sources for this transformed collective identity? First, the new and emerging international and Southern African regional politics favored negotiated settlements for the expansion of democracy. Second, and interconnected to the first, national politics had moved from a political cultural model of conflict to one of consensus. Third, for the democratic movement, the national political stakes had undergone transformation from an initial demand and political strategy to achieve mass insurrection,

institutionalize people's power and seize political and economic power from the apartheid government, to one to achieve the transfer of power from that same government. Armed insurrection, ungovernability, and people's power had given way to a search for a negotiated political settlement, with an interim government and an elected Constituent Assembly as its prize. Militant combative mass action were now reserved and activated to buttress negotiations and progress on the democratization of society.

Analysis of the 1989 *Spring Offensive* or Defiance Campaign reveals the emerging contours and master frame of this shift to a negotiated political settlement. The goals of targeted, controlled and well managed campaigns were not armed insurrection, installation of people's power and eventual seizure of political and economic power. Rather, those goals had evolved to calls for a negotiated transfer of power to the people. In this strategic vision it was to be preceded by the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners, the lifting of the prohibitions on the liberation movements and other social movement organizations, the lifting of the national State of Emergency, the return of exiles without fear of prosecution, the freeing of the constrained national politics, the scrapping of all apartheid legislation, and a start to political and constitutional negotiations.

Analysis of the campaigns of the re-emerging COSAS reveals substantial overlap with this emerging culture of politics or master frame. As part of the Charterist Movement, the organization participated actively in the propagation of this master frame, which itself was mediated by and transmitted through the alliance system (the Charterist Movement), that dominated COSAS itself. Thus, the transformation of the collective identity of the Charterist Movement significantly influenced the emerging collective identity of COSAS. As an initiator organization in the early phase of the current cycle of protest, COSAS had slipped, with little resistance, to becoming a follower and transmitter organization. From a critical reflexive social movement organization, it was becoming a legitimating organization. Let us turn to endogenous sources of this emerging trajectory.

2.7 Transitional leadership and membership dynamics. Cohort effect? 1989-93

Internal organizational dynamics also significantly influenced the emerging collective identities of NASCCO, and later, of the re-emergent COSAS. Specifically,

leadership and membership characteristics were now also leaving their imprints on the evolution of the organizations. Let us first examine the evolving leadership determinants.[45]

First, the election of organizational leaders took place at annual congresses and consultative conferences. The overwhelming majority of them were students in the final year of their schooling. Annual congresses were generally held in the second half of the year. This was so despite the fact that such elected leaders were at the point of completing their own schooling. That scenario played itself out for the interim structures of NASCCO (1986-91) as well as for the executive committees of COSAS (1991-93).[46] The outcome of this annual occurrence was regular and critical organizational disruption, especially for the period 1989-1993 because "... we were preparing for our school leaving examinations at the end of the year ... we had little time to develop congress resolutions into implementable plans in time for the opening of schools the next year."[47] The entry of these activists into higher educational institutions the following year only exacerbated the problem of a decimated leadership or leadership vacuums. By then "... we had even less time for COSAS work because many of us were elected into leadership positions in SANSCO [South African National Students Organization that organized university students]."[48]

Second, in this early phase of the 1990s, most of COSAS leaders were holding additional leadership positions in allied organizations, such as the re-launched African National Congress, the African National Congress Youth League, residents associations, sports and cultural organizations.[49] Because the early part of the 1990s was a period of heightened mobilization and collective action, all these organizations required all the energies of its leaders.[50] As it turned out, less time was allocated to fulfill leadership roles in COSAS.

In addition to the disruption of organization, and the non- or limited implementation of congress decisions, the organization experienced problems of managing and accounting

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[45]For this section, the research relied on *Interviews* P2, P3, P6, P10 and P4.

[46]*Interviews* P2, P3, P6 and P10.

[47]*Interview* P2.

[48]*Interview* P6.

[49]*Interviews* P4, P6 and P10.

[50]ibid.

for the resources it had received from its single international donor, the Swedish Labor Movement.[51] This resulted in great hesitancy on the part of other donors and allied organizations to provide COSAS with resources. The impression projected was that of an organization that had large leadership turnover and no accounting systems.[52] For COSAS, the solution that was identified and implemented, initially with limited success, was leadership training to improve management and accounting. Also, later in 1993, the organization changed its electoral rules so as to reduce the number of candidates and officials who were in their school leaving year.[53] This scenario also had some intended consequences.

Whereas the allies of COSAS, such as the National Education Crisis (later coordinating) Committee (NECC), the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS), the South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU)(that incorporated earlier ally, the National Education Union of South Africa) and the South African National Students Congress (SANSCO)(later renamed the South African Students Congress, SASCO), were experiencing increasing pressure from their international donors to transform from mass campaign to development organizations, COSAS did not experience this early (1990-92) influence.[54] This was a direct consequence of the hesitancy, outlined above, displayed by international donors to provide COSAS with support. Thus, having no international donors or extensive relations with any of them meant that little pressure was exerted on the organization to undergo an early collective identity transformation. It would only be much later, and only after constitutional changes had introduced leadership consistency and stability, *and* full-time staff into the organization, that COSAS entered the policy domain of international donors and the politics of international cooperation and aid.[55]

But there were now also discernible shifts in the character of the student body of the 1990s since "... students were no longer steeled in the survival and resistance tactics of the

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[51] *Interviews* P3, P4 and P6.

[52] ibid.

[53] *Interviews* P6 and P10.

[54] *Interviews* P3, P4 and P6.

[55] *Interviews* P6 and P10.

1980s."[56] Combativeness and militancy, hallmarks of the student body, and of COSAS in the 1980s had given way to complacency and private ambition.[57] In any event, political and constitutional negotiations, although faltering, had started. In no time, the legislative form of apartheid would be gone, and everyone would participate in an expanded, possibly transformed, polity. Increasing numbers of students asked, why be combative and militant when we would soon have a united country, one National Assembly and one President?[58]

Thus, like the dimensions of the emerging master frame of consensus politics and national development, leadership turnover and shifts in the identity of the student body were also making their mark on the identity of COSAS. It would only be after a bruising, militant and violent campaign in 1993 and the organization's 1993 Annual Congress, that its collective identity was to be effectively transformed. First we must turn to the official re-launch of COSAS in June of 1991, before making our way to the tumultuous year of 1993.

To summarize, this account has illustrated the previously conceptualized and predicted effect of high turnover in SMO leadership and membership. It suggests that endogenous organizational determinants that arise from the transient leadership and membership dynamics of these organizations - as opposed to organizations with stable and more established leadership and membership patterns - are powerful predictors of goal maintenance and collective identity formation. But, as this account has also illustrated, large variances in the external environment such as changes in political regime are likely to have exaggerated effects on the collective identities of this sub-set of social movement organizations, especially when these variances overlap with the (necessary) exit of old leaderships (to higher education or adult organizations) and the entry of new ones. Leadership inconsistencies or instabilities act as powerful conduits of organizational instability, rendering organizational routinization and improved effectiveness and efficiencies in the pursuit of social change goals a faint prospect.

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[56] *Interview* P10.

[57] *Interviews* P4, P6 and P10.

[58] *Interviews* P4, P6 and P10.

3. New resource opportunities and the decline in contentious collective action, 1991-95

3.1 Re-launching COSAS, 1991

More than 800 delegates from eleven regions attended the re-launching congress of COSAS in Pietermaritzburg from June 28 until July 2, 1991.[59] The re-launch was preceded by the re-launch of five regional chapters and hundreds of branches.[60] The conference marked a watershed in high school student organization. Whereas it was the re-launch of COSAS, this was a new organization, with a new modus operandi and a new membership,[61] because the leadership and membership cohorts of the phases of mass organization (1979-83), ungovernability (1984-85), insurrection and people's power (1985-86) and the State of Emergency (1986-90) had moved on and out of high school and student politics.

The congress was above all a learning experience for the delegates who had met for the first time in such large numbers and from so many parts of the country since the declaration of the national State of Emergency to discuss national politics, organizational policy, organizational expansion and organizational maintenance.[62] And, after lengthy debates on a wide range of topics, including the education crisis, the organization's role in politics, projects and finance, sports and culture, relationships with other organizations and campaigns, the organization retained its central character as a political student organization. The struggle for political emancipation dominated its emerging character.[63] COSAS would still mobilize students around educational demands and the transformation of the education system. And, as in December 1985 at the First National Consultative Conference on the education crisis, the campaign slogan, *Freedom Now! Education Later!* was rejected.

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[59]*Horizon*. July/August 1991. pp. 18-21.

[60]ibid.

[61]*Interview* P4.

[62]*Horizon*. Interview with Moses Maseko, National President of COSAS. July/August 1991. p. 18. See also, *Horizon*. Interview with Moses Maseko, National President, and Bongani Mkongi, General Secretary of COSAS. No 3, 1992. pp. 22-24.

[63]An excellent understanding of its role as a political student organization is provided by the organization's international secretary, Zukile Madikane, In, *Horizon*, No 1 1993. p. 24. In the article, the organization rejects the view that it should remain outside of politics and focus only on educational matters.

While pursuing the struggle for liberation, learning had to continue. Hence, the insertion of campaigns such as *Back to School, Intensive Learning* and *The Right to Learn* into its organizational program and identity.

The success of these campaigns depended on the willingness of the apartheid state to improve the appalling conditions in black schools, gross overcrowding, acute shortages of textbooks, teachers and other facilities. Mass action was "The only way to persuade the government ... to challenge the government from all corners."[64] These mass campaigns were to include the occupation of white schools, a *Defiance Campaign* against apartheid regulations and the isolation and expulsion of education authorities from schools. The campaign also included the demand for the resignation of the Minister of Education, and would comprise two weeks of mass action, with a national protest march to the Office of the State President and his government in the capital. Campaign committees were set up to implement and manage these campaigns. Learning had to continue, and alternative learning centers and programs were also being established at COSAS' initiative in collaboration with its ally, the South African Democratic Teachers Union.

The escalating political violence over accessibility of townships and villages between the supporters of the African National Congress and Inkatha Freedom Party of the homeland leader Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi dominated the congress discussions. Schools were directly affected by this civil society and system-wide violence. This violence often targeted and overran schools, resulting in mass exoduses. Often, attacks on communities resulted in entire communities moving from their villages and townships, leaving schools empty and students without education in their new safer settlements. COSAS firmly sided with its ally, the African National Congress, and decided to establish defense units in schools and townships.

Development work, and New Social Movement projects, already established in the collective identities of allies, also surfaced more specifically at the congress. It was resolved that projects to equip students politically and intellectually had to be developed. Campaigns to encourage the participation of students in the environment debate, and to

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[64]ibid.

block environmental degradation were adopted. Furthermore, campaigns to activate student participation in rural development were to be initiated.

Overall then, analysis of the congressional deliberations that included eighteen resolution and discussion themes, show that these were dominated by three matters covering fourteen of the resolutions and discussion themes: (1) understanding the emerging transitional politics, and developing an organizational orientation and identity, (2) developing an identity continuous with the identity of the COSAS of the 1980s, and (3) developing organizational campaigns to announce the organization's resuscitation as well as its key role as a policy actor. No small wonder that the adoption of a militant and combative identity was the primary goal of the congress for most delegates. On the other hand, analysis of the remaining congressional deliberations reveal the emerging themes of resource mobilization and organizational maintenance, themes that would not much later dominate the organization's evolving identity.

3.2 The struggle for education resources resumes, 1992

Like the beginning of the school year in 1986, 1990 and 1991, thousands of students heeded the *Back to School Call* of COSAS. Likewise, overcrowding and lack of classroom space made effective learning near impossible. COSAS now launched a mass campaign for educational resources, targeting the Department of Education (DET) and the homeland education departments. It first held meetings with the departments of education to register these concerns.[65] Soon though, irritated by little or no response from the education departments, the planned mass campaign and defiance of departmental officials took off. The organization now said that protest action was the last resort in its attempts to bring the education departments to their senses. And, when asked to denounce political programs in schools, COSAS said that the root causes of the education problem was the Department of Education and Training (DET) and the other race-based education department. These, the organization said should be phased out before fingers were pointed at itself, saying "Against

[65] *Burger*, February 5, 1992. *Daily Despatch*, February 5, 1992.

this background, we cannot denounce mass action." The organization simultaneously announced a program of action to restore the culture of learning in black schools.[66]

Soon, all education departments responsible for black education were the target of mass action. In Potchefstroom, COSAS members from Jouberton were arrested outside the Department of Education and Training (DET) offices after they had presented a petition to the DET demanding more teachers, textbooks, stationery and school furniture.[67] Meanwhile, the Klerksdorp branch of COSAS banned DET inspectors at a parents meeting, saying that inspectors come to inspect teachers and pupils knowing that conditions at the schools were bad, especially the shortage of teachers and books. In a statement, the branch said, "For this reason, COSAS has resolved that DET inspectors will be debarred from entering schools until our demands of more teachers, books and furniture are met."[68] The larger political question of inspection for control rather than teacher appraisal for empowerment was never ignored. After the re-launch of COSAS in Durban, the organization introduced its own *Operation Vala Campaign* that was aimed at staging sit-ins in government buildings and police stations to highlight conditions in schools.[69] In Alexandra, students staged two weeks of protest action including a hunger strike and sit-in at the Alexandra circuit inspector's office.[70]

Not all aspects of the campaign had parental support. Angry Langa parents criticized their children for 'sacking' their principal, and urged them to get on with their school work. At a meeting, parents called on the PTSA to meet and to look into pupils' grievances. Troubles were sparked by the principal's refusal to promote pupils who had failed Standard Nine and to re-admit all matric failures. Parents complained that students should have consulted them before acting.[71] The situation at the school flared up later again when two hundred students and four teachers marched to the principal's home to demand

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[66]*Eastern Province Herald.* Interview with COSAS leader, Thamsanqa Rubusana. January 9, 1992.

[67]*Lentswe*, February 7, 1992.

[68]*Lentswe*, February 21, 1992.

[69]*New African*, March 12, 1992.

[70]*Natal Witness*, March 16, 1992. *Citizen*, March 16, 1992. *Cape Times*, March 16, 1992.

[71]*The Argus*, February 10, 1992.

students' school fees. The principal had not been to school for almost one week over the auditing of the school books. He was not home when the marchers arrived. But at the school, classes had been disrupted for some time.[72]

The campaign for educational resources and defiance of departmental officials also spread to the homelands. In Ciskei, COSAS called for an interim administration to be installed, expressing unhappiness with the DET and Ciskei Department of Education for not recognizing the organization (COSAS) nor SRCs and PTSAs, for increasing examination fees, for alleged harassment of members and the brief closure of two high schools.[73] The organization also said that it would meet to "develop a sound action program to isolate the Ciskei Education Department on matters concerning education. We challenge the military government to carry out its threat to ban either COSAS or the SRCs in Ciskei."[74] After an attempted sit-in at the magistrate's court in Mdantsane, Ciskei, forty COSAS members were assaulted by Ciskei security forces.[75] The campaign also extended into the homeland of Transkei, where COSAS members ended a night long sit-in in the Transkei Department of Education Headquarters in protest against school fee increases and inept textbook distribution after a visit by the homeland's military leader, General Bantu Holomisa.[76]

There was not as much emphasis on effective and intensive learning in 1992, apart from a COSAS statement calling for the restoration of the culture of learning. That statement called for the development of a code of conduct for schools, saying, "The code of conduct will boost morale and the culture of learning."[77] An innovative and self-initiated project to recover stolen educational resources was launched by the COSAS branch in Welkom, where angry pupils reclaimed dozens of chairs from local *shebeens* or taverns which were stolen from different schools in the area. Students had acted on information, and had set aside two hours of their school day for the search of local *shebeens* for the furniture. A twenty-three meter section of fence was also found dumped in a veld after it

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[72]*The Argus*, August 21, 1992.

[73]*Daily Despatch*, April 16, 1992.

[74]*Daily Despatch*, April 10, 1992.

[75]*Daily Despatch*, August 19, 1992. *New Nation*, September 5, 1992.

[76]*Daily Despatch*, May 4, 1992.

[77]Statement by COSAS leader, Tsietsi Sithole in, *The Star*, March 23, 1992.

was stolen from a school.[78] The organization also engaged in the social construction of other education policy domains, some of which were defensive and reactive, rather than positive, planned or foreseen. For illustrative purposes one of these issues is briefly described below.

3.3 In defense of white teachers in black schools. Defense of non-racialism? 1992-95

Following attacks on white teachers who had been appointed in East Rand black schools in the province of Transvaal, more than 3000 pupils from various Katlehong high schools resolved to ensure their protection. The attacks had been launched by an organization calling itself the *Revolutionary Watchdogs* which the student wing of the Pan Africanist Congress, Pan Africanist Student Organization (PASO) claimed was a dissident group of the Pan Africanist Congress. The dissident group was seeking the expulsion of white teachers because they were "settlers" and "oppressors" rather than Africans. They also called for these posts to be given to unemployed black teachers. After a meeting of Katlehong high school students organized by the local COSAS branch, the COSAS national president, Moses Maseko said, "As pupils we must prevent criminal elements entering our schools to attack teachers and disrupt schools." However, despite the promise of security, nineteen white teachers continued to stay away from their schools after a fellow white teacher was attacked and burnt critically.[79] A campaign then launched by COSAS sought the return of the teachers. In one such action, COSAS members illegally occupied the Katlehong council chambers and embarked on a hunger strike. They were then arrested and held in the chambers. A group of students then invaded the chambers demanding the release of their colleagues and the return of the nineteen white teachers to township schools.[80]

Later, in 1994 and 1995, the campaign to forcefully remove white teachers from township schools was taken over by the Black Consciousness-oriented Azanian Student

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[78]*City Press*, February 16, 1992.

[79]*Beeld*, February 11, 1992. *Die Burger*, March 31, 1992. *Business Day*, March 31, 1992. *Cape Times*, March 31, 1992. *The Star*, February 6, 1992, and February 12, 1992. *Sowetan*, February 10, 1992. *Volksblad*, February 11, 1992.

[80]*The Star*, April 2, 1992. *Evening Post*, April 2, 1992.

Movement (AZASM).[81] AZASM was also calling for the posts held by white teachers to be given to unemployed black teachers, saying

> The minister [of education] has done nothing [about the unemployment of hundreds of black teachers] and we will continue to remove white teachers by physically visiting them in classrooms and forcing them to vacate their posts for black teachers."[sic][82]

And, once more COSAS condemned the campaign, saying, "We see the call as counterproductive and undermining our struggle. It is not justified and undermines democracy in our country. South Africa is for all; people should work where they want to work. We say people's education for people's power, and not black power or white power."[83] But, AZASM's campaign continued relentlessly, resulting in the death of one white female teacher, and the purging of all white teachers from black schools on the East Rand.[84] These instances illustrate how adversaries impact and frame the policies and collective action of social movement organizations.

3.4 The matric examination fee. The right to free education, 1993.

If in 1992, COSAS had focused on the general resourcing of schools and the right to free education through militant but non-violent campaigns, 1993 saw a much more specific campaign that targeted the payment of the matric examination fees. But this time this single campaign was protracted, militant *and* violent. In many respects 1993 was the true watershed for COSAS. Decisions and resolutions adopted at the 1991 re-launch had not been adequately implemented, in part the outcome of leadership dynamics described earlier. International and national donors were wary of the organization for the same reason, but also because of weak or non-existent accounting and reporting systems. Nineteen ninety-three saw concerted efforts directed at correcting these deficiencies as a new leadership, spawned by the protracted, militant and violent, but successful 1993 matric examination fee campaign made their way into the leadership of the organization. Let us now turn to these

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[81] *Business Day*, September 14, 1994. *The Star*, January 21 and 28, 1995.

[82] *Citizen*, January 18, 1995.

[83] *City Press*, January 15, 1995.

[84] *The Star*, March 13, 1995. *The Weekend Star*, March 11-12, 1995.

events, some of which continued into 1994, that were to dramatically transform the collective identity of COSAS.

The political economy of apartheid education, and of resistance. It is important to locate the struggle for free education, launched by COSAS, within its broader societal context, the economics of education, and the long waves of opposition and protest. Almost immediately following the inauguration of the apartheid government in 1948, it began to provide free and compulsory education until the age of sixteen years exclusively for the minority white population that had voted it into power. Much later, in the second half of the 1960s, that obligation, shouldered by the state, was extended to the two other groups, the minority Coloured and Indian segments of the population. At no stage was consideration given to extending that obligation and right - free and compulsory school education - to the economically and socially most disadvantaged majority, the African segment of the population. For, from the outset, government had made it plainly clear that the African segment of the population had to work the farms and the mines as unskilled labor. It had no intention of investing significantly in education for that segment of the population, when its labor functions, in the opinion of the government, required minimal education. That policy, of a debased and poorly resourced Bantu Education, continued into the current period. Largely as a result of this policy the current labor market crisis inherited by a democratic South Africa is characterized by dramatic shortages of skilled labor, by one of the lowest productivity levels among middle income countries, and by the country's lack of economic competitiveness in the 1990s.

The struggle against Bantu Education launched by organizations in the black community was initially dominated by campaigns directed at the political-philosophical and educational foundations of this most oppressive component of Apartheid Education. Later, especially after the June 1976 student uprising, that struggle was extended to calls for free and equal education for all South African children and youth, the majority of whom who still had to purchase their own high cost textbooks, setworks, stationery. In many instances, they even had to finance the building of classrooms and teachers' salaries and accommodation, in addition to paying school fees. These costs for a debased and poor quality racist education had to be borne over and above other hidden educational costs such as transport, uniforms and meals. The struggles of COSAS and its allies in the 1980s

incorporated both these elements, but its oppositional strategy later extended to ungovernability, people's power and people's education. Campaigns in the 1990s focused more closely on the financing of education, in particular the under-resourcing of African schooling. They also focused on the extension of the right to free and compulsory state provided education to all children and youth, a right not yet won in 1995. Nineteen ninety-three saw the campaign for free and compulsory education for all students specifically target the matriculation examination fee. The previous year had seen COSAS, unsuccessfully launch disjointed and poorly supported campaigns to scrap this user fee.

Building alliances for combat. Early in 1993, COSAS carefully built up support for its renewed effort. Meetings called by COSAS with the government did not materialize, as the government dug in its heels. It was already making significant concessions to the democratic movement in political and constitutional negotiations on the future of the country. Education was a critical and emotional aspect of the political-philosophy of Apartheid or Separate Development. It was to be a battle in which it was not going to give in easily.

To gain maximum support for its campaign, COSAS now consolidated a strategic alliance with the only two other black student organizations, the Azanian Students Movement (AZASM) and the Pan Africanist Students Organization (PASO). After several meetings the three organizations announced a joint campaign of rolling mass action against matric examination fees.[85] Later, corruption in the education departments, misappropriation of education funds by "the bureaucrats of apartheid," and the "reluctance on the part of the government to bring the culprits to book" were also incorporated into the campaign objectives.[86] Next, meetings with the African National Congress resulted in that organization, at the level of its National Working Committee, giving COSAS its vital and, initially full backing. But, the African National Congress was also concerned about the stability in schools, saying "The insensitive manner in which the National Party government is responding to legitimate demands in the education sector poses a serious threat to stability

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[85]*The Star*, March 19, 1993, and March 23, 1993

[86]*The Star*, May 23, 1993..

in the schools."[87] The National Education Coordinating Committee (formerly the National Education *Crisis* Committee) (NECC) also expressed its support for the campaign.[88]

Launched with a series of marches around the country, the campaign now kicked off with vital alliances in place. Adversaries, who through their opposition could have sapped critical organizational resources, and who could have contested the social constructions and legitimations offered by COSAS for the campaign, had been drawn in. Allies in the alliance system had also been won over.

Sporadic outbreaks of violence between students, motorists and police announced that the campaign would be combative and militant.[89] Within a week, government announced its position, "... payment of a fee shows a commitment to write the exam and that the deadline for payment of May 7 stood."[90] Hardly one week later this position had undergone change. Examination fees would be reduced by one third to R48. But still government maintained its firm refusal to enter into talks with COSAS or its allies on the campaign issue.[91] Dissatisfied with this response, COSAS launched a week of action that included class boycotts, sit-ins, demonstrations and pickets at education department offices. The campaign objectives were extended to include the question of the unilateral restructuring of education. Government decision-making and restructuring had to be made transparent, and had to involve the participation of all educational and political organizations, COSAS argued. Moreover, multi-lateral control over education, including control over the homeland education departments, had to be consolidated in a national negotiating forum that bound all education departments to its decisions.[92] COSAS also

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[87]African National Congress. National Working Committee. *Statement in support of the students' demand for the scrapping of examination fees and the decision to hold protest marches on Wednesday 24 March 1993.* Johannesburg. 1993. p.1

[88]Education Policy Unit, University of the Witwatersrand/NECC. *Standard Ten examination fees in context.* Tikly, L. September, 1993. Johannesburg. 1993. p. 3

[89]*Cape Times*, March 25, 1993.

[90]ibid. p3. *Sowetan* March 31, 1993.

[91]*Citizen*, May 1, 1993.

[92]Congress of South African Students. *Press Statement.* 16 April 1993. Johannesburg. Also, *Sowetan*, May 4, 1993. *Eastern Province Herald*, March 13, 1993.

called for the resignation of the Minister as well as the Director-General of Education and Training.[93]

The campaign moved into a new phase. The deadline for registration, May 7, was fast approaching, with no new offer coming from government. The apartheid government eventually extended the deadline, with the NECC calling on students to register but not pay the fee.[94] A march organized by COSAS to coincide with the original deadline was banned by government. Tension was building, and students' collective action became more combative and militant. The campaign also became militant and violent, with COSAS announcing four new campaign components of symbolic flames and fire in the renewed campaign to direct students' action.

Operation Funda was launched to encourage pupils to continue to prepare for exams during the protest action. *Operation Guda* would reflect students' determination to sweep away reactionary elements, including the government's top education officials and school principals. *Operation Barcelona* would reflect the flames of the Olympic torch of hope, and would include the burning of vehicles of education departments, whereas *Operation Vala* would encourage students to close all major routes to draw attention to the campaign and to increase pressure on the government.[95] Violence erupted and escalated as the renewed campaign took off.

Principals heading high schools in several education departments responsible for black education were in the spotlight of the campaign. For example, eighteen Department of Education and Training (DET) principals were barred by students from entering schools. Students insisted that they pressure their education departments to scrap the exam fees, with COSAS saying that principals would not be allowed back until the issue had been resolved. The general-secretary of the organization argued compellingly that "Principals

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[93]ibid.

[94]Education Policy Unit, University of the Witwatersrand/NECC. *Standard Ten examination fees in context.* Tikly, L. September, 1993. Johannesburg. 1993. p. 4.

[95]*Interviews* P5, P6, P7, P8, P9, P10 and P11. *South*, May 8, 1993. *Cape Times*, May 14, 1993.

have been used by the DET to tell students what to do. Now it is time for them to tell the DET what students want them to do."[96]

To develop support for a more cohesive and non-violent campaign, the NECC next called a national education crisis summit. But angry students ignored the pleas at the summit from their African National Congress (ANC) and South African Communist Party (SACP) colleagues for restraint. Instead, they vowed to deepen the education crisis through intensified mass action and the occupation of empty white schools, actions which were condemned by COSAS' key ally, the African National Congress. Students were unimpressed by calls from political leaders that demonstrations against the deepening education crisis should be constructive instead of destructive. Instead, COSAS argued that the students' mission was for a free and compulsory education and that it was the government that had decided to end negotiations over exam fees.[97]

With less than fifty per cent of students having paid the fee, the Department of Education and Training (DET) published exam registration forms in leading newspapers.[98] Its intention was to encourage individual students to register for the exams without their fellow students' knowing.[99] It took the intervention of Nelson Mandela to break the impasse and end the militant and combative campaign of COSAS.[100] Following a meeting between Mandela and the State President, the DET announced the suspension of the exam fee until the establishment of an education forum before the end of June, 1993.[101] Despite seeing this top-level intervention as "helpful" COSAS was unhappy, for the intervention was "a very problematic one in the sense that it undermined the capacity of organizations which are actively involved in education struggle to successfully engage in talks with the

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[96]Interview with COSAS General Secretary, In *South*, May 15, 1993.

[97]*Sunday Tribune*, May 16, 1993.

[98]For example in Soweto, where the greatest concentration of students are, as much as 75 per cent of students had not paid their exam fees. Education Policy Unit, University of the Witwatersrand/NECC. *Standard Ten examination fees in context.* Tikly, L. September, 1993. Johannesburg. 1993. p. 5.

[99]ibid. p4.

[100]*Citizen*, May 19, 1993. *City Press*, May 31, 1993.

[101]*Citizen*, May 21, 22, 25, and 27, 1993. *Sowetan*, May 21, 1993. *The Star*, May 27, 1993.

state."[102] Still dissatisfied, and demanding the scrapping rather than suspension of the exam fee, COSAS continued its campaign, which was overlapping with the campaign of teachers for improved remuneration packages and working conditions. It took a tragedy to break the strangle hold held by the COSAS campaign on education. In August, the organization formally suspended its campaign, but only after intense pressure from other ANC organizations, and a day after the brutal murder of the former Stanford University student, Amy Biehl, in Gugulethu, Cape Town.[103] Until then the campaign had received qualified ANC support conditional on it being pursued in a non-violent manner, but that support was withdrawn after the murder.[104]

3.4.3 Campaign Outcomes. New resource mobilization opportunities.

The campaign had been violent and victorious, but it also had other positive but unintended outcomes. The massive support mobilized and enjoyed by COSAS among students had raised their significance as a formidable actor in the politics of education and in the educational policy domain. The iron-grip displayed by COSAS over high school education had forced government - despite its stubborn unwillingness to enter into formal talks with COSAS - to formalize the educational policy objectives of the organizations' collective action. COSAS' ability to forge strategic alliances with adversaries AZASM and PASO, and its ability to consolidate existing principled alliances with alliance partners such as the African National Congress, the National Education Coordinating Committee and the South African Democratic Teachers Union displayed vision and character beyond the age of its leaders and members. Equally, its ability to exert its organizational independence in the face of great pressure, especially from historic allies, the African National Congress and the South African Communist Party, and its ability to retreat with great discipline when the time came, reflected similar vision and character. The organization took disciplinary action

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[102]Congress of South African Students. *National Secretariat Report. Prepared for the National Congress. Shaft 17. Johannesburg. 13-15 September 1993.* Johannesburg. 1993. p. 7.

[103] Amy Biehl was murdered by a group of students who claimed membership of, and allegiance to the Pan Africanist Student Organization which staged militant campaigns against the employment of White teachers in township schools.

[104]*Citizen*, August 27, 1993.

against its members who, in the wake of the campaign, still threatened violence and militancy.[105]

Likewise, with year-end examinations approaching, the organization firmly opposed mass action planned by its teacher ally, the South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU), Soweto, saying its (COSAS') *Operation Excel* was designed to ensure better year-end results.[106] Argued COSAS, the SADTU campaign now could lead to clashes between students and teachers, as

> Most pupils are concentrating on their exams. Although we agree with the teachers' demands, SADTU should decide whether it wishes to abandon the pupils during this crucial time. We agreed with SADTU to place a moratorium on mass action during exams.[107]

The re-born COSAS had made its mark, and now the organization enjoyed wide legitimacy. Calls were coming even from white student organizations and schools for the organization to come and articulate its social project and objectives for education. The campaign had also raised its capacity to mobilize resources from donors who had previously been reluctant to consider the organization's funding proposals.[108] COSAS had displayed its support base, organizational mobilizing capacity, and its ability and willingness to deliver militancy, combativeness and violence, and to wreak havoc with education practices and formally insulated policy formulation and planning procedures. Moreover, in the wake of its campaign, it was working in alliance with the National Peace Secretariat to campaign for peace and democracy.[109] This institution, charged by government and the democratic movement to stem the roller coaster ride of political violence that was threatening to engulf

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[105]COSAS suspended a senior provincial official for threatening to organize the occupation of white schools. The official had warned that South Africa would witness the disastrous effects when the "militant and revolutionary COSAS" embarked on mass action campaigns. Also, he had said that the revolution would be taken into white schools and farms and "no one will stop us." The COSAS National Executive expelled the official shortly after these utterances saying, "COSAS believes such statements may play into the hands of unruly elements who are interested in disrupting schooling." *Sowetan*, August 25, 1993. The organization later announced it had pardoned the official after "intensive investigations and consultations." *Citizen*, September 18, 1993.

[106]This program was first announced at the beginning of the final school term. *Business Day*, July 27, 1993.

[107]*Sowetan*, November 11, 1993.

[108]*Interviews* P5, P6, P9, P10 and P11.

[109]*The Star*, August 20, 1993.

the country and to render any negotiated political settlement worthless, had control over and access to resources and funding contacts, and was now a valuable ally. New resources and opportunities had been mobilized by a young leadership educated amidst the fires of *Operation Barcelona*, the roadblocks of *Operation Vala*, and the combativeness of *Operation Guda*.

3.5 From Protest to Development, 1993-94

Having been introduced to organization in the fires of struggle, the new leadership that had made their mark were now formally inducted into leadership positions at the Second Congress of the re-launched COSAS. This was their opportunity to assume leadership and to lay their imprint on the organization. Of particular concern was how the organization would deal with its historic and conjunctural leadership dynamics that were marked by large turnover and inconsistency. But, more importantly, the congress was dominated by the engulfing political violence, some of it the outcome of COSAS' own exam fee campaign. The congress was thus held with peace and democracy as its theme. There were additional reasons for this theme.

Having established itself as a formidable SMO, the organization was now well placed to mobilize new resources for its activities. Resource constraints had made it impossible to stage a major conference in 1992, as required by its constitution. This time though, COSAS recognized the importance of bringing students into the gathering *Peace Movement.* There were resources available for such activities from the National Peace Secretariat.[110] Holding a national congress under that banner had its advantages. The organization could focus sufficient time on that theme, and give its own meaning to the movement for peace. In this case, it inserted its own symbolism, *Peace and Democracy*, and so the congress became COSAS' drive for peace *and* democracy. COSAS could also use the opportunity to assess organizational achievements in the light of programs and campaigns set at the 1991 re-launch congress. It could also develop a program of action for the forthcoming period. And, the organization could assess organizational capacity,

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[110]Congress of South African Students. *National Secretariat Report. Prepared for the National Congress. Shaft 17. Johannesburg. 13-15 September 1993.* Johannesburg. 1993. p. 3, 8. *Interviews* 6, 7, 8 and 9.

evaluate the performance of the current leadership and elect a new one. Thus, with the resources and support of the National Peace Secretariat, COSAS staged a successful congress. This ability to combine organizational strategy with themes popular with donors was already operationalized in the organization's *National AIDS Awareness Campaign*, and would become organizational practice in later programs such as the *Environment Awareness Campaign* - under whose banner the organization later staged its 1994 National General Council - and the *Children's Rights Campaign.* This ability to mobilize new resources thus saw the addition of new, possibility unrelated programs into the identity of COSAS. It remains to be seen how this will affect the ability of the organization to continue to advance its own social project especially since donors would expect reports and evaluations of success for them to continue providing resources. For the original social project may soon become blurred by new resources, that are tied to new programs, new and more staff, bank accounts, and reporting requirements. The evolution of COSAS into the twenty first century will reveal important insights into this dynamic.

Let us further examine the current trajectory. After the organization's 1993 congress it entered for the first time into contracts with international donors such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Canadian International Development Research Center (IDRC), and national donors such as World University Services (South Africa), the National Progressive Primary Health Care Network and Otis Elevators (South Africa). These contracts covered project areas such as *organizational capacity building* (USAID and World University Services, South Africa), *environmental awareness and education* (IDRC), *AIDS awareness* (National Progressive Primary Health Care Network), *effective learning and restoring the culture of learning* (Otis Elevators), and *peace* (National Peace Secretariat).[111]

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[111] *Interviews* P7, P8, P10 and P11. And, Congress of South African Students. *One Round, One Condom. The COSAS National AIDS Launch.* Johannesburg. ? 1993. Congress of South African Students. *COSAS Campaign Against Aids.* Pamphlet. Johannesburg. ? 1993. Congress of South African Students. *COSAS Workshop* [on AIDS and Health] *Report.* 3 May to 7 May 1993. Johannesburg. 1993. Congress of South African Students. *Minutes of COSAS' National Peace Conference. 13-15 September 1993.* Shaft 17. Johannesburg. ? 1993. p. 3. Congress of South African Students. *Environment and Sustainable Development Programme. Report to the International Development Research Center. March-December 1994.* Johannesburg. ? 1995. Congress of South African Students. *Environment and Sustainable Development Programme*

This renewed resource mobilization effort launched by COSAS was informed by the organization's recognition of the availability of resources and the need for the organization to gear itself to mobilize these resources given its historical image. Thus, on its face value, project selection could be considered to be an autonomous decision taken by COSAS. However, closer inspection reveals some interesting themes. Donors had, by now, come to define their own social projects in term of pre-selecting policy areas and implementation mechanisms for these specified projects. Thus, COSAS' awareness of the policy areas that were up for grabs, so to speak, is recognition of that pre-selection process. Not only did donors pre-select policy interventions, but they also selected the methods of implementation. Policy interventions had to occur through the implementation of clearly identifiable projects. Moreover, project evaluation methods were in the main standardized, pre-determined packages regardless of the specificity of the contracting organization. In the evolving South African scenario, donors have thus tended to significantly influence the trajectory of social movement organizations by pre-selecting policy intervention areas - in particular those having a New Social Movement[112] theme - implementation mechanisms and evaluation procedures. About the autonomy of COSAS' selection of policy intervention areas from this menu or master frame there is little doubt.

There have also been positive outcomes associated with COSAS' entry into the resource mobilization arena. The organization had now come to "do more work," account for funds effectively, and develop and expand its administrative and management abilities. Organizational learning and development has thus been accelerated by this process. Also, networking with organizational consultants and consultant groups and with former members and supporters has been sparked by resource mobilization and the new contracts signed. As bridging mechanisms, and to create opportunities for funding relationships, joint committees that combined the experiences of donors and COSAS were established to oversee the management of released funds, and to allow organizational learning to take

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Proposal for Funding. 1995/6. Johannesburg. ? 1995. US Agency for International Development. The Education Support and Training Projects. *Funding Agreement.* June 1994-May 1996.

[112]The name New Social Movement is the term used in the literature to refer to Western European social movements which emerged in the 1970s and the 1980s and which focused mobilization on matters such as global peace, a ban on the use of nuclear weapons and dumping of nuclear waste, environment and "green" issues and children and animal rights.

place. Fund-raising workshops, leadership development courses and self-awareness sessions, and Strengths-Weaknesses-Opportunities-Threats (SWOT) analyses have now become regular affairs in the organization. In turn, these have contributed to a more complex, medium and long-run approach to the attainment of organizational goals. To what extent reporting and meeting the conditions of donors now dominate the activities of the organization and time of its leadership is a question of vital importance, but should be the subject of another study. For now, it will suffice to say that these have come to dominate the evolving collective identity of the organization.

But, there have also been other troubling outcomes. Negotiations with USAID revealed that the donor was putting pressure on COSAS to break its ties with socialist states and student organizations. The case of Cuba was highlighted by organizational leaders. Also, a new dependence developed. When donors release funds late due to donor incompetence, as happened on several occasions, newly recruited staff did not get salaries and became disillusioned, affecting organizational performance and culture. Telephone bills were not paid, and communication with regions and leadership suffered, resulting in organizational paralysis. This was so because every organizational activity began to revolve around the release of donor funds. After the democratic election of the [Interim] Government of National Unity, organizational leaders were increasingly anxious over a shift of resources from non-governmental and social movement organizations to government and the Reconstruction and Development Program.[113] Signing multi-year contracts for available resources, such as between COSAS and USAID seemed to be the way to go given this new threat.

However, whereas organizational routinization, professionalization and goal displacement are the beneficial outcomes of successful resource mobilization, a new dependency can develop in which a new set of full-time officials who have replaced voluntary workers have to spend a significant amount of organizational time on organizational maintenance goals rather than on social change goals. Organizational bureaucratization may be a short step from professionalization and routinization as these officials become more focused on ensuring their own survival since their salaries are drawn

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[113] *Interviews* P7, P8, P10 and P11.

from donor funds. As discussed later in the case study of the National Education Crisis Committee, such a reliance on donor funds may have devastating consequences for organizational morale and solidarity when resource flows are reduced when donor interests shift and reporting by the organization to donors weakens. Reliance on these new resources also induce new vulnerabilities in which organizational social change goals may be significantly influenced by the interests of donors and organizational maintenance.

3.6 From unilateral action to national education negotiations, 1993-94

Earlier it was described how COSAS' 1993 campaign against the payment of matric examination fees had been transformed to include calls for an end to financial and administrative mismanagement *and* an end to unilateral state restructuring and decision-making in education. Thus, a vital new campaign demand called for the establishment of a national education negotiating forum. Later that call became a call for a national education *and* training negotiating forum. The intent of the campaign demand was threefold, (i) to stop unilateralism and to move the prevailing policy model to one of inclusivity in policy-making, (ii) to end racism, ethnicism and fragmentation of the education policy domain, by calling for the incorporation of all education departments, including all homeland departments in national education decision-making, and (iii) to unify the two interconnected, but until now separated policy domains of education and training. COSAS' campaign accelerated moves towards the establishment of such a forum. Militant campaigns of its ally, the South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU) in 1993, and behind the scenes negotiations led by the African National Congress and the National Education Coordinating Committee, all contributed in putting irresistible pressure on the apartheid government to accede to the creation of the *National Education and Training Forum.*

Campaigning for inclusivity and re-unification of geographic and policy domains, carried its own price. It required organizational capacity, especially in the areas of policy-making, negotiation and organizational maintenance. Were organizations to have command over resources to accomplish the first two, the third could still provide serious problems for SMOs in transitional societies.

At its national congress in 1993, COSAS expressed a keen understanding of the possibilities and limitations the new policy forum presented. For the organization, influencing "the entire democratic process" was fundamental.[114] But the *National Education and Training Forum* (NETF) had to fulfill many roles. It had to

> address the ... imbalances in education ... develop clear guidelines in terms of curriculum and policy development ... represent the aspirations of our people on education matters ... establish very clear relations with management at negotiations level.[115]

However, already by the end of 1993, COSAS was experiencing problems in terms of student representation in the NETF, that required it to "urgently convene a front of student formations ... to discuss the matter of student representation."[116] Negotiations were now "a new terrain of struggle ... around education," that required "clear strategies to guide the organization."[117] This made it imperative to "equip our negotiators with the required skills ... have frequent strategizing meetings at all levels of the organization," and to "canvass [sic] our opinions with other student movements."[118]

The organization recognized that entry into negotiations carried implications for mass action which itself "has always been an important tool in the struggle for national democracy."[119] Mass struggles "cannot be abandoned [sic] ... until the realization of our goals," but from now had to be applied "with a clear understanding of its implications whenever and wherever necessary."[120] COSAS thus recognized that the entry of the NETF, a structure it had campaigned for, required (1) new organizational resources and capacity, (2) student allies, and (3) vigilance, as its establishment could alter the balance between mass struggles and negotiations in favor of the latter. Early evidence confirms the difficulty

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[114]Congress of South African Students. *Minutes of COSAS' National Peace Conference. 13-15 September 1993.* Shaft 17. Johannesburg. ? 1993. p. 12.

[115]ibid. p. 12.

[116]ibid. p.13.

[117]ibid. p. 13.

[118]ibid. p. 13.

[119]ibid. p. 13.

[120]ibid. p. 13.

of meeting these requirements to successfully advance the organization's social project. Negotiation and decision-making has been running well ahead of membership mobilization.

But, let us return to the 1993 congress, and briefly examine two of its major themes, viz., leadership dynamics (Section 3.7) and militancy and organizational image (Section 3.8).

3.7 On leadership dynamics

Major concerns of the congress were its ongoing weak organizational leadership capacity and organizational image. Earlier, aspects of the leadership dynamics were described, and its was noted that large turnover and inconsistency brought about by the specific characteristics of high school student organization, as the dominant features. It was also noted that these dynamics affected the organization's capacity to mobilize resources.

Several leaders were occupying positions despite the fact that they had completed their own schooling. Of additional concern was the notion of organizational image. The negative image of the organization held by the public arose in part also because of the organization having "failed to arm and equip young and imaginative [sic] comrades with the necessary political theory of our revolution."[121] Urgent steps were needed to correct the organizational image, especially at the leadership level, the congress decided. The organization was clearly tempted to exclude from elections students who were in their last year of schooling. This would reduce leadership turnover brought about by leaders completing schooling shortly after their election. After lengthy debate, the organization adopted a four-step strategy to remedy the situation. First, all members of the organization, irrespective of the level of schooling they were in, were entitled to be elected to the leadership. Second, leaders would now be elected for a term of two years rather than one year to improve leadership retention. Third, a program to "create strong leadership at regional as well as at local level" would be developed. And, fourth, the situation would be reviewed annually.[122] But, leadership was also about organizational image, a matter on which the congress delegates spent considerable time.

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[121] ibid.

[122] ibid. p7.

3.8 Militancy and organizational image. Mobilizing people and resources.

The organization had developed "a bad public image" which was directly related to the militant and combative tactics it deployed.[123] In the past, failure to win the confidence of donors also derived from this image of COSAS. Thus, the organization's capacity to mobilize people and resources was impeded. But, militancy, viz. the throwing of stones, burning of cars, throwing of petrol bombs, road blockades, staging of illegal marches and rallies was related to the specific organizational characteristics of the schooling population, including age, strategic perspective and the transient nature of the student populations and leadership. The membership and leadership had a "short term focus and attention span."[124] There were few if any contingency plans.[125] Students wanted immediate resolution of their "issues" and demands. They were less interested in the detail or, "nitty-gritty" of the issue, such as costs and bureaucratic delays.[126] They did not want the issues complicated. In the final analysis, all they wanted was to win the campaign.[127]

Moreover, militant tactics had greater impact, were more visible.[128] Militancy was also an expression of anger that almost always provoked reaction. It also brought greater results. Less militant campaigns were seen as "liberal" and "*swak*" [=weak].[129] Militancy also arose from the intransigent attitude of the apartheid state to students' aspirations.[130] Their campaigns had been seen by the apartheid state as the actions of a "few trouble-makers" with "communist" goals intent on "disrupting education." COSAS' campaigns

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[123]*Interviews*, P4, P5, P8 and P10. Also, Congress of South African Students. *Minutes of COSAS' National Peace Conference. 13-15 September 1993*. Shaft 17. Johannesburg. ? 1993. p. 1. Congress of South African Students. *Visioning and Strategic Planning Workshop. 3-5 December 1993*. Peninsula Technikon, Bellville. Facilitated by ERIP. ? 1994. p. 4. Congress of South African Students. *Report on the evaluation/strategic planning workshop held at Kwandebele from 25-29 July 1994*. Prepared by HAP Organizational Development Services. 11 August 1994. Johannesburg. p. 4.

[124]*Interview* P4. Also, *Interviews* P1, P2, P3, P5, P8, P9 and P11.

[125]ibid.

[126]ibid.

[127]ibid.

[128]ibid.

[129]ibid.

[130]ibid.

were not seen as ones that were grounded in popular revolt, protest and students' aspirations and grievances.[131] From the point of view of the apartheid state they had little support. But, refusing permission for marches and rallies, crushing illegal marches and rallies with teargas, batons and mass arrests, banning organizations, like COSAS, and an unwillingness to enter into talks and negotiations with student leaders bred even more militant actions.[132] Militancy was bred by intransigence. Intransigence in response to militancy bred even more militant, and even more violent campaigns. Thus, the militancy of student organizations, especially those of COSAS and its successor NASCCO, throughout the 1980s and into the early 1990s had shaped and was being shaped by the interacting characteristics of student organization, the changing stakes and state response and action. But, these militant tactics now required review, especially since they influenced the organization's public image and resource mobilizing capacity, the congress resolved.

Thus, leadership development programs were needed, congress also resolved. And, these had to focus on stabilization and consolidation, political education, organizational skills, negotiation skills, self-awareness to address inter-personal relations at national level, administration and research skills, and the ability to mobilize resources, including the packaging, marketing and sale of projects on popular themes such as children and human rights, especially in the areas of corporal punishment, child abuse and sexual harassment in schools.[133] Also, students and tourism, AIDS awareness, environmental awareness, organizational capacity building and institutional development, SRC training and the development and management of school libraries, areas all favored by international and national donors, had to be packaged, marketed and sold as projects. Thus, from an organization whose trajectory and collective identity had until now been significantly influenced by its location (students, youth) and membership and leadership characteristics, COSAS now had to be transformed into an organization with more medium and long-run

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[131]ibid.

[132]ibid.

[133]Interviews P8 and P10. Also, Congress of South African Students. *Visioning and Strategic Planning Workshop. 3-5 December 1993.* Peninsula Technikon, Bellville. Facilitated by ERIP. ? 1994. p. 7. Congress of South African Students. *Report on the evaluation/strategic planning workshop held at Kwandebele from 25-29 July 1994.* Prepared by HAP Organizational Development Services. 11 August 1994. Johannesburg. p. 6.

vision, including the ability to display a convincing and winning public image, and the ability to mobilize resources from where it had been unable to do in the past. Indeed, later in 1994, increasing organizational time was spent on planning and developing leadership capacity and saleable organizational projects. To determine the effect of this strategic decision on organizational militancy and of the effect the shift from mass mobilization to project portfolio balance, further research will have to be conducted over the remainder of the 1990s through the first decade of the next century.

3.9 An end to militant, combative mass action? 1994

The year, 1994, saw a dramatic decline in mass actions launched by COSAS. This was the outcome of three processes. First, it was the outcome of a shift from a short-term-only focus to one that included a focus on medium and long-run issues. Participation in an unfolding education debate had brought the complexity of the policy process home. Pursuit of organizational goals was now understood to be more complex, and required allies, resources and capacity. Militant, combative mass action had to be balanced with bargaining.

Second, this dramatic policy and strategy shift was in part the outcome of an agreement brokered at the NETF to make 1994 a *Year of Safe [and uninterrupted] Learning*. That commitment is reflected in COSAS' campaign to make 1994 a *Year of Back to Learning*. The motivation or frame transformation [Snow, et. al. 1986] offered by COSAS carried resonance with large parts of the parent body, education bureaucrats and the new (political) state. *Back to Learning* would make students "gainful members of society."[134] Moreover, "mass action had [detrimental] implications for establishing a culture of learning and teaching,"[sic][135] especially in the wake of years of ungovernability and rejection of education departmental officials.

Third, the country's first democratic elections, COSAS' participation therein, and the success of its historic ally, the African National Congress, now opened the way for closer working relationships between government and mass organizations. It also opened

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[134]Congress of South African Students. *1994 Year of Learning*. Pamphlet. Johannesburg. 1994. p. 2.

[135]*Interview* P8.

the way for the achievement of organizational goals continuous with past struggles and with those of the African National Congress, the dominant partner in the new government. But the new representative and democratically elected National Assembly, Senate, President and Executive required time to get its plans in place.[136] For COSAS, these new institutions were more accessible, and they listened to student organizations. Communication lines between COSAS and the new government "were now open unlike 1993," and the government was now "willing to talk to us."[137] Bargaining now had to take precedence over militant, combative mass action.[138] Leadership figures were adamant though that militant, combative mass action would be deployed if and when the new government were to act as its predecessor did.

To summarize, the strategies deployed by COSAS to advance its social project were significantly influenced in the pre-elections period (January-April 1994) by the agreement reached at the NETF and by a newly emerging organizational culture or collective action that was less determined by historically evolved and conjunctural organizational characteristics - such as transient membership and leadership, focus on the now, the visible and the results-oriented - and more by a medium and long-run vision. However, immediate post-elections strategies were significantly influenced by the transition to a new, democratically elected set of political institutions that were dominated by allies rather than adversaries *and* the emerging organizational culture with its emphasis on bargaining and a medium and long term view of change. Later, in 1994, and early in 1995, allies in government began to play an active role in the social re-construction of legitimate forms of protest that had direct implications for the emerging political culture of protest, and for the forms of protest historically selected by COSAS to advance its social project.

3.10 1994-95, The incorporation of interests, 1994-95

The first national elections and the successful election campaign of COSAS' historic ally, the African National Congress (ANC), in 1994 opened the way for the

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[136] *Interviews* P6, P7, P8 and P10.

[137] ibid.

[138] ibid.

incorporation into the reconstituted polity of the social projects of both the African National Congress (ANC) and COSAS. COSAS had assumed that there would be continuity between pre-election campaigns and commitments of the ANC and the policies and programs of the newly elected government and political institutions. Furthermore, the goals and programs outlined in the ANC's *Reconstruction and Development Program*, the *Policy Framework for Education and Training* and the *Implementation Plan for Education and Training* would be implemented in a transparent and participatory manner. Thoroughgoing education transformation would kick off with great gusto. Apartheid Education, and specifically Bantu Education would, overnight be reduced to rubble. A single, democratic, non-racial, non-sexist education department would be created in short time. Quality education would become free and compulsory for the first ten years of schooling, after which generous government subsidies would kick in for apartheid-scarred black schools. There was also little discussion in the ranks of COSAS on the limitations implicit in the compromises that had made the [Interim] Government of National Unity possible. There was little discussion of resources and constitutional constraints, nor of the constraints that organizational transformation and an inherited bureaucracy may impose on the character and pace of social change. There was also no discussion of the possibility of a re-interpretation or subversion of the policies of the ANC - the dominant partner in the new government - by the emergent bureaucracy.

These constraints were, and continue to be, significant. No other luminary than the Minister of Education, Professor Sibusiso Bengu, had responsibility for outlining the limits and possibilities, at the request of COSAS, at the organization's 1994 National General Council. Goals, objectives and social projects of the former anti-apartheid movement would be incorporated, but slowly, as resources became available through government savings, improved efficiencies and effectiveness, and economic growth. These common social projects would later be incorporated, symbolically, and potentially substantively

thereafter.[139] Delegates did not like that message of incrementalism and deference of goals and programs into an undetermined future.[140]

In response to slow movement on the incorporation of their interests, militancy resurfaced among delegates who had expected that the incorporation of their interests would proceed smoothly and in an uninterrupted manner from the social project of the anti-apartheid movement into the social project of the [Interim] Government of National Unity. That militancy was carried into the new school year in 1995, as students once more heeded the COSAS call for a return to school in large numbers. One of the outcomes of this, *Year of Learning and Teaching* campaign was massive overcrowding of already under-resourced township schools.[141] Yet, 1995 was to be have been the first year of schooling in a single, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic education and schooling was to have been free and compulsory argued COSAS organizers.

Campaigns to occupy and force open better resourced and under-populated White, Coloured and Indian schools to make place for Black students were now adopted.[142] COSAS also encouraged parents to register their children at White, Coloured and Indian schools. In some instances right wing counter-movement organizations mobilized white opposition to both the legislated opening of all schools to all students and the campaigns and calls of COSAS.[143] White counter-mobilization in turn only prompted an escalation of

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[139]Ministry of Education. *Agenda 95. Education Priorities for 1995.* Cape Town. ? February 1995.

[140]Congress of Congress of South African Students. National General Council at St. Luke's College. 5-7 December 1994. Johannesburg. 1994. *Direct Observation*, pp. 1-4.

[141]Congress of South African students. *COSAS Press release for 1995 as a Year of Learning and Teaching in South Africa.* 11 January 1995. Johannesburg. (11H30). 1995. Also, *Business Day*, January 19 and 31, 1995, and February 6, 1995. *Eastern Province Herald*, January 25, 1995. *Sowetan*, February 8, 1995.

[142]*Business Day*, January 19, 1995. *Citizen*, January 21 and 25, 1995. *The Star*, January 15 and 16, 1995.

[143]The most publicized instance of militant combative right wing counter-mobilization (against COSAS' schools occupation plan and the placement of black students in under-used and closed white schools) was in the Province of the Western Cape. See, *Business Day*, February 16, 1995. *Cape Times*, January 13, 16, 26, 27, and February 1, 9, 16, 21, 22, and 24, 1995. *Citizen*, February 16 and 17, 1995. Eastern Province Herald, February 28, 1995. *The Star*, February 17, 1995. *Sowetan*, February 15, 16 and 17, 1995. *The Argus*, February 15, 16, 17, 20, 21 and 23, 1995. *Weekend Argus*, February 18 and 19, 1995. *Weekly Mail & Guardian*, February 24-March 2, 1995. Similar instances were also reported elsewhere, in the Province of the Northern Transvaal, *City Press*, January 29, 1995. Several instances in the Province of Gauteng, *The Star*, February 17, 1995 and

student mobilization. Militant, combative mass action soon resurfaced with the forceful occupation of education departmental offices and hostage taking of departmental staff.[144] Students refused registration at township schools because of overcrowding and lack of more space were demanding access to schools, classrooms and more teachers.

Apart from a rising militancy and combativeness in their attitude towards the new government, COSAS had by now also developed a sophisticated view on several education policy issues. Earlier, it was described how the organization had developed its policy on the restoration of a culture of learning and teaching. Then, it was described how that approach was multi-faceted, and how it saw a substantive role for the organization in the development and implementation of a code of conduct for students and teachers. COSAS sees for itself a significant role in reconstructing school governance and the transformation of the formal and the implemented curriculum. The state's role was described as that of providing educational infrastructure and resources. In this view, the incorporation of interests would be the responsibility of both the state and organizations like COSAS.

It remains to be seen whether this vision will be transferred to other education policy domains at a time when public opinion is shifting towards a view that sees students now as learners, rather than substantive role players in either the politics of education or more narrowly, education policy. It also remains to be seen whether COSAS will be able to sustain the interest of students and continue to provide the organizational infrastructure necessary to transform relations in schools as a basis for a new order of governance and curriculum.

The entry of COSAS into the domains of discipline, power relations in schools and the curriculum raises a separate set of questions on whether, after almost two decades of education struggle, ungovernability and primordial forms of self-government, we may not soon see the return to a *discipline-centered curriculum* characterized by strict codes of conduct and of behavior. Public opinion, especially those of parents, strongly favor a return to discipline, playing into the hands of those in the education administration and teachers

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Business Day, January 17, 1995. And, the Province of the Northern Transvaal, *Citizen*, January 18, 1995.

[144]*Business Day*, February 15, 1995. *Daily News*, January 14, 1995. *Financial Mail*, February 10, 1995. *Sowetan*, January 31 and February 15, 1995.

who favor easy solutions to the ongoing and complex education crisis. So far COSAS has resisted this pressure. It has favored the social construction of a *democratic learning culture* that involves the active participation of students and teachers in the development of curriculum and in the learning enterprise. Students are not empty vessels to be filled, they have argued. How this vital policy matter plays itself out in education also has consequences for the wider society, where it has been the youth and students, from the days of Nelson Mandela to the days of the late Thamsanqa Rubusana, who have catalyzed creativity and critical thinking and stimulated people to take control of education and their lives. These values stood opposed to those of authoritarianism, statism and individualism, values that emanate from the Calvinist underpinning of apartheid and apartheid schooling. There are irresistible pressures in the aftermath of the death of (legislative) apartheid for a re-interpretation and transformation of COSAS' vision of a democratic learning culture by adversaries, allies and some in government, and for a return to discipline, authoritarianism and statism.

3.11 Environment Conference and the National General Council, 1994

COSAS' Evaluation/Strategic Planning Workshop[145] and later its National General Council,[146] provided the first opportunities to evaluate the implementation and progress made on the goals and objectives set in 1993. This time discussions were dominated by a new set of priorities of organizational maintenance and expansion, particularly so in the light of the organization's participation in the National Education and Training Forum (NETF) and the newly signed contracts with international and national donors. No fewer than thirty-one resolutions and issues were discussed and had some decision taken on them.[147] Most of these issues arose from or were related to COSAS' renewed resource

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[145]Congress of South African Students. *Report on the evaluation/strategic planning workshop held at Kwandebele from 25-29 July 1994.* Prepared by HAP Organizational Development Services. 11 August 1994. Johannesburg.

[146]Congress of South African Students. *The Secretariat Report for the National General Council at St. Luke's College.* 5-7 December 1994. Johannesburg. 1994.

[147]Congress of South African Students. *The Secretariat Report for the National General Council at St. Luke's College.* 5-7 December 1994. Johannesburg. 1994. Congress of South African Students. *The conditions of service for COSAS employee(s).* Johannesburg. ? 1994. Congress of South African Students. *Financial Systems and Controls. Memorandum for discussions.*

mobilization and concern for its public image. Related to these two priorities, twenty-one resolutions were discussed and decisions taken dealing with (1) financial policy, (2) financial systems and controls, (3) conditions of service, (4) organizational matters, including, recruitment, fund-raising, capacity building and leadership development, (5) environment, (6) tourism, (7) anti-crime, (8) health, including AIDS Awareness, (9) sexuality and the curriculum, (10) culture, (11) literacy awareness, (12) gender, (13) schools twinning, (14) employment of more organizers at head office, (15) the post of the general secretary (to be full time rather than voluntary), (16) salaries, (17) a recruitment drive in White, Coloured and Indian areas, (18) membership fees, (19) criteria for participation in the student front, (20) the timing of regional congresses (in relation to national congress), and (21) media.[148] These resolutions and discussions translate into workshop and meeting time, and reflect the increasing domination of COSAS' program and collective identity by the interacting themes of resource mobilization, organizational maintenance, expansion and public image. Not only had the organization come to successfully mobilize resources, but now, based on early evidence, its trajectory was being dominated by it.

Moreover, arising from its other major engagement in 1994, viz., the establishment of the NETF, another four resolutions and issues were discussed and decisions taken. These were (22) the need for an education research unit for COSAS, (23) the examination committee of the NETF, (24) composition of the NETF, and (25) skill empowerment in terms of curriculum.[149] The detail of the structure and functions of the NETF, as well as empowering itself, COSAS, to participate effectively in the workings of the NETF was also now coming to dominate the agenda and collective identity of the organization.

The remaining five resolutions and issues discussed and decisions taken on were (1) the forthcoming local government elections, (2) establishing a culture of learning and teaching, (3) the future of its ally, the NECC, (4) schools models, (5) the renaming of

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Proposed by Coopers & Lybrand. Johannesburg. ? 1994. Congress of South African Students. *Financial Policy*. Johannesburg. ? 1994. Also, Congress of Congress of South African Students. National General Council at St. Luke's College. 5-7 December 1994. Johannesburg. 1994. *Direct Observation*, pp. 4-15.

[148]ibid.

[149]ibid.

schools, and (6) working class leadership.[150] Politics, strategy and tactics, and specific education policy interventions were now diminishing in the activities and programs of the national organization, reflecting the requirements that active resource mobilization, viz. organizational routinization, impose on organizational evolution and emerging collective identity. Once successfully initiated, resource mobilization dramatically influences organizational evolution and collective identity, and this even in the case of a student organization.

4. Summary

This account of the emergence, death, succession, and re-emergence of COSAS has illustrated the role of social movement organizations such as COSAS as carriers of projects of social change and as active participants in the social construction and reconstruction of public policy domains and of public opinion. While education bureaucracies may be committed to an insulated policy model that is only acted on by themselves and participants in the formal polity, social movement organizations such as COSAS transform policy and educational practices through collective action outside of the insulated policy model. In doing so, they highlight the interrupted nature and multitude of sources of change rather than the smooth, cyclical and insulated policy model which education bureaucracies prefer.

The account has also suggested how the transformation of organizational collective identity is interwoven with the transformation of policy domains, including the *stakes*, here from mass organization through moments of ungovernability, primordial but interrupted forms of people's power, defense against extermination, resurgent defiance, through negotiated sharing of power, overarching *political cultures*, from conflictual to consensual models, and *solutions*, from combative militant collective action through negotiations, lobbying and patience. And these are less of a cyclical nature than whirlpools of forward and backward movement.

The entry of COSAS into the education policy domain, especially from 1983 on, signaled the entry of a formidable actor. And, the account has illustrated how the organization has highlighted new grievances and experiences, attributed responsibility, and

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[150]ibid.

offered solutions through collective action, then often militant and combative, but emanating from the nature of the stakes.

The prohibition placed on "any act whatsoever" of COSAS in 1985 also illustrated how states that command limited legitimacy confront and offer unsatisfactory solutions to inherent conflict and contradiction.

The account of COSAS has also illustrated how social movement organizations with conjunctural and historical organizational determinants such as transient leadership and membership evolve, especially in the context of revitalized resource mobilization. Lastly, it has also illustrated how organizational identity is transformed by resource mobilization, and that the requirements of resource mobilization, organizational routinization and credibility, and their outcomes are not much different for youth and student organizations such as COSAS than for social movement organizations with more stable patterns of leadership and membership.

5. Implications for theory and policy

The account has shown that the changes in COSAS' environment induced by the wider societal transition, as well as its successful mobilization of new resource opportunities opened up by this societal transition, had the following effects on the organization's post-apartheid identity. First, COSAS experienced an expansion in the scope of its goals resulting in the inclusion of new activities not previously considered, such as public health, AIDS/HIV and environmental education, tourism, anti-crime and peace campaigns. Second, COSAS experienced an elaboration of general goals into more specific programs and campaigns such as its code of conduct for students and teachers, its campaign for more education resources for those disadvantaged under apartheid and its *Year of Learning and Teaching* campaign. Third, COSAS experienced organizational routinization and professionalization such as the lengthening of the terms of office of organizational leaders and the employment of full-time officials to cope with endogenous organizational problems such as high leadership turnover and poor program implementation as well as with resource mobilization and managing and accounting for successfully mobilized resources. On the basis of these outcomes, COSAS' transition into the post-apartheid

period can be classified as a Type I transformation. However, COSAS also continued into early 1995 to use contentious collective action to pursue its goals and programs when confronting even the emerging democratic state. This would however not be sufficient to classify the organization's transition as a Type III transformation for it had successfully mobilized new resources which in turn had prompted organizational routinization and professionalization. It is on this basis that the account of the transition of COSAS into the mid-1990s fits a Type I transformation.

The case of COSAS has also highlighted an important difference between pupil and student SMOs with high leadership and membership turnover on the one hand and SMOs with more established and stable leadership and membership patterns on the other. Youth and student social movement organizations, especially in their early, non-routinized non-professionalized phases are best considered as special case social movement organizations. They should be studied as such. In these phases their trajectories are significantly influenced by endogenous organizational determinants, shared social projects and collective action frames that emanate from multi-organizational fields. There are however no smooth, predictable flows of collective identity. Rather, collective identity is the outcome of unpredictable and multiple sources of influence including the national, macro-societal field and an immediate organizational field. SMOs may thus in the pursuit of their social projects be seen to shift between these two fields. Thus the cycle of protest should be studied in its entirety to identify sources of change. Studying parts of the cycle of protest may come to conclusions that are nullified as the cycle continues and social movement organizations pursue their social projects.

The period of review of COSAS concludes in uncertainty, especially as concerns the continuity and durability of multi-organizational fields and shared collective action frames established and laid down by COSAS and its allies over an extended period of seventeen years. That multi-organizational field and shared collective action frames had consolidated mass organization against apartheid and apartheid education, realized ungovernability and primordial forms of people's power, endured the national State of Emergency and subsequent prolonged political negotiations, and won political power through elections. The task of winning state power and transforming the poverty stricken lives of their supporters, the majority of South Africans, still beckons. But, a compelling question

remains unsolved. Can the multi-organizational field and shared collective action frames of People's Education survive this new and complex phase?

This account has shown how social formations of that multi-organizational field, such as COSAS, have come to expect their leading partner, here, the African National Congress, to reproduce and continue the shared social projects into the reconstituted polity and the new government. It has also been shown how these formations initially declined to embark on previously practiced militant combative collective action, which emanated from previously shared collective action frames. In the case of COSAS, the organization argued that the new government needed time to get its plans finalized and its strategies in place. Moreover, COSAS initiated its own programs, aimed at restoring the culture of learning and teaching, reflecting its commitment to bridge the ungovernability frame and transform schooling conditions to those commensurate with the need to *learn to govern*. COSAS thus signaled its active participation in the processes of frame bridging and frame transformation.

Chapter 3

The South African Students Congress, 1986-1995: A Case of more contentious collective action and goal maintenance (Type III).

The beginning of 1995 saw an unprecedented, and in many ways, unexpected rise in contentious mass action in South Africa's higher education sector. Less than one year after the first democratic elections, university student organizations were engaging in a range of so-called "symbolic protests" such as hostage taking, occupation of university administration offices, littering of campuses, and the forceful removal of non-protesting students from lecture halls to profile their demands for a transparent and immediate organizational transformation of the old apartheid institutions. Student movements were pressing for the establishment of representative transformation forums that would eventually replace the existing governing bodies of higher education institutions. Under the campaign banner, *The Right to Learn*, students were also calling for a moratorium on financial exclusions and fee increases, the establishment of a national loan and bursary scheme to increase access for black students to higher education, and the reduction of the defense budget in favor of increased education spending. These actions raised questions about the extent to which the Government of National Unity (GNU) that replaced the apartheid government after the elections was successful with its project of producing and maintaining national unity, reconciliation and consensus building. On a larger scale, it raised questions about the transitional model to democracy (of power sharing through the country's Government of National Unity), its durability, and its operational rules. The resurgent mass action also raised questions about the role of social movements in the country's transitional model to democracy. To a great extent the nature of student demands was continuous with their past campaigns: demands centered around greater access of Blacks to universities and technikons, an end to the exclusion of students from academic

programs on grounds of financial need, democratization of governance bodies and representation in these bodies based upon the population profile of the country.

This case study of the emergence, middle and later evolution of the South African Students Congress will suggest that SMOs which are unable to mobilize the expanding and new resource opportunities created by the change in political regime are more likely to experience goal maintenance and to participate in even more dramatic contentious collective action which are linked to the field or site of mobilization such as the campuses of universities and schools rather than linked to the national socio-political transition. It will show that, unlike the high school student organization, the Congress of South African Students, which successfully mobilized the new resource opportunities created by the change in political regime (Chapter Two), the higher education student organization, the South African Students Congress was unable to mobilize these resources. It pursued even more dramatic collective action and mobilized specifically around issues of university and technikon access and the transformation of the governing bodies of these institutions.

For this study I triangulated fifteen two hour formal intensive interviews with SMO leaders from different time periods (1989-1995), with a review of ninety-five organizational documents (1990-1995), and the collation and review of one hundred and fifty-five press clippings (1985-1995). I also conducted thirty-five hours of participant observation and one hundred and eighty days of direct observation to determine end-points. The criteria for this analysis was shaped by the research questions: how do South African education SMOs transit through the country's early period of democratization as reflected in their goals, programs and campaigns given the goals, programs and campaigns at their emergence under apartheid.

In the remainder of the chapter, the organization's trajectory is described with emphasis on its emergence and transition into the 1990s (Section 1), a summary (Section 2) and the implications for SMO theory and policy (Section 3).

1. The Emergent phase. Activists of people's power

The emergence and later evolution of the South African Students Congress (SASCO) takes us through several historical periods and organizational forms, names and

collective identities. A systematic empirical analysis of this earlier period will not be attempted here, rather the focus will be on the later evolution of SASCO through the period of political negotiations and the transition to democracy.[151]

The trajectory of SASCO takes us through a two decade cycle of mobilization and tranquillity. Established in 1991 after the merger of the South African National Students Organization (SANSCO) with another student organization, the National Union of South African Students, SASCO mobilized black and white university, technikon and college of education students around: (i) the attainment of political democracy and the ending of apartheid and (ii) the democratization of the governing bodies of universities, technikons and colleges of education, increased access of black students to these institutions and curriculum change to accommodate for the experiences of black students under apartheid education. The leadership of SANSCO (1985-1991) and later SASCO (1991-) was drawn from the ranks of student members who were in the age cohort of eighteen to twenty-five years. Branches of SANSCO and later of SASCO were established at universities, technikons and colleges of education. These in turn were organized into regional chapters who elected delegates to the annual congresses of the organization.

1.1 People's power ... people's education

As described in Chapter Two, in 1985 high school, university, technikon and colleges of education student SMOs prepared to both mourn and celebrate the tenth anniversary of the 1976 Soweto student uprisings. They initiated a nation-wide education boycott and pushed for independent community-based organs of people's power to take charge of educational institutions. As described in Chapter Two and later in Chapter Four, this was a period of unprecedented levels of mass action as consumer boycotts, rent boycotts, bus boycotts, labor actions, and other kinds of action which expressed opposition

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[151]The collective identity of SASCO is closely interwoven with the histories and trajectories of its predecessors, the outlawed South African Student Organization (SASO) (1969-1977) - whose own identity was dominated by Black Consciousness - and the Azanian Student Organization (AZASO) (1979-1985) - whose emergent identity was continuous with that of SASO, namely Black Consciousness, but which was later transformed to that of *Charterism*. To reflect a shift from Black Consciousness to Charterism the Azanian Students Organization was renamed in 1985 the South African National Students Congress (SANSCO). *Interviews* A1, A2 and A8. Also, ERIP. *Azanian Students Organization*. Education: Students: AZASO. University of the Western Cape. Bellville. ? 1983.

to and defiance of the apartheid state became the order of township life and educational campuses. This new campaign was not only oppositional, it also began to establish rudimentary and precarious, but alternative and parallel organizations of people's power. Street, area and village committees replaced local government structures as local people's committees. Parent-Teacher-Student-Associations replaced government-appointed school committees, parents and alumni of especially black universities were mobilized by SANSCO to form alternative representative bodies and SANSCO organized successful boycotts of graduation ceremonies, staging alternative ceremonies in their place.

It is this context of general ungovernability (from the point of view of the State) and self-government (through organizations of people's power from the point of view of the black majority) within which higher education student and other education organizations opened up a new era in the struggle for the control of their institutions.[152] It is this

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[152]Carrim, Y., & Sayed, Y. "Civil society, social movements and the National Education Coordinating Committee." *Perspectives in Education*, Vol. 14 No 1 Summer 1992/93. Chisholm, L. "From Revolt to a Search for Alternatives." *Work in Progress*. Nov. 1986. Gardiner, M. "Efforts at creating alternative curricula: conceptual and practical considerations." In Nkomo, M. (ed.) *Pedagogy of Domination*. Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, Inc. 1990. Hawarden, J. "Apartheid Education 1986." *Conference on Education Against Apartheid*, International Federation of Free Teachers Unions, Lusaka, 23-25 March 1987. Hyslop, J. "Teacher Resistance in African Education from the 1940s to the 1980s" In Nkomo (ed.) *Pedagogy of Domination*. New Jersey: Africa World Press, Inc. 1990. Kruss, G. "People's Education: An Examination of the Concept." *People's Education Research Project No.1*. Center for Adult and Continuing Education (CACE). Bellville: University of the Western Cape. February, 1988. Levin, R. "People's Education and the Politics of Negotiation in South Africa." *Perspectives in Education*. 12, 2(1991) 1-18. Mashamba, G. "A Conceptual Critique of the People's Education Discourse." *Review of African Political Economy*. 48. 1990. And, *People's Education: the people's choice*. Maskew Miller Longman: Cape Town. 1991. Mkhatshwa, S. "Keynote Address." In *Report on the National Consultative Conference on the Crisis in Education*.1985. Muller, J. "People's Education and the National Education Crisis Committee." In Moss, G and Obery, I. *South African Review 4*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press. 1987. Naidoo, K. "The politics of student resistance in the 1980s." In Nkomo, M. (ed.) *Pedagogy of Domination*. Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, Inc. 1990. Obery, I. *South African Review 4*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press. 1987. Rensburg, I. *States, Actors and Conflict. Contesting Education: The People's Education Movement of South Africa and the State, 1984-1986*. Unpublished monograph. Stanford University School of Education. 1993. Resolutions form the First National Education Consultative Conference, 1985. Reprinted In Nkomo, M. (ed.) *Pedagogy of Domination*. Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, Inc. 1990. Resolutions from the Second National Education Consultative Conference, 1986. Reprinted In Nkomo, M. (ed.) *Pedagogy of Domination*. Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, Inc. 1990. Sisulu, Z. Keynote Address: People's Education for People's Power. *Second National Education Conference On the Crisis in Education*. Durban. 1986. Wolpe, H. *Three theses on people's education*. Research on Education in South Africa (RESA). Occasional Paper No 5. University of Essex. 1990. *Work In Progress*. 1986a, December. "People's Education: Creating a Democratic Future." 42, May. 1986b. "The

movement that became known as the Movement for People's Education, that was led by the National Education Crisis Committee (See Chapter Five), and carried by the South African National Students Congress (SANSCO), COSAS, grassroots-based teacher unions (see Chapter Four) and other education SMOs.

For higher education transformation, this opened a first step on the route of organizational change, here referred to as Phase 1 of transformation. For SANSCO, this was the period to transform higher education institutions "From Ivory Towers to People's Universities." Their campaigns were directed particularly at the establishment of representative institutional governing bodies, and for these to adopt a program of radical transformation of the institutions. This first phase, of seeking radical change along a single legitimate project of people's power, made its first gain with the transformation process launched at the University of the Western Cape in 1986, and can count other successes such as the transformation of the governing bodies at the University of Fort Hare (1991) and of the North (1992).

2. Into the 1990s. From people's power to negotiated transition to democracy

The 1990s opened up with a decisive break with the politics of conflict between supporters and opponents of apartheid of the past decades. Resurgent mass action against apartheid and international developments prompted political and constitutional negotiations on the future of South Africa. These international developments included the collapse of the communist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and the negotiated settlement in Angola between the South African regime, the Angolan government and Cuba which led to the evacuation of Cuban troops from Angola. For the first time public negotiations were initiated between the apartheid regime and the African National Congress, with the full endorsement of the Front-line States and the Organization of African Unity.[153] By the end of 1990, the national liberation movements were unbanned, Nelson

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NECC: Doing Battle with the DET." 45, Nov/Dec. 1986c. "DET destroys education in Duncan Village." Nov/Dec.

[153]Organization of African Unity. "Declaration of the OAU Ad-Hoc Committee on Southern Africa on the Question of South Africa." Harare, Zimbabwe. 21st August, 1989. In, *Joining the*

Mandela and many other political prisoners were released from prison, exiles were returning home to South Africa, the National State of Emergency had been lifted, and negotiations had begun. The political landscape had been transformed, and anti-apartheid SMOs which had been in the front-line of anti-apartheid opposition were confronted with new challenges.

2.1 The rise and re-emergence of the national liberation movements

In this, the first year of political and constitutional negotiations for a reconstituted polity that included the previously excluded majority population, SANSCO programs and campaigns focused predominantly on facilitating the re-building and consolidation of the African National Congress (ANC). Organizational programs were dominated by political programs, and in particular by calls for the establishment of a Constituent Assembly to draft a new constitution for South Africa, and an Interim Government to rule the country until the final constitution was drafted. While the organization also made calls for the transformation of higher education, this call was non-specific, and mobilization around the project limited.

By the end of 1990, however, SANSCO had established a National Transformation Commission tasked with developing specific policy proposals in identified policy intervention areas. At the ninth Congress of SANSCO (1991) the organization described transformation as

> part and parcel of our overall strategy to win social space for the liberation forces and for all democratically minded people. It ... seeks to achieve total overhauling of the education system at tertiary level. We ... seek to democratize all tertiary learning centers, to make tertiary education more accessible to all students, particularly black students disadvantaged by years of inferior [B]antu [E]ducation ... to address the contents of what is taught and its relevance to the community.[154]

The areas where policy for transformation was to be developed were: democratizing structures of control, admission and exclusion of students, curriculum change and

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ANC. An Introductory Handbook to the African National Congress. African National Congress. Johannesburg. May 1990.

[154]South African National Students Congress. *P.O.A. (Program of Action) 1991.* 1991. Also, interviews A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6, A7, A8, A10, A11 and A12.

development and the autonomy of higher education institutions.[155] Whereas in the 1980s the focus was on opposition, that now shifted to policies for transformation.

2.2 The end of an era ... of people's education?

But the SANSCO of 1985-86 had undergone a collective identity transformation. Organizational leaders no longer pushed for people's power and people's education. Rather, they were now concerned with the creation of national unity, reconciliation and the state. Four explanations account for this transformation.

First, the call from SANSCO's Charterist alliance partners had changed. The unfolding political environment, buttressed by the changing international and regional politics[156] supported the emergence of a macro-societal level master frame of negotiated, all inclusive political settlements as opposed to mass insurrection, military-backed seizure of power and revolutionary and radical change. Thus, seizure of power made way for negotiating a "transfer of power" to the people, a change from conflictual politics to consensus politics, and from people's power to national unity and reconciliation. Mobilization around a single hegemonic project of *people's power and people's education for multi-party democracy*, a culture of political tolerance and the recognition of others' "stakes" advanced by stakeholders, were also asserted. The civil disobedience of 1989 which continued into much of 1990 was directed at preparing the way for South Africa's own negotiated settlement. The heightened mobilization of 1989 was dominated by calls for the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners, the lifting of the ban on the national liberation movements and the State of Emergency, the return of all exiled South Africans without fear of prosecution, the establishment of an Interim Government, and the beginning of political and constitutional negotiations for a reconstituted and an all inclusive polity through a Constituent Assembly. This master frame, set and propagated by the

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[155]ibid.

[156]Elements of the new international and regional politics which impacted the South African transition were the shift from a multi-polar to uni-polar world political stage in the wake of the collapse of the communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the resultant breakdown in international solidarity for military-backed seizure of power, the successful completion of a negotiated settlement in Angola and the economic stagnation and disruption of the region's economies by the South African regime.

national liberation movements, became SANSCO's, and later SASCO's, main project.[157] SANSCO became its carrier, and in the process, people's power and people's education became dominated and later displaced. By 1992, SASCO's campaign call "From Ivory Towers to People's Universities" had been transformed into campaigns such as the *Right to Learn* and *Transformation* (see below).

Second, the development of the political instruments of people's power, and especially people's education, from campaign slogans to implementable institutional forms remained at a primitive stage. In 1985-86, the focus was on mobilizing the widest support base against apartheid and for people's power. Developing policy in the face of mobilization and repression was put on the back-burner. It was in response to this gap in the people's education movement's strategy that the NECC established Education Policy Units at the end of the 1980s. These units were to develop concrete policy to advance people's power and people's education.

Third, the wide-ranging and politically crippling State of Emergency (1986-1990) - that severely weakened all the anti-apartheid opposition, with the protagonists of people's power its primary target - had interrupted the development of people's power and people's education. This was especially so from February 1988, when the apartheid regime banned several organizations, including SANSCO, the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC) and the National Education Union of South Africa (NEUSA).

Fourth, it remains unclear to what extent consensus had been reached within the anti-apartheid opposition about people's power and people's education. Indeed, people's power and people's education had but a short window of opportunity through which to emerge, develop and extend its influence, beginning in December 1985, and continuing through June 1986, and in a very limited and clandestine manner until December 1987.

Later policy documents on educational transformation of the NECC - such as the widely influential National Education Policy Investigation (Nepi)[158] - and of the ANC -

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[157]South African National Students Congress. *P.O.A. (Programme of Action) 1991*. 1991.

[158]National Education Policy Investigation. *Briefing Papers*. 14 February 1992. Johannesburg. National Education Policy Investigation. *Education Demands of the Progressive Education Movement: Draft per written for the NEPI Principles and Frameworks Committee*. Johannesburg. April 1991. National Education Policy Investigation. *Outline*. ? 1991. National Education Policy Investigation. *The Contradictory Process of Curriculum Planning and renewal for*

such as its flagships, the Policy Framework for Education and Training (PFET) and Implementation Plan for Education and Training (IPET)[159] - reflect and confirm the decline of the influence of people's power and people's education and the entrenchment of the dimensions of a new master frame: consensual politics, a stakeholder culture, national unity and reconciliation. It is within this master frame that the search of the anti-apartheid movement for democracy, non-racialism, affirmative action (also "redress" in South African parlance), equality and equity now had to be conducted.

South African Schools Today. Research Group: Curriculum. ? Johannesburg. ? 1991. National Education Policy Investigation. *Media Briefing*. ? 1992. Johannesburg. National Education Policy Investigation. *Report from the Administration and Control Sub-Group on the Education Renewal Strategy (ERS) Document*. ? 1992. National Education Policy Investigation. *Leaflet marketing/advertising Framework Report and Final Report Summaries*. ? 1992. National Education Policy Investigation, Research Group: Planning, System and Structure. *Re-organizing the education system - possibilities for the year 2000. Draft*. 2 February 1992. Donaldson, A. Department of Economics, Rhodes University. Grahamstown, South Africa. 1992. National Education Policy Investigation (N.E.P.I.). Briefing Papers (14 February 1992). National Education Policy Investigation (N.E.P.I.). *Working Paper. Post-Secondary Education in South Africa: an overview*. Ian Bunting. February 1992. Cape Town. National Education Policy Investigation. *Adult Education* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press and NECC, 1992). National Education Policy Investigation. *Adult Basic Education* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press and NECC, 1992). National Education Policy Investigation. *Curriculum* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press and NECC, 1992). National Education Policy Investigation. *Early Childhood Educare* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press and NECC, 1992). National Education Policy Investigation. *Education Planning, Systems, and Structure* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press and NECC, 1992). National Education Policy Investigation. *The Framework Report and Final Report Summaries* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press and NECC, 1992). National Education Policy Investigation. *Governance and Administration* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press and NECC, 1992). National Education Policy Investigation. *Human Resources Development* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press and NECC, 1992). National Education Policy Investigation. *Language* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press and NECC, 1992). National Education Policy Investigation. *Library and Information Services* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press and NECC, 1992). National Education Policy Investigation. *Post-Secondary Education* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press and NECC, 1992). National Education Policy Investigation. *Support Services* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press and NECC, 1992). National Education Policy Investigation. *Teacher Education* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press and NECC, 1992. The National Education Policy Investigation Reports. *Planning Our Future: Education Policy for Change* ([Johannesburg]: Learn and Teach Publications, 1992).

[159]African National Congress. Education Department. *A Policy Framework for Education and Training. Draft: For Discussion Purposes Only*. January 1994. Braamfontein. African National Congress. Education Department. *Implementation Plan for Education and Training*. May 1994. Johannesburg. African National Congress. Education Department. *Implementation Plan for Education and Training (IPET)*: Summary Report of the IPET Task Teams. Johannesburg. May, 1994.

2.3 Master frames, politics and the Great Policy Era

1991 was dominated by calls by the African National Congress, the dominant force in political and constitutional negotiations on behalf of the anti-apartheid movement and of the Charterist Alliance, as well as blacks and democratically minded white South Africans, to "prepare to govern". This deepened the push for the development of concrete policies to transform and govern educational institutions. This new dimension of the emerging master frame, i.e. one of development, rather than resistance began to enter into the political culture and organizational practices of the anti-apartheid opposition. Specifically, it meant a shift from anti-apartheid struggles to development. It opened up the Great Policy Era during which considerable organizational resources and effort were directed at the development of policies for the new democracy. For SANSCO, it meant accelerating its plans to set specific targets for higher education transformation. In this drive for policy as a conduit for transformation, SANSCO's mid-year National General Councils now gave way to policy conferences, and year-end congresses were now supplemented with two to three day-long policy conferences.[160]

But, if the early part of this decade was marked by the push for the establishment of policy forums and the formulation of policies for a post-apartheid South Africa, then it was also marked by the rise of negotiations and of negotiation forums searching for political, economic and social change. These were not only macro-political negotiations and forums, but also social-sectoral negotiations and forums which emerged parallel to each other, and

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[160]Interview A3. See also, South African National Students Congress and National Union of South African Students. *Summary of SANSCO/NUSAS Education Summit.* Peninsula Technikon. 8th September 1990. South African National Students Congress and National Union of South African Students. *Launching congress terms of reference.* 1991. South African National Students Congress and National Union of South African Students. *Launching Congress. Programme.* Rhodes University. 5-7 September 1991. South African Students Congress. *Education and Development Conference. Proposal.* 7-11 July 1992. University of the North. South African Students Congress. *First National Congress. Programme and Terms of Reference.* University of Durban-Westville. 5th-10th December 1992. South African Students Congress. *Draft Programme for Congress 1993.* South African Students Congress. *2nd Annual Congress. Congress Package.* Includes constitution, policy document, code of conduct, procedure for elections, congress resolutions and secretariat report. Technikon Northern Transvaal. Soshanguve, Pretoria. 26 November-2 December 1993. South African Students Congress. *Press Statement on SASCO 2nd Annual Congress.* 1993. South African Students Congress. *Congress Package* (Includes secretariat report, constitution, policy document, terms of reference, and procedures for elections.) 3rd Annual Congress. 30 November-4 December 1994. University of the North, Sovenga, Pietersburg. 1994.

paralled to political and constitutional negotiations. The establishment of a National Education Delegation under the leadership of Nelson Mandela (1991-92), a Joint Working Group on Education (1991), comprising state and anti-apartheid delegations, a National Education Conference of the anti-apartheid movement (1992-95), and later a National Education and Training Forum (1993-95), comprising delegations from the state, anti-apartheid movement and the business sector, were the prominent fora created nationally to mobilize support for the anti-apartheid movement, and for national education negotiations. Mobilization in support of these forums (especially the National Education and Training Forum) required considerable resources from participating organizations and consequently drew important resources and leaders away from grassroots mobilization and organizational maintenance. If this were the case for SANSCO, it was even more so for its alliance partners such as the South African Democratic Teachers Union, COSAS, the NECC and the ANC's Education Department.

The evidence shows that in this period the shift in focus to the development of policies, combined with ongoing political and constitutional negotiations paralled a decline in mass mobilization. Hardly one year after a resurgence of collective action, mass mobilization had given way to the Great Policy Era.

2.4 International support and the merger with NUSAS: the roots of a New Social Movement project

Additional dimensions of the emergent master frame were also making their mark on the South African transition. It was at this time that international support for the (former) anti-apartheid movement shifted from support for democratization and resistance to support for organizational capacity building (in preparation of governance) and for development programs.[161] In tandem with this policy shift, direct support to anti-apartheid

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[161]Samoff, Joel. *After Apartheid, What? A Review of Externally Initiated, Commissioned, and Supported Studies of Education in South Africa*, (Paris: Donors to African Education and UNESCO, Division for Policy and Sector Analysis, May, 1994). Samoff, J., Z. Groener., and I. Rensburg. *Anti-Apartheid and Development.* A Review of Swedish Support to the Education of South Africans. Prepared for the Education Division, Swedish International Development Authority. 21 September 1993. Samoff, J., Z. Groener., and I. Rensburg. *Anti-Apartheid and Development. Interim Recommendations.* A Review of Swedish Support to the Education of South Africans. Prepared for the Education Division, Swedish International Development Authority. 27 January 1994. Samoff, J., Z. Groener., and I. Rensburg. *Anti-Apartheid and Development.* A Review of

SMOs for anti-apartheid political campaigns waned. Organizations like SANSCO, now SASCO (see the account of this transition below) sought to re-orient themselves to mobilize these shifting resources. SASCO expressed deep concern for the potential subversion of the organization's political character and project.[162] Organizers were keenly aware of the influence international support had on organizational identity. Specifically, the organization adopted three projects with this shifting resource base in mind. Influenced by the Necc's call for an Intensive Learning Campaign to help prepare black high school students for their final school exams late in 1990, SANSCO developed its own Intensive Learning Program. Later, in 1991, as SASCO, it developed and sought resources for its Leadership Development Project and its Literacy Project. All of these projects fulfilled the new master frame set by international donors and SASCO's goals overlapped with those of donors.

These projects had additional and more specific organizational objectives. SANSCO wanted to improve its financial systems, accountability and reporting practices.[163] Its difficulties with sustaining these had created problems for its fund-raising program. Also, high turnover in its leadership brought about by their short terms of office frustrated attempts at routinization. International resource providers' preference for routinized financial systems, accountability and reporting, precipitated an opportunity for dealing with these difficult organizational matters.

There were additional outcomes of the shifting focus of international resources. The shift introduced New Social Movement projects into the programs of SANSCO and later

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Swedish Support to the Education of South Africans 1994. Prepared for the Education Division, Swedish International Development Authority. 28 January 1994. Samoff, Joel, Zelda Groener, and Ihron Rensburg. *"Anti-Apartheid and Development: Education in South Africa,"* San Diego: Comparative and International Education Society Annual Conference, March, 1994. Samoff, J., Z Groener & I Rensburg. *Anti-apartheid and Development. Education in South Africa.* Paper presented at the Comparative and International Education Society, 38th Annual Meeting. March 21-24, 1994. San Diego. Samoff, J., Z. Groener., and I. Rensburg. *Contested Transitions. A Review of Swedish Support to the Education of South Africans: Final Report.* 1994. Prepared for the Education Division, Swedish International Development Authority. Revised 12 September 1994. Samoff, J., Z. Groener., and I. Rensburg. *Contested Transitions. A Review of Swedish Support to the Education of South Africans: Final Report.* 1994. Prepared for the Education Division, Swedish International Development Authority. Revised 28 September 1994.

[162]South African Students Congress. *Proposal to the SASCO NEC on finance for 1992.* South African Students Congress. *Practical approach to organizational finances and fund-raising.* 1992.

[163]ibid.

SASCO. SASCO had introduced Environmental and AIDS Awareness Campaigns by 1993 although gender equity was already well entrenched in SANSCO's program as early as the 1980s. As illustrated in the case study of COSAS in Chapter Two, international aid sought out these areas for support in the 1990s, and organizations such as SASCO geared themselves to mobilize these resources.

But this was not the only source for the introduction of New Social Movement projects campaigns into SASCO's collective identity. The merger of SANSCO with the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) later in 1991 saw the transfer of these New Social Movement projects, by then already entrenched in the programs of NUSAS, to SASCO.[164] The merger with NUSAS also heightened gender sensitivity, and it introduced sports and religious questions, and even the issue of student parking on campuses into SANSCO's collective identity.[165] It is therefore more accurate to see the insertion of such projects into program of SASCO (1993/94) as a consolidation of their earlier entry into the organization via NUSAS (1991). The release of targeted resources by international donors thus entrenched an earlier collective identity transformation initiated by the SANSCO merger with NUSAS. However when appraising the embeddedness of the dimensions of a New Social Movement culture in the collective identity of SASCO one can only draw the conclusion that transformation is incomplete. For, while the organization's formal programs and projects reflect it as an organization driven by the need to transform higher

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[164]Interviews A2, A3, A4, A7, A8 and A9.

[165]Interviews A2, A3, A4 and A7. South African Students Congress. *Report of the first SASCO NEC meeting*. 21 and 22 September 1991. South African Students Congress. *Programme of Action 1992*. ? 1992. South African Students Congress. *SASCO Fact Sheet*. ? 1992. South African Students Congress. *Education and Development Conference. Proposal*. 7-11 July 1992. University of the North. South African Students Congress. *Discussion paper on: Sexual harassment*. 1992. South African Students Congress. *Proposal to the SASCO NEC on finance for 1992*. South African Students Congress. *Practical approach to organizational finances and fund-raising*. 1992. South African Students Congress. *Projects Department 1992*. 1992. South African Students Congress. *First National Congress. Programme and Terms of Reference*. University of Durban-Westville. 5th-10th December 1992. South African Students Congress. *Report of the independent auditors to the members of SASCO*. 8 December 1992. Johannesburg. South African Students Congress. *A summary of the views of SASCO on the way forward in* [the] *national democratic struggle*. ? 1993. South African Students Congress. *National Leadership Workshop. Background document*. 19-21 March 1993. Safari International Hotel. Johannesburg. 1993. South African Students Congress. *Projects for 1993*. South African Students Congress. *The intensive learning project*. ? 1993. South African Students Congress. *Environment awareness campaign*. ? 1993. South African Students Congress. *Voter education workshop*. 1993.

education *and* to transform prevailing gender relations as well as raising awareness on environmental and AIDS concerns, it is the former rather than the latter dimensions of its collective identity that resonates with large sections of potential members and supporters, the public, and organizers. Importantly, the organization failed to mobilize significant resources even as it re-engineered its programs to mobilize the new resources created by opening of the polity and the transition to democracy.

2.5 Endogenous organizational determinants. A new generation of students, leaders and the merger with NUSAS

Three endogenous organizational factors dominated the evolution of SASCO in the first half of the 1990s. First, a new generation of school leavers was gaining access to higher education. Unlike previous generations schooled in a period of resistance and struggle, this generation, especially the cohort that entered from 1992 onwards, were schooled in a period of political and constitutional negotiations, when the political-cultural master frame shifted to consensual politics, reconciliation and nation-building. Whereas the previous cohort of high school students was successfully mobilized by the left education SMO, the Congress of South African Students (COSAS), in the black schools of the Department of Education and Training, student leaders now argued that the new cohort was dominated by students coming from private schools and the schools of the former Bantustans that were less successfully mobilized by COSAS. Student leaders described the 1990s cohort as more degree-oriented and more focused on developing professional careers than on community empowerment, the political struggle and the transformation of higher education and higher educational institutions.[166] [167] In line with this perception, organizational leaders predicted that organizational recruitment strategies as well as programs and campaigns would undergo change, resulting in a probable further transformation of SASCO's collective identity in the second half of the 1990s. Immediate

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[166]Interviews A1, A3, A7, A8 and A9. Also, interviews with student leaders at the University of the Witwatersrand and Cape Town, In *Weekly Mail*, February 3, 1995.

[167]Further quantitative and qualitative research would have to establish the validity of this proposition of a new "1990s" cohort and of its effect on student mobilization. My research strategy was to deduce collective identity from congresses and fora, policy shifts and interviews with organizational leaders rather than to explore how identities were in fact reconstitued within membership.

organizational strategies were now centered around the expansion and improvement of the effectiveness of political education programs and leadership training projects.[168]

Second, the large turnover in leadership increased ideological variance and spontaneity in organizational collective actions. These were exacerbated by the rise of the new generation student. Already, SASCO leaders argued, the increase in "immature and inexperienced leadership" has resulted in an increase in contentious collective action at a time when cool heads were needed.[169] SASCO leaders argued further that regional variance across leadership politics and style, as well as type of institutions and local experiences, may exacerbate this, at least until leadership training and political education programs have become enduring features of the organization and introduced common perspectives and strategies.[170] The significant turnover in leadership brought about by their short terms of office and leadership preparation times also complicated efforts to achieve organizational uniformity in terms of ideological perspectives, knowledge, experience and maturity, and the building of trust among each other.[171]

Third, after two years of discussion the merger with NUSAS had become a reality in the second half of 1991.[172] But, SASCO leaders claimed that the merger had little effect on

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[168]Interview A4.

[169]Interview A4.

[170]For example, the Johannesburg-based leadership organizes largely at historically white liberal and Afrikaans campuses. Because of their perception of resistance at these institutions to transformation, they favor contentious collective action. The Western Cape-based leadership adopts a more theoretical perspective on transformation and its leadership is dominated by "working class extremists" who pursue contentious collective action rather than negotiate solutions with a more sympathetic university management. On the other hand, historically black universities have in recent years been more susceptible to change, and leadership of SASCO there is dominated by "pragmatists" who have utilized the opportunities created by transformation campaigns to talk to institutional management and governing councils. Interview A3.

[171]It takes six months for a new recruit to "get to grips with leadership," yet then only six months remain (of the one year term of office) until congress, where most often that leader is not re-elected. Average terms in office are only two, being the equivalent of two years. In an increasing number of instances now, national leaders may even have bypassed serving as branch or regional officials, resulting on "not well grounded leadership" making their way into the national leadership structures. While full time staff may reduce discontinuities, the organization does not command the resources necessary to employ staff. Interviews A3, A4, A6, A7, A8, A9.

[172]South African National Students Congress and National Union of South African Students. (Announcement of) *Launch of new non-racial student organization in South Africa.* 25 March 1991. South African National Students Congress and National Union of South African Students. *Launching congress terms of reference.* 1991. South African National Students Congress and

the collective identity and trajectory of SASCO, apart from serving as an entry point and source for the consolidation of New Social Movement projects. The merger with NUSAS should predictably have influenced organizational collective identity to the extent that the entry of white students via NUSAS, and the mobilization of that sector of the student body by SASCO should have precipitated a diversified recruitment strategy and a diversified organizational program. Expanding the white member base of SASCO predictably should have been the impetus for such a diversified strategy. However, this did not materialize. What explains this "washed out effect" of the merger? Two explanations can clarify the matter.

First, the early part of the 1990s was a period of profuse recruitment of membership by political organizations. In pursuit of this project, mobilizing the majority black community meant focusing on their experiences and grievances. SASCO, an organization located firmly within the Charterist Alliance, and having identified itself at this time as a political student organization, acted within this organizational and ideological master frame: it focused on the grievances and experiences of black students in the pursuit of their support and membership. SASCO members were also recruited directly into the African National Congress, its youth league and the South African Communist Party. Recruiting white students and focusing on their experiences and grievances, which were predominantly middle class and suited New Social Movement projects, according to SASCO leaders, was

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National Union of South African Students. *Discussion paper on organizing women.* ? 1991. South African National Students Congress and National Union of South African Students. *Launching Congress. Programme.* University of Durban Westville. 9-13 July 1991. South African National Students Congress and National Union of South African Students. *Launching Congress. Programme.* Rhodes University. 5-7 September 1991. South African National Students Congress and National Union of South African Students. *The role of one organization and its relationship to SRCs.* 1991. South African National Students Congress and National Union of South African Students. *Draft Policy Document.* ? 1991. South African National Students Congress and National Union of South African Students. *Political Alignment Commission Minutes.* Launching Congress. Rhodes University. 5-7 September 1991. South African National Students Congress and National Union of South African Students. *Presidential Message.* SASCO Launching Congress. Rhodes University. 5-7 September 1991. South African National Students Congress and National Union of South African Students. *Building a single non-racial student organization. A challenge of our time. A Discussion paper.* ? 1990. South African National Students Congress and National Union of South African Students. *Summary of SANSCO/NUSAS Education Summit.* Peninsula Technikon. 8th September 1990.

less of an immediate concern, and could be postponed until after the county's first democratic elections.

Second, the simple quantitative dominance of black students and their experiences within the organization washed out the minuscule effect of the experiences and concerns of the white membership. In addition, the realities of organizational leadership turnover and variance may only have exacerbated the muted effect of the SANSCO-NUSAS merger. But the outcome of this strategic choice of focus for its mobilization - the political experiences of black students as opposed to New Social Movement and specific concerns of all students - is likely to have a telling effect on the recruitment and mobilizing fortunes of SASCO in the second half of the 1990s.

2.6 Transforming higher education and higher education institutions, 1992

If 1990 and 1991 had seen a greater focus on broader community political questions and the merger with NUSAS, March of 1992 saw a greater focus by SASCO on specific transformation programs. Transformation was now inserted into the higher education sector in a significant manner. Marches, petitions, and occupations of government and higher education institutional offices became the mechanism for inserting the specificities of higher education transformation into the public discourse and more specifically into the discourse on educational transformation: representative governing councils, greater access and higher graduation rates for black students, higher education programs which focused on the developing sector of South Africa with emphasis on matters such as primary health care and teacher development and access programs for black high school students. Most of this initial mobilization was focused on institutions in the most populous Southern Transvaal region. The region is the nerve center of the mass media and the location of several higher education institutions. Collective action was focused on: the University of the Witwatersrand, East Rand College of Education, Transvaal College of Education, Kathorus College of Education and the Daveyton and Soweto campuses of the Vista University.[173] Later in the year, campaigns targeted the administration and institutions in the former

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[173]Public announcement of SASCO's plans for 1992, and reports thereon: *Weekly Mail*, February 7, 1992 and *City Press*, March 8, 1992. Also, interviews A4 and A7. And, South African Students Congress. *Programme of Action 1992*. ? 1992.

Bantustan of the Transkei.[174] Mobilization was directed at specific policy areas: the rights of students, transformation and democratization of higher education institutions, increased access of black students to higher education institutions, calls for a moratorium on the exclusion of students unable to meet their financial obligations to their institutions, and improved teaching and learning. SASCO re-launched its Education Charter Campaign, seeking through it to develop a set of demands and popular support for higher education transformation.

At the end of 1992, SASCO for the first time publicly contested dimensions of the emerging macro-societal level master frame. Arising from the political and constitutional negotiations, the African National Congress (ANC) had argued that "the path to [political] power" and to government, required that the anti-apartheid movement make concessions to the political incumbents and their administrative personnel. Such concessions could include the provision of safeguards for public servants against their dismissal on political grounds by a democratically elected government (which presumably would expect to appoint its own administrative personnel). These concessions although contested by SASCO later became part of the "sunset clauses" which were eventually incorporated in the country's transitional constitution.

For SASCO the apartheid bureaucracy represented obstacles to transforming South Africa and its social institutions. They had to be removed and replaced by those loyal to the democratically elected government and the Reconstruction and Development Program of the Charterist Alliance. Until this time, SASCO had effectively (been) moved to the margins of the political debate, and this intervention was an attempt to re-enter the political discussion as an important actor. Following discussion at its annual congress, SASCO leadership was mandated to call "all components of the liberation movement [to] come together in a formal conference to chart the way forward" and to develop consistent and coherent strategies and tactics on constitutional negotiations.[175]

SASCO also launched two New Social Movement campaigns in 1992. First, it launched its AIDS Awareness Campaign. This campaign sought to increase awareness

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[174]*Daily Despatch*, August 19, 1992.

[175]South African Students Congress. *A summary of the views of SASCO on the way forward in* [the] *national democratic struggle*. ? 1993. Also, Citizen, December 17, 1992.

among students about the nature and causes of AIDS, and about mechanisms to prevent the disease. Additionally, the campaign was geared at highlighting the "general lack of health facilities and knowledge about the disease for the majority of South Africans."[176] Simultaneously, SASCO launched its Environment Awareness Campaign

> to educate and learn from students about environmental problems in South Africa and the rest of the world. To highlight contemporary methods of solving some of these problems, which in S[outh] A[frica] were mostly due to decades of apartheid rule ... . To build an environmentally friendly student community.[177]

2.7 Extending scope and impact of the transformation campaign, 1993

August through October of 1993 saw an even greater narrowing and combination of SASCO's *Transformation* and *Right to Learn Campaigns*. As described in Chapters Two and Four, 1993 had by then already proved to be a year of concerted and contentious collective action on the part of SASCO's education alliance partners, the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) and the South African Democratic Teachers' Union (Sadtu). These campaigns had focused on calls for an end to the apartheid government's unilateral restructuring of education, including its attempts to rationalize its teaching personnel,[178] for the establishment of a national negotiating forum for education, for improved remuneration packages for teachers (Sadtu) and the scrapping of the examination entrance fee that final year school students had to pay the state (COSAS). The problems of apartheid education, in its schooling and higher education sectors, and solutions offered by the anti-apartheid education movement received unprecedented media and public attention throughout the year.

Through SASCO's *Democracy Now Campaign*, the organization stepped up the pressure for the democratization of governance of higher educational institutions. Through

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[176]South African Students Congress. *Education and Development Conference. Proposal.* 7-11 July 1992. University of the North.

[177]South African Students Congress. *Education and Development Conference. Proposal.* 7-11 July 1992. University of the North. Also, South African Students Congress. *Projects for 1993.* South African Students Congress. *Environment awareness campaign.* ? 1993.

[178]In this context, rationalization was a signifier for the retrenchment of especially Colored teachers.

its *Freedom of Political Activity Campaign*, that was directed especially at the Bantustans of Bophuthatswana and kwaZulu, it mobilized for the rights of freedom of expression and recruitment at educational institutions. As in 1992, under the *Right to Learn Campaign*, calls were also made for moratoria on financial exclusions of black students and fee increases so as to open and increase access for black students to higher education. And, as part of its *Transformation Campaign*, collective action once more targeted the dissolution of higher education institutions' governing councils, said by SASCO to be unrepresentative of the South African community, and which it argued were undemocratically appointed. These had to be replaced with more representative governing bodies, but in the interim, while the composition and functions of governing councils were debated and negotiated "broad transformation forums" had to be installed to guide the democratization and transformation of these institutions. Both the *Right to Learn* and the *Transformation Campaigns*, this time stretched beyond the Southern Transvaal, into higher education institutions across the country.[179]

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[179]For media accounts on the ongoing and high profile University of the Witwatersrand crisis, see *Business Day*, August 27, 1993, October 1, 1993, October 12, 1993, October 7, 1994, October 28, 1994; *Citizen*, January 26, 1994, February 3, 1994, February 5, 1994, August 26, 1994, October 12, 1994, October 21, 1994, October 26, 1994; *Financial Mail*, November 4, 1994; *The Star*, October 12, 1993, October 21, 1994, *Sowetan*, October 21, 1993, October 27, 1993, October 28, 1994; *Sunday Times*, October 9, 1994, October 30, 1994, November 3, 1994, November 27, 1994. For other flash points and collective action reported in the media, see *Business Day*, October 12, 1993 (tertiary student funding), *Cape Times*, September 1, 1993, *The Star*, September 1, 1993 (University of Cape Town); *Citizen*, September 16, 1993 (University of the Western Cape); *Business Day*, September 1, 1994, *Beeld*, August 31, 1994; *Cape Times*, September 22, 1994 (tertiary education financing); *Financial Mail*, September 3, 1995 (the campuses of Vista University); *Beeld*, August 29, 1994, *The Star*, September 16, 1994 (Vaal Technikon). For reports in organizational documents, see: South African Students Congress. *Draft Programme for Congress 1993*. South African Students Congress. *2nd Annual Congress. Congress Package*. Includes constitution, policy document, code of conduct, procedure for elections, congress resolutions and secretariat report. Technikon Northern Transvaal. Soshanguve, Pretoria. 26 November-2 December 1993. South African Students Congress. *Press Statement on SASCO 2nd Annual Congress*. 1993. South African Students Congress. *Minutes of the NEC Meeting*. 17-18th September 1994. South African Students Congress. *Political Education. Report*. 1994. South African Students Congress. *Departmental Report: Department of Information and Publicity*. 1994. South African Students Congress. *Congress Package* (Includes secretariat report, constitution, policy document, terms of reference, and procedures for elections.) 3rd Annual Congress. 30 November-4 December 1994. University of the North, Sovenga, Pietersburg. 1994. And, interviews A6, A7, A8 and A9.

2.8 The rise of contentious collective action from the right and ultra-left, 1994

After participating in the elections campaigns of the African National Congress' alliance, SASCO turned its attention back to its primary focus: the transformation of higher educational institutions. Mobilization was, once again, most prominent in the latter half of the year, August through September. However, SASCO was committed to working with the "legitimate, democratically elected Government of National Unity." It also wanted to allow the Government of National Unity sufficient time to get its policies in place. The organization's mobilization was also framed by dimensions of the emerging master frame: consensus politics and a "stakeholder culture," national reconciliation, national unity and national development. But there was a new dimension entering the public discourse and emerging political culture, that of "incrementalism." This dimension held that the Government of National Unity could not be expected to deliver overnight on its elections promises of swift and deep transformation of the apartheid social institutions and the inequalities it had created. There were few resources available to make dramatic change, this view held. Later, this view was consolidated by an emerging macro-economic master frame that committed the Government of National Unity to fiscal and monetary constraint. Also, concern with the ballooning national debt and the budget deficit, combined with anxiety to attract desperately needed foreign direct investment, have encouraged conservative rather than activist economic policies. The outcome of this set of circumstances and concerns has been a vision of a less rather than more activist state in expanding and creating new resources to remove inequalities and transform society and its social institutions.

But SASCO was confronted with mobilization through especially contentious collective action from the right and ultra-left. Less than three months after the elections had brought an African National Congress-dominated Government of National Unity to power, the country was faced with road blockades and hostage taking as truck drivers, spurred on by political movements on the ultra-left of the political continuum, and public servants demanded immediately improved working conditions and salaries. Public servants in the administration and members of the police service, especially those organized in white labor organizations on the right of the political continuum, were also demanding immediate and dramatic increases in remuneration. Mobilization from this section of the community had

almost been unheard of in the time of the apartheid government. It was as if, for the white community, especially for civil servants and members of the police service, the floodgates had been opened by the country's first democratic elections, the installation of the Government of National Unity, and the emergent discourse of rights and constitutional government.

This mobilization and emerging cycle of protest was not unexpectedly condemned by the African National Congress and its alliance partners, especially the trade unions, the National Education, Health and Allied Workers Union (NEHAWU) and the Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union (POPCRU). Both unions were faced with unprecedented mobilization and contentious collective action within their organizational fields. NEHAWU, POPCRU and the ANC pre-election alliance dismissed this surging mobilization from the right (and in one instance the ultra-left) as attempts to collapse the fledgling Government of National Unity and to make the new democracy ungovernable. Faced with this scenario, SASCO, itself a member of the ANC pre-election alliance, delayed its campaigns, and displayed patience at least until the second half of 1994.[180]

2.9 Re-inserting transformation into the public discourse: the Draft Education White Paper and the National Commission for Higher Education

In August, SASCO re-introduced its transformation of higher education campaign. Sparked by the threatened exclusion of mainly black students from higher education institutions for failure to meet their financial obligations, an annual and established pattern of the 1990s, renewed mobilization sought government intervention to help black students with emergency funding, and called for the immediate introduction of a national loan and bursary scheme.[181] But there were two actions on the part of the new Education Ministry that also sparked the re-insertion of SASCO's project of social change into the public discourse. First came the release of the government's Draft Education White Paper (September 1994) that outlined the immediate steps government intended taking in its

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[180]Interviews A6, A7, A8 and A9.

[181]See references in footnote 36.

policy formation.[182] This document specified the government's developmental priorities, the division of functions between the national and the newly created provincial governments in the field of education and training, and outlined the process to be followed in the establishment of the national and provincial education departments. Significantly, higher education received little attention in these plans.[183] Almost all issues relating to the transformation of higher education were deferred to the establishment and workings of a yet to be announced National Commission on Higher Education, SASCO leaders criticized.[184] The subsequent announcement of the commission was the second trigger that broke the post-elections silence of SASCO.

In the instances of both the Draft Education White Paper and the National Commission for Higher Education the response of SASCO included criticisms and recognition of the progress, however limited, that was being made by the Education Ministry in the direction of change. For example, in its response to the Draft Education White Paper, SASCO said

> While there are those general positive aspects of the [W]hite [P]aper, we cannot fail to expose glaring weaknesses, which unfortunately once again have relegated higher education to the margins of a commission not yet in place but more so without a comprehensive framework provided by the paper.[185]

There was more and specific criticism:

> Without generalizing, two weaknesses are obvious: lack of conception by the [M]inistry of the national framework within which to transform higher education in South Africa. Consequently, the [Ministry's] lumping of every aspect on higher education into the National Commission on Higher Education (NCHE). [This is] [r]einventing the

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[182]Ministry of Education. Republic of South Africa. *Education and Training in a Democratic South Africa. First Steps to Develop a New System. Draft Policy Document for Consultation.* Pretoria and Cape Town. September 1994.

[183]ibid. And, interviews A8 and A9.

[184]Interviews A7, A8 and A9.

[185]South African Students Congress. *The White Paper on Education. A SASCO Response.* [A Submission to the Parliamentary Select Committee.] ? October 1994. Also, South African Students Congress. *Congress Package* (Secretariat Report) 3rd Annual Congress. 30 November-4 December 1994. University of the North, Sovenga, Pietersburg. 1994. Also, ***interviews*** A7, A8 and A9. And, ***media reports***, *Citizen*, October 13, 1994, and *New Nation*, October 14, 1994.

> wheel [and] failure to recognize work that has been done in higher education.[186]

These criticisms highlighted the organization's vision of the need for continuity between the African National Congress' pre-election alliance project of transformation that had been developed through several interlocking projects, including the National Education Coordinating Committee's National Education Policy Investigation, the African National Congress' Policy Framework for Education and Training, and Implementation Plan for Education and Training, and that alliance's Reconstruction and Development Program. And SASCO referred specifically to this in the conclusion to its response to the Draft Education White Paper when it said,

> ...the [W]hite [P]aper on [E]ducation should have developed the framework (in line with the ANC policy framework, and the R[econstruction and]D[evelopment]P[rogram]) within which the work of the commission must center.[187]

Significantly, the Draft Education White Paper created an opportunity for the development and consolidation of a response from the education alliance partners of SASCO.[188]

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[186]South African Students Congress. *The White Paper on Education. A SASCO Response.* [A Submission to the Parliamentary Select Committee.] ? October 1994. Also, South African Students Congress. *Congress Package* (Secretariat Report) 3rd Annual Congress. 30 November-4 December 1994. University of the North, Sovenga, Pietersburg. 1994.

[187]South African Students Congress. *The White Paper on Education. A SASCO Response.* [A Submission to the Parliamentary Select Committee.] ? October 1994. Also, South African Students Congress. *Congress Package* (Secretariat Report) 3rd Annual Congress. 30 November-4 December 1994. University of the North, Sovenga, Pietersburg. 1994.

[188]This response was coordinated by the National Education Coordinating Committee, through commissioned papers, a workshop of alliance partners, excluding the African National Congress, and a submission of the workshop findings and recommendations to the Ministry of Education. Sources: participant observation, and, National Education Coordinating Committee. *Draft White Paper on Education and Training: The response of the National Education Coordinating Committee presented to the Education Select Committee.* Draft 1. 13 October 1994. Johannesburg. National Education Coordinating Committee. *Verbal response to the Draft White Paper on Education.* Draft 2. October 1994. Johannesburg. National Education Coordinating Committee. *Strengthening the White Paper. Revised Proposal.* 30 September 1994. Johannesburg. National Education Coordinating Committee. *First Draft Written Submission on The Draft White Paper on Education and Training.* Friday, 28 October 1994. Johannesburg. National Education Coordinating Committee. *Strengthening the White Paper. An NECC Policy Workshop.* 10h00 - 16h00, Saturday, 22 October 1994. EPU, West Campus, Wits University. Package includes, Programme; NECC Input to Parliamentary Select Committee on Education; Commissioned Position Papers (5); SASCO Input to Parliamentary Select Committee on Education; Sadtu Input to

But this policy process was overshadowed by a series of institution-based campaigns of transformation launched by SASCO. Specifically, these campaigns were conducted at the Vista University campuses, the Vaal Triangle Technikon, Rhodes University and Setlogelo College of Education.[189] It was the mobilization and the nature of collective action at the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) that national attention was focused on SASCO's transformation campaign.[190] There SASCO and its allies demanded the establishment of a Broad Transformation Forum which would lead the transformation of the institution (Wits). This set SASCO in direct confrontation with the Wits administration who insisted on such a forum only having advisory powers which could be considered by the legally constituted university council in its deliberations. Interwoven with the campaign were issues relating to exclusion of students from the university on financial and academic grounds as well as trade union-related matters. In a drawn-out and highly contentious campaign, the Wits administration dug in its heels and SASCO pushed forward with even more contentious actions, including littering, hostage taking, forcible removal of students from lecture halls and the occupation of campus buildings to exact progress on transformation at the institution. But the Wits campaign had reached an impasse, and both parties were seeking the defeat of the other.

It was these several nationally prominent campaigns of SASCO that prompted the Minister of Education to appoint an Advisory Committee on the Higher Education Crisis. The committee was given the responsibility to provide the Minister with insight and analysis of the potential crises areas, provide the Minister with advice on how best to mediate the conflict, facilitate the resolution of conflicts by various stakeholders, and make the Minister aware of potential problem areas which could manifest themselves in 1995. SASCO was again successful in inserting its project into the national public discourse. Additionally, they were able to prompt the Minister to launch an investigation into the contested issues. The advisory committee subsequently identified transformation, access

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Parliamentary Select Committee on Education. National Education Coordinating Committee. *Submission of the National Education Coordinating Committee (NECC) on the Draft White Paper on Education and Training.* To the Secretariat of the White Paper Committee. Department of Education. 31 October 1994.

[189]See references in footnote 36.

[190]See references in footnote 36.

and funding of higher education as the main causes of the crisis, and developed short term proposals to deal with these matters.[191] SASCO's evaluation of the advisory committee was significant: "...the role of the committee continues to be problematic owing to the fact that it perceives itself as a mediator and hovering above the crisis. Secondly, the committee has people from the old bureaucracy who continue to stifle genuine transformation. Therefore the committee was not able to decisively intervene in the crisis, and further the transformation project."[192] Thus, initial optimism about the advisory committee and the possibilities that it had opened up for SASCO's transformation project had turned into disappointment.

To summarize, SASCO leadership had expected continuity between the African National Congress' pre-election alliance project of transformation and the post-elections transformation of higher education. The organization had not come to terms with those fundamental aspects of the emerging macro-societal level master frame, particularly those dimensions which determined the operational space of the Government of National Unity: consensus politics and a "stakeholder culture," national reconciliation, national unity, nation-building, national development and incrementalism. The implications of this finding is obvious, but disturbing. For now, SASCO cannot be considered to be an active carrier of cultures of national unity, reconciliation and inclusivity. For as part of the alliance system and as the training ground of future political leaders of that alliance system, the organization is expected to enact the master frame (although with some criticism) as it had done in the anti-apartheid and negotiations phases. Moreover it is the consolidation rather than fragmentation of this master frame which presumably would enable the organization to further pursue its social change goals. It be may asked, if social movement organizations of an alliance system like SASCO are not to be carriers of the new master frame, who will be? Viewed from another perspective it may be asked whether the enactment of these dimensions of the emerging culture can gloss over the deep divisions in society, divisions that cross and overlap race, gender, class, culture, ability and geographic location?

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[191] *Business Day*, November 15, 1994, December 2, 1994. *Sowetan*, November 16, 1994.

[192] South African Students Congress. *Congress Package* (Secretariat Report) 3rd Annual Congress. 30 November-4 December 1994. University of the North, Sovenga, Pietersburg. 1994.

2.10 Fight and defend. Consolidate and advance the democratic revolution, 1995

The 1994 annual congress of SASCO represented an important watershed in its history. First, this was the first post-elections congress, and presented the organization with its first opportunity to evaluate progress on its social project. Second, it was an ideal opportunity to develop a clear understanding of the organization's relationship with the Government of National Unity on the one hand, and with its alliance partners on the other. In particular, its relationship with the Government of National Unity had to be clarified, for it was to be a key determinant of the manner in which SASCO was to pursue its social project over the next 5 years - the full term of the Government of National Unity (1994-99). Third, it was an opportunity to develop a program of action as it positioned itself to advance its transformation project. And, fourth, it was an opportunity to make a decision about its role and ideological trajectory: was it to be a political student organization advancing a broad Marxist philosophy or a narrow sectarianism, or was it to remain a progressive political organization that was mainly concerned with the transformation of higher education institutions. Several discussion documents were commissioned by the organization dealing with these questions. The documents were subsequently drafted and disseminated by members, as the organization prepared itself for its crucial third annual congress.[193]

The congress did not disappoint. It developed an understanding of the nature of the Government of National Unity, and what SASCO saw as necessary to advance its transformation project. On the first democratic elections, and the nature of the political conjuncture, the organization said "April [1994] is neither a culmination of the democratic revolution nor a defeat. If anything it represented a strategic breakthrough ... emphatically

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[193]See for example: South African Students Congress. "*Towards a dissolution congress?*" Discussion document. Peniel Mashele. SASCO Wits Branch. April 1994. South African Students Congress. *SASCO: Possible strategic options.* C[omra]de Nape Nchabeleng and C[omra]de Sabata Kotoala. 23 May 1994. South African Students Congress. *The strategic orientation of SASCO.* Makhosi Poyo. 1994. South African Students Congress. *The resurrection of workerism in SASCO - Part 2.* A Sihlahla and B Nelani. 1994. South African Students Congress. "*The RDP and higher education - towards a people's education or education of national unity?*" Revised Draft Discussion Paper. Malemolla Makhura. September 1994. South African Students Congress. *We have risen, the target is ours. Towards our mission statement on tertiary institutions.* Discussion Paper. Sy Mokadi. SASCO Third Annual Congress. December 1994.

underlying a qualitative advance in the democratic revolution."[194] In this regard, SASCO defined its task: "to defend and ensure an ongoing adherence to the revolutionary democratic perspective which can only be the basis for our alignment with the A[frican]N[ational]C[ongress]."[195] But, the organization also recognized that mass mobilization had been in decline and the mobilization of the country's youth had grown weaker. It identified a need to rebuild these characteristics of the South African struggle. There was "a compulsive need for mass mobilization and combat."[196] The organization also identified the need to build tactical, and to consolidate strategic alliances, and for it to act as a political vanguard of the student movement. It argued that "...our organization must evolve issue-based tactical alliances with particular left/progressive formations, including the trade union movement (NEHAWU and SACCAWU).[197] But it still remains our task [to] democratize, build and lead the various organs of students' power, in particular the SRCs."[198] On the basis of these arguments, the organization identified the tasks of the liberation movement, of which it considered itself a part, as "the apparently mutually exclusive tasks" of nation-building and transformation.[199]

Arising from this orientation, SASCO developed a strategic thrust comprising two elements, complementary and confrontational collective action. It argued that

> to the extent that the democratic forces within the G[overnment of]N[ational]U[nity] and throughout [the] regions advance the democratic project, the role of the students' movement would be

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[194]South African Students Congress. *Resolutions and Programme of Action. 1995.* Johannesburg. 1995. Also, South African Students Congress. *Congress Resolutions.* 3rd Annual Congress. University of the North. 1995. South African Students Congress. *Programme of Action. January-December 1995.* Johannesburg. 1995.

[195]ibid.

[196]ibid.

[197]Note, NEHAWU refers to the National Education, Health and Allied Workers Union, and SACCAWU to the South African Commercial and Catering and Allied Workers Union. Both of these unions are part of the Congress of South African Trade Unions, and are thus members of the alliance with the African National Congress and the South African Communist Party. Also significantly, both labor unions currently organize workers at higher education institutions.

[198]South African Students Congress. *Resolutions and Programme of Action. 1995.* Johannesburg. 1995. Also, South African Students Congress. *Congress Resolutions.* 3rd Annual Congress. University of the North. 1995. South African Students Congress. *Programme of Action. January-December 1995.* Johannesburg. 1995.

[199]ibid. And, interviews A6, A7, A8 and A9.

> complementary, helping to strengthen initiatives aimed at implementing and defending the progressive content of the R[econstruction and]D[evelopment]P[rogram] and the transformation process. Conversely, a retreat away from the democratic program depending on various factors and circumstances would demand that SASCO combatively engage the government in confrontational struggles.[200]

This approach "consists in a combination and a balance between mass combat and alternative policy advocacy," which in turn poses organizational requirements of consolidating a strong mass base and developing a resourceful policy capacity.

It was this understanding that informed the organization's program in the first quarter of 1995. The transformation project was once more inserted into the public discourse. But, as never before, public attention was focused on a concentrated and coordinated campaign that lasted for six weeks from mid-February through end-March of 1995. The campaign included marches, submission of petitions, hostage taking, forcible removal of students from classes, and the occupation of buildings to disrupt normal administration.[201] All of these focused attention on transformation and transparency of the activities of institutional governing bodies. In this unprecedented mobilization, the organization called for the legal empowerment of transformation forums, demanded a moratorium on financial exclusions and fee increases, urged the immediate establishment of

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[200]ibid.

[201]The campaign was nation-wide, targeting government with marches onto the National Assembly in Cape Town, the Office of the President at the Union Buildings in Pretoria, and Provincial Legislatures. But the campaign also targeted individual higher education institutions, including now predominantly black and predominantly white universities, technikons and teacher training colleges such as the University of the Witwatersrand, the Vista University campuses, Technikon Free State, Rhodes University, the Vaal Technikon, University of the Western Cape, Fort Hare University, Peninsula Technikon and several colleges of education. Campaign plans were already announced at the end of 1994 and again at the beginning of 1995. *New Nation*, November 25, 1994, and February 3, 1995; *Evening Post*, February 20, 1995, *Sowetan*, January 23, 1995, and February 16, 1995; *Weekly Mail and Guardian*, Review/Education, February 3, 1995. On the actual campaigns, see: *The Argus*, February 23, 1995, *Business Day*, March 30, 1995, March 31, 1995, *City Press*, February 5, 1995, *Daily Despatch*, February 24, 1995, *Natal Mercury*, February 10, 1995, *Eastern Province Herald*, February 24, 1995, March 3, 1995, and March 4, 1995, *Evening Post* February 23, 1995, *SABC TV*, CCV [Evening] News, March 1, 1995, *SABC TV*, CCV Newsline, March 26, 1995 *SABC TV* Agenda, March 26, 1995, *Sowetan*, January 25, 1995, February 10, 1995, February 15, 1995, March 6, 1995, March 23, 1995, March 30, 1995, March 31, 1995, *The Star*, February 15, 1995, March 6, 1995, March 23, 1995, and March 29, 1995, *Weekly Mail and Guardian*, January 20-26, 1995, March 24-30, 1995, and March 31-April 6, 1995.

a national bursary and loan scheme for students, and called for a reduction in the defense budget and the reallocation of such additional funds to higher education.

2.11 Re-constructing the discourse of transformation? Violent protest and a "stakeholder culture."

During March of 1995 these campaigns took a particularly contentious and militant turn, as students unable to make significant gains engaged in stepped-up hostage taking, occupation of buildings and forceful removal of non-protesting students from lecture halls. The month of March was indeed a *Red Alert Month* of student mobilization and militant collective action. However, the response of the Government of National Unity was quick as it admonished the ill discipline and militant collective action that marked student protests. In its response it did not address the legitimacy or otherwise of the student protests. Already aggravated by the earlier militant and threatened militant campaigns of public servants (1994 into 1995), especially those of members of the police service, the President threatened strong action against perpetrators of violence and criminal activity during protests.[202] This was an intervention of significant proportions: on the one hand government defended the right of protest as a democratically won right, but, on the other hand it promised strong action against those using violence and engaging in criminal activities during protests. For the campaigns of SASCO the President had a stinging rebuke. In particular, the President accused white university administrations of failing to act against black student activists, calling this inaction "racism in reverse." The President further accused white university administrations of sparing the rod for black students, thus promoting the idea that blacks could not be disciplined.[203] SASCO was just as quick in its response. The organization marched onto the President's Office at the African National Congress Headquarters, demanding that the President accept their campaigns as legitimate and necessary. They argued that the President had not put their struggles in context. But, SASCO also agreed that violence and criminal actions in protest activity was destructive and incorrect. In fact, the organization argued that these drew attention away from their legitimate grievances

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[202]As early as February, 1995, government issued its warning on militant collective action. See for example, Address of President Nelson Mandela. *On the occasion of the opening of the Second Session of the Democratic Parliament.* Cape Town. February 17, 1995.

towards contentious collective action. The combative approach of the President was subsequently modified, and while recognizing the legitimate concerns of students, he urged them to prevent violence and criminal activities in their campaigns.[204]

Another dimension of the emerging political culture or master frame that was played out during the SASCO campaigns was that of the consolidating "stakeholder culture." Specifically, and during the February-March campaigns, the Minister of Education advised SASCO to gain the support of other stakeholders on a number of the organization's campaign issues. This the Minister argued, was "in line with our inclusive and consultative approach."[205] But, overall, the response of the Minister of Education provided broad support for SASCO's [Right to Learn] campaign, registering the Minister's commitment "to the development of a high quality Higher Education System for South Africa but also ... one which is increasingly representative of South Africa's society as a whole, and one which redresses the inequalities of the apartheid system." On the issues on which there was agreement with SASCO, the Minister called for "joint action to realize our objectives," while on those in which there was no agreement, the Minister argued that there was a need to "create scope for further discussion and persuasion."[206] SASCO's campaigns also prompted the Minister of Education to send a strong signal to higher education institutions, advising them that Government funding could no longer be assigned to Higher Education institutions "to be spent solely at the discretion of the institutions themselves," and that future funding would be "subjected to the constraints and requirements of the [government's] R[econstruction and] D[evelopment]P[rogram]"[207] But, like the President

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[203]*Weekend Star*, March 11-12, 1995, and March 25-26, 1995, *City Press*, March 12, 1995.

[204]Joint Press Conference, of the President, the African National Congress Deputy Secretary General, and the President of SASCO. South African Broadcasting Corporation. *CCV News*. Monday, March 13, 1995. 19H00 - 19H10. Also, *African National Congress*, Department of Information and Publicity. ANC Response to SASCO-Wits Leadership. ? March 13, 1995. And, ***interviews*** A8, A9, A10 and A11.

[205]Ministry of Education. *Response by the Minister of Education, Prof. S M E Bengu, to students' demands presented at a SASCO march on 22/02/95*. February ? 22, 1995. Also, *The Argus*, February 14, 1995, *The Cape Times*, February 14, 1995.

[206]ibid.

[207]ibid.

earlier, the Minister of Education warned of strong government action against violence and criminal activities in students' protests.[208]

3. Summary

This account of the emergence and later development of SASCO has illustrated the role of social movement organizations such as SASCO as carriers of projects of social change and as active participants in the social construction and reconstruction of public policy domains and of public opinion. The account has shown SASCO's concern with the transformation of higher education and of its institutions. That concern and social project targeted higher education institutions because they have been for SASCO such vital players in the production and distribution of knowledge. Moreover, for SASCO, these institutions have a role to play in societal transformation. SASCO has focused on the control and management of these institutions, their accessibility and the graduation rate of black students once they have access. Transformation is necessary and right but SASCO believes it has to occur in the full spotlight of the public eye: it has to be transparent and participatory.

In the period 1984-95 the transformation of the organization's collective identity was interwoven with the transformation of policy domains, including the *nature of the stakes*, from ungovernability to people's power to negotiated sharing of power, *overarching political cultures*, from conflictual to consensual models, and *solutions*, from militant and often violent campaigns that dominated the period of conflictual politics, to political negotiations that marked the consensual politics period. But the account has also shown how easily SASCO slides back into conflictual politics.

The entry of SASCO, and its immediate predecessor, SANSCO into the education domain, especially from 1985 onwards signaled like that of COSAS described earlier, the entry of a formidable actor. The account has illustrated how the organization has

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[208]The crisis in higher education also prompted the Minister of Education to place a paid advertisement in several national newspapers, in which the Minister called on South Africans to accept a transparent, inclusive and genuine process of change, "which will introduce certainty and stability in our institutions." Statement by Prof[essor] S.M.E. Bengu, Minister of Education, on the crisis in Higher Education. *Weekly Mail & Guardian*, March 24-30, 1995. Also, *City Press*, March 26, 1995, and *Sunday Times*, March 26, 1995.

highlighted new grievances and experiences, attributed responsibility, and offered solutions through collective action, then often militant and combative but emanating from the nature of the stakes.

The account of SASCO has also illustrated the insertion of new Social Movement concerns - gender, environmental and AIDS awareness - and the transformation of the collective identity of SASCO on this separate level emanating from both rising international donor concerns for these and from increasing awareness of their implications for political, social and economic well-being. Thus modern era SMOs are better understood as carrying multiple collective identities rather than a single one. However, as illustrated, it is one thing to adopt a program, it is a another to have acted on it.

The study of the latter period (1990 to 1995), has shown SASCO's collective identity transformation to be incomplete. The residues of people's power continues into its present collective identity and are kindled each time that the forces of limited and zero change hold up progress to the democratic society. But they are also kindled by the organization's firm commitment to the achievement of the goals of the National Democratic Revolution which is always the subject of intense discussion in its annual congresses.

However, the cultures of national unity and reconciliation, incrementalism and inclusivity (or a stakeholder culture) are only superficial features of the organization's evolving collective identity. The reason for this is not difficult to find. If there is little or no change in higher education and its institutions - what Tilly describes as a separate, organizational field level of mobilization and analysis - then the macro-societal field level of mobilization and analysis, in this research specified as comprising dimensions such as national unity, reconciliation and inclusivity, cannot flourish. And, in the circumstances, maximalism and contentious collective action thrive. This research holds that it is social movements that are the carriers of macro-societal level master frames, whether these are residual or emergent identities. Thus, the study argues, within SASCO, dimensions of the macro-societal master frame such as national unity, reconciliation and inclusivity are for now endured rather than actively pursued. They are part of the sacrifice on the road to the New Society. And perhaps this is not just the case in SASCO. In this regard, Nelson Mandela observed that many Black South Africans and their organizations live under the false belief that the apartheid enemy had been crushed through a military victory rather than

that political compromise was the basis upon which the Government of National Unity and the new democracy had been crafted.

4. Implications for theory and policy

This account has shown that the changes in SASCO's environment induced by the wider societal transition as well as its inability to mobilize new resource opportunities opened up by this societal transition has had the following effects on the organization's post-apartheid identity. First, poor linkages were maintained with providers of resources even after the change in political regime. Unlike in the case of COSAS which successfully mobilized new and expanding resources in the wake of the political regime change, SASCO did not undergo organizational routinization and professionalization. For there were no significant resources to manage nor to account for. Unlike the case with COSAS, little organization time was taken up in developing organizational capacity and skills to achieve these. Second, unlike COSAS which re-engineered its organizational structure as a solution to high leadership turnover and variance in experience and quality, SASCO never acted on its own similar experience, i.e. same leadership turnover rate and variance in experience and quality. High leadership turnover and variance in experience and quality are likely to dominate the evolution of the organization into the twenty-first century. Third, less success in gaining access to newly created resources, political and financial, explains partly why the organization could so easily slip back into militant and combative collective action even after the political regime change. Fourth, even when the organization sought to incorporate New Social Movement projects for which resources could be mobilized, these were hardly taken as seriously as the political structure and power relations at universities, technikons and colleges of education. New Social Movement projects such as the environmental and AIDS/HIV campaigns can only thrive when they are taken seriously, the organization is re-engineered and sufficient time is allocated for planning, implementation and evaluation. Fifth, SASCO experienced goal maintenance as if there had been no political regime change. Sixth, the organization participated in more dramatic contentious collective actions which were directly linked to the field or site of mobilization such as the campuses of universities, technikons and colleges of education.

Thus unlike its ally, the high school student organization, the Congress of South African Students which successfully mobilized the new resource opportunities created by the change in political regime (described in Chapter Two), the South African Students Congress failed to mobilize these resources, pursued even more dramatic collective action and mobilized specifically around issues of university and technikon access and the transformation of the governing bodies of these institutions. Part of the explanation of this difference must be found in the specificities of the higher education domain with its higher costs as a percentage of the income of black families. But most of the explanation must derive from the ability of COSAS to re-engineer itself in the context of the political regime change. The classification of the transition of SASCO induced by the opening of the South African polity and the democratization of society is thus as a Type III transition: poor linkages with new resources, more dramatic institution-based collective action and goal maintenance.

Let us conclude this section by reflecting on the rise in contentious collective action during 1995. A key concern for social movement organizations on the left such as SASCO as they ponder the rise in contentious collective action from the right must be whether the fundamental dimensions of the (transitional) master frame of the alliance system - national unity and reconciliation, national development, inclusivity, and incrementalism - is universally accepted and whether it will outlast collective action from the right (and even ultra-left). It can be concluded that South Africa is now experiencing the emergence of a new cycle of protest outside of their influence, where antagonistic social movement organizations of the right (and ultra-left) may be setting in place alternative conflictual master frames. A further question for social movement organizations like SASCO must be what time is available to its alliance system to act on the short run grievances of members, supporters and the community at large while at the same time keeping the long-run project of social change on line while sustaining historic alliances. It can be concluded that the cost of such a delay in acting may not be losses to the right, but the failure of the (transitional) master frame to endure and the eventual collapse of the long run project.

Already, SASCO's alliance system has been weakened by the trajectory of negotiations, and the installation of a National Assembly and Government of National Unity. The evidence suggests that this alliance has weakened, especially since the closure

of the United Democratic Front and the death of the National Education Coordinating Committee. In the wake of the creation of the new polity, it can be asked whether members of the alliance system will be held together by shared consensual master frames. Or whether the alliance system will fragment as its social movement organizations seek to maintain support by organizing around the immediate experiences and grievances of potential members, namely Black South Africans. Put differently, it can be asked for how long will the master frame that had kept this historic alliance together dominate both the alliance and society.

Perhaps the stance adopted by SASCO points us in the direction of an answer. SASCO insists on its independence, vanguardism, and its dual cooperative-combative orientation towards the Government of National Unity. This strategic orientation also clearly highlights the dialectic between short term concerns of members that emanate from actually existing relations (e.g. prohibitory high fees, exclusions, bursaries and loans), its long-run project of social change (e.g. radical higher education transformation and the achievement of the goals of the original Reconstruction and Development Program), the requirements for protecting and defending the transition (national unity and reconciliation, inclusivity and incrementalism) and multi-organizational fields. Also, for SASCO, the questions beckon: to what extent can it ably forsake short run gains for long run transformation, and at what costs?

Chapter 4

The South African Democratic Teachers Union, 1986-1995: A case of organizational routinization and professionalization (Type I).

If the historic high school student uprising in 1976 had initiated teacher re-mobilization, and precipitated a definite but brief period of teacher militancy, then it was the popular uprising of the 1980s - characterized by ungovernability and the thrust to people's power - that laid the platform for a deep-seated change in the politics of teaching, teacher mobilization, collective action and organization. It was the gathering anti-apartheid movement in the education sector that, at two momentous national education crises conferences in December 1985 and March 1986, focused the struggle for winning the hearts and minds of teachers behind the popular uprising and the struggle against apartheid rule and for people's power. At these historic conferences that thrust was expanded to education: it became a thrust for people's education. Later, especially from 1988 onwards, it was the dominant trade union movement, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), that put in place the organizational prerequisites that took the struggle over the "hearts and minds" of teachers to a new level. For, until then, collective action and the mobilization of teachers had been limited by both the nature of its leadership - mainly conservative, non-aggressive and collaborating with the apartheid state - and the power of the apartheid state that placed heavy sanctions and disincentives on the politicization of the teaching profession. 1976, 1985, and later 1988 broke open this strangle-hold, and laid the foundation for a permanent alteration of the politics of teaching, teacher mobilization, collective action and organization. These developments, in turn, had direct consequences for the, until then, stable and authoritarian system of schooling, school organization and management, and curriculum.

It is to this account that we next turn in order to further examine how exogenous and endogenous organizational determinants together influence the direction of the politics of

teaching, teacher mobilization, collective action and organization, and how these in turn alter the policy environment within which teachers do their work: teaching, school organization and management, and curriculum. This case study of the emergence and later evolution of the South African Democratic Teachers Union will be the focus of this chapter. The account will show that the changes in the organization's environment, induced by the wider societal transition, its successful mobilization of new resource opportunities opened up by this societal transition as well as its successful mobilization of membership and recognition by the apartheid state will provide sufficient evidence to classify its own evolution as a Type I transformation thus providing further support for the combined resource mobilization-social constructionist model used in this research. Earlier a Type I transformation was characterized by organizational routinization and professionalization as a postulated response to the success of a SMO in initiating an open polity and democratization of society.

This account of the emergence and later evolution of the South African Democratic Teachers Union is above all a qualitative account. It relies on four sources of evidence. First, interviews were conducted with key activists who represent leaderships from the different periods under review. Twelve formal intensive interviews, each lasting approximately two hours were conducted for this purpose. Secondly, 1,700 mass media accounts that include letters to editors, advertisements of teachers organizations, editorials, syndicated columns and running accounts of social movement organization mobilization and collective action for the period under review were compiled, sorted, selected and analyzed. Thirdly, more than sixty organizational documents and artifacts, that included policy documents, goal statements, project proposals, conference documents, minutes and resolutions of key policy meetings, memorandums, newsletters, journals, fliers, speeches, press releases, bill-board posters and pamphlets were either collected or photographed, then sorted and analyzed. Fourthly, relying on the technique of direct observation, evidence was collected from the case study sites that included the head office and meeting places of the organization in the study. Data collection and analysis were informed by the research question: how are the goals, programs and campaigns of the South African Democratic Teachers Union affected by the South African transition to democracy given its goals, programs and campaigns at its founding, and how do these affect the South African

transition with particular reference to education policy and the wider education policy domain.

The account begins with a brief background of the changing political and educational environment in the mid to late 1980s, a period within which the platform was laid for the emergence of the South African Democratic Teachers Union (Section 1). The account then studies the evolution of the South African Democratic Teachers Union through the first half of the 1990s, paying particular care to identify sources of change in organizational identity, as well as their effects and direction. The account examines the evolving identity of the organization through the technique of examining shifts in key organizational collective action frames. Those studied and analyzed are the organization's pursuit of: (i) a non-racial identity and education system within the context of a racially- and ethnically-based organizational trajectory and education system, (ii) a democratic and development-oriented appraisal system within the context of an authoritarian evaluation system, (iii) a culture of politics of teaching that incorporates a commitment to unionism and professionalism, and, (iv) a democratic restructuring and rationalization of apartheid education (Section 2). A summary is then provided (Section 3), followed by an assessment of the theoretical and policy implications of the study (Section 4).

1. Building bridges across teachers' organizations, 1985-90

Teacher mobilization, collective action and organization, and the politics of teaching underwent dramatic change in the mid to late 1980s. Five overlapping and interacting developments account for these shifts.

The first and dominant development of this time was the changing nature of the stakes and of the opposition to apartheid and apartheid education. As described in previous chapters, the mid- to late-1980s represented a period of heightened mobilization of mainly the urban Black population against apartheid political rule and authoritarian organizational practices in schools, universities, teacher training colleges, communities and factories. Soon, into the early 1980s, that mobilization shifted its thrust from an anti-apartheid oppositional mobilization only to one dominated by a push for the establishment of organs of people's power in schools, universities, teacher training colleges, communities and even

factories. Violent clashes now ensued between the apartheid state's security forces and the movement for democracy and people's power. It is in this gathering momentum, marked by political violence and repression, that teachers had to do their work of teaching, curriculum, school organization and management.

Already, in 1979, a militant teacher organization, the National Education Union of South Africa (NEUSA), that was honed in the clashes of students with the state, had emerged. Despite its linkage later to the United Democratic Front and the gathering movement for people's power and people's education,[209] it was still seen as a fringe organization by many teachers and teachers organizations. This was precisely because of the organization's overt political character.[210] It was only with the rise of the National Education Crisis Committee (later National Education Coordinating Committee) (NECC), that was spawned by the United Democratic Front and concerned parents organizations, that the thrust for people's power was squarely focused on the politics of education.[211]

The focus had shifted to the nature of teacher mobilization, collective action and organization, the political culture of teaching and the role of teachers in the realization of people's power (in schools) and people's education.[212] Attention was squarely focused on and pressure directed at teachers and their organizations to become part of the gathering anti-apartheid movement. The goal of the movement for people's power and people's education was clear: teachers were an irreplaceable asset to realize people's power and people's education.[213] Just as much, they were a vital asset to the apartheid state in enacting

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[209]*Weekly Mail*, September 18, 1987.

[210]*Interview* C6.

[211]*Interviews* C1 and C5. For an analysis that focuses on the role of school boycotts and the mobilization and politicization of township communities on the politics of the conservative teachers organizations, see Moll, I. The South African Democratic Teachers' Union and the politics of teacher unity in South Africa, 1985-90, In E Unterhalter, et al., *Apartheid Education and Popular Struggles*. Ravan Press: Johannesburg. 1991: 185-202.

[212]*Interview* C6.

[213]National Consultative Conference on the Crisis in Education. *Report*. Organized by Soweto Parents Crisis Committee at University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. 28, 29 December 1985. National Consultative Conference on the Crisis in Education. *Resolutions*. Durban. March 1986. National Consultative Conference on the Crisis in Education. *Keynote Address*. Durban. March 1986. *Work In Progress*. 1986a. "People's Education: Creating a Democratic Future." 42, May, And, 1986b. "The NECC: Doing Battle with the DET." 45, Nov/Dec. See also, *Cape Times*, June 23, 1988. *Sunday Times*, August 16, 1987. *Sunday Times Extra*, December 6,

its scripts of Bantu Education and authoritarian rule. The method was just as clear: conservative teachers' organizations that had until now collaborated with the apartheid state in realizing Bantu Education through their participation in state structures such as curriculum and examination committees; who had shied away from directly participating in the anti-apartheid political movement; and, who had been organized along the racial and ethnic lines of Apartheid Education, had to brought together with the militant teachers organizations into a national movement of teachers. The militant teachers' organizations, in contrast, were already openly engaged in political protest, opposed Bantu Education, and professed a non-racial, democratic ethic. Such a united teachers movement could then become the mechanism for realizing people's power and people's education. Thus, by March 1986, the gathering political movement specifically focused its expansive socio-political project on teachers and their organizations through the conferences and mobilization of the National Education Crisis Committee.

Arising from this intervention, new and militant teachers organizations were mushrooming throughout the country. This represented the second major development to influence the political culture of teaching and of teacher mobilization, collective action and organization. The political space opened by the gathering political movement and the interventions of the National Education Crisis Committee, had, whilst drawing in the conservative teachers organizations, also delegitimated their conservative ideologies and practices. The stranglehold of these conservative teachers organizations on teachers, exercised through authoritarian school principals' power in schools, was broken, and by the end of the 1980s, hundreds of militant township-based and some rural teachers organizations emerged.[214] These were fully lined up behind the project of people's power and people's education.[215]

1987. *South* November 26, 1987, and June 22, 1989. *The Sunday Star*, August 14, 1988. *Natal Post*, May 30 and June 7, 1989.

[214]These emerging and militant teachers organizations who fully aligned themselves with the movement for democracy, people's power and people's education, generally adopted names consistent with their geographic location. They were also committed to the democratization of school organization and curriculum, and the organization of teachers as "workers". Generally, their names also included the signifier "union" to distinguish themselves from the conservative teachers "associations" who had traditionally shied away from politics and the organization of teachers as workers. Names also, in some instances, included the signifier, "progressive" to signal the organization's affiliation with the surging movement for people's power and people's education. So

This development was well summarized by one such leader,

> Teachers are being proletarianized. The changed nature of their roles and function signifies the disappearance of a form of intellectual labor central to the nature of pedagogy itself. The tendency to reduce teachers to high-level clerks implementing orders of others within the school bureaucracy is part of much larger problems.[216]

Urging teachers to stop being passive recipients of professional knowledge and to become thoughtful and critical educational leaders, the same leader said, "They must fight against those ideological and material practices that reproduce privileges for the few and social and economic inequality for the many."[217] Previously powerful school principals - vital recruiters for the conservative teachers associations and the enforcers of their discipline, as well as that of the state - were weakened away by the more powerful thrust of the movement for people's power and people's education.

A third development that overlapped with the gathering anti-apartheid education movement was the new cohort of teachers entering the teaching profession. This new generation of teachers had been educated amidst and within the stepped up mobilization against apartheid. Many of them had been high school students in 1976. Others had been part of the mobilization against apartheid at universities and teacher training colleges. The cohort, schooled in the defiance of apartheid authority and a militant politics made its way

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for example, in the mid-1980s emerged the first set of militant teachers organizations that included, the Mamelodi Teachers Union (MATU), the Western Cape Teachers Union (WECTU), the Democratic Teachers Union (DETU), the Progressive Teachers Union (PTU), the Eastern Cape Teachers Union (ECTU), the East London Progressive Teachers Union (ELPTU), the Border Progressive Teachers Union (BOPTU), the Progressive Teachers League, the Progressive Teachers' Congress (PROTECO) and the Education for a Democratic and Aware South Africa (EDASA). In the second wave, the late 1980s into the early 1990s, a second set of militant teachers organizations emerged. These now included the Benoni Teachers Union (BETU) [*Sowetan*, January 15, 1990], Pretoria Teachers Union (PRETU) [*New Nation*, March 9, 1990. *Pretoria News*, March 3, 1990], the kwaThema Teachers Union (KWATU) [*African Springs Reporter*, April 27, 1990], the Northern Transvaal Teachers Union (NOTU) [*Pretoria News*, May 9, 1990], the Botshabelo Teachers Union (also BOPTU) [*Sowetan*, May 28, 1990. *Volksblad*, May 17, 1990], the Giyane Teachers' Union (GITU) [*Sowetan*, June 7, 1990] and the Vaal Progressive Teachers Organization (VAPTO) [Sunday Star, April 1, 1990].

[215]*Interviews* C5, C6 and C9.

[216]*Sowetan*, January 15, 1990.

[217]ibid.

into the teaching profession.[218] The dramatically increased access of black youth to apartheid schooling in the 1980s - itself the direct outcome of the 1976 uprising - and the resultant increased demand for teachers reinforced this demographic shift in the teaching population. The decline in the influence of school principals was directly related to this development. This demographic shift, coupled with the increase in the number of militant teachers organizations and the unification moves initiated by the latter, increased the pressure on the conservative teachers organizations to de-link from the apartheid state, to align themselves more clearly with the movement for democracy and people's power, and to launch active recruitment campaigns as opposed to relying on past passive and closed-shop type recruitment.

A fourth development, that coincided with those outlined, was the increasing pre-emptive state actions in the education sector. Seeking to increase its loosening grip over black schools and teachers, especially in the context of the thrust for people's power and people's education, the state launched its own counter-attack. Educational activities were subjected to political interference on a daily basis,[219] principals were forced to fire teachers or suspend students who "undermine lawful authority or are the cause of unrest,"[220] new authoritarian systems of panel inspection of teachers were introduced despite strong opposition from teachers organizations,[221] teachers graduating from "left-leaning" universities and colleges were threatened with being passed over when seeking appointments as teachers,[222] teachers organizations that had suspended their participation in state education structures were threatened with deregistration and derecognition,[223] militant teachers organizations were banned from "performing any act whatsoever" with executive committee members detained and some charged with contravening the bans imposed on

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[218] *Interview* C6.

[219] Alleged by the Teachers Association of South Africa. April 5, 1989. Also, *Business Day*, May 9, 1989. *Natal Post*, May 2, 1989. *The Leader*, October 2, 1987. See also, *Weekly Mail*, November 22, 1985. *Burger*, July 4, 1987 and April 18, 1988. *Rapport Extra* ? May, 1988.

[220] *Natal Post*, June 26, 1988. *The Star*, April 10, 1984. *Sunday Tribune*, October 6, 1984.

[221] *Natal Mercury*, September 7, 1987.

[222] *Cape Times*, August 6, 1987.

[223] *Natal Witness*, April 4, 1989. *Natal Post*, April 4 and 19, 1989. *Sunday Times Extra*, June 26, 1988.

their organizations,[224] general and executive committee meetings of others were banned,[225] teaching posts were frozen, and teachers transferred in the middle of the academic year for political reasons.[226] These state interventions were generally non-selective and were directed at both the conservative and the militant teachers organizations. It prompted retaliatory and defensive campaigns from both sets of organizations. Conservative teacher associations were now drawn closer to communities from whom they sought defense, and militant teacher organizations spread like a wild fire in the urban townships, rural villages and bantustans.

A fifth set of factors to dramatically alter the culture of politics of teaching, teacher mobilization, collective action and organization, were declining real salaries and the extremely difficult working conditions under which teachers had to perform their work.[227] These added to the rising militancy among the teaching population.

To summarize, state intervention aggravated community mobilization, the rapidly changing demographic dynamics of the teaching profession, the emergence and spread of militant teacher organizations, declining real salaries and worsening conditions of work to dramatically transform the political culture of teaching, teacher mobilization, collective action and organization, and school organization and management.

It is these developments that provided the political space for the creation of a new and united teachers movement. For, until then, militant and conservative teachers organizations had pursued unity separately. The militant teachers organizations were especially convinced that they had to pursue unity on their own. For them, a new *unitary teachers union* would aim to "unite, mobilize and politicize all teachers."[228] The

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[224]*Cape Times*, February 25, 1989. *The Star*, January 4 and February 14, 1989. *Weekly Mail*, January 27, 1989.

[225]*Argus*, May 27, 1988. *Cape Times*, November 11, 1988. *Citizen*, May 27 and June 15, 1988. *Eastern Province Herald*, November 23, 1988. *Rapport Extra*, December 4, 1988.

[226]*Sowetan*, October 12, 1988.

[227]No data is available on declining real salaries in the 1980s, but cuts in teacher service bonuses from 8.3 per cent to 5.5 per cent of annual salary opened a new battle front with government in 1985. *Star*, March 11, 1985, *Sunday Tribune and Mirror*, December 12, 1984. Earlier teachers organizations had reached a pay deadlock with government over a pay rise in 1984. *Rand Daily Mail*, June 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 1984 , July 4 and 5, 1984, *Star*, June 8, 16, 19 and 25, 1984 and July 5, 1984, and *Sunday Express*, June 17, 1984. Also, *Interview* C6.

[228]*Interviews* C4 and C6. *South*, January 28, 1988. Also, Moll, I., op. cit.

conservative unions were pursuing the creation of a unified body[229] to be founded on the principles of a *federalist teachers association* within which each of the member organizations would maintain their own identities, assets and memberships. These two streams of unity talks eventually flowed together in the pursuit of the creation of a single national body. The conditions for the creation of the South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU) were in place. It would take tremendous effort, sacrifice and losses before that organization was to be launched.

1.1 Laying the foundation for a unitary, non-racial, democratic, non-sexist teachers union. The National Teacher's Unity Forum, 1988-1990

The exiled South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU),[230] the All African Teachers' Organization (AATO), the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession (WOCTP) in close collaboration with the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the host organization, the Zimbabwe Teachers Association (ZIMTU), called a *Teacher Unity Seminar* in Harare, Zimbabwe in 1988.

The political and organizational goals, and the influence of COSATU in relation to the South African teachers organizations, was significant in that the conservative teachers associations and militant teachers unions alike were highly respectful of and keen on affiliating with COSATU. COSATU's own interests related to its project of establishing, "one industry, one union" across all social sectors, and with its expansive project of transforming labor relations through the creation of institutions for collective bargaining, mediation and conciliation. The political and organizational goals of SACTU were no different from those of COSATU. Its influence derived from its association with the highly legitimated but banned and exiled African National Congress (ANC). The influences of the AATO and WOCTP over the South African teachers organizations were also significant. Several of the conservative teachers associations were either affiliates of, or closely associated with these organizations. WOCTP was considered by them as a body concerned with the professional rather than political interests of teachers around the world. From

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[229]*The Star*, April 12, 1988. Also, Moll, I., op. cit.

thence its legitimacy with the conservative teachers associations.[231] The militant teachers unions saw no contradiction between their political concerns and the presence of WOCTP and AATO.

A newly generated initiative to bring about unity among teachers and their organizations had been launched and in addition to the political and social pressures in South Africa, the changing demographics of the teaching population, the rise of militant teacher organizations and the disorganizing state interventions in the education sector, specific organizational pressure was exerted by organizations that carried high levels of legitimacy in the eyes of the South African teachers organizations.

The Harare seminar, held April 4-8, 1988 was attended by representatives from both the conservative teachers associations and the militant teachers unions. Following a week of discussions, a fifteen point *Unity Accord* was adopted by the participating organizations. Six fundamental principles informed this accord,

> 1. that organizations agree on the need for the national unity of teachers; 2. that such an organization should be committed to a unitary, non-racial democratic South Africa, and commit itself to be part of the national mass democratic movement; 3. that the organization should protect and promote the rights of teachers as workers and professionals; 4. that ideology shall not be a pre-condition for unity; 5. that such an organization should commit itself to the realization of the ideals of people's education; and, 6. that COSATU shall convene the negotiating machinery to pursue the objective of a national, non-racial teachers organization.[232]

The effect of this set of principles on the teacher unity process was significant. It inserted the teacher unity process firmly within the 1980s thrust of maximum national unity in the pursuit of a non-racial democracy, people's power and people's education. The teacher unity process, and directly, the political culture of teaching, teacher mobilization, collective action and organization, as well as school organization, were shifted outside of

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[230]At this time, the South African Congress of Trade Union was an alliance partner of the banned and exiled African National Congress. The latter was itself now seeking to influence events directly inside South Africa.

[231]*Interview* C1.

[232]South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU), *First National Congress* 10-12 October 1991. Nasrec, Johannesburg. 1991. p. 10. And, Moll, I. op. cit., pp. 196-197. For media accounts, see *New Nation*, February 23, 1989.

the political and ideological domain of the apartheid state and firmly entrenched within the socio-political project of the Mass Democratic Movement.[233] The accord also assigned equal weight to the rights of teachers as workers and teachers as professionals. In this manner the deep divisions - ideological and political - over the two, apparently diametrically opposed concepts and practices were deferred. With the appointment of COSATU as the facilitating organization, the seminar also recognized the need for a sustainable teacher unity initiative that was backed by organizational resources. Earlier unity initiatives had fallen apart because of the absence of this sort of strategy. A routinized and professionalized teacher unification bid replaced a spontaneous one.

The presence of international teachers organizations at the outset of unity talks encouraged the participation of the conservative teachers associations.[234] Once the dominant international organizations had aligned themselves with SADTU, their effect on the emergent culture of politics of the conservative teachers associations was diminished. SADTU leaders held that it was their resolution of the professionalism-unionism debate that had encouraged the unification of the two dominant international teachers' organizations (see Section 2.4 below), the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession (WCOTP) and the International Federation of Free Teacher Unions (IFFTU). These organizations until their merger espoused separate identities of professionalism and unionism, mirroring the culture of politics of teaching and the dynamics of teacher organization in South Africa until the establishment of SADTU. Emergent international cultures have thus not been found to be a powerful tool for understanding the evolving identity of SADTU especially in its emergent phase.

Following on the Harare seminar and back in South Africa, several ideological and organizational issues were debated in eleven meetings of what became the *National Teachers Unity Forum* (NTUF). This forum comprised representatives of the conservative teacher associations and militant teacher unions. Heated debates ensued on five matters,

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[233]Moll, I., op. cit., p. 197.

[234]While initially, international support to SADTU accounted for a significant amount of organizational resources, that situation changed once the organization had won recognition and stop-order facilities. By 1993, more than 80 percent of organizational resources were derived from membership fees. SADTU now received international support mainly in the form of management training projects. *Interviews* C2 and C5.

> 1. whether the envisaged national organization should be a federal or a unitary structure; 2. the future of the assets and infra-structure of the established organizations; 3. whether the organization should be purely professional in character, or be a trade union, or be reflective of both positions; 4. the time-table for the dissolution of organizations; 5. proportional representation on the basis of membership strength or an even representation in terms of the existing organizations.[235]

Fundamental differences ahead of the official launch of the proposed new body scheduled for October 1990, prompted the facilitator organization, COSATU, to convene a special workshop on September 1, 1990 to finalize the constitution of the proposed new organization. The final constitution resolved these matters as follows,

> 1. it defined the nature of the structure as a 'single national teachers' union' in the preamble; 2. it declared as the objects of the Union both the advancing of 'collective bargaining' rights (Clause 6.2) as well as maintaining 'high standards of ethical conduct and professional integrity' (Clause 6.10) on behalf of its members; 3. it set out the entitlement of each organization to representatives on the Interim National Executive Committee (Clause 19.2).[236]

On the basis of these agreements, the participating organizations assented to the launch of the organization later in October of 1990.

A number of conservative teachers associations had already withdrawn from the unity process or were less committed to that process. Dominant among those who declined to sign the *Unity Agreement* and who together claimed more than 60,000 signed up members were the Transvaal United African Teachers Association (TUATA) and the Natal African Teachers Association (NATU). Both organizations had mainly African membership. Other conservative teachers associations, while having signed the agreement, were unhappy with the proposal that the new organization be a unitary rather than a federal one.[237] They expressed doubts about the resolution of the questions relating to the disposal of organizational assets and were still insistent on the determination of shares of the leadership based on audited membership. They knew that it would be difficult for the

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[235]*Interviews* C1, C2, C4 and C8. South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU), *First National Congress* 10-12 October 1991. Nasrec, Johannesburg. 1991. p. 10.

[236]ibid., pp. 10-11. See also, South African Democratic Teachers' Union. *Constitution Booklet.1990-91.*

[237]*Interviews* C1 and C2.

militant unions to show audited membership particularly since these unions remained unrecognized by the state and did not have access to stop-order facilities. This situation would have benefited the conservative teachers associations and could have resulted in a conservative leadership elected into SADTU. In 1993, three years after its launch and only after a conflict-ridden recognition campaign, SADTU signed stop-order facilities and rapidly expanded signed-up membership to 100, 000 teachers.[238]

The militant teachers unions were by this time unwilling to delay the launch of the new organization any further, and, to accommodate some of these concerns, the *Unity Agreement* made provision for *dual membership*.[239] Conservative teachers associations, who had asked for more time to dissolve in terms of the provisions of their own constitutions and to dispose of their assets, could become SADTU members until the first annual general meeting of the new organization. Individuals could also take out membership in the new organization. All of the militant teachers organizations dissolved prior to or soon after the launch of the new organization, and their memberships took up direct membership with the new organization.[240]

The *National Teacher Unity Forum* (NTUF) now made way for the establishment of SADTU. It had already begun to construct an identity for itself. It also had set in place an identity mold within which the new organization would emerge and develop. This emergent identity related to the nature of the stakes, from the culture of politics of teaching, teacher mobilization, collective action and organization, through to school organization and management, as well as the strategy for achieving a transformed education system, from participation in state structures through to militant mass action and collective bargaining.

It was the militant teachers unions who were setting the pace for and determining the direction of the evolving identity of the NTUF and its successor, SADTU. For example, more than 600 teachers of all races marched on Parliament on May 28, 1990 when a teacher

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[238]*Interviews* C1 and C2.

[239]"Unity Agreement," In, South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU), *First National Congress*. 10-12 October 1991. Nasrec, Johannesburg. 1991. pp. 29-36.

[240]For example, the Democratic Teachers Union (DETU), Western Cape Teachers Union (WECTU) and the National Education Union of South Africa (NEUSA) all dissolved immediately after the launch of SADTU in 1990. South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU), *First National Congress* 10-12 October 1991. Nasrec, Johannesburg. 1991. p. 12.

delegation met with the Minister of National Education. Teachers demanded a single, non-racial, non-sexist system of education; that the administration of education be removed from the present apartheid structures such as the Tricameral Parliament and the homelands; the immediate addressing of the appalling conditions in schools, including gross overcrowding, unacceptably high pupil:teacher ratios and the lack of suitable learning facilities and resources for effective learning; a minimum salary level based on a minimum living wage, regardless of qualification or experience; the democratization of education, including recognition of Student Representative Councils, Parent-Teacher-Student-Associations and the teaching profession which could then take part in negotiating education policy; the immediate suspension of all inspection activities and other prescriptive bureaucratic controls and a start to negotiations on these issues; and, the recognition of a *Teacher's Bill of Rights*, including security of tenure.[241]

The radicalization of the teaching profession, teacher mobilization, collective action and organization which in turn directly impacted the curriculum, schooling, school organization and school management was continuing within the NTUF as well as outside of it. Protest marches were now commonplace as teachers sought the resolution of their grievances.[242]

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[241]*Argus*, May 19, 1990. See also, *Argus*, June 8 and 14, 1990 (2). *Beeld*, June 11 and 14, 1990. *Business Day*, June 8, 12 and 15, 1990. *Burger*, June 8, 9 (2), 12, 14 and 15, 1990. *Citizen*, June 8, 11, 12/6 and 15, 1990. *Cape Times*, June 8, 9 and 11, 1990. *Daily Despatch*, June 8 and 9, 1990. *Eastern Province Herald*, June 8, 1990. *Financial Mail*, June 15, 1990. *Natal Witness*, February 28, 1990. *New Nation*, February 23, 1990. *Pretoria News*, June 8, 1990. *South*, June 14, 1990. *Sowetan*, February 23, 1990. *Star*, June 8 and 11, 1990. *Sunday Times*, June 10, 1990. *Volksblad*, June 11 and 12, 1990.

[242]For example the NTUF staged sit-ins of teachers countrywide on July 24, 1990 in protest against alleged victimization of teachers and the situation regarding stationery provision in black schools. The NTUF also decided to demand immediate de facto recognition from the government, and negotiations on teachers' grievances, including the dismissal and suspension of strikers, and to send the Minister of National Education a memorandum on alleged victimization [*Weekly Mail*, June 29, 1990. See also, *Leader*, July 6, 1990.]. In a second national day of action on 7 and 8 August, 1990, a picket was held outside the Department of Education and Training (DET) Headquarters in Port Elizabeth on August 7, 1990, with more than 40 executive members joining the national day of action campaign to gain government recognition. In Grahamstown 300 placard waving teachers handed a memorandum to the DET area manager. In Johannesburg 5,000 teachers marched to the DET's regional offices where they handed over a petition, while in Phoenix, outside Durban, 250 teachers held a placard demonstration outside a school in Phoenix. Demonstrations in Cape Town involved 400 teachers holding a rally, and in the Transkei 300 teachers marched to the offices of the homeland's circuit inspector where a memorandum was handed over. In Pretoria 250 teachers picketed outside the British and Australian Embassies and Japanese Consulate, as well as along the

2. Transforming the culture of politics of teaching, teacher mobilization, collective action and organization. The South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU), 1990-95.

After almost two years of teacher unity talks, the South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU) was launched in October of 1990. In the presence of 1600 teacher delegates from all over South Africa as well as 100 delegates representing the WCOTP and teacher organizations from India, Cuba, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Namibia, the organization adopted a radical transformation project and militant strategy to end apartheid education. But the withdrawal of key conservative teachers associations, and the hesitance displayed by other conservative ones,[243] opened the way for the militant identity of the NTUF, realized through the ongoing efforts of the militant unions to steer the organization, to be continued without any resistance into that of SADTU.[244] The agenda set at the launch was thus predictable and the transformation of the nature of the stakes and the strategies for achieving its social project continued at an accelerated pace. The transformation of the culture of politics of teaching, teacher mobilization, collective action and organization, and in turn, curriculum, schooling, school organization and management was tackled with even greater energy by the newly launched organization and its largely youthful leadership, who now held that "We must refuse to be loyal to warnings that we be careful of biting the hand that feeds us and that half a loaf is better than no bread."[245]

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main road out of Mamelodi, while a picket was held at the teachers' center in Atteridgeville and a march in Soshanguve. NTUF members in Laudium, near Pretoria held a protest meeting, while a rally was held in Venda [*Eastern Province Herald*, August 8, 1990].

[243]*Argus*, October 5, 1990. *Cape Times*, October 4, 1990. *Leader*, October 5, 1990. *New Nation*, October 5, 1990. *South*, October 4, 1990. *Sowetan*, October 4, 1990. *The Star*, October 2 and 5, 1990. *Sunday Star*, October 7, 1990. *Sunday Times Extra*, October 7, 1990. *Sunday Tribune*, October 7, 1990. *Volksblad*, October 4, 1990. *Weekly Mail*, October 5, 1990.

[244] Only one of the conservative teachers associations later remained within the fold of SADTU; the 10,000 member Teachers Association of South Africa which drew its membership from teachers who were classified Indian. This organization was already radicalized by its combat with an authoritarian Indian Education Department as well as by its membership of the NTUF. Membership of SADTU and of the emerging coalition of conservative teachers associations (later named the National Professional Teachers Organization of South Africa, NAPTOSA) was in 1993 split equally, with SADTU claiming membership of 100,000 teachers and NAPTOSA 100,000.

[245]*South*, October 11, 1990. *Sowetan*, October 8, 1990.

The resolutions adopted at the launching congress signaled the beginning of a new era in the politics of teaching and of teacher mobilization and organization: every teacher must have the right to be informed, the right to be politically active and the right to express personal opinions in public without fear; schools should be democratized with the implementation of Parent-Teacher-Student-Associations and other similar structures as may be necessary; favorable teacher:pupil ratios, an equitable distribution of per capita funding; early childhood education and care available to all; the effective utilization of school buildings, including their proper maintenance; the immediate abolition of the apartheid "own affairs" education system and its replacement by a single democratic Ministry of Education administering a common education policy for all South Africans; implementation of a common school calendar; full participation of women teachers in all structures of SADTU and an immediate end to discrimination against female teachers; immediate recognition from the Ministry of National Education as the only teachers' union representing teachers on a non-racial and national basis; the scrapping of temporary teacher status; and, the provision of posts to all newly qualified teachers in 1991.[246]

Macro-societal level collective action frames dominate the emergence and early development of both SADTU and of its predecessor, the National Teacher Unity Forum. The push of the anti-apartheid movement in the 1980s to one of people's power and people's education dominated the emergence and early development of SADTU. This occurred in at least two manners. First, the concern for maximum unity of the oppressed in their combat with the apartheid state had direct implications for the political culture, mobilization, collective action and organization of teachers. Despite historical differences and conflict between conservative teachers associations and militant teachers unions, teachers had to be united into a militant movement that would aggressively enter into combat with apartheid education and education departments. Only as a united front could they successfully advance the project of people's power. Second, the gathering movement for people's power and people's education called for the defiance of apartheid education authorities and the institutionalization of democratically elected organs of people's power in

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[246]*Natal Post*, October 17, 1990. South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU). *First National Congress* 10-12 October 1991. Nasrec, Johannesburg. 1991. pp. 5-8.

its stead. That project and identity continued into the early development of SADTU. Once the nature of the stakes, or the macro-societal level collective action frame had undergone change from ungovernability, people's power, people's education and armed insurrection to a negotiated sharing of power, national unity and nation building, that project dominated the later identity of SADTU. This shift opened up political space for the resurgence of conservative ideologies: it revitalized conservative teachers associations that were delegitimated in the 1980s. Therefore the emergent macro-societal level collective action affected the influence and social project of SADTU in an indirect manner through the resurgence of counter-social movement organizations in its conflict system. SADTU's own organizational identity now had to undergo change through new recruitment strategies, services, and even shifts in organizational strategies.

The account that follows will also show the power of embedding the emergence of social movement organizations in their historically evolved multi-organizational fields of alliance and conflict systems. This analytical tool - embedding an organization within its evolving organizational ecology - allows one to track the waxes and wanes of collective action and to follow the cycle of emergence, evolution and decline of single ideological and policy questions. Ultimately, social movement organizations as illustrated in this case study are involved in the social construction and reconstruction of public opinion and in the pursuit of social projects.

Let us turn to a selected number of these issues that dominated[247] the emergence and later evolution of SADTU in order to understand the organization's evolving identity as well as the organizational determinants thereof. The evolution of the collective identity of SADTU is closely tied up to the organization's project to transform the political culture of teaching, teacher mobilization, collective action and organization, curriculum, schooling, and school organization and management. The issues tracked and studied here are therefore ideological and reflect the emergent identity of SADTU. These are: (i) non-racialism, (ii) evaluation and curriculum, (iii) professionalism and unionism, and (iv) the unilateral restructuring and rationalization of education by the state in the dying moments of apartheid.

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[247] *Interviews* C2, C3, C8 and C9.

2.1 Non-racialism, Recognition and Collective Bargaining

Founded on the principle and committed to the achievement of a non-racial education system in a unitary state, SADTU signaled its determination to change the nature of the political stakes of the education system as well as the education practices that emanate from it. For SADTU, it was no longer a matter only of working inside state structures that implied enactment and affirmation of the abhorrent racial and ethnic organization of the apartheid education system, but how this long tradition of opposition to apartheid and commitment to non-racialism was to be achieved given the actual racial and ethnic organization of the education system. For SADTU, the pursuit of non-racialism could not await the dawn of a post-apartheid society.[248] Non-racialism had to be pursued within the belly of apartheid, so to speak. Two interconnected campaign strategies were adopted in the pursuit of non-racialism. First, the campaign to achieve the "recognition from the Minister of National Education as the only teacher's union representing teachers on a non-racial, national basis" was launched. Second, a national campaign to implement a uniform school calendar in all the racial and ethnic-based education departments was initiated. Let us first turn to SADTU's campaign for recognition.

The organization of apartheid education was complex, convoluted and fragmented. Let us briefly describe this system.

> In terms of the 1983 constitution which established 'general affairs' and 'own affairs', the control of education in South Africa outside the bantustans was divided between the two categories. 'General education affairs' are the responsibility of a white cabinet minister, and African education is designated a 'general affair'. 'Own affairs education' refers to the education of Coloureds, Whites, and Indians, and is the responsibility of racially segregated Coloured, White and Indian education departments. The Department of National Education (DNE), created in 1984, was given the right to determine 'general' policy across all racial groups and for all departments outside the bantustans. This applied to formal, informal, and non-formal education with regard to norms and standards for financing education, the salaries and conditions of service of staff, the professional registration of teachers, and norms and standards for syllabi and examinations. Alongside the DNE are the four other ministries responsible for the education of designated population groups. ... Each of the four ministries is racially exclusive

[248] *Interview* C5.

> and is accorded control over the implementation of policy, teacher training, its teaching corps, and education programs and methods. The control of education in South Africa is accordingly fragmented into four separate education systems for Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei (the TBVC states), six for the self-governing territories (SGTs) [Gazankulu, Lebowa, kaNgwane, kwaNdebele, kwaZulu and Qwaqwa], one for White education [plus four province-based operating departments], one for Coloured education, one for Indian education, and one general education system for African education under the Department of Education and Training (DET). This results in nineteen operating departments under fourteen different cabinets implementing their own regulations in terms of at least twelve Education Acts and seventeen different authorities employing teachers.[sic][249]

It is this racially and ethnically fragmented system that SADTU sought to confront.[250] Until now, the conservative teachers associations had negotiated and received recognition from the race and ethnically-based departments of education. In contrast, SADTU was not willing to enact this script. For, since it had membership from across the racially- and ethnically-based departments and was committed to the achievement of a non-racial education system, it now sought recognition with the only overarching and national education department, the Department of National Education (DNE), as a clear demonstration of its commitment to a single ministry of education and to non-racialism.[251] Yet, while the DNE determined national norms and standards for teacher salaries, conditions of service and the professional registration of teachers, it was the ethnically- and racially-based departments that exercised control over teacher training, the teacher corps, and education programs and methods. Moreover, as already indicated, the DNE did not directly determine norms and standards for the ten bantustan education departments. The recognition campaign of SADTU while consistent with its social project, was going to be no easy matter.

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[249]National Education Policy Investigation. *Governance and Administration. Cape Town: Oxford University Press and NECC. 1992. p.7.*

[250]For a summary of SADTU's recognition campaign, see "The Campaign for the Recognition of SADTU." In, *New Nation Education.* March 27, 1992. p. 15.

[251]*Interviews* C3, C5, C7, C8 and C9. South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU). *First National Congress* 10-12 October 1991. Nasrec, Johannesburg. 1991. p. 7. Also, *Sunday Times Extra*, October 7, 1990.

Meetings were held with the Minister of National Education, in pursuit of this project.[252] But these meetings soon increased the adversarial nature of the relationship between the apartheid state and SADTU. The former insisted that SADTU pursue recognition with the racially- and ethnically-based departments prompting the organization to walk out of a meeting with the Minister of National Education.[253] The organization threatened that failure by the education authorities to officially recognize the union, combined with

> The kind of bureaucratic arrogance we encountered during the interview would compel the union to seriously consider national and international action ... We have decided to report back to our constituencies and [will] take whatever action we deem necessary in the circumstances.[sic][254]

The organization was now confronted with an organizational determinant difficult to resist: how would it represent the interests of its membership and what about stop-order facilities in order to collect membership fees, provide services to its membership and maintain the organization? Confronted by this apparently insurmountable reality, the organization changed strategy early into 1991.[255]

SADTU this time sought recognition as a staff association from the ethnic departments, for "the union now finds itself in an invidious position in that, whilst pursuing its goal of a uniform education system as a reflection of the non-racial character of the teachers union, SADTU is compelled to negotiate with existing ethnic departments on behalf of victimized teachers."[256] The organization adopted a four-prong strategy.[257] First,

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[252]South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU). *First National Congress* 10-12 October 1991. Nasrec, Johannesburg. 1991. pp. 14-15. Also, *Sowetan*, November 29, 1990.

[253]*Interview* C8. South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU). *First National Congress* 10-12 October 1991. Nasrec, Johannesburg. 1991. p. 15.

[254]*Burger*, February 13, 1991. *Business Day*, February 13, 1991. *Cape Times*, February 13, 1991. *Natal Witness*, February 14, 1991. *Sowetan*, February 25, 1991.

[255]*Interview* C8. South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU). *First National Congress* 10-12 October 1991. Nasrec, Johannesburg. 1991. pp. 13-16.

[256]South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU). *First National Congress* 10-12 October 1991. Nasrec, Johannesburg. 1991. p.14. See also, *City Press*, January 20, 1991. *Leader*, February 15, 1991. *Lentswe*, June 14, 1991. *Natal Witness*, March 7, 1991. *New African*, April 11, 1991. *South*, April 4, 1991. *Sowetan*, January 22, 1991. *Sunday Times*, April 7, 1991.

SADTU would negotiate with the various departments of education for an *interim recognition* agreement. Second, those agreements would be interim measures which would run parallel to the broader process of negotiating the implementation of a single department of education and a national collective bargaining mechanism. Third, those interim agreements would include access to educational sites, stop-order facilities, the right to be consulted over all matters concerning members' interests, clearly defined dispute and grievance procedures, third party arbitration in cases of disputes, an acknowledgment that SADTU is recognized as the collective bargaining representative of its members, and a termination period of the interim agreement on 30 days written notice. Fourth, SADTU would proceed on the national level with intensive negotiations in respect of the implementation of a single education department and a National Collective Bargaining Mechanism.

Prompted by the slow responses, and, in some cases, no response to its call for negotiations, the organization on August 8, 1991 launched a national day of action in support of its modified recognition campaign.[258] Combined with its pursuit of negotiations, the strategy later began to bear fruit. By the end of the first quarter of 1992, four education departments, the Department of Education and Training (DET), the Transkei Education Department and the departments of education responsible for Coloured and Indian education had entered into negotiations on recognition agreements with SADTU.[259]

The apartheid state through the Department of Education and Training was also now setting its own terms for recognition: SADTU must decide on a *code of conduct* in which it undertakes not to participate in strikes; thereafter negotiations would have to be held on the

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[257]Interview C8. South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU). *First National Congress* 10-12 October 1991. Nasrec, Johannesburg. 1991. p.14. See also, *Natal Mercury*, October 15, 1991.

[258]South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU). *First National Congress* 10-12 October 1991. Nasrec, Johannesburg. 1991. p. 15. *Argus*, August 8, 1991. *Business Day*, August 1 and 8, 1991. *Beeld*, August 1 and 7, 1991. *Cape Times*, August 8, 1991. *Citizen*, August 8, 1991. *City Press*, August 11, 1991. *Daily Despatch*, August 8, 1991. *Leader*, August 9, 1991. *New Nation*, August 2 and 16, 1991. *Pretoria News*, August 6, 1991. *Rapport Extra*, July 28 and August 4, 1991. *South*, August 1, 1991. *Sowetan*, July 29, August 5 and 8, 1991. *Star*, August 3, 7 and 8, 1991. *Volksblad*, July 27, 1991. *Evening Post*, August 7, 1991.

[259]*Cape Times*, September 19, 199. *City Press*, February 22, 1992. *Learning Roots*, September, 1991. *Natal Post*, November 13 and December 4, 1991. *New African*, November 28, 1991. *New Nation*, September 27, October 4, 1991 and January 17, 1992. *Rapport*, March 23, 1992.

code and a final decision be taken; SADTU will also have to provide its membership lists so that the department can establish the support of the organization; SADTU would also have to meet conduct rules in its negotiations with the department, in terms of which SADTU would have to hold orderly meetings with the department and enjoy reasonable access to the ministry.[260]

Unmoved by the state's opening position, SADTU informed by organizational learning derived through its association with its close ally COSATU - which had already made dramatic progress on transforming broader industrial and labor relations over the previous ten years - would over the next two years engage in and win collective bargaining rights and the institutionalization of mediation and conciliation mechanisms for the teaching sector. On the other hand, the apartheid state's insistence on a code of conduct, combined with the campaign of the conservative teacher associations on professionalism (see Section 2.4 below), all prompted SADTU to speed up discussions on and adopt its own *Teachers' Code of Conduct.*[261] The organization also speeded up its discussions on and later adopted a *Bill of Rights for Teachers* as well as a document on *Disciplinary Procedures.*

In pursuance of its goal to establish a collective bargaining mechanism for all teachers, SADTU was joined by ideological adversaries in its multi-organizational field, the Union of Teachers Associations of South Africa (UTASA) and the National Professional Teachers Organization of South Africa (NAPTOSA), in negotiations with the Department of National Education. SADTU's campaign for recognition was also extended to include negotiations on collective bargaining of teachers with those of the broader public sector.[262] As a result of the campaigns of SADTU for collective bargaining rights and for collective

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[260]*Burger*, September 20, 1991.

[261]*Interview* C8. The first draft of the *Teachers' Code of Conduct* was presented for discussion at the organization's first national congress in 1991, and was, together with the *Bill of Rights for Teachers* and the document on *Disciplinary Procedures* adopted at the organization's second national congress in 1993. South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU). *First National Congress* 10-12 October 1991. Nasrec, Johannesburg. 1991. pp. 38-39. South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU). *Second National Congress*, 5-7 July 1993. Johannesburg. ? 1993. pp. 36-42. South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU). Second National Congress, 5-7 July 1993. *Congress Resolutions*. ? 1993. p. 15.

[262]South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU). *First National Congress* 10-12 October 1991. Nasrec, Johannesburg. 1991. p. 15. South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU). *Second National Congress*, 5-7 July 1993. Johannesburg. ? 1993. p. 11.

bargaining mechanisms, the state, by way of the Department of National Education (DNE) established a Collective Bargaining Forum early in 1992. This forum was set up to engage the various teachers' organizations on the question of Labor Legislation for teachers. A working group that included SADTU representatives later drafted labor legislation which was enacted on October 20, 1993. The Education Labor Relations Act of 1993 provided for the "regulation of labor relations in education, including collective bargaining, the establishment of an Education Labor Relations Council, the registration of certain organizations in the teaching profession, their admission to the said Council, and the prevention and settlement of disputes."[263] SADTU continued its mobilization for labor legislation which would be applicable to all workers in South Africa but decided to participate "under protest" in the drafting of the Education Labor Relations Act of 1993 and its operationalization.[264]

Gaining recognition from the remaining departments of education became the subject of more militant collective action by SADTU. On May 21 and 22, 1992, following what the organization called "several failed attempts to negotiate a satisfactory deal with education authorities" especially with the education departments in the bantustans of Lebowa, Ciskei, kwaZulu and Bophuthatswana, the organization embarked on renewed militant combat in pursuance of its recognition strategy.[265]

Influenced by an environment that was becoming increasingly intolerant of teacher strikes and other forms of mass action, the organization announced that protest action would not disrupt pupils' tuition and would be limited to mass meetings, placard demonstrations and petitions. In the province of Natal, SADTU members, including teachers employed by the departments responsible for Coloured and Indian education, participated in the action. The organization promised that the action would be conducted in a responsible manner

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[263]Republic of South Africa. *Government Gazette*. Vol. 340, No. 15181. Cape Town, October 20, 1993.

[264]*Interviews* C5 and C6. South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU), *Second National Congress*, 5-7 July 1993. Johannesburg. ? 1993. pp. 29-30. See also, South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU). *Education Labor Relations Act*. Mimeo. Issued by the SADTU Head Office. Johannesburg. June 1994.

[265]For a summary of this latest campaign of SADTU, see "SADTU: Teachers standing up for their rights." In, *New Nation, Learning Nation*, June 19, 1992. And, "SADTU's National Protest Action." In *New Nation, Education*, May 29, 1992. See also, *Rapport*, July 12, 1992.

since "There is anxiety among teachers and parents alike. We are aware that parents would like this matter to be resolved in an orderly manner."[266]

The organization had also sought support from allies for this renewed combat. The National Education Coordinating Committee, the Congress of South African Students, the Azanian People's Organization and the African National Congress, all endorsed SADTU's campaign for recognition following meetings with the organizations. In these discussions SADTU explained that it was not necessarily going to engage in a strike but would use the two days to conduct alternative education by teaching democracy, non-racialism and non-sexism. Contingency plans to ensure that pupils would not suffer on the two days were that SADTU would conduct extra classes ahead of the planned action. Further consultations were still to be conducted with other allied organizations to seek their support.[267] The apartheid state struck back, obtaining a court interdict restraining SADTU from embarking on the planned two days of national mass action. The union retorted that teachers were asked to report to school and attend to their teaching duties before embarking on their campaign and that it would oppose the court interdict.[268] It would in any event go ahead with its mass action even were the authorities to attempt to block it with a court order, SADTU insisted.[269]

By the organization's second national congress in 1993, agreements had been concluded with the Department of National Education, the Department of Education and Training, the departments responsible for Coloured and Indian education and the departments of education in the bantustans of Transkei, Venda, Lebowa and kaNgwane. Recognition by all education departments was thwarted by the refusal of the bantustans of Bophuthatswana and kwaZulu to even enter into talks with the organization.[270] Despite the concluded agreements, relations between the departments of education and SADTU were

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[266]*Beeld*, March 9, 1992. *Citizen*, May 23, 1992. *Natal Post*, March 6, 1992. *New Nation*, May 29, 1992.

[267]*Citizen*, May 12, 1992. *New African*, May 7, 1992.

[268]*Beeld*, May 13, 1992. *Business Day*, May 13, 1992. *Sowetan*, May 13, 1992.

[269]*Star*, May 15, 1992.

[270]South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU), *Second National Congress*, 5-7 July 1993. Johannesburg. ? 1993. p. 29. See also, *Citizen*, September 28, 1992. *New Nation*, August 21, 1992.

far from settled with the organization lashing out at the apartheid state for trying to discredit the union and to block its attempts at solving disputes. The organization singled out the Department of Education and Training (DET), the department responsible for Coloured education, and the bantustans of Lebowa, kwaZulu and Ciskei for smearing the union and victimizing its members.[271]

To summarize, the present account has illustrated how the struggles and campaigns of SADTU for a non-racial education system and society came to life in its campaign for recognition as a non-racial teachers union. The account of that event cycle has also shown how organizational social projects become revised, partly influenced by dominant exogenous organizational determinants - here the organization of apartheid education into a system of racially- and ethnically-based education departments - and partly influenced by the need to maintain organization, to recruit and defend members interests against the apartheid state through the institutionalization of collective bargaining rights and mediation and conciliation mechanisms for the teaching profession. The account has also illustrated how new policy questions arise as organizational strategy, and, in turn, organizational programs and identity are revised. The pursuit of a collective bargaining mechanism for all teachers and the goal of combining all public servants negotiations on collective bargaining into a single mechanism reflect the shift from an initial sole concern for organizational recognition to an understanding of its place within a wider public service. At the same time as the adoption of a *Teachers' Code of Conduct*, a *Bill of Rights for Teachers* and a document on *Disciplinary Procedures*, all brought the organization in line with some of the requirements imposed by the apartheid state. These combined with negotiations with the apartheid state in turn facilitated the routinization and professionalization of SADTU. Unlike in the case of COSAS (Chapter Two) where a new set of programs supported by donors initiated routinization and professionalization, it was SADTU's campaign for non-racial recognition and collective bargaining rights which prompted its own routinization and professionalization.

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[271] *Weekly Mail*, October 15, 1993.

2.2 Non-racialism and the campaign for a single school calendar

SADTU's national campaign to implement a *single* school calendar in all education departments as a first step towards the creation of a single education system reflects a similar trajectory as its campaign for organizational recognition. Initially announced in the heat and excitement of the organization's 1990 launching congress, the campaign also ran headlong into the complex organization of apartheid education. It also ran into bureaucratic and political resistance now mounted by the apartheid state.[272] The campaign was pursued at a number of levels.

Extensive research was conducted to determine the number of school days required for the completion of the academic year's work, the best number and length of terms, public holidays and commemoration days.[273] Later, in the face of bureaucratic and political resistance, militant collective action was unfolded with some SADTU branches urging members to defy the closing dates of Black schools and instead adopt those of White schools.[274] The branches later backed down on the call saying "We are not abandoning the campaign to pursue a common school calendar but are merely saying this call was not properly organized."[275]

By the time of the organization's first national congress, though the campaign had "lost its impetus and the Union's initiative ... eroded to a large extent."[276] That national congress was now directed by the National Executive Committee of SADTU to pursue the matter further.[277] But, unable to resolve it, the national congress "mandated the National Executive Committee to pursue the matter of the *Uniform* School Calendar [authors' emphasis]" further with education allies "taking into account that the school holidays were

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[272]*Interview* C8. South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU), *First National Congress* 10-12 October 1991. Nasrec, Johannesburg. 1991. p. 6.

[273]*Argus*, November 12, 1990. *The Leader*, December 7, 1990. *Pretoria News*, November 13, 1990.

[274]*Sowetan*, September 20, 1991. *Star*, September 20, 1991.

[275]*Sowetan*, September 25, 1991.

[276]South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU), *First National Congress* 10-12 October 1991. Nasrec, Johannesburg. 1991. p. 25.

[277]ibid. pp. 24-25.

Christian orientated."[278] The matter now was effectively displaced off the list of short term objectives of the organization, and informed by the results of research that raised doubts about the feasibility of a single school calendar, the campaign had now shifted to one of a uniform calendar with the possibility of a geographic rather than racial structure.[279] Only the dawn of a democratically elected government finally resolved the matter of a national uniform school calendar.[280]

To summarize, analysis of an event cycle - here the campaign for a common calendar - itself embedded in a wider social project of the creation of a single education system, has revealed how an organizational strategy in its implementation phase undergoes change from calls for a single calendar, to that of a uniform calendar with the possibility of a geographic rather than racial structure as it runs headlong into exogenous organizational determinants, shown here to be the organization of apartheid education and bureaucratic and political resistance. As illustrated with SADTU's campaign for recognition as a non-racial teachers union, the event cycle here has shown how organizational social constructions (their social projects and multi-organizational fields) are mediated by actually existing conditions and relations (the wider education system, bureaucracies, politics and endogenous organizational maintenance).

2.3 Democracy, Defiance and Evaluation

As described earlier, the 1980s was for the anti-apartheid movement a decade marked by the push for people's power and people's education. That push implied the rejection of apartheid authorities including those in the education establishment. The militant teachers unions were the means through which that socio-political project was carried into the arenas of teaching, teacher mobilization, collective action and organization, curriculum, schooling, school organization and management. For teaching and curriculum, this strategy implied the defiance of the authority of the inspectors and evaluators of

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[278]South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU). *Second National Congress*, 5-7 July 1993. Johannesburg. ? 1993. p. 13.

[279]*Interview* C8.

[280] The Government of National Unity organized the newly created nine provincial education dpartments into four geographic clusters for purposes of creating a uniform non-racial school calender.

teachers. That position was formalized by the National Teacher Unity Forum at its Bloemfontein meeting on August 18-19, 1990, and stated that "no classroom visits be done by inspectors or subject advisers for the purpose of evaluation but that inspectors may visit schools for the completion of certain administrative functions."[281] That socio-political project was now transferred into the emerging identity of SADTU not by formal resolution but through the continuing collective action of its organizational branches nation-wide.[282] Defiance of educational authorities had clear and direct implications for teaching and evaluation. Refusing inspectors and subject advisors access to schools also had implications for the evaluation of the quality of education. Branches of SADTU argued that they were not opposed to evaluation but that the prevailing system was out-dated and of no benefit to the teacher nor to the student. It only served political victimization, they argued.[283] Critique by teachers of the system of teacher evaluation was wide-ranging and specific and included the following: the prevalence of political bias in the system; inspectors wielded unchecked powers; teachers were victimized on the basis of their organizational affiliations; the system kept new teachers on probation for extended periods; its inspectors were incompetent; women promotion candidates were subjected to sexual harassment and discrimination; some of its evaluation criteria were irrelevant; the practice of "one-off" visits which inspectors relied on for appraisal was flawed, as were the arbitrariness of scores given; the process was clouded in secrecy; it was difficult to challenge inspectors' assessments; contextual factors, such as high pupil and teaching loads in Black schools were absent in the appraisal; the process was open to patronage; and, "merit awards" offered as incentives to improve teacher performance were subject to abuse.[284]

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[281]South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU). *First National Congress* 10-12 October 1991. Nasrec, Johannesburg. 1991. pp. 26-27.

[282]*Interview* C8. South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU). *First National Congress* 10-12 October 1991. Nasrec, Johannesburg. 1991. pp. 26-27.

[283]*Beeld*, January 24, 1991. *Daily Despatch*, June 22, 1991. *Natal Witness*, January 24, 1991. *Sowetan*, February 1, 1991. *Natal Mercury*, November 22, 1991.

[284]*Interviews* C3 and C10. Also, Education Policy Unit, University of the Witwatersrand/NECC. *Rethinking teacher appraisal in South Africa: Policy options and strategies.* Chetty, D., L. Chisholm, M. Gardiner, N. Magau, and P. Vinjevold. August, 1993. Johannesburg. p. 3.

The defiance campaign led to disciplinary action being taken against a number of teachers, prompting affected SADTU branches to threaten mass action in their defense.[285] The organization's first national congress in 1991 provided an apt opportunity for it to develop a cohesive and national strategy on the defiance campaign and evaluation. However, despite encouragement by its National Executive Committee for the congress to formulate a clear position, the congress adopted a procedural rather than substantial resolution. It affirmed the "validity of particular responses taken in different regions" but urged that those responses be "reconciled nationally."[286] It also encouraged the resolution of grievances "via negotiations and established procedures,"[287] and deferred the matter to one of its regions for the development of a comprehensive solution.[288]

The sporadic nature of the campaign continued and took a particularly adversarial tone in the bantustans of Venda, Lebowa, Gazankulu and Ciskei, as well as in the Southern Transvaal region of the Department of Education and Training.[289] The nature of the stakes are well summarized by one SADTU leader,

> ...SADTU has declared a moratorium on inspection until a fair and democratic system of inspection has been found. Such a system shall be a product of negotiation and intense discussions and consultation with all relevant education components. We accordingly call on our members to continue resisting inspection by undemocratic and witch-hunting inspectors. We also warn the affected bantustans to refrain from harassing and intimidating those of our members who refuse to be inspected. We warn them that their continued insistence on this issue is definitely a recipe for confrontation. SADTU reserves the right to take

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[285]South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU). *First National Congress* 10-12 October 1991. Nasrec, Johannesburg. 1991. p. 27. See also, *New Nation*, December 6, 1991.

[286]South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU). *Second National Congress*, 5-7 July 1993. Johannesburg. ? 1993. p. 17.

[287]ibid. See also, *Burger*, October 16, 1991. *Weekly Mail*, October 18, 1991.

[288]The Southern Transvaal region subsequently entered into an agreement to develop a framework proposal with the Education Policy Unit at the University of the Witwatersrand. See reference in footnote 343.

[289]*Daily Despatch*, July 9, 1992. *New Nation*, May, 8, 1992. *Sowetan*, June 18 and 25, and July 20, 1992.

whatever form of action to protect its members against this degrading system of inspection.[290]

A more forthright approach to the combined policy questions of defiance and evaluation was only adopted at SADTU's second national congress in 1993. This time the organization acknowledged that it did not have "a clearly worked out alternative method of teacher evaluation," but that "quick fix solutions" were not desirable.[291] The issue of teacher evaluation had, however, to be placed "in a broader context."[292] There were irresistible "pressures among membership to deliver interim guidelines on teacher evaluations" and a mechanism to take the matter forward was the establishment of the National Education and Training Forum.[293]

SADTU affirmed that,

> 1. evaluation/appraisal is not separate from the broader system which needs to be restructured. 2. the principles which govern a new system of education should guide the process of evaluation/appraisal, and should include: 2.1 that the process is as important as the product. 2.2 that the process be a negotiated one. 2.3 that the process be based upon a relationship of equality between appraisers and appraisees. 2.4 that the process be oriented towards development rather than judgment. 2.5 that the process and instruments take into account contextual factors. 2.6 that the process be nationally instituted. 2.7 that the process be open and transparent. 2.8 that evaluators be trained and empowered to do their job. 2.9 that there be effective feedback and accessibility [to] records to the appraisee [sic].[294]

In its resolutions on evaluation, the organization encouraged,

> 1. that there be joint planning, control and ownership of the process of teacher evaluation/appraisal. 2. to link teacher evaluation/appraisal to issues such as conditions of service, school governance, etc. and to deal with immediate issues through the D[epartment of] N[ational] E[ducation], while putting the broader issues on the agenda of the N[ational]E[ducation and]T[raining]F[orum]. 3. to coordinate the

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[290]Northern Transvaal Regional chairperson of SADTU, quoted in *New Nation*, May 8, 1992.

[291]South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU), Second National Congress, 5-7 July 1993. *Congress Resolutions*. ? 1993. p. 16.

[292]ibid.

[293]ibid.

[294]ibid. pp. 16-17.

> activities of the various task groups of SADTU dealing with evaluation/appraisal. 4. to produce interim guidelines on appraisal for distribution to membership. 5. to prepare in whatever way necessary for the discussion with the DNE ... interim guidelines and long term restructuring of [the] system of evaluation/appraisal. 6. to declare a moratorium on evaluation/appraisal pending the outcome of the ongoing negotiations. ... 8. the broad principle and guidelines prepared by the E[ducation]P[olicy]U[nit at the University of the Witwatersrand] be used as a basis for developing an alternative system for evaluation/appraisal. ...[sic].[295]

These principles were subsequently included in SADTU's "principles of performance appraisal" which formed the basis upon which the organization led discussions and negotiations with departments of education and other teachers associations.[296]

In this manner, having inherited a fragmented and localized campaign of defiance of education authorities which was a direct spill-over from the 1980s but also now embedded in actually existing practices ranging from teaching, teacher organization and collective action, through curriculum, schooling, school organization and management, SADTU sought to achieve two things. First, it sought to shape the nature of the stakes and the politics of teacher appraisal, by shifting its center of gravity from one that was inspectorally-based and bureaucracy-oriented to one that was developmentally-oriented, participatory, transparent, context-dependent and reproducible. Second, it sought to move its own trajectory and identity from one dominated by defiance, to one in which it provided leadership in the transformation of the actual reality faced by teachers. Simultaneously, it sought to bring about the *return of the teacher* and her organization as principal actors in the drama of teaching, curriculum, schooling, school organization and school management.

2.4 Professionalism, Unionism and Democracy

The nature of the education stakes, and the politics of education was brought into sharp focus with the debate in the mid-1980s over professionalism and teachers. Focused in the program of the National Teachers Unity Forum (NTUF), that debate surged on and into the emergent identity of SADTU. Its temporary resolution in the early 1990s transformed

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[295]ibid. p. 17.

the nature of the stakes and the culture of politics of teaching, teacher mobilization, organization and collective action.

Until the emergence of the NTUF, the dominant view on professionalism was powerfully shaped by the mainly uncontested domination of the culture of politics of teaching, teacher mobilization, collective action and organization by the apartheid state exercised in various degrees through the several racially- and ethnically-based education departments. That view of professionalism was a particularly narrow one within which,

> Teachers were expected to be well dressed, civil and reasonable, and had to refrain at all times from actions which could lead to confrontation between themselves and their employer ... Teachers were expected to teach under bad conditions in schools, and apply a racist curriculum in class. And when teachers would dare raise their voices against these problems, they would be victimized.[297]

This narrow definition of professionalism prevailed until the mid-1980s. It is this political culture that the emergent militant teacher organizations now contested.[298] Buoyed by militant mass action in their communities and the push for people's power and people's education, these teacher unions inserted into the debate the notion of *teacher unionism* as a counter to a narrow professionalism. For them, initially, the weight lay powerfully in favor of the notion of "teachers as workers." They were influenced both by their youth, but also by the emergence and eventual dominance of worker mobilization, organization and collective action by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and by that organization's leadership role in the unification of teachers through the NTUF. The tenacious struggles of the conservative teachers associations - carriers of the narrow notion of professionalism - within the NTUF and without, influenced the emergent perspectives of the militant teachers union.

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[296]South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU). *Secretarial Report to SADTU NEC Meeting*. 7 August 1993. pp. 7-8.

[297]"South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU): Professionalism and Unionism." In, *New Nation, Education*. April 3-9, 1992. p. 18.

[298]*Interviews* C4, C5 and C8.

The counter-strategy of the conservative teachers associations was significant. Professionals put the child first, they maintained.[299] Unionists neglect the child to advance their own interests, they argued. It is this counter that encouraged the "unionists" to develop a comprehensive approach on what was fast becoming a debate that pitted professionalism and professionals against unionism and unionists. The ad hoc, sporadic, militant mass actions of the emergent teacher unions, the NTUF and later, SADTU, which were dominated by broader political concerns, struggles for organizational recognition, conditions of service, defense of members and salary disputes, all of which contributed, to the disruption of schooling, appeared to add some credibility to the claims of those advocating a narrow professionalism and anti-unionism. In these struggles over meaning(s), the public seemed more receptive to the claims of the conservative teachers unions.

The substantive response of SADTU to this challenge came at its first national congress in 1991. Appropriately titled "Unionize for Democratic Professionalism" the congress tackled head-on this vital ideological debate and process of meaning construction.[300] SADTU's response asserted "the trade union and professionalism aspects ... [are] two sides of the same coin [sic]"[301] and the organization mounted its own campaign of meaning construction, arguing,

> Many teachers have been conditioned into accepting the definition of professionalism which says teachers do not have the right to protest.

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[299]Remarkable about this emergent counter strategy of the conservative teachers associations was that they now took the struggle over meaning(s) to parents, political leaders and the broader community through the placing of full page, paid advertisements in the print media. See for example, the advertisements placed by the Cape Professional Teachers' Association (CTPA), "The CTPA position with respect to the temporary teachers campaign," [*South*, February 28 - March 6, 1991] and, "The CTPA position with respect to inspectors of education and subject advisers," [*South*, February 21-27, 1991]. By, the Union of Teachers' Associations of South Africa (UTASA), "Press Statement" [*Sunday Times*, July 26, 1992]. And, by the Transvaal United African Teachers' Association (TUATA), "TUATA. Against defamation and disruption," [*City Press*, May 20, 1990 and Sowetan, May 21, 1990], "TUATA. Students! The new South Africa needs you to learn," [*City Press*, June 3, 1990 and Sowetan, June 5, 1990], "TUATA. And what of our children's future?" [*Sowetan*, July 30, 1990], "TUATA poses questions to SADTU" [*Sowetan*, October 1, 1990], "TUATA. There must be a new beginning," [*New Nation*, November 29, 1991], "TUATA. An appeal to parents," [*New Nation*, March 13, 1992], and, "TUATA. An appeal to the community" [*City Press*, July 19, 1992].

[300]*Interview* C2. South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU). *First National Congress* 10-12 October 1991. Nasrec, Johannesburg. 1991. Also, *New Nation*, October 4, 1991. *Weekly Mail*, September 13, 1991.

[301]"South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU): Professionalism and Unionism." In, *New Nation, Education*. April 3-9, 1992. p. 18. Also, *Interview* C2.

> The rights to organize and protest are basic human rights and we make no apology for calling on teachers to protest against undemocratic service contracts. The state expects teachers to act professionally while they treat us in the most unprofessional manner possible. For them, professionalism means towing their line and we are not prepared to do that."[302]
>
> [Furthermore] ... There are two inescapable realities about teachers. One is that they are educators and the other is that they are workers. Teachers have no option but to fight for their rights as employees and at the same time exercise the responsibilities of the profession of teaching. It would be the most misguided view of professionalism to conclude that teachers by reason of their commitment to education would accept low salaries, unsatisfactory conditions of service and discriminatory practices."[303]

This substantive view reflected a new balance within which: "SADTU fully accepts that teachers have a serious responsibility to provide an education of the highest standard to pupils in the classroom ... [and] ... that teachers also have democratic rights, in particular the right to bargain for improved benefits for the profession."[304]

To summarize, SADTU, powerfully influenced by its environment - dominant social constructions of professionalism, a resurgence of conservative teachers associations and an increasingly hostile public - but also by its history and social project, had shifted the center of gravity of its own meaning constructions from one heavily weighted in favor of unionism to one that was now seeking to advance both unionism and professionalism. With its separate but overlapping thrusts of non-racialism in education and recognition, it was transforming the politics of teaching, teacher mobilization, collective action and organization. Collective bargaining was now no longer emergent, but dominant as the basis for the construction of a relationship between teachers as both educators and employees.[305] Soon, institutional frameworks replaced ad hoc talks and consultations that were dominated and determined by the apartheid state. The Education Labor Relations Act and the

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[302]*South*, October 9, 1991.

[303]"South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU): Professionalism and Unionism." In, *New Nation, Education*. April 3-9, 1992. p. 18.

[304]ibid.

[305]For a summary of the organization's collective bargaining strategy and campaign, see, "SADTU and Collective Bargaining." In, *New Nation Education*, April 10 and 16, 1992.

Education Labor Relations Council now became the formal channels for the regulation of conflict, for collective bargaining, mediation and conciliation.[306] Even its adversaries in the set of conservative teachers associations were now pulled into that orbit of collective bargaining. As the collective identity of SADTU was shaped by its environment, so it shaped that environment, resulting in the successful incorporation of its social change goals and interests into the apartheid state. It also affirmed its role as a vital participant in processes of meaning construction, contestation of dominant social constructions and the transformation of public policy domain, once more confirming the utility of the combined resource mobilization-social constructionist theoretical model that informs this study.

2.5 Combat and the four R's. Restructuring, Rationalization, Retrenchment and Remuneration. 1993, The Year of Direct Action

For SADTU the first two years (1991-92) existence and of identity was dominated by the vital ideological and policy questions of non-racialism and education, recognition and professionalism-unionism. In contrast, 1993 was dominated by the contestation over four new ideological and policy questions: the unilateral restructuring of education by the apartheid state, even as it was entering the closure of its era; and arising here from, rationalization of its apartheid education creation, retrenchment of educators, and a salary dispute. Discussions at the organization's second national congress were dominated by these interlinked questions that now brought the organization face to face with the politics of macro-education systems planning and reform.[307]

By the end of 1992 trouble was already brewing on two fronts. First, teachers, managed by the department of education responsible for Coloured education, were advised that some 3,200 teachers were regarded by the department as "surplus." This prompted SADTU to advise its membership: that an additional 8,000 temporary teachers could also lose their jobs and that members should occupy offices of the department in Cape Town. The organization also called for support among political allies and threatened retaliatory

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[306]The ancestries of the Education Labor Relations Act and the Education Labor Relations Council were discussed earlier. See, "Non-racialism, Recognition and Collective Bargaining."

[307]*South*, June 26, 1993. *Sowetan*, July 9, 1993. *Weekly Mail*, July 9, 1993.

strike action.[308] Later, it was announced that the same education department also planned to freeze 6,000 teaching jobs.[309] Schools in the same department were also for the first time running without stationery[310] and the crisis now spread to the Department of Education and Training responsible for education of Black pupils following its retrenchment of teachers.[311] It was clear that the state had now found the maintenance of apartheid education unsustainable. As clear was that teachers would be retrenched. These plans and actions were taken at the deathknell of legislation and political apartheid and without the participation of those concerned and their organizational representatives.

A second front on which trouble was emerging was negotiations on teacher salaries. Opened on November 26-27, 1992, the state was made an initial bid of a 5 percent salary increase in response to SADTU's call for a 25 percent increase. Agreement was reached at the negotiations that "these opening bids signified the start of the bargaining process and that further negotiations would have to follow."[312] However, on January 15, 1993, the State President announced, unilaterally, that the state could only afford a 5 percent salary increase for teachers in 1993 and that the announcement was the final government statement on the matter.[313] A meeting between SADTU and the State President on March 15, 1993, to persuade government to re-open the negotiations process, failed to resolve the issue and the SADTU membership decided to embark on strike action in support of the union's demand for the re-opening of negotiations on salaries. The salary dispute widened with the union saying: "The proposed increase does not match the current inflation rate. We regret there is clearly no attempt to embark on affirmative action to cater for the under-qualified with long

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[308]*Cape Times*, February 18, 1993. *South*, October 19, 1992. *Sowetan*, January 11 and 12, 1993. *Weekly Mail*, January 29 and February 19, 1993.

[309]*Star*, November 25, 1992.

[310]*New Nation*, January 29, 1993.

[311]*Sowetan*, February 26, 1993. *Weekly Mail*, March 5, 1993.

[312]South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU). *Second National Congress*, 5-7 July 1993. Johannesburg. ? 1993. p. 30.

[313]ibid.

experience."[314] The union also criticized the state for dragging its feet instead of merging the education departments and for its "justification of the apartheid budget."[315]

SADTU was demanding that the state halt its unilateral restructuring and rationalization program; practically demonstrate its intention to stop retrenchments, implementation of Model C schools and privatization of education; consult with all relevant role players in education and political parties and set up an education forum to negotiate interim arrangements under which education can be democratically restructured.[316] A high-level intervention on the eve of the strike by Nelson Mandela, president of the African National Congress, persuaded the State President to accede to SADTU's demand.[317] Following discussions with the Department of National Education, agreement was reached that,

> 1. The Salary Negotiating Forum would meet within four weeks to attend to the re-opening of salaries negotiations. 2. Details with regard to the size of the increase and the division of finance between an across the board as opposed to a specific category increase, would be finalized by this forum. [sic][318]

Plans were also made to urgently convene the National Education and Training Forum to discuss rationalization and retrenchments in the education sector.[319] But trouble erupted within SADTU on the calling off of the salary strike.

Preparations for the now called-off strike had already reached a crescendo in a number of branches and regions of the organization. Mass meetings, in which teachers displayed unprecedented militancy, the holding of strike ballots, alliance formation with other teachers organizations and other social movement organizations and the mobilization of support from students and parents had all been completed.[320] With the strike called off

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[314]*Sowetan*, January 20, 1993.

[315]ibid.

[316]ibid.

[317]*Citizen*, March 22 and April 24, 1993.

[318]ibid.

[319]*Business Day*, June 2, 1993.

[320]*Beeld*, May 13, 1993. *South*, May 8, 1993. *Sowetan*, May 13, 1993. *Sunday Tribune*, May 16, 1993. *Weekly Mail*, May 7, 1993.

by the organization's National Executive Committee, and at the last minute following the state's commitment to reopening negotiations on the salary increase, disagreements were bound to erupt. These related both to the gathering organizational momentum and the problems of communication and consultation between head office and regions and branches.[321]

In Venda, more than 8,000 teachers vowed to continue the strike in defiance of the SADTU call for the action to be suspended and so did branches of the organization in the Western Cape, Boland, Soweto, Southern and Eastern Cape, and the bantustan of Ciskei.[322] In response, the state launched its own counter-action against those who had continued with the strike. Money was deducted from teachers salaries as the state implemented a "no work, no pay" policy. Teachers retaliated against both SADTU leadership and the state. Some demanded the immediate cancellation of their monthly union subscriptions because the organization had called off the strike.[323] Others directed their ire at the state: school principals were barred from schools, members in one of the largest branches threatened to withhold promotion reports of pupils from departmental officials, and departmental offices were picketed.[324]

The salary negotiations with the state did not however materialize as agreed, prompting SADTU to re-initiate mobilization for a national strike.[325] The government's failure to resume teacher salary negotiations was roundly condemned by SADTU allies, including the South African Catholic Bishops Conference, COSATU and the African National Congress. It was only late in July, 1993 that talks resumed between the state and 44 public servant's employee organizations in the Joint Salary Negotiation Forum.[326]

The second national congress of SADTU in July, 1993 was dominated by the leadership's handling of the aborted May strike and the failure of the state to meet its

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[321]Vadi, I. "SADTU teachers strike back." *SA Labor Bulletin*. Vol. 17. No. 3. pp. 75.

[322]*Beeld*, May 21, 1993. *Cape Times*, May 26, 1993. *Sowetan*, May 25, 1993.

[323]*Star*, September 5, 1993.

[324]*Business Day*, September 29 and October 13, 1993. *Citizen*, October 21, 1993. *New Nation*, July 7, 1993. *Sowetan*, July 21, September 1, October 6 and 7, 1993. *Star*, September 25, October 8, November 18 and 29, and December 6, 1993.

[325]*Citizen*, August 18, 1993.

[326]*Star*, July 23, 1993.

obligations in terms of the agreement that had abruptly ended the strike. This time the organization developed a comprehensive strategy even while wage talks were continuing with the state. Incensed by the state's breach of an agreement and informed by the weak coordination of the aborted May strike - which was marked by inadequate consultation before the strike was called off and poor communications - SADTU delegates affirmed their belief that,

> the government is intentionally and strategically dragging its feet on the finalization of salary increase negotiations, so as to shift its responsibilities to a new democratic government next year (1994); ... 3. the proposed National Strike was aborted; 4. Strike Action is an indispensable final weapon to break deadlocks.[sic][327]

The congress now adopted a multi-prong strategy.[328] First, delegates mandated their negotiating team to resume negotiations on salary increases with the state. These negotiations were to be circumscribed by the organization's mandate on a "living wage" for all teachers. That negotiating strategy was even further circumscribed by the national congress. It called for: (i) an across the board increase of 30% for all teachers "which could be staggered in order to give lower paid teachers a bigger salary increase than the 'highly paid' category"; (ii) housing subsidies to be paid to all teachers; (iii) opposition to increased taxation, which "will nullify the salary increase"; (iv) that the principle of "equal pay for equal work" be considered as a new basis for compensation of teachers; and, (v) that the 13th check (service bonus) be paid and that this not be taxed. Second, delegates set an ultimatum of July 22-23 for the finalization of negotiations on the salary increase. Results of this process would then have to be communicated to all regions. Third, delegates set a three week program of action, ending in a national strike in the event that the state failed to meet the SADTU demand on salaries. Fourth, delegates mandated that a strike council be formed. Fifth, and confirming the delegates' concern at the "premature" suspension of the

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[327]South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU). Second National Congress, 5-7 July 1993. *Congress Resolutions*. ? 1993. p. 2.

[328]ibid. pp. 2-3.

May strike by the National Executive Committee, delegates directed that the strike council be composed of regional representatives.[329]

With the deadline to conclude salary negotiations approaching, SADTU modified its salary demand to a 15 percent,[330] and later a 12,5 percent salary rise.[331] In return the state offered 5.6 percent.[332] SADTU also vigorously mobilized the waning support of parents and students who appeared tired of disruptions to schooling by teacher collective action, for their imminent action.[333] In the face of an unchanged state offer, SADTU was committed to a national strike. Accompanied by largescale and unprecedented mobilization of teachers,[334] more than 100,000 of an estimated 280,000 teachers corps now embarked on strike action that included demands for an immediate halt to all unilateral rationalization and cut-back measures which included salaries, retrenchment of human and material resources and withdrawal of service benefits. With wage talks deadlocked, SADTU accused the state of trying to crush the union with its threats to withdraw the union's recognition agreement.[335]

The crippling national teachers strike[336] ended ten school days after it had started, on August 30, 1993. It followed a bargaining breakthrough with a new state offer to increase salaries on (i) the lowest (A3) teacher grade by 56 percent, and, (ii) the next four grades (A2, A1, A and B) significantly with the minimum increase being 38 percent. For SADTU, this was a breakthrough, especially given its mandate to drastically improve the lot

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[329]ibid., p. 3. Also, *Interview* C2. And, Vadi, I. "SADTU teachers strike back." *SA Labor Bulletin*. Vol. 17. No. 3. p. 75.

[330]*Beeld*, August 20, 1993.

[331]*Citizen*, November 30, 1993.

[332]ibid.

[333]*Beeld*, August 18, 1993. *Business Day*, August 12, 1993. *Daily News*, August 19, 1993.

[334]*Beeld*, August 20, 1993. *Cape Times*, August 23, 1993. *South*, August 20, 1993.

[335]*Beeld*, August 20, 1993. *Business Day*, August 20, 1993. *Sowetan*, August 27, 1993. *Star*, August 20, 1993.

[336]The teacher strike and protests had cost one of the education departments, the Department of Education and Training at least R240 million in staff expenses during the 1993/94 financial year, according a report tabled by the auditor general in the National Assembly. Strikes and stayaways by teachers had lost nearly 450,000 man days, while actions by pupils and other organizations against the increased matriculation examination fee had sapped another 524,399 man days, according to the report. [*Sowetan*, March 30, 1995]

of the lowest paid teachers. The union said: "It is a significant breakthrough and a particular gain for SADTU, because teachers on the low grades are an important constituency of ours."[337] SADTU claimed victory, saying "SADTU's victory has been enormous. We have forced the apartheid state to re-open salary negotiations when it bluntly refused to do so. This is a victory not only for teachers, but also for thousands of public sector workers."[338]

The strike by members and supporters of SADTU represented the first successful attempt ever by teachers or by white collar workers to stage a national strike.[339] Despite intra-organizational differences, especially those that emanated from the aborted strike, the organization emerged from these national actions significantly strengthened. Most importantly, the national actions reduced the costs associated with national collective action by teachers. Through the action SADTU united teachers across the fragments that were apartheid education thereby rendering obsolete the notion that the organization of apartheid education made it impossible to organize national non-racial collective action among teachers. Undoubtedly the actions were also made possible because of the strategic error of the state in not meeting its obligations in terms of which the (first) May strike had been called off.

The strikes were also made possible because of their timing. Embedded within the transition between an illegitimate state and a democratically elected and legitimate one, the authority and the remaining legitimacy of the outgoing state was waning, contributing to a reduction in the costs associated with national collective action. A sector of the working population that had previously been subjected to paralyzing authoritarian and bureaucratic forms of control that was realized through prior unquestioning subservience to education authorities had broken those shackles. In its place were now installed collective bargaining, mediation and conciliation and their related institutions, and organization, mobilization and collective action. In contrast, the struggles against the remaining 3Rs, restructuring, rationalization and retrenchment, were as yet unresolved. These struggles were later be

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[337]*Interview* C5. *Saturday Star*, August 22, 1993. Also, *Sowetan*, August 30, 1993.

[338]South African Democratic Teachers Union. *SADTU's Strike Victory*. Pamphlet. Issued by SADTU Head Office. Johannesburg. August 27, 1993.

[339]*Interviews* C7 and C9.

taken up in the National Education and Training Forum,[340] a negotiating forum that was created as a result of and only after the aborted May strike and student collective action on matriculation examination fees (see also Chapter Three) and continued into the term of the emerging democratic state. The fallout from the August strike took a similar pattern as that of the aborted May one. Members of SADTU were advised that they would not be paid for the two weeks teachers' strike. This notice was applied to all members of SADTU whether they had been on strike or not[341] and again faced with having no strike funds[342] SADTU members countered retaliatory state action with mass action, including marches onto the offices of education departments. Teachers also threatened that they would disrupt year-end examinations by withholding schedules and refusing to mark matriculation papers unless the departments of education refrained from making deductions from their salaries.[343] With the organization's skillful management of the strike, obviously having learnt from the aborted May strike, new membership increased significantly from 60,000 to 90,000 signed-up members, and "no-go areas" such as the bantustans of Ciskei, Bophuthatswana and kwaZulu were now also opened up to recruitment.[344]

2.6 From defiance to disruption free schooling. Education restructuring and the Government of National Unity, 1994/95

Volatile 1993, which was marked by the unprecedented and overlapping collective actions of teachers and students, now made way for a nationally brokered agreement to make 1994 a year of disruption-free schooling. Also, and prompted by the political turn of events, especially the announcement of the country's first democratic elections, the political role of SADTU was now toned down, "a bit."[345] The organization now shifted focus to matters of organizational maintenance, principally those of: leadership training, especially

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[340]South African Democratic Teachers Union. *SADTU's Strike Victory*. Pamphlet. Issued by SADTU Head Office. Johannesburg. August 27, 1993. Also, *Interview* C3.

[341]*South*, October 1, 1993.

[342]*Interview* C2.

[343]*Beeld*, December 9, 1993. *Business Day*, December 30, 1993. *Cape Times*, November 18, 1993. *Citizen*, November 30, December 22 and 23, 1993. *Sowetan*, December 23, 1993.

[344]*Interviews* C2 and C8.

[345]*Interview* C2.

in labor negotiations skills; management training for school principals and heads of departments of schools; implementation of organizational projects in areas varying from teacher evaluation through curriculum development and training.[346] It also directed attention at improving organizational efficiency, services, recruitment and income generation: new departments for national organization, education, media, para-legal services, research, accounts and dispatch were created; a resource center was established; and, organizational calendars and a journal dealing with professional issues were added to the organization's existing newsletter.

With the country's first national elections now also dawning, much organizational time was also directed at participation in these historic elections. Having until now refrained from openly aligning with the African National Congress, SADTU now elected to support that movement in its efforts to win the first national elections. Several organizational leaders were now nominated to the election lists of the African National Congress, and, even later, in the wake of the victory of the African National Congress, additional leaders were placed in the emerging state's administrative structures, most prominently within the Department of Education at both national and provincial levels. This development, that has seen the organization release several of its most experienced, skilled and prominent leaders such as its national president and general-secretary to the political and administrative arms of the new state, has opened up a new phase in its development.[347]

Guided by its commitment to the transformation of the South African state, leaders were released to achieve precisely that goal, but now from within the state, and that strategy was one that was shared by several of the allies of SADTU, including COSATU and the NECC. This development also sheds significant light on the dynamics of social movement organizations in transitional societies. Having campaigned for so long against apartheid in South Africa, and for democracy, skilled and experienced leaders were now needed to continue that transformation process, but, now of and within the ancien regime. The effects of leadership hemorrhage on social movement organizations can be devastating. Releasing

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[346]*Interviews* C2, C3, C10 and C11. Also, site visits and interviews with some of the newly appointed staff heading the new departments.

[347]*Interviews* C2 and C6.

skilled, experienced and prominent leaders also has implications for the wider political-cultural processes, including democratization, and the relationship between and roles of the emergent state and civil society - especially when even second-level leaders have to be released to the provincial arms of the state as is the case in South Africa. With local government elections now almost upon the country, even third level leaders are about to be absorbed into the local government arms of the state. Having established organizational leadership losses as a significant predictor of organizational transformation, a new study would have to investigate these matters further in order to establish the relationships between transitions and organizational momentum, organizational death rates and emergent organizational identities. In addition, such research would have to establish the macro-effects of such organizational transformation, especially on the culture of politics, meaning construction and collective action, whether in the education sector, or any other, and on the democratization and larger transformation process itself.

The South African transition provides one such valuable opportunity, and in South Africa, such studies could target specific ideological questions that emanate from organizational identities such as those examined and analyzed in this case study. The evolving identity of SADTU could be studied in relation to emerging new state education policies and SADTU's own social project on such ideological and policy questions as curriculum, school governance and organization, labor relations, human resource planning and development and alliance formation. Many of these policy questions are already the subject of intense debate within the organization as it makes its way through the current transition. Highlighted in these discussions are concerns for (i) the organization to recognize the legitimacy of the democratically elected political arm of the state; (ii) the organization to shift from "protest" politics to meaningful participation with the state in the new education policy processes in matters such as the development of teachers as vital human resources and curriculum transformation; (iii) the organization to maintain its independence from the democratic state; and, (iv) the need to strengthen alliance systems and participation in the programs of community structures.[348]

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[348]*Interviews* C4, C5, C6, C9 and C10. Also, South African Democratic Teachers' Union. *Discussion Paper on Education Development.* For SADTU National Council meeting, 3/4/5 November 1994. 28 October 1994. South African Democratic Teachers' Union. *Input Paper: Labor*

A research agenda that could frame a study of the evolving identity of SADTU as South African moves through its socio-political and economic transition should include the following questions. Is there continuity between the militant identity that predates the national elections? Is there continuity with an identity that privileged participatory democracy, consultation, transparency, organization and collective action? Also, in the pursuit of its social project, how are the interests of teachers balanced against those of the nation, of parents and of students?

3. Summary

This account of the emergence and later evolution of SADTU has illustrated how organizational identity is the sum of an organization's social project, goals, strategies, programs and collective action. Collective identities are interwoven with (i) actually existing realities: the complex, and racially and ethnically fragmented organization of apartheid education has been shown to influence the mobilization, collective action and organization of teachers on a non-racial basis, campaigns for non-racial recognition and a single school calendar campaign; (ii) prevailing social constructions such as dominant social constructions on professionalism and emergent unionism, teaching, teacher mobilization, collective action and organization. Organizational identity has also been shown to be influenced by organizational learning, dominant political movements and cultures of politics.

Changes in political regime dramatically impact the evolution of organizational identity through losses of skilled, experienced and prominent leaders to the emergent state's political and administrative apparatuses. The long-run impact of this organizational determinant requires further study and analysis. Demographic shifts in target populations

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Issues. 3 November 1994. South African Democratic Teachers' Union. *Input Paper: Assessment of the Current Political Situation*. 1 November 1994. South African Democratic Teachers' Union. *Challenges Facing SADTU*. ? Nov 1994. South African Democratic Teachers' Union. *Input Paper: SADTU and Challenges Ahead*. 1 November 1994. South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU). SADTU National Council Meeting: 3/4/5 November 1994. *Summary of Decisions*. 7 November 1994. *The New Teacher*. Journal of the South African Democratic Teachers' Union. Volume 2 No. 1. October 1994. *The New Teacher*. Journal of the South African Democratic Teachers' Union. Volume 1 No. 2. September 1994. *The New Teacher*. Journal of the South African Democratic Teachers' Union. Volume 1 No. 1. March 1993.

dramatically impact the possibilities and opportunities for mobilization, collective action and organization, especially when those shifts are accompanied by the rise of dominant political movements and new cultures of politics, mobilization, collective action and organization.

Finally, this account has shown how dominant social constructions that frame public policy domains and public policies are confronted by emergent, alternative social constructions, the outcome of which are a dramatically altered public policy domain (in terms of stakes and culture of politics) and public policy. Ultimately, this account has shown how a social movement organization can be a vital participant in the processes of meaning construction, contestation of dominant social constructions and the transformation of public policy domains (through their entry into these domains) and public policy. The entry of SADTU into the policy domain, especially from 1990 on, thus signaled the entry of a formidable actor. Of vital importance for transitional societies, in fact for all societies, as well as for a vibrant public policy debate and for the success and sustainability of processes of democratization is the survival of these social movement organizations. It is in this regard that the early organizational routinization and professionalization of SADTU that was brought about by its successful mobilization of membership, its campaigns for recognition and its success at institutionalizing collective bargaining rights of teachers which may ensure its endurance through the change in political regime.

4. Implications for theory and policy

This case study of the emergence and later evolution of the South African Democratic Teachers Union has shown that five changes in the organization's environment and internal organizational structure induced shifts in organizational identity. These were the wider societal transition from conflict and the push for people's power to negotiated power-sharing and nation-building, SADTU's successful mobilization of membership, its successful campaigns for recognition, its success at institutionalizing collective bargaining rights of teachers and the organization of apartheid education. Many of these sources of change in organizational identity pre-dated the transition to an open polity and democratic society. The five sources of change had the following effects on the organization's identity.

First, the scope of original organizational goals, objectives and demands such as those for recognition, a single school calendar, unionism and evaluation were expanded and elaborated. At the same time these became also more specific goals, objectives and demands. For example the campaign for recognition as a non-racial teachers union had to be expanded and elaborated to include recognition as a staff association by the racially- and ethnically-based education departments. That campaign later became a campaign for collective bargaining rights and mediation and conciliation mechanisms. The campaign for a single calendar was similarly expanded and elaborated to include the option of many geographically-based calendars.

Second, SADTU experienced organizational routinization and professionalization as it embarked on both combat and negotiations with the apartheid state. In this regard, the experience of SADTU differs from that of COSAS described in Chapter Two. In the case of COSAS, it was the successful mobilization of new and expanding resources created by the change in political regime which initiated changes in its organizational structure and culture. In contrast, SADTU's shift to a routinized and professionalized structure and culture was prompted by (i) the leading role COSATU played in re-organizing teacher unity from an ad hoc to a routinized and professionalized activity, (ii) SADTU's successful mobilization of teachers who required formal representation in matters such as salary negotiations and dispute resolution which imposed on the organization a culture and structure of effective, efficient and reproducible leadership and representation, and (iii) SADTU's negotiations with the apartheid state and participation in collective bargaining structures which imposed its own discipline on organizational culture and structure. On this evidence, SADTU's transition is different from those of COSAS and SASCO since the nature of teacher organization is so different. That organization is marked in particular by the fact that teachers are employed by the state on the basis of their professional training. In the case of SADTU it was the conditions which existed prior to the change in political regime which prompted its routinization and professionalization. Emergent international cultures transferred into the South African polity by international donors and in the case of SADTU, international teachers organizations have not been found to impact the evolving identity of SADTU. On the basis of this evidence, the organizational transformation of

SADTU, initiated and implemented before the political transition, can be described as that of a Type I (organizational routinization and professionalization) transformation.

But the transition to an open polity and democratic society did impact the later evolution of SADTU. Leadership transfers to the political and administrative apparatuses of the emerging state to pursue the social project from within the state occurred and the organization experienced a decline in collective action. Thus instead of completely fitting the Type I organizational transformation, the case of SADTU also shows features of a Type II transformation: organizational routinization and professionalization, but also participation in the polity and transfer of leaders and activists to the new state. SADTU now enters the twenty-first century and the transition to democracy in South Africa as a participant in the country's political and social reconstruction through its participation in the reconstruction of the identity of the state while taking advantage of organizational routinization and professionalization.

The period of review ends, like the review of COSAS, in uncertainty. To date SADTU has played a leading role in transforming the political culture of teaching, teacher mobilization, collective action and organization as well as those of schooling, school organization and management, curriculum and evaluation. These were achieved in part because of its visionary, skilled and experienced leadership. The organization has shed several of those leaders to the emergent democratic state at national and provincial levels of government. It remains to be seen whether it can, in the wake of these losses, continue to play a leading and dynamic role in the transformation of public policy domains and of public policy, or whether in South Africa we will witness a return of the (hegemonic) state.

Chapter 5

The National Education Coordinating Committee, 1985-1995: A case of declining mobilization and organizational decay (Type II).

In the account that follows, I analyze the evolving identity of the National Education Coordinating Committee (NECC) (called National Education Crisis Committee at its founding until its renaming in 1989) and how it has shaped the nature of education, education struggles, and the evolution of progressive education policy in South Africa. The organization dramatically influenced and shaped the struggle for a non-racial and democratic education, particularly so at a time when progressive parent, student and teachers organizations were in their formative stages or weakened by state repression.

This account will show that the NECC acted as a quasi-state or alternative state formation and mobilized the diverse interests of students, teachers, parents and staff at higher education institutions during the anti-apartheid struggle. It will show the goals, interests, programs and demands and even leaders and activists of the NECC transferred to the emergent post-apartheid state formation, shift its orientation to participation in the emerging polity, undergo a decrease in mobilization and shift to a policy and program orientation. It will also show that unlike the cases of COSAS and SADTU described in Chapters 2 and 4, organizational routinization and professionalization undergone by the NECC failed to reinstate the organization at the center and leadership of the post-apartheid education movement for reconstruction and development. These findings will provide further support for the combined resource mobilization-social constructionist theoretical model advanced in this study.

Student, school and class boycotts paralyzed schooling during 1984-85. These boycotts were interlocked with general political struggles against the apartheid state's new constitution, the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, 1983 and the accompanying legislation which consolidated the bantustans, and were directed at making the country

ungovernable and apartheid unworkable. Linked state repression weakened and in some instances outlawed student and youth organizations. It is within this context of student, school and class boycotts and weak and disrupted organization that the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC) (December 1985) was established to develop and coordinate a response to the schools crisis.

Based on an alliance of student, youth, teacher, civic, worker, religious, parent and local education crisis committees, this gathering anti-apartheid movement was established at the initiative of the political movements and parents concerned about schooling. The national leadership of this loose alliance of grassroots organizations was drawn from the political and religious organizations who had no formal organizational roots in the teacher and student organizations.

Two social projects mark the early history and the rise to prominence of the NECC. First, the movement - for in effect in its emergent phase, it was a grassroots movement rather than a formal organization - successfully facilitated a return to school. Second, that call for a return to school was eventually itself transformed to a call for the transformation of apartheid state schools into people's schools through a project of People's Education. The latter social project was the result of the new thrust of the anti-apartheid movement to disrupt apartheid state formations and to install in their place organs of people's power.

The formation of the NECC led to the adoption of several programs to challenge the implementation of apartheid education, including (i) establishment of democratically elected Parent-Teacher-Student Associations (PTSAs) to take over local control of schools from the apartheid state's school committees, (ii) development of syllabi and materials for a program of People's Education, (iii) research and development of policies for the radical transformation of apartheid education through the formation of Education Policy Units (EPUs) in collaboration with some of the country's liberal universities, and (iv) formation of a united front among teachers through the establishment of a single, nonracial, and democratic teacher organization that was committed to the radical transformation of apartheid education practices in schools. The last of these initiatives laid the platform for the formation of the 100,000 member South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU) in 1990, that was described in the Chapter Four.

Throughout the 1985-1990 period, the NECC had led the internal oppcsition to apartheid education and was at the forefront of developing alternative education programs. In 1989, the NECC changed both its structure - it became a formal coalition of national student, teacher, academic, worker, civic, and parent organizations - and its name, to the National Education Coordinating Committee (NECC), to reflect this new identity. At this restructuring conference (December 1989), and in line with the resurgent national defiance of the state's banishment of opposition movements including that on the NECC, the organization defied these restrictions and began to conduct its activities publicly. Hardly five years after its defiant and confident resurgence as a popular, national movement and on the eve of the restructuring of national education by the emergent democratic state, the organization dissolved.

The account of the NECC is a case study which relies on four sources of evidence. First, consistent with the approach adopted in the earlier three case studies, interviews were conducted with key activists who represent leaderships from the different periods under review. Twelve formal intensive interviews, each lasting approximately two hours were conducted for this purpose. These interviews were augmented by twenty six formal intensive interviews and five focused discussion groups that were conducted for a project closely related to this current study.[349] Second, more than 1,500 mass media accounts, which included letters to editors, advertisements placed by the organization, editorials, syndicated columns and running accounts of social movement organization mobilization and collective action for the period under review were compiled, sorted, selected and analyzed. Third, more than 109 organizational documents and artifacts, that included policy documents, goal statements, project proposals, conference documents, minutes and resolutions of key policy meetings, memorandums, organizational evaluations (self and commissioned), funding proposals, agreements and reports to donors, policy documents, campaign documents and publications, commissioned research papers, speeches and presentations to conferences, internal press clippings, fliers, press releases, bill-board

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[349]Rensburg, I. L. *National Consultative Forums and Education and Training Policy. From the National Education and Training Forum to?* A Report Commissioned by the Chairperson of the National Education and Training Forum. Johannesburg. 1995. See other references in footnote number 8.

posters and pamphlets were either collected or photographed, then sorted and analyzed. To augment this set of documents an additional 104 documents prepared and distributed by allied research agencies, social movements organizations and by the state were collected, sorted and analyzed. Fourth, relying on the technique of participant observation, evidence was collected from key meetings, conferences, workshops and press briefings of the organization at the end-point of the study. The response of the organization to the emergent education policies of the new state were also studied. I was then commissioned by the organization to prepare this response and to participate in the presentation of the organization's oral evidence to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Education. Data collection and analysis was informed by the research question: how are the goals, programs and campaigns of the NECC affected by, and how do they affect, the country's transition to democracy, given its goals, programs and campaigns at its founding.

The study now turns to this account to explain the rise and dominant role of the organization in the 1980s and its decline and death in the 1990s. The account is organized into two main periods, the rise and dominant role in education policy played by the organization, covering the period 1985-1989 (Section 1) and its resurgence, decline and death, covering the period 1989-1995 (Section 2).

1. The National Education Crisis Committee: grassroots movement struggling for people's education, 1985-89

This section has two main objectives. Firstly, it will provide the historical structural context within which the NECC emerged and contested state power and ideology in the education sector. Secondly, it provides an outline of the key program and campaign of the NECC: *People's Education for People's Power in People's Schools.*

1.1 The Historical Structural Context of Collective Action

Since its institutionalization as apartheid education during the period 1954-63, Black education had been in a deep and ongoing crisis as students, teachers and the community rejected apartheid education. Major battles between the state and teachers (1954-1960, 1976) and between the state and students (1976, 1980) reflect the intense

nature of this crisis, but also highlight the unwillingness of the apartheid state to offer significant concessions in the face of this crisis.

Three features characterize these earlier struggles. First, they were spontaneous uprisings which emanated directly from the education site. Second, they were largely oppositional (or critical) struggles. Third, they did not lead to a complete and prolonged collapse of state control over schooling. These characteristics underwent substantial change in the mid-1980s. Education struggles became interlocked with political struggles for political power. At the launching conference of the NECC in 1985 this gathering education movement explicitly connected educational and political struggles since

> education and other structures of society, whether economic, political or social structures as a whole, are completely intertwined and therefore it is almost ridiculous to wage a struggle for democratic education and ignore the forces that are at work in the society.350

1.1.1 Education, Resistance and Reconstruction

Organizations of people's power were taking root in the Black communities notably but not exclusively in the Southern Transvaal and the Eastern Cape and schools became sites for the establishment of community-based governing structures. Parent-Teacher-Student-Associations (PTSAs) became the buzz-word and popular form of school governance and, for the first time "since the African National Congress initiated alternative programs on the 1950s, after the introduction of Bantu Education, resistance to education struggles against apartheid education took on the issue of educational governance and educational reconstruction."[351] School-based struggles found themselves turning to issues of *governance and control* and in the process a new authority began to set its roots as "the NECC moved away from ... the recapitulation of the failures of Bantu Education, to a

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[350]Mkhatshwa, S. "Keynote Address." In *Report on the National Consultative Conference on the Crisis in Education*.1985.

[351]Hawarden, J. "Apartheid Education 1986." *Conference on Education Against Apartheid*, International Federation of Free Teachers Unions, Lusaka, 23-25 March 1987.

construction both of the alternatives now and the form and character of a longer-term post-apartheid education system."[352]

Even more significantly, opposition now also gave rise to *counter-hegemony* as this education movement, in demanding "People's Education for People's Power in People's Schools ...[now] aim[ed] to shift the balance of educational power, beginning by establishing a people's authority alongside the existing state authority"[sic].[353]

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[352]Hartshorne, K. "Post-Apartheid Education: A Concept in Process." Paper presented at Conference on U.S. Initiatives for the Education and Training of South Africans and Namibians. Michigan State University. November 23-35, 1986.

[353]National Education Crisis Committee. General Secretary interviewed in Obery, I. "People's Education: Creating a Democratic Future." *Work In Progress*. 42, 1986 (May). p8. See also, Carrim, Y., & Sayed, Y. "Civil society, social movements and the National Education Coordinating Committee." *Perspectives in Education*, Vol. 14 No 1 Summer 1992/93. Chisholm, L. "From Revolt to a Search for Alternatives." *Work in Progress*. Nov. 1986. Gardiner, M. "Efforts at creating alternative curricula: conceptual and practical considerations." In Nkomo, M. (ed.) *Pedagogy of Domination*. Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, Inc. 1990. Hawarden, J. "Apartheid Education 1986." *Conference on Education Against Apartheid*, International Federation of Free Teachers Unions, Lusaka, 23-25 March 1987. Hyslop, J. "Teacher Resistance in African Education from the 1940s to the 1980s" In Nkomo (ed.) *Pedagogy of Domination*. New Jersey: Africa World Press, Inc. 1990. Kruss, G. "People's Education: An Examination of the Concept." *People's Education Research Project No.1*. Center for Adult and Continuing Education (CACE). Bellville: University of the Western Cape. February, 1988. Levin, R. "People's Education and the Politics of Negotiation in South Africa." *Perspectives in Education*. 12, 2(1991) 1-18. Mashamba, G. "A Conceptual Critique of the People's Education Discourse." *Review of African Political Economy*. 48. 1990. And, *People's Education: the people's choice*. Maskew Miller Longman: Cape Town. 1991. Mkhatshwa, S. "Keynote Address." In *Report on the National Consultative Conference on the Crisis in Education*.1985. Muller, J. "People's Education and the National Education Crisis Committee." In Moss, G and Obery, I. *South African Review 4*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press. 1987. Naidoo, K. "The politics of student resistance in the 1980s." In Nkomo, M. (ed.) *Pedagogy of Domination*. Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, Inc. 1990. Obery, I. *South African Review 4*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press. 1987. Rensburg, I. *States, Actors and Conflict. Contesting Education: The People's Education Movement of South Africa and the State, 1984-1986*. Unpublished monograph. Stanford University School of Education. 1993. Resolutions from the First National Education Consultative Conference, 1985. Reprinted In Nkomo, M. (ed.) *Pedagogy of Domination*. Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, Inc. 1990. Resolutions from the Second National Education Consultative Conference, 1986. Reprinted In Nkomo, M. (ed.) *Pedagogy of Domination*. Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, Inc. 1990. Sisulu, Z. Keynote Address: People's Education for People's Power. *Second National Education Conference On the Crisis in Education*. Durban. 1986. Wolpe, H. *Three theses on people's education*. Research on Education in South Africa (RESA). Occasional Paper No 5. University of Essex. 1990. *Work In Progress*. 1986b. "The NECC: Doing Battle with the DET." 45, Nov/Dec. 1986c. "DET destroys education in Duncan Village." Nov/Dec.

1.1.2 Education and State Control

The general condition of ungovernability[354] had its own immediate and direct impact on the role of the apartheid state in schools. Three events were important in effecting a loss of state control. First, as described in Chapter Four, conservative Black teacher associations which had previously served on state structures such as state examination and subject committees, resigned from these structures and aligned themselves with the NECC. Second, state education supervisors, inspectors and subject advisers were either not allowed access to schools by students and teachers or themselves refused to perform their duties (see Chapter Four). Third, teachers and students refused to obey state education regulations and instead established their own local Parent-Teacher-Student-Associations (PTSAs).[355]

To recapitulate, the education struggles within which the NECC emerged were characterized by an explicit link of education to politics, by a prolonged period of the absence of state control and by the construction of both a counter-hegemonic discourse in the education policy domain and the establishment of a new and community based educational authority. The alternative offered by the NECC "did not only aim at the transfer of power or control from one sector of society to another - such as from the minority to the majority" but were "intended to provide the basis for a society committed to other values, other priorities and other conceptions of what South African society" could be.[356]

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[354]Specifically, local community councilors, who had managed the townships on behalf of the state, resigned *en masse* from these government structures, effectively collapsing state control of townships. Those who refused to do so were forced out of townships. Local rent, rates and consumer boycotts completed the general context of defiance of state control, and additionally bankrupted local community councils who depended for their maintenance and reproduction on these revenues. This atmosphere directly impacted schools through student and teacher disobedience.

[355]*Work In Progress*. 1986a. "People's Education: Creating a Democratic Future." May. 1986b. "The NECC: Doing Battle with the DET." 45, Nov/Dec. 1986c. "DET destroys education in Duncan Village." Nov/Dec.

[356]Gardiner, op. cit., p. 199.

1.1.3 Contesting the State. The Making of a Popular Movement

At its First Conference (December 1985) the NECC announced its decision to call for a return to schools. That call was a conditional one[357] and all of those conditions related to state actions in the political sphere and the educational sector. In the case of the former, the state was warned to: (i) lift the partial State of Emergency which gave it wide and unchecked powers such as those of detention without trial and the ability to prohibit the activities of any organization; (ii) release all political prisoners; (iii) lift the ban on the national liberation movements; (iv) initiate political negotiations with these movements which should lead to full citizenship rights for all South Africans in a unitary, non-racial and democratic South Africa; and, (v) return politically exiled South Africans back to the country.

With regard to the education sector, and specifically for primary and high schools, the state was warned to: (i) end the occupation of schools by police and the military; (ii) lift its ban on public gatherings; (iii) release detained student, teacher and other educational leaders; (iv) lift the ban on the high school student movement, the Congress of South African Students; (v) extend the provision of free and compulsory education from Whites, Coloureds and Indians to Blacks, including free stationery and textbooks; (vi) abandon its nineteen racially divided education departments and create a single non-racial education department; and, (vii) recognize democratically elected Parent-Teacher-Student-Associations (PTSAs) which had been established in high schools.

Thus, the First Conference of the NECC made its call for a return to school conditional on the state meeting these demands. A second conference was also scheduled for three months later to review state actions and to confirm or rescind the movement's initial call for a return to school.

The NECC could make these demands and assert its social project because of its political legitimacy. This derived from its establishment at a critical historic moment: the mourning, celebrations and re-dedication to struggle to mark the tenth anniversary of the June 1976 uprisings. It also derived from its strategy to win students over to return to

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[357] Soweto Parents Crisis Committee. *Report on the National Consultative Conference on the Crisis in Education.* University of the Witwatersrand. December 28-29. ? 1986.

school to turn schools of apartheid into schools that resembled the independent authority structures that were emerging in the townships as organs of people's power. A return to school was then not a return to Bantu Education but a return to a site of education struggle. Furthermore, the ungovernability of the townships brought about by the heightened mobilization against the apartheid regime facilitated a collapse of state power and hegemony in schools. The NECC emerged in this context as the popular movement to replace state power. This did not mean that it would for example pay teacher salaries although teachers now shifted their political alliance and accountability to this popular movement. The NECC also derived its legitimacy from its loose, mass-based organizational structure. Grassroots, township-based education crisis committees paralled the political structures of the political movement led by the United Democratic Front and formed the backbone and basic unit of the NECC. These grassroots structures comprised township-based political, education, religious, women, youth and labor organizations. In turn, these in combination formed regional education crisis committees which elected regional leaderships. A national conference of the NECC comprised the leaderships of both regional education crisis committees and local education crisis committees. The national leadership of the NECC was drawn from the leaderships of regional education crisis committees. These conferences were the most representative conferences of the anti-apartheid opposition in the 1980s. They were also the focus of political mobilization because political conferences were banned during this period.

The decision to call for a return to school was considered the most important decision of the conference, especially given ongoing boycotts of schools by students as well as an anonymous but allegedly popular call for 1986 to be a year of "no schooling." Such a year of no schooling would be part of the political campaign to make the country ungovernable and to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the June 16, 1976 student uprising. The decision was significant also in that it called for a return to schools on January 28, 1986 and not on January 8, the state's official opening day of schools. This call excluded lower primary schools since the NECC and student movements had made a deliberate decision not to contest these for fear of bringing harm to younger pupils such as when the state send the police and army to crush opposition there. Two issues arise here and are discussed. First, the discussion addresses the call in a more narrow sense with

reference to its initial impact. The questions considered are how effective was the call and how well was it supported? These questions relate to the nature of the stakes and have implications for the emergent legitimacy and authority of both the NECC and the apartheid state. Second, the more long-term impact of the call is considered. How well did it stand up until the declaration of the National State of Emergency on June 12, 1986?

The short-term and immediate impact of the return to school call. The NECC's decision was welcomed widely outside of its immediate constituency as a breakthrough by those who considered it necessary for Blacks to attend school regardless of the problems of that system, by those who opposed boycotts as self-destructive, and by the state. The NECC thus won widespread support for a risky decision. Yet, this decision was taken within the context of the NECC seeking to mobilize particularly those students who had opposed a return to school. The specific decision thus could not represent "a simple" return to school. Under such circumstances it would be a call for a return to the despised Bantu Education, meaning that students would show little gain for their stayaways and class boycotts.

Thus the call *firstly* represented a challenge to the state. State interests may have been advanced in the call for a return to school but the call included a strategy for the defiance of Bantu Education and the promotion of a people's education. The movement was now established as a militant alliance. This allowed it to mobilize those sectors of the student movement who until then had vigorously opposed a return to school. *Secondly*, the call constituted an important test of the movement's authority and mobilizing capacity. Two goals emerged: attaining maximum support for its call for a return to schools and turning public schools into sites for the implementation of a revolutionary and anti-apartheid-state people's education.

While the state publicly welcomed the general decision, it rejected the specific date set aside for the return to school. It announced that it would "exercise some flexibility" with regard to those students who "could not return [to schools] on Wednesday [January 8, 1986]," the date set by the department for the reopening of schools.[358] Clearly, it was in the state's interests to have schooling resumed.[359] The alternative had several undesirable

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[358]*Weekly Mail*, January 10-19, 1986.

[359]The alternative view may be that it was in the state's interests for schools to be disrupted because its goals from the onset of Bantu Education had been to have as few Blacks as possible attain

consequences. First, students would be on the streets fueling revolutionary and defiant anti-state campaign: having them in schools may mean that they could be preoccupied with education in a controlled environment, rather than in revolutionary and defiance activities. Second, the state's remaining international legitimacy depended in part on it being perceived to be providing (the legitimating) mass schooling for Blacks. To retain this residual legitimacy, schooling had to be perceived to be normal, reflecting the state's active participation inside the country's schools set aside for Blacks. Whereas the call for a return to schools may thus have been in the interests of the state, the act of setting an alternative date for that return in contradiction to that of the state was as an act of defiance given the wider context of defiance and national insurrection. The state's "flexible" approach can thus be understood as an attempt to deal with this dilemma. It may have interpreted the call by the NECC as defiance of its authority, despite the fact that NECC leaders indicated "to the Department of Education and Training that [they] are ready for discussion on the issue..."[sic].[360] In any event, the state went ahead to open schools on January 8, 1986.

Despite independent reports that "most secondary schools were deserted on Wednesday and Thursday [January 8 and 9, 1986]" the state announced that "enrollments differ[ed] from area to area ... indications ...[were] that in certain areas between 60 percent and 95 percent of pupils were admitted on the first day"[sic].[361] Its statement noted the particular exceptions to this situation as Soweto, Pretoria, the Eastern and Western Cape. It is not inconceivable that state statistics included those for primary schools - where close to 70 percent of students were registered. It was well known that lower primary schools had been excluded from this specific call by the NECC. The turnout on January 28, 1986 was dramatic as more than ninety percent of students returned to school on that day.[362] This

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literacy and complete schooling and higher education. This view is based on the assumption that the state was still committed to a *low-skill low-technical low-participation education path* for Blacks. Interestingly, this argument had been advanced by the Black Consciousness Movement in opposition to the boycott of schools. They argued that such boycotts hurt Blacks and only advance the interests of Whites and their state. In this view education should be stabilized so that the maximum number of Blacks could complete schooling and higher education.

[360]*Weekly Mail*, January 10-19, 1986.

[361]ibid.

[362]*Weekly Mail*, January 31-February 6, 1986.

response was even more dramatic given that the state had banned all public gatherings to discuss the NECC Conference Resolutions.[363]

The Back to School Call thus represented the first major act of combat between the state and the NECC. Based on the NECC goal of achieving a successful return to school, its authority, legitimacy and mobilizing capacity had been established. The ground was prepared for proceeding with the thrust for People's Education.

The long-term impact of the call. Schooling did not return to the stability anticipated by the NECC. As the NECC moved its programs of people's education into schools, so the state retaliated by closing many schools. Notwithstanding calls for the release of students and teacher leaders more students were detained and the ban on the Congress of South African Students remained in place.[364] The police and military tightened their grip on black townships including schools, as their reaction to an escalation in the campaign to make the country ungovernable and to turn schools into organs of people's power.

But, having established itself as a movement that carried wide support, authority and legitimacy, the NECC transformed the culture of politics of education planning, financing, governance and decision-making, and curriculum. Its calls for the extension of free and compulsory education to the Black student population was legitimate and popular and the organization could not be ignored as the state had done in the past in relation to student struggles. The state's response to the call for it to provide free textbooks and stationery to Black students and to equalize education expenditures was now to announce that: (i) free stationery would be provided with immediate effect; (ii) free textbooks would be provided at the beginning of the next school year (January 1987); and, (iii) public expenditures on education would be equalized over a period of 10 years starting 1986 and ending 1996. These reforms were still to be provided within the context of the racially separate education

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[363]*Weekly Mail*, January 17-23, 1986 stated that despite its repeated inquiry it was not clear whether the Department of Education and Training had supported the ban on public gatherings. It quotes a spokesman of that department as saying that it was not within the jurisdiction of the department to comment on the activities of another department, presumably those of the Ministry of Law and Order.

[364]*Weekly Mail*, February 28-March 6, 1986.

departments.[365] In the absence of an established procurement and distribution mechanism the state's decision to provide free stationery turned out to be close to an empty promise, adding further grievance to an impatient and restless student body. The general context of schooling as well as schooling itself, worsened overall throughout the period 1986-1989.

At the Second Conference of the NECC (March 1986) and notwithstanding the deteriorating situation and the, at best, incomplete response by the state to the conditions set at the First Conference, the NECC confirmed its call for a return to school.[366] This time though the call was punctuated with a firmer commitment to the implementation of the program of People's Education and to the establishment of Parents-Teacher-Student-Associations (PTSAs) as "democratic organs of people's power in people's schools." All of these actions were planned to culminate in a day of action to commemorate the June 16, 1976 student uprisings against the system of Bantu Education.

State reaction to the second return to school call was immediate. Having achieved its objective - confirmation of the call for a return to school by a legitimate and authoritative organization - it closed several hundred more schools; maintained the ban on the high school student organization, COSAS; detained hundreds of students and local education leaders; and, banned public gatherings which were intended to discuss the resolutions of the Second Conference.[367]

In sum, although the return to school call had initially been effective, its long-term impact was compromised by state retaliatory actions and nonactions (on the conditions set to the return to school) and by the waning support for the second return to school call by an increasingly militant and impatient student body.

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[365]The first two responses were announced before the opening of schools for the second term of 1986. It may be argued that these responses were made to support the return to school call. The third announcement was made immediately prior to the Second Conference of the NECC, clearly intended to sway the opinion at that conference in favor of a confirmation of the return to school call. Ironically the state rescinded this latter promise a year later, citing the sluggish economy and tightening international economic sanctions as obstacles to the achievement of equality in public expenditures on education.

[366]National Consultative Conference on the Crisis in Education. *Resolutions*. Durban. March 1986. ? 1986.

[367]*Work In Progress*. "No End In Sight To Schools Crisis." Nov-Dec, 1986.

1.1.4 The battle over schools. The closure (by the state) and reopening (by the NECC) of closed schools

Schools were closed in even larger numbers and new restrictions were introduced. Students were expected to register again for the third school term. These actions by the state were implemented with clear political intentions. First, the new regulations were aimed at squashing the growing movement of People's Education[368] and the state even labeled the NECC as a negative organization with little support.[369] The NECC's response was to announce that questioning its legitimacy would not to solve the education crisis and that it was not at this stage questioning whether or not the Minister of Education and Training had the moral authority to run the education department. Directing itself at the Minister, the organization said,

> At this point in time we are prepared to disregard the fact that you represent a government that we had no part in electing; that we are not part of the policy-making bodies of the state; that your ministry is exclusively made up of White people who have given themselves the responsibility for Black education. This should not be seen to be a political blindness on our part, but is a reflection of our deep desire to get the education of our children on the right road. To argue whether or not the NECC is a legally recognizable body is an irrelevant question that will not benefit anyone. What is significant is that parents, teachers and students have given their support to it.[370]

The state pushed ahead with its actions stating that schools were shut down because of "interference by certain outside organizations and ... attempts on the part of unofficial 'school committees' of pupils to subsume the authority of principals".[371]

Second, education department officials said that several hundred schools were closed because: (i) pupils arrived late for school and most of them did not return after the lunch break; (ii) many of the pupils did not attend classes but preferred to mill around the school premises; (iii) most of the pupils went to school without books and others with only a few schoolbooks; (iv) there was no discipline at the schools because pupils refused to be

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[368] *Sowetan*, July 24, 1986. *Star*, January 1, 1987.

[369] *Star*, January 1, 1987. *Weekly Mail*, November 14, 1986.

[370] *Weekly Mail*, November 14, 1986.

[371] *Weekly Mail*, March 27-April 3, 1986. Later, the state now also introduced identity cards to keep militant students and education activists out of schools. [*Evening Post*, November 18, 1987.]

disciplined; (v) gambling and marijuana smoking had taken place within the school premises and in some classrooms; (vi) many pupils refused to do written work - even to write tests; (vii) Student Representative Councils wanted to take over control of the schools and they arranged stayaways whenever they wished and had chased away some pupils and teachers at some schools; and, (viii) student organizations paid no heed to appeals made by national organizations to resume their studies but acted in blatant defiance of school regulations.[372]

In its response the NECC acknowledged that there were problems in some school districts but argued that these issues could have been dealt with better through discussions with students rather than through the unilateral closure of schools. However, the general response of the NECC to the closure of schools was to call on students, parents, teachers and school principals, through their local education crisis committees to reopen closed schools which these local organizations proceeded to do. This reopening of schools proceeded despite the heavy presence of police and the military in black townships.[373]

In sum, the apartheid state had lost formal control of schools. The extent to which the NECC and its local formations had stepped into this vacuum varied from region to region and was informed by the extent of state repression. However, specific regions of the country and some urban centers appeared to be controlled by the NECC and local education and community organizations. These NECC actions were supported by an environment which had seen the collapse of state control over local government in Black townships. State actions to close schools was clearly a reaction to the direct actions and challenge presented by the NECC. It was also intended to disrupt the implementation of People's Education and the establishment of organs of people's power, viz., PTSAs and SRCs.

1.2 Elements of a Popular, People's Education

The second social project that marked the early evolution and emergent identity of the NECC and which transformed the culture of politics of education, educational governance, teaching and the curriculum was its project of People's Education. Directly

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[372]*Weekly Mail*, May 16-22, 1986.

[373]*New Nation*, July 17, 1986.

linked to the organization's dominant role in the struggle over and return to school, the campaign for People's Education was a direct consequence of an already established political campaign to make the country ungovernable, to remove apartheid authority from townships and villages and to put in their places organs of people's power. That wider collective action frame set in motion by organizational allies of the NECC, was enacted in the education sphere. With its gathering legitimacy, support and militancy, the NECC became its carrier in the education sector.

Three interlocking constructs shaped the emergent identity of People's Education, and of the NECC: political power, curriculum policy and national development. Whereas *people's power* referred to the democratic governance of and decision-making at national, provincial as well educational institutional levels, *People's Education* referred to the curriculum, classroom practices and evaluation systems, at national, provincial and institutional levels. *National development* referred to human resources development, including decision-making on the shape, structure and accessibility of the education system. In this regard, the NECC now also mooted the idea of a single, national school uniform for all school pupils to replace the uniforms that differed from school to school. This idea was however never actively pursued since it could draw attention away from the main focus of the campaign.

1.2.1 People's Education, Curriculum and Schooling

At its First Conference, the NECC appointed a commission to develop a plan to move People's Education from political-philosophy and educational principles to implementable programs. That commission advised the Second Conference that three school subjects, Mathematics, History and English be targeted for immediate intervention in the form of the adoption and implementation of a curriculum of People's Education. Specialist commissions were appointed to develop frameworks, syllabi and texts for these subjects. Initial materials were made available in the second half of 1986. Later, the organization, in collaboration with the Universities of the Witwatersrand (1987) and Natal (1988) established Education Policy [Research] Units (or EPUs) to: "investigate and evaluate education policies and curriculum options, and to provide a scholarly context for

considering emerging education alternatives and proposals."[374] The emerging school governing option spawned by People's Education, Parent-Teacher-Student-Associations (PTSAs), were also the subject of scholarly research. Within the broad framework of People's Education, these Education Policy Units were to stimulate and enrich the debate about a post-apartheid People's Education.

In schools, People's Education took the form of local initiatives, which displayed wide variance in terms of support and level of organization across the country. Several programs were initiated independently by teachers, several others by students and even others by joint teacher-student coalitions. These special classes were either conducted during normal school hours or alternatively during a school's athletics hours for example Wednesday afternoons in Soweto schools.[375] The wide support for People's Education can also be gauged from the state's reaction. It banned all publications on People's Education, including the "presentation on any school or hostel premises of any course or syllabus other than a course or syllabus contemplated in section 35 of the Education [and Training] Act [No. 90 of 1979].[sic]"[376] Further, the wearing, possession or displaying of a: "uniform, part of a uniform, T-shirt or other article, case, flag, banner, pennant, poster, sticker or any other article" supporting any of the member organizations of the NECC or their ideas, goals, and program were prohibited.[377]

The state argued that,

> The concept People's Education is completely unacceptable in so far as it has the declared goal of bringing about ungovernability in the education system and thereby creating a vacuum in which so-called alternative education can be set up. In this sense it is a destabilizing and revolutionary activity and has to be opposed vigorously and eliminated inexorably ... it has to be acknowledged that the concept People's Education as such can have a positive meaning and a creative

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[374]For an excellent review of the Education Policy Units at the universities of the Western Cape, Witwatersrand and Natal, see Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA). *Agitators, Incubators, Advisors - What role for the EPUs*? An Evaluation of South African Education Units supported by Sweden. Joel Samoff. Stockholm. 1995.

[375]For excellent participant observation accounts on People's Education practices in schools, see *Weekly Mail*, June 13-19, August 8, and October 17, 1986. Also, *Indicator*, January 1, 1988. *New Nation*, November 6, 1986. *Star*, January 6 and 7, 1987.

[376]*Star*, December 30, 1986. Also, *New Nation*, July 17, 1986.

[377]ibid.

> implication, in the sense of implying reform of the curriculum in order to bring education closer to the people ... Syllabuses should in all fairness also reflect the aspirations, experience and values of black communities and introduce the children to the experiences of other population groups.[378]

Significantly, the response of the state disregarded two key elements of the resolutions on People's Education. First, the NECC had considered the prevailing departments of education as institutions of apartheid which were not representative of the aspirations of the oppressed and disenfranchised majority. These structures were not considered to be the appropriate mechanisms for the development and implementation of People's Education since the process of the development and implementation of People's Education could only be accomplished by the people through their representative and accountable organizations. The election by the NECC of a National People's Education Commission and the appointment of three subject committees for Mathematics, History and English is an example of how the NECC intended to transform the curriculum. Representatives would thus be publicly legitimated through this mechanism and be held accountable in this manner. Second, the introduction of a new curriculum also required substantial change in teaching methods which (then) was based on teacher-centered and rote-learning methods rather than learner-centered, participatory and reflexive ones. State responses thus fell well short of the demands articulated in the NECC conference resolutions.

The NECC had set itself up as an oppositional and transforming shadow Ministry of Education. It had achieved popular legitimacy through its struggles, grassroots-based and diverse organizational structure. Its leadership had a broad mandate to focus and lead all education struggles and was somewhat independent from the sector- and narrower interest-based student and teacher organizations. Hence its ability to make the call for a return to school against the wishes of some student organizations and in the context of weak and repressed student organization and leadership and its success in pushing the divided teacher organizations to initiate unity talks within the goal of "maximum unity of all oppressed." This collective identity would undergo change in the late 1980s and early 1990s as student

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[378]The Minister of National, Dr. Gerrit Viljoen, quoted in, *Weekly Mail*, August 8, 1986.

and teacher organizations strengthened and united (both successes initiated and facilitated by the NECC), the prohibitions on the national liberation movements were lifted, political negotiations replaced mass struggles to achieve an open polity and democracy, and the reconstruction of education initiated. It is to this transition that the account now turns.

2. The National Education Coordinating Committee: from grassroots movement to formal organization, 1989-1995

The national defiance campaigns of 1989, the international isolation of South Africa because of its official apartheid policies and the failure of the States of Emergency (1985-1990) to resolve the crisis of legitimacy of the state, resulted in the celebrated speech of State President F. W. de Klerk on February 2, 1990. The subsequent release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners and the formal lifting of the ban on the national liberation movements and several social movements, including 14 student, teacher, and youth organizations, opened the way for a period of profuse activity in political and social negotiations and simultaneous mass struggles, both of which affected all spheres of South Africa's social life.

It is in this new phase in the evolution of South Africa that progressive grassroots organizations which led the push for people's power and people's education, now experienced dramatic changes in their exogenous environments and crises of identity. This was particularly so with the lifting of restrictions on - and the rise of - the national liberation movements. Few of these grassroots organizations experienced the crisis of role and identity as intensely as the NECC. Inevitably this crisis of role and identity resulted in questions about whether there was still a role for the NECC.

In response to this crisis of identity, the NECC initiated a number of internal and independent organizational evaluations, staged many workshops, summits and conferences, where organizational identity and role were the center of debate.[379] Significantly, at the end

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[379]National Education Crisis Committee. *Towards a Mass Education Movement (M.E.M) and the Re-alignment of Forces.* Johannesburg. ? 1989. National Education Crisis Committee. *Resolutions Adopted at NECC Consultative Conference held in Johannesburg.* 2 and 3 September 1989. National Education Coordinating Committee. *National Conference Report and Resolutions.* 15-17 December 1989. National Education Coordinating Committee. *Evaluation of NECC Operations.* ? 1990. National Education Coordinating Committee. *National Conference Report and*

of each review, workshop, summit and conference, activists left with the same answer: there was a role for the NECC. Also, particularly in the early reviews, the response on role was always prefaced by the political proposition: the deepening of education democracy and the transformation of apartheid education requires the collective effort of the new state as well as progressive civil society organizations. Some of the directions offered at these reviews included transforming the NECC into a development agency that would take on specific tasks such as building a progressive grassroots parents movement in education or into a progressive movement of democratic and progressive school-based Parent-Teacher-Student-Associations. Both of these possibilities pointed to many objectives of the NECC which, from its founding, still remained unfulfilled. Clearly, in the post-election and post-apartheid era these were the responsibilities of the emerging democratic state. Were the ANC to win these elections it would, now as the political leader of the state, take these responsibilities

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Programme 1990. 7-9 December, 1990. University of Durban-Westville. National Education Coordinating Committee. *Report on the NECC evaluation workshop.* 30-31 May 1991. Johannesburg. *South Africa's National Education Coordinating Committee. An Evaluation.* Trevor Coombe and Peter Hunter. London and Johannesburg. March 1992. National Education Coordinating Committee. *Civil Society, Social Movements and the National Education Coordinating Committee (NECC).* Nzimande, B, and Thuli Dlamini. Paper prepared for the NECC national workshop. 18-19 July, 1992. Johannesburg. 1992. National Education Coordinating Committee. *Workshop Agenda and Papers, on The Future and Role of the NECC.* Saturday, 18 July, 1992. National Education Coordinating Committee. *Secretariat Report.* Prepared for and presented at the 6th NECC National Conference. 11-13 December 1992. Midrand. National Education Coordinating Committee. *NECC Strategic Planning Workshop.* 25-26 November 1993. Final copy submitted by: Phumelela Services. ? 1993. Cape Town. National Education Coordinating Committee. NEC (National Executive Committee). *Minutes.* Held on 26 June 1994 at the Coronia Hotel, Berea. Johannesburg. National Education Coordinating Committee. National Executive Committee. 11, 12 and 13th December 1994. Holiday Inn Garden Court, Johannesburg. *Agenda.* Johannesburg. National Education Coordinating Committee. NEC. 11, 12 and 13th December 1994. Holiday Inn Garden Court, Johannesburg. *National Organiser Report.* Johannesburg. National Education Coordinating Committee. NEC (National Executive Committee). 11, 12 and 13th December 1994. Holiday Inn Garden Court, Johannesburg. *National Office Manager Report.* Johannesburg. National Education Coordinating Committee. NEC (National Executive Committee). 11, 12 and 13th December 1994. Holiday Inn Garden Court, Johannesburg. *National Information Officer Report.* Johannesburg. National Education Coordinating Committee. *Resolutions of the Extended NECC Meeting of 11-13th December 1994.* Johannesburg. National Education Coordinating Committee. *Minutes.* NEC (National Executive Committee). Meeting held at the Garden Court, Johannesburg, on the 11-13 December 1994. Johannesburg. National Education Coordinating Committee. *Discussion Document: Future of the NECC.* Prepared for and circulated at the Special NECC NEC (National Executive Committee), 25 February, 1995. Johannesburg. National Education Coordinating Committee. *Resolution on the Future of the NECC.* The National Office-bearers Meeting, held in Cape Town on the 16th February 1995. National Education Coordinating Committee. *Planning and Implementation Workshop Agenda. NECC Head Office.* Saturday, 7th January 1995. Johannesburg.

and the NECC would have to fold into the ANC. Many NECC leaders and activists expected that the NECC would fold into the ANC like its ally, the United Democratic Front had already done earlier. Others still saw an independent role for the organization, similar to that achieved by the South African National Civic Organization (SANCO).

The account turns to this discussion and describes and analyzes those exogenous and endogenous organizational determinants that dominated the later evolution of the NECC. The organizational determinants that are identified and whose effects are specified are understood to be to be interconnected and overlapping, and are: (i) the prominence of the unbanned national liberation movements, especially the African National Congress; (ii) shifting regimes of national collective action or national collective action frames; (iii) shifting regimes of international collective action; (iv) the rise of national level negotiating forums and coalitions; (v) the rise of the new democratic state; and, (6) endogenous organizational dynamics.

2.1 The Re-emergence of the National Liberation Movements

The re-emergence of the national liberation movements in South Africa in 1990 as legal entities which also mobilized popular support dramatically influenced the evolution and trajectory of the NECC. Whereas until this development a broad united front of organizations had established the internal liberation movement, the rise of the formerly banned, but externally based liberation movements now dramatically narrowed the political space and independent mobilizing opportunities for the NECC and allied social movement organizations (SMOs). The effect on the legitimacy and mobilizing capacity of the NECC was constricting and dramatic, especially from 1992 onwards, and occurred both directly and indirectly.

Directly this occurred through the non-contentious and direct assumption of the leadership of the internal movement for democracy by the liberation movements. Leadership transfers from the NECC to the liberation movements as well as the sharing of leadership were additional factors that now directly framed the trajectory and increased the role ambiguity of the NECC.[380] Indirectly, the NECC's evolution was framed through the

[380]Interviews D1, D2, D3, D4, D12,

new style of leadership imposed by the emergent African National Congress, e.g. now representative democracy displaced a collective and direct democracy frame and a centralized command system displaced a decentralized grassroots organizational and decision-making system.[381] This leaderships' concern for developing a more narrow set of organizational policies aimed at preparing itself for governing a South Africa after apartheid replaced concern for the development of policies for the anti-apartheid collective.[382]

In opposition to this narrowing of the mobilizing space for the NECC and allied SMOs and prompted by the collapse of statist regimes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, a debate was now initiated in South Africa on the nature and future role of civil society based social movement organizations.[383] That debate was also analyzed, discussed and debated within the NECC.[384] The early phase of the 1990s (1990-1993) saw the trajectory of NECC framed by an optimism for a symbiotic civil society-state relation in

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[381]Interview D2

[382]Interview D2

[383]See for example. African National Congress. *The Reconstruction and Development Program*. Johannesburg: Umanyano Publications. 1994. African National Congress. *A Policy Framework for Education and Training*. Education Department. Johannesburg. 1994. Also, Bekker, S. "Regional forums: new frontiers, new creations." *Indicator SA* Vol. 10 No 4 Spring 1993. Chazan, N. "Civil society at the crossroads." *Indicator SA* Vol. 10 No 1 Summer 1992. Cronin, J. "Supply and demand: the election list dilemma." *Work In Progress*. 92, Sept/Oct 1993. And, "Strategy and tactics: the boat, the tap and the Leipzig way." *The African Communist*, Third Quarter 1992. Mandela, N. Address Delivered at the Congress of South African Trade Union Special Congress. In *The African Communist*, Third Quarter (134) 1993. Mayekiso, M. "Working class civil society." *The African Communist*, Second Quarter (129) 1992a. "A response to Blade Nzimande." *Work In Progress*, 81, April 1992b. "Heat, light and civil society - another rejoinder to Nzimande and Sikhosana." And, *The African Communist*, Third Quarter 1993 (134). Moleketi, J. "Is a retreat from national democratic revolution to national bourgeois revolution imminent." And, *The African Communist*, Second Quarter 1993 (133). Mtshelwane, Z. "First it was the two hats - now it's two seats: are trade unions going to cope with the rush to parliament?" *Work In Progress*, 92, Sept/Oct 1993. Nzimande, B. & M Sikhosana. "Civil society. A response to Mzwanele Mayekiso." *The African Communist*. Third Quarter, 1992a. And, "'Civil society' does not mean democracy. A response to Mayekiso." *Work In Progress 84*, September 1992b. Stadler, A. "A strong state civilizes society." *Work In Progress*, 86, Dec 1992. Shubane, K. "Civic strategies: beyond the single city campaign." *Indicator SA* Vol. 8 No 1 Summer 1990.

[384]Nzimande, B., and T. Dlamini. "'Civil society' and the role of the NECC." *A discussion paper prepared for the NECC workshop*. Johannesburg. 18-19 July 1992. Education Policy Unit (EPU). University of Natal. "'Civil society' and the role of the National Education Coordinating Committee (NECC)." Nzimande, B. *EPU Working Paper*. No. 4. June 1993. Jansen, J. *An Evaluation of the National Education Coordinating Committee* (Including Strategic Options for the Future). An evaluation commissioned by the NECC. Johannesburg. 1992.

the post-apartheid phase. There were few doubts about the need for and role of, the NECC after the country's first democratic elections.

Establishment of the ANC Department of Education. The establishment and consolidation of the African National Congress' Department of Education in 1990 dramatically contributed to the uncertainty in the minds of the public and among education sector-based organizations about the role of the NECC. As stated earlier, many had assumed that once the ANC was established as an unbanned organization operating in South Africa, the NECC would fold into its education department,[385] while others had thought that the NECC would form the core of a new, democratic education system.[386] To the public and to many in the NECC and other education social movement organizations, the identity of the NECC was enmeshed, indeed one with those of the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the African National Congress (ANC). To them, these were one identity born in struggle in which the NECC had assumed responsibility for prosecuting the struggle in the educational terrain and the former organizations in the political terrain. The movement of civic associations and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) were assumed to occupy similar roles in relation to the UDF and ANC. In the wake of the rise of the ANC, the UDF dissolved its identity into that of the ANC. In the minds of many, the NECC was to follow the same path as the UDF.[387]

However, the dissolution of the NECC into the ANC did not occur. While the UDF dissolved (into the ANC), the NECC leadership saw no reason to follow suit. Having made that decision in December of 1990, the NECC failed to construct or reconstruct its vision, mission and purpose as well as its relationship with the ANC and its Education Department in a precise and meaningful manner.[388] The same prevailed in regard to its relationship with the increasingly independent education social movement organizations that constituted the NECC. Moreover, the NECC was now also assisting in building the ANC Department of

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[385]Jansen, J. *An Evaluation of the National Education Coordinating Committee* (Including Strategic Options for the Future). An evaluation commissioned by the NECC. Johannesburg. 1992. See also, Nzimande, B., and T. Dlamini. "'Civil society' and the role of the NECC." *A discussion paper prepared for the NECC workshop.* Johannesburg. 18-19 July 1992.

[386]ibid.

[387]ibid.

[388]*Interviews* D7, D8, D11 and D12.

Education. Several cadres simply played two roles, one within the ANC Department of Education and another within the NECC.[389] They assumed this situation neither to be contradictory nor to require different responsibilities or identities. This situation and outcome provide powerful support for the view of Melucci that SMOs are themselves social constructions who construct meaning for members, supporters, bystanders and adversaries. Surely, failure to provide such ongoing social and meaning constructions and reconstructions can only have dire consequences for the trajectory and social projects of social movements caught in such a spiral. For a social movement organization, as is the case with a formal organization, which has no distinguishing vision, mission, goal, objectives and strategy will find it impossible to provide meaning to or mobilize membership and supporters behind an indistinguishable social project. In this situation members, organizers and soon leaders jump ship to join alternative organizations.

Thus, once the ANC Department of Education had set up its own parallel policy and interventionist capacity and assumed the leadership role on education policy for the democratic movement, the uncertainty about the future of the NECC also engulfed the increasingly independent Education Policy Units which were earlier established by the NECC. Prompted by the increasing need for the democratic movement to develop national education policies as a basis for negotiations, the Education Policy Units were drawn by the NECC into a National Education Policy Investigation (NEPI).[390] But with education social

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[389]*Interviews* D7, D8 and D11.

[390]National Education Policy Investigation. Briefing Papers. 14 February 1992. Johannesburg. National Education Policy Investigation. Education Demands of the Progressive Education Movement: Draft per written for the NEPI Principles and Frameworks Committee. Johannesburg. April 1991. National Education Policy Investigation. Outline. ? 1991. National Education Policy Investigation. The Contradictory Process of Curriculum Planning and renewal for South African Schools Today. Research Group: Curriculum. ? Johannesburg. ? 1991. National Education Policy Investigation. Media Briefing. ? 1992. Johannesburg. National Education Policy Investigation. Report from the Administration and Control Sub-Group on the Education Renewal Strategy (ERS) Document. ? 1992. National Education Policy Investigation. Leaflet marketing/advertising Framework Report and Final Report Summaries. ? 1992. National Education Policy Investigation, Research Group: Planning, System and Structure. Re-organizing the education system - possibilities for the year 2000. Draft. 2 February 1992. Donaldson, A. Department of Economics, Rhodes University. Grahamstown, South Africa. 1992. National Education Policy Investigation (N.E.P.I.). Briefing Papers (14 February 1992). National Education Policy Investigation (N.E.P.I.). Working Paper. Post-Secondary Education in South Africa: an overview. Ian Bunting. February 1992. Cape Town. National Education Policy Investigation. Adult Education (Cape Town: Oxford University Press and NECC, 1992). National Education Policy Investigation.

movement organizations now increasingly asserting their own identity, combined with the movement of the ANC to the center of the policy process, the central and unifying role played by the NECC in the 1980s diminished rapidly. To be precise, the anti-apartheid education movement underwent a shift from national mobilization that was centralized within and by the NECC, to one comprising a head, the African National Congress, and several education sub-sectoral based policy centers: the education social movement organizations.

The NECC found its leadership role taken over by the ANC and in the process, the NECC lost its vitality. No longer were the public or the mass media as intensely interested in the policy views of the NECC. Even education social movement organizations which were formally part of the NECC coalition looked elsewhere for leadership.[391] The ANC, under the leadership of Nelson Mandela was becoming the central actor whether in politics or within the policy domain of social sectors, such as education. It was shaping the nature of the stakes and the method of engagement. Meetings of the National Executive Committee of the NECC were poorly attended by education social movement organizations, and when they did attend, there was little corresponding discussions of NECC matters in their own National Executive Committee meetings. The NECC, its education sectoral organizations and the ANC Education Department did not organize regular and joint

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Adult Basic Education (Cape Town: Oxford University Press and NECC, 1992). National Education Policy Investigation. Curriculum (Cape Town: Oxford University Press and NECC, 1992). National Education Policy Investigation. Early Childhood Educare (Cape Town: Oxford University Press and NECC, 1992). National Education Policy Investigation. Education Planning, Systems, and Structure (Cape Town: Oxford University Press and NECC, 1992). National Education Policy Investigation. The Framework Report and Final Report Summaries (Cape Town: Oxford University Press and NECC, 1992). National Education Policy Investigation. Governance and Administration (Cape Town: Oxford University Press and NECC, 1992). National Education Policy Investigation. Human Resources Development (Cape Town: Oxford University Press and NECC, 1992). National Education Policy Investigation. Language (Cape Town: Oxford University Press and NECC, 1992). National Education Policy Investigation. Library and Information Services (Cape Town: Oxford University Press and NECC, 1992). National Education Policy Investigation. Post-Secondary Education (Cape Town: Oxford University Press and NECC, 1992). National Education Policy Investigation. Support Services (Cape Town: Oxford University Press and NECC, 1992). National Education Policy Investigation. Teacher Education (Cape Town: Oxford University Press and NECC, 1992. The National Education Policy Investigation Reports. Planning Our Future: Education Policy for Change ([Johannesburg]: Learn and Teach Publications, 1992).

[391] *Interviews* D2, D7

strategizing sessions to address paralyzing role ambiguity. This only added to the decline in the profile of the NECC.[392]

The ANC and NECC now also differed on the need, nature and timing of collective action in the education sector. In some instances the ANC came out in opposition to, or remained silent on the campaigns of education social movement organizations.[393] For, the ANC was now seeking to win public confidence in its ability to provide leadership and to an increasingly conservative sector and public, this appeared to be the right option. In contrast, the NECC, bound by its 1989 Resolution on Reorganization (see Section below), came out in support of the collective actions embarked upon by education social movement organizations within its coalition.[394] The 1993 militant campaigns of COSAS and SADTU, described in Chapters Three and Four, which focused on the matriculation examination fee and (state-led) unilateral education restructuring, rationalization, retrenchments and remuneration are classical instances reflecting the dilemma faced by the NECC leadership. Public perceptions of and confidence in the NECC as a leading organization declined. The mantle formerly occupied by the NECC was assumed by the ANC, and where the ANC did not exercise actual leadership, its pronouncements sharply shaped the collective action options selected by education social movement organizations.

2.2 Negotiations and Crises in Education. From Mass-based Solutions to National Interventions, 1990-93

Macro-political negotiations on the future constitution of South Africa that were public, were initiated soon after the celebrated February 2, 1990 speech of State President FW De Klerk. These macro-political negotiations were soon duplicated within social-sectoral domains and these social sectoral negotiations were primarily aimed at stabilizing social sectors and preparing the way for the drafting of a new constitution. Macro-education negotiations which were initially focused largely on the transformation of the primary and secondary education sectors of education, also began to take on issues of the

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[392]*Interview* D8. See also, National Education Coordinating Committee. *Secretariat Report.* Prepared for and presented at the 6th NECC National Conference. 11-13 December 1992. Midrand. p. 21.

[393]*Interview* D7

[394]*Interview* D7

overall transformation of education, the crisis affecting higher education, the education and training of workers and adults and early childhood care and education.[395]

2.2.1 Nelson Mandela, the Education Delegation and the Joint Working Group on Education.

On his release from prison, Nelson Mandela established a broad-based Education Delegation which was intended to make a decisive intervention in the education crisis. Following the publication of the African matriculation results of 1990 - in which only 36.7 per cent of candidates passed the examination, compared with 95.8 per cent for Whites - Mandela called education organizations, university leaders, religious education organizations, trade unions and the national liberation movements to prepare for an unprecedented meeting with State President F. W. de Klerk to turn around the crisis in African matriculation.[396]

This non-partisan initiative soon took center stage in the country's pursuit of a transitional education solution. The independent political role of the NECC was now submerged into this initiative. Following the meeting with de Klerk, a Joint Working Group on Education (JWG) was established with equal representation from the state and the Education Delegation.

Although this initiative failed to win dramatic results for this new alliance of anti-apartheid political, labor, religious and education social movements[397] it marked important progress on several fronts. Through the efforts of the JWG, the Department of Education

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[395]See reports on the National Education Policy Investigation (NEPI) in previous footnote. Also, see, National Education and Training Forum. *Working Paper* [arising from discussions between the Department of National Education and representatives of the Working Committee of the National Education Conference]. 19 January 1993. National Education Conference. *Basic Texts* (8 March 1992). Includes: Principles and Values; Development and Implementation of a Code of Conduct; The Development and Implementation of a Code of Conduct With Regard to the Culture of Learning; The Development of Joint Strategies and Campaigns for Addressing the Crisis in Education; Mechanisms for Arriving at a New Education System. National Education Conference. *Keynote Address*. Professor Jakes Gerwel. March 1992. National Education Conference. *Back To Learning. The National Education Conference* [Report]. 1992. Sached/Ravan Press. 1992. National Education Conference. *The Future is Ours. Building a Culture of Learning and Teaching*. Johannesburg. National Education Conference. 1993.

[396]National Education Coordinating Committee. *Secretariat Report*. Prepared for and presented at the 6th NECC National Conference. 11-13 December 1992. p. 5.

[397]ibid.

and Training, for the first time in 1992, presented a plan to address the crisis in Black education. Education Delegation participants in the JWG highlighted as key achievements of the initiative: their experience and exposure to government political strategizing and planning, the consolidation of a non-partisan united front and the firm but visionary leadership of Mandela. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) also played a major role in placing adult education and training on the agenda of the JWG. Participants also pointed to several of the shortcomings associated with the initiative, including (i) its lack of transparency and limited participation of themselves in the initiative, two of the key objectives for which the JWG had been established in the first place, (ii) the lack of clearly specified legal status, powers, and authority for the JWG, (iii) the unclear reason for the participation and role of the education departments of the bantustans, (iv) the absence in the discussions and negotiations of the departments governing White, Coloured and Indian education, which were themselves directly affected by education reorganization and equalization, and (v) the marginal place of higher education, national curriculum policy, teacher training, adult education, and early childhood education and care in education negotiations.

2.2.2 The National Education Conference

On March 8, 1992, the Education Delegation dissolved at a National Education Conference which was organized by a broad front of progressive political, education and labor organizations to seek a fresh mandate to re-initiate education negotiations with the state, to seek a mandate to initiate several activities intended to draw grassroots organizations into such negotiations and to broaden and consolidate the non-partisan Education Delegation. The conference was also charged with evaluating the activities and achievements of the Education Delegation and the JWG, to map a plan for collective action in the education sector, and, largely at the initiative of the labor federations, to develop a much broader span of activities to include adult education and training.[398] These issues

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[398]National Education Conference. *Basic Texts* (8 March 1992). Includes: Principles and Values; Development and Implementation of a Code of Conduct; The Development and Implementation of a Code of Conduct With Regard to the Culture of Learning; The Development of Joint Strategies and Campaigns for Addressing the Crisis in Education; Mechanisms for Arriving at a New Education System. National Education Conference. *Keynote Address*. Professor Jakes Gerwel.

were organized into four commissions on: (i) the adoption of principles and values which should inform a new education system; (ii) the development and implementation of a code of conduct for schools directed at establishing effective and authorized local school government, and the development and implementation of a code of conduct intended to address the perceived decline in the culture of learning in schools; (iii) the development of joint strategies and campaigns for addressing the crisis in education which would not be disruptive of schooling and would involve the broad mass of people, especially parents and workers; and (iv) the development of mechanisms for arriving at a new education system, a particularly thorny matter which dealt with negotiations with the apartheid state.[399]

Key resolutions adopted at this conference were: (i) to establish a National Education Conference Working Committee comprising the African National Congress (ANC), Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO), Workers for Socialist Action (WOSA), COSATU, National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU), NECC and the South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU); (ii) to seek the participation of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and the National Professional Teachers Organization of South Africa (NAPTOSA), which next to SADTU is the largest teacher organization in South Africa; (iii) to initiate the establishment of a National Education and Training Forum (NETF) comprising the state, the private sector and the National Education Conference which would act as a negotiating and implementing forum for educational transformation and which would stop the government's unilateral restructuring of national education and training; and, (iv) to establish regional education forums to coordinate mass campaigns and act as report-back mechanisms between the National Education Conference Working Committee and grassroots organizations and their members.

March 1992. National Education Conference. *Back To Learning. The National Education Conference* [Report]. 1992. Sached/Ravan Press. 1992. National Education Conference. *The Future is Ours. Building a Culture of Learning and Teaching*. Johannesburg. National Education Conference. 1993.

[399]National Education Conference. *Basic Texts* (8 March 1992). Includes: Principles and Values; Development and Implementation of a Code of Conduct; The Development and Implementation of a Code of Conduct With Regard to the Culture of Learning; The Development of Joint Strategies and Campaigns for Addressing the Crisis in Education; Mechanisms for Arriving at a New Education System.

To summarize, while an alliance much broader than the NECC was being consolidated and a national intervention in the education crisis launched, the independent identity of the NECC was now subsumed by that initiative. Moreover, that initiative directed its attention at national negotiations and the finding of solutions to the national crisis. Not only had it subsumed the identity and organizational strategy of the NECC, it had also shifted the focus away from school based reform, e.g. people's education and the governance of schools and people's education and curriculum. Critically, the waning independent identity of the NECC was now even more closely interwoven with that of the ANC.

2.2.3 The National Education and Training Forum

Following a year of negotiation and planning by the National Education Conference and militant collective action by students against the matriculation examination fee (see Chapter Two) and teachers against retrenchment, unilateral restructuring of education by the apartheid state and on remuneration (see Chapter Four), the National Education and Training Forum (NETF) was launched in August 1993 with the Private Sector Education Council (PRISEC) acting as mediator between the state and the National Education Conference. The plenary of the NETF comprised representatives from the state, the National Education Conference, the private sector, the bantustans, the training sector, labor organizations, the higher education sector, teacher organizations, student organizations, and parents committees. Political parties were expected to be added to this broad representation.

The mission of the NETF was to initiate, develop and participate in the process involving education and training stakeholders intended at establishing and implementing agreements linked to the human, social and economic development needs of South Africa on (i) the resolution of the crises in education, (ii) the restructuring of education for a democratic South Africa and (iii) the formulation of policy frameworks for the long term restructuring of the education and training system. From the point of view of the National Education Conference, the NETF was also created to stop unilateral government restructuring of education. The work of the NETF was expected to extend well beyond the

country's first national and democratic elections. But soon after elections, the forum became less central as a policy forum and itself retreated into obscurity.

Important in the evolution of the NETF was the insistence of the democratic movement, and particularly COSATU, on linking education and training. That linkage reflected the commitment to develop an integrated system of lifelong learning in which learners of all ages would have alternative ways to begin and continue their education.

With these successive national level developments and interventions, the uncertainly and collective identity crisis experienced by the NECC took a further plunge. For these new policy forums and interventions had the effect of centralizing negotiations on education policy and combat with the state *away from* the NECC. The NECC had recognized the need and campaigned for national level interventions that supported grassroots interventions and that would break the impasse and crises in education. But these interventions in turn subsumed the earlier role played by the NECC. Also, the NECC had accepted the need and campaigned for national level interventions to be led through a national front that went beyond the ideological limits that the NECC now represented, one that included other political ideologies. However now, the NECC and its identity was subsumed in these forums. In effect the establishment of these forums and interventions had the outcome of shifting leadership, responsibility and legitimacy for analysis of the education problem and finding and implementing solutions thereto, away from the NECC, its allied education social movement organizations and grassroots initiatives, toward a new, national and apparently broader-based coalition. Thus, even while the NECC and education social movement organizations were consolidating and establishing their separate identities at the outset of the transition to a democratic and non-racial South Africa, they were also thrust into initiatives that would compromise the prominent roles played by themselves in the pre-transition period.

Significantly, NECC locals also began to collapse and the political cultures of the NECC and education social movement organizations now became less than hegemonic in this new generation of national level initiatives. Member organizations of the NECC also failed to meet regularly in order to develop consolidated strategies and to review successes

and failures.[400] All of these outcomes were continued rather than interrupted with the establishment of the National Education Conference and National Education and Training Forum. Legitimacy and hegemony slipped dangerously away from the NECC, education social movement and grassroots organizations.[401]

2.3 Shifting Regimes of Collective Action

The lengthy process of negotiating a political settlement (1990-93) that ultimately led to the establishment of a special, but limited form of democracy in South Africa and that resulted in the first national and democratic elections there in April of 1994, dramatically changed the resource and mobilizing possibilities of the NECC and allied education SMOs. Earlier collective action frames of the anti-apartheid movement and the NECC were marked by national insurrection, civil disobedience and ungovernability (1984-85), a commitment to replacing state power with people's power (1986-89), a move to underground and clandestine action in the face of a National State of Emergency (1988-89), and a resurgent civil disobedience (1989-90). The negotiations period itself was not one continuous collective action frame. It comprised of moments of rolling mass action (1992), to unblock the negotiations deadlock, a peace movement (1993-94), to negate state, para-state and counter-state violence, an elections campaign and the development of a program for reconstruction and development after apartheid (1993-94). These all directly and dramatically framed the evolving collective identity of NECC, through the opportunities and constraints that they had provided.

As described in earlier chapters, major transitions in the collective action frame dominated the trajectory of all SMOs including the NECC in the 1990s. Emergent modes of this collective action frame were: national reconciliation (versus seizure of power), nation-building (versus people's power), a liberal democracy (versus a radical democracy), peace (versus armed insurrection), stability (versus ungovernability and civil disobedience)

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[400]*Interviews* D7, D8 and D11. National Education Coordinating Committee. *Secretariat Report*. Prepared for and presented at the 6th NECC National Conference. 11-13 December 1992

[401]Note, that unlike the NECC, education sector-based organizations such as SASCO, COSAS and SADTU (all three of which are studied in this dissertation) were, through their independent campaigns and programs able to turn the tide and establish their separate collective identities and legitimacy.

and consensus seeking (versus conflict and unilateralism). Little resistance emanated from within the NECC and its allied education SMOs to these transition shifts in the collective action frame. These transitions were largely enacted and popularized rather than engaged reflexively and critically. But even more dramatic, these collective action frames placed new constraints on the emergent strategy and programs of the NECC. For example, two major programs of the NECC linked to its people's education project students lost their legitimacy and mobilizing capacity, viz. the program to establish parallel organs of people's power such as PTSAs as governing bodies of schools and the program to provide a curriculum informed by people's education to educators. These were both, at least at their founding, based on unilateralism, ungovernability, and civil disobedience, modes of collective action frames that contradicted the emergent and dominant ones of national reconciliation, nation-building and consensus seeking. Mobilizing support and organizational resources for these campaigns became near impossible.[402] Even later, the organization's highly publicized and successful campaign to occupy white schools in order to force these to accept black students was abandoned. They were now too militant and disruptive.

The NECC's identity became so closely interwoven with that of the ANC that to act independently from it was almost impossible. Major programs of the NECC, especially its signifier people's education program collapsed and reinforced an emergent identity and role crisis. The emergent and socially constructed collective action scripts were now enacted but also added to the fragmentation of signifier campaigns and ultimately of the NECC. The heart of the NECC's identity had now been ripped out from the organization, so to speak.

2.4 The rise of the democratic state

South Africa's successful first national and democratic elections in 1994 installed the country's first democratically elected government. The significance of that transition was elevated by the dominant leadership of Nelson Mandela of the Government of National Unity. The newly elected government moved quickly to assert itself in the public domain as an activist state. Its high levels of legitimacy also overlapped with the social projects of

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[402] *Interviews* D2, D7, D8, D10 and D11.

education SMOs who were still pursuing these in a militant manner. The social construction of grievance and of remedial strategies in education shifted from social movement organizations to the state. And, in this early period of the making of an apartheid-free South Africa, the state began to assume a dominant role over society. The state also legitimated some and delegitimated other forms of collective action.[403] Legitimated were negotiations, lobbying and consensus-seeking. Delegitimated were insurrection, hostage taking and the erection of road blockades as remedies for the highlighting of grievances. It is in this period that the NECC found it difficult to develop and sustain its social project. Down was the demand for crises resolution. Anti-state mobilizations were no longer pursued. After all, the political state was democratically elected and highly legitimate.

The state also incorporated into its project the grievances and transformation projects of the NECC and of its allied education SMOs. For example, incorporated into the identity of the state were projects previously campaigned for from *outside of the state* including: (i) the creation of new national and provincial education departments on a non-racial basis; (ii) full adherence to the Reconstruction and Development Program policy on human resource development; (iii) the establishment of a National Commission on Higher Education to advise on the restructuring and transformation of higher education; (iv) the appointment of a Committee to Review School Organization, Governance and Funding with the brief to review school models, propose representative governance structures, and equitable funding policy; (v) the undertaking of a feasibility study to establish a National Institute for Curriculum Development, while completing the "cleansing" of curricula from racist, sexist and other objectionable content; and (vi) the appointment of a Ministerial Committee on Free and Compulsory Education to advise on how to extend free and compulsory education to all South African children.[404] Thus, the state was setting and then dominating the agenda of the politics change, an activity that the NECC had performed

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[403]These developments are described and referenced in the earlier accounts of SASCO, COSAS and SADTU.

[404]Ministry of Education. Republic of South Africa. *Agenda 95. Education Priorities for 1995*. Cape Town. ? March, 1995.

throughout the 1980s and for part of the 1990s. Communities were "... now increasingly looking at the democratic government for delivery ... not organizations."[405]

2.5 Transitions in the Focus of International Support

The shift from the initial commitments of the international anti-apartheid movement - that included social movement organizations, governments, international government and non-government organizations - for the movement for democracy in South Africa underwent three transitions, thereby putting in place their own collective action frames. In the initial phase, the 1960s-1990, international support was marked by a dual focus of support for humanitarianism and support for democracy that backed the creation and expansion of anti-apartheid organizations such as the NECC. In this period, support was provided for varied activities, including institution building, mass campaigns against the apartheid state and social and institutional forms of apartheid, and development projects.[406] The emergent movement for democracy was thus able to tap successfully into a vast reservoir of international support to facilitate organizational mobilization, expansion, routinization and recruitment. In fact, by the beginning of the 1990s, the NECC had become, in effect, wholly dependent on this external source for cash-driven organizational resources. Thus, in this early phase, and for the most, there were few limitations on support for the anti-apartheid movement. That situation was now set to change.

In the second phase, 1990-1994, international support was focused on a narrower commitment of support for institution building and the establishment of development projects.[407] Support was also tied to specific projects and outcomes. Support was no longer available for mobilizing against the state or for organizational campaigns. This new focus dramatically altered the resource *and* policy environment for social movement organizations. They either had to change mode to suit the criteria set by international support, seek alternative sources of support, or face certain organizational death. Having expanded its organizational structure to employ more full-time staff, the NECC, which was,

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[405] *Interview* D8.

[406] *Interviews* D1, D2, D6, D8, D9, D10, D11 and D12.

[407] ibid.

in effect, wholly dependent on international support, had few options. The organization opted to map the changes in its resource and policy environment into its organizational structure. Mass campaigns were now reorganized to meet the new criteria[408] and these became organizational programs, with project components and specified intended outcomes.

The NECC also created a new accounting department, in part intended to meet the additional new criteria of proper accounting set by international funding organizations. The National States of Emergency and state repression had inhibited the creation of a formal accounting system and department because activists were constantly on the run from the security forces and were unable to keep proper records of income and expenditure. There was also little experience in managing donor funds with little oversight from donors. Also opening and managing bank accounts were seen to increase the security risk for activists and organizations.[409] That scenario changed in the 1990s. But as the organization expanded its staff component to meet new needs and programs, so it recruited from a pool of activists, better schooled in the rigors of debates on political theory and strategy, meeting procedures and mass mobilization, than in developing projects, and in determining and anticipating project outcomes and accounting procedures.[410] Now, while the NECC was enacting the international script through redirecting its course from campaigns to projects, organizational momentum was impeded as the focus shifted to organizational routinization, professionalization and maintenance and away from grassroots mobilization and projects around the further development of people's education. Activists found it hard to meet the new challenge and while the organization employed the services of organizational consultants to assist with organizational realignment, change was occurring too slowly.[411]

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[408]Interviews D2, D8, D10 and D11. See also, National Education Coordinating Committee. *Secretariat Report*. Prepared for and presented at the 6th NECC National Conference. 11-13 December 1992. And, National Education Coordinating Committee. *1992 Project Proposals*. ? 1991. Johannesburg.

[409]*Interviews* D6 and D9.

[410]Interviews D2, D4, D6, D7, D8, D10 and D11. See also, National Education Coordinating Committee. *Secretariat Report*. Prepared for and presented at the 6th NECC National Conference. 11-13 December 1992.

[411]See for example, National Education Coordinating Committee. *NECC Strategic Planning Workshop*. 25-26 November 1993. Final copy submitted by: Phumelela Services. ? 1993. Cape

Organizational momentum was slipping, and in turn, organizational resources were coming in much more slowly as their flow was tied to the submission of project reports and accounting schedules.

In the third transition, from April 1994 onward, international support to SMOs was even further restricted. Now it was focused on support for the new government's Reconstruction and Development Program.[412] Much of the funds which were previously directed at projects designed and implemented in collaboration with non-government and social movement organizations, including the NECC, were channeled directly to the new government. And, in its wake, organizational death rates increased. An anti-apartheid movement that had previously been populated by hundreds of non-government organizations and social movement organizations, and that had entered the 1990s with optimism for a role in the transformation of apartheid South Africa, was now being decimated. And, while the new government had anticipated a role for these organizations in the transformation of the country, the practical implementation thereof was occurring too slowly, and with too many bureaucratic requirements to prevent a rise in organizational death rates. The NECC did not escape the effects of this transition in international support. Its own decline, already initiated at a higher political level through its declining legitimacy and profile was now on the cards.

2.6 Endogenous Organizational Determinants

Fluctuations in endogenous organizational determinants also dominated the late evolution of the NECC and combined with dominant exogenous organizational determinants to interact synergistically to limit the trajectory and emergent identity of the NECC. Four of these endogenous organizational features became prominent in the end-cycle of the NECC: (i) the restructuring of the NECC in 1989, (ii) the increasing assertion of independence by the education social movement organizations that constituted the NECC coalition, (iii) evolving organizational leadership dynamics and, (iv) already noted and described, organizational staffing dynamics.

Town. And, Jansen, J. *An Evaluation of the National Education Coordinating Committee* (Including Strategic Options for the Future). An evaluation commissioned by the NECC. Johannesburg. 1992.

[412]*Interviews* D6, D8 and D11.

2.6.1 Restructuring the NECC in preparation for combat in the 1990s

Much of the crisis of collective identity experienced by the NECC in the 1990s is blamed on its 1989 Conference Resolution on Restructuring, that sought to transform the organization from an organization with broad and popular legitimacy to a sector-based or sector-driven organization.[413] In terms of that decision, the NECC's highest policy making bodies, the Biennial National Conference and the National Executive Committee, were dominated by specified sector-based organizations such as teacher and student organizations. These sector-based organizations would determine the goals, programs and campaigns of the NECC. Previously the National Executive Committee of the NECC had comprised mainly regional NECC representatives who were in the main leaders drawn from the political, religious and parent organizations. Education sector-based organizations were invited to participate in the national operations of the NECC. But they were never formally part of the organization's national policy-making bodies. That set of arrangements were in part the outcome of the nature of sector-based organization at the time of the formation of the NECC in the mid-1980s. They were either weak, non-existent or disrupted by state repression. These arrangements changed and the NECC became a formal coalition of education sector-based organizations.

This decision had a dramatic effect on the trajectory and collective identity of the NECC. The NECC would undergo a complex restructuring from a political and education policy movement with broad and popular legitimacy to intervene in education crises on behalf of the "people" and in the interests of "people's education" to a coalition type organization that drew its legitimacy from specified sector-based education organizations. These organizations were initially specified as the Congress of South African Students (COSAS), the South African National Students Congress (SANSCO) and the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) (as described in Chapter Two these two organizations later merged to form the South African Students Congress, SASCO), the National Teacher Unity Forum (later launched as the South African Democratic Teachers Union, SADTU, and described in Chapter Four), the South African Youth Congress

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[413]Interviews D7, D8 and D11. Also, National Education Coordinating Committee. *National Conference Report and Resolutions.* 15-17 December 1989. pp. 65-66.

(SAYCO) and COSATU.[414] Later, the Union of Democratic University Staff Associations (UDUSA) (1990) was recruited to join this education alliance.[415] Even later, the Young Christian Students (YCS) (1993) and the South African National Civic Organization (SANCO) (1993) were also enlisted.[416]

The intent with this restructuring was also to transform the NECC into a substantive movement of sector-based education organizations that each on its own, and in their specific policy domains mobilized support and transformed education policy domains and practices, but which together formed a national movement whose wide-ranging command over support and sectoral interventions would be impossible for the apartheid state to ignore. This movement or coalition-type organization would lead sector-wide negotiations, develop and implement education development projects, and initiate policy research, analysis and development initiatives in line with the vision of people's education. Until the rise and domination of the education sector by the ANC from mid-1992 onward, these goals were successfully pursued by the NECC.

But, there were additional reasons for seeking to reorganize the NECC. Sector-based education organizations advanced the need to improve the accountability of the NECC leadership to their own emerging identities and social projects.[417] For them, there was a need to strengthen the links of the NECC leadership to the sector-based organizations, so that NECC programs, leadership, legitimacy, and interventions would arise from and be reflective of the collective of sector-based organizations, rather than those of a progressive, but less clearly accountable leadership. Whereas in the past the NECC had intervened in education crises, at school and higher education levels largely independent of the weakened sector-based education organizations, the organization was now expected to make such interventions only at the request and with the approval of sector-based organizations. This

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[414]National Education Coordinating Committee. *National Conference Report and Resolutions.* 15-17 December 1989. pp. 65-66.

[415]National Education Coordinating Committee. *National Conference Report and Programme 1990.* 7-9 December, 1990. University of Durban-Westville. p. 50.

[416]*Interviews* D10 and D11. Also, National Education Coordinating Committee. *Secretariat Report.* Prepared for and presented at the 6th NECC National Conference. 11-13 December 1992. p. 21.

[417]*Interviews* D8 and D11. National Education Coordinating Committee. *National Conference Report and Resolutions.* 15-17 December 1989. pp. 65-66.

decision dramatically impaired the relative autonomy exercised by the NECC leadership until then in their interventions in education crises, and consequently, that leadership now acted without decisiveness, a characteristic that had earlier raised it to a movement that enjoyed high levels of legitimacy. Interventions made then were quick, pragmatic, involved negotiations with the state, carried broadly the support of sector-based organizations, the public and political movements and were informed by the vision of people's education and people's power. Sector-based education organizations would now determine, on their own, and based on their own social projects, the needs of their policy domains, e.g. schooling, teaching and higher education without reference to a national plan or national interests.

Stripped of its independent crisis-interventionist role and its relative autonomy to do so, the NECC experienced an erosion of its independent profile, popularity and legitimacy. It now experienced an identity crisis. NECC locals, those organizational structures that had organically evolved in the 1980s through collective struggles and crises interventions and which had connected the NECC to the grassroots, fell into a state of collapse. Their role was subsumed by that of local sector based organizations and Parent-Teacher-Student-Associations.

2.6.2 Sector-based organizations. Asserting their independent identities and fragmenting the education movement

In the wake of the highly effective and successful 1989 National Defiance Campaign, previously weakened and outlawed education sector-based organizations publicly unbanned themselves and began to recruit membership and mobilize support for their social projects. These public unbannings were followed by a process of organization re-building through mass campaigns. In particular, 1990 to 1993 saw sector-based organizations building organization around various mass campaigns.[418] So for example, emerged SADTU from almost two years of negotiations. That organization now began to insert itself in the education sector as a broad-based, non-racial, democratic, militant teachers union (see Chapter Four). Similarly, as described in Chapters Two and Three, COSAS and SASCO emerged and re-mobilized membership and support. Earlier the NECC was the nerve-center around which education interventions and programs had been

conceptualized, developed and implemented. Now the independent and consolidating sector-based organizations asserted their own identities as they began to advance their social projects, build support and transform educational policy domains and policies. Multiple policy centers replaced the previously single policy center.

While there was some coordination among sector-based organizations, for the most part, programs and campaigns were conceived and conducted independently from each other.[419] The NECC leadership now observed sector-based organizations launch and conduct their campaigns, some of which were controversial and apparently had limited public support. When the NECC did show its public face, it was expected, by the sector-based organizations, to support, legitimate and confirm, rather than question and criticize their campaigns and programs.[420] Alternatively, when the NECC did launch campaigns such as the Back To School Campaigns (later Back To School Program and Back To Learning Program) [1990-1994] and the Intensive Learning Campaigns (later Intensive Learning Program) [1990-1993], these were huge and ambitious campaigns, rather than small-scale and targeted. They were also fraught with great uncertainty and many unresolved contradictions[421] and they were often neutralized by the independent and uncoordinated sector-based campaigns which often included components such as school and class boycotts and chalk-downs.[422]

Lack of decisiveness and repetition of apparently unsuccessful campaigns each year did not leave a favorable impression on an increasingly despondent and skeptical public. The NECC appeared to the public as enmeshed, to others entrapped, in the campaigns of sector-based organizations. It was no longer an independent actor acting in the national and sector-wide educational interests. The decline in the role within the NECC of one of the

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[418]See the earlier accounts of SASCO, COSAS and SADTU.

[419]National Education Coordinating Committee. *Secretariat Report.* Prepared for and presented at the 6th NECC National Conference. 11-13 December 1992. pp. 18-19.

[420]*Interviews* D7, D8 and D11.

[421]For example these campaigns were labeled as reformist since most of the work conducted, such as the establishment of learning centers, winter and spring schools, and the production of supplementary school texts amounted to a "regurgitation of Bantu Education with little input on People's Education programs." [National Education Coordinating Committee. *Secretariat Report.* Prepared for and presented at the 6th NECC National Conference. 11-13 December 1992. p. 13.]

[422]*Interviews* D7 and D10.

major protagonists of a restructured NECC, the Congress of South African trade Unions, COSATU, also worsened the legitimacy and collective identity crisis of the NECC.[423] Whereas until 1991 COSATU had been an active participant in the NECC, that participation declined in effect to a non-existent role by 1993.

2.6.3 Changing leadership dynamics.

Leadership changes also influenced the rate of decline of the NECC as a national policy actor and in part the 1989 Conference Resolution on Restructuring also contributed to this crisis. For organizational leaders were to be elected mainly from the leadership of sector-based organizations and of these education sector based organizations the most active were the student organizations, COSAS and SASCO.[424] The other sector-based organizations, COSATU, SADTU and UDUSA, which had a less youthful leadership did not offer their leaderships to play similar roles in the NECC. Yet other sector-based formations were weak and could not offer leadership. These included the Parent-Teacher-Associations, other parent formations and local education crisis committees spawned in the 1980s. In contrast, in the 1980s, leadership was drawn from local community and education organizations irrespective of whether they had a location in an education sector-based organization or not. The result was that highly legitimated leaders who commanded great influence among communities and especially parents and who were not tied to a specific education sector-based organizational project rose into the leadership of the NECC. This situation changed in the 1990s and many of those in the NECC leadership were drawn from the student movements. The NECC leadership, in turn, and especially from 1992 onwards, was now younger, sector-bound, less experienced and carried less legitimacy in the community.[425] A weaker leadership, coupled with a high turnover, in turn had further dramatic consequences for the survival of the NECC.

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[423]*Interviews* D1, D7, D8 and D11. Also, National Education Coordinating Committee. *Secretariat Report.* Prepared for and presented at the 6th NECC National Conference. 11-13 December 1992. pp. 18-19.

[424]Interviews D1, D7, D8, D10 and D11. Also, National Education Coordinating Committee. *Secretariat Report.* Prepared for and presented at the 6th NECC National Conference. 11-13 December 1992. pp. 18-19.

[425]*Interviews* D8 and D11.

2.6.4 Changing staffing dynamics

As already described, transitions in the collective action frames of international support placed new demands on organizational staff in terms of project development, planning, implementation, evaluation and reporting. While the NECC attempted to build capacity through staff recruitment and training, the effect on organizational project performance was far too slow.[426]

An additional dilemma also faced the organization. With the changing domestic political culture, the demand by the private sector and the state for activists knowledgeable in the political projects and campaigns of the United Democratic Front/Mass Democratic Movement increased.[427] These mass-based organizations, including the NECC "ended up competing with the private sector and government for the same pool of people. And, because the organization was not ... paying a living wage'"[428] it lost the services of many activists. While the NECC adjusted its remuneration packages, even these were not enough to stem the significant staff turnover. The effect of this change on the staff and leadership was

> very demoralizing. You have a staff training workshop at the beginning of the year ... you invest R40,000. You get a consultant and you train people. You have a follow-up programme two months down the line and only 30 percent of the staff you trained have been retained. But, the question was is it really worthy to invest so much resources on a process that doesn't seem to be improving the quality of the NECC. So, basically it meant that we were training people to go and service some other organizational structures in the private sectors. So clearly there was that problem.[429]

Also the emergence of the democratic state, with its own demand for leading activists to take up roles and responsibilities in its political and administrative arms only exacerbated staff and leadership losses. By the middle of 1994 of a full-time staff quotient

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[426]*Interviews* D1, D7, D10, D8 and D11. Also, National Education Coordinating Committee. *Secretariat Report.* Prepared for and presented at the 6th NECC National Conference. 11-13 December 1992. pp. 9-10.

[427]*Interviews* D7, D10, D8 and D11.

[428]*Interview* D8.

[429]*Interview* D8.

of over forty members, six were lost to the state and a further two to development agencies. Prompted by the NECC's financial crisis, an additional twenty staff members were lost to the private sector.[430]

Unable to balance organizational social projects against the dominant exogenous demands and endogenous organizational ones, the organization faced certain closure. Organizational resources, still largely drawn from international support, came in drips and drags. Staff turnover doubled. Even the most committed were unable to fend off the demands of the cost of living and of supporting themselves and their families. For until then for period up to four months there were no funds to pay the salaries of staff. Even alternative resources sourced from domestic donors now came to a halt and the remaining staff, highly demoralized looked elsewhere to continue their work. In April of 1995, the organization, overcome by this set of exogenous and endogenous organizational determinants finally closed its doors.

3. Summary

This chapter has recorded the emergence, decline, resurgence and death of the National Education Coordinating Committee (NECC). It has recorded and illustrated this organization's role as a carrier of projects of social change, and as an active participant in the social construction and reconstruction of public policy domains and of public opinion. Its initial project was shown to be that of achieving the return of Black pupils to schools that had been paralyzed by a two year long boycott. That project, popular as it became among parents, students, teachers and the broad public, opened up new political and resource mobilizing opportunities, but was soon transformed to the social construction and practical pursuit of a people's education. Initially conceptualized as an alternative to Apartheid Education, People's Education was shown to take on its own momentum and trajectory, and it continues to this day to occupy the minds and work of educationists, students, educators and workers. The present account described how the NECC took on a national leadership role at a time when student and teacher organizations were either dormant or weakened by

[430] *Interviews* D8 and D11.

state repression. But the organizations also sought to mobilize the support of parents through organically evolved and issue-specific local education crisis committees.

The emergent trajectory and identity of the NECC was shown to be sharply influenced by the surging and broader anti-apartheid movement, whose character, by the mid-1980s had turned militant, and which then pursued the establishment of organs of people's power as alternative state formations, and as the basis for governance of the disenfranchised Black majority by themselves. In turn, now, the anti-apartheid education movement, with the NECC at its head, became the movement for People's Education for People's Power. The account recorded how practical effect was given to this social project which now not only reconstructed the public policy domain of education, especially that of schooling, including the nature of the stakes (mass mobilization, ungovernability and people's power) but also overarching political cultures (militancy and conflictual models) and solutions (militant collective action).

The present account also recorded how the NECC was initially established as a broad, national level, but grassroots social movement with few formal organizational structures, and with loose linkages to student, teacher, parent, civic and worker organizations. Its leadership was, within the context of the dominant national collective action frame, relatively autonomous in defining the collective identity of the movement. In 1989, that organizational structure was transformed to a tight coalition-type organization which was consolidated through a formal organizational structure.

The account also recorded how the NECC was weakened by the end of its first year, by massive state repression that raised the costs of mobilization. But amidst a national resurgence of anti-apartheid organizations prompted by the release of political activists from South Africa's prisons and the rise in international collective action against apartheid, but also more broadly against authoritarian rule across the globe, the NECC defied its own restrictions and banishment, and successfully re-mobilized support that had waned in the period of state repression.

The account has also identified and analyzed the effects of several exogenous and endogenous organizational variables which resulted in a loss of the NECC's hegemonic and leading role, caused uncertainty, role ambiguity, a dearth in resources and organizational decline and death. Through the early 1990s, these variables dramatically influenced the late

evolution and eventual death of the NECC. However, even during this period of uncertainty, role ambiguity and organizational decline, the NECC remained an active and leading participant in the social construction of a democratic order and education within the context of the new overarching political culture of consensus-seeking through negotiations. Prompted by the initiation of political negotiations which held the promise of an apartheid-free and democratic South Africa, the organization expanded its efforts of constructing a vision and developing a framework for an apartheid-free and democratic education. The National Education Policy Investigation (NEPI), spearheaded by the NECC, resulted in the mobilization of significant new resources, including monetary, but also of hundreds of educationists and education activists who shared the vision of an apartheid-free and democratic education. The results and resources mobilized by this policy development project, later became the platform for new policy development projects, especially those of the African National Congress, which in turn has been taken up in the programs of the emergent democratic state.

4. Implications for theory and policy

This account of the NECC confirms the utility of the theoretical model advocated which combines social constructionist and resource mobilization theories. Several exogenous and endogenous organizational determinants were identified, specified and analyzed, more particularly for the middle and end phases of the organization's evolution.

To recall, these were, first, the re-emergence of the national liberation movements, especially that of the African National Congress which was shown to create role ambiguity and a loss of the education leadership role of the NECC. Second, the creation of new national level social movements, with broader membership and legitimacy than the NECC, was shown to have weakened the leading and hegemonic role of the NECC. Third, shifts in national level collective action frames emphasized the pursuit of consensus through negotiations, rather than conflict through militant collective action. Fourth, the rise of the democratic state and the formal incorporation of the grievances and transformation projects of the NECC into its emergent project was shown to create further role ambiguity for the organization. Fifth, shifts from the initial commitments of the international anti-apartheid

movement resulted in a decline in vital resources for the maintenance of the NECC and the pursuit of its social project. And sixth, transitions in endogenous organizational determinants such as organizational restructuring at the end of 1989, an increasing assertion of independence by the education social movement organizations that constituted the NECC, gathering leadership losses and increasing uncertainty among organizational staff about their own futures in the organization, dominated the late phase of the organization.

The account has also illustrated how in its end-phase, the NECC's evolution was dominated by the decline and eventual loss of vital international resources. International resources played a critical role in the expansion, routinization and professionalization of the NECC and later contributed to a transformation of the organization's identity (from campaigns orientation to a development project one) as the organization sought to capture expanding resources created by the opening of the polity and the democratization of society. But, even that identity transformation was unable to recapture lost resources as the organization now struggled to retain key staff members. The matter of an over-reliance on international resources has critical implications for social movement and social movement organizations. Clearly, the availability of these resources and their focus undergo transitions which are influenced by the evolution of the national cycle of protest of the country of the recipient social movement or social movement organization. Failure to understand and conduct an early analysis of the determinants of the focus and the availability of international resources may result in and/or exacerbate organizational crises and death. Failure to mobilize additional resources from domestic sources may sharply curtail programs and necessary social projects at a time when these need to be accelerated.

There is an additional important observation to be made which holds both theoretical and policy implications. Despite several carefully organized, internally and externally facilitated strategic planning sessions aimed at eliminating goal ambiguity and achieving organizational routinization and professionalization, the NECC was unable to achieve deep-seated organizational re-alignment in time for it to mobilize expanding resources. While it had formally shed the image of a campaign-type social movement organization for a development-project type one, these changes require a lengthy lead time for donor organizations to be fully convinced of this transformation. Moreover, new organizational structures are required to meet the new requirements and staff require re-

training for their new roles. In this explanation the organization could re-engineer itself for a new role and social project but this would require sufficient lead time. What complicates this option is that the NECC had already early, and later in its evolution, established development-type organizations such as the Education Policy Units and the National Education Policy Investigation. It also initiated the creation of national overarching coalitions such as in the early childhood and adult education domains to pursue parts of its social project. Organizational transformation in line with the focus of international support implied a move into these areas already populated by social movements and social movement organizations spawned by the NECC. Moreover, this transformation had to be pursued at a time when the organization was losing key activists and staff while its legitimacy, role ambiguity and resource crises expanded.

An alternative explanation for the death of the NECC is that, like the United Democratic Front, it had accomplished its tasks. Moreover, since its identity was interwoven rather than separate from that of the African National Congress and because there was no room for both to mobilize the same public around similar social projects, the NECC had to perish. It is however a combination of these explanations which provides the explanation of the NECC's decline and death. The account has shown that the NECC acted as a quasi-state or alternative state formation and mobilized the diverse interests of students, teachers, parents and staff at higher education institutions. It has shown the goals, interests, programs and demands and even leaders and activists of the NECC transferred to the emergent state formation. It has also shown a shift in the organization's orientation to participation in the emerging polity, a decrease in mobilization, a refocus on organizational routinization, professionalization and maintenance, and a shift to a policy and program orientation. Organizational restructuring, the rise of the African National Congress, shifting regimes of collective action, new national education forums and the rise of the new democratic state were shown to precipitate role ambiguity. An earlier policy orientation which had created policy research units and overarching education coalitions narrowed future development directions the organization could have selected. Unlike the case of COSAS described in Chapter Two, organizational routinization and professionalization undergone by the NECC failed to reinstate the organization at the center and leadership of the education movement for reconstruction and development. The transformation and death

of the NECC therefore fits the Type II organizational transformation postulated as consisting of participation in the polity, a program and policy orientation, a decline in activity and collective action and losses of leaders and activists to the new state. To these must be added failed routinization and professionalization, role ambiguity, successful accomplishment of tasks and complex relationships with clandestinely operating social movement organizations.

Chapter 6

Results and Conclusions of the Research

This study began by arguing that social movement organizations are the visible parts and building blocks of society-wide social movements, and that they create mobilizing opportunities and construct meaning for their participants, bystanders and opponents, and so advance social projects. Against this background, the study began by asking the questions: How do social movement organizations impact processes of fundamental social change such as the opening of the polity and processes of democratization? And, in turn, how are social movement organizations affected by these processes of social change?

Four educational social movement organizations in a transition society - South Africa - that is making its way from authoritarian (apartheid) rule to a fully-fledged democracy, were selected for purposes of analyzing these research questions. The four cases were selected because of their common social project: militant opposition to Apartheid Education and a common commitment to the attainment of *People's Education for People's Power*, an alternative social project to that of the more radical *Liberation before Education* which propagated an outright boycott of the schools of apartheid. This common social project sought to transform policy, power relations and programs in education by advocating the return to rather than outright boycott of educational institutions.

The types of cases selected - one high school student, one university, technikon and colleges of education student, one teacher and one social movement organization which represented broader parental and public interests in education - also allowed for an explanation of similarities and variance across organizational trajectories over time. These different interests - of high school students, higher education students, teachers and parents and the general public - which all have claims on education (and training) distinguish the education policy domain from others such as labor market and civic matters. In the cases of the latter policy domains, interests are in general divided between two sides: employers and employees, tenants and ratepayers, and local governments and property owners. The

education policy domain becomes even more complex when grievances are articulated and claims are made by social movement organizations active in early childhood education and care and adult basic education and training.

The case studies are described and analyzed separately in Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5. The key indicators of the transitions in identity of the four organizations studied are listed in Table 2.

Table 2. List of key indicators of organizational transitions

	COSAS		SASCO		SADTU		NECC	
	1980's	1990's	1980's	1990's	1980's	1990's	1980's	1990's
Number and specificity of goals	med.	high	med.	med.	med.	high	med.	high
Degree of reliance on negotiations and lobbying	low	med.	low	med.	low	high	med.	high
Degree of reliance on specific programs	low	high	low	low	low	high	med.	high
Rate of turnover of elected leaders	high	med.	high	high	med.	low	med.	low
Rate of turnover of staff	n/a	low	n/a	n/a	n/a	low	low	high
Number and experience of staff	n/a	med	n/a	n/a	n/a	high	low	high
Rate of loss of leaders to new state (political and administrative arms)	n/a	n/a	n/a	low	n/a	high	n/a	high
Vitality of org.								
• survival	high	high	high	high	high	high	high	low
• membership	high	med.	high	low	med.	high	high	low
• finances	low	med.	low	low	low	high	high	med.
• public perception	med.	med.	med.	med.	med.	med.	high	med.
Degree of reliance on contentious collective action	high	med.	high	high	high	high	high	low

• n/a means that the particular indicator is not applicable to or present in the observed organization.

The study relied on a methodological model that combined resource mobilization and social constructionist theories, because, it was argued, neither taken alone is sufficiently

able to account for complex societal transitions. By using these two analytical tools, a set of propositions, intended solely to guide and hold the study together, was developed. These were formulated in Chapter One and can be summarized as follows.

Activist, grassroots participatory and open discussion model social movement organizations undergo mainly three types of organizational transformation which themselves are induced by changes of political regime. In the Type I organizational transition, social movement organizations which successfully mobilize the expanding and new resource opportunities created by the change in political regime are likely to experience organizational routinization and professionalization. In the Type II organizational transition, social movement organizations which acted as quasi-state formations and which mobilized more diverse interests are more likely to experience a transfer of their goals, programs and demands, and even leaders and activists to the new state formation, shifting their orientation to participation in the emerging polity, decreased mobilization and a policy and program orientation. In the Type III organizational transition, social movement organizations which are unable or unwilling to mobilize the expanding and new resource opportunities created by the change in political regime are more likely to participate in even more dramatic contentious collective action are linked to the field or site of mobilization such as the campuses of universities and schools.

1. On the theoretical model

Social constructionist theories offer two essential analytical tools for understanding the evolving identity - defined in this research as goals, tactics, strategies, programs and ideology - of social movement organizations in transition societies.

First, collective action frames described as broad, national-level regimes of collective action that are generated by, and transferred through, domestic and international organizations have been shown to provide the analytical tools for analyzing and predicting the influence of exogenous social constructions. This research has shown how powerfully the collective action frame of South Africa's anti-apartheid movement influenced the emergence and trajectories of the education social movements in the study. These collective action frames moved from moments of insurrection, civil disobedience and

ungovernability (1983-85) through replacing state power with people's power (1985-86), through a move to underground and clandestine action in the face of a National State of Emergency (1986-89), and through resurgent civil disobedience (1989-1992). The research has also shown how the collective action frame of the anti-apartheid movement was, later (1992-95), transformed to one of consensus-seeking through negotiations, peace, stability, nation-building and national unity, and how this is shaping the later evolution of the education social movements in the study. Moreover, the study has illustrated how these educational social movements have become carriers and legitimators of these collective action frames, a matter which is further examined below.

Second, multi-organizational fields, described in social constructionist theories as systems of alliances and conflict, have been demonstrated to be the mechanisms for the generation, transfer and sharing of collective action frames (alliance systems) as well of opposition which drain organizational resources (conflict systems). It is the systems of alliance that acted as mechanisms for the genesis, transfer and maintenance of the collective action frames described earlier. The anti-apartheid movement, consolidated in the 1980s in the United Democratic Front, and more specifically, the education social movement component thereof, have been shown to be alliance systems that provided critical political resources, organizational solidarity and mobilizing opportunities for their participating social movement organizations.

Social constructionist theories do not always adequately account for the emergent trajectories of social movement organizations in transition societies. This research has shown resource mobilization theories as additional analytical tools to predict and account for organizational change and transformation. The advantage of incorporating resource mobilization theories in an overarching theoretical model lies in a recognition that resource mobilizing opportunities magnify organizational transformation. In this respect, the organizational characteristics of the pre-transition and transition South African state have been shown to be powerful determinants of organizational identity, in that they create resource mobilizing opportunities and influence the costs of mobilization. Apartheid, through its manifold social, political and economic manifestations, created opportunities for mobilization against itself. The States of Emergency imposed in the last period of this decaying philosophy and practice, were intended to crush the opposition social movement

organizations or, at the very least, to increase the costs of counter-state mobilization. In contrast, the opening up of the polity and the democratization of society created new resource mobilizing opportunities for the oppositional social movement organizations to advance their social projects, and to become participants in social, political and economic change. The costs of mobilization were reduced as the society now transited from authoritarian to democratic rule.

The research has also shown how social movement organizations can contest the dominating organizational characteristics and collective action frames of authoritarian states and how they can construct alternative collective action frames through collective action. In this respect, the account of the South African Democratic Teacher's Union is instructive. Its social construction of teachers as not being submissive, uncritical servants of the state and its campaign for recognition as a teachers union, as opposed to a traditional professional association, reflected its role in meaning construction for teachers and for society which posited teachers as "professional workers." On the other hand, at an organizational ecological level, the four education social movement organizations in the study were united by a collective action frame that posited people's education as an alternative education philosophy, practice and governance to the prevailing and despised Bantu/Apartheid Education. Significantly, when Bantu/Apartheid Education was formally removed with the birth of the new democracy, that common social project faded and induced a weakening of the alliance system which has far-reaching consequences.

Prevailing political and social conditions have been shown to create mobilizing opportunities, both in so far as they shape collective action frames, as well as influence the collective identity of social movement organizations as reflected in the programs of these social movement organizations. At the level of organizational ecology, the anti-apartheid movement was sharply influenced by the social, political and economic organization and manifestations of apartheid. Apartheid was both social construction and a concrete reality, and so it created mobilizing opportunities against itself.

This research has also identified internal organizational dynamics, such as transitions in leadership and membership, as critical influences on, and predictors of transitions in organizational identity. The death of one of the education social movement organizations in the study was in part the outcome of these transitions and fits the postulated

Type II organizational transition. This transition predicted a decline in mobilization and use of collective action as an organizational response to changes in the political regime. Earlier in Chapter Five it was shown that the NECC acted as a quasi-state or alternative state formation and mobilized the diverse interests of students, teachers, parents and staff at higher education institutions. Its goals, interests, programs and demands and even leaders and activists were transferred to the emergent state formation. It also shifted to participation in the emerging polity, experienced a decrease in mobilization, refocused on organizational routinization, professionalization and maintenance and shifted to a policy and program orientation. Organizational restructuring, the prominence of the unbanned African National Congress, shifting regimes of collective action, new national education forums and the rise of the new democratic state were shown to precipitate role ambiguity. Earlier policy orientations which had created policy research units and overarching education coalitions narrowed future development directions the organization could have selected. To these must be added the failure of earlier organizational routinization and professionalization - which was prompted by the need to mobilize new and expanding resources - to consistently increase organizational resources; successful accomplishment of tasks; and complex relationships with clandestinely operating social movement organizations.

The research has also shown how one set of analytical tools was more effective in providing explanations for the trajectory of social movement organizations in particular moments of the cycle of protest. In the instance of the two student movement organizations in the study, resource mobilization theories which informed the Type III organizational transition predicted more contentious collective action and goal maintenance as a result of poor linkages with new and expanding resources created by the change in political regime. This was also as the result of high leadership and membership turnover which afflicts especially student social movement organizations. The results of this research both support and contradict these predictions. In this case, the successful mobilization of new resources created by the opening up of the polity and the democratization of society showed the predicted result of organizational routinization and professionalization in the case of the Congress of South African Students but not of the South African Students Congress.

The actions taken or not taken by organizations with respect to high leadership turnover and organizational culture turned out to be decisive. As did the inability of the

South African Students Congress to mobilize new resources and members through New Social Movement-type campaigns and its decision to remain a progressive political student organization. In this instance, the transition of the Congress of South African Students fits the postulated Type I transition of organizational routinization and professionalization, whilst that of the South African Students Congress fits that of the Type III transition. Future research could explore more closely the difference in mobilization between high school and university student organizations. Differences in the private costs of higher education and high school education in relation to family (or national per capita) income and in access to higher education and high school education will most likely turn out to be powerful predictors of whether student movements are more or less likely to fit the postulated Type III organizational transition. A compelling question still remains. Why did a high school student organization rather than a higher education one so successfully mobilize resources and deal with its debilitating leadership turnover?

Social constructionist theories offer a credible explanation for why social movement organizations with high leadership and membership turnover display no difference in collective identity in parts of the cycle of protest from social movement organizations with more stable leadership and membership patterns. In this regard, institutional theories, another social constructionist theory, offer an additional useful basis for further analysis of such organizational isomorphism.

This exploratory study demonstrates the usefulness of the theoretical model proposed here, viz., a combination of social constructionist theories and resource mobilization theories. Additionally, the research method deployed, viz., the study and analysis of the emergence and evolution of social movement organizations over an extended period that overlaps with national level protest cycles, have reinforced the utility of the theoretical model developed in this study. For a shortened period of study that did not overlap with national level protest cycles could have come to different and false conclusions. For example, social constructionist theories may have been more useful than resource mobilization theories in explaining the turn of events in that part of the cycle so studied, resulting in partial explanations and incomplete knowledge. In contrast, by analyzing several endogenous organizational characteristics, such as membership and leadership characteristics, the study was able to show the utility of resource mobilization

theories. Also, failure to link the emergence of social movement organizations to national level cycles of protest could have resulted in difficulties in determining the direction and combined effects of exogenous and endogenous organizational determinants.

Let us next turn to a review of the propositions[431] within which this research was grounded. To recall, the intent was that these would guide the research rather than be rigorously tested. The propositions and the findings of this research on each of the four organizations studied are included in Table 3.

Propositions 1-4. The first four propositions reflected on organizational routinization and professionalization (Type I organizational transition) as a response of grassroots organizations to wide-scale changes in political regime. Two of these propositions are related and postulated: an expansion in the scope of organizational goals, interests and activities and an elaboration of general goals into more specific change goals, objectives and demands (Proposition 1); and organizational routinization and professionalization measured by a shift to formal and recorded meetings and congresses, management and accounting systems replacing ad hoc and clandestine operations, rented office space, employment of full-time officials and efforts to establish more stable leadership patterns (Propositions 2).

These propositions are affirmed by the organizational transitions experienced by three of the organizations in the research. COSAS expanded the scope of its goals resulting in the inclusion of new activities not previously considered such as public health, AIDS/HIV and environmental education, tourism, etc. (Proposition 1). It also elaborated general goals into more specific programs and campaigns such as its code of conduct for students and teachers and its campaign for more educational resources for those disadvantaged under apartheid (Proposition 1). The organization took action to reduce leadership turnover by changing its constitution to allow for longer terms of office for leaders, established visible offices, employed full-time staff in its national and some provincial offices, put in place an accounting system particularly as it sought to mobilize new resources and established a system of records of meetings, congresses and contracts with donors (Proposition 2).

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[431] For ease of reference the propositions are listed in the Appendices, Section 1.

Table 3. Propositions and findings.

	COSAS	SASCO	SADTU	NECC
Propositions 1-4				
• expansion and elaboration of goals (*1*)	affirmed	disconfirmed	affirmed	affirmed
• routinization (*2*)	affirmed	disconfirmed	affirmed	affirmed
• distinct interest (*3*)	affirmed	disconfirmed	affirmed	affirmed
• focused change agenda (*4*)	affirmed	disconfirmed	affirmed	affirmed
Propositions 5-7				
• incremental change goals (*5*)	affirmed	disconfirmed	affirmed	affirmed
• non-contentious collective action (*6*)	disconfirmed	disconfirmed	affirmed	affirmed
• decline in org. mobilization (*7*)	disconfirmed	disconfirmed	disconfirmed	affirmed
Propositions 8-9				
• goal, tactic maintenance (*8*)	disconfirmed	affirmed	disconfirmed	disconfirmed
• contentious collective action (*9*)	affirmed	affirmed	disconfirmed	disconfirmed

Similar actions were taken by the NECC. In the case of SADTU similar actions accompanied the political transition which facilitated increased openness and accountability to membership and the public. The organization's shift to a routinized and professionalized identity was also shaped by its membership features and the employee-employer relationship of its membership with the state. In contrast, SASCO appears to have taken insufficient action along these lines although its emergent identity now does reflect some aspects of routinization and professionalization. This question is further elaborated below.

Propositions 3 and 4 reflect on the survivability of social movement organizations and predicted that those with more distinct interest and specific and focused agenda in civil society were more likely to survive a change in political regime. Both propositions are affirmed by the study which shows in the early phase of the change in political regime (1990-1995) three social movement organizations - those with more distinct interests and specific and focused agenda - surviving. In contrast, the NECC, which organized a more diverse set of interests and had a more ambitious and expansive agenda in civil society, experienced organizational decay. Several environmental and internal organizational factors highlighted by the change in political regime precipitated the decline of the organization including the redundancy of its historic identity as a quasi- and alternative state formation. Having played an essential role in the demise of the old political regime, the organization experienced role ambiguity as its goals, interests, programs, demands and leaders transferred to the new state. Interestingly SASCO may well find itself in a similar dilemma as the NECC. Even within the context of a change in political regime, the organization continues to recreate its identity as a political student organization rather than a student organization that focuses on the mobilization of students around distinct student interests and specific and focused agenda.

These four findings of my research make an important contribution to understanding how social movement organizations respond to success. Earlier work of Michels [1962] raised concerns about the oligarchical tendencies of modern democracies. Michels argued that the principal cause of oligarchy in democratic parties is to be found in the technical indispensability of leadership:

> "At the outset, leaders arise SPONTANEOUSLY; their functions are ACCESSORY and GRATUITOUS. Soon, however, they become PROFESSIONAL leaders, and in this second stage of development they are STABLE and IRREMOVABLE. [capitals in original text] [Michels, 1962:364]

Later, Piven and Cloward [1977, 1979] argued that organizational formalization or routinization results in organizations abandoning their oppositional politics [1977:xi]. They argued that "it is not possible to compel concessions from elites that can be used as resources to sustain oppositional organizations over time," [1977:xi] for

> "...all too often, when workers erupted in strikes, organizers collected due cards; when tenants refused to pay rent and stood off marshals, organizers formed building committees; when people were burning and looting, organizers used that 'moment of madness' to draft constitutions," [1977:xii] and
>
> "When the tumult is over, these organizations usually fade, no longer useful to those who provided the resources necessary to their survival. Or the organization persists by becoming increasingly subservient to those on whom it depends." [1977:xii]

This research has shown four dimensions of organizational response to success, adding to the specifications of success offered by Gamson [1990:28-37]. First, COSAS, SADTU and to a certain extent the NECC, all embarked on efforts to routinize and professionalize their organizations. Second, they expanded and elaborated their social change goals. Third, they shifted their identities to the distinct interests of potential membership while also shifting to a focused change agenda. Fourth, through transfers of their social change goals and leadership, they are participating in the creation of a new state identity. These actions will enable COSAS and SADTU to continue to mobilize potential membership and public support for their change agenda. There is no evidence to support the predictions of Michels and Piven and Cloward of oligarchical organizational tendencies, abandonment of a critical role of the emergent state or of co-optation into an elite structure. On the contrary, both organizations are participating in the construction of a new state identity (SADTU) and the transformation of society in partnership with the state (COSAS and SADTU). Their focus is critical of the nature and pace of the emergent state's change agenda but their objectives were tied up with the creation of the new state. The objective of contentious collective action was social change. Contentious collective action was not an end in itself.

Propositions 5-7. Propositions 5, 6 and 7 are related and reflected on the postulated Type II organizational transition. These propositions postulated participation in the polity and the achievement of incremental change (Proposition 5), use of non-contentious and non-disruptive collective action (Proposition 6) and declines in organizational mobilization and organizational death (Proposition 7) as responses to a change in political regime. This study has found that this type of organizational transition is the likely response of those social movement organizations which organize more diverse interests and have more

ambitious and expansive change agenda in civil society. The case of the NECC is instructive. The organization experienced heightened role ambiguity when its social project and identity were incorporated into that of the new state, experienced a decline in mobilization, engaged in non-contentious collective action and experienced organizational death.

The identity of SADTU has also become more enmeshed rather than separate from that of the new state and the organization has shifted to non-contentious collective action. This is in part an organizational response to a consolidating political culture which favors a return to effective learning and teaching rather than a continuation of militant collective action in the school sector. These features of the political culture distinguishes mobilization in the education sector from any other. While mobilization against apartheid education enjoyed the widespread support of the Black population, that support has now waned. The country is beginning to affirm an international culture which prefaces the right to education for all and of non-interruption and non-contention in the education sector. SADTU's mobilization of a distinct interest and its focus on a more specific change agenda in civil society separates its organizational trajectory from that of the NECC, thus reducing the potential for role ambiguity. The organization has experienced a significant transfer of leaders to the new state which will complicate its transition into the twenty-first century.

In contrast, the identities of both COSAS and SASCO appear to undergo a radicalization with the change in political regime. This may lead us to disconfirm propositions 5-7. The causes for this difference with SADTU and the NECC may well lie in their organizational identity. They mobilize high school and university, technikon and colleges of education students, have less stable leadership patterns, still focus more on the political dynamics of the regime change rather than on specific change agenda in civil society, and their leaderships may feel that change is coming too slowly. The shift to an open polity which protects the right to demonstrate may provide a further explanation. I return to this matter once more below.

Propositions 8-9. Propositions 8 and 9 are related and reflected on the postulated Type III organizational response to changes in political regime. These propositions held for social movement organizations whose identities were dominated by large turnovers in leadership and membership patterns. These propositions predicted that these special case

social movement organizations would be less successful in gaining access to changing and expanding resources created by the change in political regime. In turn, these social movement organizations would experience no routinization and professionalization, goal and tactic maintenance (Proposition 8) and a continuation of contentious collective actions pursued under apartheid (Proposition 9). Both propositions are disconfirmed by the organizational trajectories of SADTU and the NECC who had established more stable leadership and membership patterns. Additionally, SADTU successfully expanded and elaborated its goals, organized around the distinct interests and focused change agenda of teachers and mobilized new political resources inside the emergent state.

The focus here is on the trajectories of COSAS and SASCO, whose identities were in their founding phases dominated by large turnovers in leadership and membership patterns. Significantly, COSAS took action during the change in political regime to mobilize new resources created by that transition. As stated earlier, the organization reduced leadership turnover, established visible offices, employed full-time staff, put in place an accounting system and established a system of records of meetings, congresses and contracts with donors. The organization expanded the scope of its goals and elaborated general goals into more specific programs and campaigns. All of these actions enabled the organization to successfully mobilize new resources. The actions were precipitated by the organization's recognition of the availability of these new resources (and of their linkage to organizational routinization), the opening of the polity and resultant increased desire for transparency and accountability. The organization's desire to play an active part in the transformation of education rather than only engage contentious collective action in the pursuit of its social change goals enabled it to support the emergent state but also to be critical of its progress on its education change agenda. The experience of COSAS disconfirms the proposition that organizations like it would fail to mobilize new and expanding resources. This is because the organization was successful in establishing organizational routines. This in turn raised its ability to mobilize new resources. It remains to be seen whether, during the rest of this decade, the organization can sustain organizational routinization as new leaderships take office.

In contrast, the experience of SASCO appears to confirm propositions 8 and 9. However, the organization did not take effective remedial action to counter high turnover in

leadership and membership patterns as COSAS. Routinization and professionalization received less attention when compared with COSAS. The organization was also unable to successfully and actively mobilize the new and expanding resources. It is evident from the study that the ability to mobilize resources is unlikely to offer an adequate explanation for successful or failed organizational routinization and professionalization or for a continuation in contentious collective action by social movement organizations with high leadership and membership turnover patterns. While SASCO may appear poised to play a role more critical of the emergent state than COSAS, SADTU or the NECC, its inability to expand and elaborate its goals (Proposition 1), to routinize (Proposition 2), to shift to a more distinct interest (Proposition 3) and focused change agenda for students of higher education (Proposition 4) and to pursue incremental change goals (Proposition 5) through non-contentious collective action (Proposition 6) will impair its ability to mobilize sufficient student membership and public support for its social project. Significantly it was student leaders who supported the view that high leadership turnovers have dominated organizational trajectories for the worse since campaigns and programs are not fully implemented or understood by new leaderships who are not knowledgeable in organizational networks, discipline and programs.

It would be foolish to reject outright propositions 8 and 9. Based on this research, these propositions can be reformulated to read: *social movement organizations which experience high turnovers in leadership and membership patterns are more likely to experience program implementation failure.* Arising herefrom a second proposition can be formulated to read: *social movement organizations which experience program implementation failure are less likely to be able to successfully mobilize new and expanding resources.* On the basis of this research, the organizational adaptation of SASCO to the changing political regime is found to have been the least successful.

2. Policy implications

A simple truth emerges from the use of the analytical tools "collective action frames" and "multi-organizational fields." *Collective action frames are actively created within and by multi-organizational fields.* This requires that multi-organizational fields,

and more specifically, alliance systems themselves be actively created and nurtured. For they are not durable. Thus, while in the South African transition, historically evolved alliance systems still endure, these may, in time, as national level organizational determinants evolve, still weaken and affect the pursuit of the common social project. This simple truth suggests that, especially in transition societies, maintaining the pursuit of social movement wide social projects requires the *active generation and maintenance of alliance systems*. The absence of this requirement, or a reliance solely on the autonomous durability of historically evolved alliance systems may result in the fragmentation of social movement-wide social projects. How successful social movements and their carriers, social movement organizations, are in taking forward their social projects in transitional societies will be dependent on the ongoing evolution of alliance systems. Social movements and social movement organizations should thus give careful attention, in their strategic planning not only to the expansion of alliance systems, but also to their maintenance. The same care and attention also need to be directed at organizational conflict systems, for these drain organizational resources and restrict mobilizing opportunities. The orchestrated violence that accompanied the South African transition to democracy is a specific instance that compels social movement organizations to carefully assess, and to develop appropriate organizational responses to such events that emanate from, and are transmitted, through their conflict systems.

On the other hand, another simple point can be made. *Collective action frames are social constructions that are actively generated, transmitted and legitimated.* It is their durability that accounts, in a significant but underrated manner, for successful or failed transitions. To put it simply, transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule do not occur by accident or default. Moreover, the consolidation of successful transitions will depend, again to a significant extent, on the viability of collective action frames, and the durability of their carriers, viz., alliance systems. For such society-wide collective action frames are actively created, transmitted and legitimated through multi-organizational fields, and more particularly through alliance systems.

There are also important implications for education policy makers. The research has demonstrated how the social movement organizations studied have legitimated the international script of the right to universal, free, compulsory and quality schooling for all.

Significantly, these social movement organizations have remained silent on a related international script on the education of girls and young women. Through their social change goals the social movement organizations have also inserted a new right of open access to and high success rates within higher education. Additional social change goals inserted into the public policy domain related to: democratic and accountable institutional governance; a significant role for students, parents and teachers in institutional governance to counter-balance the interests of education bureaucracies; cooperative learning; and an integration of education and training coupled with a shift from rote to competency-based learning. Balancing these claims with those of social movement organizations in the early childhood education and care and adult basic education and training will be a significant challenge for policy makers. More so at a time when the oppositional alliance system studied - which during its oppositional mode had integrated and balanced these interests - is in decline and its alliance components each independently stake their claims.

Another matter with policy implications arises from this study. *Social movement organizations do not, as a matter of course, become pliant or submissive, undergo transformation of their identities and abandon the pursuit of their social projects.* As illustrated in this study, social movement organizations do undergo identity transformation, such as when militant tactics are replaced by moderate ones, and mass-based campaigns by individual development projects. Most importantly, those identity transformations have been shown to be induced by the opening up of the polity and the democratization of society. These changes in political regime are the successful outcomes of decades of struggle by the same social movement organizations. How the collective identity of social movement organizations will be transformed in this transition will vary, as this study has shown. Critically, the transition to an open polity and democracy in South Africa opens up new opportunities for social movement organizations to recast themselves - as they have been recasted by that transition - for full participation together and not against the emergent democratic state in the political, social and economic reconstruction of the society. For social movement organizations have contributed in important ways to the ending of the old and the making of the new political regime. It is in this manner that social movement organizations impact the emergent state and polity which in turn has impacted their own goals, tactics, culture, membership, in short, their collective identity.

Collective action frames generated within, and transmitted through, alliance systems are vital determinants of organizational identity, as are international support systems, and endogenous organizational characteristics. These all influence and determine resource mobilizing opportunities. Thus, while social movement organizations may still, subjectively, elect particular organizational pathways for the pursuit of social projects, these may be negated by emergent collective action frames, international support systems and endogenous organizational characteristics. The trajectory of the National Education Coordinating Committee, a vital coordinating forum of education social movement organizations that had consolidated an alliance system, but which ended in organizational death, bears testimony to this proposition. The research similarly recorded the death of another vital alliance structure, the United Democratic Front. Thus, in transition societies, impressive and necessary social projects may flounder, as exogenous and endogenous variables implicate a weakening, and even death of their carriers. This policy implication is particularly significant when considering the trajectories of coordinating forums that consolidate loose alliance systems into tight social movement organizational linkages. Social movements, and the advancement of social projects, are thus strongly influenced by the collapse or death of critical consolidating forums of alliance systems, especially when these occur on the eve of transitions from authoritarian rule. A testable proposition, for further research, may well pursue this line by examining the effects on the durability of social transitions, collective active frames, alliance systems and social projects of the sustenance or death of critical consolidating forums of alliance systems.

But the research has also illustrated how social movement organizations in transition societies have to supervise the movement of their key activists to the emergent state. Coupled with this, the establishment of linkages between the emergent state and social movement organizations now consumes considerable time and effort, thus delaying access of social movement organizations to vital new resources. In the event, social movement organizations are weakened as the emergent state strengthens, and gains domination over society. On this score, the social transition studied here provides important pointers as to how emergent states replace and eventually dominate social movements, social movement organizations and civil society. For, with the unchecked movement of activists to the emergent state, the pursuit of social projects is moved from social

movements and their organizational components to the emergent state, leaving behind poorly resourced social movement organizations with inexperienced and yet-to-be-legitimated leaders traveling uncharted waters.

There are also somewhat surprising policy outcomes and implications here. Instead of (as might have been predicted) oppositional social movements and social movement organizations taking a leading role in defining policy domains, in determining the substantive matters that should occupy all those concerned with societal change, and determining the pace of change, the emergent state, through its unevenly penetrated bureaucracy - for it is not an entirely new bureaucracy - actually assumes these roles, functions and identities, thus provoking and increasing role ambiguity for formerly oppositional social movement organizations. This outcome may not always result in the successful advancement and implementation of social projects. For many social projects may flounder as the state bureaucracy plods along as a result of its uneven penetration and capture by the new (activist) bureaucrats.

There are also interesting implications for further analysis of the "iron-triangle" of public policy domains, a long-standing pluralist theory on the public policy process. This theory has argued that it is political parties, state bureaucracies and interest groups that among themselves shape the public policy agenda and dominate public policy-making. While there are obvious implications for society-wide participation in the determination of public policy, as the members of this iron-triangle advocate their social projects and lobby each other, pluralists have argued that this process provides sufficient checks and balances to prevent one or the other of the members from dominating the public policy process. Clearly, in the societal transition studied here, at least at this moment in its history, there is no iron-triangle that is visible, and the emergent state, unevenly penetrated by the new bureaucrats, leads and dominates much of the public policy process. These are troubling conclusions for other earlier cases of state building in societies in deep transition such as Cuba, Mexico, Zimbabwe, the former USSR and former Yugoslavia have ended up in the construction of a corporatist state and the bureaucratization of the organizations of civil society. South Africans still have a small window of opportunity through which to construct an activist, democratizing state and a flourishing, dynamic civil society, for the successful creation of an open polity and deepened democracy depends upon the vitality of

both. Organizational routinization and professionalization - the Type I organizational transformation - combined with declines in mobilization and in the use of contentious collective action - the Type II organizational transformation - do carry benefits for grassroots organizations and transitions to democracy. These do not have to conclude in oligarchy, corporatism , bureaucratization or the collapse of social projects.

Appendices

1. Propositions

- *Proposition 1: SMOs which had maintained an activist, grassroots participatory, open discussion model and which had sought radical change will respond to changes in their environment induced by the opening up of the polity and the democratization of society by (a) expanding the scope of their goals, interests and activities by including a new set of issues that were not previously considered, and (b) elaborating general goals into more specific change goals, objectives and demands.*

- *Proposition 2: SMOs which in their emergent phase had adhered to an activist, grassroots, participatory, open discussion model and which had sought radical change, will respond to the opening of the polity and the democratization of society by undergoing processes of routinization and professionalization.*

- *Proposition 3: SMOs which represent a distinct interest rather than diverse interests in civil society are more likely to endure changes in their environment induced by an opening of the polity and the democratization of society.*

- *Proposition 4: SMOs with a more specific and focused agenda rather than a more ambitious and expansive agenda in civil society are more likely to endure changes in their environment*

- *Proposition 5: SMOs which in their emergent phase had adhered to an activist, grassroots participatory, open discussion model and which had sought radical change will change their goals to participation in the polity and the achievement of incremental rather than radical change in response to changes in their environment induced by an opening of the polity and the democratization of society.*

- *Proposition 6: SMOs which in their emergent phase had engaged in contentious tactics and practices that were oppositional and mass-based will change their tactics and practices to non-disruptive and non-contentious policy and program development in response to changes in their environment induced by an opening of the polity and the democratization of society.*

- *Proposition 7: SMOs will experience a decline in mobilization in response to changes in their environment induced by an opening up of the polity and the democratization of society*

- *Proposition 8: SMOs with transient rather than stable leadership and membership patterns will be less successful in gaining access to changing and expanding resources, which in turn produces less change in SMO goals, tactics and practices.*

- *Proposition 9: SMOs with transient rather than stable leadership and membership patterns will be less successful in gaining access to changing and expanding resources.*

2. Study questions and sources of data

This appendix lists the set of case-study questions which guided the process of obtaining the data necessary for completing this research.

1. Goals

An organization's domain consists of the specific goals it wishes to achieve and the activities it undertakes to implement its goals. The field of each social movement organizations (SMO) was assessed from its formal goals and its behavior which relates to the activities it undertakes to achieve to its formal goals. Formal goals are the stated intentions of the SMO's leaders and founders. These include policies and statements as itemized in the SMO's formal documents, resolutions outlining its missions in minutes of the meetings of its executive committees and in statements of SMO officials.

Questions guiding the research:

1.1 What were the principal motivating factors for establishing the organization?

1.2 What were the organization's stated goals at its inception?

1.3 Why were these goals chosen? What other goals were considered and rejected?

1.4 What are the organization's goals today?

1.5 How often have these been reviewed? When? Why? Who participated in the review?

1.6 How do you make the goals of your organization known to the community?

1.7 How does your organization communicate with its members?

Sources of data:

Data were collected from policy documents, goal statements, project proposals, conference documents, minutes of key policy meetings, memos, newsletters, fliers, speeches, press releases; interviews with founders, organization administrative and program staff and officials; participant observation, particularly to observe the evolution of current goals.

As pointed out earlier, the reliance on the definition of SMO goals solely through document analysis introduces a source of error in the reliability of the data. Thus assessing goals from both written and oral statements provide an opportunity for convergence of evidence in support of a particular goal at various point in time.

Goals are described in terms of meeting identified education needs of the community, bringing about social change, or organizational maintenance. Meeting

identified educational needs reflect the intentions of the SMO to respond to community-defined or professionally-defined educational problems such as high-pupil teacher ratios, shortage of classrooms, low Black matriculation rates, low success rate of black students in higher education, etc. These also reflect concern for a particular sub-sector (e.g. schooling, higher education, adult education) and population (e.g. Black).

Social change goals refer to the intentions of the SMO to bring about changes in society, institutions or people. These goals reflect the participants' intention to alleviate inequities in the availability of educational services in the community, or to achieve change in institutions, individuals, or in society at large. Social goals may include the SMO's participation in social and political issues of broad concern to the community, including social advocacy, mass meetings, civil disobedience, boycotts and strikes, negotiations, or the participants' intentions to provide alternative educational services.

Organizational maintenance refers to the SMO's intentions to sustain or expand its presence in the community. These also refer to membership recruitment and maintenance.

2. Tactics and practices

Social movement organizations engage in various activities to achieve their stated goals, including political lobbying, coalition formation, marches, rallies, civil disobedience, boycotts and violence.

Questions guiding the research:

2.1 What types of campaigns/programs/services did the organization offer when it was established? How has this changed over time?

2.2 What target population did the organization serve when it was established? How has this changed over time?

2.3 In its earlier years, to what extent did the organization participate in or support the following political protest activities?

- *peaceful*: signing of petitions; displaying posters; taking out paid advertisements in newspapers; staging marches, rallies, demonstrations; calling or supporting stayaways
- *more forceful*: occupying buildings, schools, offices; blocking traffic; calling or supporting boycotts [rent, consumer, school, class, exam]
- *violent*: violence against people; on property and buildings

2.4 How has this changed over time, since the SOE? Since Feb, 1990? Since April, 1994? Why?

2.5 What other activities does the organization engage in to achieve its goals?

2.6 What activities did the organization engage in to strengthen its organization? (fund-raising, staffing practices, educational provision, membership recruitment drives, etc.)

Sources of data:

Data were collected from interviews with founders, administrative staff, executive committee members, officials; minutes of executive committee meetings, annual reports, media accounts; and, participant and direct observation.

3. Sources of organizational change

Organizational identity is affected by changes in its environment but also in endogenous factors such as leadership and membership turnover.

Questions guiding the research:

Community, organizational leaders and members

3.1 How has support for the organization from the community and membership changed over time, since Feb, 1990? Since April, 1994? Why?

3.2 How have the education and social needs of the community and membership changed over time? Since the SOE? Since Feb, 1990? Since April, 1994? How have these affected the development and implementation of organizational goals? Campaigns and programs? Political protest? Why?

3.3 What is the average term of office of organizational leaders? How have these affected the development and implementation of organizational goals? Campaigns and programs? Political protest? Why?

3.4 What leadership crisis has the organization experienced? Describe the events leading up to the crisis. How was the crisis resolved?

3.5 What is the average term of organizational members? How have these affected the development and implementation of organizational goals? Campaigns and programs? Political protest? Why?

Executive committee and staffing changes

3.6 What rules were in place governing the composition of the executive committee at the time of the organization's founding?

3.7 Who sat on the original executive committee at its founding? What sectors of the community did they represent?

3.8 How have the rules governing membership of the executive committee changed over time? Why?

3.9 What effect has these changes had on the development and implementation of organizational goals? Campaigns and programs? Political protest? Why?

3.10 At the time of its origin, and during its early days, who was responsible for implementation of organizational goals? How did they come to be organization personnel?

3.11 Over time, how has the composition of the staff changed? What proportion of the staff are professionals? What proportion are activists? What impact has these changes has on the development and implementation of organizational goals? Campaigns and programs? Political protest? Why?

3.12 What staffing crisis has the organization experienced? Describe the events leading up to the crisis. How was the crisis resolved? How have these affected the development and implementation of organizational goals? Campaigns and programs? Political protest?

Resource dependency, material and political

3.13 At different points in time, what proportion of the organization's resources came from the following sources:

- foreign governments and/or their development agencies:
- international development NGOs:
- foreign corporations and foundations:
- domestic corporations and foundations:
- membership fees and donations:
- solicited donations from the community:
- in-kind contributions:

3.14 How have these changed over time? Why?

3.15 How has this affected the development and implementation of organizational goals? Programs and campaigns? Political protest? Why?

3.16 What funding crisis has the organization experienced? Describe the events leading up to the crisis. How was the crisis resolved? How did this affect the development and implementation of organizational goals? Campaigns and programs? Political protest?

3.17Which other organizations does the organization consider as important allies and collaborators? Why? At different points in time, what support for the organization's goals, programs, campaigns and political protest came from these allies and collaborators? Why?

3.18 How has this affected the development and implementation of organizational goals? Campaigns and programs? Political protest? Why?

3.19 What political crisis has the organization experienced? Describe the events leading up to the crisis. How was the crisis resolved? How has this affected the development and implementation of organizational goals? Campaigns and programs? Political protest?

Sources of data:

Important crises points in the organization's development were identified by interviewing current and past officials, membership and people in the community who had knowledge or were directly involved in these events, and representatives of institutions, SMOs that were sources of pressure to the organization. External events were also evaluated by reviewing minutes of meetings of the executive committee, media accounts, and annual reports. Data were collected from staff resumes, interviews with organization founders, executive committee members, and by consulting rules for membership on the executive committee and personnel policies. Data were collected from organization financial reports, annual reports, grant proposals, organization staff and the executive committee. Interviews were also conducted with material and political resource providers.

4. Multi-organizational fields

Multi-organizational fields are systems of alliances and conflict and mechanisms for the generation, transfer and sharing of collective action frames. Systems of alliances provide resources and political solidarity, but systems of conflict drain resources.

Questions guiding the research:

4.1 What formal agreements exist between the organization and the following organizations, and why:

- political organizations:
- community organizations (education organizations, civic associations, trade union organizations, religious organizations, cultural organizations):
- provincial and national government (education ministries):
- provincial and national legislatures:

4.2 How have these changed over time? Why?

4.3 How have these changes affected organizational the development and implementation of organizational goals? Campaigns and programs? Political protest? Why?

4.4 What informal relationships does the organization have with other organizations?

4.5 What is the nature of these relationships? How did they come about? What obligations, if any, does the organization have to these organizations? What impact have these relationships had on the organization? How have these changed over time?

4.6 What organizations have representatives on the executive committee of the organization? How important is their participation? How often do they attend meetings? What roles do they play? How have these changed over time?

4.7 What other organization is present in the community which provide similar roles and services? What agreements exist between the organization and these organizations?

4.8 Is the organization a member of a coalition of SMOs? What is its name? How did it come about? What role does the organization have in the coalition? What other coalitions does the organization participate in? What rules, contracts or agreements govern organization activities as a result of membership in the coalition?

Sources of data:

Data were collected from the executive committee; written affiliations and agreements between the organization and other organizations; executive committee minutes; interviews with founders, relevant organization staff and executive committee members; affiliate organizations, and community coalitions.

5. Political-culture/Ideology

Social movement organizations advance social projects and are involved in the construction of meaning for members, supporters and bystanders. Meaning construction occurs within the context of prevailing and dominant meanings and ideologies, and may contest or affirm these meanings and ideologies.

Questions guiding the research:

5.1 At the time of the organization's founding, what was its underlying philosophy? How are these reflected in the organization's tactics? And practices?

5.2 How has this philosophy changed over time? And campaigns and programs? Political protest?

5.3 What are the most important factors that have contributed to this change?

Sources of data:

Data were collected from interviews with organization founders, staff, executive committee members; and, from early and current organization documents, policy statements, and minutes of relevant executive committee meetings.

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